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REF: 2018-4-INF-2341 v3

Target: Público

Date: 20.07.2018

Created by: CERT10

Revised by: CALIDAD

Approved by: TECNICO

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## CERTIFICATION REPORT

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File: 2018-4 Windows 10: build 10.0.16299 (also known as version 1709)

Applicant: 600413485 Microsoft Corp.

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### References:

[EXT-3785] Certification request of Windows 10: build 10.0.16299 (also known as version 1709)

[EXT-3909] Evaluation Technical Report of Windows 10: build 10.0.16299 (also known as version 1709).

The product documentation referenced in the above documents.

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Certification report of the product Windows 10: build 10.0.16299 (also known as version 1709), as requested in [EXT-3785] dated 06-02-2018, and evaluated by Epoche & Espri S.L.U., as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-3909] received on 19/04/2018.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>3</b>
TOE SUMMARY .....	4
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS .....	5
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .....	6
<b>IDENTIFICATION .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>SECURITY POLICIES .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .....</b>	<b>8</b>
THREATS .....	8
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY .....	9
<b>ARCHITECTURE.....</b>	<b>9</b>
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE.....	9
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE.....	10
<b>DOCUMENTS .....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>PRODUCT TESTING.....</b>	<b>10</b>
PENETRATION TESTING.....	11
<b>EVALUATED CONFIGURATION .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>EVALUATION RESULTS.....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>COMMENTS &amp; RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>GLOSSARY .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>SECURITY TARGET.....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS.....</b>	<b>14</b>
EUROPEAN RECOGNITION OF ITSEC/CC – CERTIFICATES (SOGIS-MRA) .....	14
INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF CC – CERTIFICATES (CCRA).....	14



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product:

Windows Operating Systems (OS):

- Microsoft Windows 10 Home Edition (Fall Creators Update) (32-bit version)
- Microsoft Windows 10 Pro Edition (Fall Creators Update) (64-bit versions)
- Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise Edition (Fall Creators Update) (64-bit versions)
- Microsoft Windows 10 S Edition (Fall Creators Update)
- Microsoft Windows Server Standard Core, version 1709
- Microsoft Windows Server Datacenter Core, version 1709

TOE Versions:

- Windows 10: build 10.0.16299 (also known as version 1709)
- Windows Server: build 10.0.16299 (also known as version 1709)

The following security updates must be applied for:

- Windows 10 and Windows server, all critical updates as of January 31, 2018.

The TOE includes the Windows 10 and Windows Server operating system, and those applications necessary to manage, support and configure the operating system. Windows 10 and Windows Server can be delivered preinstalled on a new computer or downloaded from the Microsoft website.

- **Developer/manufacturer:** Microsoft Corporation.
- **Sponsor:** Microsoft Corporation.
- **Certification Body:** Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
- **ITSEF:** Epoche & Espri S.L.U..
- **Protection Profile:** General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile, Version 4.1, March 9, 2016 (GP OS PP).
- **Evaluation Level:** Common Criteria v3.1 R5 (assurance packages according to the [GPOSPP]).
- **Evaluation end date:** 19/04/2018.

All the assurance components required by the evaluation level of the [GPOSPP] have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Epoche & Espri S.L.U assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the [GPOSPP] assurance level packages, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R5, the [GPOSPP] and the CEM v3.1 R5.



Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the product Windows 10: build 10.0.16299 (also known as version 1709), a positive resolution is proposed.

## **TOE SUMMARY**

All Windows 10 and Windows Server editions, collectively called “Windows”, are preemptive multitasking, multiprocessor, and multi-user operating systems. In general, operating systems provide users with a convenient interface to manage underlying hardware. They control the allocation and manage computing resources such as processors, memory, and Input/Output (I/O) devices. Windows expands these basic operating system capabilities to controlling the allocation and managing higher level IT resources such as security principals (user or machine accounts), files, printing objects, services, window station, desktops, cryptographic keys, network ports traffic, directory objects, and web content. Multi-user operating systems such as Windows keep track of which user is using which resource, grant resource requests, account for resource usage, and mediate conflicting requests from different programs and users.

