

OS755/IDProtect v6 SSCD – Security Target

Athena OS755/IDProtect v6 Java Card On Inside Secure AT90SC28872RCU Microcontroller Embedding Athena IAS-ECC applet

> Version: 1.2 Date: March 22, 2012



Athena Confidential Material Athena Smartcard Inc., 20380 Town Center Lane, Suite 240, Cupertino, CA 95014 © Athena Smartcard Inc., 2012

Contents

1. S	T INTRODUCTION	4
1.1.	ST IDENTIFICATION	4
1.2.	COMPOSITE TOE	5
1.3.	TOE OVERVIEW	6
2. T	OE DESCRIPTION	7
2.1.	General	
2.2.	IAS-ECC - SECURE SIGNATURE CREATION DEVICE	9
2.3.	TOE LIMITS	.10
2.4.	TOE GUIDANCE	
2.5.	TOE LIFECYCLE	
2.6.	FEATURES OF IDPROTECT – INFORMATIONAL	
3. C	ONFORMANCE CLAIMS	
3.1.	CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM	
3.2.	PP CLAIM	
	ECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION	
4.1.	Assets	
4.2.	SUBJECTS	
4.3.	Assumptions	
4.4.	THREATS	
4.5.	ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES	
	ECURITY OBJECTIVES	
5.1.	SOS FOR THE TOE	
5.2.	SOS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT	
5.3.	SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE	
	XTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION	
6.1.	TOE EMANATION (FPT_EMSEC.1)	
	ECURITY REQUIREMENTS	
7.1.	TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS	
7.2.	TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS	
	OE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION	
8.1.	SF.ACCESS CONTROL	
8.2.	SF.ADMINISTRATION	
8.3.	SF.SIGNATORY AUTHENTICATION	
8.4.	SF.SIGNATURE CREATION	
8.5.	SF.SECURE MESSAGING	
8.6.	SF.CRYPTO	
8.7.	SF.PROTECTION	
	DDITIONAL RATIONALE	
9.1.	RATIONAL FOR ASSURANCE MEASURES	
9.2.	RATIONALE FOR EXTENSIONS	
9.3.	PP CLAIM RATIONALE	
10.	TERMINOLOGY	
11.	REFERENCES	.49

List of Tables

TABLE 1 – SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TO SECURITY OBJECTIVES MAPPING	25
TABLE 2 – ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS: EAL4 AUGMENTED	38
TABLE 8 – MAPPING ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS TO ASSURANCE MEASURES	

List of Figures

Figure 1 – TOE Form Factor	7
FIGURE 2 – TOE DESCRIPTION	8
FIGURE 3 – SSCD TYPES AND MODES OF OPERATION	9
FIGURE 4 – SCOPE OF THE SSCD, STRUCTURAL VIEW	11
FIGURE 5 – TOE LIFECYCLE	12

1. ST Introduction

1.1. ST Identification

ST title	- Athena OS755/IDProtect v6 SSCD-		
	Athena OS755/IDProtect v6 Java Card		
	On Inside Secure AT90SC28872RCU Microcontroller		
	Embedding Athena IAS-ECC applet		
Authors	Athena Smartcard, Inc.		
General Status	Final version		
ST Version Number	1.2		
Date of production	March 22, 2012		
TOE Reference	Mask Reference: "IDProtect_AT90	SC28872RCU_005"	
	IASECC Applet Athena Sr		
	AID	A000000164494153454343010101	
	Version	F903	
	Build	0002	
		"v0003 b0002"	
	EEPROM Code Reference		
		martcard Solutions, Inc.	
	Release Date	0352	
	Release Level	0005	
	ROM Code reference:		
	AT90SC28872RCU Inside Sec		
	Revision	G	
	Identification Number	AT58U07	
	Certificate	BSI-DSZ-CC-0421-2008 [8]	
	Ad-X Inside Sec		
	Version	00.03.11.05	
	Certificate	ANSSI-CC-2009/11 [9]	
Common Criteria	Common Criteria CC version 3.1		
Part 1: CCMB 2009-07-001 revision 3 [1]			
	Part 2: CCMB 2009-07-002 revision 3 [2]		
	Part 3: CCMB 2009-07-003 revision 3 [3]		
PP Claim	Protection Profile — Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 2		
	Version: 1.04, EAL 4+		
	Wednesday, 25 July 2001		
	Prepared By: ESIGN Workshop - Expert Group F		
	Identification PP0005b		
	Protection Profile — Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 3		
	Version: 1.05, EAL 4+		
	Wednesday, 25 July 2001		
	Prepared By: ESIGN Workshop - Expert Group F		
	Identification PP0006b		

- [8] BSI-DSZ-CC-0421-2008 "Atmel Smartcard ICs AT90SC28872RCU / AT90SC28848RCU with Atmel Cryptographic Toolbox Version 00.03.10.00 or 00.03.13.00". CC v2.3, EAL 5+ (ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4), compliant to BSI-PP-0002-2001 version 1.0.
- [9] ANSSI-CC-2009/11 "Atmel Toolbox 00.03.11.05 on the AT90SC Family of Devices". CC v2.3, EAL 5+ (ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4), compliant to BSI-PP-0002-2001 version 1.0.

1.2. Composite TOE

In this Security Target, the name of the composite TOE developer (Athena Smartcard Solutions, Inc.) will be referenced as 'Athena'.

OS755/IDProtect v6 with associated IAS-ECC applet are embedded on Inside Secure AT90SC28872RCU.

The composition analysis conducted in this section will use the words <u>Platform</u> to designate the Inside Secure AT90SC28872RCU IC [6] and Toolbox 00.03.11.05 [7], <u>Application</u> to designate the two software components Athena IDProtect/OS755 and Athena IAS-ECC Applet, and <u>Composite Product</u> to designate the TOE.

According to the Composite product documentation [14], the different roles considered in the composition activities are associated as follows:

Platform Developer	Inside Secure
Platform Evaluator	T-Systems
Platform Certification Body	BSI
Platform Toolbox Evaluator	Thales
Platform Toolbox Certification Body	ANSSI
Application Developer	Athena
Composite Product Integrator	Inside Secure
Composite Product Evaluator	Thales
Composite Product Certification Body	ANSSI
Composite Product evaluation Sponsor	Athena

See composition requirements coverage:

- [R1] Platform (including the toolbox) was evaluated to CC EAL 5+ according to BSI-PP-0002-2001 [24] and Composite Product ST relies on this claim.
- [R2] Platform Security Targets [10,11] is available.
- [R3] Evaluated versions of the Platform and Application are exposed here in section 1.1.
- [R4] Integration evidences are provided as part of the process.
- [R5] Integration is guided by delivery procedures enforced by Athena and Inside Secure.
- [R6] Integration process involves all configuration parameters provided by Athena.
- [R7] Integration data and processing are tracked by Athena.
- [R8] Application development process incorporates the Platform User Guide as technical input.
- [R9] EAL 5+ certification of the Platform provides:
 - List of applicable Technical Guides, Application Notes and Errata Sheets
 - Certified Platform ETRs
 - Platform Certification Reports [8,9]
- [R10] TOE Test Plan describes validation of the Application on Platform dedicated emulator.
- [R11] TOE Test Plan describes validation of the Application on the Platform.
- [R12] Platform certification includes testing evaluation.
- [R13] Platform samples are delivered by Inside Secure to TOE's evaluator for testing purpose.
- [R14] Composite Product samples are delivered by Inside Secure to TOE's evaluator for penetration testing purpose.
- [R15] Platform open samples are delivered by Inside Secure to TOE's evaluator for testing purpose.
- [R16] EAL 5+ certification of the Platform provides Certified Platform ETR and Certification Report.

1.3. TOE Overview

The TOE implements a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) in accordance with the European Directive 1999/93/EC [15] as a smart card which allows the generation and importation of signature creation data (SCD) and the creation of qualified electronic signatures. The TOE protects the SCD and ensures that only an authorized Signatory can use it.

OS755/IDProtect v6 is a multi-application Java Card which supports RSA cryptography of up to 2048.

The TOE meets all the following requirements as defined in the European Directive (article 2.2):

- (a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory
- (b) it is capable of identifying the signatory
- (c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control
- (d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is detectable

2. TOE Description

2.1. General

The TOE is available in a variety of form factors where digital application software is masked in ROM:




Figure 1 – TOE Form Factor

The TOE is linked to a card reader/writer via its HW and physical interfaces.


- The contact type interface of the TOE smartcard is ISO/IEC 7816 compliant.
- The interfaces of the TOE SOIC-8 are ISO 9141 compliant.
- The interfaces of the TOE QNF-44 are JEDEC compliant.

There are no other external interfaces of the TOE except the ones described above.

The packaging is out of the scope of this TOE.

The TOE smartcard form factors may be applied to a contact type card reader/writer connected to a computer such as a personal computer and allows application programs (APs) to use the TOE.





TOE Physical Boundaries

Figure 2 – TOE Description

Three applet packages are present on the chip: Athena IASECC applet, Athena LASER applet and Athena MiniDriver applet. No other Java Card applet package is present in the chip and they could all be instantiated. LASER is a Digital Signature Java Card application and follows the ISO7816 standard. LASER is out of the scope of this TOE.

This package could be instantiated into an ICAO applet instance or an IAS-ECC applet instance. Only the IAS-ECC applet instance is part of the TOE. Note that part of the IASECC Applet package is in EEPROM and contains the patch code.

IDProtect Operating System enforces separation of the data between the applets and associated packages imposing logical separation of data using the Java Card Firewall [11-JCRE].

Athena IDProtect is a GlobalPlatform 2.1.1 and Java Card 2.2.2 compliant Operating System that provides applets with standard services as defined in the related GlobalPlatform [13] and Java Card specifications [12].

The hardware platform on which the Operating System is implemented is the Inside Secure AT90SC28872RCU IC. This IC is certified according to CC EAL 5+ [9] with the Security Target compliant with BSI-PP-0002-2001 [24].

2.2. IAS-ECC - Secure Signature Creation Device


The following is an introduction to SSCD based on the SSCD Protection Profile [4] and [5].

The PP documents assume a well defined process signature-creation to take place. The present chapter defines three possible SSCD implementations, referred to as 'SSCD types', as illustrated in Figure 2.

If the SSCD holds the SVD and exports the SVD to a CGA for certification, a trusted channel is to be provided. The CGA initiates SCD/SVD generation ("Init.") and the SSCD exports the SVD for generation of the corresponding certificate ("SVD into cert.").

The signatory must be authenticated to create signatures that he sends his authentication data (e.g., a PIN) to the SSCD Type 2 or Type 3 (e.g., a smart card). If the Human Interface (HI) for such signatory authentication is not provided by the SSCD, and thus a trusted path (e.g., a encrypted channel) between the SSCD and the SCA implementing to HI is to be provided. The data to be signed (DTBS) representation (i.e., the DTBS itself, a hash value of the DTBS, or a pre-hashed value of the DTBS) shall be transferred by the SCA to the SSCD only over a trusted channel. The same shall apply to the signed data object (SDO) returned from a SSCD to the SCA.

SSCD Type 2 and 3 components are personalized components: they can be used for signature creation by one specific user – the signatory - only.



