



**COMMON CRITERIA PROTECTION PROFILE**

**for**

**NEW GENERATION CASH REGISTER FISCAL APPLICATION SOFTWARE 2**

**(NGCRFAS-2 PP)**



**TSE-CCCS/PP-005**

<b>Revision No</b>	1.1
<b>Revision Date</b>	25.12.2014
<b>Document Code</b>	
<b>File Name</b>	NGCRFAS-2 PROTECTION PROFILE
<b>Prepared by</b>	Oğuz DEMİGROĞLU
<b>Approved by</b>	Salih SARI

## Revision History

<u>Revision No</u>	<u>Revision Reason</u>	<u>Date of Revision</u>
0.1	First Draft	04.12.2014
1.1	Final Version	25.12.2014

## CONTENTS

<b>1. PP INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>4</b>
1.1 PP Reference.....	4
1.2 TOE Overview .....	5
<b>2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS.....</b>	<b>11</b>
2.1 CC Conformance Claim .....	11
2.2 PP Claim.....	11
2.3 Package Claim.....	11
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale .....	11
2.5 Conformance Statement .....	11
<b>3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION.....</b>	<b>12</b>
3.1 Introduction .....	12
3.2 Threats.....	16
3.3 OSP.....	19
3.4 Assumptions .....	21
<b>4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES .....</b>	<b>22</b>
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE.....	22
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment .....	22
4.3 Security Objective Rationale .....	24
<b>5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION.....</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .....</b>	<b>30</b>
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE.....	30
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE .....	59
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale .....	59
<b>7. ACRONYMS.....</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>8. BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>	<b>80</b>

## 1. PP INTRODUCTION

This Protection Profile (PP) describes the following items:

- The Target of Evaluation (TOE) as a product and its position in production life cycle,
- The security environment of the TOE includes: the assets to be protected, the threats to be encountered by the TOE , the development environment and production utilization phases,
- The security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of integrity and confidentiality of application data and programs,
- Protection of the TOE and associated documentation during the development and production phases,
- The Information Technology (IT) security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements and the TOE assurance requirements.

### 1.1 PP Reference

**Title:** Common Criteria Protection Profile for New Generation Cash Register Fiscal Application Software-2 (NGCRFAS-2 PP)

**Sponsor:** Presidency of Revenue Administration (PRA)

**Editor(s):**

Prepared by Oğuz DEMİGROĞLU

Approved by Salih SARI

**CC Version:** 3.1 (Revision 4)

**Assurance Level:** Minimum assurance level for this PP is EAL 2.

**General Status:** Final

**Version Number:** 1.1 as of 25<sup>th</sup> December 2014

**Registration:** TSE-CCCS/PP-005

**Key words:** New Generation Cash Register, EMV, EFT-POS, PRA, Electronic Registration Unit.

**Note:** A glossary of terms used in the Protection Profile is given ACRONYMS section of the document (Section 7).

## **1.2 TOE Overview**


The TOE addressed by this Protection Profile (PP) is an application software which is the main item of a Fiscal Cash Register (FCR). TOE is used to process the transaction amount of purchases which can be viewed by both seller and buyer. Since transaction amount is used to determine tax revenues; secure processing, storing and transmission of this data is very important.

The FCR is mandatory for first-and second-class traders and is not mandatory for sellers who sell the goods back to their previous seller as completely the same as the purchased good.

In addition to TOE, which is the main item of FCR, FCR may consist of several other hardware and software components as described in Section 1.2.1, 1.2.2 for full functionality. TOE and related components are given in Figure 1. Usage and major security features of TOE are described in section 1.2.3.

### **1.2.1 General overview of the TOE and related components**

Figure 1 shows the general overview of the TOE and its related components as regarded in this PP. The green part of Figure 1 is the TOE. Yellow parts; that are given as input/output interface, fiscal memory, daily memory, database, ERU, fiscal certificate memory; are TOE's environmental components which are crucial for functionality and security. Connections between the TOE and its environment are also subject to evaluation since these connections are made over the interfaces of the TOE.



**Figure 1** TOE and related components

## 1.2.2 Required Non-TOE Hardware/Software

Software and hardware environment of the TOE are described below.

### 1.2.2.1 Software environment of TOE

TOE runs at the top of an operating system's kernel, file-system as in a typical software environment. This structure is shown in Table 1.

**Table 1** Typical software environment of TOE

File System
Operating System Kernel

In addition to TOE, following software components are also necessary for security and functionality of the FCR:

- Application runs on an **operating system** which supports following features
  - at least 32-bit data processing capacity
  - multi-processing
  - IPv4 and IPv6
  - NTP (Network Time Protocol)

- **Database, which is** used to store sales data, has the following features;
  - i. Database has data recording, organizing, querying, reporting features
  - ii. Database stores sales records for main product groups (food, clothing, electronics, glassware etc.) and sub-product groups (milk, cigarette, fruit, trousers etc.) in order to track detailed statistics
  - iii. Database has an indexing mechanism

### 1.2.2.2 Hardware Environment of TOE

In addition to TOE, following hardware components are also necessary for security and functionality of the FCR:

- **Fiscal memory**
  - i. **Fiscal memory** has following features;
    - a. Fiscal memory has the capacity to store at least 10 years (3650 days) of data,
    - b. Fiscal memory keeps data at least 5 years after the capacity specified in (a) has been reached,
    - c. Fiscal memory has to be fixed within FCR in a way that it cannot be removed without damaging the chassis.
    - d. Fiscal memory is protected by mesh cover,
    - e. Fiscal memory has the ability to be protected against magnetic and electronic threats,  
When the connection between fiscal memory and main processor is broken, FCR enters in maintenance mode,
    - f. The data stored in the fiscal memory is not be lost in case of power off,
    - g. Fiscal memory accepts only positive amounts from the application and the peripherals,
    - h. FCR checks "Z" reports from fiscal memory during device start-up. In case where there are days for which Z report was not generated, FCR will be able to run in normal mode only after it generates Z reports for the missing days. Seasonal firms can take cumulative Z report by specifying date and time range.
  - ii. Fiscal Memory includes following data;
    - a. Fiscal symbol, company code and identification number of the device,
    - b. Cumulative sum of the total sales and Value Added Tax (VAT) amounts for all sales receipts, starting from the device activation time (i.e. first use),
    - c. Date and number of "Z" reports with total sales and VAT per day,

d. The number of receipts per day.

- **Daily memory** has following features;
  - i. Receipt total and total VAT amount for each receipt are to be stored in the daily memory instantly. This data can be transmitted to PRA information systems (PRA - IS), instantly or daily depending on demand.
  - ii. Data in the daily memory, which is not already transmitted to fiscal memory, cannot be modified in an uncontrolled way.
  - iii. Data transmitted from daily memory to fiscal memory is to be kept in daily memory for at least 10 days.
  - iv. Z reports, taken at the end of the day; and X reports, taken within the current day are produced by using the data in the daily memory.
  - v. Following values are stored in the daily memory
    - a. total VAT amount per day,
    - b. total daily sales values per day grouped by payment type
    - c. payment type (Cash, credit card etc.)
    - d. number of receipts.
- FCR supports X.509 formatted digital certificate generated by Authorized Certificate Authority. This **Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)** compatible digital certificate is called **fiscal certificate** and is used for authentication and secure communication between PRA-IS and FCR through Trusted Service Manager (TSM). For physical security, FCR is protected by electronic and mechanic systems called **electronic seal**. FCR uses **cryptographic library** for secure communication with PRA-IS and TSM
- **Electronic Record Unit (ERU)** is used to keep second copy of the receipt and has following features;
  - i. ERU stores information about receipts and reports (X, Z) in a retrievable form.
  - ii. ERU has at least 1.2 million row capacity. ERU may be included in the sealed part of the FCR. In this case ERU must have at least 40 million row capacity.
  - iii. Data stored in ERU cannot be modified
  - iv. ERU also supports features specified in “*Fiscal Cash Register General Communique Serial Number: 67, Part A*” which is about Law No: 3100 except item (ii) above.



