



ePass ICAO essential
ST lite - BAC and AA
FQR No: 110 7560
FQR Issue: 1

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Document Management

A. Identification

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1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

The objective of this document is to present the Security Target Lite of the ePass ICAO essential product configuration BAC + AA on SLE77.

1.2 Product description

This product is designed to host configurable applications that can satisfy the following use case: Machine Readable Travel Document.

This present Security Target considers BAC PP [R9] and adds Active Authentication in the scope.

This security target also adds personalization security functions.

This product involves the following cryptographic features:

- RSA 1024 to 2048 bits (256 bits steps)
- 3DES (2keys)
- SHA 1, SHA 224, 256
- RNG
- Secure messaging DES
- GP Secure messaging during personalization (SCP02)

The following interfaces are supported:

- Contactless
- Contact

A personalization application is embedded, supporting ISO 7816-4 and proprietary commands.

1.3 Objective of the Security Target

This security target describes the security needs for ePass ICAO essential configuration BAC + AA product. The configuration is conforming to PP BAC and adds requirements for Active Authentication and for Prepersonalization and personalization.

This Security Target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level EAL4 augmented ALC_DVS.2 in defining the security enforcing functions of the Target Of Evaluation and describing the environment in which it operates.

The objectives of this Security Target are:

To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart card life cycle.

To describe the security environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and the threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the platform active phases.

To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE (and its documentation) during the product active phases.

To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the TOE assurance requirements and the security requirements for the environment.

To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements.

To present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the TOE provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements.

1.4 Security Target Identification

| | |
|---------------------|---|
| Title: | Ariane - ST - BAC and AA |
| Editor: | Oberthur Technologies |
| CC version: | 3.1 revision 4 |
| EAL: | EAL4 augmented with: AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 |
| PP(s): | BSI-CC-PP-055 [R9] |
| ST Reference | FQR: 110 7402 Issue 1 |
| ITSEF: | UL |
| Certification Body: | CESG |
| Evaluation scheme: | UK |

Table 1 - General Identification

1.5 TOE Technical Identification

| | |
|--|--|
| Product name: | ePass ICAO essential Configuration BAC + AA on SLE77 |
| Commercial name for Infineon SLE77CLFX2400P & SLE77CLFX2407P | ePass ICAO essential configuration BAC and AA |

Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification

1.6 IC Identification

| | |
|-------------------------|---|
| IC Reference: | Infineon chips |
| IC EAL | EAL5+, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 |
| Communication protocol: | Contact, Contactless and Dual |
| Memory: | Flash |
| Chip Manufacturer: | Infineon |
| IC PP | Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 |
| IC certificate | BSI-DSZ-CC-0917-2014 |
| IC maintenance | BSI-DSZ-CC-0917-2014-MA-01 |
| IC ST lite | Security Target Lite of M7794 A12 and G12, Version 2.3, 2013-11-27, Infineon Technologies AG. |

Table 3 - Chip Identification

1.7 Reference documents

MRTD specifications

- [R1] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization
- [R2] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization
- [R3] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 3 – Machine Readable Official Travel Documents, Specifications for electronically enabled official travel documents with biometric identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008
- [R4] Development of a logical data structure – LDS for optional capacity expansion technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –

1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18

- [R5] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents – Extended Access control (EAC) – TR03110 – v2.10 part 1
- [R6] Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003

Oberthur Technologies Specification

- [R7] FQR 110 7226 Ed 1 - ePass ICAO essential - Perso Guide, Oberthur Technologies

Protection Profiles

- [R8] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile v 1.0 - BSI-PP-0035 15/06/2007
- [R9] Machine readable travel documents with "ICAO Application", Basic Access control – BSI-PP-0055 v1.10 25th march 2009
- [R10] E- Machine readable travel documents with "ICAO Application", Extended Access control – BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25th march 2009
- [R11] E-passport: adaptation and interpretation of e-passport Protection Profiles, SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007
- [R12] Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations, ANSSI-CC-PP-2009/02, 1/12/2009

Chips References

- [R13] [BSI-DSZ-CC-0917](#) Certification report – SLE77CLFX2400P and SLE77CLFX2407P
- [R14] Maintenance report BSI-DSZ-CC-0917 MA01 – SLE77CLFX2400P and SLE77CLFX2407P

Standards

- [R15] ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 – Organization, security and commands for interchange
- [R16] Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO/IEC 15946.TR-ECC, BSI 2006
- [R17] ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002
- [R18] ISO/IEC 15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002
- [R19] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
- [R20] ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 - Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signature schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function
- [R21] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993
- [R22] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 Secure Hash Standard (+ Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
- [R23] AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998

- [R24] Jakob Jonsson and Burt Kaliski. Public-key cryptography standards (PKCS) #1: RSA cryptography specifications version 2.1. RFC 3447, 2003
- [R25] RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA Laboratories Technical Note, 2002
- [R26] ANSI X9.31 - Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 1998.
- [R27] FIPS 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
- [R28] ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes utilisant un cryptogramme bloc"
- [R29] NIST SP 800-90 – Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators (Revised)
- [R30] FIPS 197 – Advance Encryption Standard (AES)
- [R31] ISO/IEC 11770-2. Information Technology – Security techniques – Key management – part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques, 1996

Misc

- [R32] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1, 25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
- [R33] NOTE-10 - Interpretation with e-passport PP_courtesy translation-draft v0.1
- [R34] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 1 – Technical Guideline TR-03110-1 – version 2.10 March 2012
- [R35] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 2 – Technical Guideline TR-03110-2 – version 2.10 March 2012
- [R36] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 3 – Technical Guideline TR-03110-3 – version 2.10 March 2012

CC

- [R37] Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and general model, CCMB-2012-09-001, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September 2012
- [R38] Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September 2012
- [R39] Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September 2012

2 TOE OVERVIEW

2.1 Product overview

The product **EPass ICAO essential on SLE77** is multi-applicative native software, embeddable in contact and/or contact-less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be configured to serve different use cases, during the **Prepersonalization/personalization phases** of the product. For more information on the product, please refer to complete ST.

