

# **IBM**

## **Logical Partition Architecture for Power Systems Security Target**

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## 1. Security Target Introduction

This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is Logical Partition Architecture for Power Systems provided by International Business Machines Corporation. The Logical Partition Architecture for Power Systems (LPAR) is a product that facilitates the sharing of hardware resources by disparate applications (e.g., AIX, Linux). The product is based on the concept of a 'hypervisor' that is designed to instantiate 'partitions', each with its own distinct resources, that each appear to their hosted applications as a completely functional underlying platform. These partitions are implemented to prevent interference among partitions and to prevent simultaneous sharing of storage and other device resources (adapters).

The Security Target contains the following additional sections:

- TOE Description (Section 2)
- Security Environment (Section 3)
- Security Objectives (Section 4)
- IT Security Requirements (Section 5)
- TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
- Protection Profile Claims (Section 7)
- Rationale (Section 8).

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### 1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification

**ST Title** – IBM Logical Partition Architecture for Power Systems Security Target

**ST Version** – Version 1.0

**ST Date** – 21 November 2008

**TOE Identification** – IBM Logical Partition Architecture for Power Systems operating on IBM Power Systems hardware (models E8A, MMA, and FHA)

**TOE Developer** – IBM

**Evaluation Sponsor** – IBM

**CC Identification** – Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3, August 2005

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### 1.2 Conformance Claims

This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security Functional Requirements, Version 2.3, August 2005.
  - Part 2 Conformant
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements, Version 2.3, August 2005.
  - Part 3 Conformant
  - Assurance Level: EAL 4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2
  - Strength of Function Claim: SOF-medium

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## 1.3 Conventions

The following conventions have been applied in this document:

- Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
  - Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST, iteration is indicated by a letter placed at the end of the component. For example FDP\_ACC.1a and FDP\_ACC.1b indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the FDP\_ACC.1 requirement, a and b.
  - Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [**assignment**]). Note that an assignment within a selection would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [*selected-assignment*])).
  - Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [*selection*]).
  - Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “... **all** objects ...” or “... ~~some~~ **big** things ...”).
- Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as captions.

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## 2. TOE Description

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Logical Partition Architecture for Power Systems.

While the TOE is designed to generally support the entire line of IBM Power Systems products, it has been evaluated and tested in the context of the IBM Power Systems server models FHA (8204-E8A), MMA (9117-MMA), and E8A (9119-FHA).

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### 2.1 TOE Overview

The TOE is a set of hardware and firmware designed to abstract and virtualize physical hardware resources to provide the underlying platform for one or more concurrent operating systems. Each virtual platform is known as a partition. The operating systems executing in the available partitions are treated as subjects of the TOE, where the TOE not only provides the necessary operational support for the hosted operating systems, but also serves to separate them from each other to ensure mutual non-interference.

While not included as part of the TOE, the TOE is configured using a connected Hardware Management Console (HMC) that provides access to the functions necessary to enable administrative personnel to effectively manage the allocation of resources (i.e., processors, memory, and I/O device adapters) to the configured partitions. Once the TOE is configured, the HMC is expected to be disconnected so that it offers no interfaces while the TOE is operating in its evaluated configuration.

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### 2.2 TOE Architecture

The TOE consists of a number of layered components as follows:

1. Processor Subsystem consisting of
  - a. **PowerPC Hypervisor (PHYP):** provides virtualization and other advanced server functions, and
2. Flexible Service Processor (FSP) Component consisting of
  - a. **Hardware:** an IBM Power Systems (utilizing IBM Power Systems CPUs), and

- b. **Firmware:** provides APIs to the hosted processor subsystem and the means to communicate with the HMC to facilitate the dynamic management of partitions
3. Bulk Power Assembly (BPA) consisting of
    - a. **Bulk Power Controller (BPC):** controls power available to the rest of the components.




Figure 1: LPAR Architecture

Note that Figure 1 identifies the TOE components in the yellow-filled boxes inside the green-filled boxes. Note that the operating systems within the partitions are subjects instantiated by the TOE and device adapters (and attached devices) are outside scope of the TOE, though the TOE manages connections between partitions and device adapters.

### 2.2.1 Physical Boundaries

As indicated above, the TOE consists of a number of architectural components. The components expose a number of interfaces both externally and internally.

The external interfaces include the interfaces to the subject operating in a partition. These include the Hypervisor interfaces as well as the hardware instructions available to applications. Note that when operating in the evaluated configuration, the Hardware Management Console (HMC) used to configure the TOE is detached and, hence, does not represent an interface. There is also an operator panel where basic, non-security related operator functions can be

performed by a user with direct physical access to the TOE. Given that the operator panel co-exists with the physical TOE, it must be similarly protected in order to (physically) restrict access to the limited functions it provides.

The internal interfaces, specifically those not also available externally, include the FSP interface to the Hypervisor.

Note that connections to a broad or public network are supported, but they would be treated as resources that can be granted to partitions for operating system use, but would not be used by TOE for its own purposes. Along these lines, while the TOE controls which device adapters a given partition can access, it does not control or otherwise constrain the nature of those device adapters (and associated devices). Any functions or connections of those device adapters (and devices) are outside the scope of control of the TOE.

## 2.2.2 Logical Boundaries

This section summarizes the security functions provided by Logical Partition Architecture for Power Systems:

- User data protection
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF

### 2.2.2.1 User data protection

The Hypervisor manages the association of CPUs, memory, and I/O device adapters, in a relatively static environment, with partitions containing operating system instances. Memory and I/O device adapters can be assigned to single partitions and when assigned are accessible only by the partition (including OF/RTAS and the OS running in the partition). CPUs can also be assigned a single partition, and only that partition (and occasionally the TOE) can use that CPU. CPUs can also be configured to be shared among a collection of partition (shared processor partition or also called micro-partitions) and the Hypervisor will save/restore the hardware register state when switching between partitions.

The Hypervisor also provides a mechanism where users can create LPAR groups (also referred to as eWLM groups) where a list of partitions are allowed to share the quantity of resources (memory and processors but not I/O) between the partitions. The resource is still owned at any point in time by one and only one partition but the operating system is given the ability to remove the resource from one partition and another partition can add the resource to their partition in the same group. The Hypervisor clears out the state of the resource before it is moved between partitions.

The Hypervisor allows the configuration of I/O device adapters such as Ethernet and virtual logical area network (LAN) which can be used to provide connections between partitions. I/O device adapters are the only mechanisms offered by Hypervisor that facilitate communication between partitions, and such communication is possible only when partitions are explicitly configured to have access to specific I/O device adapters (i.e., those that provide communication services, such as virtual SCSI, virtual LAN, and Ethernet).

With the exception of the sharing among partitions in a partition group (see above), partitions have no control over the assignment of their resources. The Hypervisor receives the partition management information from the HMC when it is being configured. Once configured, the HMC is disconnected and the TOE is placed in an operational state where those assignments would be continuously enforced.

### 2.2.2.2 Identification and authentication

Partitions are implicitly identified and authenticated by internal numerical identifiers associated with partitions (using internal data structures) as they are defined. Being implicitly identified by the TOE, partitions have no need, nor means, to identify themselves. Furthermore, the identification of a partition is guaranteed by the TOE and as such each partition is also continuously authenticated.

### **2.2.2.3 Security management**

All of the TOE configuration occurs via the interface to the HMC. Since the HMC is disconnected while the TOE is operational the TOE effectively doesn't offer any security management functions. However, the TOE serves to restrict the ability to change its own configuration nonetheless.

### **2.2.2.4 Protection of the TSF**

The components of the TOE protect themselves using the domains provided by the Power Systems processors. The TOE operates in the privileged domain and the partitions operate in the unprivileged domain. This allows the TOE to protect itself as well as the resources it makes selectively available to the applicable partitions.

Beyond protecting itself and its resources, the TOE is also designed such that when the hardware that supports a partition fails, the other partitions will continue uninterrupted.

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## **2.3 TOE Documentation**

IBM offers a series of documents that describe the installation process for LPAR as well as guidance for subsequent use and administration of the applicable security features (see section 6.2 for details).



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### 3. Security Environment

The TOE security environment describes the security aspects of the intended environment in which the TOE is to be used and the manner in which it is expected to be employed. The statement of the TOE security environment defines the following:

- Threats that the TOE counters
- Assumptions made about the operational environment and the intended method of use for the TOE

Furthermore, the TOE is intended to be used in environments where the relative assurance that its security functions are enforced is commensurate with EAL4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 as defined in the CC.