* The trusted path for user authentication will be required if the HI is not provided by the TOE itself

(e. g., it is provided by a SCA outside the SSCD)

** The trusted channel between the SSCD Type 2 and the CGA is required for cases where the SSCD type 2 holds the SVD and export of the SVD to the CGA for certification is provided

Figure 3 – SSCD types and modes of operation

2.3. TOE Limits

The TOE is a secure signature-creation device (combination of SSCD type 2 and type 3) according to Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures [15]. The destruction of the SCD is mandatory before the TOE generate a new pair SCD/SVD or loads a new pair SCD/SVD.

A SSCD is configured software or hardware used to implement the signature-creation data (SCD). The smart card HW and Software in which the SSCD application is installed can contain additional functions and files which are not related to the digital signature application and do not influence it or interact with it in any way and are regarded as data structures. Such applications and files are beyond the scope of this TOE.

The TOE described in this ST is a smart card operating system implemented on a smart card IC which is certified CC EAL 6+. The TOE includes embeddable software in the NVM of the IC and a file system including the digital signature application stored in EEPROM. Parts of the operating systems may be stored in EEPROM. NVM (Non Volatile Memory) corresponds to ROM memory for the Inside Secure AT90SC28872RCU IC [10, 8].

The TOE provides the following functions necessary for devices involved in creating qualified electronic signatures:

- (1) to generate the SCD and the correspondent signature-verification data (SVD)
- (2) to create qualified Electronic Signatures
 - (a) after allowing for the Data To Be Signed (DTBS) to be displayed correctly by the appropriate environment
 - (b) using appropriate hash functions that are, according to [5], agreed as suitable for qualified electronic signatures
 - (c) after appropriate authentication of the signatory by the TOE
 - (d) using appropriate cryptographic signature function that employ appropriate cryptographic parameters agreed as suitable according to [5]

The generation of the SCD/SVD key pair by means of a SSCD type 1 requires the export of the SCD into the TOE (Type 2). Vice versa, signature generation by means of the TOE (Type 2) requires that the SCD/SVD has been generated by and imported from an SSCD Type 1, or has been generated by the TOE itself. Consequently, there is interdependence where an SSCD Type 1 constitutes the environment of the TOE.

The TOE implements all IT security functionality which are necessary to ensure the secrecy of the SCD. To prevent the unauthorised usage of the SCD the TOE provides user authentication and access control. The TOE may provide an interface for user authentication by its own or implements IT measures to support a trusted path to a trusted human interface device.

This TOE does not implement, in addition to the functions of the SSCD, the signature-creation application (SCA). The SCA presents the data to be signed (DTBS) to the signatory and prepares the DTBS-representation the signatory wishes to sign for performing the cryptographic function of the signature. The SCA is considered as part of the environment of the TOE.

The SSCD protects the SCD during the whole life cycle as to be solely used in the signature creation process by the legitimate signatory. The TOE will be initialised for the signatory's use by:

- (1) importation of the SCD or generation of SCD/SVD pair
- (2) personalization for the signatory by means of the signatory's verification authentication data (VAD)

The SVD corresponding to the signatory's SCD will be included in the certificate of the signatory by the certificate-service-provider (CSP). The TOE will destroy the SCD if the SCD is no longer used for signature generation.

The TOE allows to implement a Human Interface (HI) for user authentication:

- (i) by the TOE itself or
- (ii) by a trusted human interface device connected via a trusted channel with the TOE.

The human interface device is used for the input of VAD for authentication by knowledge or for the generation of VAD for authentication by biometric characteristics. The TOE holds RAD to check the provided VAD. The human interface implies appropriate hardware. The second approach allows to reduce the TOE hardware to a minimum e.g. a smart card.




Figure 4 – Scope of the SSCD, structural view

Figure 3 shows the PP scope from the structural perspective. The SSCD, i.e. the TOE, comprises the underlying hardware, the operating system (OS), the SCD/SVD generation, SCD storage and use, and signature-creation functionality. The SCA and the CGA (and possibly other applications) are part of the immediate environment of the TOE. They shall communicate with the TOE over a trusted channel, a trusted path for the human interface provided by the SCA, respectively.

2.4. TOE Guidance

The TOE guidance comprises the following documentation:

Title	Date	Version
OS755/IDProtect v6 – Manufacturer Manual Consult certification		ertification
OS755/IDProtect v6 SSCD - Preparative Procedures	report for applicable	
OS755/IDProtect v6 SSCD - Operational User Guidance dates and version		lversions

2.5. TOE lifecycle

The TOE lifecycle is shown in Figure 5.

The integration phase is added to the PP generic lifecycle as this particular TOE requires that card production phase is refined.




Figure 5 – TOE lifecycle

2.5.1. Design Phase

The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.

<u>HW Design</u>	 Inside Secure 	
OS Design	 Athena Development departments 	– Cupertino, US
		 Edinburgh, Scotland
Application Design	 Athena Development departments 	– Cupertino, US

The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the IC embedded software is securely delivered by the IC Manufacturer to Athena.

2.5.2. Fabrication Phase

<u>HW Fabrication and OS & Application implementation</u> – Inside Secure. <u>IC Manufacturing</u> – Inside Secure.

The Operating System and applicative parts (including the patches) of the TOE which are developed by Athena are sent in a secure way to Inside Secure for masking in NVM (ROM and EEPROM). In addition to the TOE, the mask contains confidential data, knowledge of which is required in order to initialize and personalize the chip. Additional Java Card applets developed by Athena are included in the mask and the corresponding converted files (.cap or.jca) are also provided to the IC Manufacturer.

2.5.3. Integration Phase

The Integration Phase is performed under the assurance when the TOE components have to be initialized. In this case, all the steps of Integration are performed by Inside Secure.

<u>IC Manufacturing – Inside Secure.</u> <u>IC Packaging – Inside Secure</u> <u>Card Manufacturing – Inside Secure</u>

This phase corresponds to the integration of the hardware and firmware components into the final product body. In the case of this TOE it will be a smart card. The ROM is masked with the embedded software designed to be stored in the non-volatile and non-programmable memory of the IC. The EEPROM is masked with the embedded software and data designed to be stored in the non-volatile but programmable memory (this includes the application patches).

No logical interaction with the TOE is required in this phase during production, but the TOE is protected during transfer between various parties with a diversified (per card) Transport Key. Note that the TOE Patch mechanism is terminated in that phase (this setting is part of the data programmed in EEPROM).

IC Packaging and Card Manufacturing are not part of the scope of this TOE.

2.5.4. Initialization Phase

The chip may be sent by Inside Secure to Athena or to a 3rd party initialization centre/card manufacturer and Athena sends to itself or the 3rd party initialization centre the confidential information required in order to proceed with initialization. Initialization may be done in parts at various facilities (for example, start at Athena and continue in a 3rd Party or start at 3rd Party and transfer to another 3rd Party) and personalization can be done by Athena, 3rd Party initialization facility or Card Issuer/Customer.

The TOE remains protected by the Transport Key mechanism, which is based on mutual authentication with diversified (per card) key. Authentication of the Transport Key is required to perform the initialization of the TOE, and more globally of the product.

<u>Initialization</u> – Athena or 3rd Party initialization facility/Card Manufacturer which includes loading of the General Application Data

This phase includes the pre-personalization of the SSCD application: IASECC applet instantiation, creation of MF and IAS-ECC ADF, and creation of the SSCD Administrator credentials. Card Content Loading and Installation mechanism is then terminated in this phase.

The pre-personalized SSCD is securely delivered to the Personalization facility.

2.5.5. Personalization Phase

<u>Personalization</u> – Athena or 3rd Party Personalization facility which includes the loading of Personal Application Data and optional generation of the SCD/SVD pair if loading does not include importing an SCD/SVD pair

This phase is handled by the SSCD Administrator and corresponds to the preparation of SSCD products for designated Signatories. The necessary files are created (including the RAD), the SCD/SVD Key Pair is created and the Key values are loaded or generated on-card, the Access Control is setup, and the Activation mechanism is put in place before the product is delivered to the End User.

The Personalization phase is not part of the scope of this TOE.

2.5.6. Operational Phase

This ST addresses the functions used in the operational phase but developed during development phase.

<u>Usage</u> – Where upon the card is delivered from the Administrator to the Signatory (End User).

The Signatory may use it for signature-creation including all supporting functionality (e.g., SCD storage and SCD use). Usage is only allowed after correct activation of the device: the activation mechanism ensures that the Signatory is the first user to ever use this product for digital signature.

The Operational Use phase is not part of the scope of this TOE.

2.5.7. Application note: Scope of SSCD PP application

This ST refers to qualified certificates as electronic attestation of the SVD corresponding to the signatory's SCD that is implemented by the TOE.

While the main application scenario of a SSCD will assume a qualified certificate to be used in combination with a SSCD, there still is a large benefit in the security when such SSCD is applied in other areas and such application is encouraged. The SSCD may as well be applied to environments where the certificates expressed as 'qualified certificates' in the SSCD do not fulfil the requirements laid down in Annex I and Annex II of the Directive [15].

When an instance of a SSCD is used with a qualified certificate, such use is from the technical point of view eligible for an electronic signature as referred to in Directive [15], article 5, paragraph 1. This Directive does not prevent TOE itself from being regarded as a SSCD, even when used together with a non-qualified certificate.

2.6. Features of IDProtect – Informational

<u>Note</u>: The features described in this section are provided by the IDProtect product family, they are not necessarily Security Functions of the TOE. Please refer to section 8 of this Security Target to find the TOE summary specification.

Java promises write once, run anywhere capability. Athena IDProtect - Athena Java Card technology and GlobalPlatform Operating System - fulfils that promise for the smart card industry.

Athena's IDProtect is built to give you flexibility in the way you work: a blank canvas on which to create smart card products for all market sectors.

Central to Athena IDProtect is its compliance with the Java Card and GlobalPlatform standards; multiple compliant Java Card applets from any source will run securely on Athena IDProtect enabled silicon. Applets can be securely loaded and deleted post issuance thanks to GlobalPlatform compliant Issuer Security Domain implementation. Athena uses its RapidPort architecture to ease the process of porting the system to different silicon platforms, meaning it is already available on various devices from leading manufacturers.

2.6.1. GlobalPlatform

IDProtect provides a Card Manager. This is a generic term for the three card management entities of a GlobalPlatform card; the GlobalPlatform Environment, Issuer Security Domain and Cardholder Verification Method Service Provider.

GlobalPlatform 2.1.1	Information Technology - Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts - Part 4: Inter-industry commands for interchange
Atomic Package and Application Deletion	Memory recovered and is reusable
Global PIN	A PIN that may be checked by all applets on a card, using CVM.verify(). Its value is usually set at personalization time
Secure Channel Protocol 01	SCP01 provides mutual authentication; integrity and data origin authentication; confidentiality
Secure Channel Protocol 02	Support for all SCP02 options
Secure Channel Protocol 03	Support for all SCP03 options
Repeated application install failure	The OPEN may keep track of the number of unsuccessful consecutive attempts of the Card Content load and installation process by a particular Application and the total number of such attempts by all applications. Actions may include such defensive measures as the locking or termination of the card
Applications boundary violations	The OPEN may also enable velocity checking against repeated failed attempts by an Application to allocate additional memory beyond its allowed limit as stored in the Open Platform Registry. The OPEN may choose to lock an Application which exhibits such behavior

2.6.2. Java Card

Athena IDProtect is compatible with the following Java Card standards versions [12]:

- Runtime Environment Specification for the Java Card Platform, Version 2.2.2 March, 2006
- Application Programming Interface, Java Card Platform, Version 2.2.2 March, 2006
- Virtual Machine Specification for the Java Card Platform, Version 2.2.2 March, 2006

Data type *int* is optionally supported in the JCVM and is supported in IDProtect.