The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical Data Structure as specified in [R2].

This product is embedded on an IC. The IC functionalities are described in §1.6 IC Identification.

2.2 TOE overview

The TOE described in this security target is the BAC with active authentication (AA) of the product.

The BAC TOE is instantiated during the product prepersonalization, using the Application Creation Engine that creates the MF / DF required for the BAC configuration.

The TOE life cycle is described in **§ 4 TOE life cycle**.

The TOE identification is described in **§1.6 IC Identification** .

2.3 TOE Usages

State or organisation issues MRTDs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an MRTD configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder.

In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal MRTD to the inspection system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used on the field.

The MRTD in context of this security target contains:

- Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the booklet or any other form factor.

- A separate data summary for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine Readable Zone,

- And data elements stored on the TOE's chip for contact and contact-less machine reading.

The authentication of the holder is based on:

The possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page.

When holder has been authenticated the issuing State or Organization can perform extra authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as “visa information”...

The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTDs. The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.

The MRTD can be viewed as the combination:

A physical MRTD in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder.

The biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book or any other form factor.

The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) or keydoc area that identifies the device.

The printed portrait.

A logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO on the integrated circuit. It presents contact or contact-less readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder.

The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data or keydoc data, DG1).

The digitized portraits.

The other data according to LDS (up to DG24).

The Document security object.

The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and its data. The MRTD as the physical device and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number.

The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the physical support.

The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s chip.

2.4 TOE Definition

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control according to ICAO Doc 9303 and Active authentication.

The physical scope of the TOE is:

- Circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC)
- IC Dedicated Software
- IC Embedded Software (operating system)
- MRTD application
- Associated guidance documentation

2.5 TOE Guidance

The table below identifies the guidance for the personalization of the TOE.

| | |
|--|--|
| Guidance document for Prepersonalization and Personalization | [R7] FQR 110 7226 - ePass ICAO essential - Perso Guide, Oberthur Technologies |
|--|--|

| | |
|---|--|
| <p>Guidance documents for Operational Phase</p> | <p>[R1] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization</p> <p>[R2] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization</p> <p>[R3] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 3 – Machine Readable Official Travel Documents, Specifications for electronically enabled official travel documents with biometric identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008</p> <p>[R34] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 1 – Technical Guideline TR-03110-1 – version 2.10 March 2012</p> <p>[R36] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 3 – Technical Guideline TR-03110-3 – version 2.10 March 2012</p> |
|---|--|

Table 4: TOE Guidance reference

2.6 TOE identification

The means to identify the TOE is presented in the chapter 3 of guidance for personalization [R7].

3 TOE ARCHITECTURE

The TOE is an IC with software, composed of various modules and composed of the following components:

The **EPass ICAO essential configuration BAC + AA on SLE77** architecture can be viewed as shown in the following picture:




Figure 1 - TOE architecture

3.1 Integrated Circuit – Infineon SLE 77

The TOE is embedded on infineon chips, as presented in **Table 3 - Chip Identification**.

The IC part of the TOE comprises the following:

Core System:

- CPU
- Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit (MED)
- Memory Management Unit (MMU)

Memories:

- Read-Only Memory (ROM)
- Random Access Memory (RAM)

SOLID FLASH™ NVM

Peripherals:

- True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
- Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG)
- Watchdog and timers
- Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART)
- Checksum module (CRC)
- Radio Frequency Interface (RFI)

Control:

- Dynamic Power Management
- Internal Clock Oscillator (ICO)
- Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller (ITP and PEC)
- Interface Management Module (IMM)
- User mode Security Life Control (UmSLC)
- Voltage regulator

Coprocessors:

- Crypto2304T for asymmetric algorithms like RSA and EC
- Symmetric Crypto Coprocessor for AES and 3DES Standard

Security Peripherals:

- Filters
- Sensors

Buses:

- Memory Bus
- Peripheral Bus

And associated Firmware and Software, it comprises:

RMS and SAM routines for Solid Flash NVM programming; security functions test, random number online testing. STS consisting of test and initialization routines. All stored in the ROM part.

The Flash Loader that allows the loading of TOE software.

And cryptographic libraries.

IC is part of the TOE and also part of the TSF. More information on the chips is given in the related Security Target.

3.2 Low layer

The native low layer of Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip features from the applications. It is based on services organized according to a multi-layer design which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip.

The main features of the OS are the following:

- management Memories and secure data processing,
- Transaction management,
- APDU protocol management,
- Low level T=0 ; T=1 and T=CL management (type A and type B),
- Error processing.

A dedicated cryptographic library has been developed and designed by Oberthur Technologies to provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms:

| Cryptographic Feature | Embedded |
|--|----------|
| SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256 | ✓ |
| RSA from 1024, to 2048 bits (by steps of 256 bits) - signature for AA | ✓ |
| ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521 bits : - signature/verification (ECDSA) - key agreement (ECDH) - key pair generation | |
| 3DES with 112 bits key size | ✓ |
| Random Generator compliant AIS31 | ✓ |

Table 5 - Supported Cryptography

More information is available in complete ST.

Low layer is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.

3.3 Tools modules

The tools modules provide ePass ICAO essential product:

- File system compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4 and ISO/IEC 7816-9. It is also compliant with ICAO recommendations [R2].
- ISO Secure Messaging as specified in [R15] and as described in annex E of [R36].

- Asymmetric Keys Management as storage, signature, verification, DH and generation.
- Symmetric Key management
- Access Control for 'Change MSK' and 'PUT KEY' APDU
- Authentication and secure messaging to be used during Prepersonalization and Personalization phases, based on Global Platform standard

More information is available in complete ST.

