

National Information Assurance Partnership



Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report

Dell 11th Generation PowerEdge Servers running Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document is intended to assist the end-user of this product with determining the suitability of the product in their environment. End-users should review both the Security Target (ST) which is where specific security claims are made, and this Validation Report (VR) which describes how those security claims were evaluated.

This report documents the NIAP validators' assessment of the evaluation of Dell Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) Version 5.3 Server. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This validation report is not an endorsement of the IT product by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the IT product is either expressed or implied.

The evaluation was performed by the atsec Information Security Corporation, and was completed during September 2009. atsec Information Security Corporation is an approved NIAP Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, both written by the CCTL. The evaluation determined the product to be **Part 2 extended, Part 3 conformant**, and to meet the requirements of **EAL4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3**. Additionally, the TOE was shown to satisfy the requirements of the Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Version 1.d, 8 October 1999.

The Protection Profile listed above conforms to Version 2.3 of the Common Criteria, while this product was evaluated against Version 3.1. Because Version 3.1 does not have the FPT_SEP (Domain Separation) and FPT_RVM (Reference Mediation) families, an Observation Decision (OD0262) was made by the Scheme to recommend mapping these assurance functions to equivalent ones in Version 3.1. The following mappings were made:

- FPT_RVM.1 to ADV_ARC.1
- FPT_SEP.1 to ADV_ARC.1

Red Hat Enterprise Linux is a general purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking Linux based operating system. It provides a platform for a variety of applications in the governmental and commercial environment. Red Hat Enterprise Linux is available on a broad range of computer systems, ranging from departmental servers to multi-processor enterprise servers and small server type computer systems.

The Red Hat Enterprise Linux evaluation covers a potentially distributed, but closed network of Dell (Intel Xeon EM64T based) servers running the evaluated version of Red Hat Enterprise Linux. The hardware platforms selected for the evaluation consist of machines which are available when the evaluation has completed and to remain available for a substantial period of time afterwards.

The validation team agrees that the CCTL presented appropriate rationales to support the Results of Evaluation presented in Section 4, and the Conclusions presented in Section 5 of the ETR. The

validation team therefore concludes that the evaluation and the Pass results for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 are complete and correct.

2. IDENTIFICATION

The Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) is a National Security Agency (NSA) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 through EAL 4 in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation granted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.

Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:

- The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated;
- The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product;
- The conformance result of the evaluation;
- The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant;
- The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.

Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers

Item	Identifier
Evaluation Scheme	United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Target of Evaluation	Dell Red Hat Enterprise Linux Version 5.3
Protection Profile	Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Issue 1.d, 8 October 1999.
Security Target	<i>Title: DELL Red Hat Enterprise Linux Version 5.3 Security Target for CAPP Compliance v1.0</i>
Evaluation Technical Report	<i>Evaluation Technical Report for a Target of Evaluation Red Hat Enterprise Linux Version 5.3 ETR Version 2 as of 2009-09-28</i>
Conformance Result	CC V3.1, Part 2 extended, Part 3 conformant, EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3, and CAPP –compliant
Sponsor	Dell
Developer	Dell and Red Hat
Evaluators	atsec information security corporation

Validators	The Aerospace Corporation Noblis, Inc.
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3. SECURITY POLICY

3.1. Discretionary Access Control

Red Hat Enterprise Linux implements Discretionary Access Control (DAC) through the use of standard UNIX permission bits and the POSIX standard Access Control Lists (ACLs). A Discretionary Access Control policy requires mechanisms whereby the access of users (i.e., subjects) to system resources and data (i.e., objects) can be controlled on the basis of user identity, role, and explicit permissions. Mechanisms that implement a DAC policy provide the capability for users to specify the how their personal data objects are to be shared.

Permission bits are associated with objects and specify the permissions (typically, READ, WRITE, EXECUTE) for a specific user, the user's group affiliation, and all others (i.e., "world"). Access Control Lists provide the same functionality relative to granting specific permissions, but are considerably more flexible in that they can identify a number of group affiliations for a single user.

The standard UNIX DAC mechanism is permission bits, as is the case with RHEL. However, RHEL implements ACLs as an extended permission mechanism, available at the discretion of the file owner; ACLs are supported only for file system objects.

3.2. Mandatory Access Control

Red Hat Enterprise Linux implements Mandatory Access Control (MAC) through the use of labels maintained by SELinux for processes and objects maintained by the kernel. The MAC policy implements the rule-set based on the Bell-LaPadula model.

Labeled networking as well as labeled printing is provided with the TOE.