- FCR devices support at least one of the internal ETHERNET, PSTN or mobile communication technology (GPRS etc.) interfaces and EFTPOS-integrated FCR devices support at least two of these interfaces for communication with PRA-IS (for data transfer) and TSM system (for parameter management and software update). External ETHERNET may be accepted in case the data is encrypted in fiscal unit.
- Incoming and outgoing data traffic for FCR passes over a **firewall**
- FCR supports the use of **EFTPOS**.
- FCR has a **printer** to print sales receipt.
- FCR needs some input/output devices for functionalities listed below;
  - i. FCR has a **keyboard unit**. It may optionally use a touch screen additionally.
  - ii. FCR has separate displays for **cashier and buyer**.
  - iii. FCR has an **internal battery** to keep time information.

### **1.2.3 Major security and functional features**

The major functional and security features of the TOE are described below.

#### **1.2.3.1 TOE functional features**

The TOE is a part of a FCR which is an electronic device for calculating and recording sales transactions and for printing receipts. TOE provides the following services;

- i. TOE stores sales data in fiscal memory.
- ii. TOE stores total receipt and total VAT amount for each receipt in daily memory.
- iii. TOE is able to generate reports (X report, Z report etc.).
- iv. TOE is able to transmit Z reports, receipt information, sale statistics and other information determined by PRA to PRA-IS in PRA Messaging Protocol format.
- v. TOE is able to start the communication with PRA-IS and respond to requests instantly originated from PRA-IS.
- vi. TOE stores records of important events as stated in PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6] and transmits them to PRA-IS in PRA Messaging Protocol format in a secure way.
- vii. TOE is able to be used by users in secure state or maintenance mode. Roles and modes of operation are described in 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 respectively.

#### **1.2.3.2 TOE major security features**

The TOE provides following security features;

- i. TOE supports access control.
- ii. TOE supports secure communication between main processor and fiscal memory.  
However, for the cases where the main processor and the fiscal memory are included within the same electronic seal, secure communication is not mandatory. TOE is able to detect disconnection between main processor and fiscal memory and enter into the maintenance mode.
- iii. TOE supports usage of ITU X509 v3 formatted certificate and its protected private key for authentication and secure communication with PRA-IS and TSM.
- iv. TOE supports secure communication between FCR-PRA-IS and FCR-TSM.
- v. TOE ensures the integrity of event data, sales data, authentication data, characterization data and FCR parameters.
- vi. TOE records important events defined in PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6] and sends urgent event data immediately to PRA-IS in a secure way.
- vii. TOE detects physical attacks to FCR and enters into the maintenance mode in such cases.

#### **1.2.4 TOE type**

TOE is a software application embedded within FCR.

## **2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS**

### **2.1 CC Conformance Claim**

This protection profile claims conformance to:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 [1]
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 [2]
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 [3]

As follows

- Part 2 conformant,
- Part 3 conformant.

The

- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 [4]

has to be taken into account.

### **2.2 PP Claim**

This PP does not claim conformance to any protection profile.

### **2.3 Package Claim**

The current PP is conformant to the following security requirements package:

- Assurance package EAL2 conformant to CC, part 3.

### **2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale**

Since this PP does not claim conformance to any protection profile, this section is not applicable.

### **2.5 Conformance Statement**

This PP requires demonstrable conformance of any ST or PP claiming conformance to this PP.

### **3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

##### **3.1.1 External Entities**

###### **PRA-IS**

PRA-IS takes sales data and event data from FCR by sending query with parameters to FCR through TSM.

###### **Trusted Service Manager**

TSM is the system which is used to load parameters, update software and manage FCR.

###### **Attacker**

Attacker tries to manipulate the TOE in order to change its expected behavior and functionality. Attacker tries to breach confidentiality, integrity and availability of the FCR.

###### **PRA On-site Auditor**

PRA On-site Auditor is an employee of PRA who performs onsite audits to control the existence of expected FCR functionalities by using the rights of FCR Authorised User.

###### **Certificate storage**

The certificate storage holds certificates and private key used for authentication and secure communication. Certificate storage is protected inside a physical and logical tampering system.

###### **Time Information**

FCR gets time information from trusted server. Time information is used during receipt, event, fiscal memory record, daily memory record and ERU record creation and is also used to send information to PRA-IS according to FCR Parameters.

###### **Audit storage**

Audit storage can be any appropriate memory unit in FCR. Audit storage stores important events according to their criticality level (urgent, high, warning and information). List of events can be found in PRA messaging protocol document [6].

###### **Storage unit**

Storage units of FCR are database, fiscal memory, daily memory and ERU.

###### **Input interface**

Input interfaces provide necessary input data from input devices to the TOE. Input devices for FCR may be keyboard, barcode reader, QR code (matrix barcode) reader, order tracking device and global positioning devices.

### **External Device**

External device is the device which is used to communicate with FCR by using secure channel according to External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]

*Application Note 1: If the device provides Main Unit communication, the description given below shall also be included;*

#### **Main Unit**

Main Unit is an external device which is used for following actions;

- ✓ Provides visual interface for fiscal transaction,
- ✓ Provides input interface for fiscal transaction,
- ✓ Provides secure communication with TOE according to External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]

### **Output interface**

Output interfaces deliver outputs of the TOE to the output devices. Output devices for FCR may be printer, display etc.

## **3.1.2 Roles**

### **FCR Authorised User**

FCR Authorised User is the user who uses the functions of FCR and operates FCR by accessing the device over an authentication mechanism.

### **Authorised Manufacturer User**

Authorised Manufacturer User works for FCR manufacturer and conducts maintenance works on FCR.

*Application Note 2: If TOE provides FCR User (Cashier) as a role the below description shall also be added to Roles.*

#### **FCR User (Cashier)**

FCR user is the user who uses the sale functionality of FCR by using his/her identity

### 3.1.3 Modes of FCR

**Maintenance Mode:** Maintenance Mode is the mode that allows only Authorised Manufacturer User to fix FCR in case of any technical problem, to change date and time information; to review event data and to start update operation of TOE. FCR does not allow any fiscal transaction in maintenance mode. FCR enters this mode when the following occur;

- FCR Certificate check fails,
- Mesh cover monitoring check fails,
- A disconnection between fiscal memory and main processor occurs,
- Electronic seal is opened or forced by unauthorised persons,
- A technical problem is determined by FCR Manufacturer.

