



Certification Report

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Target of Evaluation

Application date/ID	2007-12-07 (ITC-7188)
Certification No.	C0168
Sponsor	Panasonic Communications Co., Ltd.
Name of TOE	Japanese Name: Data Security Kit DA-SC04 English Name: Data Security Kit DA-SC04
Version of TOE	V1.00
PP Conformance	None
Conformed Claim	EAL2
Developer	Panasonic Communications Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Facility	Information Technology Security Center Evaluation Department

This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE is certified as follows.

2008-05-30

Hideji Suzuki, Technical Manager
Information Security Certification Office
IT Security Center

Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following criteria prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme".

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 18045:2005)

Evaluation Result: Pass

"Data Security Kit DA-SC04" has been evaluated in accordance with the provision of the "IT Security Certification Procedure" by Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.

Notice:

This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme.

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1. Executive Summary

1.1 Introduction

This Certification Report describes the content of certification result in relation to IT Security Evaluation of "Data Security Kit DA-SC04" (hereinafter referred to as "the TOE") conducted by Information Technology Security Center (hereinafter referred to as "Evaluation Facility"), and it reports to the sponsor, Panasonic Communications Co., Ltd..

The reader of the Certification Report is advised to read the corresponding ST and manuals (please refer to "1.5.9 Documents Attached to Product" for further details) attached to the TOE together with this report. The assumed environment, corresponding security objectives, security functional and assurance requirements needed for its implementation and their summary specifications are specifically described in ST. The operational conditions and functional specifications are also described in the document attached to the TOE.

Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on assurance requirements conformed to the TOE, and does not certify individual IT product itself.

Note: In this Certification Report, IT Security Evaluation Criteria and IT Security Evaluation Method prescribed by IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme are named CC and CEM, respectively.

1.2 Evaluated Product

1.2.1 Name of Product

The target product by this Certificate is as follows:

Name of Product:	Japanese Name: Data Security Kit DA-SC04
	English Name: Data Security Kit DA-SC04
Version:	V1.00
Developer:	Panasonic Communications Co., Ltd.

1.2.2 Product Overview

The TOE is a software product, Data Security Kit DA-SC04 installed in the Digital Color Imaging System, to protect the used document data which had been already stored on the hard disk drive after being processed by the Digital Color Imaging System from being disclosed illicitly.

The TOE is offered as an optional product of Panasonic Communications Co., Ltd. Digital Color Imaging System DP-C3040VFS / C3030VFS / C2626VFS / DP-C3040V(*) / C3030V(*) / C2626VF(*) for Japan (DP-C405 / C305 / C265 for Overseas), and provides the security functions by replacing the standard bundled software of the Digital Color Imaging System.

(*) Requires installation of optional Hard Disk Unit

1.2.3 Scope of TOE and Overview of Operation

1) Usage Environment of TOE

The TOE is a software product installed in the Digital Color Imaging System to protect the used document data which had been already stored on the hard disk drive after being processed by Digital Color Imaging Systems from being disclosed illicitly. The TOE installed in the Digital Color Imaging System is used in an environment shown in Figure 1-1.




Figure 1-1 Assumed Usage Environment

2) Scope of TOE

The physical configuration of Digital Color Imaging System with TOE installed is shown in Figure1-2.




Figure 1-2 Physical Configuration

Software that controls the Digital Color Imaging System is stored in FROM on Main PCB in Figure 1-2. The TOE is a group of software parts and is shown in the shaded portion of Figure 1-2, namely:

- Key Operator Authentication Function
- Service Technician Authentication Function
- Security Mode Operating Management Function
- Security Mode Maintenance Management Function
- Hard Disk Drive Lock Management Function
- Hard Disk Drive Overwriting Function for Residual Data

The hard disk drive unit attached to the Digital Color Imaging System has a drive lock function whereby the password can directly be assigned to the hard disk drive so that the hard disk drive cannot be recognized unless the correct password is entered. The TOE provides "Hard Disk Drive Lock Management Function" to manage the password. The drive lock function of the hard disk drive is outside the TOE scope.

3) Persons Related to TOE

Following are the persons related to Digital Color Imaging System with TOE installed.

- General user
General users are the ones who use the general functions of Digital Color Imaging System, such as copy, printer, scanner and facsimile.