## **TOE major security features**

The major security features implemented by the TOE and subject to evaluation (no assurance can be supposed to any other functionality) to can be summarised as follows:

- **Security Audit:** Windows has the ability to collect audit data, review audit logs, protect audit logs from overflow, and restrict access to audit logs. Audit information generated by the system includes the date and time of the event, the user identity that caused the event to be generated, and other event specific data. Authorized administrators can review audit logs and have the ability to search and sort audit records. Authorized Administrators can also configure the audit system to include or exclude potentially auditable events to be audited based on a wide range of characteristics. In the context of this evaluation, the protection profile requirements cover generating audit events, selecting which events should be audited, and providing secure storage for audit event entries.
- **Cryptographic Support:** Windows provides CAVP validated cryptographic functions that support encryption/decryption, cryptographic signatures, cryptographic hashing, cryptographic key agreement, and random number generation. The TOE additionally provides support for public keys, credential management and certificate validation functions and provides support for the National Security Agency’s Suite B cryptographic algorithms. Windows also provides extensive auditing support of cryptographic operations, the ability to replace cryptographic functions and random number generators with alternative implementations, and a key isolation service designed to limit the potential exposure of secret and private keys. In addition to using cryptography for its own security functions, Windows offers access to the cryptographic support functions for user-mode and kernel-mode programs.



Public key certificates generated and used by Windows authenticate users and machines as well as protect both user and system data in transit.

- **User Data Protection:** In the context of this evaluation Windows protects user data and provides virtual private networking capabilities.
- **Identification and Authentication:** Each Windows user must be identified and authenticated based on administrator-defined policy prior to performing any TSF-mediated functions. An interactive user invokes a trusted path in order to protect his I&A information. Windows maintains databases of accounts including their identities, authentication information, group associations, and privilege and logon rights associations. Windows account policy functions include the ability to define the minimum password length, the number of failed logon attempts, the duration of lockout, and password age.
- **Protection of the TOE Security Functions:** Windows provides a number of features to ensure the protection of TOE security functions. Windows protects against unauthorized data disclosure and modification by using a suite of Internet standard protocols including IPsec, IKE, and ISAKMP. Windows ensures process isolation security for all processes through private virtual address spaces, execution context, and security context. The Windows data structures defining process address space, execution context, memory protection, and security context are stored in protected kernel-mode memory. Windows includes self-testing features that ensure the integrity of executable program images and its cryptographic functions. Finally, Windows provides a trusted update mechanism to update Windows binaries itself.
- **Session Locking:** Windows provides the ability for a user to lock their session either immediately or after a defined interval. Windows constantly monitors the mouse, keyboard, and touch display for activity and locks the computer after a set period of inactivity.
- **TOE Access:** Windows allows an authorized administrator to configure the system to display a logon banner before the logon dialog.
- **Trusted Path for Communications:** Windows uses HTTPS, DTLS, and TLS to provide a trusted path for communications.
- **Security Management:** Windows includes several functions to manage security policies. Policy management is controlled through a combination of access control, membership in administrator groups, and privileges.

## **SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS**

The product was evaluated with all the evidences required to fulfil the assurance packages defined in [GPOSPP], according to Common Criteria v3.1 R5. The TOE meets the following SARs:



Class	Family/Component
ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition ASE_INT.1 ST introduction ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives ASE_REQ.1 Derived security requirements ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ADV: Development	ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
ATE: Tests	ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing – Conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey

## SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the Common Criteria v3.1 R5:

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
<b>Security Audit (FAU)</b>	Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1)
<b>Cryptographic Support (FCS)</b>	Cryptographic Key Generation for (FCS_CKM.1(1))
	Cryptographic Key Establishment (FCS_CKM.2(1))
	Cryptographic Key Destruction (FCS_CKM.4)
	Cryptographic Operation for Data Encryption/Decryption (FCS_COP.1(SYM))
	Cryptographic Operation for Hashing (FCS_COP.1(HASH))
	Cryptographic Operation for Signing (FCS_COP.1(SIGN))
	Cryptographic Operation for Keyed Hash Algorithms (FCS_COP.1(HMAC))
	Random Bit Generation (FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
	Storage of Sensitive Data (FCS_STO_EXT.1)
	TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1)
	TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.2)
	TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.3)
	TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.4)
DTLS Implementation (FCS_DTLS_EXT.1)	
<b>User Data Protection (FDP)</b>	Access Controls for Protecting User Data (FDP_ACF_EXT.1)
	Information Flow Control (FDP_IFC_EXT.1)
<b>Identification &amp; Authentication (FIA)</b>	Authorization Failure Handling (FIA_AFL.1)
	Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)
	X.509 Certification Validation (FIA_X509_EXT.1)
	X.509 Certificate Authentication (FIA_X509_EXT.2)
<b>Security Management (FMT)</b>	Management of Security Functions Behavior (FMT_MOF_EXT.1)
	Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF_EXT.1)
<b>Protection of the TSF (FPT)</b>	Access Controls (FPT_ACF_EXT.1)
	Address Space Layout Randomization (FPT_ASLR_EXT.1)
	Stack Buffer Overflow Protection (FPT_SBOP_EXT.1)