3.3. Role-based Access Control

Red Hat Enterprise Linux implements Role-based Access Control (RBAC) through the use of SELinux labels containing role information. A Role-based Access Control policy requires mechanisms whereby the access of users (i.e., subjects) to system resources and data (i.e., objects) can be controlled on the basis of user role and object role.

3.4. Identification & Authentication

Each user must have a unique identity (i.e., username plus password), and be authenticated prior to obtaining resources and services from the TOE. Note, however, that in a networked environment, user identities are unique to a server, and are neither known globally nor are universally unique. That is, each server maintains its own set of users and their associated passwords and attributes. A user

that has access to more than one server on a network will have a different user identity, and possibly different attributes, on each server for which access is authorized.

Users can change their own passwords. However, an administrator can define the following constraints for the authentication process:

- Maximum duration of a password (i.e., time-to-live);
- Minimum time allowed between password changes;
- Minimum password length;
- Number of days warnings are displayed prior to password expiration;
- Allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful login attempts;
- Disallowed passwords (i.e., the TOE retains a history of recently-used passwords to prevent users from cycling previously-used passwords).

The proper parameters for each of these choices is defined for the evaluated configuration

3.5. Auditing

The TOE audit mechanism allows the generation of audit records for security-related events, and allows the administrator to configure the audit mechanism to collect which events are to be captured and which users are to be audited; it is also possible for the administrator to identify specific users that are not to be audited.

Each audit record contains event-specific information, and identifies whether the request that caused the event was successful or failed, and. An audit record consists of a standard header that includes the following information:

- A unique audit identifier;
- The LoginID of the user who caused the audit record to be generated;
- The Effective User ID of the user at the time the record was generated;
- Date and time the audit record was generated;
- Type of event.

Audit records are stored in ASCII format, and can be searched through the use of the standard UNIX/LINUX *grep* tool.

3.6. Object Reuse

Although the TOE supports several different types of objects, each is managed by the system such that no pre-existing content is provided to users to whom objects are allocated. That is, whenever an object (e.g., buffers, memory extents, disk space) is allocated to a user process, it is managed such that any data that had previously been in the object (i.e., from an earlier process) is unavailable to the new process.

In short, memory pages are initialized to all zeroes when allocated to a process, IPC objects are also initialized to all zeroes, file system objects are created with no content (with the exception of directories and symbolic links).

3.7. Secure Communication

The TOE supports secure communication with other systems via the SSHv2.0, SSLv3, and TLSv1 protocol. Communication via those protocols is protected against unauthorized disclosure and modification via cryptographic mechanisms. The TOE also allows for secure authentication of the communicating parties using the SSLv3/TLSv1 protocols with client and server authentication. This allows establishing a secure communication channel between different machines running the TOE even over an insecure network. The SSLv3/TLSv1 protocols can be used to tunnel otherwise unprotected protocols in a way that allows an application to secure its TCP based communication with other servers (provided the protocol uses a single TCP port).

In MLS mode, the TOE supports labeled network communication using the CIPSO and labeled IPsec protocols. IPsec is included for the purpose of associating MLS level information with network data only, not for confidentiality or integrity.

3.8. TSF Protection

While in operation, the kernel software and data are protected by the hardware memory protection mechanisms. The memory and process management components of the kernel ensure a user process cannot access kernel storage or storage belonging to other processes.

Non-kernel TSF software and data are protected by DAC, and (in MLS mode) MAC, and process isolation mechanisms. In the evaluated configuration, the reserved user ID “root” owns the directories and files that define the TSF configuration. In general, files and directories containing internal TSF data (e.g., configuration files, batch job queues) are also protected from reading by DAC and (in MLS mode) MAC permissions.

The TOE, including the hardware and firmware components, **IS** required to be physically protected from unauthorized access. The system kernel mediates all access to hardware components that are protected from direct access by user programs. A user process may execute unprivileged instructions and read or write to memory and processor REGISTER within the bounds defined by the kernel for the user process without those types of access being mediated by the kernel. All other types of access to hardware resources by user processes can only be performed by requests (in the form of system calls) to the kernel.

The TOE provides a tool that allows an administrative user to check the correct operation of the underlying hardware. This tool performs tests to check the system memory, the memory protection features of the underlying processor and the correct separation between user and supervisor state.

The TOE security features are supported by domain separation and reference mediation, which ensure that the features are always invoked and cannot be bypassed.