- Key operator
The machine administrator called key operator is to perform operating management using the operating management functions offered by Digital Color Imaging System.
Key operator is appointed by the person in charge of Digital Color Imaging System.
- Person in charge
Person in charge is the one who is in charge of introducing Digital Color Imaging System, and appoints and manages the key operator.
- Service technician
The service technician provides installation, maintenance and repair services, using the maintenance and management functions offered by Digital Color Imaging System.
Service technicians belong to the company which undertakes the maintenance of Digital Color Imaging System.

4) Overview of Operation

The TOE is used as follows.

- General user
When a general user uses copy function / printer function / scanner function of the Digital Color Imaging System, the document data is stored temporarily in the hard disk drive. This temporary document data becomes used document data when each function finishes its usage.
"Hard Disk Drive Overwriting Function for Residual Data" of the TOE is executed automatically at the time of generation of the used document data, and the document data area is overwritten and erased without any awareness of the general user.
- Key operator
The key operator operates the control panel to use "Hard Disk Drive Lock Management Function" and "Security Mode Operating Management Function" of the TOE after the identification and the authentication by "Key Operator Authentication Function" of the TOE.
"Security Mode Operating Management Function" includes the function to command the execution of "Hard Disk Drive Overwriting Function for Residual Data" of the TOE.
- Service technician
The service technician operates the control panel to use "Security Mode Maintenance Management Function" of the TOE after the identification and the authentication by "Service Technician Authentication Function" of the TOE.

1.2.4 TOE Functionality

The TOE has the security functions described below.

(1) Hard Disk Drive Overwriting Function for Residual Data

This function overwrites and erases the data area of the used document data.

There are following three overwriting and erasing methods, and set by "Security

Mode Operating Management Function".

- Basic:
Only the management information for the document data is deleted.
- Medium:
Over the entire area of the document data, the data of all 0's are overwritten three times for erasure.
- High:
Over the entire area of the document data, random values are overwritten twice and then all 0's are overwritten once for erasure.

This function is executed at the following timing.

- When the used document data is generated in the hard disk drive, after the document data is processed by copy control function, printer control function or scanner control function.
- When the key operator directs it from the control panel by "Hard disk initialization" in "Security Mode Operating Management Function".
- When the key operator directs it from the control panel by "Delete All Image Files" in "Security Mode Operating Management Function".

(2) Key Operator Authentication Function

This function identifies and authorizes the key operator, by means of the input to the control panel and the entered dedicated password for key operator. Only the identified and authorized key operator can perform operations described in "Hard Disk Drive Lock Management Function" and "Security Mode Operating Management Function".

(3) Hard Disk Drive Lock Management Function

This function is for the key operator to manage the hard disk drive lock. Only the identified and authorized key operator can set up and change the password for the memory inside the Digital Color Imaging System controlling the "Hard Disk Drive Lock Password" and the hard disk drive, and also reset the drive lock setting the password to "unsetup" condition. At its startup time, the Digital Color Imaging System sends the password stored in the memory inside the system to the hard disk drive, requesting the data access to it.

(4) Security Mode Operating Management Function

This function is the management function for key operator to conduct operations. Only the identified and authorized key operator can direct following setup and change of setting data and processing regarding the security.

- "Hard Disk Data Erasure Level"
This function specifies the overwriting and erasing mode of "Hard Disk Drive Overwriting Function for Residual Data". (Except "Hard Disk Initialization")
It can set up three types of overwriting and erasing, Basic (initial setting), Medium and High.
- "Hard Disk Initialization"
This function enables the key operator to direct "Hard Disk Drive Overwriting Function for Residual Data" to overwrite and erase all document data stored on the hard disk drive. As the ways to overwrite and erase, there are two types, Medium and High.
- "Delete All Image Files"
This function enables the key operator to direct "Hard Disk Drive Overwriting Function for Residual Data" to overwrite and erase all document data stored in the image box which is inside the hard disk drive. The overwriting and erasing method is specified by "Hard Disk Data Erasure Level" setting.
- "Key Operator Password"
This function is to set up and change the key operator password.

(5) Service Technician Authentication Function

This function identifies and authenticates the service technician by the operations of service mode setting procedure from the control panel as well as the entered password.

Only the identified and authorized service technician is allowed for operations described in "Security Mode Maintenance Management Function".

(6) Security Mode Maintenance Management Function

This function is for service technician to carry out the management functions for maintenance tasks.

Only the identified and authorized service technician can direct the setup, change and initialization (returning to the initial setting) for the following setup data regarding the security.

- "Service Technician Password"

This function is to set up and change the service technician password.

