

Xerox WorkCentre 5632/5638/5645/5655/ 5665/5675/5687 Multifunction Systems Security Target Version 1.0

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1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION

This Chapter presents Security Target (ST) identification information and an overview of the ST. An ST contains the information technology (IT) security requirements of an identified Target of Evaluation (TOE) and specifies the functional and assurance security measures offered by that TOE to meet stated requirements. An ST principally defines:

- a) A security problem expressed as a set of assumptions about the security aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product is intended to counter, and any known rules with which the product must comply (Chapter 3, TOE Security Environment).
- b) A set of security objectives and a set of security requirements to address the security problem (Chapters 4 and 5, Security Objectives and IT Security Requirements, respectively).
- c) The IT security functions provided by the TOE that meet the set of requirements (Chapter 6, TOE Summary Specification).

The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the Common Criteria (CC), Part 1 v3.1R1, Annex A, and Part 3 v3.1R2, Chapter 11.

1.1. ST and TOE Identification

This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its associated TOE. This ST targets Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 3 augmented with ALC_FLR.3.

ST Title:	Xerox WorkCentre 5632/5638/5645/5655/5665/5675/5687 Multifunction Systems Security Target
ST Version:	1.0
Revision Number:	Revision 1.14
Publication Date:	October 28, 2010
Authors:	CSC Common Criteria Testing Laboratory, Xerox Corporation

TOE Identification: Xerox WorkCentre 5632/5638/5645/5655/5665/5675/5687 Multifunction Systems (see Section 1.3.1 for software version numbers)

ST Evaluator: Domus ITSL

Keywords: Xerox, Multi Function Device, Image Overwrite, WorkCentre

1.2. TOE Overview

1.2.1. Usage and Major Security Features

The product is a multi-function device (MFD) that copies and prints, with scan-to-email (scanned files are emailed to the user), network scan (including “scan to mailbox” where scanned files are routed to a directory), and FAX options. A standard component of the TOE is the Image Overwrite Security package. This function forces any temporary image files created during a print, network scan, scan to email, or LanFax job to be overwritten when those files are no longer needed.

The optional Xerox Embedded Fax accessory, when purchased and installed, provides local analog fax capability over PSTN connections.


Table 1: Models and capabilities

(X – included in all configurations; O – product options ordered separately)

	Print	Copy ¹	Network Scan	Embedded Fax ¹	Scan 2 email	Print Speed
WorkCentre 5632	x	x	o	o	o	Up to 32 ppm
WorkCentre 5638	x	x	o	o	o	Up to 38 ppm
WorkCentre 5645	x	x	o	o	o	Up to 45 ppm
WorkCentre 5655	x	x	o	o	o	Up to 55 ppm
WorkCentre 5665	x	x	o	o	o	Up to 65 ppm
WorkCentre 5675	x	x	o	o	o	Up to 75 ppm
WorkCentre 5687	x	x	o	o	o	Up to 87 ppm

¹ Copy and embedded FAX jobs are not spooled to the HDD.

An optional Finisher, which is not part of the TOE, provides “after print” services such as document collation and stapling. The hardware included in the TOE is shown in Figure 1. This figure also shows an optional Finisher connected to the TOE at the right side of the picture and an optional Paper Feeder at the left side of the picture, neither of which are part of the TOE.



The MFD is available in two distinct controller configurations which signify underlying architectural differences. These models are referred to as Single Board Controller (SBC) and Multi Board Controller (MBC). Both models share a common set of security features. The MBC model controllers however implement additional features not present in the SBC models.

The MFD stores temporary image data created during a print, network scan or scan to email, and LanFAX job on an internal hard disk drive (HDD). This temporary image data consists of the original data submitted and additional files created during a job. All partitions of the HDD used for spooling temporary files are encrypted. The encryption key is created dynamically on each power-up.

Copy jobs are not written to the hard drive and need not to be overwritten. Copy/Print, Store and Reprint jobs are written to the hard drive so that they may be reprinted at a later time; therefore, they will be overwritten when a full on-demand image overwrite is performed. Embedded FAX jobs are written to flash memory and are overwritten at the completion of each job, or on demand of the MFD system administrator.

The TOE provides an Image Overwrite function to enhance the security of the MFD. The Image Overwrite function overwrites temporary document image data as described in DoD Standard 5200.28-M at the completion of each print, network scan, scan to email, or LanFAX job, once the MFD is turned back on after a power failure or *on demand* of the MFD system administrator.

The optional Xerox Embedded Fax accessory provides local analog FAX capability over Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) connections

and also enables LanFax jobs, if purchased by the consumer. A separate non-volatile memory resource is dedicated to embedded fax, and the image files written to this memory are zeroized at the completion of a fax job.

User image files associated with the Copy/Print, Store and Reprint feature may be stored long term for later reprinting. When a job is selected for reprint, the stored job is resubmitted to the system. Temporary files created during processing are overwritten at the completion of the job using the 5200.28-M algorithm. The stored jobs are not overwritten until the jobs are deleted by the user, or when the System Administrator executes a full on-demand image overwrite.

Xerox's optional Network Scanning Accessory may be purchased and added to the TOE configuration. This accessory allows documents to be scanned at the device with the resulting image being stored on a remote server/repository. The connection between the device and the remote server is secured when the TOE's SSL support is enabled; the transfer of the data is through an HTTPS connection. The TOE supports network scanning using FTP, HTTPS (SSL), SMTP over IPv4 and IPv6 with support for utilizing LDAP over IPv4 and IPv6. The cryptography used to protect this connection has been scoped out of the evaluation.

All models of the TOE support both auditing and network security. The system administrator can enable and configure the network security support. The network security support is based on SSL. When SSL support is enabled on the device, the following network security features can be enabled/configured: HTTPS support over both IPv4 and IPv6 (for both the device's Web UI and secure network scan data transfer); system administrator download of the device's audit log; IPsec support for IPP, lpr and port 9100 print jobs over IPv4 or IPv6; and specification of IPv4 and IPv6 filtering rules. Scan-to-email and FAX data are not protected from sniffing by the IPsec or SSL support. The transmission of LanFax data over the Ethernet connection is protected by IPsec, but the transmission over the PSTN is not. Note that for the MFD configuration, IPsec can only be activated if SSL has been enabled and an SSL-based certificate (either "self-signed" or generated by an external Certificate Authority) has been loaded into the TOE via the Web UI. Once this has occurred, SSL could be disabled. Except for the cryptography used to protect the audit logs (SSL v3.1), the cryptography used for network security has been scoped out of the evaluation.

The TOE provides for user identification and authorization based on either local or remote ACL's as configured by the system administrator.

The TOE can integrate with an IPv4 or IPv6 network with native support for dhcp/dhcpv6.

In addition to the features of the SBC architecture the MBC based models support the Common Access Card (CAC) standard for authentication.

1.2.2. TOE Type

The TOE is a multi-function device (MFD) that provides copy, print, document scanning and optional FAX services.

1.2.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software and Firmware

The TOE does not require any additional hardware, software or firmware in order to function as a multi-function device, however, the network security features are only useful in environments where the TOE is connected to a network. TSF_NET_ID is only available when one of the following remote authentication services are present on the network that the TOE is connected to: LDAP, NDS, Kerberos, or SMB.

1.3. TOE Description

This section provides context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the logical and physical scope of the TOE, as well as its evaluated configuration.

1.3.1. Physical Scope of the TOE

The TOE is a Multi-Function Device (Xerox WorkCentre model 5632, 5638, 5645, 5655, 5665, 5675, or 5687) that consists of a printer, copier, scanner, FAX (when purchased by the consumer), and email as well as all Administrator and User guidance (all dated December 16th, 2008). The difference between the seven models is their printing speed. A Duplex Automatic Document Handler is available on all models; the 5632 is available in a platen-only configuration. The hardware included in the TOE is shown in Figure 1. This figure also shows an optional Finisher connected to the TOE at the right side of the picture and an optional Paper Feeder at the left side of the picture, neither of which are part of the TOE. The optional FAX card is not shown in this figure1.

Table 2: Evaluated Software/Firmware version

Software/Firmware Item	WorkCentre 56XX MBC	WorkCentre 56XX SBC
System Software	021.120.060.00015	025.054.060.00015

¹ For installation, the optional FAX card must be fitted into the machine. After powering on the machine, the Fax Install window pops up on the Local UI with step by step instructions for installation.

Software/Firmware Item	WorkCentre 56XX MBC	WorkCentre 56XX SBC
Network Controller Software	061.100.08402	061.060.08402
UI Software	020.014.063	025.061.063
IOT Software	092.011.000	092.011.000
SIP (Copy Controller) Software	020.063.000	025.058.000
DADH Software (Options)		
• DADH 75	016.028.000	016.028.000
• DADH 100	020.019.000	020.019.000
• DADH 100 Quiet Mode	025.018.000	025.018.000
Paper Feeder Software	000.040.000	000.040.000
High Capacity Feeder Software	000.010.009	000.010.009
• Finisher Software (Options)		
• 1K LCSS	001.031.000	001.031.000
• LCSS	003.053.000	003.053.000
• HCSS	013.040.000	013.040.000
• HCSS with BookletMaker	024.016.000	024.016.000
• High Volume Finisher (HVF)	004.003.072	004.003.072
HVF with BookletMaker	003.002.005	003.006.006
FAX Software	003.009.009	003.009.009
Scanner Software (Options)		
• 32, 38, 45, 55 PPM	017.005.000	017.005.000
• 65, 75, 87 PPM	004.022.000	004.022.000

The various software and firmware (“Software”) that comprise the TOE are listed in Table 2. A system administrator can ensure that they have a TOE by printing a configuration sheet and comparing the version numbers reported on the sheet to the table above.

Table 3: System User and Administrator Guidance

Title	Version	Date
System Administration CD1	538E11432	December 16 th , 2008
Xerox IUG CD 2	538E11443	December 16 th , 2008

The Administrator and User guidance included in the TOE are listed in Table 3. A system administrator or user can ensure that they have the appropriate guidance by comparing the software version number, displayed when the CD is initially run, to the version numbers listed in the table above.

The **UI software** controls the User Interface. **SIP software** controls the Copy Controller and is able to interface with all other software components. **IOT software** controls the marking engine that prints to paper. **DADH software** controls the input tray. **Finisher software** controls the optional Finisher attachment. **FAX software** resides on the FAX board and controls some fax functions. The **System software** manages overall system function while the **Network Controller software** resides on the Network Controller and controls all network functions.

The TOE's physical interfaces include a power port, Ethernet port, non-functional USB host ports, optional target USB and parallel ports, serial ports, FAX ports (if the optional FAX card is installed), Local User Interface (LUI) with keypad, a document scanner, a document feeder and a document output.

1.3.2. Logical Scope of the TOE

The logical scope of the TOE includes all software and firmware that are installed on the product (see Table 2). The TOE logical boundary is composed of the security functions provided by the product.

The following security functions are controlled by the TOE:

- Image Overwrite (TSF_IOW)
- Authentication (TSF_AUT)
- Network Identification (TSF_NET_ID)
- Security Audit (TSF_FAU).
- Cryptographic Operations (TSF_FCS)
- Management Data Protection – SSL (TSF_FDP_SSL)
- User Data Protection – IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER)
-
- Information Flow Security (TSF_FLOW)
- Security Management (TSF_FMT)
- User Data Protection - AES (TSF_EXP_UDE)

1.3.2.1. Image Overwrite (TSF_IOW)

The TOE has an “Image Overwrite” function that overwrites files created during the printing, network scan, scan-to-email, and LanFax processes. This overwrite process is implemented in accordance with DoD 5200.28-M and will be activated at the completion of each print, network scan, scan to e-mail, or LanFax job, once the MFD is turned back on after a power failure or *on demand* of the MFD system administrator.