**Secure State Mode:** Secure State Mode is the mode that allows;

❖ FCR Authorised User;

- ✓ to configure FCR,
- ✓ to take fiscal and FCR reports

*Application Note 3: If TOE provides FCR User (Cashier) as a role the below description shall be added to modes of FCR. Extra proper functionalities may also be defined for FCR user.*

❖ FCR User;

- ✓ to do fiscal sales

### 3.1.4 Assets

#### **Sensitive data**

Sensitive data is used for secure communication with PRA-IS and TSM. Confidentiality and integrity of this asset need to be protected.

*Application Note 4: Sensitive data may consist of symmetric keys (TREK, TRAK, TRMK, TDK and TRMKD).*

- *TREK is used for provide confidentiality of data transfer to PRA-IS.*
- *TRAK is used for integrity control of data transferred to the PRA-IS.*
- *TDK is used for provide confidentiality of data transfer to the TSM.*
- *TRMK is used for key transportation from PRA-IS to TOE.*
- *TRMKD is used for key transportation from TSM to TOE.*

### **Event data**

Event data is used to obtain information about important events saved in audit storage. The integrity of this asset is crucial while stored in FCR and both integrity and confidentiality of this asset are important while it is transferred from TOE to PRA-IS. Event data is categorized in PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6].

### **Sales data**

Sales data is stored in storage unit. Sales data is required by PRA-IS to calculate tax amount and to provide detailed statistics about sales. The integrity of this asset has to be protected while stored in FCR; and both integrity and confidentiality have to be protected while it is transferred from TOE to PRA-IS.

### **Characterization data (Identification data for devices)**

Characterization data is a unique number assigned to each FCR by the manufacturer. PRA-IS uses characterization data for system calls to acquire sales data or event data of an FCR. Integrity of this asset has to be protected.

### **Authentication data**

Authentication data contains authentication information which is required for FCR Authorised User and Authorised Manufacturer User to gain access to FCR functionalities. Both integrity and confidentiality of this asset have to be protected.

### **Time Information**

Time information is stored in FCR and synchronized with trusted server. Time information is important when logging important events and sending reports to the PRA-IS. The integrity of this asset has to be protected.

### **Server Certificates**

Server certificates contain PRA-IS and TSM certificates ( $P_{PRA}$ ,  $P_{PRA-SIGN}$ ,  $P_{TSM}$  and  $P_{TSM-SIGN}$ )  
 $P_{PRA}$  and  $P_{PRA-SIGN}$  certificates are used for signing and encryption process during key transport between TOE and PRA-IS.

$P_{TSM}$  certificate is used for encryption process during key transport between TOE and TSM and  $P_{TSM-SIGN}$  is used for signature verification of FCR parameters by TOE.

### **FCR Parameters**

FCR parameters stored in FCR are updated by TSM after Z report is printed.

FCR parameters set;

- Sales and event data transferring time

- Criticality level of event data sent to the PRA-IS
- Maximum number of days that FCR will work without communicating with PRA-IS

### **3.2 Threats**

Threats averted by TOE and its environment are described in this section. Threats described below result from assets which are protected or stored by TOE or from usage of TOE with its environment.

#### **T.AccessControl**

Adverse action: Authenticated users could try to use functions which are not allowed.

(e.g.FCR Users gain access to FCR Authorised User management functions)

Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to FCR.

Asset: Event data, sales data, time information.

#### **T.Authentication**

Adverse action: Unauthorized users could try to use FCR functions.

Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has logical and physical access to the FCR

Asset: Sales data, event data, time information

#### **T.MDDData - Manipulation and disclosure of data**

Adverse action: This threat deals with four types of data: event data, sales data, characterization data and FCR parameters.

- An attacker could try to manipulate the event data to hide its actions and unauthorised access to the FCR, failure reports, and deletion of logs. An attacker also could try to disclose important events while transmitted between PRA-IS and FCR.
- An attacker could try to manipulate or delete the sales data generated by TOE which may result in tax fraud. In addition, an attacker also could try to disclose sales data while transmitted between PRA-IS and FCR. Manipulation and deletion of sales data may be caused by magnetic and electronic reasons.
- An attacker could try to manipulate the characterization data to cover information about tax fraud; to masquerade the user identity.
- An attacker could try to manipulate the FCR parameters to use FCR in undesired condition.



Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to the FCR.

Asset: Event data, sales data, characterization data, FCR parameters.

### **T.Eavesdrop - Eavesdropping on event data, sales data and characterization data**

Adverse action: An attacker could try to eavesdrop event data, sales data and characterization data transmitted between the TOE and the PRA-IS and also between the TOE and the distributed memory units (Fiscal memory, Database, Daily memory, ERU).

Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, physical and logical access to the FCR.

Asset: Characterization data, sales data, and event data.

### **T.Counterfeit - FCR counterfeiting**

Adverse action: An attacker could try to imitate FCR by using sensitive data (TREK, TRAK and TDK) while communicating with PRA-IS and TSM to cover information about tax fraud.

Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to the FCR.

Asset: Sensitive data (TRMK, TRMKD, TREK, TRAK and TDK)

### **T. Server counterfeiting**

Adverse action: An attacker could try to imitate PRA-IS and TSM by changing server certificates ( $P_{PRA}$ ,  $P_{PRA-SIGN}$ ,  $P_{TSM}$  and  $P_{TSM-SIGN}$ ) in FCR. In this way, the attacker could try to receive information from FCR while communicating with PRA-IS and to imitate TSM to set parameters to FCR.

Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to the FCR.

Asset: Server Certificates

### **T.Malfunction - Cause malfunction in FCR**

Adverse action: An attacker may try to use FCR out of its normal operational conditions to cause malfunction without the knowledge of TOE

Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical access to the FCR.

Asset: Sales data, event data.

### **T.ChangingTime**

Adverse action: An attacker may try to change time to invalidate the information about logged events and reports in FCR.

Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to the FCR.

Asset: Time Information.

### **3.3 OSP**

This section describes organizational security policies that must be satisfied.

#### **P.Certificate**

It has to be assured that certificates, which are installed at initialization step, are compatible with ITU X.509 v3 format. FCR contains FCR certificate, Certification Authority root certificate, and Certification Authority sub-root (subordinate) certificate; UpdateControl certificate; P<sub>PRA</sub> and P<sub>TSM</sub> certificates that are used for key transport process between FCR-PRA-IS and FCR-TSM; P<sub>PRA-SIGN</sub> and P<sub>TSM-SIGN</sub> certificates which are used by TOE for signature verification. UpdateControl certificate is used to verify the signature of the TOE.

#### **P.Certificates Installation**

It has to be assured that environment of TOE provides secure installation of certificates (P<sub>PRA</sub>, P<sub>PRA-SIGN</sub>, P<sub>TSM</sub>, P<sub>TSM-SIGN</sub>) into the FCR at initialization phase. Before the installation of certificates, it has to be assured that asymmetric key pair is generated in a manner which maintains security posture.

#### **P.Comm\_EXT - Communication between TOE and External Device**

It has to be assured that communication between TOE and external devices is encrypted using AES algorithm with 256 bits according to External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]

#### **P.InformationLeakage - Information leakage from FCR**

It has to be assured that TOE's environment provides a secure mechanism which prevents attacker to obtain sensitive information (secret key) when FCR performs encryption operation; i.e. by side channel attacks like SPA (Simple power analysis), SEMA (Simple Electromagnetic Analysis), DPA (Differential power analysis), DEMA (Differential electromagnetic analysis).