2.6.3. Security settings

Keys and PINs are stored encrypted	The OS does not store any Keys or PINs in plain text during computation
On card key generation	RSA keys indicated in the Key Pair list may be generated on the card
FIPS 140-2 Level 3	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules FIPS PUB 140-2
FIPS approved DRBG	IDProtect supports the secure RNG specified in JC API and is FIPS approved
FIPS 140-2 Self Tests	Self tests are performed to check that the HRNG and the DRBG are not stuck and that RSA Keys that are generated by the TOE are a consistent pair.
FIPS 140-2 KAT	Known Answer Tests performed at power up. The cryptographic function tests consist of computing from pre-recorded input data, and comparing the results with pre-recorded answers
FIPS 140-2 Software Integrity	Checks that no FIPS application present in EEPROM (packages) is corrupted. The error detecting code is FIPS approved

2.6.4. Cryptography

Athena IDProtect is a GlobalPlatform compliant Java Card [12] Operating System that supports the cryptographic algorithms.

Note that not all the Cryptographic algorithms, lengths and modes are involved in TOE Security Functions. Please refer to the relevant SFRs for a complete description of what cryptography is used by the TOE (section 7.1.1).

Supported Cryptographic Algorithms (non-SFR enforcing ones in italic):

- AES: AES_128, AES_192, AES_256
- DES: 2 keys TDES [22], Single DES, 3 keys TDES,
- ECC:
 - Finite Prime Field
 - ECC key pair generation
 - Key length: 160 to 521 bits
 - Algorithm: ALG_ECDSA_SHA, ALG_ECDSA_SHA_224, ALG_ECDSA_SHA256
- RSA

0

- o CRT and Standard
 - RSA key pair generation
- Used Key length: RSA_1024 to RSA_2048, and up to RSA_4096 bits
- Algorithm: ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, ALG_RSA_SHA256_PKCS1,
 - ALG_RSA_SHA_ISO9796 [18], ALG_RSA_NOPAD,
 - ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1_PSS,
 - ALG_RSA_SHA256_PKCS1_PSS, ALG_RSA_PCKS1,
- Hash: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-224, SHA-384, SHA-512
- RNG: True RNG and FIPS compliant DRNG

2.6.5. Communication

Athena IDProtect v6 provides the following communication features:

- Physical: ISO/IEC 7816- 1 and 2
- Electrical: ISO/IEC 7816- 3 and 4
- Protocol Support:
 - Protocol T=0 with PPS for speed enhancement
 - Protocol T=1 with PPS for speed enhancement with extended APDU length support

3. Conformance Claims

3.1. CC Conformance Claim

The ST claims compliance with the following references:

- Common Criteria Version 3.1 Part 1 [1]
- Common Criteria Version 3.1 Part 2 [2] extended
- Common Criteria Version 3.1 Part 3 [3] conformant

Extensions are based on the Protection Profiles (PP [4] and PP [5]) presented in the next section:

- FPT_EMSEC.1 'TOE emanation'

The assurance level for this ST is EAL 4 augmented with:

- AVA_VAN.5

3.2. PP Claim

This ST claims strict compliance with:

[4]	Protection Profile — Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 2
Version	1.04
Date	Wednesday, 25 July 2001
Prepared by	ESIGN Workshop - Expert Group F
Identification	PP0005b
Approved by	WS/E-SIGN on the 30 November 2001
Registration	BSI-PP-0005-2002

[5]	Protection Profile — Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 3
Version	1.05
Date	Wednesday, 25 July 2001
Prepared by	ESIGN Workshop - Expert Group F
Identification	PP0006b
Approved by	WS/E-SIGN on the 30 November 2001
Registration	BSI-PP-0006-2002

4. Security Problem Definition

4.1. Assets

- 1. **SCD**: private key used to perform an electronic signature operation (confidentiality of the SCD must be maintained).
- 2. **SVD**: public key linked to the SCD and used to perform an electronic signature verification (integrity of the SVD when it is exported must be maintained).
- 3. **DTBS** and DTBS-representation: set of data, or its representation which is intended to be signed (Their integrity must be maintained).
- 4. **VAD**: PIN, PUK, Activate-PIN code or biometrics data entered by the End User to perform a signature operation, changing and unblocking (confidentiality and authenticity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed)
- 5. **RAD**: RAD, PUK, Activate-PIN code or biometrics authentication reference used to identify and authenticate the End User (integrity and confidentiality of RAD must be maintained)
- 6. **Signature-creation function**: Code of the SSCD dedicated to the generation of digital signature of DTBS using the SCD (The quality of the function must be maintained so that it can participate to the legal validity of electronic signatures)
- 7. **Electronic signature**: output of the Signature-creation function (Unforgeability of electronic signatures must be assured).

4.2. Subjects

This Security Target considers the following subjects:

Subjects	Definition	
S.User	End user of the TOE which can be identified as S.Admin or S.Signatory	
S.Admin	User who is in charge to perform the TOE initialization, TOE personalization or other TOE administrative functions.	
S.Signatory	User who holds the TOE and uses it on his own behalf or on behalf of the natural or legal person or entity he represents.	

4.3. Assumptions

The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used:

The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory's name and the SVD in the qualified certificate by an advanced signature of the CSP.

A.SCA	Trustworthy signature-creation application	
-------	--	--

The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends the DTBS-representation of data the signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.

If a party other than the signatory generates the SCD/SVD-pair of a signatory, then

- (a) this party will use a SSCD for SCD/SVD-generation,
- (b) confidentiality of the SCD will be guaranteed until the SCD is under the sole control of the signatory and
- (c) the SCD will not be used for signature-creation until the SCD is under the sole control of the signatory.
- (d) The generation of the SCD/SVD is invoked by authorised users only
- (e) The SSCD Type1 ensures the authenticity of the SVD it has created an exported

4.4. Threats

4.4.1. Threat agents

S.OFFCARD	Attacker. A human or process acting on his behalf being located outside the TOE. The main goal of the S.OFFCARD attacker is to access Application sensitive information. The attacker has a high level potential attack and knows no secret .
-----------	---

4.4.2. Threats to Security

T.Hack_Phys	Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces
-------------	---

An attacker interacts with the TOE interfaces to exploit vulnerabilities, resulting in arbitrary security compromises. This threat addresses all the assets.

T.SCD_Divulg Storing, copying, and releasing of the signature-creation data

An attacker can store, copy, the SCD outside the TOE. An attacker can release the SCD during generation, storage and use for signature-creation in the TOE.

T.SCD_Derive Derive the signature-creation data

An attacker derives the SCD from public known data, such as SVD corresponding to the SCD or signatures created by means of the SCD or any other data communicated outside the TOE, which is a threat against the secrecy of the SCD.

T.SVD_Forgery Forgery of the signature-verification data

An attacker forges the SVD presented by the TOE to the CGA. This results in loss of SVD integrity in the certificate of the signatory.

T.DTBS_Forgery Forgery of the DTBS-representation

An attacker modifies the DTBS-representation sent by the SCA. Thus the DTBS-representation used by the TOE for signing does not match the DTBS the signatory intended to sign.

T.SigF_Misuse Misuse of the signature-creation function of the TOE

An attacker misuses the signature-creation function of the TOE to create SDO for data the signatory has not decided to sign. The TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE.

T.Sig_Forgery Forgery of the electronic signature

An attacker forges the signed data object maybe together with its electronic signature created by the TOE and the violation of the integrity of the signed data object is not detectable by the signatory or by third parties. The signature generated by the TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE.

T.Sig_Repud Repudiation of signatures

If an attacker can successfully threaten any of the assets, then the non repudiation of the electronic signature is compromised. This results in the signatory being able to deny having signed data using the SCD in the TOE under his control even if the signature is successfully verified with the SVD contained in his un-revoked certificate.

T.MOD SOFT Unauthorized Software Modification

Unauthorized modification of Smart Card Embedded Software using the patch mechanism or the Card Content Loading and Installation mechanism.

4.5. Organizational Security Policies

The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations.

P.CSP_QCert *Qualified certificate*

The CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate the qualified certificate for the SVD generated by the SSCD. The qualified certificates contains at least the elements defined in Annex I of the Directive, i.e., inter alias the name of the signatory and the SVD matching the SCD implemented in the TOE under sole control of the signatory. The CSP ensures that the use of the TOE is evident with signatures through the certificate or other publicly available information.

P.QSign Qualified electronic signatures

The signatory uses a signature-creation system to sign data with qualified electronic signatures. The DTBS are presented to the signatory by the SCA. The qualified electronic signature is based on a qualified certificate (according to directive Annex 1) and is created by a SSCD.

P.Sigy_SSCD TOE as secure signature-creation device

The TOE implements the SCD used for signature creation under sole control of the signatory. The SCD used for signature generation can practically occur only once.

5. Security Objectives

This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives for the operational environment.

5.1. SOs for the TOE

This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.

OT.EMSEC_Design Provide physical emanations security	
--	--

Design and build the TOE in such a way as to control the production of intelligible emanations within specified limits.

OT.Lifecycle_Security Lifecycle security

The TOE shall detect flaws during the initialization, personalization and operational usage. The TOE shall provide safe destruction techniques for the SCD in case of re-import or re-generation.

OT.Init

SCD/SVD generation

The TOE provides security features to ensure that the generation of the SCD and the SVD is invoked by authorized users only

OT.SCD_Secrecy Secrecy of the signature-creation data

The secrecy of the SCD (used for signature generation) is reasonably assured against attacks with a high attack potential.

OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp Correspondence between SVD and SCD

The TOE shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD. The TOE shall verify the correspondence between the SCD and the SVD when they are generated by the TOE on demand. The TOE shall verify on demand the correspondence between the SCD stored in the TOE and the SVD if it has been sent to the TOE.

OT.SVD_Auth_TOE

The TOE provides means to enable the CGA to verify the authenticity SVD that has been exported by that TOE.

TOE ensures authenticity of the SVD

OT.Tamper ID

Tamper detection

The TOE provides system features that detect physical tampering of a system component, and use those features to limit security breaches.

OT.Tamper_Resistance Tamper resistance

The TOE prevents or resists physical tampering with specified system devices and components.

OT.SCD_Unique Uniqueness of the signature-creation data

The TOE shall ensure the cryptographic quality of the SCD/SVD pair for the qualified electronic signature. The SCD used for signature generation can practically occur only once and cannot be reconstructed from the SVD. In that context 'practically occur once' means that the probability of equal SCDs is negligible low.

OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE Verification of the DTBS-representation integrity

The TOE shall verify that the DTBS-representation received from the SCA has not been altered in transit between the SCA and the TOE. The TOE itself shall ensure that the DTBS-representation is not altered by the TOE as well. Note, that this does not conflict with the signature-creation process where the DTBS itself could be hashed by the TOE.

OT.Sigy_SigF Signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only

The TOE provides the signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only and protects the SCD against the use of others. The TOE shall resist attacks with high attack potential.

OT.Sig_Secure Cryptographic security of the electronic signature

The TOE generates electronic signatures that cannot be forged without knowledge of the SCD through robust encryption techniques. The SCD cannot be reconstructed using the electronic signatures. The electronic signatures shall be resistant against these attacks, even when executed with a high attack potential.

OT.SCD_Transfer Secure transfer of SCD between SSCD

The TOE shall ensure the confidentiality of the SCD transferred between SSCDs.