The TOE has an “Image Overwrite” function that overwrites files created during the embedded fax process. This overwrite process is implemented

as a single-pass zeroization of the embedded fax card flash memory and will be activated at the completion of each embedded fax job, once the MFD is turned back on after a power failure or *on demand* of the MFD system administrator. The embedded fax card flash memory overwrite is not compliant with DoD 5200.28-M. LanFax jobs are overwritten on the hard disk after the image is transferred from the Network Controller to Copy Controller, and zeroized on the fax card flash memory once the image has been sent. The Fax mailbox and dial directory are only zeroized when the administrator commands a full On-Demand Image Overwrite (ODIO) operation.

User image files associated with the Copy/Print, Store and Reprint feature may be stored long term for later reprinting. When a job is selected for reprint, the stored job is resubmitted to the system. Temporary files created during processing are overwritten at the completion of the job using the 5200.28-M algorithm. The stored jobs are not overwritten until the jobs are deleted by the user, or when the System Administrator executes a full on-demand image overwrite. A standard ODIO overwrites all files written to temporary storage areas of the HDD and zeroizes the temporary storage areas of the fax card flash memory. A full ODIO overwrites those files as well as the Fax mailbox/dial directory, Scan to mailbox data, and all files that have been stored at the request of a user via Copy/Print, Store and Reprint jobs.

Copy jobs are not written to the hard drive and need not to be overwritten. Copy/Print, Store and Reprint jobs are written to the hard drive so that they may be reprinted at a later time; therefore, they will be overwritten when a full on-demand image overwrite is performed. Embedded FAX jobs are written to flash memory and are overwritten at the completion of each job or on demand of the MFD system administrator. The embedded fax card flash memory overwrite is not compliant with DoD 5200.28-M.

1.3.2.2. Authentication (TSF_AUT)

The TOE requires a system administrator to authenticate before granting access to system administration functions. The system administrator has to enter a password at either the Web User Interface or the Local User Interface. The password will be obscured² as it is being entered. Identification of the system administrator at the Local User Interface is explicit -- the administrator will identify themselves by entering the username "admin" in the authentication window. Identification of the system administrator at the Web user Interface is explicit -- the

² The LUI obscures input with the asterisk character. The specific character used to obscure input at the WebUI is browser dependent

administrator will identify themselves by entering the username “admin” in the authentication dialog window.

1.3.2.3. Network Identification (TSF_NET_ID)

The TOE can prevent unauthorized use of the installed network options (network scanning, scan-to-email, and LanFax); the network options available are determined (selectable) by the system administrator. To access a network service, the user is required to provide a user name and password, which is then validated by the designated authentication server (a trusted remote IT entity). The user is not required to login to the network; the account is authenticated by the server as a valid user. The remote authentication services supported by the TOE are: LDAP v4, Kerberos v5 (Solaris), Kerberos v5 (Windows 2000/2003), NDS (Novell 4.x, 5.x), and SMB (Windows NT.4x/2000/2003). The cryptography used by remote authentication services has been scoped out of the evaluation.

Additionally the MBC model of the TOE can be configured to accept Common Access Cards as a means of network authentication for users to access the installed network options. When using the Common Access Card method of authentication the Common Access Card performs authentication for the TOE via PIN number. The TOE can not gain access to the identification information on the access card until a valid pin number has been entered by the user. The TOE obscures pin number entry with asterisks when it is entered by the user.

1.3.2.4. Security Audit (TSF_FAU)

The TOE generates audit logs that track events/actions (e.g., print/scan/fax job submission) to users (based on network login). The audit logs, which are stored locally in a 15000 entry circular log, are available to TOE administrators and can be exported for viewing and analysis. SSL v3.1 must be configured in order for the system administrator to download the audit records; the downloaded audit records are in comma separated format so that they can be imported into an application such as Microsoft Excel™.

1.3.2.5. Cryptographic Operations (TSF_FCS)

The TOE utilizes data encryption (RSA, TDES, AES), key establishment (RSA) and cryptographic checksum generation and secure hash computation (SHA-1) to support secure communication between the TOE and remote trusted products. Those packages include provisions for the generation of checksum/hash values and meet the following standards: 3DES – NIST 800-67 (CAVP Certificate No. 990); SHA-1 – FIPS-180-2 (CAVP Certificate No. 1331), AES-256-FIPS-197 (CAVP Certificate No. 1472), SSLv3.1, RSA - FIPS 186-2 (CAVP Certificate No. 719)

1.3.2.6. Management Data Protection – SSL (TSF_FDP_SSL)

The TOE provides support for SSL and allows the TOE to act as either an SSL server, or SSL client, depending on the function the TOE is performing (SSLSec SFP). SSL v3.1 must be enabled before the system administrator can retrieve the audit log. SSL functionality also permits the TOE to be administered from the Web UI. Except for the cryptography used to protect the audit logs (SSL v3.1), the cryptography used for management data protection has been scoped out of the evaluation.

1.3.2.7. User Data Protection – IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER)

The TOE provides the ability for the system administrator to configure a network information flow control policy based on a configurable rule set. The information flow control policy (IPFilter SFP) is generated by the system administrator specifying a series of rules to “accept,” “deny,” or “drop” packets. These rules include a listing of IP addresses that will be allowed to communicate with the TOE. The IP Filter supports the construction of both IPv4 and IPv6 filtering policies. Additionally rules can be generated specifying filtering options based on port number given in the received packet. IP Filtering is not available for IPv6, AppleTalk or IPX; however, the effect of IP Filtering can be accomplished for IPv6 by configuring IPsec associations.

Note: The TOE cannot enforce the IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER) security function when it is configured for IPv6, AppleTalk or IPX networks.

1.3.2.8. Information Flow Security (TSF_FLOW)

The TOE controls and restricts the information flow between the PSTN port of the optional FAX processing board (if installed) and the network controller (which covers the information flow to and from the internal network). Data and/or commands cannot be sent to the internal network via the PSTN. A direct connection from the internal network to external entities by using the telephone line of the TOE is also denied.

If the optional FAX board is not installed, an information flow from or to the FAX port is not possible at all.

1.3.2.9. Security Management (TSF_FMT)

Only authenticated system administrators can enable or disable the Image Overwrite function, enable or disable the On Demand Image Overwrite function, change the system administrator password, and start or cancel an On Demand Image Overwrite operation.

While IIO or ODIO can be disabled, doing so will remove the TOE from its evaluated configuration.

Additionally, only authenticated system administrators can assign authorization privileges to users, establish a recurrence schedule for “On Demand” image overwrite, enable/disable SSL support, create/install X.509 certificates, enable/disable and download the audit log, enable/disable and configure (rules) IP filtering, enable/disable disk encryption, enable/disable use of Common Access Cards or enable/disable and configure IPv6.

1.3.2.10. User Data Protection - AES (TSF_EXP_UDE)

The TOE utilizes data encryption (AES) and cryptographic checksum generation and secure hash computation (SHA-1) to support encryption and decryption of designated portions of the hard disk where user files may be stored. Those packages meet the following standards: AES-256-FIPS-197 (CAVP Certificate No. 1471), SHA-1 – FIPS-180-2 (CAVP Certificate No. 1331).

1.3.3. Evaluated Configuration

In its evaluated configuration, the Image Overwrite Security Package is installed and IIO, ODIO and SSL (for protection of management data only) are enabled on the TOE. The FAX option, if purchased by the consumer, is installed and enabled. All other configuration parameter values, including the presence of the Network Scanning Accessory, are optional. The LanFax option is included in the evaluated configuration of the TOE.

Consumers of the TOE should refer to the Product Security Guidance at <http://www.xerox.com/security> for more information.

2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS

This section describes the conformance claims of this Security Target.

2.1. Common Criteria Conformance Claims

The Security Target is based upon

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 1, CCMB-2006-09-001,
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components; Version 3.1, Revision 2, CCMB-2007-09-002,
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components; Version 3.1, Revision 2, CCMB-2007-09-003

referenced hereafter as [CC].

This Security Target claims the following CC conformance:

- Part 2 conformant
- Part 3 conformant
- Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 3+

2.2. Protection Profile Claims

This Security Target does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.

2.3. Package Claims

This Security Target claims conformance to the EAL3 package augmented with ALC_FLR.3.

3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION

The Security Problem Definition describes assumptions about the operational environment in which the TOE is intended to be used and represents the conditions for the secure operation of the TOE.

3.1. Definitions

3.1.1. CC Terms

Authentication data	Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user.
Authorized User	A user who may, in accordance with the SFRs, perform an operation.
External entity	Any entity (human or IT) outside the TOE that interacts (or may interact) with the TOE
Identity	A representation (e.g. a string) uniquely identifying an authorized user, which can either be the full or abbreviated name of that user or a pseudonym.
Object	An entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.
Role	A predefined set of rules establishing the allowed interactions between a user and the TOE.
Subject	An entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
User	See external entity.

3.1.2. Subjects

Human user	Any person who interacts with the TOE.
System Administrator	An authorized user who manages the TOE.

3.1.3. Objects

- FAX** A generic reference to one of the Fax types supported by the Device (i.e., embedded analog fax (fax board), LanFAX (see below), and Server Fax (not part of the evaluation).
- LanFAX** A TOE function in which the data is sent to the device as a print job, but rather than being output as a hardcopy, it is sent out through the embedded analog fax board (optional).
- Management Interfaces** The management interfaces provide access to the related security relevant functions that only system administrators are allowed to use. The management interfaces are accessible via the Local UI and the Web UI.
- scan-to-mailbox** A TOE function in which data is scanned into a directory.

3.1.4. Information

- Image Data** Information on a mass storage device created by the print, scan, or LanFAX processes.
- Latent Image Data** Residual information remaining on a mass storage device when a print, scan, or LanFAX job is completed, cancelled, or interrupted.
- User Data** Primarily image data, but may also include user commands.

3.2. Assumptions

This section describes the security aspects of the intended environment for the evaluated TOE. This includes information about the physical, personnel, procedural, connectivity, and functional aspects of the environment.

The operational environment must be managed in accordance with assurance requirement documentation for delivery, operation, and user/system administrator guidance. The following specific conditions are assumed to exist in an environment where this TOE is employed.

Table 4: Environmental Assumptions

Assumption	Description
A.INSTALL	The TOE has been delivered and installed by Xerox-authorized representatives using Xerox delivery and installation guidance. The TOE has been configured by the system administrator in accordance with the administrator and user guidance delivered with the TOE. As a part of this installation process, the system administrator has changed the password from its default value. The password chosen by the

Assumption	Description
	<p>administrator consists of at least 8 alphanumeric characters and will be changed at least every 40 days. The Image Overwrite Security accessory is installed and enabled. IIO and ODIO are enabled.</p> <p>The “secure print” option has been configured to remove jobs that are unprinted after 72 hours.</p> <p>The “Copy/Print, Store and Reprint” option is configured to remove stored documents after no more than 72 hours.</p>
A.ACCESS	The TOE has been installed in a standard office environment. Because the TOE is under observation by office personnel, unauthorized physical modifications to the TOE and unauthorized attempts to connect to the TOE via its physical interfaces are not possible.
A.MANAGE	One or more system administrators are assigned to manage the TOE. Procedures exist for granting a system administrator access to the system administrator password for the TOE.
A.NO_EVIL_ADM	The system administrator(s) are not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and will follow the instructions provided in the administrator and user guidance delivered with the TOE. The system administrator will not remove the TOE from its evaluated configuration and will especially not disable TSF_IOW.
A.NETWORK	The network that the TOE is connected to will be monitored for unapproved activities and/or attempts to attack network resources (including the TOE).
A.SAME_CONTROL	All of the systems that communicate with the TOE are under the same management and physical control as the TOE and are covered by the same management and security policy as the TOE.
A.EXT_RFC_COMPLIANT	All of the remote trusted IT products that communicate with the TOE implement the external half of the communication protocol in accordance with industry standard practice with respect to RFC/other standard compliance (i.e., SSL, IPsec, SNMP) and work as advertised.
A.EXTERNAL_SVC	The IT environment will provide the TOE with the following services:

Assumption	Description
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Network Time Protocol (NTP) • Identification and Authentication • Authorization (LDAP, ADS, or other methods of delegating user groups)

3.3. Threats

3.3.1. Threats Addressed by the TOE

This section identifies the threats addressed by the TOE. The various attackers of the TOE are considered to be either authorized or unauthorized users of the TOE with public knowledge of how the TOE operates. These users do not have any specialized knowledge or equipment. The authorized users have physical access to the TOE. Mitigation to the threats is through the objectives identified in Section 4, Security Objectives.