#### **P.SecureEnvironment**

It has to be assured that environment of TOE senses disconnection between fiscal memory and main processor. Then TOE enters into the maintenance mode and logs urgent event. Moreover, it has to be assured that fiscal memory doesn't accept transactions with negative amounts which results in a decrease of total tax value. Also it has to be assured that environment of TOE provides a mechanism that sales data in daily memory which is not reflected to the fiscal memory cannot be deleted and modified in an uncontrolled way. In addition to this, it has to be assured that sales data in ERU cannot be deleted and modified.

### **P.PhysicalTamper**

It has to be assured that TOE environment and TOE provide a tamper respondent system which is formed by electromechanical seals. It has to be assured that physical tampering protection system protects the keys (asymmetric key, symmetric key), the certificates, event data, characterization data, FCR parameters and sales data in FCR. It has to be assured that TOE logs this type of events and enters into the maintenance mode when physical tampering protection system detect unauthorised access. On the other hand it has to be assured that authorised access such as maintenance work or service works are logged.

It has to be also assured that physical tampering protection system (mesh cover) protects fiscal memory.

### **P.PKI - Public key infrastructure**

It has to be assured that IT environment of the TOE provides public key infrastructure for encryption, sign, key agreement and key transport

### **P.UpdateControl**

TOE is allowed to be updated by only TSM or Authorised Manufacturer User to avoid possible threats during this operation, FCR shall verify the signature of the new version of TOE to ensure that the TOE to be updated is signed by the correct organisation. Thus, the TOE to be updated is ensured to be the correct certified version because only the certified versions will be signed. In addition, FCR shall check version of TOE to ensure that it is the latest version.

### **3.4 Assumptions**

This section describes assumptions that must be satisfied by the TOE's operational environment.

#### **A. TrustedManufacturer**

It is assumed that manufacturing is done by trusted manufacturers. They process manufacturing step in a manner which maintains IT security.

#### **A.Control**

It is assumed that PRA-IS personnel performs random controls on FCR. During these controls, PRA-IS personnel should check that tax amount and total amount printed values on receipt and sent to PRA-IS are the same. In addition to this, a similar check should be made for events as well.

#### **A.Initialisation**

It is assumed that environment of TOE provides secure initialization steps. Initialization step is consist of secure boot of operating system, and integrity check for TSF data. Moreover, it is assumed that environment of TOE provides secure installation of certificate to the FCR in initialization phase. Before certificate installation it is assumed that asymmetric key pair generated in a manner which maintains security posture.

#### **A. TrustedUser**

User is assumed to be trusted. It is assumed that for each sale a sales receipt is provided to the buyer.

#### **A.Activation**

It is assumed that environment of TOE provides secure activation steps at the beginning of the TOE operation phase and after each maintenance process.

#### **A. AuthorisedService**

It is assumed that repairing is done by trusted authorised services. The repairing step is processed in a manner which maintains legal limits.

#### **A.Ext\_Key**

It is assumed that External Device (EFT-POS, Main Unit) generates strong key for communicating with TOE

## **4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES**

This chapter describes security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment.

### **4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE**

This part describes security objectives provided by the TOE.

#### **O.AccessControl**

TOE must control authenticated user's access to functions and data by using authorization mechanism.

#### **O.Event**

TOE must record important events stated as in PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6].

#### **O.Integrity**

TOE must provide integrity for sales data, event data, characterization data, authentication data, sensitive data (TRMK, TRMKD, TREK, TRAK and TDK) and FCR parameters.

#### **O.Authentication**

TOE must run authentication mechanism for users.

#### **O.Function**

TOE must ensure that processing of inputs to derive sales data and event data is accurate.

TOE must ensure that time information is accurate by doing anomaly detection.

TOE must enter a maintenance mode when maintenance mode events occur in section 3.1.3

#### **O.Transfer**

TOE must provide confidentiality, integrity and authenticity for sales data, event data, characterization data transferred to the PRA-IS and FCR parameters transferred from TSM. TOE also provides integrity for sales data and event data transferred from memories to other memories.

*Application Note 5: TOE must provide confidentiality, integrity and authenticity for information send/received during external device communication.*

### **4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment**

This part describes security objectives provided by the operational environment.

#### **OE.Manufacturing**

Manufacturer should ensure that FCR is protected against physical attacks during manufacturing.

#### **OE.Delivery**

Authorised Manufacturer User must ensure that delivery and activation of the TOE done by a secure way.

### **OE.KeyGeneration**

Asymmetric key generation mechanism shall be accessible only by trusted persons.

### **OE.SecureStorage**

Asymmetric private key shall be stored within smartcard or Secure-IC's.

Keys (asymmetric key, symmetric key), certificates, event data, characterization data and sales data shall be stored within secure environment protected by electronic seal.

### **OE.KeyTransportation**

Transportation and installation of asymmetric private key and server certificates ( $P_{PRA}$ ,  $P_{PRA-SIGN}$ ,  $P_{TSM}$ ,  $P_{TSM-SIGN}$ ) to the FCR must be done by protecting their confidentiality and integrity.

### **OE.TestEnvironment**

Before FCR activation; test interfaces (functions, parameters) inserted in TOE shall be disabled or removed.

### **OE.StrongAlgorithm**

Environment of TOE shall use asymmetric private keys for signature generation by using libraries of smartcard and Secure-IC's. These libraries used in FCR shall be strong. They should also have protection against side channel analysis (SPA, DPA, SEMA, DEMA, and DFA).

### **OE.UpgradeSoftware**

FCR software updates should be get passed verdict from Common Criteria maintenance or reevaluation procedures (according to update type) before installed to the FCR. This will be validated by the FCR, using the cryptographic signature control methods.

### **OE.TrustedUser**

Users shall act responsibly.

### **OE.Control**

PRA Onsite Auditor must check FCR functionality by controlling tax amount on the receipt and tax amount sent to the PRA-IS.

### **OE.External Device**

External Device should generate strong key for communicating with TOE.

## **OE.SecureEnvironment**

Fiscal memory shall not accept transactions with negative amounts which results in a decrease of total tax value.

Tampering protection system shall protect fiscal memory with mesh cover.

Environment of TOE provides secure initialization steps. Initialization step is consist of secure boot of operating system, and integrity check for TSF data.

### **4.3 Security Objective Rationale**

Table-2 provides security problem definition covered by security objectives. Threats and OSPs are addressed by security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment. Assumptions are addressed by only security objectives for the operational environment.



**Table 2** Security Objective Rationale

	Threats							OSPs							Assumptions								
	T.AccessControl	T. Authentication	T.MDDData	T.Eavesdropping	T.Server Counterfeiting	T.Counterfeit	T.Malfunction	T.ChangingTime	P.Certificate	P.Certificate Installation	P.SecureEnvironment	P.PhysicalTamper	P.PKI	P.InformationLeakage	P.Comm_EXT	P.UpdateControl	A.Ext_Key	A.TrustedManufacturer	A.Control	A. AuthorisedService	A.Initialisation	A.Activation	A.TrustedUser
O.AccessControl	X							X				X											
O.Event	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X											
O.Integrity			X	X	X	X					X	X											
O.Authentication	X	X													X								
O.Function							X	X			X												
O.Transfer			X	X											X								
OE.External Device																X							
OE.Manufacturing																	X						
OE.Delivery												X									X		

OE.KeyGeneration								X	X												X		
OE.SecureStorage											X												
OE.KeyTransportation									X			X									X		
OE.TestEnvironment																X							
OE.StrongAlgorithm												X											
OE.UpgradeSoftware														X									
OE.TrustedUser																				X			X
OE.Control																			X				
OE.SecureEnvironment			X	X		X				X	X									X			

Justification about Table 2 is given below;

**T.AccessControl** is addressed by O.AccessControl to control user access to functions and data; O.Authentication to provide authentication mechanism for users; O.Event to log all access attempts.