OT.CCLI_END Secure termination of Card Content Loading and Installation

The TOE shall ensure that a mechanism to close the TOE in post issuance is available to the Administrator. Terminating Card Content Loading and Installation feature implies that it is not possible for an attacker to load any applet in the card using the GlobalPlatform Card Content Management interfaces.

OT.PATCH END Secure termination of Patching

The TOE shall ensure that a mechanism to close the TOE patching mechanism is available to the Administrator. Terminating patching feature implies that it is not possible for an attacker to load any patch in the card.

5.2. SOs for the Environment

Because OS755/IDProtect v6 SSCD is both SSCD type 2 and SSCD type3 means that the TOE environment consists of a CGA, an SCA, an SSCD type 1 and a specific development environment.

OE.CGA_QCert	Generation of qualified certificates
--------------	--------------------------------------

The CGA generates qualified certificates which include inter alia

(a) the name of the signatory controlling the TOE,

(b) the SVD matching the SCD implemented in the TOE under sole control of the signatory,

(c) the advanced signature of the CSP

OE.SVD_Auth_CGA CGA verifies the authenticity of the SVD

The CGA verifies that the SSCD is the sender of the received SVD and the integrity of the received SVD. The CGA verifies the correspondence between the SCD in the SSCD of the signatory and the SVD in the qualified certificate.

OE.HI VAD	Protection of the VAD

If an external device provides the human interface for user authentication, this device will ensure confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed.

OE.SCA_Data_Intend Data intended to be signed
--

The SCA

- (a) generates the DTBS-representation of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which the signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for signing by the TOE,
- (b) sends the DTBS-representation to the TOE and enables verification of the integrity of the DTBS-representation by the TOE

(c) attaches the signature produced by the TOE to the data or provides it separately

OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp Correspondence between SVD and SCD

The SSCD Type1 shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD. The SSVD Type1 shall verify the correspondence between the SCD sent to the TOE and the SVD sent to the CGA or TOE.

OE.SCD_Transfer Secure transfer of SCD between SSCD

The SSCD Type1 shall ensure the confidentiality of the SCD transferred to the TOE. The SSCD Type1 shall prevent the export of a SCD that already has been used for signature generation by the SSCD Type2. The SCD shall be deleted from the SSCD Type1 whenever it is exported into the TOE.

OE.SCD_Unique

Uniqueness of the signature-creation data

The SSCD Type1 shall ensure the cryptographic quality of the SCD/SVD pair for the qualified electronic signature. The SCD used for signature generation can practically occur only once and cannot be reconstructed from the SVD. In that context 'practically occur once' means that the probability of equal SCDs is negligible low.

5.3. Security objectives rationale

All the security objectives described in the ST are traced back to items described in the TOE security environment and any items in the TOE security environment are covered by those security objectives appropriately.

5.3.1. Security Objectives Coverage

The following able indicates that all security objectives of the TOE are traced back to threats and/or organizational security policies and that all security objectives of the environment are traced back to threats, organizational security policies and/or assumptions.

Threats Assumptions Policies / Security objectives	OT.EMSEC_Design	OT.lifecycle_Security	OT.Init	OT.SCD_Secrecy	OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp	OT.SVD_Auth_TOE	OT.Tamper_ID	OT.Tamper_Resistance	OT.SCD_Unique	OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE	OT.Sigy_SigF	OT.Sig_Secure	OT.SCD_Transfer	OT.CCLI END	OT.PATCH_END	OE.CGA_Qcert	OE.SVD_Auth_CGA	OE.HI_VAD	OE.SCA_Data_Intend	OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp	OE.SCD_Transfer	OE.SCD_Unique
T.Hack_Phys	х			х			х	х														
T.SCD_Divulg				х									х								х	
T.SCD_Derive									х			х										х
T.SVD_Forgery						х											х					
T.DTBS_Forgery										х									х			
T.SigF_Misuse										х	х							х	х			
T.Sig_Forgery	х	х		х	х	х	х	х				х	х			х	х		х	х	х	
T.Sig_Repud	х	х		x	х	х	x	x	х	х	х	х	х			х	х		х	х	x	
T.MOD_SOFT														х	х							
A.CGA																х	х					
A.SCA																			х			
A.SCD_Generate																				х	х	х
P.CSP_Qcert					х											х				х		
P.Qsign											х	х				х			х			
P.Sigy_SSCD			х						х		х											х

 Table 1 – Security Environment to Security Objectives Mapping

5.3.2. Security Objectives Sufficiency

5.3.2.1. Policies and Security Objective Sufficiency

P.CSP_QCert (CSP generates qualified certificates) establishes the qualified certificate for the signatory and provides that the SVD matches the SCD that is implemented in the SSCD under sole control of this signatory. P.CSP_QCert is addressed by the TOE by OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp and OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp concerning the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD, in the TOE IT environment, by OE.CGA_QCert for generation of qualified certificates by the CGA, respectively.

P.QSign (Qualified electronic signatures) provides that the TOE and the SCA may be employed to sign data with qualified electronic signatures, as defined by the Directive [15], article 5, paragraph 1. Directive [15], recital (15) refers to SSCDs to ensure the functionality of advanced signatures. The requirement of qualified electronic signatures being based on qualified certificates is addressed by OE.CGA_QCert. OE.SCA_Data_Intend provides that the SCA presents the DTBS to the signatory and sends the DTBS-representation to the TOE. OT.Sig_Secure and OT.Sigy_SigF address the generation of advanced signatures by the TOE.

P.Sigy_SSCD (TOE as secure signature-creation device) establishes the TOE as secure signaturecreation device of the signatory with practically unique SCD. This is addressed by OT.Sigy_SigF ensuring that the SCD is under sole control of the signatory and OT.SCD_Unique and OE.SCD_Unique ensuring the cryptographic quality of the SCD/SVD pair for the qualified electronic signature. OT.Init provides that generation of the SCD/SVD pair is restricted to authorised users.

5.3.2.2. Threats and Security Objective Sufficiency

T.Hack_Phys (Exploitation of physical vulnerabilities) deals with physical attacks exploiting physical vulnerabilities of the TOE. OT.SCD_Secrecy preserves the secrecy of the SCD. Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces or observation of TOE emanations are countered by OT.EMSEC_Design. OT.Tamper_ID and OT.Tamper_Resistance counter the threat T.Hack_Phys by detecting and by resisting tamper attacks.

T.SCD_Divulg (Storing, copying, and releasing of the signature-creation data) addresses the threat against the legal validity of electronic signature due to storage and copying of SCD outside the TOE, as expressed in the Directive [15], recital (18). This threat is countered by OT.SCD_Secrecy which assures the secrecy of the SCD used for signature generation. OT.SCD_Transfer and OE.SCD_Transfer ensures the confidentiality of the SCD transferred between SSCDs.

T.SCD_Derive (Derive the signature-creation data) deals with attacks on the SCD via public known data produced by the TOE. This threat is countered by OT.SCD_Unique and OE.SCD_Unique that provide cryptographic secure generation of the SCD/SVD-pair. OT.Sig_Secure ensures cryptographic secure electronic signatures.

T.SVD_Forgery (Forgery of the signature-verification data) deals with the forgery of the SVD exported by the TOE to the CGA for the generation of the certificate. T.SVD_Forgery is addressed by OT.SVD_Auth_TOE which ensures that the TOE sends the SVD in a verifiable form to the CGA, as well as by OE.SVD_Auth_CGA which provides verification of SVD authenticity by the CGA.

T.DTBS_Forgery (Forgery of the DTBS-representation) addresses the threat arising from modifications of the DTBS-representation sent to the TOE for signing which than does not correspond to the DTBS-representation corresponding to the DTBS the signatory intends to sign. The TOE counters this threat by the means of OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE by verifying the integrity of the DTBS-representation. The TOE IT environment addresses T.DTBS_Forgery by the means of OE.SCA_Data_Indent.

T.SigF_Misuse (Misuse of the signature-creation function of the TOE) addresses the threat of misuse of the TOE signature-creation function to create SDO by others than the signatory to create SDO for data the signatory has not decided to sign, as required by the Directive [15], Annex III, paragraph 1, literal (c). This threat is addressed by the OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only), OE.SCA_Data_Intend (Data intended to be signed), OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (Verification of the DTBS-representation integrity), and OE.HI_VAD (Protection of the VAD) as follows: OT.Sigy_SigF ensures that the TOE provides the signature-generation function for the legitimate signatory only. OE.SCA_Data_Intend ensures that the SCA sends the DTBS-representation only for data the signatory intends to sign. The combination of OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE and OE.SCA_Data_Intend counters the misuse of the signature generation function by means of manipulation of the channel between the SCA and the TOE. If the SCA provides the human interface for the user authentication, OE.HI_VAD provides confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed.

T.Sig_Forgery (Forgery of the electronic signature) deals with non-detectable forgery of the electronic signature. This threat is in general addressed by OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature), OE.SCA_Data_Intend (SCA sends representation of data intended to be signed), OE.CGA_QCert (Generation of qualified certificates), OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD), OT.SVD_Auth_TOE (TOE ensures authenticity of the SVD), OE.SVD_Auth_CGA (CGA proves the authenticity of the SVD), OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of the signature-creation data), OT_SCD_Transfer (Secure transfer of SCD between SSCD), OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations security), OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection), OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) and OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security), as follows:

OT.Sig_Secure ensures by means of robust encryption techniques that the signed data and the electronic signature are securely linked together. OE.SCA_Data_Intend provides that the methods used by the SCA (and therefore by the verifier) for the generation of the DTBS-representation is appropriate for the cryptographic methods employed to generate the electronic signature. The combination of OE.CGA_QCert, OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp, OT.SVD_Auth_TOE, and OE.SVD_Auth_CGA provides the integrity and authenticity of the SVD that is used by the signature verification process. OT.Sig_Secure, OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.SCD_Transfer, OT.EMSEC_Design, OT.Tamper_ID, OT.Tamper_Resistance, and OT.Lifecycle_Security ensure the confidentiality of the SCD implemented in the signatory's SSCD and thus prevent forgery of the electronic signature by means of knowledge of the SCD.

T.Sig Repud (Repudiation of electronic signatures) deals with the repudiation of signed data by the signatory, although the electronic signature is successfully verified with the SVD contained in his unrevoked certificate. This threat is in general addressed by OE.CGA QCert (Generation of gualified certificates), OT.SVD Auth TOE (TOE ensures authenticity of the SVD), OE.SVD Auth CGA (CGA proves the authenticity of the SVD), OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD), OT.SCD Unique (Uniqueness of the signaturecreation data), OT.SCD Secrecy (Secrecy of the (Secure between data). OT.SCD Transfer transfer signature-creation of SCD SSCD). OT.EMSEC Design (Provide physical emanations security), OT.Tamper ID (Tamper detection), OT.Tamper Resistance (Tamper resistance), OT.Lifecycle Security (Lifecycle security), OT.Sigy SigF (Signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only), OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature), OE.SCA Data Intend (SCA sends representation of data intended to be signed) and OT.DTBS Integrity TOE (Verification of the DTBS-representation integrity).