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#### 3.1 Threats

T.ACCESS	An entity operating within a partition may be able to gain access to resources that belong to another partition as configured by an authorized user.
T.COMMUNICATE	An entity operating within a partition may be able to establish an unauthorized communication channel with another partition.
T.INTERFERE	An entity operating within a partition may be able to disrupt the operation of another partition.

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#### 3.2 Assumptions

A.CONNECT	The TOE is assumed to be appropriately installed, including connections to device resources as well as being disconnected from the management console when operational.
A.LOCATE	The TOE and its connections are assumed to be physically protected from unauthorized access or modification.
A.MANAGE	The TOE is assumed to be managed by users who are capable and trustworthy and will follow the applicable guidance correctly.

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## 4. Security Objectives

This section defines the security objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment. The security objectives are intended to counter identified threats and address applicable assumptions.

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### 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

- O.AUTHORIZATION      The TOE must ensure that resources can be assigned to partitions only by an authorized user and that those resources will not be accessible to other partitions.
- O.COMMUNICATION      The TOE must not provide an unauthorized direct means of communication between partitions.
- O.NONINTERFERE      The TOE must ensure that each partition cannot access resources or communicate with other unauthorized partitions.

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### 4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment

- OE.ADMIN              A suitable management console must be configured for use by a capable and trustworthy user assigned to follow the applicable guidance in order to install and operate the TOE in a secure manner.
- OE.INSTALL            The TOE must be installed and configured in accordance with its guidance documents, including connecting appropriate device resources and disconnecting the management console when the TOE is operational.
- OE.PHYSICAL          The TOE must be established in a physical environment suitable to protect itself and its external connections from inappropriate access and modification.

## 5. IT Security Requirements

The security requirements for the TOE have all been drawn from Parts 2 and 3 of the Common Criteria. The security functional requirements have been selected to correspond to the actual security functions implemented by the TOE while the assurance requirements have been selected to offer a reasonable degree of assurance that those security functions are properly realized by users of the TOE.

### 5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following table describes the SFRs that are candidates to be satisfied by Logical Partition Architecture for Power Systems.

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
<b>FDP: User data protection</b>	FDP_ACC.2: Complete access control
	FDP_ACF.1: Security attribute based access control
	FDP_IFC.2: Complete information flow control
	FDP_IFF.1: Simple security attributes
	FDP_RIP.1: Subset residual information protection
<b>FIA: Identification and authentication</b>	FIA_ATD.1: User attribute definition
	FIA_UAU.2: User authentication before any action
	FIA_UID.2: User identification before any action
	FIA_USB.1: User-subject binding
<b>FMT: Security management</b>	FMT_MSA.1: Management of security attributes
	FMT_MSA.3: Static attribute initialization
<b>FPT: Protection of the TSF</b>	FPT_FLS.1: Failure with preservation of secure state
	FPT_RVM.1: Non-bypassability of the TSP
	FPT_SEP.1: TSF domain separation

Table 1 TOE Security Functional Components

#### 5.1.1 User data protection (FDP)

##### 5.1.1.1 Complete access control (FDP\_ACC.2)

**FDP\_ACC.2.1** The TSF shall enforce the [**Resource Access Control Policy**] on [**subjects: partitions and objects: CPUs, memory, and I/O device adapters**] and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.

**FDP\_ACC.2.2** The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject in the TSC and any object within the TSC are covered by an access control SFP.

##### 5.1.1.2 Security attribute based access control (FDP\_ACF.1)

**FDP\_ACF.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the [**Resource Access Control Policy**] to objects based on the following: [**partition, CPU, memory, and I/O device adapter identities**].

**FDP\_ACF.1.2** The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [**a given partition can access only CPUs, memory, and I/O device adapters explicitly assigned to it**].

**FDP\_ACF.1.3** The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [**no explicit authorization rules**].

**FDP\_ACF.1.4** The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [**no explicit denial rules**].

### 5.1.1.3 Complete information flow control (FDP\_IFC.2)

**FDP\_IFC.2.1** The TSF shall enforce the [**Partition Separation Policy**] on [**partitions and attached resource contents**] and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.

**FDP\_IFC.2.2** The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TSC to flow to and from any subject in the TSC are covered by an information flow control SFP.

### 5.1.1.4 Simple security attributes (FDP\_IFF.1)

**FDP\_IFF.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the [**Partition Separation Policy**] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [**partition identities and no attached resource content attributes**].

**FDP\_IFF.1.2** The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [**separate I/O device adapters are associated with each partition such that the device or devices controlled by these adapters implement some means of communication via their contents**].

**FDP\_IFF.1.3** The TSF shall enforce the [  

- 1) **partitions cannot communicate with one another using CPU or memory resource contents;**
- 2) **partitions assigned to a group can release CPU and memory resources and those resources can be acquired by another partition within the same group; and**
- 3) **when a CPU is designated as shared, it can be assigned to partitions in successive time slots.**

]

**FDP\_IFF.1.4** The TSF shall provide the following [**no additional SFP capabilities**].

**FDP\_IFF.1.5** The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [**no explicit authorization rules**].

**FDP\_IFF.1.6** The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [**no explicit denial rules**].

### 5.1.1.5 Subset residual information protection (FDP\_RIP.1)

**FDP\_RIP.1.1** The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [*allocation of the resource to*] the following objects: [**CPUs and memory**].

## 5.1.2 Identification and authentication (FIA)

### 5.1.2.1 User attribute definition (FIA\_ATD.1)

**FIA\_ATD.1.1** The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [**identity**].

### 5.1.2.2 User authentication before any action (FIA\_UAU.2)

**FIA\_UAU.2.1** The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

### 5.1.2.3 User identification before any action (FIA\_UID.2)

**FIA\_UID.2.1** The TSF shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

### 5.1.2.4 User-subject binding (FIA\_USB.1)

**FIA\_USB.1.1** The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [**identity**].

- FIA\_USB.1.2** The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [**partitions are identified internally when defined**].
- FIA\_USB.1.3** The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [**partition security attributes do not change once assigned**].

### 5.1.3 Security management (FMT)

#### 5.1.3.1 Management of security attributes (FMT\_MSA.1)

- FMT\_MSA.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the [**Resource Access Control Policy and Partition Separation Policy**] to restrict the ability to [*modify*] the security attributes [**partition and resource identities (and association of resources to partitions)**] to [**no user**<sup>1</sup>].

#### 5.1.3.2 Static attribute initialization (FMT\_MSA.3)

- FMT\_MSA.3.1** The TSF shall enforce the [**Resource Access Control Policy and Partition Separation Policy**] to provide [*restrictive*<sup>2</sup>] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
- FMT\_MSA.3.2** The TSF shall allow the [**no user**] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

### 5.1.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

#### 5.1.4.1 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1)

- FPT\_FLS.1.1** The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [**memory and I/O device failures**].

#### 5.1.4.2 Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT\_RVM.1)

- FPT\_RVM.1.1** The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.

#### 5.1.4.3 TSF domain separation (FPT\_SEP.1)

- FPT\_SEP.1.1** The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
- FPT\_SEP.1.2** The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC.

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## 5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirements for the TOE are the EAL 4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 components as specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. No operations are applied to the assurance components.

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
<b>ACM: Configuration management</b>	ACM_AUT.1: Partial CM automation
	ACM_CAP.4: Generation support and acceptance procedures
	ACM_SCP.2: Problem tracking CM coverage
<b>ADO: Delivery and operation</b>	ADO_DEL.2: Detection of modification
	ADO_IGS.1: Installation, generation, and start-up procedures

<sup>1</sup> The intention here is to indicate that the TOE does not allow any modifications to security attributes while it is operational. Note that this applies to potential changes associated with FMT\_MSA.3 as well.

<sup>2</sup> The policy is restrictive in that resources can be accessed only after being explicitly assigned to a partition and that a given resource can be assigned only to a single partition (or partition group in the case of CPU and memory resources).