Table 5: Threats Addressed by the TOE

Threat	Description
T.RECOVER	<p>A malicious user may attempt to recover temporary or stored document image data using commercially available tools to read its contents.</p> <p>This may occur because the attacker gets physical access to the hard disk drive (e.g. as part the life-cycle of the MFD (e.g. decommission)), or the document image data can be read/recovered from the fax card flash memory (e.g. as the result of a purposeful or inadvertent power failure before the data could be erased.)</p>
T.COMM_SEC	<p>An attacker may break into a communications link between the TOE and a remote trusted IT product in order to intercept and/or modify management data passed to/from/between the TOE and remote trusted IT product.</p>
T. INFAX	<p>During times when the FAX is not in use, a malicious user may attempt to access the internal network by connecting to the FAX card via PSTN and using publicly available T.30 FAX transmission protocol commands for the purpose of intercepting or modifying sensitive information or data that may reside on resources</p>

	connected to the network. This threat only exists if the FAX board is installed and connected to the PSTN.
T.OUTFAX	During times when the FAX is not in use, a malicious user may attempt to connect to the TOE over the network and make an outgoing connection using the FAX card, either as a method of attacking other entities or for the purpose of sending sensitive information or data to other entities. ³ This threat only exists if the FAX board is installed and connected to the PSTN.
T.USER	A user, at any time, may attempt to reconfigure the TOE, for the purpose of disabling security functions or intercepting sensitive information or data, either by attempting to access the management functions directly or by logging in as the system administrator. Moreover a user may try to use the installed network options (network scanning, scan-to-email, and LanFax) although he is not authorized to do so.

3.3.2. Threats Addressed by the IT Environment

This section specifies and describes the threat against which protection from the IT environment is required.

Table 6: Threat Addressed by the IT Environment

Threat	Description
TE.COMM_SEC	An attacker may break into a communications link between the TOE and a remote trusted IT product in order to intercept, and/or modify, print job or scan-to-mailbox data passed to/from/between the TOE and remote trusted IT product.

3.4. Organizational Security Policies

This section enumerates the organizational security policies the TOE must comply with:

³Application Note: The sending of company confidential information to external entities by Fax is not considered a threat to the TOE.

Table 7: Organizational Security Policy(s)

Policy	Description
P.COMMS_SEC	The system administrator shall employ TOE supported network security mechanisms (i.e., HTTPS, IPSec ESP and/or AH, IP filtering) per, and in accordance with, established local site security policy.
P.HIPAA_OPT	(Appropriate to organizations under HIPAA oversight) All audit log entries (scan) shall be reviewed periodically (the period being local site specific and to be determined by the local audit cyclic period) and in accordance with 45 CFR Subtitle A, Subchapter C, Part 164.530(c),(e),(f) which covers safeguards of information (c), sanctions for those who improperly disclose (e), and mitigation for improper disclosures (f). The TOE provides the audit log information so that an organization can be compliant; the HIPPA statute requires that personnel actually review the available audit log.
P.SSL_ENABLED	Secure Socket layer network security mechanisms shall be supported by the TOE and enabled.

4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES

The purpose of the security objectives is to detail the planned response to a security problem or threat. Threats can be directed against the TOE or the security environment or both, therefore, the CC identifies two categories of security objectives:

- Security objectives for the TOE, and
- Security objectives for the environment.

4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE

This section identifies and describes the security objectives of the TOE. The TOE accomplishes the security objectives defined in Table 8.

Table 8: Security Objectives for the TOE

Objectives	Description
O.AUDITS	The TOE must record, protect, and provide to system administrators audit records relative to scan data transmissions through the TOE that (may) have HIPAA-privileged information.

Objectives	Description
O.RECOVER	<p>Temporary document image data from a print, network scan, scan-to-email job, LanFax, the Fax mailbox and/or dial directory, Scan to mailbox data, or stored document image data from a Copy/Print, Store and Reprint job must be overwritten on the hard disk drive in accordance with DoD 5200.28-M immediately after that job is completed or once the TOE is turned back on after a power failure.</p> <p>Temporary document image data from a FAX job must be zeroized in the fax card flash memory immediately after that job is completed or once the TOE is turned back on after a power failure. The embedded fax card flash memory zeroization is not compliant with DoD 5200.28-M.</p> <p>Temporary document image data from the jobs stored on the HDD must also be overwritten on demand in accordance with DoD 5200.28-M (Standard or Full ODIO). The temporary storage for Embedded Faxes (compact flash) must be zeroized at the command (“on demand”) of the system administrator when a standard or full ODIO is run. The Fax mailbox and dial directory are only zeroized when the system administrator runs a full ODIO. The embedded fax card flash memory zeroization is not compliant with DoD 5200.28-M. Copy and Embedded FAX (if installed) jobs must not be written to the hard drive at all.</p>
O.FAXLINE	<p>The TOE will not allow access to the internal network from the telephone line via the TOE’s FAX modem (if installed). Likewise, the TOE will not allow accessing the PSTN port of the TOE’s FAX modem (if installed) from the internal network.</p>
O.MANAGE	<p>The TOE will provide the functions and facilities necessary to support system administrators responsible for the management of the TOE.</p> <p>The TOE must require that system administrator(s) authenticate with a password before allowing access to management functions. The password must be obscured as it is entered by the system administrator. The Local UI will be locked for 3 minutes once 3 invalid login attempts have been detected. The WebUI will send an error code after every invalid authentication attempt.</p> <p>The TOE must require authorized users to be identified and authenticated before providing access to installed network options of the TOE.</p>
O.CONTROL_ACCESS	<p>The TOE will provide the system administrator with the ability to determine network access/information flow to the TOE for trusted remote IT products.</p>

Objectives	Description
O.PROTECT_COM	The TOE must protect management data from disclosure, or modification, by establishing a trusted channel between the TOE and another trusted IT product over which the management data is transported.
O.PROTECT_DAT	The TOE must protect from disclosure or modification: user data temporarily stored for the purpose of reprinting in the future, temporary spool files created from print, fax and scan jobs, and swap files.

4.2. Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

Table 9: Security Objectives for the IT Environment

Objectives	Description
OE. NETWORK	The network that the TOE is connected to will be monitored for unapproved activities and/or attempts to attack network resources (including the TOE). This includes a high number of logon tries to the web interface of the TOE.
OE.NETWORK_I&A	The TOE environment shall provide, per site specific policy, the correct and accurately functioning Identification and Authentication, and NTP mechanism(s) that are compatible with, and for external use by, the TOE. These mechanisms will be under the same management and physical control as the TOE and are covered by the same management and security policy as the TOE. These I&A assets may also maintain authorization information (access and/or permissions lists) for users who are authenticated by the environment.
OE.PROTECT_COM	The TOE environment (product) and remote trusted IT products (which support the external half of all RFC-compliant communications and protocols) must protect user print jobs and scan-to-mailbox job data from disclosure, or modification. The TOE environment and remote trusted IT products must also prevent management data from being disclosed.

Objectives	Description
OE.INSTALL	<p>System administrator oversees installation, configuration and operation of the TOE by Xerox-authorized representatives in accordance with the Xerox delivery and installation guidance. The TOE must be configured by the system administrator in accordance with the system administration and user guidance as well as with the security guidance found at http://www.xerox.com/security.</p> <p>As part of the installation process, the system administrator has to change the password from its default value to a value with at least 8 alphanumeric characters. The system administrator has to change the password at least every 40 days.</p> <p>The “secure print” option has been configured to remove jobs that are unprinted after 72 hours.</p> <p>The “Copy/Print, Store and Reprint” option is configured to remove stored documents after no more than 72 hours.</p> <p>Image Overwrite Security accessory is installed and enabled, and IIO and ODIO are enabled.</p> <p>The system administrator ensures that the TOE will be configured according to the configuration under evaluation and will not remove the TOE from its evaluated configuration.</p>
OE.ACCESS	<p>The TOE will be located in an office environment where it will be monitored by the office personnel for unauthorized physical connections, manipulation or interference.</p>
OE.ADMIN	<p>At least one responsible and trustworthy individual (system administrator) will be assigned, according to onsite procedures for granting access to the password, to manage the TOE and other trusted IT products that the TOE interacts with, enable SSL, and review audit logs.</p>
OE.EXTERNAL_SVC	<p>The IT environment will provide the TOE with the following services:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Network Time Protocol (NTP) • Identification and Authentication • Authorization (LDAP, ADS, or other methods of delegating user groups)

4.3. Rationale for Security Objectives

The following table maps the assumptions, threats and OSPs to the objectives for the TOE and the objectives for the operational environment. The mapping will be justified in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

	O.AUDITS	O.RECOVER	O.FAXLINE	O.MANAGE	O.CONTROL_ACC	O.PROTECT_COM	O.PROTECT_DAT	OE.NETWORK	OE.NETWORK_I&	OE.PROTECT_CO	OE.INSTALL	OE.ACCESS	OE.ADMIN	OE.EXTERNAL_S
A.INSTALL											X			
A.ACCESS												X		
A.MANAGE													X	
A.NO_EVIL_ADM											X		X	
A.NETWORK								X						
A.SAME_CONTROL									X				X	
A.EXT RFC COMPLIANT										X				
A.EXTERNAL_SVC														X
T.RECOVER		X			X		X							
T.COMM_SEC						X								
T.INFAX			X											
T.OUTFAX			X											
T.USER				X				X						
TE.COMM_SEC										X				
P.COMMS_SEC						X							X	
P.HIPAA_OPT	X												X	
P.SSL_ENABLED						X							X	

4.3.1. Coverage of the Assumptions

- A.INSTALL **OE.INSTALL** verbalized the assumption as objective and therefore covers the assumption completely and correctly.
- A.ACCESS **OE.ACCESS** verbalized the assumption as objective and therefore covers the assumption completely and correctly.
- A.MANAGE **OE.ADMIN** verbalized the assumption as objective and therefore covers the assumption completely and correctly.

A.NO_EVIL_ADM	<p>OE.ADMIN covers parts of A.NO_EVIL_ADM because “responsible and trustworthy individuals” are “not careless, willfully negligent or hostile.” Furthermore, the individuals must follow the instructions provided in the guidance documents.</p> <p>OE.INSTALL covers the remaining part of A.NO_EVIL_ADM because the objective ensures that the system administrator configures the TOE according to and will not remove the TOE from the evaluated configuration (especially that the Image Overwrite Security accessory is installed and enabled).</p>
A.NETWORK	<p>OE.NETWORK verbalized the assumption as objective and therefore covers the assumption completely and correctly.</p>
A.SAME_CONTROL	<p>OE.NETWORK_I&A covers parts of A.SAME_CONTROL by ensuring the presence within the environment of a fully-functioning I&A mechanism to detect network-based attacks against the TOE, and an NTP mechanism to synchronize the TOE with the time of its environment.</p> <p>OE.ADMIN covers the remaining parts of A.SAME_COTNROL because the same “responsible and trustworthy individuals” who control the TOE should also control the remote trusted IT products in the environment.</p>
A.EXT_RFC_COMPLIANT	<p>OE.PROTECT_COM covers A.EXT_RFC_COMPLIANT by ensuring that a trusted communications channel between the TOE and remote trusted IT products is established to protect the user and TSF data from disclosure or modification.</p>
A.EXTERNAL_SVC	<p>OE.EXTERNAL_SVC covers A.EXTERNAL_SVC by ensuring that the environment provides NTP, Identification, Authentication and Authorization services for the TOE’s use.</p>

4.3.2. Coverage of the Threats

T.RECOVER	<p>O.RECOVER helps to mitigate the threat</p>
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T.RECOVER to an acceptable level by minimizing the amount of time that temporary document image data is on the hard disk drive or in fax card flash memory.

