

# Certification Report

**BSI-DSZ-CC-0898-2014**

for

**PWPW SmartApp-ID 3.1 (IFX)**

from

**Polska Wytwórnia Papierów Wartościowych S.A.**

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# Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom



Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

## BSI-DSZ-CC-0898-2014

Electronic ID documents: IC with Applications

### PWPW SmartApp-ID 3.1 (IFX)

from	Polska Wytwórnia Papierów Wartościowych S.A.
PP Conformance:	Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE_PP), Version 1.0, 2 November 2011, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011, Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02
Functionality:	PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:	Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2, ALC_DVS.2, and AVA_VAN.5



Common Criteria  
Recognition  
Arrangement  
for components up to  
EAL 4



The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 27 August 2014

For the Federal Office for Information Security

Bernd Kowalski  
Head of Department

L.S.



SOGIS Recognition  
Agreement

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## Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSI<sup>1</sup> Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

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<sup>1</sup> Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSI<sup>1</sup>) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

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## A Certification

### 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- BSIG<sup>2</sup>
- BSI Certification Ordinance<sup>3</sup>
- BSI Schedule of Costs<sup>4</sup>
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN 45011 standard
- BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1<sup>5</sup> [1]
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]

### 2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

#### 2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical domains only.

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined. It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

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<sup>2</sup> Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

<sup>3</sup> Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

<sup>4</sup> Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

<sup>5</sup> Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730

As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found at <https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung>.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

## 2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC.

As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

This evaluation contains the components ALC\_DVS.2, ATE\_DPT.2 and AVA\_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.

## 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product PWPW SmartApp-ID 3.1 (IFX) has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.

The evaluation of the product PWPW SmartApp-ID 3.1 (IFX) was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 21 August 2014. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)<sup>6</sup> recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Polska Wytwórnia Papierów Wartościowych S.A..

The product was developed by: Polska Wytwórnia Papierów Wartościowych S.A..

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

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<sup>6</sup> Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

## 4 Validity of the Certification Result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

## 5 Publication

The product PWPW SmartApp-ID 3.1 (IFX) has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: <https://www.bsi.bund.de> and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer<sup>7</sup> of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

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<sup>7</sup> Polska Wytwórnia Papierów Wartościowych S.A.  
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Poland

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## **B Certification Results**

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

# 1 Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is The PWPW SmartApp-ID 3.1 (IFX), an electronic travel document representing a contactless smart card programmed according to ICAO Technical Report "Supplemental Access Control" [9] (which means amongst others according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) defined in [10]) and additionally providing the Extended Access Control according to [10] and [11], respectively. The communication between terminal and chip shall be protected by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) according to [7].

The PWPW SmartApp-ID 3.1 (IFX) comprises of:

- the platforms operating system jTOP INF#46, offered as IFX SLJ52GLA080AL, IFX SLJ52GLA128AL and IFX SLJ52GLA150AL, certified according to the Common Criteria for Evaluation Assurance Level 5+ (ANSSI-CC-2013/42),
- the platforms chip and crypto library SLE78CLX1600PM-m7820-A11, certified according for Evaluation Assurance Level 5+ (BSI-DSZ-CC-0829-2012),
- the e-passport application,
- the guidance documentation.

The TOE supports the following security protocols/mechanisms specific for travel documents:

- Password Authenticated Connections Establishment (PACE) according to [7],
- Extended Access Control (EAC) i.e.: Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication,
- Passive Authentication.

The security functionality of the TOE will be externally available to the user by APDU commands according to the access conditions specified by the appropriate policies considering the life cycle state, user role and security state.

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profiles Electronic Passport using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (ePass\_PACE PP), Version 1.0, 2 November 2011, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011 [7], and Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application“, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02, Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012 [8].

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ATE\_DPT.2, ALC\_DVS.2, and AVA\_VAN.5.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionality:

No.	TOE Security Functionality
1	SF.Access

No.	TOE Security Functionality
2	SF.Random
3	SF.SymmetricAuthentication
4	SF.Trust
5	SF.TerminalAuthentication
6	SF.Protection
7	SF.Configuration

Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.

This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.