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
<b>ADV: Development</b>	ADV_FSP.2: Fully defined external interfaces
	ADV_HLD.2: Security enforcing high-level design
	ADV_IMP.1: Subset of the implementation of the TSF
	ADV_LLD.1: Descriptive low-level design
	ADV_RCR.1: Informal correspondence demonstration
	ADV_SPM.1: Informal TOE security policy model
<b>AGD: Guidance documents</b>	AGD_ADM.1: Administrator guidance
	AGD_USR.1: User guidance
<b>ALC: Life cycle support</b>	ALC_DVS.1: Identification of security measures
	ALC_FLR.2: Flaw reporting procedures
	ALC_LCD.1: Developer defined life-cycle model
	ALC_TAT.1: Well-defined development tools
<b>ATE: Tests</b>	ATE_COV.2: Analysis of coverage
	ATE_DPT.1: Testing: high-level design
	ATE_FUN.1: Functional testing
	ATE_IND.2: Independent testing - sample
<b>AVA: Vulnerability assessment</b>	AVA_MSU.2: Validation of analysis
	AVA_SOF.1: Strength of TOE security function evaluation
	AVA_VLA.2: Independent vulnerability analysis

**Table 2 EAL 4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 Assurance Components**

## 5.2.1 Configuration management (ACM)

### 5.2.1.1 Partial CM automation (ACM\_AUT.1)

**ACM\_AUT.1.1d** The developer shall use a CM system.

**ACM\_AUT.1.2d** The developer shall provide a CM plan.

**ACM\_AUT.1.1c** The CM system shall provide an automated means by which only authorised changes are made to the TOE implementation representation.

**ACM\_AUT.1.2c** The CM system shall provide an automated means to support the generation of the TOE.

**ACM\_AUT.1.3c** The CM plan shall describe the automated tools used in the CM system.

**ACM\_AUT.1.4c** The CM plan shall describe how the automated tools are used in the CM system.

**ACM\_AUT.1.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

### 5.2.1.2 Generation support and acceptance procedures (ACM\_CAP.4)

**ACM\_CAP.4.1d** The developer shall provide a reference for the TOE.

**ACM\_CAP.4.2d** The developer shall use a CM system.

**ACM\_CAP.4.3d** The developer shall provide CM documentation.

**ACM\_CAP.4.1c** The reference for the TOE shall be unique to each version of the TOE.

**ACM\_CAP.4.2c** The TOE shall be labelled with its reference.

**ACM\_CAP.4.3c** The CM documentation shall include a configuration list, a CM plan, and an acceptance plan.

**ACM\_CAP.4.4c** The configuration list shall uniquely identify all configuration items that comprise the TOE.

**ACM\_CAP.4.5c** The configuration list shall describe the configuration items that comprise the TOE.

**ACM\_CAP.4.6c** The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the configuration items that comprise the TOE.

**ACM\_CAP.4.7c** The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items that comprise the TOE.

**ACM\_CAP.4.8c** The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used.

**ACM\_CAP.4.9c** The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is operating in accordance with the CM plan.

**ACM\_CAP.4.10c** The CM documentation shall provide evidence that all configuration items have been and are being effectively maintained under the CM system.

**ACM\_CAP.4.11c** The CM system shall provide measures such that only authorised changes are made to the configuration items.

**ACM\_CAP.4.12c** The CM system shall support the generation of the TOE.

**ACM\_CAP.4.13c** The acceptance plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or newly created configuration items as part of the TOE.

**ACM\_CAP.4.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

### 5.2.1.3 Problem tracking CM coverage (ACM\_SCP.2)

**ACM\_SCP.2.1d** The developer shall provide a list of configuration items for the TOE.

**ACM\_SCP.2.1c** The list of configuration items shall include the following: implementation representation; security flaws; and the evaluation evidence required by the assurance components in the ST.

**ACM\_SCP.2.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

## 5.2.2 Delivery and operation (ADO)

### 5.2.2.1 Detection of modification (ADO\_DEL.2)

**ADO\_DEL.2.1d** The developer shall document procedures for delivery of the TOE or parts of it to the user.

**ADO\_DEL.2.2d** The developer shall use the delivery procedures.

**ADO\_DEL.2.1c** The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to a user's site.

**ADO\_DEL.2.2c** The delivery documentation shall describe how the various procedures and technical measures provide for the detection of modifications, or any discrepancy between the developer's master copy and the version received at the user site.

**ADO\_DEL.2.3c** The delivery documentation shall describe how the various procedures allow detection of attempts to masquerade as the developer, even in cases in which the developer has sent nothing to the user's site.

**ADO\_DEL.2.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

### 5.2.2.2 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures (ADO\_IGS.1)

**ADO\_IGS.1.1d** The developer shall document procedures necessary for the secure installation, generation, and start-up of the TOE.

**ADO\_IGS.1.1c** The installation, generation and start-up documentation shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation, generation and start-up of the TOE.

**ADO\_IGS.1.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**ADO\_IGS.1.2e** The evaluator shall determine that the installation, generation, and start-up procedures result in a secure configuration.

## 5.2.3 Development (ADV)

### 5.2.3.1 Fully defined external interfaces (ADV\_FSP.2)

**ADV\_FSP.2.1d** The developer shall provide a functional specification.

**ADV\_FSP.2.1c** The functional specification shall describe the TSF and its external interfaces using an informal style.

**ADV\_FSP.2.2c** The functional specification shall be internally consistent.

**ADV\_FSP.2.3c** The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use of all external TSF interfaces, providing complete details of all effects, exceptions and error messages.

**ADV\_FSP.2.4c** The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.

**ADV\_FSP.2.5c** The functional specification shall include rationale that the TSF is completely represented.

**ADV\_FSP.2.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**ADV\_FSP.2.2e** The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements.

### 5.2.3.2 Security enforcing high-level design (ADV\_HLD.2)

**ADV\_HLD.2.1d** The developer shall provide the high-level design of the TSF.

**ADV\_HLD.2.1c** The presentation of the high-level design shall be informal.

**ADV\_HLD.2.2c** The high-level design shall be internally consistent.

**ADV\_HLD.2.3c** The high-level design shall describe the structure of the TSF in terms of subsystems.

**ADV\_HLD.2.4c** The high-level design shall describe the security functionality provided by each subsystem of the TSF.

**ADV\_HLD.2.5c** The high-level design shall identify any underlying hardware, firmware, and/or software required by the TSF with a presentation of the functions provided by the supporting protection mechanisms implemented in that hardware, firmware, or software.

**ADV\_HLD.2.6c** The high-level design shall identify all interfaces to the subsystems of the TSF.

**ADV\_HLD.2.7c** The high-level design shall identify which of the interfaces to the subsystems of the TSF are externally visible.

**ADV\_HLD.2.8c** The high-level design shall describe the purpose and method of use of all interfaces to the subsystems of the TSF, providing details of effects, exceptions and error messages, as appropriate.

**ADV\_HLD.2.9c** The high-level design shall describe the separation of the TOE into TSP-enforcing and other subsystems.

**ADV\_HLD.2.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**ADV\_HLD.2.2e** The evaluator shall determine that the high-level design is an accurate and complete instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements.

### 5.2.3.3 Subset of the implementation of the TSF (ADV\_IMP.1)

**ADV\_IMP.1.1d** The developer shall provide the implementation representation for a selected subset of the TSF.

**ADV\_IMP.1.1c** The implementation representation shall unambiguously define the TSF to a level of detail such that the TSF can be generated without further design decisions.

**ADV\_IMP.1.2c** The implementation representation shall be internally consistent.

**ADV\_IMP.1.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**ADV\_IMP.1.2e** The evaluator shall determine that the least abstract TSF representation provided is an accurate and complete instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements.

### 5.2.3.4 Descriptive low-level design (ADV\_LLD.1)

**ADV\_LLD.1.1d** The developer shall provide the low-level design of the TSF.

**ADV\_LLD.1.1c** The presentation of the low-level design shall be informal.

**ADV\_LLD.1.2c** The low-level design shall be internally consistent.

**ADV\_LLD.1.3c** The low-level design shall describe the TSF in terms of modules.

**ADV\_LLD.1.4c** The low-level design shall describe the purpose of each module.

**ADV\_LLD.1.5c** The low-level design shall define the interrelationships between the modules in terms of provided security functionality and dependencies on other modules.

**ADV\_LLD.1.6c** The low-level design shall describe how each TSP-enforcing function is provided.

**ADV\_LLD.1.7c** The low-level design shall identify all interfaces to the modules of the TSF.

**ADV\_LLD.1.8c** The low-level design shall identify which of the interfaces to the modules of the TSF are externally visible.

