



# Certification Report

**EAL 2 Evaluation of Alacris ® Inc.**

**OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0**

Issued by:

**Communications Security Establishment**

**Certification Body**

**Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme**

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## **DISCLAIMER**

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, have been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established under the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) – using the *Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 1.0*, for conformance to the *Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1*. This certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the CCS, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the CSE, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.

## FOREWORD

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A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the CCS Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of *ISO Standard 17025, General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and testing laboratories*. Accreditation is performed under the Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories Canada (PALCAN), administered by the Standards Council of Canada.

The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is CGI Information Systems and Management Consultants Inc., located in Ottawa, Ontario.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the security requirements.

This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation 29 February 2004, and the security target identified in Section 4 of this report.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted on the CCS Certified Products list at:

[http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/services/common\\_criteria/trusted\\_products.html](http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/services/common_criteria/trusted_products.html)

This certification report makes reference to the following trademarked names: Alacris, which is a registered trademark of Alacris® Inc.; Windows 2000/2003 which are registered trademarks of Microsoft® Corporation.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Disclaimer .....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>Foreword .....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>Foreword .....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>Executive Summary .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1 Identification of Target of Evaluation.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>2 TOE Description.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>3 Evaluated Security Functionality .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>4 Security Target .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>5 Common Criteria Conformance .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>6 Security Policy .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>6.1 CONFIDENTIALITY .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>6.2 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>6.3 INTEGRITY .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>6.4 AUDITING .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>7.1 SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>7.2 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>7.3 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>8 Architectural Information.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>9 Evaluated Configuration .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>10 Documentation.....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>11 Evaluation Analysis Activities.....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>12 ITS Product Testing .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>12.1 ASSESSING DEVELOPER TESTS .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>12.2 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING.....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>12.3 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING.....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>12.4 CONDUCT OF TESTING.....</b>	<b>8</b>

**12.5 TESTING RESULTS .....8**

**13 Results of the Evaluation .....8**

**14 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations.....8**

**15 Glossary.....9**

**16 References .....10**

## Executive Summary

The OCSP Server Professional, 3.0.0, from Alacris® Inc., is the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2 evaluation.

The Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 provides X.509 certificate status information to clients in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) using the On-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) defined in RFC 2560. The Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 accepts OCSP requests from the Alacris® OCSP Client Professional, or any OCSP client implementation compliant with RFC 2560, and returns the revocation status associated with the requested certificate in an OCSP response message conformant to RFC 2560.

CGI Information Systems and Management Consultants Inc. is the Common Criteria Evaluation Facility that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 20 February 2004, and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS).

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

The results documented in the evaluation technical report<sup>1</sup> for this product provides sufficient evidence that it meets the EAL 2 assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the *Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 1.0* (with applicable final interpretations), for conformance to the *Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.1*.

The Communications Security Establishment, as the CCS Certification Body, declares that the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 evaluation meets all the conditions of the *Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates* and that the product will be listed on the CCS Certified Products list.

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<sup>1</sup> The evaluation technical report is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.

## 1 Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2 evaluation is the OCSP Server Professional, 3.0.0, from Alacris® Inc.

## 2 TOE Description

The Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 provides X.509 certificate status information to clients in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) using the On-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) defined in RFC 2560. The Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 accepts OCSP requests from the Alacris® OCSP Client Professional, or any OCSP client implementation compliant with RFC 2560, and returns the revocation status associated with the requested certificate in an OCSP response message conformant to RFC 2560.

See section 2 in the Security Target (ST) for a more complete, detailed description of the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0.

## 3 Evaluated Security Functionality

The complete list of evaluated security functionality for the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 is identified in Section 4.1 of the ST.

## 4 Security Target

The ST associated with this Certification Report (CR) is identified by the following nomenclature:

Title: *Security Target for Alacris® OCSP Server Professional Version 3.0.0 (EAL2)*

Version: 1.6

Date: 15 January 2004

## 5 Common Criteria Conformance

The evaluation was conducted using the *Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 1.0*, for conformance to the *Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.1*.

The OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 is:

- a) Common Criteria Part 2 extended, with security functional requirements based upon functional components in Part 2 and additional security functional requirements as defined in section 4.1.1 of the ST;
- b) Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, with security assurance requirements based only upon assurance components in Part 3; and
- c) Common Criteria EAL 2 conformant, with all the security assurance requirements in the EAL 2 package.

## **6 Security Policy**

### **6.1 Confidentiality**

The Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 allows the configuration of an SSL session to protect the confidentiality of communications with other OCSP responders and OCSP clients.

### **6.2 Identification and Authentication**

The Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 allows requests from OCSP clients, and other OCSP responders, that identify and authenticate themselves through the use of a digital signature as described in RFC 2560. The Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 can identify and authenticate OCSP responses as coming from a valid OCSP responder or OCSP client through the use of digital signature verification, as described in RFC 2560.

### **6.3 Integrity**

The Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 uses digital signatures to verify the integrity of messages exchanged with other OCSP responders and OCSP clients. The use of nonces, as described in RFC 2560, is used to provide resistance to replay attacks.