O.RECOVER requires that the residual data will be overwritten as described in DoD 5200.28-M immediately after the job is finished or once the TOE is turned back on after a power failure. Copy and Embedded FAX jobs (if installed) will not be stored on the HDD at all.

Additionally, **O.RECOVER** requires that the TOE perform the overwrite security function at any time that the system administrator chooses to ensure that all latent data has been removed from the HDD and the Fax card flash memory.

O.CONTROL_ACCESS helps counter the threat T.RECOVER because restricted access to TOE network resources helps to prevent recovery attacks from untrusted remote IT products.

O.PROTECT_DAT helps counter the threat T.RECOVER because it ensures that user data stored on the hard disk is not recoverable when the disk is removed from the system.

T.COMM_SEC

O.PROTECT_COM helps mitigate the threat T.COMM_SEC by ensuring that a fully-compliant trusted channel between the TOE and another remote trusted IT product exists to protect management data from disclosure or modification by an attacker attempting to intercept communications between the TOE and the remote trusted IT product.

T.INFAX

O.FAXLINE counters the threat T.INFAX because a connection from the PSTN port of the FAX board (if installed) to the internal network is not allowed.

T.OUTFAX

O.FAXLINE counters the threat T.OUTFAX because the users of the internal network are not allowed to access the PSTN port of the FAX board (if installed). So, it is not possible to establish an interconnection between PSTN and the internal network by using the TOE.

T.USER

O.MANAGE counters the threat T.USER by ensuring that the users who have not authenticated as the system administrator cannot access the management functions and cannot make configuration or

operational changes to the TOE that would remove it from the evaluated configuration or allow them to access job data. Additionally O.MANAGE counters T.USER by requiring authorized users to be identified and authenticated before providing access to use installed network options of the TOE. O.MANAGE also protects against brute-force attacks against the password at the local user interface.

OE.NETWORK ensures that brute-force attacks against the password are also not possible at the web interface.

TE.COMM_SEC **OE.PROTECT_COM** helps mitigate the threat T.COMM_SEC and helps meet OSPs P.COMMS_SEC and P.SSL_ENABLED by ensuring that fully-compliant (A.EXT_RFC_COMPLIANT) trusted channel between the TOE and another remote trusted IT product exists to protect management data from disclosure or modification by an attacker attempting to intercept communications between the TOE and the remote trusted IT product.

4.3.3. Implementation of Organizational Security Policies

P.COMMS_SEC **O.PROTECT_COM** helps meet P.COMMS_SEC by ensuring that a fully-compliant trusted channel between the TOE and another remote trusted IT product exists to protect management data from disclosure or modification by an attacker attempting to intercept communications between the TOE and the remote trusted IT product.

OE.ADMIN helps meet P.COMMS_SEC by ensuring that local site security policies have been complied with by a competent administrator.

P.HIPAA_OPT **O.AUDITS** helps satisfy OSP P.HIPAA_OPT by ensuring that log entries are provided by the TOE for periodic review by a competent administrator (**OE.ADMIN**), to ensure that safeguards for information mandated by applicable laws and regulations remain in place, and that audit logs available to mitigate the risk of improper disclosure and to support application of sanctions following improper disclosure.

P.SSL_ENABLED **O.PROTECT_COM** helps meet P.SSL_ENABLED by ensuring that a fully-compliant trusted channel between the TOE and another remote trusted IT

product exists, and has been enabled (**OE.ADMIN**), to protect management data disclosure or modification by an attacker attempting to intercept communications between the TOE and the remote trusted IT product.

5. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

This section defines the IT security requirements that shall be satisfied by the TOE or its environment:

The CC divides TOE security requirements into two categories:

- Security functional requirements (SFRs) (such as, identification and authentication, security management, and user data protection) that the TOE and the supporting evidence need to satisfy to meet the security objectives of the TOE.
- Security assurance requirements (SARs) that provide grounds for confidence that the TOE and its supporting IT environment meet its security objectives (e.g., configuration management, testing, and vulnerability assessment).

These requirements are discussed separately within the following subsections.

5.1. Conventions

All operations performed on the Security Functional Requirements or the Security Assurance Requirements need to be identified. For this purpose the following conventions shall be used.

- Assignments will be written in normal text with brackets: [normal]
- Selections will be written in underlined and italic text
- Refinements will be written bold
- Iterations will be performed on components and functional elements. The component ID defined by the Common Criteria (e.g. FDP_IFC.1) will be extended by an ID for the iteration (e.g. "(SSL)"). The resulting component ID would be "FDP_IFC.1 (SSL)".
- Where an iteration is identified in rationale discussion as "all", the statement applies to all iterations of the requirement (e.g. "FCS_COP.1 (all)")

5.2. Security Policies

This chapter contains the definition of security policies which must be enforced by the TSF.

Note: The TOE cannot enforce the IP Filtering (TSP_FILTER) security policy when it is configured for AppleTalk or IPX networks.

5.2.1. User Data Protection Policy (TSP_IOW)

The image information of the different types of jobs the MFD can handle is considered as confidential user information. Therefore, the TOE must protect this information according to the following rules:

- Temporary document image data from a print, network scan, LanFax or scan-to-email job must be overwritten on the hard disk drive in accordance with DoD 5200.28-M immediately after that job is completed. Temporary document image data from a FAX job must be overwritten (zeroized) in fax card flash memory immediately after that job is completed. The embedded fax card flash memory overwrite is not compliant with DoD 5200.28-M.
- All temporary document image data of abnormally terminated jobs [on the HDD](#) must be overwritten in accordance with DoD 5200.28-M once the MFD is turned back on after a power failure.
- The space on the hard disk drive reserved for temporary document image data must be overwritten in accordance with DoD 5200.28-M, if the system administrator has invoked the On Demand Image Overwrite function.
- The space on the hard disk drive reserved for the Scan to mailbox data, and Copy/Print, Store and Reprint image data must be overwritten in accordance with DoD 5200.28-M, if the system administrator has invoked the On Demand Image Overwrite function.
- The space on the fax card flash memory must be zeroized, if the system administrator has invoked the On Demand Image Overwrite function and when the TOE is powered on after a power failure.
- Document image data of copy and Embedded FAX jobs must not be written to the hard disk drive.

5.2.2. Information Flow Control Policy (TSP_FLOW)

The security function “Information Flow” (TSF_FLOW) (see section 1.3.2.81.3.2.8) restricts the information flow between the PSTN port of the optional FAX board (if installed) and the internal network by implementing a store-and-forward principle.

The following policy defines the rules according to which TSF_FLOW shall restrict the information flow, if the FAX board is installed:

- Only the copy controller (SIP) (see section 1.3.2.8) may copy image information and job data (e.g. the telephone number of the other fax machine) from and to a shared memory area on the FAX board.
- RECEIVING FAX: The FAX board must have terminated the PSTN connection before informing the copy controller about the fax currently received.
- SENDING FAX: The copy controller must have finished the copy operation of the fax image to the shared memory area of the FAX board before informing the FAX board to send the fax.

If the FAX board is not installed, an information flow is not possible and needs not to be restricted. However, it is not required that the copy controller works in this situation in a different way.

5.2.3. SSLSec SFP (TSP_SSL)

The security function “User Data Protection -- SSL” (TSF_FDP_SSL) requires that SSL is enabled so that Web-based management data network traffic to and from the TOE will be encrypted using SSL This policy will be enforced on:

- SUBJECTS: Web clients.
- INFORMATION: All web-based management traffic to and from that destination.
- OPERATIONS: HTTP commands.

5.2.4. IP Filter SFP (TSP_FILTER)

The security function “User Data Protection -- IP Filtering” (TSF_FDP_FILTER) requires that network traffic to and from the TOE will be filtered in accordance with the rules defined by the system administrator at the Web User Interface configuration editor for IP Filtering. This policy will be enforced on:

- SUBJECTS: External entities that send network traffic to the TOE.
- INFORMATION: All IP-based traffic to and from that destination.
- OPERATIONS: Pass network traffic.

5.2.5. PrivUserAccess SFP (TSP_FMT)

The security function “Security Management” (TSF_FMT) restricts management of TOE security functions to the authorized system administrator.

5.3. Security Functional Requirements

The TOE satisfies the SFRs delineated in Table 10. The rest of this section contains a description of each component and any related dependencies.

Table 10: TOE Security Functional Requirements

Functional Component ID	Functional Component Name
FAU_GEN.1	Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1	Audit review
FAU_SAR.2	Restricted audit review
FAU_STG.1	Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4	Prevention of audit data loss
FCS_COP.1	Cryptographic operation
FDP_ACC.1	Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1	Security attributed based access control
FDP_IFC.1	Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1	Simple security attributes
FDP_RIP.1	Subset residual information protection
FDP_UCT.1	Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1	Data exchange integrity
FIA_AFL.1	Authentication failure handling
FIA_UAU.2	User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.7	Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.2	User identification before any action
FMT_MOF.1	Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MTD.1	Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1	Security Roles
FPT_STM.1	Reliable time stamp
FTP_TRP.1	Trusted Path

5.3.1. Class FAU: Security Audit

5.3.1.1. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamp

FAU_GEN.1.1: The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- b. All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
- c. [the events specified in Table 11 below].

FAU_GEN.1.2: The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [the entries specified at the top of Table 11 below].

Table 11: Audit Events

<p>The audit log will have the following fixed size entries:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Entry number (an integer value from 1 to the number of entries in the audit log) • Event Date (mm/dd/yy) • Event Time (hh:mm:ss) • Event ID (a unique integer value – see table entries below) • Event Description (a brief description of an entry that should match the unique Entry ID value – see table entries below) • Entry Data (This value is any additional data that is logged for an audit log entry – see table entries below) 		
Event ID	Event Description	Entry Data Contents
1	System startup	Device name; Device serial number
2	System shutdown	Device name; Device serial number
3	ODIO Standard started	Device name; Device serial number
4	ODIO Standard complete	Device name; Device serial number

5	Print Job	Job name; User Name; Completion Status; IIO status; Accounting User ID; Accounting Account ID
6	Network Scan Job	Job name; User Name; Completion Status; IIO status; Accounting User ID; Accounting Account ID; total-number-net-destination; net-destination
7	LanFax job	Job name; User Name; Completion Status; IIO status; Accounting User ID; Accounting Account ID; total-fax-recipient-phone-numbers; fax-recipient-phone-numbers.
9	Email Job	Job name; User Name; Completion Status; IIO status; Accounting User ID; Accounting Account ID; total-number-of-smtp-recipients; smtp-recipients
10	Audit Log Disabled	Device name; Device serial number
11	Audit Log Enabled	Device name; Device serial number
16	ODIO Full started	Device name Device serial number
17	ODIO Full complete	Device name Device serial number Overwrite Status
20	Scan to Mailbox job	Job name or Dir name User Name Completion Status IIO status
21	Delete File/Dir	Job name or Dir name User Name Completion Status IIO status

23	Scan to Home	UserName Device name Device serial number Completion Status (Enabled/Disabled)
30	SA login	Device name Device serial number Completion Status (Success or Failed)
31	User Login	UserName Device name Device serial number Completion Status (Success or Failed)
32	Service Login	Service name Device name Device serial number Completion status (Success or Failed).
33	Audit log download	UserName Device name Device Serial Number Completion status (Success or Failed).
34	IIO feature status	UserName Device name Device serial number IIO Status (enabled or disabled)
35	SA password changed	UserName Device name Device serial number Completion status
36	Audit log Transfer	UserName Device name Device serial number Completion status
37	SSL	UserName Device name Device serial number Completion status (Enabled/Disabled).
38	X509 certificate	UserName Device name Device serial number Completion Status

		(Created/uploaded/Downloaded).
41	IP Filtering Rules	UserName Device name Device serial number Completion Status (Configured/enabled/disabled).
42	Network Authentication	UserName Device name Device serial number Completion Status (Enabled/Disabled)
43	Device clock	UserName Device name Device serial number Completion Status (time changed/date changed)
44	SW upgrade	Device name Device serial number Completion Status (Success, Failed)
45	Cloning	Device name Device serial number Completion Status (Success, Failed)
46	Secure scanning	Device name Device serial number Completion Status (Certificate validation success, failed)
50	Process Terminated	Device name Device serial number Process name
51	ODIO scheduled	Device name Device serial number ODIO type (Standard) Scheduled time ODIO status (Started/Completed/canceled) Completion Status (Success/Failed/Canceled)

Application note: The data line of each field size entry might exceed the assigned size and will result in truncating the data in an entry.

