



**ORACLE**  
APPLICATION SERVER **10<sup>g</sup>**

# Security Target for Oracle Internet Directory 10g (10.1.4.0.1)

May 2008

**Security Evaluations  
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# Introduction

This document is the security target for the Common Criteria evaluation of Oracle Internet Directory Release 10g (10.1.4.0.1).

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## Identification and CC Conformance

**Title:** Security Target for Oracle Internet Directory Release 10g (10.1.4.0.1).

**Target of Evaluation (TOE):** Oracle Internet Directory (OID).

**Release:** 10g (10.1.4.0.1).

**Operating System Platform:**

Red Hat Enterprise Linux AS Version 4 Update 5.

**Database Platform:** Oracle Database 10g (10.1.0.5.0).

**CC Conformance:**

This Security Target conforms to CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3. All SFRs in the Security Target are derived from [CC], although FAU\_GEN.1 and FPT\_SEP.1 have been extended. ALC\_FLR.3 is the only augmented assurance criterion specified.

**Assurance:** EAL4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.3<sup>1</sup>.

**Keywords:** Oracle Internet Directory, OID, security target, EAL4.

**Version of the Common Criteria [CC] used to produce this document:** 2.3.

- 
1. ALC\_FLR.3 provides assurance at the highest defined component level that there are flaw remediation procedures for the TOE by which discovered security flaws can be reported to, tracked and corrected by the developer, and by which corrective actions can be issued to TOE users in a timely fashion.

---

## TOE Overview

Oracle Internet Directory is a general purpose directory service that enables fast retrieval and centralised management of information about dispersed users and network resources. It combines LDAP V3 with the high performance, scalability, robustness, and availability of the Oracle Database 10g server. The security functionality in Oracle Internet Directory includes:

- user identification and authentication, with password management;
- discretionary access controls - which use Access Control Items held in the directory to define users' authorisations for directory data access; and
- auditing.

The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a standard, extensible directory access protocol. It is a common language that LDAP clients and servers use to communicate. LDAP Version 3 is defined in [LDAP3].

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## TOE Product Components

The Oracle product which constitutes the TOE is Oracle Internet Directory 10g (10.1.4.0.1).

Oracle Internet Directory relies on Oracle Database 10g Enterprise Edition 10.1.0.5.0 for the storage of directory data and uses Oracle Net Services 10.1.0.5.0 for communication interfaces.

Oracle Process Manager and Notification Server (OPMN) is installed and configured with every Oracle Application Server installation type and is used to start, monitor and stop OID's processes in the TOE's evaluated configuration.

[ECD] defines how the TOE product must be installed in the evaluated configuration and defines the requirements for setting up the TOE environment.

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## Document Overview

This document consists of a minor update to Issue 1.0 of the Security Target for Oracle Internet Directory 10g (9.0.4.0.1), [ST904], which was used in the previous Common Criteria evaluation of Oracle Internet Directory. The changes for this update are mainly concerned with version number changes, changes to the operating system platforms, a change in the Common Criteria version used for the evaluation from 2.2 to 2.3, and changed references to information in technical publications.

Change bars indicate changes since the previous issue of this document.

Chapter 2 of this security target provides a high-level overview of the security features of the Oracle Internet Directory. Chapter 3 identifies the assumptions, threats, and security policies of the TOE environment. Chapter 4 describes the security objectives for the TOE and for the environment needed to address the assumptions, threats, and security policies identified in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 identifies the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs), the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) and the security requirements for the IT environment. Chapter 6 summarises each Security Function (SF) provided by Oracle Internet Directory to meet the security requirements. Chapter

7 covers the topic of protection profile conformance by the TOE and Chapter 8 provides the rationale for the security claims made within this security target. Annex A contains a list of references and Annex B provides a glossary of the terms.

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# TOE Description

This chapter describes the product features that provide security mechanisms and contribute to the security of a system using the Oracle Internet Directory (OID) TOE. The security features of Oracle Internet Directory are explained primarily in [OIDAG, 16] and [OIDAG, 14: Using the Audit Log]. In general, these descriptions correspond to the specifications of IT security functions provided in Chapter 6 of this Security Target.

The major elements of the Oracle Internet Directory security architecture are described below, and the TOE is defined in terms of this architecture. The TOE's mechanisms for access control, identification and authentication, and accountability and auditing are summarised. Additional OID security features that are not addressed by the security functional requirements of Chapter 5 are also briefly discussed.

---

## OID Architecture

The Oracle Internet Directory architectural components are described in detail in [OIDAG, 3].

### Directory

A *directory* stores and retrieves information about organisations, individuals and other resources.

### LDAP

The *Lightweight Directory Access Protocol* (LDAP) is a standard, extensible directory access protocol. It is a common language that LDAP clients and servers use to communicate. LDAP Version 3 is defined in [LDAP3].


### Oracle Internet Directory

*Oracle Internet Directory* (OID) is a general purpose directory service that enables fast retrieval and centralised management of information about dispersed users and network resources. It combines LDAP V3 with the high performance, scalability, robustness, and availability of the Oracle Database 10g server. The Oracle Internet Directory runs as an application on Oracle Database 10g and uses its Oracle database to hold the directory data.

The figure below illustrates a typical TOE configuration by which clients using the

LDAP protocol and the directory administrator can connect to the Oracle Directory Server. The Oracle Directory Server connects to Oracle Database 10g by using Oracle Net Services.

*Figure 1: Oracle Internet Directory Architecture*



The OID components include:

- The Oracle Directory Server;
- Oracle Directory Replication Server;
- Oracle Database 10g Server;
- OID Monitor (OIDMON);
- OID Control Utility (OIDCTL);
- Directory Administration Tools (including Oracle Directory Manager and the command-line administration tools);
- Oracle Directory Integration Platform; and
- The Delegated Administration Service.

OID is not a security product, but is a mechanism for managing enterprise data, including security data such as user names and passwords for the Oracle 10g product stack.

## Directory Entries

In a directory, a collection of information about an object is called an *entry*. Each entry is uniquely identified by a *distinguished name* (DN), which defines exactly where in the directory's hierarchy the entry resides.

Each entry contains information stored in *attributes*. An *object class* is a group of attributes that define the structure of an entry.

Each directory has a *Directory-Specific Entry* (DSE), which holds information that relates to the whole directory, such as the audit log.

## Oracle Directory Server Instance

Each *Oracle Directory Server instance* services directory requests through a single OID dispatcher process listening at a specific TCP/IP port number. There can be more than one directory server instance on a node, each listening on a different port.

One instance comprises one dispatcher process and one or more server processes. By default there is one server process for each instance.

## Oracle Database 10g

OID runs as an Oracle Database 10g application. An Oracle database stores the directory data. The database can reside on the same node as the directory server processes or on a separate node.

## Oracle Net Connections

OID communicates with the database using Oracle Net Services, Oracle's operating system-independent database connectivity solution. Oracle Net Services is used for all connections between the Oracle Database Server and the OID Control utility (`oidctl`), the directory server instance, and the OID Monitor (`oidmon`).

## LDAP Clients

LDAP Clients send LDAP requests to an OID listener/dispatcher process listening for LDAP commands at its port.

The following OID command-line tools can be used to send LDAP commands to the TOE in its evaluated configuration:

- `ldapadd`, `ldapaddmt`, `ldapbind`, `ldapcompare`, `ldapdelete`, `ldapmoddn`, `ldapmodify`, `ldapmodifymt` and `ldapsearch`.

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
## TOE Definition

This evaluation covers the security features of Oracle Internet Directory in its capacity as an LDAP directory service.

The TOE for this evaluation of the Oracle Internet Directory is defined to be the Oracle Directory Server and the command-line directory administration tools that are essential for the directory to be maintained and administered securely. These command-line tools are the tools to run the Oracle Directory Server instances (`oidmon` and `oidctl`), the Catalog Management Tool (`catalog`), the Bulk Operations Tools (`bulkload` etc.), the OID Database Password Utility (`oidpasswd`), and the OID Database Statistics Collection Tool (`oidstats`).

The figure below illustrates the TOE boundary. It shows clients outside of the TOE using the LDAP protocol to send messages over the network to the Oracle Directory Server. The directory administrator can run command-line directory administration tools that are in the TOE. These tools run on the machine that hosts the Oracle Directory Server.

Figure 2: Oracle Internet Directory TOE Boundary



## Identification and Authentication

### Directory User Representation

The attributes a directory user entry can have are listed in [OIMUR, 7: User, Group and Subscriber Schema Elements]. Some of the attributes relevant to identification and authentication include:

- `cn` - the user's common name; and
- `UserPassword` - the password to be used for authenticating the user to OID.

### User Identification

In OID each user has a unique entry identified by a distinguished name (DN). The distinguished name indicates exactly where the entry resides in the directory hierarchy (represented by the *Directory Information Tree* (DIT)). A DN for a user could look like this:

```
cn=Alice Smith,ou=Server Technologies,c=UK,o=oracle
```

Within a distinguished name, the lowest component is called the *relative distinguished name* (RDN). In the example above the RDN is `cn=Alice Smith`.

To uniquely identify a particular entry within the overall DIT, the full DN must be used. This allows for user entries for two different Alice Smiths to exist within the same DIT.

## super user

The *super user* is the administrator for the directory and has full access to all directory information (see [OIDAG, 7: Managing Super Users, Guest Users and Proxy Users]). The actual name and the password for the super user are held in the DSE (by default the super user's name is `orcladmin`).

## Authentication

Authentication is the process by which the directory server validates the claimed identity of the user connecting to the directory. OID implements four different levels of directory user authentication:

- Anonymous;
- Password-based (Simple Authentication);
- Certificate-based through Secure Socket Layer (SSL); and
- Indirect Authentication.

For anonymous authentication, the directory user binds to the directory server without specifying a user name or password.

For Password-based (simple) authentication, a user must specify a user name (DN) and password in order to connect to the directory. The password is compared to the password for the user stored in the directory and, if they match, a directory session is created.

OID stores a user's directory password in the `UserPassword` attribute. Passwords are stored as one-way hashed values. During authentication the client provides a password to the directory server in clear text. The directory server hashes this value using the algorithm specified in the `orclCryptoScheme` attribute within the DSE (this is set up during installation). If the hashed password values match, the server authenticates the user.

For simple authentication passwords are not encrypted when sent over the network. To ensure that no security issues arise from this, [ECD] imposes appropriate security constraints on the TOE's networking environment.

SSL based authentication involves the exchange of certificates issued by trusted certificate authorities. This method of authentication will not be assessed during this evaluation.

Indirect authentication can occur through any entity that has credentials in the directory, for example the Delegated Administration Service, or through a middle tier such as a firewall or an application. This type of authentication involves the entity connecting to the directory and then performing directory operations on an end user's behalf. This is only allowed if the access control policy governing the end user's directory entry allows the entity to act as a proxy for the end user.

## Password Policies

Password policies enable an administrator to establish and enforce rules for how passwords are created, changed and used within Oracle Internet Directory. When a user attempts to bind to the directory, the directory server ensures that the password meets the requirements specified in the password policy.

OID provides a password policy which includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- the maximum length of time a given password is valid;
- whether a user's old password value can be used as the new one when the password is being changed;

- the minimum number of characters a password must contain;
- the number of numeric characters required in a password; and
- the number of consecutive failed userpassword checks after which a user's account is locked.

The OID password policy is only applicable to the `UserPassword` attribute, except that the super user is also subject to account lockout after the specified number of consecutive failed password checks.

The command-line tool `ldapmodify` may be used to modify the password policy.

More information on password policies may be found in [OIDAG, 19] and [OIDAG, Appendix A: Password Policy Fields in Oracle Directory Manager].

By default the directory enforces the password policy limits as specified in [OIDAG, 19], however, in the evaluated configuration it is necessary that more restrictive password controls are used so that the TOE achieves a *high* strength of function for the password mechanism (see the Minimum Strength of Function section in Chapter 5).

Guidance covering the different password controls, and instructions for modifying profiles to achieve SOF-*high*, are provided in the TOE's Evaluated Configuration Document [ECD].

---

## Security Attribute Maintenance

These features provide the means for creating and maintaining the security attributes for directory users and directory entries. The mechanisms by which changes to security attributes become effective for a directory session are also included.

---

## Access Controls

Access controls are used to govern access to a computer's resources. Access control mechanisms rely on the system having correctly identified and authenticated the user first. In OID access controls use the identity of the user in order to determine the access rights that are to be enforced for that user.

### Access Control Lists

The OID directory holds access control information to define the administrative policies relating to access control. This information is stored as user-modifiable operational attributes called *access control items* (ACIs). A list of such ACI attributes is called an *Access Control List* (ACL).

Access Control Lists (ACLs) are used to protect the directory information within OID and specify what actions can be carried out by which entities on a given resource. They ensure that a user only reads or updates the information for which they have the appropriate privileges.

When an attempt is made to perform an operation on an object during a session, the directory server is responsible for making sure that the user has the requisite permission to carry out this operation. If not, then the directory server disallows the operation.

## ACI components

Access control information represents the permissions that various entries or subjects have to perform operations on a given object in the directory. An Access Control Item is comprised of 3 *ACI components*:

- The object to which access may be granted (an entry or attribute);
- The entities or subjects to which access may be granted; and
- The kind of access that may be granted (as listed in [OIDAG, 18: Operations: What Access Are You Granting?]).

## Access Control Policy Points

An *Access Control Policy Point (ACP)* is an entry for which the `orclACI` attribute has been given a value. The `orclACI` attribute values are inherited by a subtree of entries starting with the ACP at the root of the subtree.

When a hierarchy of multiple ACPs exist in a directory subtree, a subordinate entry in that subtree inherits the access policies from all of the superior ACPs. The result is an aggregate of all the policies above the entry (where the root of a subtree is considered to be the highest entry in the subtree).

The `orclACI` attribute contains ACL directives that are prescriptive. That is, these directives apply to all entries in the subtree below the ACP where this attribute is defined.

## Entry Level Access Control

The `orclEntryLevelACI` attribute is used for *entry level access control*. That is, when a policy pertains only to a specific entity. The `orclEntryLevelACI` attribute contains ACL directives that apply to only the entry with which it is associated.

## Default Access Policies

The *default access control policy* grants the following to both entries and attributes:

- Everyone is given access to read, search, write, and compare all attributes in an entry, and selfwrite permissions are unspecified; and
- If permission to access an entry is not specified, access is determined at the next highest level at which access is specified.

## How ACL evaluation works

When a user tries to perform an operation on a given object, the directory server determines whether the user has the appropriate access permission to perform that operation. If the object is an entry, it evaluates the access systematically for the entry and each of its attributes.

