



## Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0266-2005-MA-01

**Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)  
SLE66CX322P/m1484b14 and m1484f18, with  
RSA 2048 V1.30 and specific IC Dedicated  
Software**

from  
Infineon Technologies AG



Common Criteria Arrangement

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements*, version 1.0, February 2004 and the developers Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0266-2005.

The change to the certified product or its documentation is at the level of an editorial change in documentation, a change that has no effect on assurance. The product did not change. The identification of the change is indicated by the additional document *ETR-lite for Composition* compared to the certified product and its documentation.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0266-2005 is maintained for this version of the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0266-2005.

Bonn, 07 June 2005



## Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified TOE [3], the Security Target [4] and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX322P/m1484b14 and m1484f18, with RSA 2048 V1.30 and specific IC Dedicated Software, Infineon Technologies AG, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes the changes made to the certified TOE, the evidence updated as a result of the changes and the security impact of the changes.

The product was not changed, but the document ETR-lite for Composition [6] according to the CC supporting document *ETR-lite – for Composition and ETR-lite – for Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation: Recommended best practice* [5, AIS 36] was generated by the ITSEF in addition. The change is not significant from the standpoint of security as the content of the new ETR-lite document is a subset of the full ETR documentation of the certified TOE.

The ETR-lite is intended to provide the results of the platform evaluation for the TOE in a way that meets the requirements for a composite evaluation as defined in AIS 36 [5].

## Recommendation

For evaluations of products or systems including the TOE as a part or using the TOE as a platform (for example smart card operating systems or complete smart cards), the ETR-lite for composition [6] is of importance and shall be given to the succeeding evaluation according to AIS 36.

## Conclusion

The change to the certified product or its documentation is at the level of an editorial change in documentation, a change that has no effect on assurance. Examination of the evidence indicates that the change required is limited to the identification of the additional ETR-lite document provided and thus related to the TOE. The Security Target [4] is still valid. Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, BSI agrees that the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [3] is maintained for this version of the product. This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

## References

- [1] Common Criteria document CCIMB-2004-02-009 “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 1.0, February 2004
- [2] Impact Analysis Report for BSI-DSZ-CC-0266 dated 19. May 2005

- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0266-2005 for Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX322P/m1484b14 and m1484f18, with RSA 2048 V1.30 and specific IC Dedicated Software from Infineon Technologies AG, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 22. April 2005
- [4] Infineon Technologies AG, Security and Chipcard ICs, Security Target, SLE66CX322P/m1484b14, SLE66CX322P/m1484f18 both with RSA2048 V1.30, 20. December 2004, Version 1.4
- [5] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS), Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Bonn, as relevant for the TOE, specifically  
AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1, July 2002 and  
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation, Version 1.2 March 2002
- [6] ETR-lite for Composition for SLE66CX322P / m1484b14, SLE66CX322P / m1484f18 both with RSA2048 V1.30, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit der TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, BSI-DSZ-CC-0266, Version 4, 24. May 2005 (confidential document)