	Software Restriction Policies (FPT_SRP_EXT.1)
	Boot Integrity (FPT_TST_EXT.1)
	Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
	Trusted Update for Application Software (FPT_TUD_EXT.2)
<b>TOE Access (FTA)</b>	Default TOE Access Banners (FTA_TAB.1)
<b>Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)</b>	Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1)
	Trusted Channel Communication (FTP_ITC_EXT.1(TLS))
	Trusted Channel Communication (FTP_ITC_EXT.1(DTLS))

## IDENTIFICATION

### Product:

Windows Operating Systems (OS):

- Microsoft Windows 10 Home Edition (Fall Creators Update) (32-bit version)
- Microsoft Windows 10 Pro Edition (Fall Creators Update) (64-bit versions)
- Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise Edition (Fall Creators Update) (64-bit versions)
- Microsoft Windows 10 S Edition (Fall Creators Update)
- Microsoft Windows Server Standard Core, version 1709
- Microsoft Windows Server Datacenter Core, version 1709

TOE Versions:

- Windows 10: build 10.0.16299 (also known as version 1709)
- Windows Server: build 10.0.16299 (also known as version 1709)

The following security updates must be applied for:

- Windows 10 and Windows server, all critical updates as of January 31, 2018.

**Security Target:** Microsoft Windows 10, Windows Server (Fall Creators Update) Security Target version 0.03, March 23, 2018.

**Protection Profile:** General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile, Version 4.1, March 9, 2016 (GP OS PP)

**Evaluation Level:** Common Criteria v3.1 R5 (assurance packages according to the [GPOSPP]).

## SECURITY POLICIES

There are no Organizational Security Policies defined for this evaluation as there are not defined in the [GPOSPP].



## ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The following assumptions specified in the [GPOSPP] and included in the [ST], are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target [ST]. These assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.

In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.

Assumption	Description
<b>A.PLATFORM</b>	The OS relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This underlying platform is out of scope of this PP.
<b>A.PROPER_USER</b>	The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy. At the same time, malicious software could act as the user, so requirements which confine malicious subjects are still in scope.
<b>A.PROPER_ADMIN</b>	The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

## THREATS

The threats to the IT assets against which protection is required by the TOE or by the security environment as defined in the [GPOSPP] and included in the [ST] are listed below.

Threat	Description
<b>T.NETWORK_ATTACK</b>	An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with applications and services running on or part of the OS with the intent of compromise. Engagement may consist of altering existing legitimate communications.
<b>T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP</b>	An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between applications and services that are running on or part of the OS.
<b>T.LOCAL_ATTACK</b>	An attacker may compromise applications running on the OS. The compromised application may provide maliciously formatted input to the OS through a variety of channels including unprivileged system calls and messaging via the file system.
<b>T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS</b>	An attacker may attempt to access data on the OS while having a limited amount of time with the physical device.



## **OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY**

The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the objectives of the defined security problem. The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment in the [GPOSPP] and included in the [ST] are categorized below.

<b>Environment Objective</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>OE.PLATFORM</b>	The OS relies on being installed on trusted hardware.
<b>OE.PROPER_USER</b>	The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy. Standard user accounts are provisioned in accordance with the least privilege model. Users requiring higher levels of access should have a separate account dedicated for that use.
<b>OE.PROPER_ADMIN</b>	The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise policy.

## **ARCHITECTURE**

### **LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE**

Conceptually the Windows TOE can be thought of as a collection of the following security services which the security target describes with increasing detail in the remainder of this document:

- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- User Data Protection
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TOE Security Functions
- Access to the TOE
- Trusted Path and Channels

These services are primarily provided by Windows components:

- The Boot Manager, which is invoked by the computer's bootstrapping code.
- The Windows Loader which loads the operating system into the computer's memory.
- The Windows Kernel which contains device drivers for the Windows NT File System, full volume encryption, the crash dump filter, and the kernel-mode cryptographic library.



- The IPv4 / IPv6 network stack in the kernel.
- The Windows Trusted Installer which installs updates to the Windows operating system.
- The Local Security Authority Subsystem which identifies and authenticates users prior to log on and generates events for the security audit log.
- NIST CAVP-validated to protect user and system data.
- The Key Isolation Service which protects secret and private keys.
- Local and remote administrative interfaces for security management.
- Windows Explorer which can be used to manage the OS and check the integrity of Windows files and updates.

## **PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE**

Each instance of the general purpose OS TOE runs on a tablet, convertible, workstation or server computer. The TOE executes on processors from Intel (x86 and x64) or AMD (x86 and x64) along with peripherals for input/output (keyboard, mouse, display, and network).

The TOE does not include any hardware or network infrastructure components between the computers that comprise the distributed TOE. The security target assumes that any network connections, equipment, peripherals and cables are appropriately protected in the TOE security environment.

## **DOCUMENTS**

The product includes the following document that shall be distributed and made available together to the users of the evaluated version.