Evaluating access to an object can involve examining all the ACI directives for that object.

The directory server first examines the ACI directives in the entry-level ACI, `orclEntryLevelACI`. It proceeds to the nearest ACP, then considers each superior ACP in succession until the evaluation is complete.

The exact steps taken during the evaluation of ACLs, the precedence rules used, and the exceptions to these rules are described in [OIDAG, 18: How ACL Evaluation Works].

## Access Control Groups

A group entry in OID contains a list of names. It is associated with either the `groupOfNames` or `groupOfUniqueNames` object class, which has the object class `orclPrivilegeGroup` as a subclass.

Membership in the group is determined by adding DNs to the multi-valued attribute `member` if the entry belongs to the `groupOfNames` object class, or `uniqueMember` if the entry belongs to the `groupOfUniqueNames` object class.

There are two types of access control groups: ACP groups and privilege groups.

If an individual is a member of an *ACP group*, then the directory server simply grants to that individual the privileges associated with that ACP group. ACP groups are associated with the `orclACPgroup` object class.

A *Privilege Group* is a higher-level access group. This is similar to an ACP group, but it also provides for additional checking beyond a single ACP. If an ACP denies access, an attribute in the user's entry tells the directory server whether the user being denied is in any privilege group. If so, then this user has additional rights at a higher administration level, and all higher administration levels in the DIT are checked. If the directory finds a higher ACP that grants to the privilege group access to the requested object, then it overrides the denials by the subordinate ACP, and grants access to the user.

Privilege groups should only be used when access control at higher levels need the right to override standard controls at lower levels.

Privilege Groups are associated with the `orclPrivilegeGroup` object class.

If a user is a member of both an ACP and a Privilege group, then OID evaluates each type of group. It resolves access rights for the privilege group by looking into ACPs higher in the DIT.

## Managing Access Control

It is possible to view and modify access control information using Oracle Directory Manager or the command-line tools. Only the command-line tools are within the scope of this evaluation.

## Knowledge References

*Knowledge references* (or *referrals*) allow directory servers to return references to other servers as a result of a directory query (as described in [OIDAG, 3: Knowledge References and Referrals]).

There are two kinds of referrals:

**Smart referral** - these are returned to the client when the knowledge reference entry is within the scope of the search. A smart referral points the client to the server that stores the requested information.

**Default referral** - these are returned when the base object is not in the directory, and the operation is performed in a naming context not held locally by the server (because it is on another server). A default referral typically sends the clients to a server that has more knowledge about the directory partitioning arrangement.

Knowledge references are represented in the directory as a particular type of entry. They must be associated with the `referral` object class and the `extensibleObject` object class.

A knowledge reference provides users with a referral containing an LDAP URL. Such URLs are entered as values for the `ref` attribute. There can be multiple `ref` attributes for any knowledge reference entry. Similarly, there can be multiple knowledge reference entries in the DIT.



## Referential Integrity

If this feature is enabled, then, whenever an entry in the directory is deleted or its DN is modified, the TOE also updates the groups that refer to that entry. Referential Integrity is described in [OIDAG, 12].

---

## Auditing

Oracle Internet Directory ensures that relevant information about operations performed by users can be recorded so that the consequences of these operations can later be linked to the user in question, and the user held accountable for his or her actions. OID does this by providing auditing options to ensure that exactly what needs to be audited, as dictated by the application or system security policy, is recorded, but nothing more. This helps to ensure that the size of audit trails remain manageable and that the important records are easily accessible.

As the audit log generation is contingent upon events occurring on the server, only the OID directory server itself can create the log entries. In particular, it is not possible to add audit log entries using Oracle Directory Manager or the command-line tools.

The *audit log* is made up of directory entries, where each entry records the audit data for one event.

## Audit Level

To enable auditing, the attribute `orclauditlevel` in the DSE must be modified to the appropriate level. The value held in this attribute is called the directory's *audit level*. A value of 0 for the audit level indicates that no audit log entries are to be generated. By default `orclauditlevel` has a value of 0, but [ECD] instructs administrators that this value must not be used when the TOE is in its evaluated configuration.

## Auditable Events

A directory super user can request auditing of one or more actions by *event type*:

- Super user login;
- Schema element add/replace;
- Schema element delete;
- Unsuccessful bind;
- Access violation;
- Directory-specific entry (DSE) modification;
- Replication login;
- ACL modification;
- User Password modification;
- Add;
- Delete;
- Modify;
- ModifyDN; and
- User login.

Both successful and unsuccessful events are recorded in the audit log if they are selected, except:

- Bind - only unsuccessful binds are audited; and
- Access Violation - which is only concerned with attempted access that has been denied by an access control policy.

The events from the above list which are to be audited are indicated via settings in the DSE attribute `orclauditlevel`.

## Audit Records

Oracle Internet Directory auditing results in audit information being written to a directory audit trail. An audit trail entry always includes the following elements when they are meaningful for the audited event:

- `orclsequence` (used to create the name of the audit entry);
- `orcleventtype` (the type of event that occurred);
- `orcleventtime` (the time at which the event occurred in coordinated universal time);
- `orcluserdn` (the identity of the user who caused the directory server to perform the operation);
- `orclopresult` (the outcome of the operation);
- `orclauditmessage` (a textual message); and
- `objectclass` (contains the preset values `top` and `orclauditoc`).

## Audit Analysis

Audit log entries may be searched using `ldapsearch` commands or Oracle Directory Manager. However, audit log entries do not automatically become part of a search result even though the search filter may satisfy the query criteria. Only a search with `cn=auditlog` as the base of the search will retrieve audit log entries.

## Purging the Audit Log

`bulkdelete` may be used to purge audit log objects under the container `cn=auditlog`. In order to run the `bulkdelete` tool, the correct password for OID's database user must be entered. This ensures that only users who are suitably authorised administrators can use this tool.

---

## Other OID Security Features

In addition to the security features described above, Oracle Internet Directory provides features which are related to security but do not directly address any of the functional requirements identified in this Security Target. These features provide significant security capabilities to support robust and reliable directory-based applications.

The features described below are **not** part of the evaluated configuration defined in [ECD], because this evaluation only covers the security features of Oracle Internet Directory in its capacity as a provider of an LDAP directory service. Thus the TOE for this evaluation of OID is defined to be the Oracle Directory Server and the command-line directory administration tools that provide essential features by which the directory can be maintained and administered securely.

## SSL

OID can make sure that no data has been modified, deleted, replayed, or disclosed to unauthorised parties during transmission through the use of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). The use of SSL by OID will not be part of the configuration for this evaluation since it is assumed that the Directory Server and the Clients used to access it are all within a secure network.

## Other Directory Components

The following OID components are outside of the scope of this evaluation of OID:

- The Directory Replication Service (Replicates LDAP data between Oracle directory servers);
- Directory Integration Platform (This feature allows connectivity and synchronisation with other applications and directories, both Oracle-built and otherwise).; and
- Server Side plug-in framework, except for use with the referential integrity feature (This plug-in framework enables OID applications to make use of advanced capabilities such as external authentication of directory clients, brokered access, and synchronisation with external relational tables).

## Directory Administration Tools

The following Directory Administration Tools are outside of the scope of this evaluation of OID:

- Oracle Directory Manager (OID's standalone, 100% Java on-line administration tool);
- The Directory Replication Service Tools (Two tools exist to help administer the directory replication service: the OID reconciliation tool and the human intervention queue manipulation tool);
- The Delegated Administration Service (This allows delegated administrators, such as non-technical managers, to create and manage both users and groups. It also allows end users to modify and manage their own passwords without needing to know how to run a command-line tool); and
- Enterprise Manager Integration (used to start, stop, and monitor OID instances).

The command-line tools which can be used to send LDAP messages to a host Oracle Directory Server. It is the Oracle Directory Service, which receives and acts upon those messages, that is the subject of this evaluation.

## Enterprise Users

Enterprise users can be managed via entries in a directory and can be given access to multiple schemas and databases without having to create an account or schema in each database. The standard OID security functions for access control, identification and authentication, and auditing are relied on by Oracle products that implement enterprise user facilities. However, these enterprise user facilities are not part of the OID TOE and are therefore outside the scope of this evaluation.

## guest user and proxy user

The *guest user* and the *proxy user* are special users (like the super user). In the evaluated configuration defined in [ECD], only the administrator is permitted to know the passwords for these users (which are held in the Directory-Specific Entry). This restriction is placed to prevent further unidentified users gaining access to the directory, in addition to those using anonymous authentication.

The directory administrator must establish Access Control Settings for the directory so that the guest user and the proxy user can only access data that anonymous users

can access.

Please note that the proxy user is a particular special user. This concept is not connected with the concept of a directory session in which a user can act as a proxy for another user if the access control policy governing the second user's directory entry permits it.

## **APIs**

The Oracle Internet Directory C API, Java API and PL/SQL API are outside the scope of this evaluation, which focuses on the LDAP service provided by the Oracle Directory Server.

---

# Security Environment

This section identifies the IT assets protected by the TOE. It also identifies the threats to those IT assets, the organisational security policies supported by the TOE, and the assumptions for secure usage of the TOE.

---

## IT Assets

The IT assets requiring protection consist of the information stored within the directory, the confidentiality, integrity or availability of which could be compromised. The primary IT assets are:

- *Directory objects* and the data contained within those directory objects.

The secondary IT assets, which support the protection of the primary assets are:

- *Directory control data* used by the directory server to organise and protect the directory objects, and
- *Directory audit data* generated by the directory server during operation.

---

## Threats

The assumed threats to the TOE security, along with the threat agents which might instigate these threats, are specified below. Each threat statement identifies a means by which the TOE and its underlying system might be compromised.

These threats will be countered by:

- a) technical security measures provided by the TOE, in conjunction with
- b) technical security measures provided by an underlying system, and
- c) non-technical operational security measures (personnel, procedural and physical measures) in the environment.

## Threat agents

The threat agents are:

- Persons who are not authorised users of the underlying system (operating system and/or database system and/or network services and/or custom software);
- Persons who are authorised users of the TOE;
- Persons who are authorised users of the underlying system. System Users may be:
  - a) those persons who are not directory users, or
  - b) those persons who are directory users;
- Interruptions to the operation of the TOE resulting from failures of hardware, power supplies, storage media etc, where the source of the threat may be human (e.g. suppliers of equipment) or non-human (e.g. hardware glitches and natural disasters).

Threat agents can initiate the types of threats against the directory that are listed below.

## Threats countered by the TOE

The threats in this section are countered by technical security measures provided by the TOE, supported by technical security measures provided by the underlying system and non-technical operational security measures in the environment.

**T.ACCESS**      *Unauthorised Access to the Directory.* An outsider or system user who is not (currently) an authorised directory user accesses the directory other than via anonymous authentication. This threat includes: *Impersonation* - a person, who may or may not be an authorised directory user, accesses the directory by impersonating an authorised directory user (including an authorised user impersonating a different user who has different - possibly more privileged - access).

**T.DATA**      *Unauthorised Access to Information.* An authorised or anonymous directory user accesses information contained within the directory without the permission of the directory user who has responsibility for ensuring that this data is protected.

*Note that this threat includes unauthorised access to directory information, residual information held in memory, or storage resources managed by the TOE, or directory control data.*

**T.ATTACK**      *Undetected Attack.* An undetected compromise of the directory occurs as a result of an attacker (whether an authorised directory user or not) attempting to perform actions that the individual is not authorised to perform.

*Note that this threat is included because, whatever countermeasures are provided to address the other threats, there is still a residual threat of a violation of the security policy occurring by attackers attempting to defeat these countermeasures.*

**T.ABUSE.USER**      *Abuse of Privileges.* An undetected compromise of the directory occurs as a result of a directory user (intentionally or otherwise) performing actions the individual is authorised to perform.

*Note that this threat is included because, whatever countermeasures are provided to address the other threats, there is still a residual threat of a violation of the security policy occurring, or the directory being placed at risk, as a result of actions taken by authorised directory users. For example, a directory user may grant access to a*

directory object they are responsible for to another directory user who is able to use this information to perform a fraudulent action.

Note also that the above threat does not extend to highly trusted TOE users (see assumption A.MANAGE below).

## Threats countered only by the Operating Environment

- T.OPERATE** *Insecure Operation.* Compromise of the directory may occur because of improper configuration, administration, and/or operation of the composite system.
- T.CRASH** *Abrupt Interruptions.* Abrupt interruptions to the operation of the TOE may cause security related data, such as audit data, to be lost or corrupted. Such interruptions may arise from human error or from failures of software, hardware, power supplies, or storage media.
- T.PHYSICAL** *Physical Attack.* Security-critical parts of the TOE or the underlying operating system and/or network services may be subjected to physical attack by unauthorised users which could compromise security.

Note that the security critical parts do not include the processing resources which are covered by A.PHYSICAL below.

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## Organisational Security Policies

- P.ACCESS** Access to directory objects is determined by:
- the user identity and access control group memberships associated with the subject attempting the access; *and*
  - directory access control information directives that apply to the object.

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## Assumptions

The TOE is dependent upon both technical IT and operational aspects of its environment.

### TOE Assumptions

- A.TOE.CONFIG** The TOE is installed, configured, and managed in accordance with [ECD] its evaluated configuration.

### Underlying System Assumptions

- A.PHYSICAL** The processing resources of the TOE and the underlying system are located within controlled access facilities which prevents unauthorised physical access by outsiders, system users and directory users.
- A.SYS.CONFIG** The underlying system (operating system and/or secure network services and database server) is installed, configured, and managed in accordance with its secure configuration documentation.
- A.ACCESS** The underlying system is configured such that only the approved group of individuals may obtain access to the system.

**A.MANAGE**

There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the underlying system and the security of the information it contains who can be trusted not to abuse their privileges.

**A.PEER**

Any other IT components with which the TOE communicates are assumed to be under the same management control and operate under the same security policy.



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# Security Objectives

This section first describes the IT security objectives of the TOE and the threats and policies they address. Then the requirements on the operational environment needed to support the TOE IT objectives are presented.

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## TOE Security Objectives

This section defines the IT security objectives that are to be satisfied by the TOE in combination with the IT security environment. Table 4 in chapter 8 correlates the TOE security objectives to each of the threats and security policies, showing that each threat is countered by at least one IT security objective, and that each security policy is satisfied by at least one IT security objective.

- O.ACCESS.OBJECTS** The TOE must prevent the unauthorised or undesired disclosure, entry, modification, or destruction of directory data, directory objects, and directory control and audit data.
- O.ACCESS.CONTROL** The TOE must allow directory users who are responsible for directory data to control the access to that data by other authorised directory users.
- O.ACCESS.RESIDUAL** The TOE must prevent unauthorised access to residual data remaining in directory objects and resources e.g. memory or reused directory objects following the use of those objects and resources.