- "System Initialization"

Under the direction from the service technician, this function initializes setup data such as "Hard Disk Drive Lock Password" described in "Hard Disk Drive Lock Management Function", "Hard Disk Data Erasure Level" and "Key Operator Password" described in "Security Mode Operating Management Function", "Service Technician Password" described in "Security Mode Maintenance Management Function", to the initial setting.

1.3 Conduct of Evaluation

Based on the IT Security Evaluation/Certification Program operated by the Certification Body, TOE functionality and its assurance requirements are being evaluated by evaluation facility in accordance with those publicized documents such as "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme"[2], "IT Security Certification Procedure"[3] and "Evaluation Facility Approval Procedure"[4].

Scope of the evaluation is as follow.

- Security design of the TOE shall be adequate;
- Security functions of the TOE shall be satisfied with security functional requirements described in the security design;
- The TOE shall be developed in accordance with the basic security design;
- Above mentioned three items shall be evaluated in accordance with the CC Part 3 and CEM.

More specific, the evaluation facility examined "Data Security Kit DA-SC04 Security Target" as the basis design of security functions for the TOE (hereinafter referred to as "the ST")[1], the evaluation deliverables in relation to development of the TOE and the development, manufacturing and shipping sites of the TOE. The evaluation facility evaluated if the TOE is satisfied both Annex B of CC Part 1 (either of [5], [8] or [11]) and Functional Requirements of CC Part 2 (either of [6], [9] or [12]) and also evaluated if the development, manufacturing and shipping environments for the TOE is also satisfied with Assurance Requirements of CC Part 3 (either of [7], [10] or [13]) as its rationale. Such evaluation procedure and its result are presented in "Data Security Kit DA-SC04 Evaluation Technical Report" (hereinafter referred to as "the Evaluation Technical Report") [17]. Further, evaluation methodology should comply with the CEM (either of [14], [15] or [16]).

1.4 Certification

The Certification Body verifies the Evaluation Technical Report prepared by the evaluation facility and evaluation evidence materials, and confirmed that the TOE evaluation is conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Certification review is also prepared for those concerns found in the certification process. Evaluation is completed with the Evaluation Technical Report dated 2008-05-16 submitted by the evaluation facility and those problems pointed out by the Certification Body are fully resolved and confirmed that the TOE evaluation is appropriately conducted in accordance with CC and CEM. The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation Technical Report submitted by the evaluation facility and concluded fully certification activities.

1.5 Overview of Report

1.5.1 PP Conformance

There is no PP to be conformed.

1.5.2 EAL

Evaluation Assurance Level of TOE defined by the ST is EAL2 conformance.

1.5.3 SOF

The ST claims "SOF-basic" as its minimum strength of function. The TOE is a product which assumes low attack capabilities. So, "SOF-Basic" is enough level as its minimum strength of security function.

1.5.4 Security Functions

Security functions of the TOE are as shown in "1.2.4 TOE Functionality".

1.5.5 Threat

The TOE assumes such threats presented in Table 1-1 and provides functions for countermeasure to them.

Table 1-1 Assumed Threat

Identifier	Threat
T.RECOVER	- Illicit recovery of used document data General users or the non-related persons to TOE having malicious intention may attempt to recover the used document data by connecting PC or other tools to hard disk drive.

1.5.6 Organizational Security Policy

Organizational security policy required in use of the TOE is presented in Table 1-2.

Table 1-2 Organizational Security Policy

Identifier	Organizational Security Policy
P.OWMETHOD	- Overwriting and erasing the used document data The data area of used document data remaining on the hard disk drive must be overwritten and erased.

1.5.7 Configuration Requirements

The TOE is used installed in the Panasonic Communications Co., Ltd. Digital Color Imaging System DP-C3040VFS / C3030VFS / C2626VFS / DP-C3040V(*) / C3030V(*) / C2626VF(*) for Japan (DP-C405 / C305 / C265 for Overseas).

(*)DP-C3040V / C3030V / C2626VF don't have the hard disk drive in the standard configuration. These models require installation of optional Hard Disk Unit.

1.5.8 Assumptions for Operational Environment

Assumptions required in environment using the TOE presents in the Table 1-3. The effective performance of the TOE security functions are not assured unless these preconditions are satisfied.

Table 1-3 Assumptions in Use of the TOE

Identifier	Assumptions
A.SETSEC	- Security Mode setting Key operator enables following TOE functions before operations. -"Hard Disk Drive Lock Password" is set up.
A.ADMIN	- Credibility of key operator Key operator is a person who commits no illicit acts.
A.SE	- Credibility of service technician Service technician is a person who commits no illicit acts.