OE.CGA QCert ensures gualified certificates which allow to identify the signatory and thus to extract the SVD of the signatory. OE.CGA_QCert, OT.SVD_Auth_TOE and OE.SVD_Auth_CGA ensure the integrity of the SVD. OE.CGA_QCert and OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp ensure that the SVD in the certificate correspond to the SCD that is implemented by the SSCD of the signatory. OT.SCD Unique provides that OT.Sig_Secure, OT.SCD Transfer, the signatory's SCD can practically occur just once. OT.SCD Secrecy. OT.Tamper ID, OT.Tamper Resistance, OT.EMSEC Design, and OT.Lifecycle Security ensure the confidentiality of the SCD implemented in the signatory's SSCD. OT.Sigy SigF provides that only the signatory may use the TOE for signature generation. OT.Sig Secure ensures by means of robust cryptographic techniques that valid electronic signatures may only be generated by employing the SCD corresponding to the SVD that is used for signature verification and only for the signed data. OE.SCA Data Intend and OT.DTBS Integrity TOE ensure that the TOE generates electronic signatures only for DTBS-representations which the signatory has decided to sign as DTBS.

The threat **T.MOD_SOFT** "**Unauthorized Software Modification**" deals with the alteration of loaded and installed software or more generally Applicative Card Content. This threat is in general addressed by OT.CCLI_END, and OT.PATCH_END. OT.CCLI_END guarantees that the Card Content Loading and Installing mechanism is no longer available once it is terminated. OT.PATCH_END guarantees that the patch loading is no longer available once it is terminated.

5.3.2.3. Assumptions and Security Objective Sufficiency

A.CGA (Trustworthy certification-generation application) establishes the protection of the authenticity of the signatory's name and the SVD in the qualified certificate by the advanced signature of the CSP by means of the CGA. This is addressed by OE.CGA_QCert (Generation of qualified certificates) which ensures the generation of qualified certificates and by OE.SVD_Auth_CGA (CGA proves the authenticity of the SVD) which ensures the verification of the integrity of the received SVD and the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD that is implemented by the SSCD of the signatory.

A.SCA (Trustworthy signature-creation application) establishes the trustworthiness of the SCA according to the generation of DTBS-representation. This is addressed by OE.SCA_Data_Intend (Data intended to be signed) which ensures that the SCA generates the DTBS-representation of the data that has been presented to the signatory as DTBS and which the signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for being signed by the TOE.

A.SCD_Generate (Trustworthy SCD/SVD generation) establishes a trustworthy SCD/SVD pair. This that the SCD must be unique, objective met by OE.SCD_Unique, that the SCD and the SVD must correspond, objective met by OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp. The secrecy of the SCD must be maintained while it is transferred to the TOE before being deleted, OE.SCD_Transfer.

6. Extended Components Definition

This ST contains the following extended component defined as extension to CC part 2 in the claimed PPs [4,5]:

- SFR FPT_EMSEC.1 'TOE emanation'

6.1. TOE emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)

The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE's electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [2].

The family "TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)" is specified as follows.

Family behavior

This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.

Component leveling:

FPT EMSEC TOE emanation]	1	
-------------------------	---	---	--

FPT_EMSEC.	1 TOE Emanatio	on has two constituents:			
	FPT_EMSEC.1.1	Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF data or user data.			
	FPT_EMSEC.1.2	Interface Emanation requires not to emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF data or user data.			
Management:	FPT_EMSEC.1				
	There are no managen	nent activities foreseen.			
Audit:	FPT_EMSEC.1				
	There are no actions d	efined to be auditable.			
FPT_EMSEC	C.1 TOE Emanation				
	Hierarchical to: No oth	her components.			
	Dependencies: No dep	pendencies.			
FPT_EMSEC.1.1	[assignment: spec	not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of cified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of ssignment: list of types of user data].			
FPT_EMSEC.1.2		ensure [assignment: <i>type of users</i>] are unable to use the ace [assignment: <i>type of connection</i>] to gain access to			

following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].

7. Security Requirements

This chapter gives the security functional requirements and the security assurance requirements for the TOE.

Security functional requirements components given in section 7.1, except FPT_EMSEC.1 which is explicitly stated, are drawn from Common Criteria part 2 v2.3: they are extracted from the claimed PPs which have been certified before CC v3.0 was issued. The content of the SFRs present in this ST have not been impacted by the CC v3.1: FDP_ITC.1 and FDP_SDI.1 have only been rephrased.

Some security functional requirements represent extensions to [2]. Operations for assignment, selection and refinement have been made and are designated by an <u>underline</u>, in addition, where operations that were uncompleted in the PPs are also identified by <u>italic underlined</u> type.

The TOE security assurance requirements statement given in section 7.2 is drawn from the security assurance components from Common Criteria part 3 [3].

7.1. TOE Security Functional Requirements

7.1.1. Cryptographic support (FCS)

7.1.1.1. Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)

FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <u>RSA</u> and specified cryptographic key sizes <u>between 1024 bit and 2048 bit</u> that meet the following: <u>Algorithms and parameters for algorithms [16]</u>.

7.1.1.2. Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)

FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in case of importation or generation of a new SCD and re-importation of a new DES Key in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method <u>overwriting old key with new key</u> that meets the following: <u>none</u>.

Application note:

The cryptographic key SCD will be destroyed on demand of the Signatory or Administrator. The destruction of the SCD is mandatory before the SCD/SVD pair is re-generated by the TOE. Re-importation is not supported by the TOE.

7.1.1.3. Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)

FCS_COP.1.1/ CORRESP	The TSF shall perform <u>SCD / SVD correspondence verification</u> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <u>RSA</u> and cryptographic key sizes <u>between 1024 bit and 2048 bit</u> that meet the following: <u>Algorithms and parameters</u> for algorithms [16].
FCS_COP.1.1/ SIGNING	The TSF shall perform <u>digital signature-generation</u> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <u>RSA</u> and cryptographic key sizes <u>1024 bit, 1536 bit and</u> <u>2048 bit</u> that meet the following: <u>RSA CRT with hashing SHA-1 or SHA-256 and</u> with padding PKCS#1 v1.5 as per Algorithms and parameters for algorithms [16].
FCS_COP.1.1/ ENC	The TSF shall perform <u>data encryption/decryption for Administrator and Signatory</u> <u>authentication and Secure Messaging</u> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <u>TDES CBC</u> and cryptographic key sizes <u>16 bytes</u> that meet the following: <u>FIPS PUB 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES) [22]</u> .
FCS_COP.1.1/ MAC	The TSF shall perform <u>Message Authentication Code for Secure Messaging</u> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <u>TDES MAC</u> and cryptographic key sizes <u>16 bytes</u> that meet the following: <u>FIPS PUB 46-3 Data</u> Encryption Standard (DES) [22].

7.1.2. User data protection (FDP)

7.1.2.1. Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)

FDP_ACC.1.1/The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP on import and on export of SVD by
User.SVD Transfer SFPUser.

Application note:

FDP_ACC.1/SVD Transfer SFP is only required to protect the exportation of the SVD as the SVD is never imported from an SSCD type 1 into the TOE. Actually, this TOE only provides SCD/SVD import with a fixed SVD that is known by the TOE: only SCD is transferred during an SCD/SVD import.

FDP_ACC.1.1/ SCD Import SFP	The TSF shall enforce the <u>SCD Import SFP</u> on <u>Import of SCD by User</u> .
FDP_ACC.1.1/ Initialisation SFP	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Initialisation SFP</u> on <u>generation of SCD/SVD pair</u> by User.
FDP_ACC.1.1/ Personalisation SFP	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Personalisation SFP</u> on <u>creation of RAD by</u> Administrator and update of RAD DES Key by Signatory.
FDP_ACC.1.1/	The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP on
Signature Creation SFP	1. sending of DTBS-representation by SCA,
	2. signing of DTBS-representation by Signatory.

7.1.2.2. Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)

The security attributes for the user, TOE components and related status are:

User, subject or object the attribute is associated with	Attribute	Status
General attribute		
User	Role	Administrator, Signatory
Initialization attribute		
User	SCD / SVD management	authorized, not authorized
SCD	Secure SCD import allowed	No, yes
Signature-creation attribute group		
SCD	SCD operational	no, yes
DTBS	sent by an authorized SCA	no, yes

Initialisation SFP

FDP_ACF.1.1/ Initialisation SFP	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Initialisation SFP</u> to objects based on the following: <u>General attribute and Initialisation attribute</u> .
FDP_ACF.1.2/ Initialisation SFP	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
	The user with the security attribute "role" set to "Administrator" or set to "Signatory" and with the security attribute "SCD / SVD management" set to "authorised" is allowed to generate SCD/SVD pair.
FDP_ACF.1.3/ Initialisation SFP	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <u>none</u> .
FDP_ACF.1.4/	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule:
Initialisation SFP	The user with the security attribute "role" set to "Administrator" or set to "Signatory" and with the security attribute "SCD / SVD management" set to "not authorised" is not allowed to generate SCD/SVD pair.

SVD Transfer SFP	
FDP_ACF.1.1/ SVD Transfer SFP	The TSF shall enforce the <u>SVD Transfer SFP</u> to objects based on the following: <u>General attribute</u> .
FDP_ACF.1.2/ SVD Transfer SFP	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
	The user with the security attribute "role" set to "Administrator" or to "Signatory" is allowed to export SVD.
FDP_ACF.1.3/ SVD Transfer SFP	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <u>none</u> .
FDP_ACF.1.4/ SVD Transfer SFP	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule: <u>none</u> .
SCD Import SFP	

•	
FDP_ACF.1.1/ SCD Import SFP	The TSF shall enforce the <u>SCD Import SFP</u> to objects based on the following: <u>General attribute and Initialisation attribute group</u> .
FDP_ACF.1.2/ SCD Import SFP	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
	The user with the security attribute "role" set to "Administrator" or to "Signatory" and with the security attribute "SCD / SVD management" set to "authorised" is allowed to import SCD if the security attribute "secure SCD import allowed" is set to "yes".
FDP_ACF.1.3/ SCD Import SFP	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <u>none</u> .
FDP_ACF.1.4/	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule:
SCD Import SFP	(a) The user with the security attribute "role" set to "Administrator" or to <u>"Signatory" and with the security attribute "SCD / SVD management" set to</u> <u>"not authorised" is not allowed to import SCD if the security attribute "secure</u> <u>SCD import allowed" is set to "yes".</u>
	(b) The user with the security attribute "role" set to "Administrator" or to <u>"Signatory" and with the security attribute "SCD / SVD management" set to</u> <u>"authorised" is not allowed to import SCD if the security attribute "secure</u> <u>SCD import allowed" is set to "no".</u>
Personalisation SFP	
FDP_ACF.1.1/ Personalisation SFP	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Personalisation SFP</u> to objects based on the following: <u>General attribute</u> .
FDP_ACF.1.2/ Personalisation SFP	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
	User with the security attribute "role" set to "Administrator" is allowed to create the RAD.
	<u>User with the security attribute "role" set to "Signatory" is allowed to update the RAD (import PIN or DES Key)</u> .
FDP_ACF.1.3/ Personalisation SFP	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <u>none</u> .
FDP_ACF.1.4/ Personalisation SFP	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule: <u>none</u>

Signature-creation SFP	
FDP_ACF.1.1/ Signature Creation SFP	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Signature-creation SFP</u> to objects based on the following: <u>General attribute and Signature-creation attribute group</u> .
FDP_ACF.1.2/ Signature Creation SFP	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
	<u>User with the security attribute "role" set to "Signatory" is allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS sent by an authorised SCA with SCD by the Signatory which security attribute "SCD operational" is set to "yes".</u>
FDP_ACF.1.3/ Signature Creation SFP	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <u>none</u> .
FDP_ACF.1.4/	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rules:
Signature Creation SFP	(a) User with the security attribute "role" set to "Signatory" is not allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS which is not sent by an authorised SCA with SCD by the Signatory which security attribute "SCD operational" is set to "yes".
	(b) <u>User with the security attribute "role" set to "Signatory" is not allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS sent by an authorised SCA with SCD by the Signatory which security attribute "SCD operational" is set to "no".</u>
7.1.2.3. Export of user data without security attributes (FDP_ETC.1)	
	e TSF shall enforce the <u>SVD Transfer SFP</u> when exporting user data, controlled der the SFP(s), outside of the TOE.