Tools modules are part of the TOE and are also part of the TSF.

3.4 Applicative modules

The applicative modules provide ePass ICAO essential product:

- Active Authentication used to authenticate the card to the terminal. This authentication service is made available to the MRTD application.
- Access Conditions Engine that checks the AC rules attached to an object (file, key, data object) with a current context (CHA, Role ID...).

More information is available in complete ST.

Those applicative modules are part of the TOE and are also part of the TSF.

Another applicative module is the Digital Blurred Image (DBI) module. It allows the blurring of a JPG or JPEG2000 file stored in a transparent file. This feature is the implementation of patents owned by Oberthur Technologies. More information is available in complete ST.

This module is part of the TOE and outside the scope of this present certification.

3.5 Operating System

The operating system manages the TOE in pre-personalization and personalization phases in order to configure the TOE in the expected way. It implements and control access to Key management (MSK) or File management including data reading and writing. It can be addressed in clear mode for secure environment or non-sensitive commands or using SCP02.

The operating system also manages protocols available during Use phase such as Basic Access Control or Active Authentication. The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO [R2]. Basic Access Control checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRTD's data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 [R31] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted data.

The inspection system

- reads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD),
- authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data.

After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.

More information is available in complete ST.

The Operating System is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.

3.6 Application layer

Two kinds of applications are available on the top of the product: MRTD BAC + AA and resident application used for Personalization.

More information is available in complete ST.

This layer is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.

4 TOE LIFE CYCLE

4.1 Life cycle overview

The TOE life-cycle is described in terms of four life-cycle phases. (With respect to the [R8], the TOE life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps). The table below presents the TOE role:

| Roles | Subject |
|-----------------------------|---|
| IC developer | Infineon |
| IC manufacturer | Infineon |
| Embedded software developer | Oberthur Technologies |
| Module Manufacturer | Oberthur Technologies or Infineon |
| Prepersonalizer | Oberthur Technologies or another agent: Agent in charge of the Prepersonalization This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [R9]. It is the agent in charge of the Prepersonalization of the TOE. It corresponds to the MRTD manufacturer as described in [R9] |
| Personalization Agent | The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity of the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (iv) signing the DSO. |
| MRTD Holder | The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD. |

Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle

The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle [R8], the TOE delivery point and the coverage:

| Steps | Phase | Subject | Covered by |
|--------|-------------|-----------------------|---------------|
| Step 1 | Development | Oberthur Technologies | ALC R&D sites |

| | | | |
|--------------------|------------------------|---|-------------------|
| | (Phase1) | | |
| Step 2 | Development (Phase1) | Infineon | IC certification |
| Step 3 | Manufacturing (Phase2) | Infineon (code loading in flash Memory) | IC certification |
| Step 4 | Manufacturing (Phase2) | Oberthur Technologies Manufacturer (Code loading in flash Memory) | ALC sites |
| TOE delivery point | | | |
| Step 5 | Manufacturing (Phase2) | Prepersonalization or Other agent | AGD_OPE & AGD_PRE |
| Step 6 | Personalization (p) | Oberthur Technologies Personalization or Other agent | AGD_OPE & AGD_PRE |
| Step 7 | Operational Use | End user | AGD_OPE & AGD_PRE |

Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps

The figure below summarizes the different phases of the development of any configuration of the ePass ICAO Essential family.




Figure 2: ePass ICAO Essential life cycle

4.2 Phase 1 “Development”

(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.

(Step2) The TOE developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.

The Oberthur Technologies Code with associated documentation is ready to be loaded in the flash memory.

4.3 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”

(Step 3) The Oberthur Technologies code is loaded in the flash memory, this operation can be done in the step 3 and in the step 4:

At Infineon site; the code is then securely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The Infineon site is covered by an audit, step 3.

Or at Oberthur Technologies manufacturing Site. The code is then securely transferred to audited Oberthur Technologies factories, step 4.

(Step) When the code is loaded by Infineon in the Step 3, the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the travel document’s chip Dedicated Software in the flash memories. The manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the Manufacturer.

The manufacturer adds initialization data and keys. The product is self protected, security functions are active. The product can be sent:

to Oberthur Technologies or
directly to Oberthur Technologies Customers.

(Step4) Oberthur Technologies load the Code and data on the flash memories. The IC contains the MRTD code and data with the required protection. The product can be sent to Oberthur Technologies customers (another agent).

TOE delivery point

(Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it, (ii) creates the eMRTD application, and (iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre-personalization Data.

The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.

4.4 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”

(Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes

- the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data,
- the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits),
- the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document,
- the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and configuration of the TSF if necessary.

The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of

- (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
- (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2),
- and (iii) the Document security objects. The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer finalizes the personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the travel document holder for operational use.

4.5 Phase 4 “Operational Use”

(Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified.

Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an issuing State or Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target outlines the split up of P.Manufact, P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3.

5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS

5.1 Common Criteria conformance

This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4 [R37], [R38] and [R39].

The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows:

| CC | Conformance rationale |
|--------|---|
| Part 1 | Strict conformance |
| Part 2 | Conformance to the extended ¹ part: FAU_SAS.1 "Audit Storage" FCS_RND.1 "Quality metric for random numbers" FMT_LIM.1 "Limited capabilities" FMT_LIM.2 "Limited availability" FPT_EMS.1 "TOE Emanation" |
| Part 3 | Strict conformance to Part 3. The product claims conformance to EAL 4, augmented with: ALC_DVS.2 "Sufficiency of security measures" AVA_VAN.5 "Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis" |

Table 8 - Conformance Rationale

Remark:

For interoperability reasons it is assumed the receiving state cares for sufficient measures against eavesdropping within the operating environment of the inspection systems. Otherwise the TOE may protect the confidentiality of some less sensitive assets (e.g. the personal data of the TOE holder which are also printed on the physical TOE) for some specific attacks only against enhanced basic attack potential (AVA_VAN.3).