**T.Authentication** is addressed by O.Authentication to ensure that user is authenticated to the FCR; O.Event to log successful/unsuccessful authentication attempts.

**T.MDDData** is addressed by O.Integrity to ensure integrity of sales data, event data, characterization data and FCR parameters in FCR with logical and physical security features; O.Transfer to ensure integrity, confidentiality and authenticity of sales data, event data and characterization data during transferring to PRA-IS and FCR parameters during transferring from TSM to FCR; O.Event to log unexpected behavior of these memories and unexpected behavior in transferring data; OE.SecureEnvironment to provide electronic seal.

**T.Eavesdropping** is addressed by O.Transfer to ensure confidentiality of sales data, event data and characterization data during communication with PRA-IS; O.Integrity to ensure the integrity of event data, sales data and characterization data; O.Event to log physical tamper; by OE.SecureEnvironment to provide electronic seal

**T.Counterfeit** is addressed by O.Integrity to ensure the integrity of sensitive data ( TREK, TRAK, TDK); O.Event to log physical tamper; OE.SecureEnvironment to provide electronic seal.

**T.Server Counterfeiting** is addressed by O.Integrity to ensure the integrity of server certificates ( $P_{PRA}$ ,  $P_{PRA-SIGN}$ ,  $P_{TSM}$  and  $P_{TSM-SIGN}$ ); O.Event to log physical tamper.

**T.Malfunction** is addressed by O.Function to ensure functions processing accurately; O.Event to log unexpected behavior of functions.

**T.ChangingTime** is addressed by O.Event to log unexpected changes in time information; by O.AccessControl to control user access to time information; by O.Function to ensure accuracy of time information.

**P.Certificate** is fulfilled by OE.KeyGeneration.

**P.Certificate Installation** is fulfilled OE.KeyGeneration and OE.KeyTransportation.

**P.SecureEnvironment** is fulfilled by OE.SecureEnvironment, O.Event, O.Integrity and O.Function.

**P.PhysicalTamper** is fulfilled by OE.SecureEnvironment, O.AccessControl, O.Event, O.Integrity and OE.SecureStorage.

**P.PKI** is fulfilled by OE.Delivery and OE.KeyTransportation.

**P.InformationLeakage** is fulfilled by OE.StrongAlgorithm to ensure that cryptographic algorithms used by FCR have side channel protection.

**P.Comm\_EXT** is fulfilled by O.Transfer.

**P. UpdateControl** is upheld by OE.UpgradeSoftware and O.Authentication.

**A.Ext\_Key** is upheld OE.External Device.

**A. TrustedManufacturer** is upheld by OE.Manufacturing and OE.TestEnvironment.

**A.Control** is upheld by OE.Control.

**A. AuthorisedService** is upheld by OE.TrustedUser.

**A.Initialisation** is upheld by OE.KeyGeneration, OE.SecureEnvironment and OE.KeyTransportation.

**A.Activation** is upheld by OE.Delivery.

**A. TrustedUser** is upheld by OE.TrustedUser.

## **5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION**

This protection profile does not use any components defined as extensions to CC part 2.

## 6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

This chapter describes the security functional and the assurance requirements which have to be fulfilled by the TOE. Those requirements comprise functional components from CC part 2 and the assurance components as defined for the Evaluation Assurance Level 2 from CC part 3.

The following notations are used:

**Refinement** operation (denoted in such a way that added words are in **bold text** and changed words are ~~crossed-out~~): is used to add details to a requirement, and thus further restricts a requirement.

**Selection** operation (denoted by *italicised bold text* and placed in square bracket): is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a requirement.

**Assignment** operation (denoted by underlined text and placed in square bracket): is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates assignment.

**Iteration** operation are identified with a slash (e.g. “(/)”).

### 6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE

This chapter defines the security functional requirements for the TOE according to the functional requirements components drawn from the CC part 2 version 3.1 revision 4.

#### 6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit

##### 6.1.1.1 FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation

FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FPT\_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

FAU\_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- b) All auditable events for the [*not specified*] level of audit; and
- c) [the auditable events specified in PRA Messaging Protocol document[6]].

FAU\_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [none].

### **6.1.1.2 FAU\_SAR Security audit review**

FAU\_SAR.1 Audit review

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation.

FAU\_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [Authorised Manufacturer User] with the capability to read [all event data] from the audit records.

FAU\_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

### **6.1.1.3 FAU\_STG Security audit event storage**

FAU\_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation

FAU\_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.

FAU\_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

FAU\_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss

Hierarchical to: FAU\_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss

Dependencies: FAU\_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

FAU\_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [overwrite the oldest stored audit records] and [none] if the audit trail is full.

## **6.1.2 Class FCO Communication**

### **6.1.2.1 FCO\_NRO Non-repudiation of origin**

FCO\_NRO.2 Enforced proof of origin

Hierarchical to: FCO\_NRO.1 Selective proof of origin

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

FCO\_NRO.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the generation of evidence of origin for transmitted [Sales data and event data] at all times.

FCO\_NRO.2.2 The TSF shall be able to relate the [originator identity, time of origin] of the originator of the information, and the [body of the message] of the information to which the evidence applies.

FCO\_NRO.2.3 The TSF shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of origin of information to *[recipient]* given [immediately].

### **6.1.3 Class FCS Cryptographic Support**

#### **6.1.3.1 FCS\_CKM Cryptographic key management**

FCS\_CKM.1/TRMK Cryptographic key generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or  
FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [RNG] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

FCS\_CKM.1/TRMKD Cryptographic key generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or  
FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [RNG] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or



FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method [according to PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6]] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].

FCS\_CKM.1/ DHE-KEY Cryptographic key generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or  
FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [RNG] and specified cryptographic key sizes [2048 bits] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

FCS\_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV  $K_{\text{HMAC}}$  Cryptographic key generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or  
FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [PRF] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [RFC 5246].

FCS\_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV  $K_{\text{ENC}}$  Cryptographic key generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or  
FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [PRF] and specified cryptographic key sizes [AES:256 bits] that meet the following: [RFC 5246].

FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
 FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
 FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS\_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].