FDP_ETC.1.2/ The TSF shall export the user data without the user data's associated security attributes.

7.1.2.4. Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1)

FDP_ITC.1.1/ SCD	The TSF shall enforce the <u>SCD Import SFP</u> when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/ SCD	The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/ SCD	The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: <u>SCD shall be sent by an authorised SSCD</u> .

Application note:

An SSCD of Type 1 is authorised to send SCD to an SSCD of Type 2, if it is designated to generate the SCD for this SSCD of Type 2 and to export the SCD for import into this SSCD of Type 2. Authorised SSCD of Type 1 is able to establish a trusted channel to the SSCD of Type 2 for SCD transfer as required by FTP_ITC.1.3/SCD export.

FDP_ITC.1.1/The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP when importing user data,
controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.

FDP_ITC.1.2/ The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.

FDP_ITC.1.3/The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled
under the SFP from outside the TOE: DTBSDTBSauthorised SCA.

Application note:

An SCA is authorised to send the DTBS-representation if it is actually used by the Signatory to create an electronic signature and able to establish a trusted channel to the SSCD as required by FTP_ITC.1.3/ DTBS Import.

FDP_ITC.1.1/
DES KeyThe TSF shall enforce the <u>Personalization SFP</u> when importing user data,
controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.FDP_ITC.1.2/
DES KeyThe TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TOE.FDP_ITC.1.3/
DES KeyThe TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled
under the SFP from outside the TOE: None.

Application note:

DES Key importation includes SM Keys update and RAD update when the RAD is in the form of a DES Key. Only the Signatory is allowed to import a new value for a DES Key, and it shall be done under a trusted channel.

7.1.2.5. Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)

FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the <u>de-allocation of the resource from</u> the following objects: <u>SCD</u>, <u>VAD</u>, <u>RAD</u>.

7.1.2.6. Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)

The following data persistently stored by TOE have the user data attribute "integrity checked persistent stored data" (integrity redundancy code):

- 1. SCD
- 2. RAD
- 3. SVD (if persistent stored by TOE)
- 4. Corrective patch code and data

FDP_SDI.2.1/ Persistent	The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for <u>integrity error</u> on all objects, based on the following attributes: <u>integrity checked</u> <u>persistent data</u> .
FDP_SDI.2.2/ Persistent	Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
	1 prohibit the use of the altered data

2. inform the Signatory about integrity error.

The DTBS-representation temporarily stored by TOE has the user data attribute "integrity checked stored data":

FDP_SDI.2.1/	The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for
DTBS	integrity error on all objects, based on the following attributes: integrity checked
	stored data.

FDP_SDI.2.2/ Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall DTBS

- 1. prohibit the use of the altered data
 - 2. <u>inform the Signatory about integrity error</u>.

7.1.2.7. Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)

FDP_UCT.1.1/ The TSF shall enforce the <u>SCD Import SFP</u> to be able to <u>receive</u> user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.

7.1.2.8. Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)

FDP_UIT.1.1/ SVD Transfer	The TSF shall enforce the <u>SVD Transfer SFP</u> to be able to <u>transmit</u> user data in a manner protected from <u>modification and insertion</u> errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/ SVD Transfer	The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether <u>modification</u> and insertion has occurred.

- FDP_UIT.1.1/The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP to be able to receive the DTBS-
representation in a manner protected from modification, deletion and insertion
errors.
- FDP_UIT.1.2/The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification,
deletion and insertion has occurred.

7.1.3. Identification and authentication (FIA)

7.1.3.1. Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)

- FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when <u>10 consecutive</u> unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to: <u>RAD authentication and PUK authentication</u>.
- FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall <u>block RAD</u>.

7.1.3.2. User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)

FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: <u>RAD</u>.

7.1.3.3. Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)

- FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
 - 1. Identification of the user by means of TSF required by FIA_UID.1.
 - 2. Establishing a trusted path between the TOE and a SSCD of Type 1 by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SCD Import
 - 3. Establishing a trusted path between local user and the TOE by means of TSF required by FTP_TRP.1/TOE
 - 4. Establishing a trusted channel between the SCA and the TOE by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/DTBS import.

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

Application note:

"Local user" mentioned in component FIA_UAU.1.1 is the user using the trusted path provided between the SGA in the TOE environment and the TOE as indicated by FTP_TRP.1/SCA and FTP_TRP.1/TOE.

7.1.3.4. Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)

- FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
 - 1. <u>Establishing a trusted channel between the TOE and a SSCD of Type 1 by</u> means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SCD import.
 - 2. <u>Establishing a trusted path between local user and the TOE by means of TSF required by FTP_TRP.1/TOE.</u>
 - 3. Establishing a trusted channel between the SCA and the TOE by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/DTBS import.

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

7.1.4. Security management (FMT)

7.1.4.1. Management of security functions behaviour (FMT_MOF.1)

FMT_MOF.1/ Sign	The TSF shall restrict the ability to $\underline{\text{enable}}$ the functions $\underline{\text{signature-creation function}}$ to $\underline{\text{Signatory}}$.
<u>FMT_MOF.1/</u> Patch	The TSF shall restrict the ability to <i>disable</i> the functions <i>Patching</i> to <i>Administrator</i> .
FMT_MOF.1/ CCLI	The TSF shall restrict the ability to <i>disable</i> the functions <i>Card Content Loading and Installation</i> to <i>Administrator</i> .

7.1.4.2. Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)

- FMT_MSA.1.1/
 The TSF shall enforce the <u>SCD Import SFP and Initialisation SFP</u> to restrict the ability to <u>modify</u> the security attributes <u>SCD/SVD management and Secure SCD</u> import allowed to <u>Administrator</u>.
- FMT_MSA.1.1/The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP to restrict the ability to modifySignatorythe security attributes SCD operational to Signatory.

7.1.4.3. Secure security attributes (FMT_MSA.2)

FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for security attributes.

7.1.4.4. Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)

FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the <u>SCD Import SFP</u>, <u>Initialisation SFP and Signature-</u> <u>creation SFP</u> to provide <u>restrictive</u> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

Refinement:

The security attribute of the SCD "SCD operational" is set to "No" after generation or Importation of the SCD.

FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the <u>Administrator</u> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

7.1.4.5. Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)

FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to <u>modify or unblock</u> the <u>RAD</u> to <u>Signatory</u>.

Application note:

The RAD can be unblocked by the Signatory after presentation of the PUK by the Signatory. in case of a PIN. In case of a DES Key, the RAD cannot be unlocked.

7.1.4.6. Specifications of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: <u>RAD creation, RAD Modification, Access Condition Management,</u> <u>Patching termination, Card Content Loading and Installation termination</u>.

7.1.4.7. Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)

- FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles <u>Administrator</u> and <u>Signatory</u>.
- FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

7.1.5. Protection of the TSF (FPT)

7.1.5.1. TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)

- FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit *information of IC Power consumption* in excess of <u>State of</u> <u>the Art values</u> enabling access to <u>RAD</u> and <u>SCD</u>.
- FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure <u>any user</u> is unable to use the following interface <u>physical</u> <u>chip contacts I/O</u> to gain access to <u>RAD</u> and <u>SCD</u>.

Application note:

The TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may origin from internal operation of the TOE or may origin by an attacker that varies the physical environment under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement the TOE. Examples of measurable phenomena are variations in the power consumption, the timing of transitions of internal states, electromagnetic radiation due to internal operation, radio emission.

Due to the heterogeneous nature of the technologies that may cause such emanations, evaluation against state-of-the-art attacks applicable to the technologies employed by the TOE is assumed. Examples of such attacks are, but are not limited to, evaluation of TOE's electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc.

7.1.5.2. Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)

FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: <u>IC</u> <u>sensors failure detection (RNG failure, EEPROM failure, out of range temperature, clock and voltage of chip)</u>.

7.1.5.3. Passive detection of physical attack (FPT_PHP.1)

- FPT_PHP.1.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the TSF.
- FPT_PHP.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.

7.1.5.4. Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)

FPT_PHP.3.1The TSF shall resist <u>Environment attacks (clock frequency and voltage tampering)</u>
and Intrusive attacks (penetration of the module protective layers) to the <u>IC</u>
Hardware by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

7.1.5.5. TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)

- FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests <u>during initial start-up or before running a</u> <u>secure operation</u> to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
- FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data.
- FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.

7.1.6. Trusted path/channels (FTP)

7.1.6.1. Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)

- FTP_ITC.1.1/The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a remote
trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
- FTP_ITC.1.2/The TSF shall permit the remote trusted IT product to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.SCD Importtrusted channel.
- FTP_ITC.1.3/The TSF or the trusted IT shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
SCD Import.SCD ImportSCD Import.
- FTP_ITC.1.1/ The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
- FTP_ITC.1.2/The TSF shall permit the remote trusted IT product to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.SVD Transfertrusted channel.
- FTP_ITC.1.3/The TSF or the trusted IT shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
transfer of SVD.
- FTP_ITC.1.1/The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a remote
trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
- FTP_ITC.1.2/The TSF shall permit the remote trusted IT product to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.DTBS Importtrusted channel.
- FTP_ITC.1.3/The TSF or the trusted IT shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
signing DTBS-representation.

Refinement:

The mentioned remote trusted IT products are: an SSCD type 1 for SCD import, the CGA for the SVD transfer, and the SCA for DTBS Import.

7.1.6.2. Trusted path (FTP_TRP.1)

The trusted path between the TOE and the SCA will be required only if the human interface for user authentication is not provided by the TOE itself but by the SCA.

FTP_TRP.1.1/The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and local users that is
logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from
modification or disclosure.

FTP_TRP.1.2/ The TSF shall permit *local users* to initiate communication via the trusted path. TOE

FTP_TRP.1.3/ The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for *initial user authentication*. TOE

Refinement:

The local and initial user who can communicate and authenticate with the TOE via a trusted path is the Signatory only.

7.2. TOE Security Assurance Requirements

TOE Security Assurance Requirements as stated in section 5.2 of the claimed PPs [4,5].

AVA_VAN is augmented from 3 to 5, compared to the CC V3.1 package for EAL4. This augmentation in CC v3.1 complies with the augmentation required by the claimed PPs.

7.2.1. SARs Measures

The assurance measures that satisfy the TOE security assurance requirements are the following:

Assurance Class	Component	Description
	ADV_ARC.1	Security architecture description
ADV:	ADV_FSP.4	Complete functional specification
Development	ADV_IMP.1	Implementation representation of the TSF
	ADV_TDS.3	Basic modular design
AGD:	AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance
Guidance documents	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures
	ALC_CMC.4	Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
	ALC_CMS.4	Problem of Tracking CM coverage
ALC:	ALC_DEL.1	Delivery procedures
Lifecycle support	ALC_DVS.1	Identification of security measures
	ALC_LCD.1	Developer defined lifecycle model
	ALC_TAT.1	Well defined development tools
	ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims
	ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition
ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_INT.1	ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.2	Security objectives
	ASE_REQ.2	Derived security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification
	ATE_COV.2	Analysis of coverage
ATE:	ATE_DPT.2	Testing: security enforcing modules
Test	ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing
	ATE_IND.2	Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.5	Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

 Table 2 – Assurance Requirements: EAL4 augmented

7.2.2. SARs Rationale

The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.