5.3.1.2. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

- FAU_SAR.1.1: The TSF shall provide [system administrator(s)] with the capability to read [all information] from the audit records.
- FAU_SAR.1.2: The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

5.3.1.3. FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
- FAU_SAR.2.1: The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access.

5.3.1.4. FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

- Hierarchical to: None.
- Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
- FAU_STG.1.1: The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.
- FAU_STG.1.2: The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

5.3.1.5. FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss

- Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3.
- Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
- FAU_STG.4.1: The TSF shall overwrite the oldest stored audit records and [no other actions to be taken] if the audit trail is full.

5.3.2. Class FCS: Cryptographic Support

5.3.2.1. FCS_COP.1 (SSL 1) Cryptographic operation

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [digital signature generation and verification, and key establishment] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [RSA (CAVP Certificate No. 719)] and cryptographic key sizes [1024 bits or smaller key sizes required for SSLv3.1 non-capable clients] that meet the following: [SSLv3.1 standard].

5.3.2.2. FCS_COP.1 (SSL 2) Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [session encryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [TDES (CAVP Certificate No. 990)] and cryptographic key sizes [168 bits] that meet the following: [SSLv3.1 standard].

5.3.2.3. FCS_COP.1 (SSL 3) Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES (CAVP Certificate No. 1472)] and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [SSLv3.1 standard].

5.3.2.4. FCS_COP.1 (SSL 4) Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [cryptographic checksum generation and secure hash computation] in accordance with a

specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1 (CAVP Certificate No. 1331)] and cryptographic key sizes [160 bits] that meet the following: [SSLv3.1 standard].

5.3.2.5. FCS_COP.1 (UDE 1) Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] **on user data stored on the HDD** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES] and cryptographic key sizes [256 bit] that meet the following: [AES-256-FIPS-197 (CAVP Certificate No. 1471)].

5.3.2.6. FCS_COP.1 (UDE 2) Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [cryptographic checksum generation and secure hash computation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1 (CAVP Certificate No. 1331)] and cryptographic key sizes [160 bits] that meet the following: [SSLv3.1 standard].

5.3.3. Class FDP: User Data Protection

5.3.3.1. FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [PrivUserAccess SFP] on [

- Subjects: authorized users;
- Object: functions accessible via WebUI and Local UI;

- Operations: access management interfaces].

5.3.3.2. FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the [PrivUserAccess SFP] to objects based on the following: [<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Subjects: Authorized users – role;• Objects: functions accessible via WebUI and Local UI – role].
FDP_ACF.1.2	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [<p style="margin-left: 40px;">Authorized user(s) in System Administrator role will be granted access to the TOE security relevant functions accessible via the management interfaces].</p>
FDP_ACF.1.3	The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [no additional access rules].
FDP_ACF.1.4	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [no denial of access rules].

5.3.3.3. FDP_IFC.1 (IOW) Subset information flow control

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the [User Data Protection Policy (TSP_IOW)] on [<p style="margin-left: 40px;">subjects: the hard disk drive, fax card flash memory information: image information operations: storage and erase of the image information].</p>

5.3.3.4. FDP_IFF.1 (IOW) Simple security attributes

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
------------------	----------------------

- Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
- FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [User Data Protection Policy (TSP_IOW)] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [
- MFD Job
 - Type of the job (print; network scan; scan-to-email; copy; FAX; Copy/Print, Store and Reprint)
 - image information of the job
 - no security attributes].
- FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
- A MFD job of the type print, network scan, LanFax or scan-to-email may store image information in the reserved space on the hard disk drive.
 - A MFD job of the type fax may store image information in the Fax compact flash memory.
 - A MFD job of the type Copy/Print, Store and Reprint may store image information in a reserved space of the hard disk drive for the purpose of being reprinted at a later time].
- FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce [the following additional information flow control SFP rules
- When the TOE is turned back on after a power failure, all temporary document image data stored on the hard disk or fax card flash memory of abnormally terminated jobs shall be overwritten according to DoD 5200.28-M.
 - Once the system administrator has invoked standard ODIO, the space on the hard disk drive reserved for temporary and stored document image data shall be overwritten according to DoD 5200.28-M until the complete space is erased or the function is canceled by the system administrator. The temporary document image data on the fax card flash memory shall be zeroized until the complete space is erased or the function is canceled by the system administrator.
 - Once the system administrator has invoked a full ODIO, the space on the hard disk drive reserved for temporary and stored document image and directory data shall be

overwritten according to DoD 5200.28-M until the complete space is erased or the function is canceled by the system administrator. The temporary document image data, the Fax mailbox and the dial directory on the fax card flash memory shall be zeroized until the complete space is erased or the function is canceled by the system administrator.

].

FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [none].

FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [

- Except for Copy/Print, Store and Reprint jobs, a MFD job of the type copy or embedded fax must not store image information on the hard disk drive.].

5.3.3.5. FDP_IFC.1 (FLOW) Subset information flow control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [information flow control policy TSP_FLOW] on [subjects: SIP, the network controller, the FAX board information: fax image information and job data, command messages operations: receiving a fax, sending command messages, receiving command messages, copy operation of FAX image data, sending a FAX].

5.3.3.6. FDP_IFF.1 (FLOW) Simple security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [information flow control policy TSP_FLOW] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [

- the copy controller (SIP)
 - copy operation from/to the shared memory area of the FAX board in progress or not
- the network controller

- no security attributes
- the FAX board
 - PSTN port in use or not
- fax image information and job data
 - address of the memory where the data is stored (on the copy controller or on the FAX board)
- command messages
 - Type of the command message between FAX board and copy controller

].

FDP_IFF.1.2

The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [

- The copy controller is allowed to copy fax image information and job data from the shared memory of the FAX board to its own memory.
- The copy controller is allowed to copy fax image information and job data from its own memory to the shared memory of the FAX board.
- The FAX board is allowed to send out a fax over PSTN once the copy controller has signaled the end of the copy operation to the shared memory area.
- The FAX board is allowed to signal the copy controller “Fax received” once the PSTN connection has been terminated.
- The network controller is allowed to send image information and respective commands to the copy controller.

].

FDP_IFF.1.3

The TSF shall enforce [the following additional information flow control SFP rules

- The FAX board is allowed to send command messages to the copy controller.
- The copy controller is allowed to send command messages to the FAX board.

].

- FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [none].
- FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [
- The copy controller is not allowed to send fax image information to the network controller.
 - The network controller is not allowed to send commands to the FAX board.
-].

5.3.3.7. FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER) Subset information flow control

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
- FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [IPFilter SFP] on [
- Subjects: External entities that send traffic to the TOE;
 - Information: All IP-based traffic to/from that source/destination;
 - Operations: send or receive network traffic].

5.3.3.8. FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER) Simple security attributes

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization.
- FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [IPFilter SFP] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [
- Subjects: External entities that send traffic to the TOE
 - IP address,
 - Information: IP Package]
 - Source IP address, protocol used (TCP or UDP)].
- FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
- The source IP address matches a rule in the TOE's rule base

- If configured, the destination transport layer port matches a rule in the TOE's rule base.]
- FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [implicit allow if no rules have been defined].
- FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: [if the rule is the default all].
- FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [if there are no rules with matching security attributes].

Application Note: When custom rules have not been defined by the system administrator, the default rule (allow all traffic) will apply. Because it is a wildcard rule, all IP addresses, ports and protocols (either TCP or UDP) will be a match for allowed traffic.

5.3.3.9. FDP_IFC.1 (SSL) Subset information flow control

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
- FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [SSLSec SFP] on [
- Subjects: Web clients;
 - Information: All web-based management traffic to/from that client;
 - Operations: receiving HTTP traffic].

5.3.3.10. FDP_IFF.1 (SSL) Simple security attributes

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
- FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [SSLSec SFP] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [
- Subjects: web clients and servers
 - IP address and/or DNS name
 - Information: X.509 certificates
 - RSA public and private keys; IP address or DNS name of the owner of the certificate].

- FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
- SSL session establishment and maintenance are in accordance with the SSLv3.1 standard.
 - The SSL cryptographic operations are in accordance with the SSLv3.1 standard.
 - The signature on the X.509 certificate received by the MFD is valid].
- FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [no additional information flow control SFP rules].
- FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: [no additional rules based on security attributes that explicitly authorize information flows].
- FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny any information flow based on the following rules: [HTTP management traffic without an SSL tunnel].

5.3.3.11. FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 1) Subset residual information protection

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of **temporary image files will be overwritten according to DoD 5200.28-M** upon the deallocation of the temporary image files from the following objects: [print, network scan or scan-to-email job].

Application Note: This SFR shall ensure that all temporary document image data written to the hard disk drive will be overwritten once the respective print, network scan or scan-to-email job is finished.

5.3.3.12. FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 2) Subset residual information protection

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of **temporary image files will be overwritten with zeroes** upon the deallocation of the temporary image files from the following objects: [embedded fax job].

Application Note: The embedded fax card flash memory overwrite is not compliant with DoD 5200.28-M.

5.3.3.13. FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 3) Subset residual information protection

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of **stored image files will be overwritten according to DoD 5200.28-M** upon the deallocation of the stored image files from the following objects: [stored Copy/Print, Store and Reprint jobs].

Application Note: This SFR shall ensure that all stored document image data written to the hard disk drive will be overwritten once the respective Copy/Print, Store and Reprint job is deleted.

5.3.3.14. FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [SSLSec SFP] to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.

5.3.3.15. FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]

FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [SSLSec SFP] to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion, or replay errors.

FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification, deletion, insertion, or replay has occurred.

5.3.4. Class FIA: Identification and Authentication

5.3.4.1. FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 1) Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1	The TSF shall detect when [<u>3</u>] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [authentication at the local user interface].
FIA_AFL.1.2	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been <u>met</u> , the TSF shall [lockout the SA login for a period of 3 minutes on the Local User Interface].

5.3.4.2. FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 2) Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1	The TSF shall detect when [<u>1</u>] unsuccessful authentication attempts occurs related to [authentication at the Web User Interface].
FIA_AFL.1.2	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been <u>met</u> , the TSF shall [require that the SA re-authenticate].

5.3.4.3. FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 3) Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1	The TSF shall detect when [1] unsuccessful authentication attempts occurs related to [remote network authentication].
FIA_AFL.1.2	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been <u>met</u> , the TSF shall [rely on the network authentication device to lock out the user account].

5.3.4.4. FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action

Hierarchical to:	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification
FIA_UAU.2.1	The TSF shall require each system administrator and authorized user to be successfully authenticated before

allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that **system administrator and authorized user**.

5.3.4.5. FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback

Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [obscured feedback] to the **system administrator and CAC user** while the authentication is in progress.