**Application Note 6:** Keys shall be deleted according to below Table 3.

**Table 3** Key Management Table

<b>Keys</b>	<b>When</b>
TREK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ After each one hundred connection with PRA-IS</li> <li>➤ Electronic seal is opened by authorized/unauthorized user</li> </ul>
TRAK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ After each one hundred connection with PRA-IS</li> <li>➤ Electronic seal is opened by authorized/unauthorized user</li> </ul>
TDK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ According to FCR Parameters</li> <li>➤ Electronic seal is opened by authorized/unauthorized user</li> </ul>
TRMK	After key transport from PRA-IS to TOE for TREK and TRAK
TRMKD	After key transport from PRA-IS to TOE for TDK
K <sub>ENC</sub>	Electronic seal is opened by authorized/unauthorized user
K <sub>HMAC</sub>	Electronic seal is opened by authorized/unauthorized user
DHE-KEY	After key agreement between TOE and External Device

**6.1.3.2 FCS\_COP Cryptographic operation**

FCS\_COP.1/TREK Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
 FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
 FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
 FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES in CBC mode] and cryptographic key sizes [AES:256 bits ] that meet the following: [NIST SP800-38A (CBC.AES256)].

FCS\_COP.1/TRAK Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption for integrity protection] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES in CBC mode] and cryptographic key sizes [AES:256 bits ] that meet the following: [NIST SP800-38A (CBC.AES256)].

FCS\_COP.1/TDK Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES in CBC mode] and cryptographic key sizes [AES:256 bits] that meet the following: [NIST SP800-38A (CBC.AES256)].

FCS\_COP.1/HASHING Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [hashing] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA2] and cryptographic key sizes [none] that meet the following: [FIPS 180-2].

FCS\_COP.1/TRMK-DEC Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES in CBC mode] and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [NIST SP800-38A (CBC.AES256)].

FCS\_COP.1/TRMKD-DEC Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES in CBC mode] and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [NIST SP800-38A (CBC.AES256)].

FCS\_COP.1/PUB-ENC Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [RSA] and cryptographic key sizes [2048 bits] that meet the following: [PKCS#1 v2.1 (RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5) ].

FCS\_COP.1/SIGN-VER Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [signature verification] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [RSA] and cryptographic key sizes [2048 bits] that meet the following: [PKCS#1 v1.5, SHA256 Type 2 (random padding)].

FCS\_COP.1/EXT-DEV KEYEXCHANGE Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [key agreement] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [DHE]and cryptographic key sizes [2048 bits] that meet the following: [NIST SP 800-56A].

FCS\_COP.1/EXT-DEV K<sub>ENC</sub> Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES with CBC] and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [NIST SP800-38A (CBC.AES256)].

FCS\_COP.1/EXT-DEV K<sub>HMAC</sub> Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption for integrity protection] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC SHA256] and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [FIPS 198-1 and NIST FIPS PUB 180-2].

#### **6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection**

##### **6.1.4.1 FDP\_ACC Access control policy**

FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP\_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] on [Subjects: FCR Authorised User and Authorized Manufacturer User]  
[Objects: Sales and event data, exchange rates, time information, P<sub>TSM</sub>, P<sub>PRA</sub>, P<sub>TSM-SIGN</sub> and P<sub>PRA-SIGN</sub>]  
[Operations: Secure state mode and maintenance mode actions],  
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].

*Application Note 7: If TOE does not provide Main Unit communication for fiscal transaction, you shall add list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP to above SFR for FCR User (Cashier).*

##### **6.1.4.2 FDP\_ACF Access control functions**

FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control

FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP\_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] to objects based on the following [Subjects: FCR Authorised User and Authorized Manufacturer User]  
[Subject Attributes: User Identity,Privileges]  
[Objects: Sales and event data, exchange rates, time information, P<sub>TSM</sub>, P<sub>PRA</sub>, P<sub>TSM-SIGN</sub> and P<sub>PRA-SIGN</sub>]  
[Object Attributes: Access Control List (Secure State Mode and maintenance mode access rights)]

Operations: Secure State Mode and Maintenance Mode actions describe in 3.1.3], [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].

FDP\_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [verify the operator's user identity and privileges].

FDP\_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [none].

FDP\_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [none].

*Application Note 8: If TOE does not provide Main Unit communication for fiscal transaction, you shall add "list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes" by the SFP to above SFR for FCR User (Cashier).*

#### **6.1.4.3 FDP\_ETC Export from the TOE**

FDP\_ETC.2/TSM Export of user data with security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

FDP\_ETC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and PRA-IS] when exporting user data, controlled under the SFP(s), outside of the TOE.

FDP\_ETC.2.2 The TSF shall export the user data with the user data's associated security attributes.

FDP\_ETC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the security attributes, when exported outside the TOE, are unambiguously associated with the exported user data.

FDP\_ETC.2.4 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when user data is exported from the TOE: [Communication with secure messaging according to PRA Messaging Protocol Document[6]].

FDP\_ETC.2 /EFTPOS Export of user data with security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_ETC.2.1	The TSF shall enforce the [ <u>Information Flow Control SFP with EFT-POS Device</u> ] when exporting user data, controlled under the SFP(s), outside of the TOE.
FDP_ETC.2.2	The TSF shall export the user data with the user data's associated security attributes.
FDP_ETC.2.3	The TSF shall ensure that the security attributes, when exported outside the TOE, are unambiguously associated with the exported user data.
FDP_ETC.2.4	The TSF shall enforce the following rules when user data is exported from the TOE: [ <u>Communication with secure messaging according to External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]</u> ].

**Application Note 9:** *If your device provides Main Unit communication you shall include SFR described below;*

FDP\_ETC.2 / MAIN UNIT Export of user data with security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

FDP\_ETC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with Main Unit] when exporting user data, controlled under the SFP(s), outside of the TOE.

FDP\_ETC.2.2 The TSF shall export the user data with the user data's associated security attributes.

FDP\_ETC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the security attributes, when exported outside the TOE, are unambiguously associated with the exported user data.

FDP\_ETC.2.4 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when user data is exported from the TOE: [Communication with secure messaging according to External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]].

#### **6.1.4.4 FDP\_IFC Information flow control policy**

FDP\_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION Subset information flow control



Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

FDP\_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and PRA- IS] on [subjects (TSM and PRA-IS) and objects (sales data, event data reports, FCR parameters, TREK, TRAK and TDK, TRMK and TRMKD)] as specified in PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6].

FDP\_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMMUNICATION Subset information flow control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

FDP\_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT-POS Device] on [subjects (EFT-POS) and objects (amount information in sales data)] as specified in External Device Communication Protocol Document [7].

*Application Note 10: If your device provides Main Unit communication you shall include SFR described below;*

FDP\_IFC.1/MAIN UNIT Subset information flow control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

FDP\_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with Main Unit] on [subjects (Main Unit) and objects (department information of purchased good, amount of purchased good, unit price of purchased good)] as specified in External Device Communication Protocol Document [7].

#### **6.1.4.5 FDP\_IFF Information flow control functions**

FDP\_IFF.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION Simple security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control  
FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP\_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and PRA-IS] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [TOE has ability to send reports related to sales data, event data reports and TRMK to PRA-IS by using subject identifier(IP/Port information) and object identifier (file name); TOE has ability to receive TREK and TRAK from PRA-IS by using subject identifier (IP/Port information) and object identifier (information label) according to PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6]; TOE has ability to receive FCR parameters from TSM by using subject identifier (IP/Port information) and object identifier (information label) according to PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6]; TOE has ability to receive TDK from TSM by using subject identifier (IP/Port information) and object identifier (information label) according to PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6]; TOE has ability to send TRMKD to TSM by using subject identifier (IP/Port information) and object identifier (information label) according to PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6]]

FDP\_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [Communication with secure messaging according to PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6]].