FPT_EMSEC.1 from the Protection Profile has been renamed to FPT_EMS.1, in order to keep the SFR formatting.

5.2 Protection Profile conformance

5.2.1 Protection Profile claims

The Security Target claims strict conformance to the following PPs written in CC3.1 revision 2: Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control – BSI-PP-0055 v1.10 25th march 2009 [R9].

5.3 Protection Profile additions

This st has 2 kinds of additions:

The first addition is linked to Active Authentication.

The second addition is related to prepersonalization and personalization phases. This functionality is usable in step 5 and step 6. Once the product is locked, stated as personalized, it is no more possible to perform this operation.

5.3.1 Additional Threats

For AA:

T.Counterfeit

Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for authentication of a traveler by possession of a MRTD. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRTD's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD's chip.

Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs

Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data

This ST adds a specific threat on prepersonalization and personalization phases after loading of the TOE code in the flash memory of the component. (elements related to the prepersonalization and personalization phases are indicated by MP, for example: T.ACC_MP. This threats is related to access control in phases prepersonalization and personalization)

T.ACC_MP

An attacker may access to the TOE at prepersonalization and personalization phases to try to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software.

5.3.2 Additional objectives

This additional objective doesn't contradict the objectives of the TOE as this objectives aims to protect integrity of the MRTD data.

OT.Data_Int_AA

The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active Authentication.

This additional objective doesn't contradict the objectives of the TOE as this objectives aims to protect the product in the prepersonalization and personalization phases.

OT.ACC_MP

The TOE must control the access to its sensitive information and its functions and must provide the means to secure exchanges using cryptographic functions. It must also ensure secure erasing of unused keys.

5.3.3 Additional objectives for the environment

These objective ara added to allow the environnement to perform the Active Authentication.

OE.Exam_MRTD_AA

Additionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Active Authentication protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD's chip.

OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA

Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Active Authentication Protocol.

OE.Activ_Auth_Verif

In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the verification by Active Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the MRTD.

5.3.4 Additional SFR

This Security Target adds some SFRs to specify the Active Authentication functions.

FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA for crypto graphic operation used for AA

FDP_DAU.1/AA, to prove of the authenticity the TOE

FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ for management of AA keys

FPT_EMS.1/AA to protect TSF data from unauthorized access

FPT_TST.1 /AA to ensure correct operation of the function by testing it before its use.

FMT_MOF.1/AA ensures the activation of the Active Authentication functions in Prepersonalization and Personalization.

The listed SFrs adds Active Authentication feature to the product and doesn't contradict BAC functionalities. Moreover it permits to reach of AVA_VAN.5 of the product.

This Security Target adds some SFRs in Prepersonalization step. The details of each sfr are in chapter [9.1.3] 'SFR for Prepersonalization'. The details below present the list and explain that each sfr doesn't contradict the TOE SPD.

The added sfr contribute to ensure the security of the prepersonalization step. They are identified by adding "MP" in the sfrs names.

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

This SFR is added in step 5, to allow the creation of diversified MSK during the first command, and then replaced by the first MSK.

The dependency of this SFR is ensured by the generic FCS_CKM.4.

FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation

This ST extends the use of cryptographic operation for MSK key diversification, SM, encryption and decryption of exchanges and SM MAC for TDES in Prepersonalization step.

FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

The 2 sfrs are added to allow some operations (Get Data and Select File commands) before identification and authentication of the users in prepersonalization Step.

FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

This SFR is added to detect unsuccessful authentication and limits the authorized number of unsuccessful authentication of the Prepersonalizer.

FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control

The policy 'prepersonalization access control' implemented in the TOE enforces access control over all the performed operations in this step.

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

This sfr completes the Prepersonalization Access Control by defining the rules of this control.

FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes

This SFR controls import of data in Step 5. This SFR ensures also the MSK diversification, which is performed at first command, without any security requirements preliminary to this action.

FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality

This SFR control confidentiality of data import in Step 5.

FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity

This SFR control integrity of imported data in Step 5.

FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

This sfr is added to ensure that some management of TSF data are only allowed to the Prepersonalizer in Prepersonalization step : the life cycle transition from step 5 to step 6, the MSK update with the Derivation data.

FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

This sfr ensures that the TSF provides a secure communication channel to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the exchanged data.

Application Note: The rationale between the SPD, taking into account the additional elements of the SPD, and the Objectives and Objectives on the operational environment are given in the paragraph Rationales.

6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION

6.1 Subjects

| SFR | Before step 5 | Step 5 | Step 6 | Step 7 |
|---|---------------|--------|--------|--------|
| PP BAC subjects | | | | |
| Manufacturer | x | x | | |
| Personalization Agent | | | x | |
| Terminal | | x | x | x |
| Inspection System | | | | x |
| MRTD Holder | | | | x |
| Traveler | | | | x |
| Attacker | x | x | x | x |
| Additional subjects | | | | |
| IC Developer | x | | | |
| Software Developer | x | | | |
| Prepersonalizer (refinement of Manufacturer. It corresponds to the MRTD manufacturer) | | x | | |

6.1.1 PP BAC subjects

Manufacturer

The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD's chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.

Personalization Agent

The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined in [R2].

Application Note:

Personalization Agent is referred as the Personalizer in the Security Target.

Terminal

A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface.

Inspection System (IS)

A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD's chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.

Application Note:

This security target does not distinguish between the BIS, GIS and EIS because the Extended Access Control is outside the scope.

MRTD Holder

The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.

Traveler

Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.

Attacker

A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD's chip remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.

Application Note

An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.

6.1.2 Additional Subjects

IC Developer

Developer of the IC.