1.5.9 Documents Attached to Product

Documents attached to the TOE are listed below.

(1) For Japan

- Operating Instructions Data Security Kit DA-SC04 (in Japanese) C0608-0(04)
- Installation Instructions for Service Technicians Data Security Kit DA-SC04 (in Japanese) C0608-0(04)

(2) For Overseas

- Operating Instructions Data Security Kit DA-SC04 C0608-0(04)
- Installation Instructions for Service Technicians Data Security Kit DA-SC04 C0608-0(03)

NOTE: Manuals (Japanese version) were translated from the original Japanese titles.

2. Conduct and Results of Evaluation by Evaluation Facility

2.1 Evaluation Methods

Evaluation was conducted by using the evaluation methods prescribed in CEM in accordance with the assurance requirements in CC Part 3. Details for evaluation activities are report in the Evaluation Technical Report. It described the description of overview of the TOE, and the contents and verdict evaluated by each work unit prescribed in CEM.

2.2 Overview of Evaluation Conducted

The history of evaluation conducted was present in the Evaluation Technical Report as follows.

Evaluation has started in November 2007 and concluded by completion the Evaluation Technical Report in May 2008. The evaluation facility received a full set of evaluation deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by developer, and examined the evidences in relation to a series of evaluation conducted. Additionally, the evaluation facility directly visited the development and manufacturing sites in April 2008 and examined procedural status conducted in relation to each work unit for configuration management, delivery and operation and lifecycle by investigating records and staff hearing. Further, the evaluation facility executed sampling check of conducted testing by developer and evaluator testing by using developer testing environment at developer site in April 2008.

Any concerns were not found in evaluation activities for each work unit, so no Observation Report were reported to developer.

As for concerns indicated during evaluation process by the Certification Body, the certification review was sent to the evaluation facility. These were reflected to evaluation after investigation conducted by the evaluation facility and the developer.

2.3 Product Testing

Overview of developer testing evaluated by evaluator and evaluator testing conducted by evaluator are as follows.

2.3.1 Developer Testing

1) Developer Test Environment

Test configuration performed by the developer is shown in the Figure 2-1 and 2-2.




Figure 2-1 Configuration of Developer Testing




Figure 2-2 Test Configuration of Hard Disk Drive Overwriting Function for Residual Data testing

2) Outlining of Developer Testing

Outlining of the testing performed by the developer is as follows.

a. Test configuration

Test configuration performed by the developer is shown in the Figure 2-1 and 2-2. Developer testing was performed at the same TOE testing environment with the TOE configuration identified in the ST.

The Digital Color Imaging System that was used for test is DP-C3040VFS for

Japan and DP-C405 for Overseas. Each model has a Hard Disk Unit installed in its standard configuration. This Hard Disk Unit is same as the optional Hard Disk Unit DA-HD40.

The TOE supports multiple models. The difference between the models is the installation of the optional units and the print speed in the standard configuration. The evaluator confirmed that the difference has no effect on the TOE security functions which operates for the hard disk drive, and the testing using the representative model is sufficient for multiple models.

b. Testing Approach

For the testing, following approach was used.

1. The TOE is operated from the control panel and from the client PC (internal network connection and USB connection), and the display status and processing results are confirmed.
2. To confirm the operation of Hard Disk Drive Overwriting Function for Residual Data, the TOE is operated from the control panel and from the client PC. The result of the operation is confirmed from the log data which is output by the debugging client PC as shown in Figure 2-2.

c. Scope of Testing Performed

172 items of testing was conducted by the developer.

The coverage analysis is conducted and examined to testing satisfactorily all of the security functions described in the functional specification and the external interface.

d. Result

The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the expected test results and the actual test results provided by the developer. The evaluator confirmed the developer testing approach performed and legitimacy of items performed, and confirmed consistencies between the testing approach described in the test plan and the actual test results.

2.3.2 Evaluator Testing

1) Evaluator Test Environment

Test configuration performed by the evaluator is the same configuration with developer testing.

2) Outlining of Evaluator Testing

Outlining of testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.

a. Test configuration

Test configuration performed by the evaluator is shown in the Figure 2-1 and 2-2. Evaluator testing was performed at the same TOE testing environment with the TOE configuration identified in the ST.

However, the Mail Server, the File Server and the public telephone line network

are not used because the tests that utilize these functions are not executed.

The Digital Color Imaging System which was used for testing is the same as the developer testing.

b. Testing Approach

For the testing, following approach was used.