5.3.4.6. FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action

Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each **system administrator and authorized user** to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that system administrator and authorized user.

5.3.5. Class FMT: Security Management

5.3.5.1. FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior

Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions [

- Immediate Image Overwrite (IIO),
- On Demand Image Overwrite (ODIO)
- Network Authentication
- Audit Logging
- SSL
- IP Filtering
- IPv6
- Disk Encryption
- Common Access Card Use]

to [the system administrator].

5.3.5.2. FMT_MTD.1 (AUT) Management of TSF data

Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to clear, delete, [create,
read (download)] the [
• Audit log]
to [the system administrator].

5.3.5.3. FMT_MTD.1 (FILTER) Management of TSF data

Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to query, modify, delete,
[create] the [
• IP filter rules]
to [the system administrator].

5.3.5.4. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions: [
• Enable/disable Immediate Image Overwrite (IIO)
[TSF_IOW] (Local User Interfaces);
• Enable/disable On Demand Image Overwrite (ODIO)
[TSF_IOW] (Local User Interface),
• Enable/disable Common Access Card use (Local
User Interface)
• Change password (Web and Local User Interfaces);
• Invoke ODIO [TSF_IOW] (Web and Local User
Interfaces);
• Abort ODIO [TSF_IOW] (only Local User Interface,
and only if invoked at the Local User Interface)
• Create a recurrence schedule for “On Demand” image
overwrite (Web User Interface);

- Enable/disable audit function (Web User Interface);
- Transfer the audit records (if audit is enabled) to a remote trusted IT product (Web User Interface);
- Enable/disable SSL (Web User Interface);
- Create/upload/download X.509 certificates (Web User Interface);
- Enable/disable and configure (specify the IP address and/or IP address range, port and port range for remote trusted IT products (presumed) allowed to connect to the TOE via the network interface) IP filtering] (Web User Interface);
- Enable/disable and configure IPv6 (Web User Interface);
- Enable/disable and configure Disk Encryption (Web User Interface);
- Configure Common Access Card use (Web User Interface);
- Configure network authentication (Web User Interface);
- Configure device authorization (Web User Interface).

5.3.5.5. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1	The TSF shall maintain the roles [system administrator].
FMT_SMR.1.2	The TSF shall be able to associate human users with roles.

5.3.6. Class FPT: Protection of the TSF

5.3.6.1. FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No Dependencies
FPT_STM.1.1	The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

5.3.7. Class FTP: Trusted path/channels

5.3.7.1. FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path (NOTE: SSLSec SFP)

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: No dependencies
- FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and remote users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from modification or disclosure.
- FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit remote users to initiate communication via the trusted path.
- FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require use of the trusted path for [
- the security management functions available to the system administrator from the Web UI].

5.4. TOE Security Assurance Requirements

Table 12 identifies the security assurance components drawn from CC Part 3 Security Assurance Requirements EAL3 and includes the augmented SAR, ALC_FLR.3. The SARs are not iterated or refined from Part 3.

Table 12: EAL3 (augmented with ALC_FLR.3) Assurance Requirements

Assurance Component ID	Assurance Component Name	Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1	Security architecture description	ADV_FSP.1, ADV_TDS.1
ADV_FSP.3	Functional specification with complete summary	ADV_TDS.1
ADV_TDS.2	Architectural design	ADV_FSP.3
AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance	ADV_FSP.1
AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures	None
ALC_CMC.3	Authorisation controls	ALC_CMS.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.3	Implementation representation CM coverage	None
ALC_DEL.1	Delivery procedures	None
ALC_DVS.1	Identification of security measures	None

Assurance Component ID	Assurance Component Name	Dependencies
ALC_LCD.1	Developer defined life-cycle model	None
ALC_FLR.3	Systematic flaw remediation	None
ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims	ASE_INT.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_REQ.1
ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition	None
ASE_INT.1	ST introduction	None
ASE_OBJ.2	Security objectives	ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2	Derived security requirements	ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_ECD.1
ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition	None
ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification	ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.1, ADV_FSP.1
ATE_COV.2	Analysis of coverage	ADV_FSP.2, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.1	Testing: basic design	ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.2, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing	ATE_COV.1
ATE_IND.2	Independent testing-sample	ADV_FSP.2, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.1, ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.2	Vulnerability analysis	ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.1, ADV_TDS.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1

5.5. Security Requirements for the IT Environment

There are no security requirements for the IT Environment.

5.6. Explicitly Stated Requirements for the TOE

There are no explicitly stated requirements for the TOE.

5.7. Rationale for Security Functional Requirements

	O.AUDITS	O.RECOVER	O.FAXLINE	O.MANAGE	O.CONTROL_ACCESS	O.PROTECT_COM	O.PROTECT_DAT
FAU_GEN.1	X			X	X	X	
FAU_SAR.1	X						
FAU_SAR.2	X						
FAU_STG.1	X						
FAU_STG.4	X						
FCS_COP.1 (SSL 1 and SSL 3)						X	
FCS_COP.1 (SSL 2 and SSL 4)						X	
FCS_COP.1 (UDE 1 and UDE 2)							X
FDP_ACC.1					X		
FDP_ACF.1					X		
FDP_IFC.1 (IOW)		X					
FDP_IFF.1 (IOW)		X					
FDP_IFC.1 (FLOW)			X				
FDP_IFF.1 (FLOW)			X				
FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER)					X		
FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER)					X		
FDP_IFC.1 (SSL)						X	
FDP_IFF.1 (SSL)						X	
FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 1)		X					X
FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 2)		X					X
FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 3)		X					X
FDP_UCT.1						X	
FDP_UIT.1						X	
FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 1)				X			
FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 2)				X			
FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 3)				X			
FIA_UAU.2				X			
FIA_UAU.7				X			
FIA_UID.2				X			

	O.AUDITS	O.RECOVER	O.FAXLINE	O.MANAGE	O.CONTROL_ACCESS	O.PROTECT_COM	O.PROTECT_DAT
FMT_MOF.1		X		X	X	X	
FMT_MTD.1 (AUT)				X			
FMT_MTD.1 (FILTER)				X	X		
FMT_SMF.1		X		X	X	X	
FMT_SMR.1		X		X	X	X	
FPT_STM.1	X					X	
FTP_TRP.1						X	

O.AUDITS	<p>FAU_GEN.1 ensures that the TOE is able to generate time-stamped audit records of a specified set of security-relevant events related to TOE operations.</p> <p>FAU_SAR.1 and FAU_SAR.2 ensure that the TOE is able to make available only to users granted explicit “read” access (TOE administrators) audit information in a form suitable for viewing and evaluation/analysis.</p> <p>FAU_STG.1 and FAU_STG.4 ensure that the TOE is able to prevent unauthorized modification of audit trail records and, when the audit trail file is full, is able to overwrite the oldest stored audit records without other modification to stored records.</p> <p>FPT_STM.1 ensures that the TOE provides a reliable timestamp for inclusion in the audit log.</p>
O.RECOVER	<p>FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 1) , FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 2) ensure that residual temporary document data does not remain on the mass storage device or compact flash memory once the corresponding job has completed processing.</p> <p>FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 3) ensures that residual stored document data does not remain on the mass storage device once the system administrator has determined that the stored jobs and data are no longer necessary.</p> <p>FDP_IFF.1 (IOW) together with FDP_IFC.1 (IOW) ensures that all</p>

	<p>temporary document image data of abnormally terminated jobs will be overwritten once the TOE is turned back on after a power failure. Additionally, these two requirements ensure that the complete space reserved for temporary document image data can be overwritten “on demand” by the system administrator.</p> <p>FMT_SMF.1 requires that there is a possibility to invoke this ODIO function. FMT_MOF.1 specifies that the function can be enabled or disabled by the system administrator. FMT_SMR.1 manages the role “system administrator”.</p>
O.FAXLINE	<p>FDP_IFC.1 (FLOW) and FDP_IFF.1 (FLOW) define the rules according to which an information flow between network controller, copy controller and FAX board (if installed) is allowed. By implementing a store-and-forward principle in both directions, a direct interconnection between the PSTN and the internal network is not possible.</p>
O.MANAGE	<p>FAU_GEN.1 ensures that the TOE is able to generate time-stamped audit records of a specified set of security-relevant events related to TOE operations.</p> <p>FMT_SMF.1 ensures that the security management functions (i.e., enable/disable IIO and ODIO, change system administrator password, invoke/abort ODIO, enable/disable Network Authentication, enable/disable Audit Logging, enable/disable SSL, enable/disable IP Filtering) are available on the TOE.</p> <p>FMT_MOF.1 restricts the access to these management functions to the system administrator. FMT_SMR.1 manages the role “system administrator”.</p> <p>FIA_UAU.2 and FIA_UID.2 ensure that system administrators are authenticated (and implicitly identified) before accessing the security functionality of the TOE. FIA_UAU.7 ensures that only obscured feedback generated by the authentication process is provided to system administrators before successful authentication.</p> <p>FIA_UAU.2 and FIA_UID.2 ensure that the TOE enforces authorized users to identify and authenticate before being able to use the installed network options of the TOE.</p> <p>FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 1) ensures that the TOE takes specific and immediate self-protection action when the set threshold of unsuccessful login attempts by the System Administrator is reached for the Local User Interface.</p> <p>FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 2) provides an appropriate error message to the user’s web browser when the set threshold of unsuccessful login attempts by the System Administrator is reached for the Web User Interface.</p> <p>FMT_MTD.1 (all) ensures that the TOE enforces the PrivUserAccess</p>

	<p>SFP so that only system administrators have the capability to query, modify, delete, create, or install specified security attributes, keys and certificates, and IP filter rules.</p> <p>FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 3) uses the rules defined by remote network authentication assets to deny a user access after failed logins.</p>
<p>O.CONTROL_ACCESS</p>	<p>FAU_GEN.1 ensures that the TOE is able to generate time-stamped audit records of a specified set of security-relevant events related to TOE operations.</p> <p>FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 ensure that the TOE enforces the PrivUserAccess SFP on subjects, objects, information, and operations and applies specific rules on all operations involving controlled subjects and objects, limiting access to management interfaces to the System Administrator.</p> <p>FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER) and FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER) ensure that the IP_Filter SFP is enforced to control and protect information flow between controlled subjects (IP address, protocol) based on specific subject and information security attributes to enable the transmission and receipt of user data in a protected manner.</p> <p>FMT_SMF.1 requires that there is a possibility to invoke the IP Filter function. FMT_MOF.1 specifies that the function can be enabled or disabled by the system administrator. FMT_SMR.1 manages the role “system administrator”.</p> <p>FMT_MTD.1 (FILTER) ensures that the TOE enforces the PrivUserAccess SFP so that only system administrators have the capability to query, modify, delete, or create IP filter rules.</p>
<p>O.PROTECT_CO M</p>	<p>FAU_GEN.1 ensures that the TOE is able to generate time-stamped audit records of a specified set of security-relevant events related to TOE operations.</p> <p>FCS_COP.1 (all but UDE1 and 2) ensure that the TOE provides the cryptographic support capabilities necessary to assure secure communication between TOE components and remote trusted.</p> <p>FDP_IFC.1 (SSL), FDP_IFF.1 (SSL), FDP_UCT.1, and FDP_UIT.1, and SSLSec SFP are enforced to control and protect information flow between controlled subjects based on specific subject and information security attributes to enable the transmission and receipt of management data in a protected manner.</p> <p>FMT_SMF.1 requires that there is a possibility to invoke the SSL, and IP Filtering functions. FMT_MOF.1 specifies that these functions can be enabled or disabled by the system administrator. FMT_SMR.1 manages the role “system administrator”.</p>

	<p>FTP_TRP.1 ensures that the TOE provides communications channels between itself and remote trusted IT distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.</p> <p>FPT_STM.1 ensures that the TOE provides a reliable timestamp for inclusion in cryptographic operations.</p>
O.PROTECT_DAT	<p>FCS_COP.1(UDE 1 and 2) ensures that the TOE provides the cryptographic support necessary to assure data protection for stored.</p> <p>FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 1) and FDP_RIP.1 (IOW2) protect data by ensuring that residual temporary document data does not remain on the mass storage device once the corresponding job has completed processing.</p> <p>FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 3) protects data by ensuring that stored document data and directory information does not remain on the mass storage device once the system administrator has determined that the stored jobs and data are no longer necessary.</p>

5.8. Rationale for Security Assurance Requirements

This ST has been developed for multi-function digital image processing products incorporating Image Overwrite Security function, an Authentication and Authorization function, an Audit Logging function, an IP Filtering function, and cryptographic network communications protocols. The TOE environment will be exposed to only a low level of risk because the TOE sits in office space where it is under almost constant supervision. Agents cannot physically access the HDD or FAX without disassembling the TOE. Agents have no means of infiltrating the TOE with code to effect a change. As such, the Evaluation Assurance Level 3 is appropriate.