Augmentation results from the selection of:

AVA_VAN.5 Vulnerability Assessment - Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfill the security objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof and OT.AA_Proof.

The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:

ADV_ARC.1	Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2	Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.3	Basic modular design
ADV_IMP.1	Implementation representation
AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures

All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.

8. TOE summary specification

This set of TSFs manages the identification and/or authentication of the external user and enforces role separation (FMT_SMR.1).

All details of the Security Functions of this TOE can be obtained by contacting an Athena Sales and Support representative. This Security Target Lite contains the main highlights for each Security Function.

8.1. SF.Access Control

This function checks that for each operation initiated by a user, the security attributes for user authorization (FMT_SMR.1) and data communication required are satisfied. The function includes:

Control over the authorization of Administrator to:

- Load and Install Card Content (such as applets)
- Load and Install Patches
- Create an initial SCD/SVD Key Pair
 - Import SCD with fixed SVD (FDP_ACC.1/SCD Import SFP, FDP_ACF.1/SCD Import SFP) from an authorised SSCD Type 1
 - Generate the SCD/SVD key pair
 - Export SVD (FDP_ACC.1/SVD Transfer SFP, FDP_ACF.1/SVD Transfer SFP)
- Manage the SCD/SVD security attributes after the key pair is created (imported or generated)
 - "SCD/SVD management" is set to "not authorized" (FDP_ACC.1/Initialisation SFP,
 - FDP_ACF.1/Initialisation SFP, FMT_MSA.1/Administrator, FMT_SMF.1)
 - "SCD Operational" is set to "No" (FMT_MSA.3)
- Create the RAD during personalisation (FDP_ACC.1/Personalisation SFP, FDP_ACF.1/Personalisation SFP)
- Control over the authorization of Signatory to:
 - Activate the SCD and set its operational state to "Yes" (FMT MSA.1/Signatory, FMT SMF.1)
 - Import a new SCD (FDP_ITC.1/SCD)
 - Generate a new SCD/SVD key pair
 - Export SVD (FDP ACC.1/SVD Transfer SFP, FDP ACF.1/SVD Transfer SFP)
 - Sign DTBS data sent by an authorized SCA (FDP_ITC.1/DTBS, FDP_ACC.1/ Signature Creation SFP, FDP_ACF.1/ Signature Creation SFP, FMT_MOF.1/Sign). Any security attributes associated with the DTBS are ignored.
 - Unblock and modify the RAD (FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1).

Control over the enforcement of secure messaging over:

- Export of the SVD (FTP_ITC.1/SVD Export)
- Importation of the DTBS-Representation (FTP_ITC.1/DTBS Import)
- Importation of the SCD (FTP_ITC.1/SCD Import)

8.2. SF.Administration

<u>In Initialization Phase</u>, this TSF provides Card initialization and pre-personalization services as per GlobalPlatform. This includes but is not restricted to card initialization, patch loading, applet installation and instantiation.

This TSF also provides personalization functions to allow the Administrator to create and set the initial File System (LDS) (FMT_SMF.1). This includes disabling read access to Initialization data, Patch mechanism and Card Content Loading and Installation at completion of the personalization phase (FIA_UAU.1, FMT_MOF.1/CCLI, and FMT_MOF.1/Patch).

The Administrator is the only user authenticated through the GlobalPlatform Mutual Authentication process (FCS_COP.1/ENC). He authenticates during the Manufacturing Phase of the TOE using the Secure Channel protocol (SCP01 or SCP02) with the Operating System to launch the installation of the IAS-ECC applet and to perform TOE Operating System (OS) personalization (pre-personalization).

When the TOE is ready to be personalized, the Administrator will create the authentication data for the Personalization Phase within the IAS-ECC Applet and terminate this manufacturing stage by disabling the card content loading and installation functions (FMT_MOF.1/CCLI, FMT_MOF.1/Patch).

<u>In Personalization Phase</u>, the Administrator is identified through the relevant access rights during the initialization and personalization of the TOE.

In Usage phase, the Administrator could also use this authentication method to set TERMINATE the TOE.

IC power variation emanation is below state of the art values, and physical access to the authentication data is protected during this SF activity (FPT_EMSEC.1).

8.3. SF.Signatory Authentication

This TSF manages the identification and authentication of the Signatory and enforces role separation (FMT_SMR.1) between the Signatory and the Administrator.

Signatory Authentication: RAD

TSF mediated actions are not allowed by the TOE before the user is identified (FIA_UID.1), authenticated and associated to the role of Signatory (FDP_ACF.1/Signature Creation SFP).

The authentication of the Signatory is made through validation of the RAD by the TOE (FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UAU.1). This is only possible if the RAD allows remaining attempts (FIA_AFL.1): each failed attempt to authenticate is counted and when maximum amount of consecutive attempts failure is reached RAD is blocked. A successful authentication resets the counter and an unblocking mechanism is provided (FMT_MTD.1).

The RAD can be a PIN or a Key, and RAD validation consists of:

- in case of a RAD-PIN, presentation of the VAD and comparison with the stored RAD,
- in case of a RAD-Key, achievement of a challenge-response authentication (FCS_COP.1/ENC)

Signatory data characteristics:

Data	Туре	Length	Max retry	Purpose of verification
	PIN	≥ 6 bytes	10	Authoritizate the Circatory
RAD	TDES key	16 bytes	10	Authenticate the Signatory
PUK	PIN	≥ 6 bytes	10	Unblock RAD-PIN (reset Retry Counter)

IC power variation emanation is below state of the art values, and physical access to the RAD is protected during this SF activity (FPT_EMSEC.1).

8.4. SF.Signature Creation

This TSF is responsible for signing DTBS data using the SCD by the Signatory, following successful authentication of the Signatory.

The SF generates digital signatures using RSA 1024 to 4096 bit (FMT_MSA.2, FCS_COP.1/SIGNING) and SHA-1, SHA-256 hashing calculated by the host. The signature is calculated based on PKCS#1 version 1.5 [25].

A hash value calculated over the DTBS is sent to the TOE by the IT Environment.

The integrity of the DTBS representation is maintained through the use of SF. Secure Messaging (FDP_SDI.2/DTBS).

IC power variation emanation is limited to below state of the art values, and physical access to the SCD is protected during this SF activity (FPT_EMSEC.1).

8.5. SF.Secure Messaging

Commands and responses are exchanged between the TOE and the external device.

Various data and processes such as DTBSs, signatures, public keys, identification and authentication data, SVD Transfer or other user data are embedded in command and response frames. The SF.Secure Messaging function is capable of providing a secure communication channel between legitimate end points both of the TOE and the external device. The secure communication channels are supported with cryptographic functions and provide for 4 distinct channels (TOE and SSCD Type 1, TOE and CGA, TOE and SCA, TOE and User) logically distinct from each other and other communication channels and provide assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

This function is responsible for confidentiality and data authentication. Confidentiality is ensured through the encryption of communication data by symmetric cryptography by the use 3DES operations (FCS_COP.1/ENC). Data authentication and integrity is achieved by calculating of a cryptographic checksum (MAC) (FCS_COP.1/MAC).

The SSCD Type 1, CGA, SCA and local user are allowed to initiate the communication with the TOE through via a trusted channel (FTP_TRP.1/TOE)

TOE and SSCD Type 1

During SCD Import (FTP_ITC/SCD Import), a trusted channel between the TOE and the SSCD Type 1 is established with secure messaging. Secure Messaging shall be setup to prevent disclosure of the imported SCD (FDP_UCT.1/Receiver).

TOE and CGA

During SVD export from the TOE to the CGA (FTP_ITC.1/SVD Transfer, FDP_UIT.1/SVD Transfer), a trusted channel between the TOE and the CGA is established with secure messaging. Secure messaging maintains the integrity of the exported SVD. The SVD is exported without associated security attributes (FDP_ETC.1/SVD Transfer).

TOE and SCA

During import of the DTBS from the SCA to the TOE, a trusted channel, through secure messaging, is established between the SCA and the TOE (FTP_ITC.1/DTBS import, FDP_UIT.1/TOE DTBS). Secure Messaging maintains the integrity of the DTBS during import.

TOE and User

During the change of RAD secure messaging is enforced (FMT_SMF.1)

8.6. SF.Crypto

This Security Function is responsible for providing cryptographic support to all the other Security Functions including secure key generation, secure random generator, and data hashing:

- Secure generation of asymmetric Key Pair (FCS_CKM.1, FMT_MSA.2), key generation is protected against SPA, Timing attacks, and electromagnetic emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1) and includes Key Pair Correspondence verification (FCS_COP.1/CORRESP): RSA key pair with length from 1024 to 2048 bits
- Data hashing using SHA-1, or SHA-256 (FCS_COP.1/SIGNING)
- Digital Signature generation with RSA CRT Key Pair of lengths 1024 to 2048 with PKCS#1 v1.5 (FCS_COP.1/SIGNING)
- TDES 2 Keys in CBC and Retail MAC modes (FDP_UIT.1, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/MAC)
- Secure destruction of cryptographic key secret or private material (FCS_CKM.4).
- The random number generator of the underlying IC is used by the TOE whenever the generation of a nonce is required.
- Adequate number of Rabin Miller test rounds is performed in addition to GCD test in order to ensure correct generation of primes.

This TSF enforces protection of Key material during cryptographic functions processing and Key Generation, against state-of-the-art attacks, including IC power consumption analysis (FPT_EMSEC.1)

8.7. SF.Protection

This Security Function is responsible for protection of the TSF data, user data, and TSF functionality. The SF. Protection function is composed of software implementations of test and security functions including:

- Performing self tests of the TOE at each power-up (FPT_TST.1)
- Deleting authentication resources (Biometrics, PINs, secret and private keys) when relevant memory is de-allocated (FCS_CKM.4, FDP_RIP.1)
- Validating the integrity of all stored cryptographic keys and PINs before use (FDP_SDI.2/Persistent) and informing the Terminal when such validation fails (FPT_TST.1).
- Performing a set of test to verify that the underlying cryptographic algorithms are operating correctly (FPT_TST.1).
- Initializing memory after reset
- Initializing memory of de-allocated data
- Preserving secure state after sensitive processing failure (RNG, EEPROM handling) or potential physical tampering or intrusion detection (FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.1, FPT_PHP.3)
- Termination of the card content loading and installation services (FMT_MOF.1/CCLI, FMT_SMF.1)
- Patch loading and termination (FMT_MOF.1/Patch, FMT_SMF.1)

The TOE provides the ability to patch some identified native functions of the original Operating System TOE. This mechanism is available during fabrication phase but in the case of this TOE, no patch of the Operating System is loaded. The patch activities during the fabrication phase are reduced to the termination of the patch mechanism.

This TSF prevents re-activation of de-activated or disabled or terminated mechanisms: the code area and data area are protected.

9. Additional Rationale

9.1. Rational for assurance measures

Each assurance requirement is covered by an assurance measure.