*Note that the above three objectives are concerned with the TOE providing end-users and administrators with the capability of controlling and limiting access by identified individuals, or grouping of individuals, to the data or resources they are responsible for, in accordance with the P.ACCESS security policy.*

- O.I&A.TOIE** The TOE must provide the means of identifying and authenticating users of the TOE. Users who do not identify themselves are to be given sessions with the TOE that only allow access to IT assets that are authorised for ac-

cess by anonymous users.

**O.AUDIT**

The TOE must provide the means of recording security relevant events in sufficient detail to help an administrator of the TOE to:

a) detect attempted security violations, or potential mis-configuration of the TOE security features that would leave the directory open to compromise; *and*

b) hold individual directory users accountable for any actions they perform that are relevant to the security of the directory.

**O.ADMIN.TOIE**

The TOE, where necessary in conjunction with the underlying system, must provide functions to enable an authorised administrator to effectively manage the TOE and its security functions, ensuring that only authorised administrators can access such functionality.

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## Environmental Security Objectives

The following IT security objectives are to be satisfied by the environment in which the TOE is used.

**O.ADMIN.ENV**

The underlying system must provide functions to enable an authorised administrator to effectively manage the TOE and its security functions, ensuring that only authorised administrators can access such functionality. In particular, to enable the effective management of the TOE's audit functions:

a) the underlying database server's functions must include auditing of the startup and shutdown of the TOE's database sessions, and

b) the underlying operating system's functions must include the provision of reliable timestamps for use in audit records.

**O.FILES**

The underlying system must provide access control mechanisms by which all of the directory related files (including executables, run-time libraries, database files, export files, redo log files, control files, trace files and dump files) and directory related database tables may be protected from unauthorised access.

**O.SEP**

The underlying operating system must provide the means to isolate the TOE Security Functions (TSF) and assure that the TSF components cannot be tampered with.

The following non-IT security objectives are to be satisfied by procedural and other measures taken within the TOE environment.

**O.INSTALL**

Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that:

a) The TOE is delivered, installed, managed and operated in accordance with the operational docu-

mentation of the TOE, and

- b) The underlying system is installed and operated in accordance with its operational documentation. If the system components are certified they should be installed and operated in accordance with the appropriate certification documentation.

*Note that [ECD] defines the evaluated configuration of the TOE in detail. It states requirements for the installation and configuration of the underlying system, describes how to install the TOE from its issue media and specifies actions that must be taken by the administrator to ensure the security of the evaluated configuration. Such specified actions may emphasise items already documented in the TOE's administrator guidance documentation or may provide additional instructions to avoid potential security problems that relate to the evaluated configuration.*

**O.PHYSICAL** Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the TOE that are critical to the security policy are protected from physical attack.

**O.AUDITLOG** Directory administrators must ensure that audit facilities are used and managed effectively. These procedures shall apply to the directory audit trail and the audit trail for the underlying operating system and the database server and/or secure network services. In particular:

- a) Appropriate action must be taken to ensure continued audit logging, e.g. by regular archiving of logs before audit trail exhaustion to ensure sufficient free space;
- b) Audit logs must be inspected on a regular basis and appropriate action should be taken on the detection of breaches of security, or events that are likely to lead to a breach in the future;
- c) The system clocks must be protected from unauthorised modification (so that the integrity of audit timestamps is not compromised).

**O.RECOVERY** Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that procedures are in place to ensure that, after system failure or other discontinuity, recovery without security compromise is obtained.

**O.TRUST** Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that only users, who can be trusted to perform administrative duties with integrity, have privileges which allow them to:

- a) set or alter the audit trail configuration for the directory;
- b) modify the contents of the OID audit trail;
- c) create any user account or modify any user security attributes; or
- d) authorise use of administrative privileges.

*Note that one user would not normally simultaneously hold all of these privileges. Thus an audit administrator would normally be given the privileges for items a) and b) while a system administrator would be given the privileges for c) and d).*

**O.AUTHDATA**

Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the authentication data for each user account for the TOE as well as the underlying system is held securely and not disclosed to persons not authorised to use that account. In particular:

- a) The media on which the authentication data for the underlying operating system is stored shall not be physically removable from the underlying platform by unauthorised users;
- b) Users shall not disclose their passwords to other individuals;
- c) Passwords generated by the system administrator shall be distributed in a secure manner.

**O.MEDIA**

Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the confidentiality, integrity and availability of directory data held on storage media is adequately protected. In particular:

- a) The on-line and off-line storage media on which directory and security related data ( such as operating system backups, database backups and transaction logs, and audit trails ) must not be physically removable from the underlying platform by unauthorised users;
- b) The on-line and off-line storage media must be properly stored and maintained, and routinely checked to ensure the integrity and availability of the security related-data;
- c) The media on which directory-related files ( including database files, export files, redo log files, control files, trace files and dump files) have been stored shall be purged prior to being re-used for any non-directory purpose.

Table 5 in chapter 8 illustrates how each of the above objectives counters a threat, supports a policy, or maps to a secure usage assumption.

# IT Security Requirements

## TOE Security Functional Requirements

Table 1 below lists each Security Functional Requirement (SFR) included in this Security Target. This table identifies which Common Criteria operations (assignment (A), selection (S), refinement (R), and/or iteration (I)) have been applied to the requirement relative to Part 2 of [CC]. The text for such completed operations is highlighted with *ITALICISED CAPITAL LETTERS* within each requirement. SFRs in Table 1 that are extended relative to Part 2 of [CC] are indicated in this table by the presence of a “\*” after the element identifier.

The remainder of this section details the functional requirements for this Security Target. Annex B provides definitions for various terms used in the functional requirements. Note that the phrase “suitably authorised users”, which is used in the SFRs listed below, refers to users who are permitted by the Directory Access Control SFP to perform the operation in question. Such users may or may not be administrators (the terms “suitably authorised user” and “administrator” are covered in the Glossary in Annex B).

*Table 1: List of Security Functional Requirements*

| Element        | Name                      | A | S | R | I |
|----------------|---------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| FAU_GEN.IT.1 * | Audit Data Generation     | X | X |   |   |
| FAU_GEN.IT.2 * | Audit Data Generation     | X |   |   |   |
| FAU_GEN.2.1    | User Identity Association |   |   |   |   |
| FAU_SAR.1.1    | Audit Review              | X |   |   |   |
| FAU_SAR.1.2    | Audit Review              |   |   |   |   |
| FAU_SAR.3.1    | Selectable Audit Review   | X | X |   |   |

| Element        | Name                                    | A | S | R | I |
|----------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAU_SEL.1.1    | Selective Audit                         | X | X |   |   |
| FAU_STG.1.1    | Protected Audit Trail Storage           |   |   |   |   |
| FAU_STG.1.2    | Protected Audit Trail Storage           |   | X |   |   |
| FAU_STG.4.1    | Prevention of Audit Data Loss           | X | X | X |   |
| FDP_ACC.1.1    | Subset Access Control                   | X |   |   |   |
| FDP_ACF.1.1    | Security Attribute Based Access Control | X |   |   |   |
| FDP_ACF.1.2    | Security Attribute Based Access Control | X |   |   |   |
| FDP_ACF.1.3    | Security Attribute Based Access Control | X |   |   |   |
| FDP_ACF.1.4    | Security Attribute Based Access Control | X |   |   |   |
| FDP_RIP.2.1    | Full Residual Information Protection    |   | X |   |   |
| FIA_AFL.1.1    | Authentication Failure Handling         | X |   |   |   |
| FIA_AFL.1.2    | Authentication Failure Handling         | X |   |   |   |
| FIA_ATD.1.1    | User Attribute Definition               | X |   |   |   |
| FIA_SOS.1.1    | Verification of Secrets                 | X |   |   |   |
| FIA_UAU.1.1    | Timing of Authentication                | X |   |   |   |
| FIA_UAU.1.2    | Timing of Authentication                |   |   |   |   |
| FIA_UID.1.1    | Timing of Identification                | X |   |   |   |
| FIA_UID.1.2    | Timing of Identification                |   |   |   |   |
| FMT_MSA.1.1    | Management of Security Attributes       | X | X |   |   |
| FMT_MSA.3.1    | Static Attribute Initialisation         | X | X |   |   |
| FMT_MSA.3.2    | Static Attribute Initialisation         | X |   |   |   |
| FMT_MTD.1.1    | Management of TSF Data                  | X | X |   | X |
| FMT_REV.1.1    | Revocation                              | X | X |   |   |
| FMT_REV.1.2    | Revocation                              | X |   |   |   |
| FMT_SMF.1.1    | Specification of Management Functions   | X |   |   |   |
| FMT_SMR.1.1    | Security Roles                          | X |   |   |   |
| FMT_SMR.1.2    | Security Roles                          |   |   |   |   |
| FPT_RVM.1.1    | Non-Bypassability of the TSP            |   |   |   |   |
| FPT_SEP.1T.1 * | TSF Domain Separation                   |   |   |   |   |
| FPT_SEP.1T.2 * | TSF Domain Separation                   |   |   |   |   |
| FTA_TSE.1.1    | TOE Session Establishment               | X |   |   |   |

## Security Audit

**FAU\_GEN.1T.1** The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) All auditable events for the *MINIMUM* level of audit *AS IDENTIFIED IN TABLE 2 BELOW*; and
- b) *ADDITIONAL EVENTS HIGHLIGHTED IN TABLE 2.*

*Table 2: Required Auditable Events*

| Component  | Event   | Additional Data                             |
|------------|---|---|
| FAU_GEN.1T | None (i.e. no associated events are required to be audited)   | None  |
| FAU_GEN.2  | None  | None  |
| FAU_SAR.1  | None  | None  |
| FAU_SAR.3  | None  | None  |
| FAU_SEL.1  | All modifications to the audit configuration that occur while the audit collection functions are operating  | <i>IDENTITY OF DIRECTORY ENTRY MODIFIED</i> |
| FAU_STG.1  | None  | None  |
| FAU_STG.4  | None  | None  |
| FDP_ACC.1  | None  | None  |
| FDP_ACF.1  | <i>UNSUCCESSFUL</i> requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the SFP <i>AND SUCCESSFUL REQUESTS TO PERFORM AN OPERATION WHICH CHANGES AN OBJECT COVERED BY THE SFP</i>  | <i>OBJECT IDENTIFIER, REQUESTED ACCESS</i>  |
| FDP_RIP.2  | None  | None  |
| FIA_AFL.1  | The reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts and the actions taken and the subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal state  | None  |
| FIA_ATD.1  | None  | None  |
| FIA_SOS.1  | Rejection by the TSF of any tested secret <i>AND ACCEPTANCE BY THE TSF OF ANY TESTED SECRET WHEN AN AUTHORISED ADMINISTRATOR BINDS TO THE DIRECTORY</i>   | None  |
| FIA_UAU.1  | Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism <i>AND SUCCESSFUL USE OF THE AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM WHEN AN AUTHORISED ADMINISTRATOR BINDS TO THE DIRECTORY</i>  | None  |
| FIA_UID.1  | Unsuccessful use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided, <i>AND SUCCESSFUL USE OF THE USER IDENTIFICATION MECHANISM WHEN AN AUTHORISED ADMINISTRATOR BINDS TO THE DIRECTORY, INCLUDING THE USER IDENTITY PROVIDED</i> | None  |

Table 2: Required Auditable Events

| Component  | Event  | Additional Data    |
|------------|--|--------------------|
| FMT_MSA.1  | ALL MODIFICATIONS OF THE VALUES OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES                       | None               |
| FMT_MSA.3  | ALL MODIFICATIONS OF THE INITIAL VALUES OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES               | None               |
| FMT_MTD.1  | None   | None               |
| FMT_REV.1  | Unsuccessful revocation of security attributes                               | SECURITY ATTRIBUTE |
| FMT_SMF.1  | Specification of Security Management Functions.                              | None               |
| FMT_SMR.1  | Modifications to the group of users that are part of a role                  | None               |
| FPT_RVM.1  | None   | None               |
| FPT_SEP.1T | None   | None               |
| FTA_TSE.1  | Denial of a session establishment due to the session establishment mechanism | None               |

Note that the FAU\_GEN.1.1 element defined in Section 3.2 of [CC] Part 2 requires that the TSF shall be able to generate an audit record for the start-up and shutdown of the audit functions. However, auditing takes place throughout the TOE's directory session according to the value of the audit level at the start of the session. To cater for this, FAU\_GEN.1 has been extended as a requirement for this TOE. This extended component has been designated as FAU\_GEN.IT. The Security Requirements for the IT Environment defined later in this Chapter include the requirement FAU\_GEN.1E.2 for the IT Environment to be able to generate an audit record for the start-up and shutdown of the TOE's database session (during which any audit records generated by the TOE are stored in a database table). This requirement therefore satisfies the need for the TOE administrator to know the periods of time during which audit records could have been written to the TOE's audit trail.

**FAU\_GEN.1T.2** The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the *SECURITY TARGET AND OTHER AUDIT RELEVANT INFORMATION AS IDENTIFIED IN TABLE 2 ABOVE*.

Note that FAU\_GEN.1T.2 is identical to FAU\_GEN.1.2

**FAU\_GEN.2.1** The TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

**FAU\_SAR.1.1** The TSF shall provide *SUITABLY AUTHORISED USERS* with the capability to read *ALL AUDIT INFORMATION* from the audit records.



- FAU\_SAR.1.2** The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.
- FAU\_SAR.3.1** The TSF shall provide the ability to perform *SEARCHES* of audit data based on *A FUNCTION OF ONE OR MORE ATTRIBUTE VALUES IN THE AUDIT RECORD*.
- FAU\_SEL.1.1** The TSF shall be able to include or exclude auditable events from the set of audited events based on the following attributes:
- a) *EVENT TYPE*;
  - b) *AND NO OTHER ATTRIBUTES*.
- FAU\_STG.1.1** The TSF shall protect the stored audit records from unauthorised deletion.
- FAU\_STG.1.2** The TSF shall be able to *PREVENT* unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.
- FAU\_STG.4.1** The TSF shall *IGNORE AUDITABLE EVENTS* if the audit trail is full.