That Assurance Level is augmented with ALC_FLR.3, Systematic flaw remediation. ALC_FLR.3 ensures that instructions and procedures for the reporting, configuration management, and remediation of identified security flaws are in place and their inclusion is expected by the consumers of this TOE.

5.9. Rationale for Dependencies

5.9.1. Security Functional Requirement Dependencies

Table 13 is a cross-reference of the functional components, their related dependencies, and whether the dependency was satisfied.

Table 13: SFR Dependencies Status

Functional Component ID	Dependency (ies)	Satisfied
FAU_GEN.1	FPT_STM.1	Yes
FAU_SAR.1	FAU_GEN.1	Yes
FAU_SAR.2	FAU_SAR.1	Yes
FAU_STG.1	FAU_GEN.1	Yes
FAU_STG.4	FAU_STG.1	Yes
FCS_COP.1 (SSL 1 and SSL 3)	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1	No ⁴
	FCS_CKM.4	No ⁴
FCS_COP.1 (SSL 2 and SSL 4)	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1	No ⁴
	FCS_CKM.4	No ⁴
FCS_COP.1 (UDE 1 and UDE 2)	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1	No ⁴
	FCS_CKM.4	No ⁴
FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACF.1	Yes
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACC.1	Yes
	FMT_MSA.3	No ⁵
FDP_IFC.1 (IOW)	FDP_IFF.1	Yes, FDP_IFF.1 (IOW)
FDP_IFF.1 (IOW)	FDP_IFC.1	Yes, FDP_IFC.1 (IOW)
	FMT_MSA.3	No ⁶

⁴The dependency of FCS_COP.1 (all) on FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.4 is not met because CCS Instruction #4, dated 28 July 2008, does not require that the FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.4 dependencies be met when just an algorithm but not the entire module is validated.

⁵The dependency of FDP_ACF.1 and FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER and SSL) on FMT_MSA.3 is not met because none of these functions support "a) **managing** the group of roles that can specify initial values; b) **managing** the permissive or restrictive setting of default values for a given access control SFP; c) **management** of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values." (CC Part 2 Page 106). The TOE does not give system administrators the option of **managing** or specifying default values, permissive or otherwise for the FILTER and SSL services (FDP_IFF). In fact, these features are configured and, with the exception of IP Filter rules, cannot be modified by the system administrator other than to enable or disable them. The TOE also does not give system administrators the option of **managing** or specifying default values, permissive or otherwise, for the creation of user accounts (FDP_ACF). It is for these reasons that the dependencies on FMT_MSA.3 are not and cannot be expected to be met.

⁶The dependency of FDP_IFF.1 (IOW and FLOW) on FMT_MSA.3 is not met because none of these functions support "a) **managing** the group of roles that can specify initial values; b) **managing** the permissive or restrictive setting of default values for a given access control SFP; c) **management** of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values." (CC Part 2 Page 106). The TOE does not give system administrators the option of **managing** or specifying default values, permissive or otherwise for the Fax

Functional Component ID	Dependency (ies)	Satisfied
FDP_IFC.1 (FLOW)	FDP_IFF.1	Yes, FDP_IFF.1 (FLOW)
FDP_IFF.1 (FLOW)	FDP_IFC.1	Yes, FDP_IFC.1 (FLOW)
	FMT_MSA.3	No ⁶
FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER)	FDP_IFF.1	Yes, FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER)
FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER)	FDP_IFC.1	Yes, FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER)
	FMT_MSA.3	No ⁶
FDP_IFC.1 (SSL)	FDP_IFF.1	Yes, FDP_IFF.1 (SSL)
FDP_IFF.1 (SSL)	FDP_IFC.1	Yes, FDP_IFC.1 (SSL)
	FMT_MSA.3	No ⁵
FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 1)	None	
FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 2)	None	
FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 3)	None	
FDP_UCT.1	FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1	Yes, FTP_TRP.1 (SSL)
	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	Yes, FDP_IFC.1 (SSL)
FDP_UIT.1	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	Yes, FDP_IFC.1 (SSL)
	FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1	Yes, FTP_TRP.1 (SSL)
FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 1)	FIA_UAU.1	Yes, hierarchically by FIA_UAU.2
FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 2)	FIA_UAU.1	Yes, hierarchically by FIA_UAU.2
FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 3)	FIA_UAU.1	Yes, hierarchically by FIA_UAU.2
FIA_UAU.2	FIA_UID.1	Yes, hierarchically by FIA_UID.2. Identification of the system administrator at the Local User Interface is implicit -- the administrator will identify themselves by pressing the "Access" hard button. Identification of the system administrator at the Web user Interface is explicit

Separation (which an architecture) or for the IIO or ODIO services. In fact, these features are configured and cannot be modified by the system administrator other than to enable or disable some of their features.

Functional Component ID	Dependency (ies)	Satisfied
		-- the administrator will identify themselves by entering the username "admin" in the authentication dialog window.
FIA_UAU.7	FIA_UAU.1	Yes, hierarchically by FIA_UAU.2
FIA_UID.2	None	
FMT_MOF.1	FMT_SMF.1	Yes
	FMT_SMR.1	Yes
FMT_MTD.1 (AUT)	FMT_SMF.1	Yes
	FMT_SMR.1	Yes
FMT_MTD.1 (FILTER)	FMT_SMF.1	Yes
	FMT_SMR.1	Yes
FMT_SMF.1	None	
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1	Yes, hierarchically by FIA_UID.2. Identification of the system administrator at the Local User Interface is implicit -- the administrator will identify themselves by pressing the "Access" hard button. Identification of the system administrator at the Web user Interface is explicit -- the administrator will identify themselves by entering the username "admin" in the authentication dialog window.
FPT_STM.1	None	
FTP_TRP.1	None	

5.9.2. Security Assurance Requirement Dependencies

SAR dependencies identified in the CC have been met by this ST as shown in Table 14.

Table 14: EAL3 (Augmented with ALC_FLR.3) SAR Dependencies Satisfied

Assurance Component ID	Dependencies	Satisfied
ADV_ARC.1	ADV_FSP.1, ADV_TDS.1	Yes
ADV_FSP.3	ADV_TDS.1	Yes
ADV_TDS.2	ADV_FSP.3	Yes
AGD_OPE.1	ADV_FSP.1	Yes
AGD_PRE.1	None	
ALC_CMC.3	ALC_CMS.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1	Yes Yes Yes
ALC_CMS.3	None	
ALC_DEL.1	None	
ALC_DVS.1	None	
ALC_LCD.1	None	
ALC_FLR.3	None	
ASE_CCL.1	ASE_ECD.1 ASE_INT.1 ASE_REQ.1	Yes Yes Yes
ASE_ECD.1	None	
ASE_INT.1	None	
ASE_OBJ.2	ASE_SPD.1	Yes
ASE_REQ.2	ASE_ECD.1 ASE_OBJ.2	Yes Yes
ASE_SPD.1	None	
ASE_TSS.1	ASE_ARC.1 ASE_INT.1 ASE_REQ.1	Yes Yes Yes
ATE_COV.2	ADV_FSP.2 ATE_FUN.1	Yes Yes
ATE_DPT.1	ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.2, ATE_FUN.1	Yes Yes Yes
ATE_FUN.1	ATE_COV.1	Yes
ATE_IND.2	ADV_FSP.2 AGD_OPE.1 AGD_PRE.1 ATE_COV.1 ATE_FUN.1	Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Assurance Component ID	Dependencies	Satisfied
AVA_VAN.2	ADV_ARC.1	Yes
	ADV_FSP.1	Yes
	ADV_TDS.1	Yes
	AGD_OPE.1	Yes
	AGD_PRE.1	Yes

6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION

This section presents an overview of the security functions implemented by the TOE and the Assurance Measures applied to ensure their correct implementation.

6.1. TOE Security Functions

This section presents the security functions performed by the TOE to satisfy the identified SFRs in Section 5.1.1.

- Image Overwrite (TSF_IOW)
- Information Flow Security (TSF_FLOW)
- System Authentication (TSF_AUT)
- Network Identification (TSF_NET_ID)
- Security Audit (TSF_FAU)
- Cryptographic Support (TSF_FCS)
- Management Data Protection – SSL (TSF_FDP_SSL)
- User Data Protection – IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER)
- Security Management (TSF_FMT)
- User Data Protection - AES (TSF_EXP_UDE)

6.1.1. Image Overwrite (TSF_IOW)

FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 1), FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 2), FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 3), FDP_IFC.1 (IOW), FDP_IFF.1 (IOW)

The TOE implements an image overwrite security function to overwrite temporary files created during the printing, network scan, or scan to email, and LanFax process.

The network controller spools and processes documents to be printed or scanned. Temporary files are created as a result of this processing on a reserved section of the hard disk drive of the network controller. The definition of this reserved section is statically stored within the TOE and cannot be manipulated. Immediately after the job has completed, the files are overwritten using a three pass overwrite procedure as described in DOD 5200.28-M.

User image files associated with the Copy/Print, Store and Reprint feature may be stored long term for later reprinting. When a job is selected for reprint, the stored job is resubmitted to the system. Temporary files created during processing are overwritten at the completion of the job using the 5200.28-M algorithm. The stored jobs are not overwritten until the jobs are deleted by the user, or when the System Administrator executes a full on-demand image overwrite. A standard on-demand image overwrite (ODIO) overwrites all files written to temporary storage areas of the HDD and the temporary storage area of the Fax card flash memory. A full ODIO overwrites those files as well as the Fax mailbox/dial directory (in Fax card flash memory), Scan to mailbox data, and all files that have been stored at the request of a user via Copy/Print, Store and Reprint jobs.

The embedded fax card buffers incoming and outgoing fax images in flash memory. Immediately after an embedded fax job has completed, the files are overwritten using a single-pass zeroization method. The embedded fax card flash memory overwrite is not compliant with DoD 5200.28-M.

The image overwrite security function can also be invoked manually by the system administrator (ODIO). Once invoked, the ODIO cancels all print and scan jobs, halts the printer interface (network), overwrites the contents of the reserved section on the hard disk according to DoD 5200.28-M, overwrites the contents of the embedded fax card flash memory using a single-pass zeroization method, and then the network controller reboots. The embedded fax card flash memory overwrite is not compliant with DoD 5200.28-M. A scheduling function allows ODIO to be executed on recurring basis as set up by the System Administrator.

If ODIO was started from the Local UI and while ODIO is running, the Local UI will display a message stating that ODIO is in progress and an abort button. Before pressing the abort button, authentication as system administrator is required. If the System Administrator cancels ODIO at the Local UI, the process stops at a sector boundary. As part of the cancellation, the file system is rebuilt. This means, all temporary files are deleted but may not be overwritten as defined in DoD 5200.28-M. The ODIO cannot be aborted from the Web Interface. If ODIO was started from the Web Interface, it cannot be aborted from either the WebUI or Local UI.