### **6.4 Auditing**

The Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 generates security relevant audit events that are written to the Operating System (OS) audit repositories.

## **7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope**

Consumers of the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will help to ensure the proper and secure operation of the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0.

### **7.1 Secure Usage Assumptions**

The following secure usage assumptions have been made, consistent with Section 2.9 in the ST:

- a) SSL is configured for communication with other OCSP responders and OCSP clients;
- b) The Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 is configured to verify nonces in OCSP responses;
- c) Signing of OCSP requests and responses is enabled;
- d) All logging and auditing is enabled; and
- e) The Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 is deployed on a supported operating system platform.

## 7.2 Environmental Assumptions

The following environmental assumptions, consistent with the ST, have been made during the evaluation of the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0:

- a) The host workstation for the TOE is assumed to be located within controlled access facilities that will prevent unauthorized physical access;
- b) The host workstation for the TOE is assumed to be protected from unauthorized logical access using appropriate logical access controls;
- c) Administrators are neither careless nor willfully negligent and will abide by the instructions provided in the administrative guidance supplied with the TOE; and
- d) The host workstation, software and associated devices function correctly and are maintained at regular intervals. Maintenance will include the application of standard security hardening techniques for the operating system platform, application of security patches and archiving of audit logs so as not to exceed storage limitations.

For more information about the TOE security environment, refer to Section 3 of the ST.

## 7.3 Clarification of Scope

As described in the ST and previous sections of this document, the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 is intended to be deployed in environments that provide a considerable amount of physical and logical security for the underlying operating system. As such, the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 does not counter any threats aimed at compromising the TSF or TSF Data through the subversion of the hosting operating system or the physical platform on which it resides.

Although the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 does make use of cryptography, it does not directly implement cryptographic algorithms or perform key generation. The cryptographic implementation used is that provided by the Windows® OS resident Cryptographic Application Programming Interface (CAPI) libraries, and was not in the scope of this evaluation.

## 8 Architectural Information

The major components comprising the TOE are:

- a) OCSP Server Service;
- b) OCSP Responder(s);
- c) Validator plug-in;
- d) Acceptance Policy plug-in; and
- e) Microsoft® Management Console (MMC) Snap-In.

The OCSP Server Service manages the configuration store, OCSP Responder registration, logging, and auditing. The OCSP Responder(s) process OCSP requests from clients and

produce OCSP responses on behalf of a particular Certificate Authority. The Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 can be configured to have one or more active responders. The Validator plug-In is used by the OCSP Responder to obtain the revocation status of the requested certificate. Three types of Validator plug-Ins are shipped with the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0:

- a) Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Pull Mode;
- b) CRL Push Mode; and
- c) OCSP Relying Participant.

The CRL Pull Mode and CRL Push Mode Validator plug-Ins allow for the revocation information to be determined using remote or local CRLs. The OCSP Relying Participant Validator plug-In allows the revocation status to be obtained through forwarding the OCSP request to a third party OCSP responder.

The Acceptance Policy plug-In is used by the OCSP Responder to determine whether a given OCSP request should be accepted or rejected. When a new request arrives, the OCSP Responder notifies the Acceptance Policy plug-in that a new request has arrived. The Acceptance Policy plug-in processes the request and then returns to the OCSP Responder whether the request should be accepted.

The TOE is shipped with a Default Acceptance Policy plug-In that allows requests to be accepted or rejected using common acceptance criteria such as client identity, digital signature validation, certificate extensions and number of certificate statuses requested. The management console is implemented via an Alacris® provided MMC snap-in. Using the MMC snap-in, an administrator can access the OCSP Service, OCSP Server, and OCSP Responder configuration.

## **9 Evaluated Configuration**

The following OS platforms were used for the evaluation of the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0:

- a) Microsoft Windows® 2000 Advanced Server with Service Pack 3 and High Encryption Pack for Windows® 2000; and
- b) Microsoft Windows® 2003 Enterprise Edition.

The following Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 configuration was used for the evaluation:

- a) SSL was configured for communication with other OCSP responders and OCSP clients;
- b) The Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 was configured to verify nonces in OCSP responses;
- c) Signing of OCSP requests and responses was enabled; and

- d) All logging and auditing was enabled.

## 10 Documentation

The documentation for the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 consists of the online help distributed to the consumer in Microsoft® Help Format (accessible from within the TOE software) as well as the installation instructions, “readme” file and release notes in the root directory of the CD that is delivered to the consumer. The filenames<sup>2</sup>, as distributed on the CD containing the TOE, are:

- a) ocspserverv3.chm;
- b) Alacris OCSP Server Installation Guide.mht; and
- c) Readme.txt.

## 11 Evaluation Analysis Activities

The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0, including the following areas:

**Configuration management:** An analysis of the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 development environment and associated documentation was performed. The evaluator found that the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 configuration items were clearly marked, and could be modified and controlled. The developer’s configuration management system was observed during a site visit, and it was found to be mature and well developed.