*Note that the assignment operation for the FAU\_STG.4.1 element defined in Section 3.6 of [CC] Part 2 has effectively been completed with “and NO OTHER ACTIONS”. However, a refinement has been applied to omit these words for the sake of clarity.*

## User Data Protection

- FDP\_ACC.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the *DIRECTORY ACCESS CONTROL SFP* on:
- a) *DIRECTORY USERS*;
  - b) *DIRECTORY OBJECTS, EACH OF WHICH IS A DIRECTORY ENTRY OR AN ATTRIBUTE OF A DIRECTORY ENTRY; AND*
  - c) *OPERATIONS PROVIDING THE TYPES OF ACCESS IN THE FOLLOWING LIST:*  
*COMPARE*  
*SEARCH*  
*BROWSE*  
*PROXY*  
*READ*  
*SELFWRITE*  
*WRITE*  
*ADD*  
*DELETE.*

*Note that this SFR identifies the Directory Access Control SFP and defines its scope of control. The rules of this SFP are described in FDP\_ACF.1.*

- FDP\_ACF.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the *DIRECTORY ACCESS CONTROL SFP* to objects based on the following:
- a) *THE USER IDENTITY AND ACCESS CONTROL GROUP MEMBERSHIPS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUBJECT; AND*
  - b) *THE ACCESS CONTROL INFORMATION (ACI) DIRECTIVES THAT APPLY TO THE OBJECT.*
- FDP\_ACF.1.2** The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
- a) *WHEN A USER TRIES TO PERFORM AN OPERATION ON AN OBJECT, THE TSF SHALL EVALUATE WHETHER ACCESS IS*

*ALLOWED BY EXAMINING ALL OF THE ACI DIRECTIVES THAT APPLY TO THAT OBJECT.*

- b) *IF THE OBJECT IS AN ENTRY, ACCESS SHALL BE EVALUATED FOR THE ENTRY AND EACH OF ITS ATTRIBUTES.*
- c) *THE TSF SHALL EVALUATE ACCESS BY FIRST EXAMINING THE ACI DIRECTIVES IN THE ENTRY-LEVEL ACI FOR THE OBJECT. IT SHALL PROCEED TO THE NEAREST ACCESS CONTROL POINT (ACP), AND SHALL THEN CONSIDER EACH SUPERIOR ACP IN SUCCESSION UNTIL THE EVALUATION IS COMPLETE.*
- d) *DURING ACCESS EVALUATION, AN ATTRIBUTE'S STATUS IS "RESOLVED WITH PERMISSION" IF THE REQUIRED ACCESS FOR THE ATTRIBUTE HAS BEEN GRANTED IN THE ACI; ITS STATUS IS "RESOLVED WITH DENIAL" IF THE REQUIRED ACCESS FOR THE ATTRIBUTE HAS BEEN EXPLICITLY DENIED IN THE ACI; AND ITS STATUS IS "UNRESOLVED" IF NO APPLICABLE ACI HAS YET BEEN ENCOUNTERED FOR THE ATTRIBUTE.*
- e) *FOR A SEARCH OPERATION, THE ACCESS EVALUATION SHALL CONTINUE UNTIL ALL THE ATTRIBUTES REACH A RESOLVED STATE. ATTRIBUTES THAT ARE RESOLVED WITH DENIAL SHALL NOT BE RETURNED.*
- f) *FOR OPERATIONS OTHER THAN SEARCH, THE ACCESS EVALUATION SHALL STOP IF ACCESS TO THE ENTRY ITSELF IS DENIED OR IF ANY OF THE ATTRIBUTES REACH A RESOLVED WITH DENIAL STATE. IN THIS CASE, ACCESS IS DENIED, OTHERWISE ACCESS IS GRANTED.*

*Note that exceptions to the normal case presented in this SFR are provided by FDP\_ACF.1.3.*

**FDP\_ACF.1.3** The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

- a) *DURING ACCESS EVALUATION, A USER SHALL BE GRANTED ACCESS TO WRITE TO THE ATTRIBUTE OF THE USER'S ENTRY THAT HOLDS THE USER'S PASSWORD.*
- b) *IF ACCESS TO AN ENTRY IS DENIED OR IF AN ATTRIBUTE REACHES A RESOLVED WITH DENIAL STATE, THEN IF THE USER IS A MEMBER OF A PRIVILEGE GROUP OBJECT, THE ACCESS EVALUATION SHALL CONTINUE AS IF IT IS STILL UNRESOLVED. IF A STATE OF "RESOLVED WITH PERMISSION" IS REACHED THROUGH A GROUP SUBJECT SELECTOR DURING THIS CONTINUING ACCESS EVALUATION, THEN THIS RESOLUTION EFFECTIVELY OVERRIDES THE EARLIER DENIAL STATE.*

**FDP\_ACF.1.4** The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: *NONE*.

## Identification and Authentication

**FDP\_RIP.2.1** The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the *ALLOCATION OF A RESOURCE TO* all objects.

**FIA\_AFL.1.1** The TSF shall detect when *AN ADMINISTRATOR CONFIGURABLE POSITIVE INTEGER WITHIN THE RANGE 1 TO 10<sup>63</sup>-1* unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to *A USER BINDING TO THE DIRECTORY OR COMPARING A USER'S PASSWORD WITH A PARTICULAR VALUE*.

*Note that an administrator can set the maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts to be any positive integer up to 10<sup>63</sup>-1, but [ECD] defines a specific value to be used in the TOE's evaluated configuration..*

**FIA\_AFL.1.2** When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall *LOCK THE USER'S ACCOUNT*.

**FIA\_ATD.1.1** The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users:

- a) *USER IDENTITY;*
- b) *GROUP MEMBERSHIPS;*
- c) *AUTHENTICATION DATA.*

**FIA\_SOS.1.1** The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet *REUSE, LIFETIME, AND CONTENT METRICS AS DEFINED BY A SUITABLY AUTHORISED ADMINISTRATOR*.

**FIA\_UAU.1.1** The TSF shall allow *VIEWING OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DIRECTORY INFORMATION* on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

**FIA\_UAU.1.2** The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

**FIA\_UID.1.1** The TSF shall allow *VIEWING OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DIRECTORY INFORMATION* on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

**FIA\_UID.1.2** The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

## Security Management

**FMT\_MSA.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the *DIRECTORY ACCESS CONTROL SFP* to restrict the ability to *MODIFY, DELETE, CREATE* the security attributes *USER IDENTITY, GROUP MEMBERSHIPS AND AUTHENTICATION DATA FOR USERS, AND ACCESS CONTROL INFORMATION FOR OBJECTS* to *SUITABLY AUTHORISED USERS*.

**FMT\_MSA.3.1** The TSF shall enforce the *DIRECTORY ACCESS CONTROL SFP* to provide *RESTRICTIVE* default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

*Note that Section H.2 of Part 2 of [CC] states that FMT\_MSA.3.1 applies only to security attributes for objects.*

**FMT\_MSA.3.2** The TSF shall allow *SUITABLY AUTHORISED USERS* to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

**FMT\_MTD.1.1.1** The TSF shall restrict the ability to *QUERY, CLEAR* the *AUDIT TRAIL* to *SUITABLY AUTHORISED USERS*.

**FMT\_MTD.1.1.2** The TSF shall restrict the ability to *MODIFY* the *SET OF AUDITED EVENTS* to *SUITABLY AUTHORISED ADMINISTRATORS*.

**FMT\_REV.1.1** The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke security attributes associated with the *USERS AND OBJECTS* within the TSC to *SUITABLY AUTHORISED USERS*.

**FMT\_REV.1.2** The TSF shall enforce the rules:

- a) *THE REVOCATION OF A USER'S SECURITY ATTRIBUTES SHALL BE IN EFFECT WHEN THE USER NEXT BINDS FOR A DIRECTORY SESSION;*
- b) *THE REVOCATION OF AN OBJECT'S SECURITY ATTRIBUTES SHALL BE IN EFFECT WHEN A USER NEXT ATTEMPTS TO ACCESS THE OBJECT.*

**FMT\_SMF.1.1** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions:

- a) *QUERY, CLEAR* the *AUDIT TRAIL*.
- b) *QUERY, MODIFY* the *SET OF AUDITED EVENTS*.
- c) *MODIFY, DELETE, CREATE* the *DIRECTORY ACCESS CONTROL SECURITY ATTRIBUTES*.

*Note, refer to FMT\_MSA.1.1 for the definition of the DIRECTORY ACCESS CONTROL SECURITY ATTRIBUTES.*

**FMT\_SMR.1.1** The TSF shall maintain the roles:

- a) *AUTHORISED ADMINISTRATOR;*
- b) *USER.*

*Note that an authorised administrator is a user with the necessary privileges and permissions to perform their administrative duties. The super user for a directory is such an administrator (the terms "super user" and "administrator" are covered in the Glossary in Annex B).*

**FMT\_SMR.1.2** The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

## Protection of the TOE Security Functions

**FPT\_RVM.1.1** The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.

**FPT\_SEP.1T.1** The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution *SO THAT ITS UNDERLYING OPERATING SYSTEM CAN* protect it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.

*Note that the FPT\_SEP.1.1 element defined in Section 10.11 of CC Part 2 requires that the TSF shall be self-protecting so that an untrusted subject cannot modify or damage the TSF. However, it is the underlying operating system which protects the TSF against untrusted subjects modifying or damaging it during its execution. To cater for this, FPT\_SEP.1 has been extended as a requirement for the TOE. This extended component has been designated as FPT\_SEP.1T. FPT\_SEP.1T.1 is underpinned by the Security Requirement for the IT Environment FPT\_SEP.1E.1 which requires the*

*underlying operating system to protect the TSF against untrusted subjects modifying or damaging it during its execution.*

**FPT\_SEP.1T.2** The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC.

*Note that FPT\_SEP.1T.2 is identical to the FPT\_SEP.1.2 element defined in section 10.11 of [CC] Part 2.*

## TOE Access

**FTA\_TSE.1.1** The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on *EXPIRATION OF A USER'S AUTHENTICATION DATA*.

---

## TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The target assurance level is EAL4 as defined in Part 3 of the CC, augmented with ALC\_FLR.3.

---

## Security Requirements for the IT Environment

This section details the security requirements for the IT Environment.

### Support for SFRs

The functional requirements for the IT Environment to support the SFRs defined in this chapter are defined below via elements which have been extended relative to Part 2 of [CC] (using refinements which have been highlighted with *ITALICISED CAPITAL LETTERS*).

**FAU\_GEN.1E.1** The *DATABASE SYSTEM UNDERLYING THE TSF* shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable event:

- a) start-up and shutdown of the *TSF'S DATABASE SESSION*.

**FAU\_GEN.1E.2** The *DATABASE SYSTEM UNDERLYING THE TSF* shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components as defined for SFR FAU\_GEN.1.2 in [DPP, 5].

*Note that FAU\_GEN.1T.1, FAU\_GEN.1T.2, FAU\_GEN.1E.1 and FAU\_GEN.1E.2 together meet the requirements of the FAU\_GEN.1 component defined in Section 3.2 of [CC] Part 2.*

**FPT\_SEP.1E.1** The *OPERATING SYSTEM UNDERLYING THE TSF DURING ITS EXECUTION SHALL PROTECT* it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.

*Note that FPT\_SEP.1T.1 and FPT\_SEP.1E.1 together meet the requirements of the FPT\_SEP.1.1 element defined in Section 10.11 of [CC] Part 2. FPT\_SEP.1T.2 is not relevant to the IT environment and hence there is no equivalent requirement called FPT\_SEP.1E.2.*

**FPT\_STM.1.1** The *OPERATING SYSTEM UNDERLYING THE TSF DURING ITS EXECUTION* shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for *USE BY THE TSF*.

*Note that FPT\_STM.1.1 satisfies the dependency of the SFR FAU\_GEN.1.2 for the provision of reliable time stamps.*

## Support for security objectives

The underlying operating system, database server, network services and/or customer software (collectively, the *system*) shall support the security objectives of the TOE as follows:

**O.I&A.TOE** The operating system and database server shall identify and authenticate users prior to providing access to the underlying system.

**O.ACCESS** The system shall provide the access control mechanisms required to support O.FILES. In addition these mechanisms are required to support O.AUTHDATA and O.ADMIN.TOE.

**O.RECOVERY & O.AUDITLOG** The system shall provide backup, restore and other secure recovery mechanisms. Such mechanisms are to be capable of archiving and restoring the directory audit trail.

In addition to the above, the system shall provide mechanisms to ensure that the system security functions are always invoked prior to passing control to the TOE and that non-TOE activity within the system does not interfere with the operation of the TOE. Thus the system shall at least support FPT\_RVM.1 and FPT\_SEP.1. Also the underlying operating system platform should perform testing to demonstrate the security assumptions made about the underlying abstract machine upon which the TSF relies.

Note that an operating system meeting the functional and assurance requirements defined in [CAPP], or equivalent, and a database system meeting the functional and assurance requirements defined in [DPP], or equivalent, will meet the above requirements (although conformance to [CAPP] and [DPP] is not a mandatory requirement).

---

## Minimum Strength of Function

The minimum strength of function for the TOE is *SOF-High*.

## 6

# TOE Summary Specification

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## TOE Security Functionality

This section contains a high-level specification of each Security Function (SF) of the TOE that contributes to satisfaction of the Security Functional Requirements of chapter 5. The specifications cover four major areas: identification and authentication, security attribute maintenance, directory access control and auditing.

Note that the phrase “userpassword check”, which is used in the SFs listed below, refers to operations of the TOE which check whether the `userpassword` attribute of a user entry has a particular value. These are `bind` operations for which a password has been supplied and `compare` operations which are acting on the `userpassword` attribute of a user entry.

Table 9 in chapter 8 shows that all the SFRs are satisfied by at least one SF and that every SF is used to satisfy at least one SFR (but note that SFR FDP\_ACF.1.4 is not explicitly satisfied by any particular SF because this SFR specifies null functionality).

### Identification and Authentication

#### IA.UID

Each directory user is uniquely identified via the distinguished name (DN) of the user’s directory entry. The exception to this is that there are three special users: the super user, the guest user and the proxy user, whose names are held in the root directory-specific entry. The super user is the administrative user for the directory.

#### IA.ASESS

If a connection is requested to a directory server and no username and no password are supplied, the TOE will create an anonymous directory session in which only publicly available material authorised for access by anonymous users is accessible.

#### IA.USESS

If a user requests to connect to a directory server and that user is configured for simple authentication, then if

- a) the user provides a valid user identifier; and
- b) the user's account is not locked; and
- c) the user provides a password corresponding to the stored password for that user;

then the TOE will create a directory session for the user.

*Note that SF IA.PWDC covers the conditions under which a user's account can be locked. In particular, if check c) fails, then IA.PWDC a) specifies the condition under which the user's account may consequently be locked.*

**IA.IDE**

A subject can only submit requests to a directory server and receive responses (information) from a directory server while the subject is establishing or has established a directory session as per IA.ASESS or IA.USESS. During a directory session, the TOE will either have access to information recording the fact that this session is anonymous or will have access to the user's identifier.