4. ASSUMPTIONS

4.1. Usage Assumptions

Although there are several assumptions stated in the Security Target, the primary conditions are that:

- The TOE is located within controlled facilities and is protected from unauthorized physical access;
- TOE hardware and software are protected from unauthorized modification;
- All authorized users possess authorization for at least some of the data managed on the TOE;
- The TOE operates in a relatively benign environment;
- Unencrypted communications paths, and communications paths within the controlled facility are protected from unauthorized physical access.

4.2. Clarification of Scope

The TOE includes the hardware platform (see Section 8) and all the code that enforces the policies identified (see Section 3). TOE also includes secure communications functions; i.e., SSH V2, TLSv1 and SSL V3).

5. ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION

The TOE is a multi-user, multi-tasking operating system which can support multiple users simultaneously. A fundamental protection mechanism is the memory management and virtual memory support provided by the hardware. This provides a domain (i.e., supervisor state) in which only the kernel executes.

The TSF comprises two major components: kernel software and trusted processes.

The kernel software executes in supervisor state, which is supported by the memory management mechanism in the hardware. The memory management mechanism insures that only kernel code can execute in the supervisor state (wherein all memory may be accessed), and also serves to protect the kernel code from external tampering. The kernel implements file and I/O services, which provides access to files and devices. The kernel also implements:

- Named pipes
- Unnamed pipes
- Signals
- Semaphores
- Shared memory
- Message queues
- Internet domain sockets
- Unix domain sockets.

The trusted processes, which provide the remainder of the TSF, are referred to as “non-kernel TSF” services because they run in user state; they execute in the same hardware domain as user applications. These are protected from external tampering through the process management and memory virtualization mechanisms that implement per-process address spaces, which prevent processes from interfering with each other. They are also protected from unauthorized access by the access control mechanisms of the TSF. The primary non-kernel TSF services are:

- Identification and authentication
- Network application layer services
- Configuration and management commands requiring root privileges.

6. DOCUMENTATION

The TOE is delivered with a combination of hardware and software specific documentation as a download from the RedHat Network. Hardware specific documentation varies with the model of the TOE. The following software documentation is uniform across TOE hardware platforms:

- EAL4 Evaluated Configuration Guide for Red Hat Enterprise Linux on DELL hardware August 25, 2009; v0.7
- Command references for the applications and configuration files implementing security functionality are available as man pages on an installed system

Additional guidance documents available from Red Hat have not been assessed by the evaluation.

The above mentioned Evaluated Configuration Guide fully and completely explains how to install, configure and administrate the TOE. Moreover, it provides explanations about the intended environment.

Additional man pages to the ones mentioned above are present on the system for applications, configuration files, APIs and others which do not implement security functionality. These man pages have not been reviewed during the evaluation.

7. IT PRODUCT TESTING

7.1. Sponsor Testing

Test configuration

The test results provided by the sponsor were generated on the following systems:

- DELL PowerEdge R710 (Intel Xeon EM64T)

The sponsor has performed their tests on the above listed hardware platform. The software was installed and configured as defined in the Evaluated Configuration Guide [ECG] with additional software packages identified in the Test Plan [TP]. The Test Plan presents the arguments that those additional packages are within the boundary defined by the Security Target and do not constitute a

violation of the evaluated configuration (see the chapter headed “Target of Evaluation (TOE) compliance” in [TP]).

The test system was installed using RHEL5.3 Server.

Tests were executed in the following configurations:

- NUMA: Hardware with NUMA enabled, executing tests for 32bit and 64bit with both, the CAPP mode and MLS mode
- non-NUMA: Hardware with NUMA disabled, executing tests for 32bit and 64bit with both, the CAPP mode and MLS mode
- Xen-HVM with para-virtualized Linux drivers: TOE installed in a DomU on Xen fully virtualized (HVM guest) but using para-virtualized drivers, executing tests for 32bit and 64bit with both, the CAPP mode and MLS mode

Testing approach

The Test Plan provided by the sponsor lists test cases by groups, which reflects the mix of sources for the test cases. The mapping provided lists the TSF/TSFI the test cases are associated with. The Test Plan is focused on the security functions of the TOE and ignores other aspects typically found in developer test plans. The test cases are mapped to the corresponding Functional Specification and HLD.

The sponsor uses several test suites that are integrated into one test system which includes automatic and manual tests to test the TOE.