The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

## 2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

### **PWPW SmartApp-ID 3.1 (IFX)**

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
1	HW/SW	<p>TOE consists of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>the platforms operating system jTOP INF#46, offered as IFX SLJ52GLA080AL, IFX SLJ52GLA128AL and IFX SLJ52GLA150AL,</li> <li>the platforms chip and crypto library SLE78CLX1600P M-m7820-A11,</li> <li>the e-passport application.</li> </ul>	PWPW SmartApp-ID 3.1 (IFX)	The TOE is delivered in protected parcels s by the IC manufacturer (Infineon) or by the Inlay manufacturer (Smartrac) and consists of the integrated circuit (in the form of module or IC inlays) with the embedded operating system jTOP and PWPW SmartApp-ID3.1 (IFX) applet
2	DOC	PWPW SmartApp-ID 3.1 (IFX) Operational user guidance – SAC + EAC [14]	Version 3.1.10.0, Date 2014-04-14	Encrypted per Software and Mail, delivered by PWPW
3	DOC	PWPW SmartApp-ID 3.1 (IFX) Preparative procedures [13]	Version 3.1.14.0, Date 2014-04-14	Encrypted per Software and Mail, delivered by PWPW
4	Keys	<p>Personalization Agent Key: this key allows to configure/personalize the card/applet.</p> <p>Secure Messaging Keys: this key is used to establish secure communication (send APDU commands) with the TOE during personalization.</p>	n/a	Encrypted per download from Infineon's "CC Secure X portal" or by PGP protected mail by Smartrac.

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

The GET DATA Version command (see also [13], chapter 3.1.2) can be used by the Personalization Agent to verify that the TOE was delivered with the correct SmartApp-ID applet version. The GET DATA Version command is also used to determine that the TOE is in the right state (i.e. within applet state "configuration" for personalization, the least significant byte of the data field in the GET DATA Version command response has to be '01')

The GET DATA: VERSION response is: '03 01 16 00 xx' which stands for "Applet version (four bytes): 3.1.22.0", and Applet state (one byte), indicated by "xx":

'01' – Configuration,

'02' – Pre-personalization,

'03' – Personalization.

Therefore, in applet state "configuration", the content of the response data field should be '03 01 16 00 01'

The TOE is delivered in one evaluated configuration with the mandatory security functionalities as described in the Security Target. The parameterization of the security mechanisms has to be done by the personalization agent. Before the delivery of the TOE to the personalization agent the TOE is in "manufacturing" phase. When the TOE is delivered to the personalization agent, the personalization agent has to determine that the TOE is identified by its version. The steps for the right personalization of the TOE by the personalization agent are provided by the developer in the preparative procedures guidance [13] chapters 3, 4, and 5. After the TOE is personalized it is in "operational use" state.

### 3 Security Policy

The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It is defined according to the certified Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE\_PP), Version 1.0, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011 [7], and Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 [8] by the Security Objectives and Requirements in these Protection Profiles and according to the Security Target [6].

### 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The List of objectives which have to be met by the the environment can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.

### 5 Architectural Information

The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit, the platform operating system, a crypto library, and IC Application Software containing the e-Passport Application. In detail, the TOE consists of the platforms operating system jTOP INF#46, offered as IFX SLJ52GLA080AL, IFX SLJ52GLA128AL and IFX SLJ52GLA150AL, the platforms chip and crypto library SLE78CLX1600PM-m7820-A11, and the e-passport application.

According to the TOE Design the TOE subsystems enforce the following security functionality of the TOE:

- SF.Access
- SF.Random
- SF.SymmetricAuthentication
- SF.Trust
- SF.TerminalAuthentication
- SF.Protection

- SF.Configuration

## 6 Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

## 7 IT Product Testing

### Developer's Test

The developer used a self-developed script application for implementing the tests. With the application also test reports and test logs can be created. A test run automatically compares expected and actual results. Testing is performed on the final TOE, consisting of the platform specified and the PWPW SmartApp-ID 3.1 (IFX) application (JavaCard applet) accessed through a card reader. All developer's tests address the observable behaviour of the TOE.

The scenarios for performing the functional tests are divided into 9 campaigns:

- Tests of APDU syntax,
- Tests of APDU access conditions,
- Tests of SecureByte, SecureShort and SecureByteArray classes,
- Tests of the contact interface,
- Tests of the contactless interface,
- Tests of the HMAC\_DRBG,
- ICAO test suite,
- PACE test suite,
- EAC test suite.

To run the test campaign the card shall be prepared as described in the guidance document [13]. The card preparation is implemented as a script by the developer and could be run by the Script Application.

The developer's testing results demonstrate that the TSF perform as specified.

### Evaluator Tests

The APDU tests were performed using smartcard reader, a standard PC, test software provided by the developer as well as evaluator's test software. The LFI tests were performed using a smartcard reader, an oscilloscope, a delay generator, a probe station, a motor control unit, a laser and a microscope.

The selected tests cover tests of the TSFI related to

- Manufacturing (applet loading, installing and selection),
- Identification and Authentication (interfaces of different authentication mechanisms),

- Protection against interference, logical tampering and bypass (disturbance of interface execution),
- Secure Messaging (test of interface commands using secure messaging),
- Preparative procedures, performed by the evaluator according to the guidance.