**ADV\_LLD.1.9c** The low-level design shall describe the purpose and method of use of all interfaces to the modules of the TSF, providing details of effects, exceptions and error messages, as appropriate.

**ADV\_LLD.1.10c** The low-level design shall describe the separation of the TOE into TSP-enforcing and other modules.

**ADV\_LLD.1.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.



**ADV\_LLD.1.2e** The evaluator shall determine that the low-level design is an accurate and complete instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements.

#### **5.2.3.5 Informal correspondence demonstration (ADV\_RCR.1)**

**ADV\_RCR.1.1d** The developer shall provide an analysis of correspondence between all adjacent pairs of TSF representations that are provided.

**ADV\_RCR.1.1c** For each adjacent pair of provided TSF representations, the analysis shall demonstrate that all relevant security functionality of the more abstract TSF representation is correctly and completely refined in the less abstract TSF representation.

**ADV\_RCR.1.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

#### **5.2.3.6 Informal TOE security policy model (ADV\_SPM.1)**

**ADV\_SPM.1.1d** The developer shall provide a TSP model.

**ADV\_SPM.1.2d** The developer shall demonstrate correspondence between the functional specification and the TSP model.

**ADV\_SPM.1.1c** The TSP model shall be informal.

**ADV\_SPM.1.2c** The TSP model shall describe the rules and characteristics of all policies of the TSP that can be modeled.

**ADV\_SPM.1.3c** The TSP model shall include a rationale that demonstrates that it is consistent and complete with respect to all policies of the TSP that can be modeled.

**ADV\_SPM.1.4c** The demonstration of correspondence between the TSP model and the functional specification shall show that all of the security functions in the functional specification are consistent and complete with respect to the TSP model.

**ADV\_SPM.1.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

### **5.2.4 Guidance documents (AGD)**

#### **5.2.4.1 Administrator guidance (AGD\_ADM.1)**

**AGD\_ADM.1.1d** The developer shall provide administrator guidance addressed to system administrative personnel.

**AGD\_ADM.1.1c** The administrator guidance shall describe the administrative functions and interfaces available to the administrator of the TOE.

**AGD\_ADM.1.2c** The administrator guidance shall describe how to administer the TOE in a secure manner.

**AGD\_ADM.1.3c** The administrator guidance shall contain warnings about functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment.

**AGD\_ADM.1.4c** The administrator guidance shall describe all assumptions regarding user behaviour that are relevant to secure operation of the TOE.

**AGD\_ADM.1.5c** The administrator guidance shall describe all security parameters under the control of the administrator, indicating secure values as appropriate.

**AGD\_ADM.1.6c** The administrator guidance shall describe each type of security-relevant event relative to the administrative functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.

**AGD\_ADM.1.7c** The administrator guidance shall be consistent with all other documentation supplied for evaluation.

**AGD\_ADM.1.8c** The administrator guidance shall describe all security requirements for the IT environment that are relevant to the administrator.

**AGD\_ADM.1.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

#### **5.2.4.2 User guidance (AGD\_USR.1)**

**AGD\_USR.1.1d** The developer shall provide user guidance.

**AGD\_USR.1.1c** The user guidance shall describe the functions and interfaces available to the non-administrative users of the TOE.

- AGD\_USR.1.2c** The user guidance shall describe the use of user-accessible security functions provided by the TOE.
- AGD\_USR.1.3c** The user guidance shall contain warnings about user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment.
- AGD\_USR.1.4c** The user guidance shall clearly present all user responsibilities necessary for secure operation of the TOE, including those related to assumptions regarding user behaviour found in the statement of TOE security environment.
- AGD\_USR.1.5c** The user guidance shall be consistent with all other documentation supplied for evaluation.
- AGD\_USR.1.6c** The user guidance shall describe all security requirements for the IT environment that are relevant to the user.
- AGD\_USR.1.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

## 5.2.5 Life cycle support (ALC)

### 5.2.5.1 Identification of security measures (ALC\_DVS.1)

- ALC\_DVS.1.1d** The developer shall produce development security documentation.
- ALC\_DVS.1.1c** The development security documentation shall describe all the physical, procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development environment.
- ALC\_DVS.1.2c** The development security documentation shall provide evidence that these security measures are followed during the development and maintenance of the TOE.
- ALC\_DVS.1.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
- ALC\_DVS.1.2e** The evaluator shall confirm that the security measures are being applied.

### 5.2.5.2 Flaw reporting procedures (ALC\_FLR.2)

- ALC\_FLR.2.1d** The developer shall provide flaw remediation procedures addressed to TOE developers.
- ALC\_FLR.2.2d** The developer shall establish a procedure for accepting and acting upon all reports of security flaws and requests for corrections to those flaws.
- ALC\_FLR.2.3d** The developer shall provide flaw remediation guidance addressed to TOE users.
- ALC\_FLR.2.1c** The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the procedures used to track all reported security flaws in each release of the TOE.
- ALC\_FLR.2.2c** The flaw remediation procedures shall require that a description of the nature and effect of each security flaw be provided, as well as the status of finding a correction to that flaw.
- ALC\_FLR.2.3c** The flaw remediation procedures shall require that corrective actions be identified for each of the security flaws.
- ALC\_FLR.2.4c** The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the methods used to provide flaw information, corrections and guidance on corrective actions to TOE users.
- ALC\_FLR.2.5c** The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe a means by which the developer receives from TOE users reports and enquiries of suspected security flaws in the TOE.
- ALC\_FLR.2.6c** The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall ensure that any reported flaws are corrected and the correction issued to TOE users.
- ALC\_FLR.2.7c** The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall provide safeguards that any corrections to these security flaws do not introduce any new flaws.
- ALC\_FLR.2.8c** The flaw remediation guidance shall describe a means by which TOE users report to the developer any suspected security flaws in the TOE.
- ALC\_FLR.2.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

### 5.2.5.3 Developer defined life-cycle model (ALC\_LCD.1)

- ALC\_LCD.1.1d** The developer shall establish a life-cycle model to be used in the development and maintenance of the TOE.
- ALC\_LCD.1.2d** The developer shall provide life-cycle definition documentation.

- ALC\_LCD.1.1c** The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to develop and maintain the TOE.
- ALC\_LCD.1.2c** The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the TOE.
- ALC\_LCD.1.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

#### **5.2.5.4 Well-defined development tools (ALC\_TAT.1)**

- ALC\_TAT.1.1d** The developer shall identify the development tools being used for the TOE.
- ALC\_TAT.1.2d** The developer shall document the selected implementation-dependent options of the development tools.
- ALC\_TAT.1.1c** All development tools used for implementation shall be well-defined.
- ALC\_TAT.1.2c** The documentation of the development tools shall unambiguously define the meaning of all statements used in the implementation.
- ALC\_TAT.1.3c** The documentation of the development tools shall unambiguously define the meaning of all implementation-dependent options.
- ALC\_TAT.1.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

### **5.2.6 Tests (ATE)**

#### **5.2.6.1 Analysis of coverage (ATE\_COV.2)**

- ATE\_COV.2.1d** The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage.
- ATE\_COV.2.1c** The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate the correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation and the TSF as described in the functional specification.
- ATE\_COV.2.2c** The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate that the correspondence between the TSF as described in the functional specification and the tests identified in the test documentation is complete.
- ATE\_COV.2.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

#### **5.2.6.2 Testing: high-level design (ATE\_DPT.1)**

- ATE\_DPT.1.1d** The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing.
- ATE\_DPT.1.1c** The depth analysis shall demonstrate that the tests identified in the test documentation are sufficient to demonstrate that the TSF operates in accordance with its high-level design.
- ATE\_DPT.1.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

#### **5.2.6.3 Functional testing (ATE\_FUN.1)**

- ATE\_FUN.1.1d** The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
- ATE\_FUN.1.2d** The developer shall provide test documentation.
- ATE\_FUN.1.1c** The test documentation shall consist of test plans, test procedure descriptions, expected test results and actual test results.
- ATE\_FUN.1.2c** The test plans shall identify the security functions to be tested and describe the goal of the tests to be performed.
- ATE\_FUN.1.3c** The test procedure descriptions shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the scenarios for testing each security function. These scenarios shall include any ordering dependencies on the results of other tests.
- ATE\_FUN.1.4c** The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a successful execution of the tests.
- ATE\_FUN.1.5c** The test results from the developer execution of the tests shall demonstrate that each tested security function behaved as specified.
- ATE\_FUN.1.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

#### 5.2.6.4 Independent testing - sample (ATE\_IND.2)

- ATE\_IND.2.1d** The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
- ATE\_IND.2.1c** The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
- ATE\_IND.2.2c** The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to those that were used in the developer's functional testing of the TSF.
- ATE\_IND.2.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
- ATE\_IND.2.2e** The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF as appropriate to confirm that the TOE operates as specified.
- ATE\_IND.2.3e** The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test documentation to verify the developer test results.