Assurance Requirements / Assurance Measures	AM_ADV	AM_AGD	AM_ALC	AM_ATE	AM_AVA
ADV	х				
AGD		х			
ALC			х		
ATE				х	
AVA					Х

 Table 3 – Mapping Assurance Requirements to Assurance Measures

9.2. Rationale for Extensions

Extensions are based on the Protection Profiles [4,5] and have all been adopted by the developer of the TOE:

- FPT_EMSEC.1 'TOE emanation'

9.3. PP Claim Rationale

This ST includes all the security objectives and requirements claimed by the two claimed Protection Profiles [4,5] and, all of the operations applied to the SFRs are in accordance with the requirements of these PPs.

9.3.1. SPD Rationale

All assets, assumptions, threats and OSPs of each claimed PPs have been strictly applied to this TOE.

The following threat has been added:

T.MOD_SOFT threat has been added as the TOE provides mechanisms for loading and installing software, and patching original software during the Initialization phase. These features actually introduce threats that some illegal modifications of the TOE might be performed.

No assumptions have been added:

9.3.2. Objectives Rationale

OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp objective for the TOE has been reworded to apply to the TOE. Actually, this TOE does not provide on-demand SCD/SVD correspondence as this is provided by construction when they are generated or imported on the TOE.

The following objectives for the TOE have been added to those of the Protection Profiles:

OT.CCLI_END objective has been added to cover the fact that the card is closed before issuance: installation phase includes a step that terminates Card Content Loading and Installing. This procedure is irreversible.

OT.PATCH_END objective has been added to cover the fact that the card provides a patch mechanism that allows patch loading and termination during Initialization phase of the TOE. Terminating the patch mechanism is irreversible: loaded patches are always run instead of the original code and no more patches can be loaded.

9.3.3. SFR Rationale

The selections and assignments performed in the TOE are compliant with the Protection Profiles. Selections and refinements of SFRs allowable by the Protection Profiles were performed and are noted by using underline italic text. The following SFRs from the PPs have been reworked.

Assignments:

- FCS CKM.1.1
- FCS_CKM.4.1
- FCS COP.1.1/CORRESP
- FCS COP.1.1/SIGNING _
- FIA AFL.1.1 -
- FMT MSA.1.1/ADMINISTRATOR _
- FMT MTD.1.1
- FPT EMSEC.1.1
- FPT EMSEC.1.2 -
- _ FPT FLS.1.1
- _ FPT PHP.3.1
- FPT_TST.1.1
- FTP_TRP.1.3

Selections:

- FPT TST.1.1
- FTP ITC.1.2 (all)
- FTP_TRP.1.2 FTP_TRP.1.3

Refinements:

FIA AFL.1.1: the PP SFR text was reworded to be applied to two authentication mechanisms

FMT MSA.3.1: a restriction applies to the "Secure SCD Import allowed" security attribute

The compliancy with the two PPs (SSCD Type 2 and Type 3) has the following impact on the SFRs:

- FIA UAU.1.1: the SFR from [4] includes the SFR from [5], considering SCD Import
- FIA UID.1.1: the SFR from [4] includes the SFR from [5], considering SCD Import
- FMT MSA.1.1/Administrator: the SFRs from [5] and [4] are not overlapping and are merged
- FMT MSA.3.1: the SFRs from [5] and [4] are not overlapping and are merged
- Several SFRs are in one PP and not in the other: they are simply all enforced by the TOE

Some SFRs of the two PPs are reworded in the CC V3.1:

- FDP ETC.1.1: 'TSP' replaced by 'TOE'
- FDP ITC.1.*: 'TSP' replaced by 'TOE'
- FDP SDI.2.1: 'stored within the TSC' replaced by 'stored in containers controlled by the TSF'
- FDP_UCT.1.1: 'objects' replaced by 'user data'
- FPT PHP.3.1: 'TSP is not violated' replaced by 'SFRs are always enforced'

FPT AMT.1 is part of both claimed PPs and has been removed in the CC V3.1.

Due to the introduction of Card Content Loading and Installation and Patching mechanisms during TOE initialization (both terminated before issuance), some SFRs have been modified:

- FMT MOF.1.1 is now FMT MOF.1.1/Sign
- FMT MOF.1.1/CCLI is added
- FMT_MOF.1.1/Patch is added

Additions to the PP SFRs:

Final Interpretation 065 requires the addition of:

FMT SMF.1: Specifications of Management Functions

Card Content Loading and Installation and Patching mechanisms required the addition of:

- FMT MOF.1/Patch: Access Control to termination of the Patch Mechanism
- FMT MOF.1/CCLI: Access Control to termination of the Card Content Loading and Installation

The support of DES as part of the Security Functions of the TOE required the addition of:

- FDP_ITC.1/DES Key: the RAD can be a TDES Key, and can be imported and authenticated
- FCS_COP.1.1/ENC: RAD authentication and Secure Messaging (SM) involve data encryption (and decryption for the SM) with TDES 2keys
- FCS_COP.1.1/MAC: Secure Messaging involve MAC calculations with TDES 2keys

9.3.4. PP compliancy

The TOE type is compliant with the claimed PPs: the TOE is a Secure Signature-Creation Device representing the SCD storage, SCD/SVD generation, and signature-creation component.

The TOE is compliant with the representation provided in both PPS:

- SSCD of Type 1 represents the SCD/SVD generation component,
- SSCD of Type 2 represents the SCD storage and signature-creation component.
- SCD generated on an SSCD Type 1 shall be exported to an SSCD Type 2 over a trusted channel.
- SSCD Type 3 is analogous to a combination of Type 1 and Type 2, but no transfer of the SCD between two devices is provided.
- SSCD Type 2 and Type 3 are personalized components; it means that they can be used for signature creation by one specific user the signatory only.

Actually, Type 2 and Type 3 are not necessarily to be considered mutually exclusive, as both PPs state.

The conformance to the PPs is strict: the threat (T.MOD_SOFT) and the 3 objectives (OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp, OT.CCLI_END, and OT.PATCH_END) that have been added create a superset of the PPs Threats and Objectives. The assumptions in this ST are identical to the assumptions of the PPs.

10. Terminology

Term	Definition
CC	Common Criteria
CGA	Certification generation application (CGA) means a collection of application elements which requests the SVD from the SSCD for generation of the qualified certificate. The CGA stipulates the generation of a correspondent SCD / SVD pair by the SSCD, if the requested SVD has not been generated by the SSCD yet. The CGA verifies the authenticity of the SVD by means of the SSCD proof of correspondence between SCD and SVD and checking the sender and integrity of the received SVD.
CSP	Certification-service-provider (CSP) means an entity or a legal or natural person who issues certificates or provides other services related to electronic signatures (defined in the Directive, article 2.11).
DI	Dual Interface
Directive	The Directive; DIRECTIVE 1999/93/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures
DTBS	Data to be signed (DTBS) means the complete electronic data to be signed (including both user message and signature attributes)
DTBS Representation	 Data to be signed representation (DTBS-representation) means the representation data sent by the SCA to the TOE for signing and is a hash-value of the DTBS or an intermediate hash-value of a first part of the DTBS and a remaining part of the DTBS or the DTBS
	The SCA indicates to the TOE the case of DTBS-representation, unless implicitly indicated. The hash-value in case (a) or the intermediate hash-value in case (b) is calculated by the SCA. The final hash-value in case (b) or the hash-value in case (c) is calculated by the TOE.
OS	Operating System
Qualified Certificate	Means a certificate which meets the requirements laid down in Annex I of the Directive and is provided by a CSP who fulfils the requirements laid down in Annex II of the Directive. (defined in the Directive, article 2.10)
RAD	Reference authentication data (RAD) means data persistently stored by the TOE for verification of the authentication attempt as authorised user.
SCA	 Signature-creation application (SCA) means the application used to create an electronic signature, excluding the SSCD. I.e., the SCA is a collection of application elements. to perform the presentation of the DTBS to the signatory prior to the signature process according to the signatory's decision, to send a DTBS-representation to the TOE, if the signatory indicates by
	 specific non misinterpretable input or action the intend to sign, to attach the qualified electronic signature generated by the TOE to the data or provides the qualified electronic signature as separate data.
SCD	Signature-creation data (SCD) means unique data, such as codes or private cryptographic keys, which are used by the signatory to create an electronic signature. (defined in the Directive, article 2.4)
SDO	Signed data object (SDO) means the electronic data to which the electronic signature has been attached to or logically associated with as a method of authentication.

Term	Definition
Signatory	Signatory means a person who holds a SSCD and acts either on his own behalf or on behalf of the natural or legal person or entity he represents. (defined in the Directive, article 2.3)
SSCD	Secure signature-creation device (SSCD) means configured software or hardware which is used to implement the SCD and which meets the requirements laid down in Annex III of the Directive. (SSCD is defined in the Directive, article 2.5 and 2.6)
SVD	Signature-verification data (SVD) means data, such as codes or public cryptographic keys, which are used for the purpose of verifying an electronic signature. (defined in the Directive, article 2.7)
TS	Tessera Sanitaria
VAD	Verification authentication data (VAD) means authentication data provided as input by knowledge or authentication data derived from user's biometric characteristics.

11. References

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation CCMB-2009-07-001 Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009.
- [2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation CCMB-2009-07-002 -Part 2: Security functional requirements, Revision 3, July 2009.
- [3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation CCMB-2009-07-003 -Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Revision 3, July 2009.
- [4] PP0005b Protection Profile Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 2 EAL 4+ Version: 1.04, 25 July 2001
- [5] PP0006b Protection Profile Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 3 EAL 4+ Version: 1.05, 25 July 2001
- [6] Inside Secure AT90SC28872RCU Technical Datasheet Revision C
- [7] Inside Secure Toolbox 00.03.11.05 Technical Datasheet Revision C
- [8] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0421-2008 Atmel AT90SC28872RCU Dec 04, 2008
- [9] Certification Report ANSSI-2009/11 Atmel Toolbox 00.03.11.05 Jun 30, 2009
- [10] AT90SC28872RCU Security Target Public Version Inside Secure version 02.01
- [10] Toolbox 00.03.11.05 Security Target Public Version Inside Secure version 02.0
- [12] Java Card 2.2.2 Specification. March 2006. Published by Sun Microsystems, Inc.
 - Virtual Machine Specification [JCVM]
 - Application Programming Interface [JCAPI]
 - Runtime Environment Specification [JCRE]
- [13] GlobalPlatform, Card Specification, Version 2.1.1, March 2003
- [14] CCDB-2007-09-001 Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices Version: 1.0, revision 1, September 2007
- [15] DIRECTIVE 1999/93/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures
- [16] Algorithms and parameters for algorithms, list of algorithms and parameters eligible for electronic signatures, procedures as defined in the directive 1999/93/EC, article 9 on the 'Electronic Signature Committee' in the Directive.
- [17] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology Security techniques Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
- [18] ISO/IEC 9796-2: Information technology Security techniques Signature Schemes giving message recovery Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms, 2002
- [19] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993
- [20] Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO 15946.TR-ECC, BSI 2006.
- [21] FIPS PUB 180-2, FIPS Publication Secure hash standard (+ Change Notice to include SHA-224), 2002, NIST
- [22] FIPS PUB 46-3, FIPS Publication Data Encryption Standard (DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S. Department of Commerce/NIST
- [23] IEEE 1363-2000 IEEE Standard Specification for Public-Key Cryptography
- [24] BSI-PP-0002-2001 Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile version 1.0 EAL4+
- [25] PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 1.5