If the TOE is turned back on after a power failure, the TOE automatically starts an IIO procedure for all abnormally terminated print or scan jobs stored on the HDD and on the fax card flash memory prior to coming "on line".

6.1.2. Information Flow Security (TSF_FLOW)

FDP_IFC.1 (FLOW), FDP_IFF.1 (FLOW)

The TOE provides separation between the optional FAX processing board and the network controller and prevents therefore an interconnection between the PSTN and the internal network as illustrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2: TSF_FLOW

There are two methods of communication between the copy controller and the FAX: Commands (which also includes the respective responses) and Image data transfer (which also includes job data like other FAX machines). Commands and responses are sent and received via a shared memory block on the FAX card by both the FAX card and the copy controller. Image data is also transferred in both directions using a shared memory area on the FAX card, but only by the copy controller.

For outgoing FAX the copy controller will push image data to the FAX card. The image data can come from the network controller or another part of the TOE (e.g., the optical scanner). The copy controller will inform the FAX card when it has finished the transfer of the image data. The FAX card cannot access the shared memory area until the copy controller has completed its transfer of outgoing FAX image data. Likewise the copy controller cannot access the shared memory area until the FAX card has completed its transfer of incoming FAX image data.

For incoming FAX the FAX card will inform the copy controller when there is a FAX available for collection after the transmission of the fax has finished and the PSTN connection is terminated. The copy controller will pull image data from the FAX card. The copy controller sends the image data only to the IOT software, which prints the FAX to paper.

The addresses of the shared memory areas of the FAX card and the types of command/response messages are statically defined within the TOE. No user or system administrator is able to change these values.

6.1.3. Authentication (TSF_AUT)

FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.2, FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 1), FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 2), FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 3), FMT_SMR.1

The system administrator must authenticate by entering a password prior to being granted access to the system administration functions (see 6.1.9). While the system administrator is typing the password, the TOE obscures⁷ each character entered to hide the value entered. Identification of the system administrator at the Local User Interface is explicit -- the administrator will identify themselves by entering the username "admin" in the authentication window. Identification of the system administrator at the Web user Interface is explicit -- the administrator will identify themselves by entering the username "admin" in the authentication dialog window.

The authentication process will be delayed at the Local User Interface, for 3 minutes if 3 wrong passwords were entered in succession. If a wrong password is entered at the web interface, the TOE will give an error message that has to acknowledge before another attempt to complete the authentication process can be made.

There are no more roles than "System Administrator" which can authenticate.

The Web user interface can be configured such that authentication of the system administrator is based upon individual credentials. If configured for local authentication the system requires the system administrator to enter a username and password. The system will authenticate the user against an internal database. Alternatively the system may be configured such that authentication is performed remotely by the network's domain controller. In this case, the SA must enter a valid fully-qualified username and password. In both cases, privileged user status is granted based upon successful authentication.

6.1.4. Network Identification (TSF_NET_ID)

FIA_AFL.1 (AUT 3), FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.7

The TOE can prevent unauthorized use of the installed network options (network scanning, scan-to-email, and LanFax); the network options available are determined (selectable) by the system administrator. To access a network service, the user is required to provide a user name and password which is then validated by the designated authentication server (a trusted remote IT entity). The user is not required to login to the network; the account is authenticated by the server as a valid user. The remote authentication services supported by the TOE are: CAC two-factor local authentication, LDAP v4, Kerberos v5 (Solaris), Kerberos v5 (Windows 2000/2003), NDS (Novell 4.x, 5.x), and SMB (Windows NT.4x/2000/2003). The cryptography used by remote authentication services has been scoped out of the evaluation.

⁷ The LUI obscures input with the asterisk character. The specific character used to obscure input at the WebUI is browser dependent

When a user authenticates using the CAC method the PIN number is only displayed on screen via obscured feedback (asterisks).

The TOE maintains the username from a successful authentication during the context of the job, and this value is entered into the audit log as the *user name*.

Application Note: There is a difference between authentication and accounting (for a discussion see Application Note in Section 6.1.5, Security Audit). The TOE defines one user authentication method: Network Authentication. Also note, in CAC two-factor local authentication mode, the user's certificate on the card is not currently checked for validity (using OCSP).

6.1.5. Security Audit (TSF_FAU)

FAU_GEN.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4, FMT_MTD.1 (AUT), FTP_STM.1

The TOE generates audit logs that track events/actions (e.g., print/scan/fax job submission) to logged in users, and each log entry contains a timestamp. The audit logs are only available to TOE administrators and can be downloaded via the web interface for viewing and analysis.

The audit log tracks system start-up/shutdown, ODIO start/completion, and print, scan, email, local fax, and LanFax jobs. Copy jobs are not tracked. By adopting a policy of regularly downloading and saving the audit logs, users can satisfy the tracking requirements for transmission of data outside of the local environment, as required by such legislation as HIPAA, Sarbanes-Oxley, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, etc.

The Web UI presents the only access to the audit log; the audit log is not viewable from the local UI. The Web UI screen contains a button labeled "Save as Text File" that is viewable by all users. If this button is selected, and the system administrator is not already logged in through the interface, then a system administrator login alert window is presented. Once the system administrator has successfully logged in, then the audit log file becomes downloadable.

Application Note: The device provides both authentication and accounting – both serve different functions. The "Accounting" feature allows for authorizing and tracking device usage to specific accounts for usage accounting purposes. The TOE defines (see Guidance documentation) three accounting methods: *Auditron*, *Xerox Standard Accounting (XSA)*, and *Network Accounting*; these three methods are mutually exclusive.

The Guidance documentation defines only one user authentication method: *Network Authentication* (see Section 6.1.3 above). *Network Authentication* is mutually exclusive with *Auditron* and *XSA*, however, it can be enabled concurrently with *Network Accounting*.

The *Auditron* method utilizes a PIN-based identification system that is maintained in a database resident on the copy controller board. The *XSA* method is also PIN-based, however its database is resident on the network controller board. *Network Accounting*

works with an external Accounting server (i.e., Equitrac or Control Systems). *Network Accounting* uses full character set IDs.

For network scan, email, and IFax (not included in the evaluation) jobs the accounting IDs (i.e., PINS) required by the *Auditron*, *XSA*, or *Network Accounting*, will be recorded in the audit log.

If *Network Authentication* is enabled, then the name required by *Network Authentication* will be recorded in the audit log.

For print and LanFax jobs, the network username associated with the logged in user at the client workstation will be recorded in the audit log.

6.1.6. Cryptographic Support (TSF_FCS)

FCS_COP.1 (SSL 1), FCS_COP.1 (SSL 2), FCS_COP.1 (SSL 3), FCS_COP.1 (SSL 4)

The TOE utilizes digital signature generation and verification (RSA), data encryption (TDES, AES), key establishment (RSA) and cryptographic checksum generation and secure hash computation (SHA-1) to support secure communication between the TOE and remote trusted products. Those packages include provisions for the generation of checksum/hash values and meet the following standards: 3DES – NIST 800-67 (CAVP Certificate No. 990); SHA-1 – FIPS-180-2 (CAVP Certificate No. 1331), AES-256-FIPS-197 (CAVP Certificate No. 1472), SSLv3.1, RSA - FIPS 186-2 (CAVP Certificate No. 719).

6.1.7. Management Data Protection – SSL (TSF_FDP_SSL)

FCS_COP.1 (SSL 1), FCS_COP.1 (SSL 2), FCS_COP.1 (SSL 3), FCS_COP.1 (SSL 4), FDP_IFC.1 (SSL), FDP_IFF.1 (SSL), FDP_UCT.1 , FDP_UIT.1, FTP_TRP.1

The TOE provides support for SSL and allows the TOE to act as either an SSL server, or SSL client, depending on the function the TOE is performing. SSL v3.1 must be enabled before the system administrator can retrieve the audit log. SSL functionality also permits the TOE to be administered from the Web UI.

All information that is transmitted between the TOE and a remote trusted product using SSL v3.1 is protected from both disclosure and modification. The disclosure protection is accomplished by the symmetric encryption of the data being transferred using the 3DES EDE (aka, Triple DES – defined in NIST 800-67 (CAVP Certificate No. 990)) cipher or AES cipher and a per connection key generated as part of the SSLv3.1 protocol. The modification protection is accomplished by the use of the HMAC-SHA1 (Hashed Message Authentication Code – defined by IETF RFC2104) that is incorporated into the SSLv3.1 record transfer protocol. The key establishment is accomplished by the use of RSA.

Except for the cryptography used to protect the audit logs (SSL v3.1), the cryptography used for management data protection has been scoped out of the evaluation.

6.1.8. User Data Protection – IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER)

FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER), FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER), FMT_MTD.1 (FILTER)

The TOE provides the ability for the system administrator to configure a network information flow control policy based on a configurable rule set. The information flow control policy (IPFilter SFP) is defined by the system administrator through specifying a series of rules to “accept,” “deny,” or “drop” packets. These rules include a listing of IP addresses that will be allowed to communicate with the TOE. Additionally rules can be generated specifying filtering options based on port number given in the received packet.

Note: The TOE cannot enforce the IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER) security function when it is configured for AppleTalk or IPX networks.

6.1.9. Security Management (TSF_FMT)

FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MOF.1

Only authenticated system administrators can enable or disable the Image Overwrite function, enable or disable the On Demand Image Overwrite function, change the system administrator password, and start or cancel an On Demand Image Overwrite operation.

While IIO or ODIO can be disabled, doing so will remove the TOE from its evaluated configuration.

Additionally, only authenticated system administrators can assign authorization privileges to users, establish a recurrence schedule for “On Demand” image overwrite, enable/disable SSL support, create/install X.509 certificates, enable/disable and download the audit log, enable/disable and configure (rules) IP filtering, enable/disable disk encryption, enable/disable use of Common Access Cards, configure Common Access Card use, configure network authentication, configure device authorization, or enable/disable and configure IPv6.

6.1.10. User Data Protection - AES (TSF_EXP_UDE)

FCS_COP.1 (UDE 1), FCS_COP.1 (UDE 2)

The TOE utilizes data encryption (AES) and cryptographic checksum generation and secure hash computation (SHA-1) to support encryption and decryption of designated portions of the hard disk where user files may be temporarily stored. Those packages meet the following standards: AES-256-FIPS-197 (CAVP Certificate No. 1471), SHA-1 – FIPS-180-2 (CAVP Certificate No. 1331).

7. ACRONYMS

The following acronyms are used in this Security Target:

ACRONYM	DEFINITION
AUT	Authentication
CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
CM	Configuration Management
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DMA	Direct Memory Access
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
FDP	User Data Protection CC Class
FIA	Identification and Authentication CC Class
FMT	Security Management CC Class
FPT	Protection of Security Functions
FSP	Functional Specification
HDD	Hard Disk Drive
HLD	High Level Design
IIO	Immediate Image Overwrite
ISO	International Standards Organization
IPSec	Internet Protocol Security
ISO 15408	Common Criteria 2.2 ISO Standard
IT	Information Technology
MFD	Multifunction Device
MOF	Management of Functions
MTD	Management of TSF Data
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
ODIO	On Demand Image Overwrite
OSP	Organization Security Policy
PP	Protection Profile
PSTN	Publicly Switched Telephone Network
RSA	Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SA	System Administrator
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement

ACRONYM	DEFINITION
SIP	Scanner Image Processor
SM	Security Management
SMR	Security Management Roles
SMTP	Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMPv3	Simple Network Management Protocol, Version 3
SSL	Secure Socket Layer
SSLv2	Secure Socket Layer, Version 2
SSLv3.1	Secure Socket Layer, Version 3.1
ST	Security Target
TDES	Triple DES
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSC	TSF Scope of Control
TSF	TOE Security Function
TSP	TOE Security Policy
UAU	User Authentication
UDP	User Data Protection
UI	User Interface