#### 5.2.7 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)

##### 5.2.7.1 Validation of analysis (AVA\_MSU.2)

- AVA\_MSU.2.1d** The developer shall provide guidance documentation.
- AVA\_MSU.2.2d** The developer shall document an analysis of the guidance documentation.
- AVA\_MSU.2.1c** The guidance documentation shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences and implications for maintaining secure operation.
- AVA\_MSU.2.2c** The guidance documentation shall be complete, clear, consistent and reasonable.
- AVA\_MSU.2.3c** The guidance documentation shall list all assumptions about the intended environment.
- AVA\_MSU.2.4c** The guidance documentation shall list all requirements for external security measures (including external procedural, physical and personnel controls).
- AVA\_MSU.2.5c** The analysis documentation shall demonstrate that the guidance documentation is complete.
- AVA\_MSU.2.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
- AVA\_MSU.2.2e** The evaluator shall repeat all configuration and installation procedures, and other procedures selectively, to confirm that the TOE can be configured and used securely using only the supplied guidance documentation.
- AVA\_MSU.2.3e** The evaluator shall determine that the use of the guidance documentation allows all insecure states to be detected.
- AVA\_MSU.2.4e** The evaluator shall confirm that the analysis documentation shows that guidance is provided for secure operation in all modes of operation of the TOE.

##### 5.2.7.2 Strength of TOE security function evaluation (AVA\_SOF.1)

- AVA\_SOF.1.1d** The developer shall perform a strength of TOE security function analysis for each mechanism identified in the ST as having a strength of TOE security function claim.
- AVA\_SOF.1.1c** For each mechanism with a strength of TOE security function claim the strength of TOE security function analysis shall show that it meets or exceeds the minimum strength level defined in the PP/ST.
- AVA\_SOF.1.2c** For each mechanism with a specific strength of TOE security function claim the strength of TOE security function analysis shall show that it meets or exceeds the specific strength of function metric defined in the PP/ST.
- AVA\_SOF.1.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
- AVA\_SOF.1.2e** The evaluator shall confirm that the strength claims are correct.

##### 5.2.7.3 Independent vulnerability analysis (AVA\_VLA.2)

- AVA\_VLA.2.1d** The developer shall perform a vulnerability analysis.
- AVA\_VLA.2.2d** The developer shall provide vulnerability analysis documentation.
- AVA\_VLA.2.1c** The vulnerability analysis documentation shall describe the analysis of the TOE deliverables performed to search for ways in which a user can violate the TSP.

- AVA\_VLA.2.2c** The vulnerability analysis documentation shall describe the disposition of identified vulnerabilities.
- AVA\_VLA.2.3c** The vulnerability analysis documentation shall show, for all identified vulnerabilities, that the vulnerability cannot be exploited in the intended environment for the TOE.
- AVA\_VLA.2.4c** The vulnerability analysis documentation shall justify that the TOE, with the identified vulnerabilities, is resistant to obvious penetration attacks.
- AVA\_VLA.2.1e** The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
- AVA\_VLA.2.2e** The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, building on the developer vulnerability analysis, to ensure the identified vulnerabilities have been addressed.
- AVA\_VLA.2.3e** The evaluator shall perform an independent vulnerability analysis.
- AVA\_VLA.2.4e** The evaluator shall perform independent penetration testing, based on the independent vulnerability analysis, to determine the exploitability of additional identified vulnerabilities in the intended environment.
- AVA\_VLA.2.5e** The evaluator shall determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low attack potential.

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## 6. TOE Summary Specification

This chapter describes the security functions and associated assurance measures.

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### 6.1 TOE Security Functions

#### 6.1.1 User data protection

The TOE is designed to instantiate partitions for the purpose of supporting multiple simultaneous operating systems. As such, it implements a policy where by partitions can access only those resources explicitly assigned to it.

In terms of access control, CPU, memory, and all virtual (e.g., virtual SCSI and virtual LAN) and physical (e.g., Ethernet) I/O device adapters can be assigned to a given partition and a partition can access those resources only when they are assigned to it. This is accomplished using hardware features supporting the mapping of these resources to established partitions so that even when using hardware instructions directly, a partition cannot directly perceive that other resources may exist (except via the capabilities used to share resources among partition groups).

During operation of the TOE, CPU and memory resources can be assigned to only a single partition at any given point in time and cannot be simultaneously shared among partitions. However, some I/O device adapters can be assigned to partitions such that communication channels are explicitly configured among partitions. For example, a virtual LAN could be explicitly assigned to a specific set of partitions allowing those partitions to communicate using that adapter.

If a partition has access to an adapter, that partition has access to all the devices on that adapter. Note that while other IBM products can provide device access control at the level of a device, the TOE only controls access to device adapters. The TOE can be configured with any of the following adapters: USB, serial, SAS (serial attached SCSI), Ethernet, SPCN, PCI-X, PCI-Express, DASD. However, TOE guidance explicitly prohibits installing InfiniBand adapters in the evaluated configuration.

Normally, CPU, memory, and I/O adapters are permanently assigned to a partition at configuration time. Alternately, partitions can be placed in groups (one per partition) and partitions within those groups can release CPU and memory resources and alternately acquire available CPU and memory resources, though they can be accessed by only a single partition at any given time. Also, a given CPU can be configured to be shared among partitions and subsequently partitions can utilize that CPU, one at a time, based on available time slots.

In terms of communication, while the TOE is generally intended to isolate partitions by limiting access to available resources, partitions can be assigned to virtual or physical I/O device adapters and accessible devices might be capable of facilitating communication among the explicitly assigned set of partitions. As such, I/O device adapters can be used to facilitate controlled sharing among partitions and care should be taken when configuring access to I/O device adapters to ensure that unintended communication is not enabled.

The User data protection function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

- FDP\_ACC.2: The TOE controls all operations that a partition may perform on CPU, memory, and I/O device adapters by allowing partitions to access (in any manner) only the resources explicitly assigned to it.
- FDP\_ACF.1: As indicated above, partitions can access only those resources that have been assigned to it.
- FDP\_IFC.2: The TOE offers communication among partitions only via explicitly configured I/O device adapters, so all means of inter-partition communication within the scope of the TOE are controlled.
- FDP\_IFF.1: CPU and memory resources are assigned to only one partition at a time. CPUs and memory can be dynamically re-allocated and the TOE clears their state when re-allocating the resources. I/O device adapters can be assigned to partitions in a limited and controlled manner allowing some control over potential inter-partition communication.

- FDP\_RIP.1: When a partition initially starts and when it is assigned a new CPU, the corresponding CPU context is initialized to a known state appropriate to the partition (either a new starting state when initially assigned or restoration of the previous partition state when reassigned). In the case of memory, the volatile nature of the memory ensures it is clear when the TOE starts operation. When memory is acquired by a partition after start-up, it is cleared of any residual data before it can be accessed. *Note that I/O device adapters and associated I/O devices cannot be addressed with this claim since essentially any I/O device could be used and the TOE does not have the ability to clear the contents of all applicable I/O devices. Hence, it is left to the partitions themselves to address any associated issues related to reuse of information in devices when the TOE is reconfigured such that a device's adapter may be reassigned to a different partition.*

### 6.1.2 Identification and authentication

The TOE is aware of one type of active entity (users): partitions which it instantiates. *Note that the HMC is assumed to be disconnected while the TOE is operational and there is also a directly connected operator panel, it allows only basic functional operations.*

When partitions are defined they are assigned unique numbers in TOE-internal data structures which are subsequently used to identify the partition and to associate resources with the partition. Once a partition is created, its number will not change except when it is deleted and recreated. Given that each partition is uniquely identified by the TOE using TOE-internal data structures, the TOE effectively ensures that each partition is authentic on a continuous basis.