TOE Developer

Developer of part of the TOE source code.

Prepersonalizer

Agent in charge of the Prepersonalization. This agent corresponds to the MRTD manufacturer as described in [R9].

6.2 Assets

Logical MRTD data

The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R2]. These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (CAPK) in EF.DG 14 is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.

| User Data | Description |
|---|---|
| CPLC Data | Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as user data as they enable to track the holder |
| Personal Data of the MRTD holder (EF.DGx, except EF.DG15) | Contains identification data of the holder |
| Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD | Contain a certificate ensuring the integrity of the file stored within the MRTD and their authenticity. It ensures the data are issued by a genuine country |
| Common data in EF.COM | Declare the data the travel document contains. This data is optional and may be absent in the TOE |
| Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15 (AAPK) | Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to an Active Authentication |
| Chip Authentication v1 Public Key in EF.DG14 (CAPK) | Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to an the Chip Authentication v1 Protocol |

Table 9 - User Data

| TSF Data | Description |
|---|---|
| TOE_ID | Data enabling to identify the TOE |
| Prepersonalizer reference authentication data | Private key enabling to authenticate the Prepersonalizer |
| Personalization Agent reference authentication Data | Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalization Agent |
| Basic Access Control (BAC) Key | Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document |
| Active Authentication private key (AAK) | Private key the chip uses to perform an Active Authentication |
| Chip Authentication v1 private key (CAK) | Private key the chip uses to perform a Chip Authentication v1 |
| Session keys for the secure channel | Session keys used to protect the communication in confidentiality, authenticity and integrity |

| TSF Data | Description |
|------------------|-----------------------------|
| Life Cycle State | Life Cycle state of the TOE |

Table 10 - TSF Data

Authenticity of the MRTD's chip

The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.

6.3 Threats

This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.

6.3.1 Threats from the PP BAC

T.Chip_ID

Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD's chip by establishing or listening to communications through the contactless communication interface.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance

Asset: Anonymity of user

T.Skimming

Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a communication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.

Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data.

T.Eavesdropping

Adverse action: An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD's chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in advance.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.

Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data.

T.Forgery

Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD holder's identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data

page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD's chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs.

Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data.

T.Abuse-Func

Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase "Operational Use" in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.

This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.

T.Information_Leakage

Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.

Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.

T.Phys-Tamper

Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD's chip in order (i) to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD's chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRTD's

chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.

The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD's chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD's chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.

T.Malfunction

Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software.

This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD's chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD's chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.

Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.

6.3.2 Added Threat for AA

T.Counterfeit

Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for authentication of a traveler by possession of a MRTD. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRTD's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD's chip.

Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs

Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data

6.3.3 Threats for Prepersonalization and Personalization

T.ACC_MP

An attacker may access to the TOE at Prepersonalization and personalization phases to try to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software.

6.4 Organisational Security Policies

6.4.1 OSP from PP BAC

P.Manufact

The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.

P.Personalization

The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.

P.Personal_Data

The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD's chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4)³ and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD's chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD's chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access Control to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [R9].

6.4.2 OSP for AA

P.Activ_Auth

The terminal implements the Active Authentication protocol as described [R9].

6.5 Assumptions

The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used.

6.5.1 Assumptions from PP BAC

A.MRTD_Manufact

It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).

A.MRTD_Delivery

Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its objectives:

Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.

Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process and storage.

Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill.

A.Pers_Agent

The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD's chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD's chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.

A.Insp_Sys

The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R2]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.

A.BAC-Keys

The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the "ICAO Doc 9303" [R2], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.

6.5.2 Added Assumption for AA

A.Insp_Sys_AA

The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD's chip during inspection using the signature returned by the TOE during Active Authentication.

7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES

7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.

7.1.1 SO from PP BAC

OT.AC_Pers

The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object according to LDS [R2] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.

OT.Data_Int

The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.

OT.Data_Conf

The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic Inspection System.

OT.Identification

The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The storage of the Pre-Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). In Phase 4 "Operational Use" the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.

OT.Prot_Abuse-Func

After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE. Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.

OT.Prot_Inf_Leak

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD's chip:

by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines and by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or by a physical manipulation of the TOE.

OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper

The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced-basic attack potential by means of:

- measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
- measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
- manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data) with a prior reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.

OT.Prot_Malfunction

The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.

7.1.2 Added Objectives for AA

OT.AA_Proof

The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRTD's chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active Authentication as defined in [R2]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD's chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.

OT.Data_Int_AA

The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active Authentication.

7.1.3 SO for Prepersonalization and Personalization

OT.ACC_MP

The TOE must control the access to its sensitive information and its functions and must provide the means to secure exchanges using cryptographic functions. It must also ensure secure erasing of unused keys.

7.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment

7.2.1 OE from PP BAC

7.2.1.1 Issuing State or Organization

The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.

OE.MRTD_Manufact

Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.

During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through steps 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.

OE.MRTD_Delivery

Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following objectives:

- non-disclosure of any security relevant information
- identification of the element under delivery
- meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment)
- physical protection to prevent external damage
- secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE"s)
- traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
 - origin and shipment details
 - reception, reception acknowledgement
 - location material/information.

Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.

Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, and reception department) dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.

OE.Personalization

The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.

OE.Pass_Auth_Sign

The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [R2].

OE.BAC-Keys

The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the "ICAO Doc 9303" [R2] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.

7.2.1.2 Receiving State or Organization

The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.

OE.Exam_MRTD

The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R2].

OE.Passive_Auth_Verif

The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.

OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD

The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems).

OE.Exam_MRTD_AA

Additionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Active Authentication protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD's chip.

OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA

Additionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Active Authentication Protocol.

OE.Activ_Auth_Verif

In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the verification by Active Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the MRTD.

OE.Activ_Auth_Sign

The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) generate the MRTD's Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD's Active Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.

