



Bundesamt  
für Sicherheit in der  
Informationstechnik

## Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

**BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007-MA-01**

**NXP Secure Smart Card Controller  
P5CD012V0B with specific IC Dedicated  
Software**

from

**NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH  
Business Line Identification**



Common Criteria Arrangement  
for components up to EAL4

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements*, version 1.0, February 2004 and the developers Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007.

The change to the certified product is at the level of generation of specific new TOE configurations before TOE delivery. A new version of the data sheets is considered. The changes have no effect on assurance. The identification of the new configurations of the product is indicated by the product name P5CD012V0B.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007 is maintained for this version of the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007.

Bonn, 28<sup>th</sup> September 2007



## Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified TOE [3], the Security Target Lite [4], Security Target [5] and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the product, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes the changes made to the certified TOE, the evidence updated as a result of the changes and the security impact of the changes.

The new configuration P5CD012V0B is configured at the end of the production process and can be accepted under the scope of the certification because the configuration option for memories was already evaluated within the P5CD040V0B, P5CC040V0B, P5CD020V0B and P5CC021V0B certification BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007, a TOE having the same hardware platform indicated by the nameplate T036B. In addition to the evaluated P5CD040V0B also a P5CD012V0B with the only difference that the available EEPROM size is 12kByte instead of 40kByte. The ISO14443A contact-less interface and the S<sup>2</sup>C interface are enabled and the ISO7816 contact interface is enabled.

For the identification of a specific NXP P5CD012V0B chip, the Device Coding Bytes stored in the EEPROM can be used: The value 20 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip configuration P5CD012V0B. As the TOE hardware did not change, it is indicated by the chip identifier T036B (see [3]). An updated configuration list [6] was provided.

## Conclusion

The change to the TOE is at the level of minor document changes or taking over information from other evaluated documents and generating new products with differing configurations settings out of already evaluated parts. The changes have no effect on assurance or the information taken over was already evaluated. Examination of the evidence indicates that the changes required are limited to the identification of configuration information. The Security Target [5] is still valid for the changed TOE. Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, BSI agrees that the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [3] is maintained for this version of the product. This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

## References

- [1] Common Criteria document CCIMB-2004-02-009 "Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements", version 1.0, February 2004

- [2] Impact Analysis Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0404, Revision 1.0, 10. September 2007, Evaluation of the NXP P5CD012V0B Secure Smart Card Controller (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007 for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD040V0B, P5CC040V0B, P5CD020V0B and P5CC021V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 5 July 2007
- [4] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0404, Version 1.0, 21 March 2007, Evaluation of the NXP P5CD040/P5CC040/P5CD020/ P5CC021 V0B Secure Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH (sanitised public document)
- [5] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0404, Version 1.2, 7. March 2007, Evaluation of the NXP P5CD040/P5CC040/P5CD020/ P5CC021 V0B Secure Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH (Confidential Document)
- [6] Configuration List, BSI-DSZ-CC-0404/0410/0411, Version 1.2, 10<sup>th</sup> September 2007, Evaluation of the NXP P5Cx012/02x/040/073/080/144 family of Secure Smart Card Controllers NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification (confidential document)