The Identification and authentication function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

- FIA\_ATD.1: Each partition is identified by a unique partition number by the TOE and there is only one HMC identified by virtue of its dedicated physical connection to the TOE.
- FIA\_UAU.2: As indicated above, each partition is continuously authenticated.
- FIA\_UID.2: As indicated above, each partition is always identified once created.
- FIA\_USB.1: Unique identifying partition numbers are assigned when partitions are created and cannot change except by deleting and recreating a partition.

### 6.1.3 Security management

All functions to configure the TOE are available only through the dedicated physical HMC interface. However, the HMC is expected to be disconnected while the TOE is operational and as a result the HMC is outside the scope of evaluation. Regardless, the HMC allows a user of the HMC to create partitions and to assign CPU, memory, and I/O device adapters to those partitions.

The HMC presents its user with a list of adapters that may be assigned to partitions. The TOE enumerates the available adapters and provides this information to the HMC. The adapter information is obtained from vital product data (VPD) built into each adapter (e.g. model and serial numbers, adapter type). The TOE also provides rack, bus, and slot identification for each adapter. Thus, information is available correlate each physical adapter, its guidance, and location with the corresponding representation presented by the HMC.

Each given resource can be assigned only to a single partition (or partition group in the case of CPU and memory resources). The resulting configuration data is pushed to the TOE prior to it being placed in an operational, evaluated configuration.

When operational, the TOE restricts the security management functions by offering no interfaces to manipulate them to its subjects (i.e., partitions). The available interfaces (i.e., PowerPC Hypervisor) offer no ability to perform any security management related function and as summarized below, the architecture of the TOE prevents bypass and tampering of its mechanisms to ensure that inappropriate users cannot perform any security management functions.

The Security management function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

- FMT\_MSA.1: The only interfaces available to manipulate the assignment of resources to partitions are offered through the dedicated HMC connection.
- FMT\_MSA.3: Partitions cannot access resources until they are defined and explicitly assigned resources via the HMC. The only interfaces available to create partitions and manipulate the assignment of resources to partitions are offered through the dedicated HMC connection.

#### 6.1.4 Protection of the TSF

The TOE includes FSP hardware and firmware elements. The FSP firmware elements of the TOE depend on the processor hardware (i.e., IBM Power Systems) to provide a separate domain for its execution as well as features that enable the instantiation of separate domains for its partition subjects.

The processor hardware provides a privileged mode of execution specifically for the Hypervisor firmware. Only the Hypervisor firmware executes in that mode and it is only from this privileged execution mode that full, unconstrained access to the available resources (CPUs, memory, and I/O device adapters) is available. Even though the Hypervisor firmware shares the available CPUs with its instantiated partitions, the contexts of the CPUs are saved and restored appropriately during every context switch to ensure uninterrupted operation of the Hypervisor and the partitions.

The Hypervisor firmware instantiates partitions that execute in other execution modes offered by the Power Systems. Additionally, those partitions can access only those resources that have been specifically allocated for use by the associated partitions. While a partition can freely access the resources it has been assigned, there are no interfaces that might allow access to (or even the perception of) other unassigned or otherwise assigned resources, with the exception of the limited sharing facilitated within partition groups.

The TOE ensures that its security mechanisms cannot be bypassed by encapsulating partitions (and partition groups) with their assigned resources and offering only limited interfaces that are designed to ensure that partitions cannot interfere with other partitions or the TOE's own operation. Note that partitions within partition groups can potentially interfere with other partitions within the group, but not the TOE's operation or other partitions. However, it is assumed that the TOE will be used appropriately to mitigate any related problems. For example, partition groups should be used for well-behaved applications designed to cooperate and share their resources appropriately. In other cases, partition groups should be avoided.

When the TOE detects a memory or I/O device failure, the TOE will shut itself down. Given that the TOE is configured and stored in firmware, it will be restored to its previous state when it is restarted. While the contents of a given partition could potentially be corrupted, the TOE itself cannot be permanently corrupted by transient failures (such as memory errors) since it will be restored from firmware.

The Protection of the TSF function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

- FPT\_FLS.1: When memory or I/O device errors occurs and is detected by the TOE, the TOE shuts down and when restarted would revert to its previously secure configuration as defined in firmware.
- FPT\_RVM.1: The TOE ensures it cannot be bypassed by encapsulating (using hardware-based mechanisms) partitions with their assigned resources and offering only services that are appropriately mediated.
- FPT\_SEP.1: The TOE executes in its own hardware-provided execution domain, and instantiates partitions in their own separate domains using the support of hardware mechanisms.



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## 6.2 TOE Security Assurance Measures

### 6.2.1 Configuration management

The configuration management measures applied by IBM ensure that configuration items are uniquely identified, and that documented procedures are used to control and track changes that are made to the TOE. IBM ensures changes to the implementation representation are controlled with the support of automated tools and that TOE associated configuration item modifications are properly controlled. IBM performs configuration management on the TOE implementation representation, design documentation, tests and test documentation, user and administrator guidance, delivery and operation documentation, life-cycle documentation, vulnerability analysis documentation, configuration management documentation, and security flaws.

These activities are documented in:

- IBM LPAR Configuration Management Plan

The Configuration management assurance measure satisfies the following EAL 4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 assurance requirements:

- ACM\_AUT.1
- ACM\_CAP.4
- ACM\_SCP.2

### 6.2.2 Delivery and operation

IBM provides delivery documentation and procedures to identify the TOE, allow detection of unauthorized modifications of the TOE and installation and generation instructions at start-up. IBM's delivery procedures describe all applicable procedures to be used to detect modification to the TOE. IBM also provides documentation that describes the steps necessary to install Logical Partition Architecture for Power Systems in accordance with the evaluated configuration.

These activities are documented in:

- IBM LPAR Installation and Delivery Guide

The Delivery and operation assurance measure satisfies the following EAL 4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 assurance requirements:

- ADO\_DEL.2
- ADO\_IGS.1

### 6.2.3 Development

IBM has numerous documents describing all facets of the design of the TOE. In particular, they have a functional specification that describes the accessible TOE interfaces; a high-level design that decomposes the TOE architecture into subsystems and describes each subsystem and their interfaces; a low-level design that further decomposes the TOE architecture into modules and describes each module and their interfaces; and, correspondence documentation that explains how each of the design abstractions correspond from the TOE summary specification in the Security Target to the actual implementation of the TOE. Furthermore, IBM has a security model that describes each of the security policies implemented by Logical Partition Architecture for Power Systems. Of course, the implementation of the TOE itself is also available as necessary.

These activities are documented in:

- IBM LPAR Functional Specification
- IBM LPAR High-level Design
- IBM LPAR Low-level Design

- IBM LPAR source code
- IBM LPAR Security Policy Model

The Development assurance measure satisfies the following EAL 4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 assurance requirements:

- ADV\_FSP.2
- ADV\_HLD.2
- ADV\_IMP.1
- ADV\_LLD.1
- ADV\_RCR.1
- ADV\_SPM.1

#### 6.2.4 Guidance documents

IBM provides administrator and user guidance on how to utilize the TOE security functions and warnings to administrators and users about actions that can compromise the security of the TOE.

These activities are documented in:

- IBM LPAR Configuration Guide

The Guidance documents assurance measure satisfies the following EAL 4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 assurance requirements:

- AGD\_ADM.1
- AGD\_USR.1

#### 6.2.5 Life cycle support

IBM ensures the adequacy of the procedures used during the development and maintenance of the TOE through the use of a comprehensive life-cycle management plan. IBM applies security controls on the development environment that are adequate to provide the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation that is necessary to ensure the secure development of the TOE. IBM has procedures that define the process for accepting and acting upon user reports of security flaws. These procedures describe the acceptance criteria for security flaws, how all security flaws and the status of fixes for each security flaw are tracked, and how corrections and corrective measures are made available as applicable. IBM has a documented model of the TOE life cycle that ensures that the TOE is developed and maintained in a well-defined manner. IBM uses well-defined development tools in order to ensure consistent and predictable results while developing the TOE.

These activities are documented in:

- IBM LPAR Life-cycle Document

The Life cycle support assurance measure satisfies the following EAL 4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 assurance requirements:

- ALC\_DVS.1
- ALC\_FLR.2
- ALC\_LCD.1
- ALC\_TAT.1

### 6.2.6 Tests

IBM has a test plan that describes how each of the necessary security functions is tested, along with the expected test results. IBM has documented each test as well as an analysis of test coverage and depth demonstrating that the security aspects of the design evident from the functional specification and high-level design are appropriately tested. Actual test results are created on a regular basis to demonstrate that the tests have been applied and that the TOE operates as designed.