- Windows 10 Fall Creators Update GP OS Operational Guidance version 0.6, March 20, 2018 along with all the documents referenced therein.

## **PRODUCT TESTING**

The tests performed by the evaluator are based on the assurance activities defined for the ATE activity in the [GPOSPP] for each SFR that is included in the [ST].

The evaluator has performed an installation and configuration of the TOEs and their operational environment following the steps included in the installation and operation manual. The TOE configuration used to execute the independent tests is consistent with the evaluated configuration according to security target [ST].

The independent testing has covered 100% of SFRs of the [ST] and assurance activities defined in the [GPOSPP] for each SFR. There has not been any deviation from the expected results under the environment defined in security target [ST].



## PENETRATION TESTING

According to the [GPOSPP], the vulnerability analysis scope has taken into account the public vulnerabilities affecting to all the operating system versions. The lab has performed a search on public sources to discover known vulnerabilities of the TOE. The lab has checked that all the public vulnerabilities published until August 9, 2017 have been fixed in the evaluated configuration.

Also, the vendor has published the corresponding update fixing the public vulnerabilities identified for the period from January 31 to March 14, 2018.

## EVALUATED CONFIGURATION

The TOE under evaluation is composed of the following operating system versions:

- Microsoft Windows 10 Home Edition (Fall Creators Update) (32-bit version)
- Microsoft Windows 10 Pro Edition (Fall Creators Update) (64-bit versions)
- Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise Edition (Fall Creators Update) (64-bit versions)
- Microsoft Windows 10 S Edition (Fall Creators Update)
- Microsoft Windows Server Standard Core, version 1709
- Microsoft Windows Server Datacenter Core, version 1709

The build tested for all Windows 10 and Windows Server editions has been [version 10.0.16299] (also known as 1709).

The hardware platforms used during the evaluation are listed below:

- Microsoft Surface Book 2
- Microsoft Surface Laptop
- Dell Latitude 5290
- Dell PowerEdge R740
- Microsoft Windows Server Hyper-V
- Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Hyper-V

The following list summarizes the combination between hardware platforms and operating system editions used for the testing:

- Microsoft Surface Book 2 with Windows 10 Enterprise x64 Fall Creators Update
- Microsoft Surface Laptop with Windows 10 S x64 Fall Creators Update.
- Dell Latitude 5290 with Windows 10 Pro x64 Fall Creators Update.
- Dell PowerEdge R740 with Windows Server 2016 (1709) Datacenter Core.
- Microsoft Windows Hyper-V Server 2016 with Windows 10 Home x86 Fall Creators Update.



- Microsoft Windows Server 2016 (1709) Hyper-V role with Windows Server 2016 (1709) Standard Core.

## EVALUATION RESULTS

The product Windows 10: build 10.0.16299 (also known as version 1709) has been evaluated against the Security Target: Microsoft Windows 10, Windows Server (Fall Creators Update) Security Target version 0.03, March 23, 2018.

All the assurance components defined in the [GPOSPP] have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory CF assigns the “**PASS**” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the assurances packages defined in the [GPOSPP] and included in the [ST], as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R5, the [GPOSPP] and the CEM v3.1 R5.

## COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM

The TOE usage is recommended given that there are not exploitable vulnerabilities in the operational environment. The following usage recommendations are given:

- It is mandatory to strictly follow the steps indicated in the installation documentation in order to download and install the correct version of the TOE in a proper manner.
- The user guidance must be read and understood in order to operate the TOE in an adequate manner according to the security target.

## CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the product Windows 10: build 10.0.16299 (also known as version 1709), a positive resolution is proposed.

## GLOSSARY

CCN	Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI	Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
OC	Organismo de Certificación
TOE	Target Of Evaluation



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:

[CC\_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.

[CC\_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.

[CC\_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.

[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.

[GPOSPP] General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile, Version 4.1, March 9, 2016 (GP OS PP)

[ST] Microsoft Windows 10 (Creators Update) Security Target version 0.05, December 18, 2017

## SECURITY TARGET

Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is stored and protected in the Certification Body premises. This document is identified as:

- Microsoft Windows 10, Windows Server (Fall Creators Update) Security Target version 0.03, March 23, 2018.

The public version of this document constitutes the ST Lite. The ST Lite has also been reviewed for the needs of publication according to [CCDB-2006-04-004], and it is published along with this certification report in the Certification Body and CCRA websites. The ST Lite identifier is:

- Microsoft Windows 10, Windows Server (Fall Creators Update) Security Target version 0.05, July 14, 2018.



## RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

### ***European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)***

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at <https://www.sogisportal.eu>.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.

### ***International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)***

The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC\_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).

The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including



EAL 4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC\_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.

As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.