**IA.PSESS**

If a directory session has been established as per IA.USESS and a connection is requested to the directory server from within this directory session, then if

- a) the connection request supplies a valid identifier for a user, but supplies no password; and
- b) the user for the directory session has proxy access to the new user's entry as per the policy defined in DAC.POL;

then the directory session will continue under the new user's identifier.

*Note that this SF describes a process by which the directory session's user can act as a proxy for the user specified in the new connection request.*

**IA.CRUG**

The TOE will allow only suitably authorised users to create user entries and group entries in the directory. The default values of attributes of such new directory entries are as described in Chapters 8, 11 and 13 of [OIDAG].

**IA.PWDC**

The TOE provides the following configurable controls on user passwords held in the directory:

- a) the number of consecutive failed userpassword checks before the user account is locked;
- b) the maximum length of time the same password can be used before it expires and the user's account becomes locked;
- c) whether the current password can be reused when the user password attribute of a user entry is modified;
- d) the number of seconds a user account will remain locked after the specified number of consecutive failed userpassword checks;
- e) the number of seconds after which the count of the number of consecutive failed userpassword checks is purged from the user entry; and



- f) a password complexity check performed on values supplied for the user password attribute of a user entry.

None of the above list of controls applies to the three special users: the super user, the guest user and the proxy user. The exception is that the value configured for a) gives the number of consecutive failed super user login attempts before the super user account is locked.

*Note that the TOE provides more configurable controls on user passwords than are listed in the above SF. [OIMUR, 7: Password Policy Schema Elements] defines the full set of such controls.*

*Note also that the TOE does not accept values to be configured for a) if they are negative or greater than  $10^{63}-1$ .*

## Security Attribute Maintenance

|                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
| <b>IA.PWDCM</b>   | Configurable controls on user passwords held in the directory are held in a password policy entry. A user can read or modify attributes in a password policy entry only if authorised by the Directory Access Control Policy defined in DAC.POL. Changes to a password policy entry take effect either immediately, or, at the latest, on completion of the startup of the next directory server session.  |
| <b>SAM.UATT</b>   | The directory contains a set of security attributes for each directory user, including relative distinguished name, group memberships and password.  |
| <b>SAM.EATT</b>   | The directory contains a set of security attributes for each directory entry. These define the Access Control Information related to the attributes for the entry and the entry itself. The default Access Control Information established when the TOE is installed is covered in the About the Default Configuration section of Chapter 21 of [OIDAG].   |
| <b>SAM.CHPWD</b>  | The following constraints apply when a suitably authorised user attempts to change the user password attribute of a user entry: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) if the password policy applying to the user entry includes a complexity check function, then the new password is accepted only if it meets the criteria of the complexity check; and</li> <li>b) if the password policy applying to the user entry specifies password reuse constraints and the user attempts to reuse a password, the TOE rejects the change if the reuse constraints are not met.</li> </ul> |
| <b>SAM.MODATT</b> | A user can create, read, modify or delete security attributes for directory users and directory entries only if authorised by the Directory Access Control Policy defined in DAC.POL.  |
| <b>SAM.UEFF</b>   | A user security attribute will be effective in a directory session only if the user had that attribute at the start of the session.  |
| <b>SAM.OEFF</b>   | An object security attribute will be effective for directory access control in a directory session only if the object had that attribute when the access was attempted.  |

## Directory Access Control

|                  |   |
|------------------|---|
| <b>DAC.OBID</b>  | The TOE ensures that every object created in a directory is uniquely identified in that directory via the distinguished name (DN) of the directory entry.   |
| <b>DAC.OBREF</b> | The TOE correctly resolves every reference to a directory object, including knowledge references via referrals.   |
| <b>DAC.SUA</b>   | For directory users, the TOE enforces the directory access control policy on directory users based on the following subject attributes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a) the identity of the user; and</li><li>b) any access control group memberships associated with the user.</li></ul>  |
| <b>DAC.OBA</b>   | For directory users, the TOE enforces the Directory Access Control Policy defined in DAC.POL on each directory object based on the access control information (ACI) directives that apply to the object. The entries in a directory and the attributes of directory entries constitute the set of directory objects.  |
| <b>DAC.POL</b>   | When a directory user attempts to perform an operation (as listed in FDP_ACC.1.1) on a directory object, access is either granted or denied according to a set of rules (as specified in FDP_ACF.1.2, with exceptions as listed in FDP_ACF.1.3). A user is always allowed to modify the <code>userpassword</code> attribute of that user's directory entry. |

*Note that further elaboration of the Directory Access Control policy rules is provided in [OIDAG, 18], which gives a practical explanation of the rules and has examples of their use. Note also that, if the Referential Integrity feature is enabled, then, whenever an entry in the directory is deleted or its DN is modified, the TOE also updates the groups that refer to that entry. Referential Integrity is described in [OIDAG, 12].*

|                |   |
|----------------|---|
| <b>DAC.SEP</b> | The TOE does not allow interference between concurrent directory sessions and the TOE does not perform any actions which could allow untrusted subjects to observe or modify the TOE's internal data or code. |
| <b>DAC.OR</b>  | When a new directory object is created, none of the information previously contained in the resource allocated to the object will be capable of being accessed by any directory user.                         |

## Audit and Accountability

|                |  |
|----------------|--|
| <b>AUD.INF</b> | When the audit level is non-zero, for every occurrence of an auditable event described in Chapter 14 of [OIDAG], the TOE will write an audit record which holds the following information:<br><br>date and time of event; type of event; subject identity (which is null if the user is anonymous); and the outcome (success or failure) of the event.<br><br>In addition: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a) when the audit level is changed, the identity of the directory entry modified is recorded;</li><li>b) when a user attempts to access a directory object, the object identifier and the requested access operation is</li></ul> |
|----------------|--|

recorded (provided that the operation was unsuccessful or caused a change to the object); and

- c) when a security attribute is modified, the attribute name is recorded.

**AUD.SET** The TOE will allow only the super user to set the audit level to specify which types of event are auditable.

**AUD.ACC** The TOE will allow only users authorised by the Directory Access Control Policy defined in DAC.POL to view all records in the audit log in a format suitable for the users to interpret the information. The TOE provides facilities to search for audit records based on a function of one or more attribute values in the records.

**AUD.DEL** The TOE will allow only authorised users to delete audit records from the audit log (such users are authorised by the system administrator, who will inform them of the OID password). No other modification to the audit records is permitted.

*Note that the bulkdelete command line tool is used to delete audit records from the audit log. This tool requests the user to confirm that they are an authorised administrator by supplying the OID password (which is the password used when OID connects to the Oracle database that holds its directory data, see [OIMUR, 3: oidpasswd] and [OIMUR, 4: bulkdelete]).*

**AUD.FULL** If the audit log becomes full, auditable actions are not audited until space has been made available to write further audit records.

*Note that the TOE attempts to write audit entries to the directory for auditable actions even when the audit log is full. Under such circumstances, the writing of the audit entry will fail and messages are output to report the failure.*

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## Security Mechanisms and Techniques

A password is used for authentication of TOE users. The TOE password management functions (together called the PWD mechanism) provide a Strength of Function level of *SOF-high*.

Specific SFs supporting the claimed SOF are:

- IA.USESS (SOF-High); *and*
- IA.PWDC, SAM.UATT and SAM.CHPWD, which support IA.USESS by providing password management facilities.

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## Assurance Measures

The target assurance level is EAL4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.3. The following table indicates the documentation that will be supplied to support each security assurance requirement for EAL4 and also the assurance requirement for ALC\_FLR.3. No other specific assurance measures are claimed.

Table 3: Oracle Internet Directory Assurance Measures

| Component | Name                                    | Documents  |
|-----------|---|--|
| ACM_AUT.1 | Partial CM Automation                   | Document(s) describing the TOE's configuration management will be provided.              |
| ACM_CAP.4 | Generation Support and Acceptance Procs | Document(s) describing the TOE's configuration management will be provided.              |
| ACM_SCP.2 | Problem Tracking CM Coverage            | Document(s) describing the TOE's configuration management will be provided.              |
| ADO_DEL.2 | Detection of Modification               | Document(s) describing the TOE's delivery procedures will be provided.                   |
| ADO_IGS.1 | Installation, Generation, and Startup   | Document(s) describing the TOE's installation and configuration will be provided.        |
| ADV_FSP.2 | Fully Defined External Interfaces       | Document(s) covering the TOE's external interfaces will be provided.                     |
| ADV_HLD.2 | Security Enforcing High-level Design    | Document(s) describing the TOE's high level design will be provided.                     |
| ADV_IMP.1 | Subset of the TSF Implementation        | All of the TOE's source code will be provided.   |
| ADV_LLD.1 | Descriptive Low-level Design            | Document(s) describing the TOE's low level design will be provided.                      |
| ADV_RCR.1 | Informal Correspondence Demonstration   | A demonstration of correspondence will be provided within the design documentation.      |
| ADV_SPM.1 | Informal TOE Security Policy Model      | A document describing the TOE's Security Policy Model will be provided.                  |
| AGD_ADM.1 | Administrator Guidance                  | Administrator guidance document(s) will be provided.                                     |
| AGD_USR.1 | User Guidance                           | User guidance document(s) will be provided.  |
| ALC_DVS.1 | Identification of Security Measures     | Document(s) covering the security of the TOE's development environment will be provided. |
| ALC_LCD.1 | Developer Defined Life Cycle Model      | Document(s) covering the TOE's life cycle model will be provided.                        |
| ALC_TAT.1 | Well Defined Development Tools          | Document(s) covering the TOE's development tools will be provided.                       |
| ATE_COV.2 | Analysis of Coverage                    | Document(s) describing the TOE's developer testing will be provided.                     |
| ATE_DPT.1 | Testing - High-level Design             | Document(s) describing the TOE's developer testing will be provided.                     |
| ATE_FUN.1 | Functional Testing                      | Document(s) describing the TOE's developer testing will be provided.                     |
| AVA_MSU.2 | Validation of Analysis                  | Document(s) providing guidance analysis for the TOE will be provided.                    |
| AVA_SOF.1 | Strength of TOE Security Functions      | Document(s) analysing the strength of the TOE security functions will be provided.       |

*Table 3: Oracle Internet Directory Assurance Measures*

| <b>Component</b> | <b>Name</b>                        | <b>Documents</b>   |
|------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| AVA_VLA.2        | Independent Vulnerability Analysis | Document(s) providing vulnerability analysis for the TOE will be provided. |
| ALC_FLR.3        | Systematic Flaw Remediation        | Document(s) covering the flaw remediation procedures will be provided.     |

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CHAPTER

# 7

## Protection Profile Claims

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### PP Reference

This security target does not make any claims about Protection Profile conformance.

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# Rationale

## Security Objectives Rationale

This section demonstrates how the identified security objectives are suitable to counter the identified threats and meet the stated security policies.

The threats for the TOE and the security policies are stated in Chapter 3. The TOE security objectives and the environmental security objectives are stated in Chapter 4.

The table below covers those threats countered by the TOE and the security policies, showing that a threat is countered by at least one TOE security objective, and that each security policy is satisfied by at least one TOE security objective. This table does not cover threats addressed purely by the environment. A *YES* in the table indicates that the identified TOE security objective is relevant to the identified threat or security policy.

*Table 4: Correlation of Threats and Policies to TOE Security Objectives*

| Threat/<br>Policy | O.I&A.<br>TOE | O.ACCESS | O.AUDIT | O.ADMIN.<br>TOE |
|-------------------|---------------|----------|---------|-----------------|
| T.ACCESS          | YES           | YES      |         | YES             |
| T.DATA            | YES           | YES      |         | YES             |
| T.ATTACK          | YES           | YES      | YES     | YES             |
| T.ABUSE.<br>USER  | YES           | YES      | YES     | YES             |
| P.ACCESS          |               | YES      |         | YES             |

The following table illustrates how each of the environmental security objectives counters a threat, supports a policy or maps to a secure usage assumption.

Table 5: Mapping of Environmental Security Objectives to Threats, Policy, and Secure Usage Assumptions

| Environmental Objective | Counters Threat            | Supports Policy | Maps to Secure Usage Assumptions                       |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|--|
| O.INSTALL               | T.OPERATE                  |                 | A.TOE.CONFIG, A.SYS.CONFIG, A.MANAGE, A.ACCESS, A.PEER |
| O.PHYSICAL              | T.PHYSICAL                 |                 | A.PEER, A.PHYSICAL                                     |
| O.AUDITLOG              | T.ATTACK T.ABUSE.USER      |                 | A.MANAGE   |
| O.RECOVERY              | T.CRASH                    |                 | A.MANAGE   |
| O.TRUST                 |                            | P.ACCESS        | A.MANAGE, A.ACCESS                                     |
| O.AUTHDATA              | T.ACCESS                   | P.ACCESS        | A.MANAGE, A.ACCESS                                     |
| O.MEDIA                 | T.CRASH                    |                 | A.MANAGE   |
| O.ADMIN.ENV             |                            | P.ACCESS        | A.MANAGE, A.ACCESS                                     |
| O.FILES                 | T.ACCESS, T.ATTACK, T.DATA | P.ACCESS        | A.MANAGE   |
| O.SEP                   | T.ACCESS                   | P.ACCESS        | A.MANAGE   |

### T.ACCESS Rationale

T.ACCESS (*Unauthorised Access to the Directory*) is directly countered by O.I&A.TOE which ensures the TOE can protect the resources of the directory from access by persons not authorised to use the directory. O.I&A.TOE ensures the TOE has the means of authenticating the claimed identity of any user. O.ACCESS.CONTROL & O.ADMIN.TOE provide support by controlling access to the directory control data and administrative functionality that might otherwise enable circumvention of the directory access controls. O.SEP and O.FILES together prevent bypass of the TOE. O.AUTHDATA ensures that authentication data is held securely to stop it being used by unauthorised users to authenticate to the TOE.

### T.DATA Rationale

T.DATA (*Unauthorised Access to Information*) is directly countered by O.ACCESS.OBJECTS. O.ACCESS.OBJECTS ensures access is controlled to information contained within specific directory objects. O.ACCESS.RESIDUAL ensures access is prevented to residual information held in memory or reused directory objects. O.I&A.TOE provides support by providing the means of identifying the user attempting to access a directory object. O.ACCESS.CONTROL and O.ADMIN.TOE provide support by controlling access to directory control data and administrative functionality that might otherwise enable circumvention of directory object access controls. O.FILES prevents bypass of the TOE by users gaining direct access to files holding directory data.