These activities are documented in:

- IBM LPAR Test Plan
- IBM LPAR Test procedures
- IBM LPAR Test Results

The Tests assurance measure satisfies the following EAL 4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 assurance requirements:

- ATE\_COV.2
- ATE\_DPT.1
- ATE\_FUN.1
- ATE\_IND.2

### 6.2.7 Vulnerability assessment

The TOE administrator and user guidance documents describe the operation of Logical Partition Architecture for Power Systems and how to maintain a secure state. These guides also describe all necessary operating assumptions and security requirements outside the scope of control of the TOE. They have been developed to serve as complete, clear, consistent, and reasonable administrator and user references. Furthermore, IBM has conducted a misuse analysis demonstrating that the provided guidance is complete.

IBM has conducted a strength of function analysis wherein all permutational or probabilistic security mechanisms have been identified and analyzed resulting in a demonstration that all of the relevant mechanisms fulfill the minimum strength of function claim, SOF-medium.

IBM performs regular vulnerability analyses of the entire TOE (including documentation) to identify weaknesses that can be exploited in the TOE.

These activities are documented in:

- IBM LPAR Vulnerability Analysis

The Vulnerability assessment assurance measure satisfies the following EAL 4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 assurance requirements:

- AVA\_MSU.2
- AVA\_SOF.1
- AVA\_VLA.

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## **7. Protection Profile Claims**

There are no Protection Profile claims in this Security Target.

## 8. Rationale

This section provides the rationale for completeness and consistency of the Security Target. The rationale addresses the following areas:

- Security Objectives;
- Security Functional Requirements;
- Security Assurance Requirements;
- Strength of Functions;
- Requirement Dependencies;
- TOE Summary Specification; and,
- PP Claims.

### 8.1 Security Objectives Rationale

This section shows that all secure usage assumptions and threats are completely covered by security objectives. In addition, each objective counters or addresses at least one assumption or threat.

#### 8.1.1 Security Objectives Rationale for the TOE and Environment

This section provides evidence demonstrating the coverage of organizational policies and usage assumptions by the security objectives.

	T.ACCESS	T.COMMUNICATE	T.INTERFERE	A.CONNECT	A.LOCATE	A.MANAGE
<b>O.AUTHORIZATION</b>	X					
<b>O.COMMUNICATION</b>		X				
<b>O.NONINTERFERE</b>			X			
<b>OE.ADMIN</b>						X
<b>OE.INSTALL</b>				X		
<b>OE.PHYSICAL</b>					X	

**Table 3 Environment to Objective Correspondence**

##### 8.1.1.1 T.ACCESS

*An entity operating within a partition may be able to gain access to resources that belong to another partition as configured by an authorized user.*

This Threat is satisfied by ensuring that:

- **O.AUTHORIZATION**: By ensuring that resources can be accessed only by the partition assigned by an authorized user, the TOE mitigates the threat of partitions gaining access to resources of other partitions.

### 8.1.1.2 T.COMMUNICATE

*An entity operating within a partition may be able to establish an unauthorized communication channel with another partition.*

This Threat is satisfied by ensuring that:

- O.COMMUNICATION: By ensuring that partitions cannot communicate with one another (unless an I/O device adapter communication channel has been configured) using any direct means provided by the TOE, the TOE limits the potential for inter-partition communication.

### 8.1.1.3 T.INTERFERE

*An entity operating within a partition may be able to disrupt the operation of another partition.*

This Threat is satisfied by ensuring that:

- O.NONINTERFERE: By ensuring that partitions are limited to access their assigned resources, the TOE mitigates the threat of interference among partitions. Note that while the limited sharing of resources that can occur among partitions in partition groups could enable some interference within a partition group, but this can be mitigated by careful configuration choices.

### 8.1.1.4 A.CONNECT

*The TOE is assumed to be appropriately installed, including connections to device resources as well as being disconnected from the management console when operational.*

This Assumption is satisfied by ensuring that:

- OE.INSTALL: This objective is intended to directly address the need to ensure that the TOE is appropriately installed and connected to other device adapters.

### 8.1.1.5 A.LOCATE

*The TOE and its connections are assumed to be physically protected from unauthorized access or modification.*

This Assumption is satisfied by ensuring that:

- OE.PHYSICAL: This objective is intended to directly address the need of physical protection for the TOE and its physical connections.

### 8.1.1.6 A.MANAGE

*The TOE is assumed to be managed by users who are capable and trustworthy and will follow the applicable guidance correctly.*

This Assumption is satisfied by ensuring that:

- OE.ADMIN: This objective is intended to directly address the need to assign capable and trustworthy administrators who will adhere to the applicable guidance.

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## 8.2 Security Requirements Rationale

This section provides evidence supporting the internal consistency and completeness of the components (requirements) in the Security Target. Note that **Table 4** indicates the requirements that effectively satisfy the individual objectives. .

### 8.2.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale

All Security Functional Requirements (SFR) identified in this Security Target are fully addressed in this section and each SFR is mapped to the objective for which it is intended to satisfy.

	O.AUTHORIZATION	O.COMMUNICATION	O.NONINTERFERE
FDP_ACC.2	X		X
FDP_ACF.1	X		X
FDP_IFC.2		X	X
FDP_IFF.1		X	X
FDP_RIP.1	X		
FIA_ATD.1	X		
FIA_UAU.2	X		
FIA_UID.2	X		
FIA_USB.1	X		
FMT_MSA.1	X		X
FMT_MSA.3	X		X
FPT_FLS.1	X		
FPT_RVM.1	X	X	X
FPT_SEP.1	X	X	X

**Table 4 Objective to Requirement Correspondence**

### 8.2.1.1 O.AUTHORIZATION

*The TOE must ensure that resources can be assigned to partitions only by an authorized user and that those resources will not be accessible to other partitions.*

This TOE Security Objective is satisfied by ensuring that:

- FDP\_ACC.2: In order to ensure that resources are restricted to partitions appropriately, an access control policy is defined which covers all resources as well as all operations.
- FDP\_ACF.1: In order to ensure that resources are restricted to partitions appropriately, the access control rules ensure that partitions gain access to resources only when they are appropriately configured for that purpose.
- FDP\_RIP.1: In order to ensure that resources (including information they contain) are restricted to partitions appropriately, the TOE must ensure that memory and processor resources are cleared when allocated to partitions.
- FIA\_ATD.1: In order to limit resource access to specific partitions, the TOE must define identities associated with partitions.
- FIA\_UAU.2: In order to limit resource access to specific partitions, the TOE must ensure the authenticity of the applicable partitions.
- FIA\_UID.2: In order to limit resource access to specific partitions, the TOE must identify the applicable partitions.
- FIA\_USB.1: In order to limit resource access to specific partitions, the TOE must ensure that partitions are continuously identified and that identification cannot change.
- FMT\_MSA.1: In order to ensure that resources are managed properly, the TOE must ensure that assignment of resources to partitions cannot be accomplished by unauthorized users.
- FMT\_MSA.3: In order to ensure that resources are managed properly, the TOE must ensure that they are not accessible by partitions until they are explicitly assigned.

- FPT\_FLS.1: In order to protect against inappropriate resource access, the TOE must protect itself against memory and disk failures.
- FPT\_RVM.1: In order to protect against inappropriate resource access, the TOE must ensure that its security functions cannot be bypassed.
- FPT\_SEP.1: In order to protect against inappropriate resource access, the TOE must ensure that it can protect itself from tampering and distinguish the partitions and resources it is controlling.

### 8.2.1.2 O.COMMUNICATION

*The TOE must not provide an unauthorized direct means of communication between partitions.*

This TOE Security Objective is satisfied by ensuring that:

- FDP\_IFC.2: In order to limit potential means of communication between partitions, an information flow policy is defined which covers any means of communication between partitions.
- FDP\_IFF.1: In order to limit potential means of communication between partitions, the information flow policy rules ensure that inter-process communication is not allowed, unless explicitly configured, using any mean provided by the TOE.
- FPT\_RVM.1: In order to protect against inappropriate communication channels, the TOE must ensure that its security functions cannot be bypassed.
- FPT\_SEP.1: In order to protect against inappropriate communication channels, the TOE must ensure that it can protect itself from tampering and distinguish the partitions it is controlling.