1. The security function is stimulated and observed by the use of the control panel.
2. The security function is stimulated by the use of the control panel and client PC (USB connection), and observed by the use of the log data which is output from the debugging client PC as shown in Figure 2-2.
3. The possibility of an illegal intrusion is searched by the use of a client PC (internal network connection).

c. Scope of Testing Performed

Total of 86 items of testing; namely 29 items from testing devised by the evaluator, 6 items from penetration testing devised by the evaluator, and 51 items from sampling of developer testing was conducted. As for selection of the test subset, the following factors are considered.

1. Security function that the evaluator doubts it operates as specified due to insufficient developer testing.
2. Further significant security function than the other security function.
3. Security function subjected for strength of function.
4. Function used by different interface.

d. Result

All evaluator testing conducted is completes correctly and could confirm the behavior of the TOE. The evaluator also confirmed that all the test results are consistent with the behavior.

2.4 Evaluation Result

The evaluator had the conclusion that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in CEM by submitting the Evaluation Technical Report.

3. Conduct of Certification

The following certification was conducted based on each materials submitted by evaluation facility during evaluation process.

1. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall be adequate.
2. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall properly be reflected.
3. Evidential materials submitted were sampled, its contents were examined, and related work units shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
4. Rationale of evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall be adequate.
5. The Evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall conform to the CEM.

Concerns found in certification process were prepared as certification review, which were sent to evaluation facility.

The Certification Body confirmed such concerns pointed out in Observation Report and certification review were solved in the ST and the Evaluation Technical Report.

4. Conclusion

4.1 Certification Result

The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report and the related evaluation evidential materials submitted and confirmed that all evaluator action elements required in CC Part 3 are conducted appropriately to the TOE. The Certification Body verified the TOE is satisfied the EAL2 assurance requirements prescribed in CC Part 3.

4.2 Recommendations

The countermeasure to counter the threat T.RECOVER directly is the drive lock function of the hard disk drive which is one of the IT environments that the TOE depends. The TOE provides the management function for the password of the drive lock function to support the countermeasure.

5. Glossary

The abbreviations used in this report are listed below.

CC:	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM:	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL:	Evaluation Assurance Level
PP:	Protection Profile
SOF:	Strength of Function
ST:	Security Target
TOE:	Target of Evaluation
TSF:	TOE Security Functions

The glossaries used in this report are listed below.

Digital Color Imaging System	Peripheral which integrates functions such as copy, printer, scanner and facsimile into one machine. In this report, the term "Digital Color Imaging System" is used to generically refer to the models DP-C3040VFS / C3030VFS / C2626VFS DP-C3040V / C3030V / C2626VF (for Japan) and DP-C405 / C305 / C265 (for Overseas) manufactured by Panasonic Communications Co., Ltd.
Internal Network	The LAN used in the organization where the Digital Color Imaging System is introduced.
External Network	The networks other than the Internal Network, such as the Internet.
USB	A data transmission standard which connects peripherals to a personal computer.
General User	One who uses copy, printer, scanner or facsimile functions of Digital Color Imaging System.
Key Operator	One who manages Digital Color Imaging System.
Service Technician	A technician who belongs to the service provider company to provide installation, maintenance and repair services of Digital Color Imaging System.
Service Mode	A set of maintenance functions that the service technician uses for installation, maintenance and repair services of Digital Color Imaging System.

Service Mode Setting Procedure	The setting procedure that a service technician uses to switch the mode to Service Mode.
Control Panel	Operation Panel with keys, LEDs and a touch panel display required for operating the functions of Digital Color Imaging System.
SCN Board	PCB to control the mechanical function of scanner unit.
EC Board	PCB to control the mechanical function of printer unit.
FROM	Nonvolatile memory allowing electrical block erasure and reprogramming of arbitrary portion.(Flash Read Only Memory)
Document Data	Collective name for all digitized image data handled inside Digital Color Imaging System when copy, print, scanner or facsimile functions are used in Digital Color Imaging System. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Image data captured from scanner unit. - Image data that can be printed on printer unit. - Image data which has been received from the FAX Communication Unit and transformed by image processing technology. - Image data received from client PCs or the received data to be transformed to image data.
Used Document Data	Document Data that is stored on the hard disk drive of the Digital Color Imaging System and had already been used.
Image Box	Area of the hard disk drive which has been set beforehand to store document data of Image box function.
Image Box Function	One of the scanner functions that stores the document data captured from the scanner unit on the hard disk drive, and allows the inspection and deletion of the document data from Web browser of general user's client PC.

6. Bibliography

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