8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS

8.1 Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage

8.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1

Description: see [R9].

FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage

FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

Rationale: see [R9]

8.2 Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers

8.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1

Description: see [R9]

FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers

FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].

Dependencies: No dependencies.

Rationale: See [R9]

8.3 Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability

8.3.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1

Description: see [R9]

FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].

Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)

Rationale: See [R9]

8.3.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2

Description: See [R9]

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability

FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].

Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)

Rationale: See [R9]

8.4 Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation

8.4.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1

Description: see [R9]

FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].

FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].

Dependencies: No dependencies.

Rationale: See [R9]

9 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

9.1 Security Functional Requirements

The following table presents the classification of SFR regarding the TOE lifecycle:

| SFR | Before Step 5 | Step 5 | Step 6 | Step 7 |
|------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|--------|
| SFR from PP BAC | | | | |
| FAU_SAS.1 | x | | | |
| FCS_CKM.1 | | | | X |
| FCS_CKM.4 | | | | X |
| FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA | | | | X |
| FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC | | | | X |
| FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH | | | x | |
| FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC | | | | X |
| FCS_RND.1 | x | x | x | X |
| FIA_AFL.1 | | | | X |
| FIA_UID.1 | x | x | x | X |
| FIA_UAU.1 | x | x | x | X |
| FIA_UAU.4 | x | x | x | X |
| FIA_UAU.5 | x | x | x | X |
| FIA_UAU.6 | | | | X |
| FDP_ACC.1 | | | | X |
| FDP_ACF.1 | | | | X |
| FDP_UCT.1 | | | | X |
| FDP_UIT.1 | | | | X |
| FMT_SMF.1 | x | x | x | X |
| FMT_SMR.1 | X | x | x | X |
| FMT_LIM.1 | X | x | x | X |
| FMT_LIM.2 | X | x | x | X |
| FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA | x | x | x | X |
| FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS | x | x | x | X |
| FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE | x | x | x | X |
| FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ | x | x | x | X |
| FPT_EMS.1 | | | x | |
| FPT_FLS.1 | x | x | x | X |

| SFR | Before Step 5 | Step 5 | Step 6 | Step 7 |
|---|---------------|--------|--------|--------|
| FPT_TST.1 | x | x | x | X |
| FPT_PHP.3 | x | x | x | X |
| SFR for AA | | | | |
| FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA | | | | x |
| FDP_DAU.1/AA | | | | x |
| FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE | | | | x |
| FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ | | | | x |
| FPT_EMS.1/AA | | | | x |
| FPT_TST.1/AA | | | | x |
| FMT_MOF.1/AA | x | x | x | |
| SFR for Personalization and Prepersonalization | | | | |
| FCS_CKM.1/MP | | x | | |
| FCS_CKM.4/MP | x | x | x | |
| FCS_COP.1/MP | | x | | |
| FDP_ACC.2/MP | x | x | x | |
| FDP_ACF.1/MP | x | x | x | |
| FDP_ITC.1/MP | | x | | |
| FDP_UCT.1/MP | | x | | |
| FDP_UIT.1/MP | | x | | |
| FIA_AFL.1/MP | | x | | |
| FIA_UAU.1 | | x | | |
| FIA_UID.1/MP | | x | | |
| FMT_MTD.1/MP | X | x | x | |
| FTP_ITC.1/MP | | x | | |

Table 11 - SFR classification regarding TOE lifecycle

9.1.1 SFR from PP BAC

The SFRs listed in the present chapter are all issued from the PP BAC. Their scope can be the use phase of the personalization phase.

FAU_SAS.1 Audit data storage

FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide **the Manufacturer** with the capability to store **the IC Identification Data** in the audit records.

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm **Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm** and specified cryptographic key sizes **112 bits** that meet the following: **[R2], normative appendix 5.**

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method **zeroisation** that meets the following: **none.**

FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform **cf. below** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **cf. below** and cryptographic key sizes **cf. below** that meet the following:

| Iteration | Operation | Algo | Key length (bits) | Standard |
|-----------|---|-----------------|-------------------|--------------|
| /BAC_SHA | Hashing | SHA1 | None | [R36] |
| /BAC_ENC | SM (BAC), encryption and decryption | TDES CBC | 112 | [R27] |
| /BAC_AUTH | Symmetric authentication, encryption and decryption | TDES | 112 | [R27] |
| /BAC_MAC | SM – MAC | TDES Retail MAC | 112 bits | [R28] |

FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers

FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet **(1) the requirement to provide an entropy of at least 7.976 bits in each byte, following AIS 31 [R32].**

FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA_UID.1.1/BAC The TSF shall allow

- o 1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 "Manufacturing",
- o 2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD",
- o 3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 "Operational Use"

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA_UID.1.2/BAC The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_UAU.1.1/BAC The TSF shall allow:

1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 "Manufacturing",
 2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD",
 3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 "Operational Use"
- on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA_UAU.1.2/BAC The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.4.1/BAC The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to

1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES.

FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.5.1/BAC The TSF shall provide

1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
- to support user authentication.

FIA_UAU.5.2/BAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the

1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by one of the following mechanism(s):
 - the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key,
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.

FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating

FIA_UAU.6.1/BAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism based communication after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.

FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

FIA_AFL.1.1/BAC The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within range of acceptable values 0 to 255 consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to BAC authentication protocol.

FIA_AFL.1.2/BAC When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall wait for an increasing time between receiving of the terminal challenge and sending of the TSF response during the BAC authentication attempts.

FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

FDP_ACC.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16.

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACF.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the **Basic Access Control SFP** to objects based on the following:

Subjects:

Personalization Agent

Basic Inspection System

Terminal

Objects:

data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD

data in EF.COM

data in EF.SOD

Security attributes

authentication status of terminals

FDP_ACF.1.2/BAC The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD

FDP_ACF.1.3/BAC The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.