**Secure delivery and operation:** The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 during distribution to the consumer. The evaluators examined and tested the installation, generation and start-up procedures, and determined that they were complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

**Design documentation:** The evaluators analysed the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 functional specification and high-level design; they determined that the documents were internally consistent, and completely and accurately instantiated all interfaces and security functions. The evaluators also independently verified that the correspondence mappings between the design documents were correct.

**Guidance documents:** The evaluators examined the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 user and administrator guidance documentation and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously described how to securely use and administer the product, and that it was consistent with the other documents supplied for evaluation.

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<sup>2</sup> Individual version numbers are not provided for these documents as the documentation is packaged as a part of the product build. As such, the document version numbers are considered to be the same as the product version.

**Vulnerability Assessment:** The evaluators examined the developer's vulnerability analysis for the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 and found that it sufficiently described each of the potential vulnerabilities along with a sound rationale as to why it was not exploitable in the intended environment. The evaluators conducted an independent review of public domain vulnerability databases, relevant OCSP standards, and evaluation deliverables to provide assurance that all potential vulnerabilities have been considered. Additionally, the evaluators conducted some penetration testing to validate several of the vendor's claims for non-exploitability.

All these evaluation activities resulted in **PASS** verdicts.

## **12 ITS Product Testing**

Testing at EAL 2 consists of the following three steps: assessing the developer's tests, performing independent functional tests, and performing independent penetration tests.

### **12.1 Assessing Developer Tests**

The evaluators verified that the developer had met their testing responsibilities through an examination of the developer's test plans and procedures, a review of the test results, and an on-site visit to the developer's test facility. Additionally, the developer provided a coverage analysis, which the evaluators used to assess the correspondence between the developer's test plans and the functional specification for the TOE.

### **12.2 Independent Functional Testing**

During this evaluation, the evaluators developed independent functional tests by examining the design and guidance documentation, examining the developer's test documentation, executing a sample of the developer's test cases and creating test cases that augmented the developer tests.

Independent execution of a subset of the developer's test procedures was performed to gain assurance in the developer's testing effort. In order to gain assurance that the TOE Security Functions (TSF) operate in accordance with the functional specification on both developer-recommended OS platforms, evaluators performed a subset of the developer's test procedures on both platforms.

Independent evaluator tests were devised using the ST, functional specification, developer test evidence, and guidance documentation. The tests focused on:

- a) Installation and configuration;
- b) OCSP request and response generation;
- c) OCSP response verification; and
- d) Logging and auditing.

### 12.3 Independent Penetration Testing

Penetration/vulnerability tests were devised using the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 vulnerability analysis, the functional specification, the high-level design, the ST, and the administration guidance. These tests focused primarily on validating the protection of data in transit between the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 and other trusted devices, and validating vendor claims that the TOE was not opening any excess ports.

### 12.4 Conduct of Testing

The Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent, functional and penetration tests. The testing took place at the Information Technology Security Evaluation and Testing (ITSET) facility at CGI Information Systems and Management Consultants Incorporated, located in Ottawa, Ontario. The CCS Certification Body witnessed a portion of the independent testing.

The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)<sup>3</sup>.

### 12.5 Testing Results

The developer's tests and the evaluator's independent tests yielded the expected results, giving assurance that the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.

## 13 Results of the Evaluation

This evaluation has provided the basis for an **EAL 2** level of assurance. The overall verdict for the evaluation is **PASS**. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

## 14 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations

As described in the ST and previous sections of this document, the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 is intended to be deployed in environments that provide a considerable amount of physical and logical security for the underlying operating system. As such, the Alacris OCSP Server Professional 3.0.0 does not counter any threats aimed at compromising the TSF or TSF Data through the subversion of the hosting operating system or the physical platform on which it resides. Consumers are advised to review the ST and ensure that their deployment environment is consistent with the defined intended environment.

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<sup>3</sup> The Evaluation Technical Report is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.

## 15 Glossary

This section expands any acronyms, abbreviations and initializations used in this report.

<u>Acronym/Abbreviation/Initialization</u>	<u>Description</u>
CAPI	Cryptographic Application Programming Interface
CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CCEF	Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CCS	Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CR	Certification Report
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
ISO	International Organisation for Standardisation
IT	Information Technology
ITSET	Information Technology Security Evaluation and Testing
OCSP	On-line Certificate Status Protocol
OS	Operating System
PALCAN	Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories Canada
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functions

## 16 References

This section lists all documentation used as source material for this report:

- a) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CCIMB-99-031/032/033, Version 2.1, August 1999.
- b) Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM-99/045, Part 2: Evaluation and Methodology, Version 1.0, August 1999.
- c) CCS #4: Technical Oversight for TOE Evaluation, Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS), Version 1.0, 3 October 2002.
- d) Security Target for Alacris® OCSP Server Professional Version 3.0.0 (EAL2), Version 1.6, 15 January 2004.
- e) Evaluation Technical Report of the Alacris OCSP Server Version 3.0.0, Version 1.0, 20 February 2004.