### T.ATTACK Rationale

T.ATTACK (*Undetected Attack*) is countered directly by O.AUDIT which ensures the TOE has the means of recording security relevant events which could be indicative of an attack aimed at defeating the TOE security features. O.I&A.TOE provides support by reliably identifying the user responsible for particular events, where the attacker is

an authorised user of the directory. O.ACCESS.CONTROL and O.ADMIN.TOE provide support by controlling access to audit configuration data which only highly trusted individuals must be allowed to view and modify. O.FILES provides support by preventing users gaining direct access to files holding directory audit data to modify evidence of an attack.O.AUDITLOG ensures that audit data is correctly managed by the administrator so that it can be used to detect attacks.

### **T.ABUSE.USER Rationale**

T.ABUSE.USER (*Abuse of Privileges*) is countered directly by O.AUDIT, which ensures the TOE has the means of recording security relevant events which could be indicative of abuse of privilege by an authorised user of the directory. O.I&A.TOE provides support by reliably identifying the user responsible for particular events, thus ensuring that the user can be held accountable for actions for which he or she is responsible. O.ACCESS.CONTROL and O.ADMIN.TOE provide support by controlling access to audit configuration data which only highly trusted individuals must be allowed to view and modify. O.AUDITLOG ensures that audit data is correctly managed by the administrator so that it can be used to detect users abusing their privileges.

### **T.OPERATE Rationale**

T.OPERATE (*Insecure Operation*) is countered directly by O.INSTALL, which ensures that the TOE and its underlying platform are correctly installed, managed and operated.

### **T.PHYSICAL Rationale**

T.PHYSICAL (*Physical Attack*) is countered directly by O.PHYSICAL, which protects critical parts of the TOE from physical attack.

### **T.CRASH Rationale**

T.CRASH (*Abrupt Interruptions*) is countered by O.MEDIA and O.RECOVERY. These ensure that suitable recovery mechanisms are in place to recover from a crash and that the media used during the crash recovery is able to maintain the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the TOE.

### **P.ACCESS Rationale**

P.ACCESS is satisfied by O.ACCESS.OBJECTS, O.ACCESS.CONTROL, O.ADMIN.TOE & O.ADMIN.ENV, O.TRUST, O.AUTHDATA, O.FILES and O.SEP. O.ACCESS.OBJECTS ensures that the subjects using the TOE are able to control access to the objects for which they are responsible. O.ADMIN.TOE and O.ADMIN.ENV ensure that only authorised administrators can effectively manage the TOE and its Security Functions. O.FILES, O.TRUST, O.AUTHDATA and O.SEP ensure that components of the TSF cannot be tampered with by unauthorised users.

### **Assumptions Rationale**

This section demonstrates how the security objectives map to the TOE secure usage assumptions.

A.TOE.CONFIG is directly provided by O.INSTALL part a) because [ECD] is part of the operational documentation of the TOE.

A.SYS.CONFIG is directly provided by O.INSTALL part b).

A.PHYSICAL is directly provided by O.PHYSICAL.

A.ACCESS is provided by O.INSTALL, O.TRUST, O.AUTHDATA, and O.ADMIN.ENV.

A.MANAGE is provided by O.TRUST, supported by O.INSTALL, O.AUDIT-

LOG, O.AUTHDATA, O.MEDIA, O.ADMIN.ENV, O.FILES, O.RECOVERY and O.SEP.

A.PEER is provided by O.PHYSICAL & O.INSTALL. Since connected systems will require a physical connection to the TOE to be established they fall into the scope of O.PHYSICAL.

## Security Requirements Rationale

### Suitability of Security Requirements

The table below correlates the IT security objectives to the SFRs which satisfy them (as indicated by a *YES*), showing that each IT security objective is satisfied by at least one SFR, and that each SFR satisfies at least one IT security objective.

Table 6: Correlation of IT Security Objectives to Security Functional Requirements

| Requirement | O.I&A.TOE | O.ACCESS | O.AUDIT | O.ADMIN.TOE |
|-------------|-----------|----------|---------|-------------|
| FAU_GEN.1T  |           |          | YES     |             |
| FAU_GEN.2   |           |          | YES     |             |
| FAU_SAR.1   |           |          | YES     |             |
| FAU_SAR.3   |           |          | YES     |             |
| FAU_SEL.1   |           |          | YES     |             |
| FAU_STG.1   |           |          | YES     |             |
| FAU_STG.4   |           |          | YES     |             |
| FDP_ACC.1   |           | YES      |         |             |
| FDP_ACF.1   |           | YES      |         |             |
| FDP_RIP.2   |           | YES      |         |             |
| FIA_AFL.1   | YES       |          |         |             |
| FIA_ATD.1   | YES       | YES      | YES     | YES         |
| FIA_SOS.1   | YES       |          |         |             |
| FIA_UAU.1   | YES       |          |         |             |
| FIA_UID.1   | YES       | YES      |         |             |
| FMT_MSA.1   | YES       | YES      |         | YES         |
| FMT_MSA.3   |           | YES      |         |             |
| FMT_MTD.1   |           |          | YES     | YES         |
| FMT_REV.1   |           | YES      |         |             |
| FMT_SMF.1   | YES       | YES      | YES     | YES         |
| FMT_SMR.1   |           |          |         | YES         |

Table 6: Correlation of IT Security Objectives to Security Functional Requirements

| Requirement | O.I&A.TOE | O.ACCESS | O.AUDIT | O.ADMIN.TOE |
|-------------|-----------|----------|---------|-------------|
| FPT_RVM.1   |           | YES      |         |             |
| FPT_SEP.1T  |           | YES      |         |             |
| FTA_TSE.1   | YES       |          |         |             |

#### ***O.I&A.TOE Suitability***

O.I&A.TOE is directly provided by FIA\_UID.1 and FIA\_UAU.1, which provide the means of identifying and authenticating users of the TOE. FIA\_AFL.1 performs certain actions if a specified number of consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts is made. FIA\_ATD.1 provides a unique set of user attributes for each user while FMT\_MSA.1 and FMT\_SMF.1 specify controls over the modification of these attributes. FIA\_SOS.1 provides for quality metrics to be applied when new passwords are chosen. FTA\_TSE.1 controls the ability to create a directory session by a user.

#### ***O.ACCESS Suitability***

O.ACCESS is directly provided by FDP\_ACC.1 which defines the access control policy and FDP\_ACF.1 which specifies the access control rules. FMT\_REV.1 enforces revocation of security attributes. FDP\_RIP.2 ensures prevention of access to information residing in reused storage objects when they are reallocated to another subject. FIA\_ATD.1 ensures the security attributes of a user are bound to subjects created to act on his or her behalf. FIA\_UID.1 ensures users are identified prior to any TSF-mediated access actions. FPT\_RVM.1 ensures that the traditional reference monitor is always invoked prior to access. FMT\_MSA.1, FMT\_MSA.3 and FMT\_SMF.1 provide support for the management of security attributes to control access to directory objects. FPT\_SEP.1T assures that objects one subject are accessing cannot be intentionally or inadvertently accessed by another subject without a TSF access decision being made for the second subject.

#### ***O.AUDIT Suitability***

O.AUDIT is directly provided by FAU\_GEN.1T which generates audit records for all security relevant events. FAU\_GEN.2 supports the enforcement of individual accountability by ensuring the user responsible for each event can be identified. FIA\_ATD.1 provides for the storage of user security attributes. FAU\_STG.1 provides permanent storage for the audit trail, FAU\_STG.4 provides for mechanisms to deal with full audit trails, while FMT\_MTD.1.1.1 and FMT\_SMF.1 provide for the protection of that audit trail. FAU\_SAR.1 and FAU\_SAR.3 provide functions to review the contents of the audit trail, while FAU\_SEL.1 provides the ability to select which events are to be audited.

#### ***O.ADMIN.TOE Suitability***

O.ADMIN.TOE is directly provided by FMT\_SMR.1 and FMT\_MTD.1, which provide essential administrative functionality which is restricted to authorised administrators. FIA\_ATD.1 provides support by ensuring that the security attributes of users are associated with the subjects acting on the user's behalf. FMT\_MSA.1

## Suitability of Security Requirements for the IT Environment

and FMT.SMF.1 provide administrative functionality which enforces DAC Security Function Policy to restrict the ability to modify, delete and create security attributes.

The rationale above demonstrates the suitability of the TOE security requirements.

The Security Requirements for the IT Environment section of Chapter 5 defines a set of SFRs for the IT environment to support the TOE SFRs, and also provides an informal description of requirements for the IT environment to support the security objectives. Most of these requirements are described informally in order not to unduly limit the environments that can satisfy them. The Support for Security Objectives section in Chapter 5 gives a rationale as to why these requirements are needed. The requirements for the IT environment that are described in the Support for Security Objectives section are together sufficient to meet the objectives for the IT environment defined in Chapter 4 (which are O.ADMIN.ENV, O.FILES and O.SEP).

The functional security requirements for the IT environment (defined in the Support for SFRs section in Chapter 5) are traced to security objectives for the environment as follows:

- FAU\_GEN.1E.1, FAU\_GEN.1E.2 and FPT\_STM.1.1 map to O.ADMIN.ENV which includes requirements on the underlying database system and operating system for the support of auditing functions. O.ADMIN.ENV's requirements for auditing correspond to the requirements defined in FAU\_GEN.1E.1, FAU\_GEN.1E.2 and FPT\_STM.1.1.
- FPT\_SEP.1E.1 maps to O.SEP, which covers requirements for the operating system to provide separation features to protect the TOE.

## Dependency Analysis

The table on the next page demonstrates that all dependencies of functional components are satisfied.

*Table 7: Functional Component Dependency Analysis*

| Component Reference | Component         | Dependencies                | Dependency Reference       |
|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1                   | <b>FAU_GEN.1T</b> | FPT_STM.1                   | See notes 1, 2 and 3 below |
| 2                   | <b>FAU_GEN.2</b>  | FAU_GEN.1T<br>FIA_UID.1     | 1<br>15                    |
| 3                   | <b>FAU_SAR.1</b>  | FAU_GEN.1T                  | 1                          |
| 4                   | <b>FAU_SAR.3</b>  | FAU_SAR.1                   | 3                          |
| 5                   | <b>FAU_SEL.1</b>  | FAU_GEN.1T<br>FMT_MTD.1.1.2 | 1<br>18                    |
| 6                   | <b>FAU_STG.1</b>  | FAU_GEN.1T                  | 1                          |
| 7                   | <b>FAU_STG.4</b>  | FAU_STG.1                   | 6                          |

Table 7: Functional Component Dependency Analysis

| Component Reference | Component  | Dependencies                        | Dependency Reference         |
|---------------------|------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 8                   | FDP_ACC.1  | FDP_ACF.1                           | 9                            |
| 9                   | FDP_ACF.1  | FDP_ACC.1<br>FMT_MSA.3              | 8<br>17                      |
| 10                  | FDP_RIP.2  | -                                   | -                            |
| 11                  | FIA_AFL.1  | FIA_UAU.1                           | 14                           |
| 12                  | FIA_ATD.1  | -                                   | -                            |
| 13                  | FIA_SOS.1  | -                                   | -                            |
| 14                  | FIA_UAU.1  | FIA_UID.1                           | 15                           |
| 15                  | FIA_UID.1  | -                                   | -                            |
| 16                  | FMT_MSA.1  | FDP_ACC.1<br>FMT_SMR.1              | 8<br>21                      |
| 17                  | FMT_MSA.3  | FMT_MSA.1<br>FMT_SMF.1<br>FMT_SMR.1 | 16<br>20<br>21               |
| 18                  | FMT_MTD.*  | FMT_SMF.1<br>FMT_SMR.1              | 20<br>21<br>See note 4 below |
| 19                  | FMT_REV.1  | FMT_SMR.1                           | 21                           |
| 20                  | FMT_SMF.1  |                                     | -                            |
| 21                  | FMT_SMR.1  | FIA_UID.1                           | 15                           |
| 22                  | FPT_RVM.1  | -                                   | -                            |
| 23                  | FPT_SEP.1T | -                                   | -<br>See note 2 below        |
| 24                  | FTA_TSE.1  | -                                   | -                            |

**Note 1:** The security requirement for the IT environment FPT\_STM.1.1 satisfies the dependency of the SFR FAU\_GEN.1T.2 for the provision of reliable timestamps (see the section on security requirements for the IT environment in chapter 5).

**Note 2:** The nature of the extensions does not impact on the dependencies as defined for the CC Part 2 components from which they are derived.

**Note 3:** The modification of FAU\_GEN.1 does not impact its ability to satisfy the dependencies of FAU\_GEN.2, FAU\_SAR.1, FAU\_SEL.1 and FAU\_STG.1 - especially given that collectively the TOE and IT environment meet FAU\_GEN.1.

**Note 4:** FMT\_MTD.1 has 2 iterations. Its entry in the table above indicates that all FMT\_MTD.1 dependencies are satisfied by FMT\_SMF.1 and FMT\_SMR.1.

## Dependency analysis of the security assurance requirements

EAL4 is a self-contained assurance package and ALC\_FLR.3 has no dependencies on any other component.

## Demonstration of Mutual Support

The dependency analysis provided in the table above demonstrates mutual support between functional components, showing that all dependencies required by Part 2 of the CC are satisfied.

The following supportive dependencies exist for the TOE to prevent bypassing of and tampering with the SFRs:

FIA\_UID.1 and FIA\_UAU.1 together with FIA\_ATD.1 and FMT\_MSA.1 provide support to all SFRs which rely on the identification of individual users and their security attributes, namely: FDP\_ACC.1, FDP\_ACF.1, FMT\_MSA.1, FMT\_SMR.1, FAU\_GEN.1, FAU\_GEN.2, FMT\_MTD.1, FMT\_SMF.1, FAU\_SAR.1 and FAU\_SEL.1.

FDP\_RIP.2 supports FDP\_ACC.1 and FDP\_ACF.1 by preventing the bypassing of those SFRs through access to reused to storage objects.

FMT\_MSA.3 provides support to FDP\_ACC.1 and FDP\_ACF.1 by ensuring objects are protected by default when newly created.

FMT\_MSA.1 provides support to FDP\_ACC.1, FDP\_ACF.1 and FMT\_SMF.1 by controlling the modification of object security attributes.

FMT\_REV.1 provides support to FMT\_MSA.1, FDP\_ACC.1 and FDP\_ACF.1 by enforcing revocation of object security attributes.

FAU\_STG.1 and FAU\_STG.4 support FAU\_GEN.1T by providing permanent storage for the audit trail, and dealing with the audit trail full condition.

FMT\_MTD.1 supports FAU\_STG.1, FAU\_STG.4 and FMT\_SMF.1 by protecting the integrity of the audit trail.