FDP_ACF.1.4/BAC The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.

FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality

FDP_UCT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the **Basic Access Control SFP** to **transmit and receive** user data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.

FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity

FDP_UIT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the **Basic Access Control SFP** to **transmit and receive** user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors.

FDP_UIT.1.2/BAC The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether **modification, deletion, insertion and replay** has occurred.

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

1. Initialization
2. Pre-personalization
3. Personalization

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles

1. Manufacturer

2. Personalization Agent

FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FMT_SMR.1.1/BAC The TSF shall maintain the roles

3. Basic Inspection System

FMT_SMR.1.2/BAC The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:

Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow

- o 1. User Data to be manipulated,
- o 2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
- o 3. software to be reconstructed and,
- o 4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.

FMT_LIM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:

Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow

- o 1. User Data to be disclosed

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability

FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:

Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow

1. User Data to be manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
3. software to be reconstructed and,
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.

FMT_LIM.2.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:

Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow

1. User Data to be disclosed

FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and Prepersonalization Data to the Prepersonalizer.

FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to **write** the **Document Basic Access Keys to the Personalization Agent**.

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to **read**:

1. the Document Basic Access Keys
 2. the Personalization Agent Keys
- to None.

FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to:

- Prepersonalizer Key
- Personalization Agent Key
- EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
- MSK

FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any **unauthorized users** are unable to use the following interface **smart card circuit contacts** to gain access to:

- Prepersonalizer Key
- Personalization Agent Key
- EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
- MSK

FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state

FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:

1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur,
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.

FPT_TST.1 TSF testing

FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests **at the conditions:**

- At reset
- Before any cryptographic operation
- When accessing a DG or any EF
- Prior to any use of TSF data
- Before execution of any command

to demonstrate the correct operation of **the TSF**.

FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF data**.

FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF executable code**.

FPT_TST.1.1/BAC [Editorially refined] Additionally to FPT_TST.1.1, the TSF shall run a suite of self tests **at the conditions:**

When performing a BAC authentication,
to demonstrate the correct operation of **the TSF**.

FPT_TST.1.2/BAC The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF data**.

FPT_TST.1.3/BAC The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF executable code**.

FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack

FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist **physical manipulation and physical probing** to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

9.1.2 SFR for AA

FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/AA_DSA The TSF shall perform **cf. below** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **cf. below** and cryptographic key sizes **cf. below** that meet the following:

| Type | Operation | Algo | Key length (bits) | Standard |
|------|--|--|--------------------------------------|----------|
| DSA | Digital Signature Creation "Authentication" | RSA signature with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512. | 1024 to 4096 with a step of 256 bits | [R20] |

FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication

FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of **the TOE itself**.

FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide **any users** with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the indicated information.

Refinement:

Evidence generation and ability of verifying it, constitute the Active Authentication protocol.

FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behavior

FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions TSF Active Authentication to Personalization Agent.

FMT_MTD.1/AA Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the AAK to Personalization Agent.

FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to **read** the **AAK** to **none**.

FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1.1/AA The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to:

Active Authentication: private AAK Key.

FPT_EMS.1.2/AA The TSF shall ensure any **unauthorized users** are unable to use the following interface **smart card circuit contacts** to gain access to:

Active Authentication: private AAK Key.

FPT_TST.1 TSF testing

FPT_TST.1.1/AA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests **at the conditions**

- After the Active Authentication is computed to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.

FPT_TST.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF data**.

FPT_TST.1.3/AA The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF executable code**.

9.1.3 Added SFR for Prepersonalization

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/MP The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm **MSK derivation from initial MSK, using SHA-256** and specified cryptographic key sizes **256** that meet the following: **None**

Application Note

In step 5, (Master) MSK is diversified during the first command, and then replaced by the derived MSK generated by FCS_CKM.1/MP thanks to this SFR.

The secure erasing of the keys is ensured by the generic FCS_CKM.4.

FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform **cf. below** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **cf. below** and cryptographic key sizes **cf. below** that meet the following:

| Iteration | Operation | Algo | Key length (bits) | Standard |
|-----------|---------------------------------|------------|-------------------|----------|
| /MP_SHA | Hashing for MSK diversification | SHA256 | None | [R22] |
| /MP_ENC | SM, encryption and decryption | TDES CBC | 112 | [R27] |
| /MP_MAC | SM - MAC | Retail MAC | 112 bits | [R28] |

Application Note

These requirements are duplicated in order to distinguish those required by the PP BAC and those added by in the present ST.

FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA_UID.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow **GET DATA, SELECT FILE** on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA_UID.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_UAU.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow **GET DATA, SELECT FILE** on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA_UAU.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

FIA_AFL.1.1/MP The TSF shall detect when **3** unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to **authentication of the Prepersonalizer**.

FIA_AFL.1.2/MP When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been **met**, the TSF shall **forbid any authentication attempt as Prepersonalizer**.

FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control

FDP_ACC.2.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the **Prepersonalization Access Control** on **all subjects and all objects** and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.

FDP_ACC.2.2/MP The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.

Application Note:

This SFR enforces access control over all the operations performed in step 5.

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACF.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control to objects based on the following Prepersonalizer Authentication (**AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS**).

FDP_ACF.1.2/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: **AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS=TRUE (EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE)**.

FDP_ACF.1.3/MP The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.

FDP_ACF.1.4/MP The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.

Application Note

This SFR enforces access control over all the operation in Step 5.

FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes

FDP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the **Prepersonalization access control** when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.

FDP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.

FDP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: **none**.

Application Note:

This SFR control import of data in Step 5. This SFR ensures also the MSK diversification, which is performs once, at first command, without any security requirements preliminary to this action.

FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality

FDP_UCT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the **Prepersonalization access control to receive** user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.