The LTP test suite is an adapted version of tests from the Linux Testing Project. The LTP tests have a common framework in which individual test cases adhere to a common structure for setup execution and cleanup of tests. Each test case may contain several tests of the same function, stressing different parts (for example, base functionality, behavior with illegal parameters and reaction to missing privileges). Each test within a test case reports PASS respectively OK or FAIL, and the test case summary in batch mode reports PASS if all the tests within the test case passed, otherwise FAIL.

The ACL tests are structured in a very peculiar way. The test cases are comments, shell scripts and expected output. The driver script for the test cases runs the shell commands and compares the output with the expected output in the test scripts. Each output line that matches is tagged with ok, each line that does not match is tagged with failed. The driver scripts summarize the ok/failed entries and report the number of each of the two flags at the end. The test case reports 101 ok entries when executed successfully. The tests are started in batch mode via the runme shell script.

The OpenSSL tests execute a part of the LTP OpenSSL test suite adapted for the security evaluation.

The audit tests use their own testing framework, where each test is executed twice: once with a positive test goal and once with a negative test goal. The audit tests that do not cover system calls directly but the supporting tools use a similar approach of iterating over the various stages as far as applicable. For each of the areas in the audit test suite, a driver program will perform global setup

and run the individual test cases. Results are collected into the log file showing pass or fail verdicts. Additionally, the audit tests also cover MLS logic. By verifying that certain permutations of allowed and denied access requests are audited, the MLS logic is verified as well.

The manual tests cover functionality that can not easily be tested in an automated way, such as serial terminals.

The test results of the sponsor can be found in [TRES]. All the tests were executed successfully (pass/ok) apart from the test cases that are documented to fail or be skipped in the [TP]. The test systems were configured according to the ST and the instructions in [ECG]. The manual test results included in [TRES] also include PASS/FAIL labeling by the sponsor.

The test results provided by the sponsor were generated on the following above mentioned systems.

Testing results

The test results provided by the sponsor were generated on the hardware platform listed above. As described in the testing approach, the test results of all the automated tests are written to files. In addition a log-file for the LTP tests reports more details on the flow of the tests.

The test results of the few manual tests have been recorded by the sponsor and those results have been presented in separate files.

All test results from all tested platforms show that the expected test results are identical to the actual test results, considering the expected failures stated in the developer's test plan.

Test coverage

The functional specification has identified the following TSFI:

- system calls
- security critical configuration files (TSF databases)
- trusted programs and the corresponding network protocols of SSHv2, TLSv1 and SSLv3
- CIPSO/IPSEC labeled network protocols

A mapping provided by the sponsor shows that the tests cover all individual TSFI identified for the TOE. An extension to this mapping developed by the evaluator as documented in the test case coverage analysis document shows that also significant details of the TSFI have been tested with the sponsor's test suite. This therefore satisfies the requirements for the evaluation, since an exhaustive interface specification testing is not required.

Test depth

In addition to the mapping to the functional specification, the sponsor provided a mapping of test cases to subsystems of the high level design and the internal interfaces described in the high level design. This mapping shows that all subsystems the internal interfaces are covered by test cases.

The depth analysis between the components of the [HLD] and the available test cases is seen as sufficient by the evaluator, because each test case can be matched to a subsystem of the [HLD] and vice versa, as shown in [XREF]. All TSF covered by the subsystems of the high-level design are covered with test cases. The security-relevant internal interfaces can be linked to the test cases. As stated above, the hardware subsystem is always implicitly tested by every software component that runs on it. Therefore, the hardware subsystem was not explicitly mentioned in [XREF].

Not all of the internal interfaces mentioned in the high-level design could be covered by direct test cases. Some internal interfaces can – due to the restrictions of the evaluated configuration – only be invoked during system startup. This includes especially internal interfaces to load and unload kernel modules, to register /deregister device drivers and install / deinstall interrupt handler. Since the evaluated configuration does not allow to dynamically load and unload device drivers as kernel modules those interfaces are only used during system startup and are therefore implicitly tested there.

7.2. Evaluator Testing

TOE test configuration

The evaluator independently installed the test systems according to the documentation in the Evaluated Configuration Guide [ECG] and the test plan.

DELL PowerEdge R710 (Intel Xeon EM64T):

The DELL PowerEdge is located at the evaluator facility in Austin, TX. The hardware configuration is identical to the system used by the sponsor to perform testing (see ATE_FUN.1-8). The exact hardware and software configuration of the test system can be found in [TRES], file systeminfo.run.log.

The evaluator installed RHEL 5.3 Server on this system.

Subset size chosen

The evaluator choose to monitor all automated test cases of the sponsor test suite.