### 8.2.1.3 O.NONINTERFERE

*The TOE must ensure that each partition cannot access resources or communicate with other unauthorized partitions.*

This TOE Security Objective is satisfied by ensuring that:

- FDP\_ACC.2: In order to ensure that resources cannot be used for interference among partitions, an access control policy is defined which covers all resources as well as all operations.
- FDP\_ACF.1: In order to ensure that resources cannot be used for interference among partitions, the access control rules ensure that partitions gain access to resources only when they are appropriately configured for that purpose.
- FDP\_IFC.2: In order to ensure that communication mechanisms cannot be used for interference among partitions, an information flow policy is defined which covers any means of communication between partitions.
- FDP\_IFF.1: In order to ensure that communication mechanisms cannot be used for interference among partitions, the information flow policy rules ensure that inter-process communication is allowed only using devices accessible via device adapters which may be subject to object reuse or other means of communication.
- FMT\_MSA.1: In order to protect against configuration-related interference attempts, the TOE must ensure that resource assignments cannot be established by unauthorized users.
- FMT\_MSA.3: In order to protect against configuration-related interference attempts, the TOE must ensure that resource access is not allowed until it is explicitly configured.
- FPT\_RVM.1: In order to protect against interference among partitions, the TOE must ensure that its security functions cannot be bypassed.
- FPT\_SEP.1: In order to protect against interference among partitions, the TOE must ensure that it can protect itself from tampering and distinguish the partitions it is controlling.

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## 8.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

The TOE is intended for an environment requiring a moderate to high level of assurance in the security functionality of conventional commodity TOEs, as presented in the statement of security environment (Section 3). The target assurance level of EAL4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 is appropriate for such an environment.



## 8.4 Strength of Functions Rationale

In accordance with EAL4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 a Strength of Functions claim of SOF-medium has been made. EAL4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 represents a moderate to high level of security assurance and hence SOF-medium should represent an appropriate strength of function. Note that there are no permutational or probabilistic mechanisms in the TOE. Hence, there are no applicable SFRs.

## 8.5 Requirement Dependency Rationale

The following table identifies the dependencies of the requirements in this ST, including the requirements explicitly defined in this ST. As indicated in the table, all of the dependencies are satisfied with the exceptions of FMT\_SMR.1 and FMT\_SMF.1.

The CC indicates that the depending requirements need a security management role (FMT\_SMR.1) and to provide the associated security management functions (FMT\_SMF.1). However, the applicable functions are available only when the TOE is offline. While online, the applicable security attributes cannot be changed and the applicable default information flow settings are restrictive (FMT\_MSA.1 and FMT\_MSA.3). Given that the TOE offers no ability to change the applicable attributes while online, there is no real dependency on FMT\_SMF.1 or FMT\_SMR.1.

ST Requirement	CC Dependencies	ST Dependencies
<b>FDP_ACC.2</b>	FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1
<b>FDP_ACF.1</b>	FDP_ACC.1 and FMT_MSA.3	FDP_ACC.2 and FMT_MSA.3
<b>FDP_IFC.2</b>	FDP_IFF.1	FDP_IFF.1
<b>FDP_IFF.1</b>	FDP_IFC.1 and FMT_MSA.3	FDP_IFC.2 and FMT_MSA.3
<b>FDP_RIP.1</b>	none	none
<b>FIA_ATD.1</b>	none	none
<b>FIA_UAU.2</b>	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.2
<b>FIA_UID.2</b>	none	none
<b>FIA_USB.1</b>	FIA_ATD.1	FIA_ATD.1
<b>FMT_MSA.1</b>	FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1 and (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)	[FMT_SMR.1] and [FMT_SMF.1] and FDP_ACC.2 and FDP_IFC.2
<b>FMT_MSA.3</b>	FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_SMR.1	FMT_MSA.1 and [FMT_SMR.1]
<b>FPT_FLS.1</b>	none	none
<b>FPT_RVM.1</b>	none	none
<b>FPT_SEP.1</b>	none	none
<b>ACM_AUT.1</b>	ACM_CAP.3	ACM_CAP.4
<b>ACM_CAP.4</b>	ALC_DVS.1	ALC_DVS.1
<b>ACM_SCP.2</b>	ACM_CAP.3	ACM_CAP.4
<b>ADO_DEL.2</b>	ACM_CAP.3	ACM_CAP.4
<b>ADO_IGS.1</b>	AGD_ADM.1	AGD_ADM.1
<b>ADV_FSP.2</b>	ADV_RCR.1	ADV_RCR.1
<b>ADV_HLD.2</b>	ADV_FSP.1 and ADV_RCR.1	ADV_FSP.2 and ADV_RCR.1
<b>ADV_IMP.1</b>	ADV_LLD.1 and ADV_RCR.1 and ALC_TAT.1	ADV_LLD.1 and ADV_RCR.1 and ALC_TAT.1
<b>ADV_LLD.1</b>	ADV_HLD.2 and ADV_RCR.1	ADV_HLD.2 and ADV_RCR.1
<b>ADV_RCR.1</b>	none	none
<b>ADV_SPM.1</b>	ADV_FSP.1	ADV_FSP.2
<b>AGD_ADM.1</b>	ADV_FSP.1	ADV_FSP.2
<b>AGD_USR.1</b>	ADV_FSP.1	ADV_FSP.2
<b>ALC_DVS.1</b>	none	none
<b>ALC_FLR.2</b>	none	none
<b>ALC_LCD.1</b>	none	none
<b>ALC_TAT.1</b>	ADV_IMP.1	ADV_IMP.1

ST Requirement	CC Dependencies	ST Dependencies
ATE_COV.2	ADV_FSP.1 and ATE_FUN.1	ADV_FSP.2 and ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.1	ADV_HLD.1 and ATE_FUN.1	ADV_HLD.2 and ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1	none	none
ATE_IND.2	ADV_FSP.1 and AGD_ADM.1 and AGD_USR.1 and ATE_FUN.1	ADV_FSP.2 and AGD_ADM.1 and AGD_USR.1 and ATE_FUN.1
AVA_MSU.2	ADO_IGS.1 and ADV_FSP.1 and AGD_ADM.1 and AGD_USR.1	ADO_IGS.1 and ADV_FSP.2 and AGD_ADM.1 and AGD_USR.1
AVA_SOF.1	ADV_FSP.1 and ADV_HLD.1	ADV_FSP.2 and ADV_HLD.2
AVA_VLA.2	ADV_FSP.1 and ADV_HLD.2 and ADV_IMP.1 and ADV_LLD.1 and AGD_ADM.1 and AGD_USR.1	ADV_FSP.2 and ADV_HLD.2 and ADV_IMP.1 and ADV_LLD.1 and AGD_ADM.1 and AGD_USR.1

Table 5 Requirement Dependencies

## 8.6 Explicitly Stated Requirements Rationale

This Security Target includes no requirements that are not defined in the CC.

## 8.7 TOE Summary Specification Rationale

Each subsection in Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, describes a security function of the TOE. Each description is followed with rationale that indicates which requirements are satisfied by aspects of the corresponding security function. The set of security functions work together to satisfy all of the security functions and assurance requirements. Furthermore, all of the security functions are necessary in order for the TSF to provide the required security functionality.

This Section in conjunction with Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, provides evidence that the security functions are suitable to meet the TOE security requirements. The collection of security functions work together to provide all of the security requirements. The security functions described in the TOE summary specification are all necessary for the required security functionality in the TSF. **Table 6 Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping** demonstrates the relationship between security requirements and security functions.

	User data protection	Identification and authentication	Security management	Protection of the TSF
FDP_ACC.2	X			
FDP_ACF.1	X			
FDP_IFC.2	X			
FDP_IFF.1	X			
FDP_RIP.1	X			
FIA_ATD.1		X		
FIA_UAU.2		X		
FIA_UID.2		X		
FIA_USB.1		X		
FMT_MSA.1			X	
FMT_MSA.3			X	

	User data protection	Identification and authentication	Security management	Protection of the TSF
<b>FPT_FLS.1</b>				X
<b>FPT_RVM.1</b>				X
<b>FPT_SEP.1</b>				X

**Table 6 Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping**

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## 8.8 PP Claims Rationale

See Section 7, Protection Profile Claims.