FDP\_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [none].

FDP\_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [none].

FDP\_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [none].

FDP\_IFF.1/EFT-POSCOMMUNICATION Simple security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control

FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

- FDP\_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT-POS Device] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [TOE has ability to send amount information to EFT-POS Device by using subject identifier (EFT-POS label and source port).TOE has ability to receive outcome of the operation conducted by the EFT-POS Device by using subject identifier (source port)]
- FDP\_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [Communication with secure messaging according to External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]].
- FDP\_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [none].
- FDP\_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [none].

***Application Note 11: If your device provides Main Unit communication you shall include SFR described below;***

FDP\_IFF.1/MAIN UNIT Simple security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control  
FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP\_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with Main Unit] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [TOE has ability to receive department information of purchased good, amount of purchased good and unit price of purchased good by using subject identifier (source port) and object identifier (information label)]

FDP\_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [Communication with secure messaging according to External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]].

FDP\_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [none].

FDP\_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [none].

FDP\_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [none].

#### **6.1.4.6 FDP\_ITC Import from the outside of the TOE**

FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP\_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.

FDP\_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.

FDP\_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: [assignment: additional importation control rules]

FDP\_ITC.2/TSM Import of user data with security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
[FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSD trusted channel, or  
FTP\_TRP.1 Trusted Path]  
FPT\_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency

FDP\_ITC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and PRA-IS] when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.

FDP\_ITC.2.2 The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data.

FDP_ITC.2.3	The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4	The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5	The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: [ <u>Communication with secure messaging according to PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6]</u> ].
<b>Application Note 12:</b> FCR parameters and TDK are imported from TSM to TOE. TREK and TRAK are imported from PRA-IS to TOE	
FDP_ITC.2/EFTPOS	Import of user data with security attributes
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSD trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path] FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
FDP_ITC.2.1	The TSF shall enforce the [ <u>Information Flow Control SFP with EFT-POS Device</u> ] when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2	The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data
FDP_ITC.2.3	The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4	The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5	The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: [ <u>Communication with secure messaging according to External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]</u> ].

**Application Note 13:** *If your device provides Main Unit communication you shall include SFR described below;*

FDP\_ITC.2/MAIN UNIT Import of user data with security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
[FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSD trusted channel, or  
FTP\_TRP.1 Trusted Path]  
FPT\_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency

FDP\_ITC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with Main Unit] when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.

FDP\_ITC.2.2 The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data

FDP\_ITC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user data received.

FDP\_ITC.2.4 The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.

FDP\_ITC.2.5 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE:  
[Communication with secure messaging according to External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]].

#### **6.1.4.7 FDP\_SDI/MEMORY Stored data integrity**

FDP\_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action

Hierarchical to: FDP\_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor ~~user data sales data stored in fiscal memory and ERU; event data, authentication data and characterization data~~ stored in containers controlled by the TSF for [integrity errors] ~~on all objects, based on the following attributes: [assignment: user data attributes]~~.

FDP\_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [generate an audit event and transmit it to the PRA-IS according to PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6] and then enter into the maintenance mode].

FDP\_SDI.2/DAILY and PRMTR Stored data integrity monitoring and action

Hierarchical to: FDP\_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor ~~user data sales data~~ stored in ~~containers~~ **daily memory and FCR parameters stored in containers** controlled by the TSF for [integrity errors] ~~on all objects, based on the following attributes: [assignment: user data attributes]~~.

FDP\_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [generate an audit event and transmit it to the PRA-IS according to PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6] and print Z report automatically].

## 6.1.5 Class FIA Identification and Authentication

### 6.1.5.1 FIA\_AFL Authentication failures

FIA\_AFL.1/MANUFACTURER Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA\_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [Authorized Manufacturer User authentication].

FIA\_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [*met*], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].

FIA\_AFL.1/AUTHORISED Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA\_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within[assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [FCR Authorised User].

FIA\_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [*met*], the TSF shall [assignment: *list of actions*].

### 6.1.5.2 FIA\_UAU User authentication

FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA\_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [to do fiscal sales, to get X report ] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA\_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

*Application Note 14: If TOE provides Main Unit communication for fiscal transaction, users except FCR Authorised User and Authorised Manufacturer User shall be authenticated by Main Unit.*

*Application Note 15: If TOE does not provide Main Unit communication for fiscal transaction, you shall use FIA\_UAU.2 (hierarchical to FIA\_UAU.1) described below in spite of using FIA\_UAU.1*

FIA\_UAU.2 User Authentication before any action

Hierarchical to: FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA\_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA\_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.



FIA\_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [the authentication mechanism employed to authenticate Authorized Manufacturer User].

### 6.1.5.3 FIA\_UID User Identification

FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA\_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [to do fiscal sales, to get X report ] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA\_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

*Application Note 16: If TOE does not provide Main Unit communication for fiscal transaction, you shall use FIA\_UID.2 (hierarchical to FIA\_UID.1) described below in spite of using FIA\_UID.1.*

FIA\_UID.2 User identification before any action

Hierarchical to: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA\_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

### 6.1.6 Class FMT Security Management

#### 6.1.6.1 FMT\_MOF Management of security functions behaviour

FMT\_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to *[modify the behaviour of]* the functions [new generation cash register fiscal application software normal operation functions] to ~~[assignment: the authorised identified roles]~~ **nobody**.

**Application Note 17:** No authorised user makes the changes on the behaviour of the functions. The TSF itself makes the behavioral changes according to the FCR parameters received from TSM.

**Application Note 18:** Ability to Modification of behaviour shall be used according to PRA directives. Normal operation functions includes all FCR parameters that are sent to FCR by TSM.

#### 6.1.6.2 FMT\_MSA Management of security attributes

FMT\_MSA.1/USER IDENTITY Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] to restrict the ability to [*modify*] the security attributes [User Identity] to [FCR Authorised User].

FMT\_MSA.1/PRIVILEGES Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] to restrict the ability to [*modify*] the security attributes [Privileges] to [none].

FMT\_MSA.1/ IP: PORT\_INFO Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and PRA-IS] to restrict the ability to [*modify*] the security attributes [IP: Port Information] to [Authorised Manufacturer User].

FMT\_MSA.1/FILE NAME and INFO-LABEL Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and PRA-IS] to restrict the ability to [*modify*] the security attributes [file name and information label] to [none].

*Application Note 19: If your device provides Main Unit communication you shall include SFRs described below;*

FMT\_MSA.1/ INFO-LABEL Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with Main Unit] to restrict the ability to [*modify*] the security attributes [information label] to [none].

FMT\_MSA.1/MAIN UNIT SOURCE PORT INFO Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with Main Unit] to restrict the ability to [*modify*] the security attributes [Source Port] to [none].

FMT\_MSA.1/EFTPOS SOURCE PORT INFO Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT\_POS Device] to restrict the ability to [*modify*] the security attributes [Source Port] to [none].

FMT\_MSA.1/ EFT-POS LABEL INFO Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT\_POS Device] to restrict the ability to [*modify*] the security attributes [EFT-POS Label] to [none].