The choice of the subset of interfaces used for testing has been done according to the following approach:

- Augmentation of developer testing for interfaces and supplementation of developer testing strategy for interfaces are both used for setting up test cases.
- Besides augmentation and supplementation of developer's tests the tests are also selected by the complexity and the susceptibility to vulnerabilities of interfaces and related functionality.
- Since the developer has tested all interfaces and the rigour of developer testing of the interfaces is sufficient, the evaluator found that all TSFI have been suitably tested. The evaluator had no doubt that an interface is not properly implemented.
- The APDU interfaces are essential for the TOE and therefore in the focus of testing.
- Implicit testing was sufficiently included in developer testing because preparative steps were performed and described for each test case.
- The selection process is based on evaluation experience of the evaluation body.
- Therefore all TOE security functionality is included within the subset. All cryptographic functionality was provided by the platform and sufficiently tested during platform evaluation.

The cryptographic keys and personalization data used in the test configurations were the same as used in the developer's testing. The configuration used during testing corresponds to the configuration described in the security target.

The test prerequisites, test steps, and expected results adequately test the related TSFI, and they are consistent with the descriptions of the TSFI in the functional specification. The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the actual test results.

### **Penetration Testing**

The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer's testing environment, and partially using the test environment of the ITSEF. All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were tested. The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually successful.

Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment the evaluator devised the attack scenarios for penetration tests to verify if they could be exploited in the TOE's operational environment.

The evaluator referred to the documentation for the functional testing and came to the conclusion that all characteristics of the security architecture have been completely covered by testing. The evaluator performed applet code review to verify the implementation of the requirements of the platform's ETR for composition and guidance as well as of the security mechanisms of the applet in general. Further aspects are covered

by additional independent tests. The results of these activities led to confidence in the security of the TOE as a whole.

According to the ST, the TOE has only one configuration. The configuration complies with the configuration of the TOE after delivery.

The following attack scenarios having been tested:

- Perturbation attacks: Program flow disturbance and authentication bypass (LFI)
- Attacks on HMAC RNG (SPA/SEMA)
- Bypass authentication or access control (LFI)

The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually successful in the TOE's operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all measures required by the developer are applied.

## 8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is delivered in one configuration, consisting of:

- the platform operating system jTOP INF#46, offered as IFX SLJ52GLA080AL, IFX SLJ52GLA128AL and IFX SLJ52GLA150AL,
- the platform chip and crypto library SLE78CLX1600PM-m7820-A11,
- the e-passport application.

Please note that the TOE is intended for local (national) and export projects. That is why the evaluation process is limited to Steps 1-2 of the TOE life cycle as they are described in the Security Target [6], chapter 1.3.4. If necessary, the evaluation of the other life cycle steps should be done as a separate process according to needs of the specific Issuing State.

## 9 Results of the Evaluation

### 9.1 CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [15] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).

The following guidance specific for the technology was used:

- The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
- Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards
- Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic random number generators (for jTOP)
- Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random number generators (for the hardware platform)

- Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36). According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e. on the platform operating system jTOP INF#46, offered as IFX SLJ52GLA080AL, IFX SLJ52GLA128AL and IFX SLJ52GLA150AL [16] and [17] and on the the platform chip and crypto library [18] and [19]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation.

(see [4], AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31, AIS 34, AIS 36).

For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations aspects of AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used on the platform evaluation (see [4]).

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
- The components ATE\_DPT.2, ALC\_DVS.2, and AVA\_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE\_PP), Version 1.0, 2 November 2011, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011, Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 [7] and [8]
- for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions  
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant  
EAL 4 augmented by ATE\_DPT.2, ALC\_DVS.2, and AVA\_VAN.5

For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report.

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

## 9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment

The cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy are detailed with all necessary information in the ST [6] annex E, Cryptographic Functionality.

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

According to technical guideline BSI TR-03110 [11] and [12] and ICAO-SAC [9] the algorithms are suitable to protect the authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of the data. The validity period of each algorithm is mentioned in the official catalogue [12].

## 10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.

## 11 Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.

## 12 Definitions

### 12.1 Acronyms

<b>AIS</b>	Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
<b>ANSI</b>	American National Standards Institute
<b>APDU</b>	Application Protocol Data Unit
<b>BSI</b>	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
<b>BSIG</b>	BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
<b>CBC</b>	Cipher Block Chaining
<b>CCRA</b>	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
<b>CC</b>	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
<b>CEM</b>	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
<b>CRT</b>	Chinese Remainder Theorem
<b>EAL</b>	Evaluation Assurance Level
<b>EBC</b>	Electronic Code Book
<b>ECDSA</b>	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithmus
<b>ETR</b>	Evaluation Technical Report
<b>ICAO</b>	International Civil Aviation Organisation
<b>ISO</b>	International Organization for Standardization
<b>IT</b>	Information Technology
<b>ITSEC</b>	Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
<b>ITSEF</b>	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