FAU\_SEL.1 supports FAU\_STG.4 by providing the means of limiting the events to be audited, thereby ensuring that the available space for the audit trail is not exhausted more frequently than necessary.

FPT\_RVM.1 and FPT\_SEP.1T support FDP\_ACC.1 and FDP\_ACF.1 by restricting access to residual data and providing separate domains.

FDP.ACC.1 and FDP.ACF.1 support FAU\_STG.1 and FMT\_SMF.1 by preventing unauthorised modifications to the audit trail. They also support FMT\_MSA.1 by preventing unauthorised modifications of directory objects' security attributes and they protect the TSF data from unauthorised modification to support FMT\_MTD.1.

## Strength of Function Validity

The PWD mechanism is the only TOE mechanism that is probabilistic or permutational, and has a strength of *SOF-high*. This strength of function is intended to provide enough protection against straight forward or intentional attack from threat agents having a high attack potential.



## Assurance Requirements Appropriate

The target assurance level is EAL4, augmented with ALC\_FLR.3. EAL4 is appropriate because the TOE is designed for use with an underlying operating system and database server that have been assured to EAL4.

ALC\_FLR.3 has been included in addition to EAL4 to cause the evaluation of the TOE's flaw remediation procedures which OID users need to be in place following the release of the TOE. These procedures are required to offer continuing assurance to users that OID provides secure storage of and access to the data which is crucial to their enterprise's success.

To meet this requirement, the flaw remediation procedures must offer:

- the ability for TOE users to report potential security flaws to Oracle,
- the resolution and correction of any flaws with assurance that the corrections introduce no new security flaws, and
- the timely distribution of corrective actions to users.

ALC\_FLR.3 is the ALC\_FLR component which is at an appropriate level of rigour to cover these requirements.

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## TOE Summary Specification Rationale

This section demonstrates that the TOE Security Functions and Assurance Measures are suitable to meet the TOE security requirements.

## TOE Security Functions Satisfy Requirements

The table below demonstrates that for each SFR the TOE security functions are suitable to meet the SFR, and the combination of TOE security functions work together so as to satisfy the SFR:

*Table 8: TOE Security Function Suitability and Binding*

| SFR         | TOE Security Functions | Rationale  |
|-------------|------------------------|--|
| FIA_AFL.1.1 | IA.PWDC<br>IA.USESS    | IA.PWDC provides the configurable control governing the number of failed userpassword check attempts before a user account is locked. IA.USESS detects if this number is reached or exceeded.                        |
| FIA_AFL.1.2 | IA.PWDC<br>IA.USESS    | IA.PWDC provides the configurable control governing the number of failed userpassword check attempts before a user account is locked. IA.USESS locks the user's account if this number has been reached or exceeded. |
| FIA_ATD.1.1 | SAM.UATT               | The directory contains the required security attributes for each directory user.   |
| FIA_SOS.1.1 | IA.PWDC<br>SAM.CHPWD   | IA.PWDC specifies the configurable metrics user passwords have to meet. SAM.CHPWD allows users to change their own passwords within the configured metrics.  |

Table 8: TOE Security Function Suitability and Binding

| SFR         | TOE Security Functions   | Rationale  |
|-------------|--|--|
| FIA_UAU.1.1 | IA.ASESS<br>IA.IDE   | If a user does not authenticate, IA.ASESS will allow an anonymous directory session in which only publicly available material is accessible. IA.IDE states that a directory session must be established in order to submit a request to and receive information from a directory server.   |
| FIA_UAU.1.2 | IA.USESS<br>IA.ASESS<br>IA.IDE   | IA.IDE states that a directory session must be established in order to submit a request to and receive information from a directory server. IA.USESS and IA.ASESS state the conditions for being able to establish a directory session. Authentication is required in order to perform TSF-mediated actions other than accessing publicly available material.  |
| FIA_UID.1.1 | IA.ASESS<br>IA.IDE   | If the user supplies no username, IA.ASESS will allow an anonymous directory session in which only publicly available material is accessible. IA.IDE states that a directory session must be established in order to submit a request to and receive information from a directory server.  |
| FIA_UID.1.2 | IA.USESS<br>IA.ASESS<br>IA.UID<br>IA.PSESS<br>IA.IDE   | IA.IDE states that a directory session must be established in order to submit a request to and receive information from a directory server. If the user supplies no username, IA.ASESS will allow an anonymous directory session in which only publicly available material is accessible. IA.UID, IA.USESS and IA.PSESS state the conditions for being able to establish a directory session with an identified user. Identification is required in order to perform TSF-mediated actions other than accessing publicly available material.  |
| FDP_ACC.1.1 | IA.UID<br>DAC.OBID<br>DAC.OBREF<br>DAC.SUA<br>DAC.OBA  | IA.UID enforces that each user is uniquely identified. DAC.OBID and DAC.OBREF ensures that all objects (which are subject to DAC) can be uniquely identified. DAC.SUA and DAC.OBA state that the DAC policy for access operations extends to all subjects and objects.   |
| FDP_ACF.1.1 | IA.UID<br>DAC.OBID<br>DAC.OBREF<br>DAC.SUA<br>DAC.OBA<br>DAC.POL<br>SAM.UATT<br>SAM.EATT<br>SAM.UEFF<br>SAM.OEFF | IA.UID ensures each user has a unique user identity. DAC.OBID and DAC.OBREF ensure that all objects (which are subject to DAC) can be uniquely identified. DAC.SUA and DAC.OBA state that the DAC policy for access operations extends to all subjects and objects. DAC.POL is a statement of the DAC policy. SAM.UATT and SAM.EATT cover the security attributes for users and directory objects (including the identity and group memberships for users and access control information for objects). SAM.OEFF and SAM.UEFF state the conditions under which the user and object security attributes are effective for a directory session. |

Table 8: TOE Security Function Suitability and Binding

| SFR           | TOE Security Functions  | Rationale   |
|---------------|---|---|
| FDP_ACF.1.2   | IA.UID<br>IA.CRUG<br>DAC.OBID<br>DAC.OBREF<br>DAC.POL<br>SAM.UEFF<br>SAM.OEFF | DAC.POL fully covers the access control rules defined in FDP_ACF.1.2. DAC.OBID and DAC.OBREF ensure that all objects (which are subject to DAC) can be uniquely identified. IA.CRUG is relevant as I&A data is subject to the DAC policy. IA.UID ensures users are uniquely identified via a DN name. SAM.OEFF and SAM.UEFF state the conditions under which the user and object security attributes are effective for a directory session.             |
| FDP_ACF.1.3   | DAC.POL<br>SAM.UEFF<br>SAM.OEFF   | DAC.POL specifies the rules for subjects to gain access to objects. SAM.OEFF and SAM.UEFF state the conditions under which the user and object security attributes are effective for a directory session.   |
| FDP_ACF.1.4   | N/A   | This SFR does not mandate any functionality. It is included for compliance with the CC.   |
| FDP_RIP.2.1   | DAC.OR  | DAC.OR satisfies FDP_RIP.2.1 directly.  |
| FMT_MSA.1.1   | IA.CRUG<br>SAM.MODATT<br>SAM.CHPWD  | IA.CRUG only allows authorised users to create user entries and group memberships in the directory. SAM.MODATT ensures an authorised user can create, read, modify or delete security attributes for directory users and directory entries. SAM.CHPWD allows authorised users to change user password attributes.   |
| FMT_MSA.3.1   | DAC.POL<br>SAM.EATT<br>IA.CRUG  | SAM.EATT states that default security attributes for directory entries are as per the Default Access Policies defined for the TOE. DAC.POL defines the access control policy. The user security attributes used to enforce directory access control are user identity and group memberships. IA.CRUG states that the default values of attributes of newly created user entries and group entries are as described in Chapters 8, 11 and 13 of [OIDAG]. |
| FMT_MSA.3.2   | DAC.OBA<br>DAC.POL<br>SAM.EATT  | Unless access to an object has been explicitly granted, as described in DAC.OBA and DAC.POL, no access will be allowed. SAM.EATT states that default security attributes for directory entries are as per the Default Access Policies defined for the TOE, which cover how authorised users can reset the default security configuration.   |
| FMT_MTD.1.1.1 | AUD.ACC<br>AUD.DEL  | AUD.DEL states that only an authorised administrator can clear the audit trail. AUD.ACC will allow only authorised users to view records in the audit log.  |
| FMT_MTD.1.1.2 | AUD.SET   | AUD.SET allows only the super user to access the audit level that specifies which events are auditable.   |
| FMT_REV.1.1   | SAM.MODATT  | SAM.MODATT ensures that only a suitably authorised user can create, read, modify or delete security attributes for directory users and directory entries and hence to effectively revoke such attributes.   |

Table 8: TOE Security Function Suitability and Binding

| SFR          | TOE Security Functions  | Rationale   |
|--------------|---|---|
| FMT_REV.1.2  | SAM.OEFF<br>SAM.UEFF  | SAM.OEFF and SAM.UEFF state the conditions under which the user and object security attributes are effective for a directory session and hence when a change to revoke such attributes becomes effective.   |
| FMT_SMF.1.1  | AUD.ACC<br>AUD.DEL<br>AUD.SET<br>DAC.POL<br>IA.CRUG<br>IA.PWDC<br>IA.PWDCM<br>SAM.CHPWD<br>SAM.MODATT | IA.CRUG allows only authorised users to create user entries and group memberships in the directory. SAM.MODATT and DAC.POL ensures an authorised user can create, read, modify or delete security attributes for directory users and directory entries. SAM.CHPWD allows authorised users to change user password attributes. AUD.DEL states that only an authorised administrator can clear the audit trail. AUD.ACC will allow only authorised users to view records in the audit log. AUD.SET allows only the super user to access the audit level that specifies which events are auditable. IA.PWDC and IA.PWDCM ensure that the configurable controls on user passwords (i.e. reuse, lifetime and content metrics for passwords) can only be accessed and updated by suitably authorised users. |
| FMT_SMR.1.1  | IA.UID  | IA.UID ensures that the TSF maintains the roles of normal user and super user and states that the super user is the administrator for the directory.  |
| FMT_SMR.1.2  | IA.UID  | IA.UID states how directory entries for normal users and the super user are identified.   |
| FPT_RVM.1.1  | IA.IDE<br>DAC.POL   | IA.IDE ensures that the TOE always knows who the current user is. DAC.POL ensures that the directory access control policy enforcement functions are always invoked for this user before an access operation can proceed.   |
| FPT_SEP.1T.1 | DAC.SEP   | DAC.SEP ensures that the interactions between different users and the TOE cannot interfere with each other. Additionally there is no way to access the TOE except through the evaluated interfaces described by the TOE security functions.   |
| FPT_SEP.1T.2 | IA.IDE<br>DAC.SEP   | IA.IDE ensures that the identity of the user associated with each interaction with the TOE is clear. DAC.SEP ensures that the interactions between different users and the TOE cannot interfere with each other.  |
| FTA_TSE.1.1  | IA.PWDC<br>IA.USESS   | IA.PWDC provides the configurable control governing the expiration of a password. IA.USESS prevents the establishment of a directory session if the user's password has expired.  |
| FAU_GEN.1T.1 | AUD.INF<br>AUD.SET  | AUD.SET allows the super user to set which events are to be auditable. Audit records are generated to contain information as defined by AUD.INF.  |
| FAU_GEN.1T.2 | AUD.INF   | Audit records are generated to contain the required information as defined by AUD.INF.  |
| FAU_GEN.2.1  | IA.UID<br>AUD.INF   | IA.UID ensures that each user is uniquely identified. Audit records are generated to contain the required user identity information as defined by AUD.INF.  |

Table 8: TOE Security Function Suitability and Binding

| SFR         | TOE Security Functions | Rationale  |
|-------------|------------------------|--|
| FAU_SAR.1.1 | AUD.ACC                | AUD.ACC directly satisfies FAU_SAR.1.1   |
| FAU_SAR.1.2 | AUD.ACC                | AUD.ACC directly satisfies FAU_SAR.1.2   |
| FAU_SAR.3.1 | AUD.ACC                | AUD.ACC provides facilities for searching for audit records according to their attribute values. |
| FAU_SEL.1.1 | AUD.SET                | AUD.SET directly satisfies FAU_SEL.1.1.  |
| FAU_STG.1.1 | AUD.DEL                | AUD.DEL directly satisfies FAU_STG.1.1.  |
| FAU_STG.1.2 | AUD.DEL                | F.AUD.DEL protects audit records from modification.  |
| FAU_STG.4.1 | AUD.FULL               | AUD.FULL directly satisfies FAU_STG.4.1  |

The table below shows that all the SFRs are satisfied by at least one SF and that every SF is used to satisfy at least one SFR (but note that SFR FDP\_ACF.1.4 is not explicitly satisfied by any particular SF because this SFR specifies null functionality).