Evaluator tests performed

In addition monitoring all the automated sponsor tests, the evaluator devised tests for a subset of the TOE. The tests are listed in the Evaluator Test Plan [TPE].

The evaluator has chosen these tests for the following reasons:

- The test cases examine some of the security functions of the TOE in more detail than the sponsor supplied test cases. (Object reuse, DAC and MLS override capability enforcement)
- The test cases cover aspects not included in the developer testing (verification of the ACL support in the archival tool assessment of the consistency of the MLS policy with Bell-LaPadula model, assessment of override capabilities)
- As the sponsor-supplied test cases already cover the TOE in a broad sense the evaluator has devised only a small set of test cases.

The evaluator created several test cases for testing a few functional aspects where the sponsor test cases were not considered by the evaluator to be broad enough. During the evaluator coverage analysis of the test cases provided by the sponsor, the evaluator gained confidence in the sponsor testing effort and the depth of test coverage in the sponsor supplied test cases. The analysis has shown a very wide coverage of the TSF, therefore the evaluator devised only a small number of test cases.

Summary of Evaluator test results

The evaluator testing effort consists of two parts. The first one is the monitoring of the sponsor test execution and the second is the execution of the tests created by the evaluator.

The tests were performed at the evaluators' facility in Austin. The system available for testing is listed above.

In each case the system was accessible through SSH and the system's console. The TOE operating system with the required additional RPM as well as the test cases and test tools were installed on the test machine by the evaluator according to the instructions in [ECG], [TP] and [TPE]. During the evaluation, the file system type was used for hard disk partitions on the test system. The configuration script contained in the rpm ensured the evaluation compliant system configuration. After running the automated configuration, no further system configuration was performed and only the tools required for testing have been installed. The test system was therefore configured according to the [ST] and the instructions in the [ECG]. The evaluator watched the sponsor during the execution of the test cases. The log files generated by the test cases were analyzed for completeness and failures. The sponsor provided automated test cases [TC].

All the test results conformed to the expected test results from the test plan.

In addition to running the tests that were provided by the sponsor according to the test plan from the sponsor, the evaluator decided to run some additional test cases on the provided test systems as defined in [TPE]:

- Permission settings of relevant configuration files
- Verification of the use of SHA512 passwords
- Verification the SUID programs do not change the real UID

- Testing of object reuse in regular file system objects
- Check for data import / export with DAC enforcement
- Verification that the permission check during open() is enforced during read() and write()
- Verification of cleaning of environment for SUID/SGID binaries
- Test that the MLS policy complies with Bell-LaPadula
- Test for MLS override attributes
- Test for trusted objects
- Test for ranged objects

All tests passed successfully.

8. EVALUATED CONFIGURATION¹

The evaluated configurations are:

- DELL 11th Generation PowerEdge Servers (abbreviated as 11g PowerEdge Servers)
- TOE in DomU of Xen Guest System

9. RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION²

The evaluation team determined the product to be **CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, CAPP conformant**, and to meet the requirements of **EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3**. In short, the product satisfies the security technical requirements specified in *Red Hat Enterprise Linux Version 5.3 Security Target for CAPP Compliance on DELL 11th Generation PowerEdge Servers*, version 1.0.

10. VALIDATOR COMMENTS

The Validator determined that the evaluation and all of its activities were performed in accordance with the CC, the CEM and CCEVS practices.

The Validator has the following observations:

- While the TOE distribution media includes a Graphical User Interface (GUI), it is not installed by default, is not part of the Evaluated Configuration and was not evaluated.

¹ For more complete information on the evaluated configurations, see Section 1.5 of the Security Target.

² The terminology in this section is defined in CC Interpretation 008, specifying new language for CC Part 1, section/Clause 5.4.

- The version of Stunnel supported by the vendor in the evaluated configuration of the TOE does not support OCSP.
- The TOE relies on username/password authentication. Kerberos and other authentication methods available via Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) are excluded from the TOE and were not evaluated.

11. SECURITY TARGET

The ST, *Red Hat Enterprise Linux Version 5.3 Security Target for CAPP Compliance on DELL 11th Generation PowerEdge Servers*, version 1.0 is included here by reference.

12. LIST OF ACRYONYMS

CC	Common Criteria
CCEVS	Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
CCTL	Common Evaluation Testing Laboratory
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
NIAP	National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST	National Institute of Standards & Technology
NSA	National Security Agency
PP	Protection Profile
ST	Security Target
SMP	Symmetric Multiprocessing
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function
TSFI	TOE Security Function Interface
UP	Uniprocessor

13. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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