<b>LFI</b>	Laser Fault Injection
<b>PACE</b>	Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
<b>PKCS</b>	Public-key cryptography standards
<b>PP</b>	Protection Profile
<b>RNG</b>	Random Number Generator
<b>RSA</b>	Rivest Shamir Adleman Algorithmus
<b>SAR</b>	Security Assurance Requirement
<b>SEMA</b>	Simple Electromagnetic Analysis
<b>SFP</b>	Security Function Policy
<b>SFR</b>	Security Functional Requirement
<b>SHA</b>	Secure Hash Algorithm
<b>SPA</b>	Single Power Analysis
<b>SSCD</b>	Secure Signature Creation Device
<b>ST</b>	Security Target
<b>TOE</b>	Target of Evaluation
<b>TSF</b>	TOE Security Functionalities
<b>TSFI</b>	TSF Interface

## 12.2 Glossary

**Augmentation** - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

**Extension** - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.

**Formal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

**Informal** - Expressed in natural language.

**Object** - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

**Protection Profile** - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type.

**Security Target** - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

**Semiformal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

**Subject** - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

**Target of Evaluation** - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance.

**TOE Security Functionality** - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.

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<sup>8</sup>specifically

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- AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
- AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
- AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
- AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
- AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
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## C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part 1:

### Conformance Claim (Release 3 und 4 = chapter 10.4)

“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC conformance claim that:

- describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
  - **CC Part 2 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
  - **CC Part 2 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
  - **CC Part 3 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
  - **CC Part 3 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:

- Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package (e.g. EAL) if:
  - the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
  - the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
- Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if:
  - the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package.
  - the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the package.

Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.

Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection Profiles:

- PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.
- Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”

CC Part 3:

**Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation** (chapter 10)

“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent, and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation	APE_INT.1 PP introduction
	APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements

APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”

**Class ASE: Security Target evaluation** (chapter 11)

“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary

ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition

### Security assurance components (chapter 7)

“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance classes, families, and components.”

“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”

“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”

The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification
	ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
	ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
	ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
	ADV_TDS.1 Basic design ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-level design presentation

Assurance Class	Assurance Components	
AGD:	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance	
Guidance documents	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures	
ALC: Life cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support	
	ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage	
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures	
	ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures	
	ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation	
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model	
	ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts	
	ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
		ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
		ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete		
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis	

Assurance class decomposition

## **Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)**

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

### **Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)**

“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended assurance requirements.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level						
		EAL1	EAL2	EAL3	EAL4	EAL5	EAL6	EAL7
Development	ADV_ARC		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ADV_FSP	1	2	3	4	5	5	6
	ADV_IMP				1	1	2	2
	ADV_INT					2	3	3
	ADV_SPM						1	1
	ADV_TDS		1	2	3	4	5	6
Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	AGD_PRE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Life cycle Support	ALC_CMC	1	2	3	4	4	5	5
	ALC_CMS	1	2	3	4	5	5	5
	ALC_DEL		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2
	ALC_FLR							
	ALC_LCD			1	1	1	1	2
	ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3
Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_ECD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_INT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_OBJ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASR_REQ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASE_SPD		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_TSS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3
	ATE_DPT			1	1	3	3	4
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN	1	2	2	3	4	5	5

Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”

**Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested** (chapter 8.3)

## “Objectives

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through security objectives.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation.”

**Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested** (chapter 8.4)

## “Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

**Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked** (chapter 8.5)

## “Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practises.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.”

**Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed**  
(chapter 8.6)

## “Objectives

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”

**Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested** (chapter 8.7)

## “Objectives

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”

**Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested**  
(chapter 8.8)

## “Objectives

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”

**Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested**  
(chapter 8.9)

## “Objectives

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”

**Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment** (chapter 16)

“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”

**Vulnerability analysis (AVA\_VAN)** (chapter 16.1)

## “Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate the SFRs.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”

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## **D Annexes**

### **List of annexes of this certification report**

- Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
- Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment

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## Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0898-2014

### Evaluation results regarding development and production environment



The IT product PWPW SmartApp-ID 3.1 (IFX) (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.

As a result of the TOE certification, dated 27 August 2014, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC\_CMC.4, ALC\_CMS.4, ALC\_DEL.1, ALC\_DVS.2, ALC\_LCD.1, ALC\_TAT.1)

are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:

- Development Environment of Polska Wytwórnia Papierów Wartościowych S.A., ul. R. Sanguszki 1, 00-222 Warsaw, Poland (Development)
- SMARTRAC Technology Ltd. 142 Moo1, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate, Tambon Ban Laean Amphor Bang-pa-in Phra Nakorn Si Ayutthaya 13160 Thailand (Inlay Manufacturer)
- Infineon Technologies Dresden Königsbrücker Strasse 180, 01099 Dresden, Germany (IC Manufacturer, Covered by HW-certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0829-2012-MA-01)

For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.

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