Table 9: Mapping of SFs to SFRs

|            | FIA     |         |         |         | FDP     |         |         |         | FMT     |         |         |         |         |        |         | FPT     |         | FTA | FAU       |           |         |         |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
|------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--|
|            | AFL.1.1 | AFL.1.2 | ATD.1.1 | SOS.1.1 | UAV.1.1 | UAV.1.2 | UID.1.1 | UID.1.2 | ACC.1.1 | ACF.1.1 | ACF.1.2 | ACF.1.3 | ACF.1.4 | RP.2.1 | MSA.1.1 | MSA.3.1 | MSA.3.2 |     | MTD.1.1.1 | MTD.1.1.2 | REV.1.1 | SME.1.1 | SMR.1.1 | SMR.1.2 | RV.1.1 | SE.1.1 | SE.1.2 | SE.1.3 | RV.1.1 | GEN.1.1 | GEN.1.2 | GEN.2.1 | SAR.1.1 | SAR.1.2 | SAR.3.1 | SEL.1.1 | STG.1.1 | STG.1.2 | STG.4.1 |  |
| IA.UID     |         |         |         |         |         | Y       | Y       | Y       | Y       |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |         |     |           |           |         | Y       | Y       |         |        |        |        |        |        |         | Y       |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| IA.ASESS   |         |         |         |         | Y       | Y       | Y       | Y       |         |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |         |     |           |           |         |         |         |         |        |        | Y      |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| IA.USESS   | Y       | Y       |         |         |         | Y       | Y       | Y       |         |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |         |     |           |           |         |         |         |         |        |        | Y      |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| IA.IDE     |         |         |         | Y       | Y       | Y       | Y       |         |         |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |         |     |           |           |         |         |         |         |        | Y      | Y      |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| IA.PSESS   |         |         |         |         |         |         | Y       |         |         |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |         |     |           |           |         |         |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| IA.CRUG    |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | Y       |         |         |         |         | Y      | Y       |         |         |     |           |           |         | Y       |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| IA.PWDC    | Y       | Y       |         | Y       |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |         |     |           |           |         |         |         |         |        |        | Y      |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| IA.PWDCM   |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |         |     |           |           |         |         | Y       |         |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| SAM.UATT   |         |         | Y       |         |         |         |         |         | Y       |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |         |     |           |           |         |         |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| SAM.EATT   |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | Y       |         |         |         |         |        |         | Y       | Y       |     |           |           |         |         |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| SAM.CHPWD  |         |         | Y       |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | Y      |         |         |         |     |           |           |         | Y       |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| SAM.MODATT |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | Y      |         |         |         |     |           | Y         |         | Y       |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| SAM.UEFF   |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | Y       | Y       | Y       |         |         |        |         |         |         |     |           |           | Y       |         |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| SAM.OEFF   |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | Y       | Y       | Y       |         |         |        |         |         |         |     |           | Y         |         |         |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| DAC.OBID   |         |         |         |         |         | Y       | Y       | Y       |         |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |         |     |           |           |         |         |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| DAC.OBREF  |         |         |         |         |         | Y       | Y       | Y       |         |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |         |     |           |           |         |         |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| DAC.SUA    |         |         |         |         |         | Y       | Y       |         |         |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |         |     |           |           |         |         |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| DAC.OBA    |         |         |         |         |         | Y       | Y       |         |         |         |         |         |         |        |         | Y       |         |     |           |           |         |         |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| DAC.POL    |         |         |         |         |         | Y       | Y       | Y       |         |         |         |         |         |        |         | Y       | Y       |     |           |           |         | Y       |         |         |        | Y      | Y      |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| DAC.SEP    |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |         |     |           |           |         |         |         |         |        | Y      | Y      |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| DAC.OR     |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | Y      |         |         |         |     |           |           |         |         |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| AUD.INF    |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |         |     |           |           |         |         |         |         |        |        | Y      | Y      | Y      |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| AUD.SET    |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |         |     | Y         |           |         | Y       |         |         |        |        | Y      |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         | Y       |         |         |         |  |

Table 9: Mapping of SFs to SFRs

|          | FIA    |        |        |        | FDP    |        |        |        | FMT    |        |        |        | FPT    |       |        | ETA    | FAU    |          |          |        |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |  |   |  |
|----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|----------|----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--|---|--|
|          | AFL1.1 | AFL1.2 | ATD1.1 | SOS1.1 | UAU1.1 | UAU1.2 | UDD1.1 | UDD1.2 | ACC1.1 | ACE1.1 | ACE1.2 | ACE1.3 | ACE1.4 | RP2.1 | MSA1.1 | MSA3.1 | MSA3.2 | MTD1.1.1 | MTD1.1.2 | REY1.1 | REY1.2 | SME1.1 | SMR1.1 | SMR1.2 | RYM1.1 | SEPT1.1 | SEPT1.2 | TSE1.1 | GEN1T1 | GEN1T2 | GEN2.1 | SAR1.1 | SAR1.2 | SAR3.1 | SEL1.1 | STG1.1 | STG1.2 | STG4.1 |  |   |  |
| AUD.ACC  |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |       |        |        | Y      |          |          |        |        | Y      |        |        |        |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |        | Y      | Y      | Y      |        |        |  |   |  |
| AUD.DEL  |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |       |        |        |        | Y        |          |        |        |        | Y      |        |        |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | Y      | Y      |  |   |  |
| AUD.FULL |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |       |        |        |        |          |          |        |        |        |        |        |        |         |         |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |  | Y |  |

## Assurance Measures Rationale

Table 3 in chapter 6 shows that, for each Security Assurance Requirement, there is an appropriate assurance measure.

## PP Claims Rationale

This security target makes no claims about Protection Profile conformance.

## ANNEX

# A

## References

- [CAPP] *Controlled Access Protection Profile*,  
Version 1.d, NSA, October 1999.
- [CC] *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation*,  
Version 2.3, August 2005.
- [DPP] *Database Management System Protection Profile (DBMS PP)*,  
Issue 2.1, Oracle Corporation, May 2000.
- [ECD] *Evaluated Configuration for Oracle Internet Directory 10g (10.1.4.0.1)*,  
Oracle Corporation.
- [LDAP3] *Lightweight Directory Access Protocol Version 3*,  
Request For Comments (RFC) 2251 of the Internet Engineering Task Force,  
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available on the World Wide Web at <http://www.ietf.org/rfc.htm>
- [OIDAG] *Oracle Internet Directory Administrator's Guide 10g (10.1.4.0.1)*,  
Part No. B15991-01, Oracle Corporation.
- [OIMUR] *Oracle Identity Management User Reference 10g (10.1.4.0.1)*,  
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ANNEX

# B

# Glossary

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## Acronyms

|              |   |
|--------------|---|
| <b>ACI</b>   | Access Control Item                                 |
| <b>ACL</b>   | Access Control List                                 |
| <b>ACP</b>   | Access Control Policy Point                         |
| <b>ASN.1</b> | Abstract Syntax Notation One                        |
| <b>AVL</b>   | Adelson, Velskii and Landis (a type of binary tree) |
| <b>BER</b>   | Basic Encoding Rules (for ASN.1)                    |
| <b>DAC</b>   | Directory Access Control                            |
| <b>DIB</b>   | Directory Information Base                          |
| <b>DIT</b>   | Directory Information Tree                          |
| <b>DN</b>    | Distinguished Name                                  |
| <b>DSE</b>   | Directory-Specific Entry                            |
| <b>LDAP</b>  | Lightweight Directory Access Protocol               |
| <b>LDIF</b>  | LDAP Data Interchange Format                        |
| <b>OID</b>   | Oracle Internet Directory                           |

|             |                                 |
|-------------|---------------------------------|
| <b>RDN</b>  | Relative Distinguished Name     |
| <b>SF</b>   | Security Function               |
| <b>SFP</b>  | Security Function Policy        |
| <b>SFR</b>  | Security Functional Requirement |
| <b>SOF</b>  | Strength of Function            |
| <b>TOE</b>  | Target Of Evaluation            |
| <b>TSC</b>  | TOE Scope of Control            |
| <b>TSF</b>  | TOE Security Functions          |
| <b>TSFI</b> | TSF Interface                   |
| <b>TSP</b>  | TOE Security Policy             |

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## Terms

If a term described below has [CC] written after it, then this term is defined in the IT-security evaluation scheme. All other terms relate to Oracle Internet Directory (OID). [OIDAG, Glossary] covers the full set of terms for OID. The terms used in this document are described below.

### **Access Control Group**

A group entry in OID contains a list of names. A user is a member of the group if the user's DN is held in the group entry's multi-valued attribute `member` or `uniqueMember`. There are two types of access control groups: ACP groups and privilege groups.

### **Access Control Item (ACI)**

The OID directory holds access control information to define the administrative policies relating to access control. This information is stored as user-modifiable operational attributes called access control items (ACIs).

### **Access Control List (ACL)**

A list of Access Control Items is called an Access Control List (ACL).

### **Access Control Policy Point (ACP)**

An Access Control Policy Point (ACP) is an entry for which the `orclACI` attribute has been given a value. The `orclACI` attribute contains ACL directives that are prescriptive. That is, these directives apply to all entries in the subtree below the ACP where this attribute is defined.

### **ACP Group**

If an individual is a member of an ACP group, then the directory server grants to that individual the privileges associated with that ACP group.

### **Administrator**

A person who has some or all of the responsibilities of installing, configuring and maintaining a system, establishing and managing user accounts, allocating adminis-

trative privileges and permissions to trusted system users and auditing the usage of the system. Such users would be allocated the privileges and permissions necessary to discharge their responsibilities. [OIDAG, Part II] describes the basic administrative duties for managing an Oracle directory server. The super user for a directory has privileges that enable this user to perform such administrative duties.

|   |   |
|---|---|
| <b>Attribute</b>                        | Each entry in a directory contains information stored in attributes.  |
| <b>Audit Log</b>                        | The OID audit log is made up of directory entries, where each entry records the audit data for one event.   |
| <b>Audit Level</b>                      | To enable auditing, the attribute <code>orclauditlevel</code> in the DSE must be modified to the appropriate level. The value held in this attribute is called the directory's audit level.   |
| <b>Authentication</b>                   | Authentication is the process by which the directory server validates the claimed identity of the user connecting to the directory. OID implements four different levels of directory user authentication: Anonymous, Password-based (Simple Authentication), Certificate-based through Secure Socket Layer (SSL), and Indirect Authentication. |
| <b>Authorised Administrator</b>         | An administrator who has been granted the necessary privileges to perform his or her administrative duties.   |
| <b>AVL Tree</b>                         | A binary tree representation that can be used for the entries in a directory.   |
| <b>Binding</b>                          | The process of authenticating a user to a directory.  |
| <b>Directory</b>                        | A directory stores and retrieves information about organisations, individuals and other resources.  |
| <b>Directory Information Base (DIB)</b> | The complete set of all information held in a directory. The DIB consists of entries that are related to each other hierarchically in a directory information tree.   |
| <b>Directory Information Tree (DIT)</b> | A hierarchical tree-like structure consisting of the DNs of the entries.  |
| <b>Directory Server Instance</b>        | Each Oracle Directory Server instance services directory requests through a single OID dispatcher process listening at a specific TCP/IP port number. There can be more than one directory server instance on a node, each listening on a different port.   |
| <b>Directory Access Control (DAC)</b>   | Access control on directory objects based on access control information established by directory users.   |
| <b>Distinguished Name (DN)</b>          | Each entry in a directory is uniquely identified by a distinguished name, which defines exactly where in the directory's hierarchy the entry resides. It comprises all of the individual names of the parent entries back to the root.  |
| <b>Entry</b>                            | In a directory, a collection of information about an object is called an entry.   |
| <b>Entry Level Access Control</b>       | The <code>orclEntryLevelACI</code> attribute is used for entry level access control, for which the policy pertains only to a specific entity.   |

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>Knowledge Reference</b>                          | A knowledge reference (or referral) allows a directory server to return a reference to another server as a result of a directory query.  |
| <b>LDAP Client</b>                                  | LDAP Clients send LDAP requests to an OID listener/dispatcher process listening for LDAP commands at its port.   |
| <b>LDAP Data Interchange Format (LDIF)</b>          | The set of standards for formatting an input file for any of the LDAP command-line utilities.  |
| <b>Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)</b> | The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol is a standard, extensible directory access protocol. It is a common language that LDAP clients and servers use to communicate. LDAP Version 3 is defined in [LDAP3].   |
| <b>Object</b>                                       | An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations. Objects are visible through the TSFI and are composed of one or more TOE resources encapsulated with security attributes. [CC]  |
| <b>Object Class</b>                                 | An object class is a group of attributes that define the structure of a directory entry.   |
| <b>Oracle Internet Directory (OID)</b>              | Oracle Internet Directory is a general purpose directory service that enables fast retrieval and centralised management of information about dispersed users and network resources. LDAP V3 is used to communicate with it and OID is an Oracle Database 10g application.  |
| <b>Password Policy</b>                              | A password policy is a set of rules about how passwords can be created, changed and used within Oracle Internet Directory.   |
| <b>Platform</b>                                     | The combination of software and hardware underlying the TOE.   |
| <b>Privilege Group</b>                              | A Privilege Group is a higher-level access control group. This is similar to an ACP group, but it also provides for additional checking beyond a single ACP. Thus, if the directory finds an ACP at a higher level in the DIT that grants the privilege group access to the requested object, then it overrides any denials by a subordinate ACP and grants the user access to the object. |
| <b>Referral</b>                                     | A referral (or knowledge reference) allows a directory server to return a reference to another server as a result of a directory query.  |
| <b>Role</b>   | A predefined set of rules establishing the allowed interactions between a user and the TOE. [CC]   |
| <b>Security Attribute</b>                           | Information associated with subjects, users, and/or objects which is used for the enforcement of the TSP. [CC]   |
| <b>Security Domain</b>                              | The set of objects that a subject has the ability to access.   |
| <b>Security Function (SF)</b>                       | A part or parts of the TOE which have to be relied upon for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP. [CC]   |
| <b>Security Function Policy (SFP)</b>               | The security policy enforced by a SF. [CC]   |

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|--|--|
| <b>Security Functional Requirement (SFR)</b> | A security functional requirement defined in a protection profile or security target. [CC]   |
| <b>SOF-high</b>                              | A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against a deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack potential. [CC]   |
| <b>Strength of Function (SOF)</b>            | A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms. [CC]   |
| <b>Subject</b>                               | An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed. [CC]  |
| <b>Suitably Authorised Administrator</b>     | When a particular administrative operation is under consideration, a suitably authorized administrator is an administrator who has been granted the necessary privileges to perform this operation.  |
| <b>Suitably Authorised User</b>              | When a user is attempting to perform an operation on an object, a suitably authorised user is one who is permitted by the Directory Access Control SFP to perform the operation on the object. This policy is described in Chapter 18 of [OIDAG].  |
| <b>super user</b>                            | The super user is the administrator for the directory (but note that it is subject to access control policies as from this release of the TOE, and hence no longer has full access to all directory information by default). The actual name and the password for the super user are held in the DSE (by default the super user's name is <code>orcladmin</code> ) |
| <b>System</b>                                | A specific IT installation, with a particular purpose and operational environment [CC]   |
| <b>Target Of Evaluation (TOE)</b>            | The product or system being evaluated. [CC]  |
| <b>TOE resource</b>                          | Anything usable or consumable in the TOE. [CC]   |
| <b>TOE Scope of Control (TSC)</b>            | The set of interactions which can occur with or within a TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP. [CC]   |
| <b>TOE Security Functions (TSF)</b>          | A set consisting of all the software of the TOE that must be relied on for the correct enforcement of the TSP. [CC]  |
| <b>TOE Security Policy (TSP)</b>             | A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and distributed within a TOE. [CC]  |
| <b>TSF Interface (TSFI)</b>                  | A set of interfaces, whether interactive (man-machine interface) or programmatic (application programming interface), through which TOE resources are accessed, mediated by the TSF, or information is obtained from the TSF. [CC]   |
| <b>User</b>                                  | Any entity (human or machine) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE. [CC]  |
| <b>Userpassword Check</b>                    | This phrase refers to operations of the TOE which check whether the <code>userpassword</code> attribute of a user entry has a particular value. These are <code>bind</code> operations for which a password has been supplied and <code>compare</code> operations which are acting on the <code>userpassword</code> attribute of a user entry.                     |

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