Application note:

This SFR control confidentiality of data import in Step 5.

FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity

FDP_UIT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the **Prepersonalization access control SFP to receive** user data in a manner protected from **modification** errors.

FDP_UIT.1.2/MP The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether **modification of some of data sent by the Prepersonalizer** has occurred.

Application Note:

Modification errors should be understood as modification, substitution, unrecoverable ordering change of data and any other integrity error.

This SFR control integrity of data import in Step 5.

FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/MP The TSF shall restrict the ability to **See below** the **See below** to **See below**.

| | | |
|--|------------------|-----------------|
| | List of TSF data | Authorized role |
|--|------------------|-----------------|

| | | |
|--------|---|-----------------|
| Write | The MSK is diversified (by using Derivation data) by the TOE at the first command The MSK can still be changed between any other operation by the Prepersonalizer A final key (ISK) is created before the switch of the life cycle. | Prepersonalizer |
| Switch | TOE life cycle from Step 5 to step 6 | Prepersonalizer |

FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

FTP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

FTP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall permit **the Prepersonalizer** to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for **Personalization Agent key loading**.

10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION

10.1 TOE Summary Specification

Access Control in reading

This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.

It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable:

BAC keys

Personalization Agent keys

MSK

It controls access to the CPLC data as well:

It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase

Regarding the file structure:

In the operational use:

The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, EF.COM only after BAC authentication and through a valid secure channel.

In the personalization phase

The Personalization Agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).

It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime

Access Control in writing

This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.

It ensures as well the CPLC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is personalized.

Regarding the file structure

In the operational use: It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update any system files. However

the application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs

In the personalization phase

The Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).

BAC mechanism

This security functionality ensures the BAC is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the symmetric BAC keys the Personalization Agent loaded beforehand

during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the session keys are destroyed at the end of each BAC session.

Personalization

This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES algorithm. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging.

Physical protection

This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks.

Prepersonalization

This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Prepersonalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES algorithm. This function is in charge of pre-initializing the product.. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging.

Safe state management

This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS

a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM)

This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill card" or becomes mute.

Secure Messaging

This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity & integrity of the communication between the TOE and the IFD. After a successful BAC authentication, a secure channel is established based on Triple DES algorithm.

This security functionality ensures

No commands were inserted, modified nor deleted within the data flow

The data exchanged remain confidential

If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed.

This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02) for the Prepersonalization or Personalization.

Self tests

The TOE performs self tests to verify the integrity on the TSF data and TSF Code:

- At reset

- Before any cryptographic operation

- When accessing a DG or any EF

Prior to any use of TSF data
Before execution of any command
When performing a BAC authentication,

Active Authentication

This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in [R34].

10.2 Links between SFRs and TSF

| | FALL_SAS.1 | FCS_CKM.1 | FCS_CKM.4 | FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA | FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC | FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH | FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC | FCS_RND.1 | FIA_AFL.1 | FIA_UID.1 | FIA_UAU.1 | FIA_UAU.4 | FIA_UAU.5 | FIA_UAU.6 | FDP_ACC.1 | FDP_ACF.1 | FDP_UCT.1 | FDP_UIT.1 | FMT_SMF.1 | FMT_SMR.1 | FMT_LIM.1 | FMT_LIM.2 | FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA | FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS | FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRIT | FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ | FPT_EMS.1 | FPT_FLS.1 | FPT_TST.1 | FPT_PHP.3 |
|---------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Access Control in reading | | | | | | | | | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | | | | | | X | | X | | | | |
| Access Control in writing | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X | | | | X | | | | X | | X | | | | | |
| BAC mechanism | | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | | | | | | | | | X | | | |
| Personalization | | | X | X | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | X | | | | X | | | X | | | | |
| Physical protection | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X | X | | | | | | | | X |
| Prepersonalization | | | | X | X | X | X | X | | X | | | | | | | | | X | | | | X | | | X | | | | |
| Safe state management | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X | X | X | X | | | | | X | | | |
| Secure Messaging | | X | X | | X | | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Self tests | | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X | | |

Table 12 - Links between SFR and TSF

| | FCS_COP.1/AA _DSA | FDP_DAU.1/AA | FMT_MOF.1 /AA | FMT_MTD.1/A A_KEY_WRITE | FMT_MTD.1/A A_KEY_READ | FPT_EMS.1/AA | FPT_TST.1/AA | FMT_MOF.1 /AA |
|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------|------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|
| Active Authentication | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
| Personalization | | | | | | | | X |
| PrePersonalization | | | | | | | | X |
| Self tests | | | | | | | X | |

Table 13 - Links between SFR and TSF

11 RATIONALES

The rationales are available in the complete ST.

Appendix A: Glossary

| Acronym | Definition |
|---------|---|
| AA | Active Authentication |
| BAC | Basic Access Control |
| CC | Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision 4 |
| CPLC | Card personalization life cycle |
| DF | Dedicated File |
| DFA | Differential Fault Analysis |
| DG | Data Group |
| EAL | Evaluation Assurance Level |
| EF | Elementary File |
| EFID | File Identifier |
| DES | Digital encryption standard |
| DH | Diffie Hellmann |
| I/O | Input/Output |
| IC | Integrated Circuit |
| ICAO | International Civil Aviation organization |
| ICC | Integrated Circuit Card |
| IFD | Interface device |
| LDS | Logical Data structure |
| MF | Master File |
| MRTD | Machine readable Travel Document |
| MRZ | Machine readable Zone |
| MSK | Manufacturer Secret Key |
| OCR | Optical Character Recognition |
| OS | Operating System |
| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
| PP | Protection Profile |
| SFI | Short File identifier |
| SHA | Secure hashing Algorithm |
| SOD | Security object Data |
| TOE | Target of Evaluation |
| TSF | TOE Security fonction |