FMT\_MSA.3/USERS and SYSTEMS Static attribute initialisation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP, Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and PRA-IS] to provide [*restrictive*] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT\_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [none] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

FMT\_MSA.3/EFTPOS Static attribute initialisation

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1	The TSF shall enforce the [ <u>Information Flow Control SFP with EFT-POS Device</u> ] to provide [ <i>permissive</i> ] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2	The TSF shall allow the [ <u>none</u> ] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

**Application Note 20:** *If your device provides Main Unit communication you shall include SFR described below;*

FMT\_MSA.3/MAIN UNIT Static attribute initialisation

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1	The TSF shall enforce the [ <u>Information Flow Control SFP with Main Unit</u> ] to provide [ <i>permissive</i> ] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2	The TSF shall allow the [ <u>none</u> ] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

**6.1.6.3 FMT\_MTD Management of TSF data**

FMT\_MTD.1/ FCR AUTHORISED USER Management of TSF data

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1	The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [ <u>FCR Authorised User's authentication data</u> ] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles].

FMT\_MTD.1/ AUTHORIZED MANUFACTURER USER Management of TSF data

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
------------------	----------------------

Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
 FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to *[create]* the [Authorized Manufacturer User's authentication data ] to ~~[assignment: the authorised identified roles]~~ **[nobody]**.

*Application Note 21: No authorised identified roles make the changes on Authorized Manufacturer User's authentication data but TSM creates it.*

*Application Note 22: If TOE does not provide Main Unit communication for fiscal transaction, you shall add FMT\_MTD.1/ FCR USER SFR described below.*

FMT\_MTD.1/ FCR USER Management of TSF data

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to *[modify]* the [FCR User's authentication data] to [FCR Authorised User].

#### **6.1.6.4 FMT\_SMF Specification of Management Functions**

FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FMT\_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [Authorised Manufacturer User modifies IP: Port Information, FCR Authorised User modifies User Identity], ~~[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]~~

#### **6.1.6.5 FMT\_SMR Security management roles**

FMT\_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles

Hierarchical to: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

FMT\_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles: [FCR Authorised User, Authorised Manufacturer User], ~~[assignment: authorised identified roles]~~

FMT\_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FMT\_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions [Authorised Manufacturer User shall take action in maintenance works and FCR Authorised User take action in secure state works], [assignment: conditions for the different roles] are satisfied.

### **6.1.7 Class FPT Protection of the TSF**

#### **6.1.7.1 FPT\_FLS Fail secure**

FPT\_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [except maintenance mode events that specified in Section 3.1.3]

#### **6.1.7.2 FPT\_PHP TSF physical protection**

FPT\_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack

Hierarchical to: FPT\_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack

Dependencies: FMT\_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour

FPT\_PHP.2.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the TSF.

FPT\_PHP.2.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.

FPT\_PHP.2.3 For [the devices/elements for which active detection is required in Technical Guidance Document [5]], the TSF shall monitor the devices and elements and notify [FCR Authorised User], [assignment: a designated user or role] when physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.

#### **6.1.7.3 FPT\_RCV Trusted recovery**

FPT\_RCV.1 Manual recovery

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: AGD\_OPE.1 Operational user guidance

FPT\_RCV.1.1 After [maintenance mode events which expressed in section 3.1.3 occur] the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to return to a secure state is provided.

FPT\_RCV.4 Function recovery

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_RCV.4.1 The TSF shall ensure that [except maintenance mode events that specified in section 3.1.3] have the property that the function either completes successfully, or for the indicated failure scenarios, recovers to a consistent and secure state.

#### **6.1.7.4 FPT\_STM Time stamps**

FPT\_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

#### **6.1.7.5 FPT\_TDC Inter-TSF TSF data consistency**

FPT\_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_TDC.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret [Checksum] when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product.

FPT\_TDC.1.2 The TSF shall use [Communication with secure messaging according to PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6]] when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.

#### **6.1.7.6 FPT\_TEE Testing of external entities**

FPT\_TEE.1/EXT Testing of external entities

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.



FPT\_TEE.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of tests [*during initial start-up and during fiscal transactions*] to check the fulfillment of [proper working of external entities].

FPT\_TEE.1.2 If the test fails, the TSF shall [generate an audit event according to Technical Guidance [5]].

**Application Note 23:** External entities are ERU, fiscal memory, daily memory, mesh cover and electronic seal.

FPT\_TEE.1/TIME Testing of external entities

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_TEE.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of tests [during time synchronization with NTP] to check the fulfillment of [accuracy of time information].

FPT\_TEE.1.2 If the test fails, the TSF shall [assignment: *action(s)*].

#### **6.1.7.7 FPT\_TST TSF self test**

FPT\_TST.1 TSF testing

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [*during initial start-up and periodically during normal operation*] to demonstrate the correct operation of [assignment: parts of TSF].

FPT\_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [assignment: parts of TSF data].

FPT\_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [assignment: parts of TSF].

#### **6.1.8 Class FTP Trusted Patch/Channels**

##### **6.1.8.1 FTP\_ITC Inter-TSF trusted channel**

FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

- FTP\_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
- FTP\_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit *[the TSF]* to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
- FTP\_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [sending user data (sales, event data and TRMK) to PRA-IS and receiveing user data (FCR parameters, exchange rates and TDK) from TSM; receiveing user data (TREK and TRAK) from PRA-IS; sending user data (TRMKD) to TSM]

## 6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE

The assurance requirements for the evaluation of the TOE and for its development and operating environment are chosen as the predefined assurance package EAL2.

## 6.3 Security Requirements Rationale

### 6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale

Table 4 provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage and also giving an evidence for sufficiency and necessity of the SFRs chosen.

**Table 4** Coverage of security objectives by SFRs for TOE

		O.AccessControl	O.Event	O.Integrity	O.Authentication	O.Function	O.Transfer
FAU_GEN.1	Audit data generation		X				
FAU_SAR.1	Audit review	X					
FAU_STG.1	Protected audit trail storage			X			
FAU_STG.4	Prevention of audit data loss			X			
FCO_NRO.2	Enforced proof of origin						X
FCS_CKM.1/TRMK	Cryptographic key generation						X
FCS_CKM.1/TRMKD	Cryptographic key generation						X
FCS_CKM.2	Cryptographic key distribution						X
FCS_CKM.1/ DHE-KEY	Cryptographic key generation						X
FCS_CKM.1/EXT-DEV K <sub>ENC</sub>	Cryptographic key generation						X

FCS_CKM.1/EXT-DEV K <sub>HMAC</sub>	Cryptographic key generation						X
FCS_CKM.4	Cryptographic key destruction			X			X
FCS_COP.1/TREK	Cryptographic operation						X
FCS_COP.1/TRAK	Cryptographic operation						X
FCS_COP.1/TDK	Cryptographic operation						X
FCS_COP.1/HASHING	Cryptographic operation						X
FCS_COP.1/TRMK-DEC	Cryptographic operation						X
FCS_COP.1/TRMKD-DEC	Cryptographic operation						X
FCS_COP.1/PUB-ENC	Cryptographic operation						X
FCS_COP.1/SIGN-VER	Cryptographic operation						X
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV K <sub>ENC</sub>	Cryptographic operation						X
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV K <sub>HMAC</sub>	Cryptographic operation						X
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV KEYEXCHANGE	Cryptographic operation						X
FDP_ACC.1	Subset access control	X					
FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute based access control	X					
FDP_ETC.2/TSM	Export of user data with security attributes						X
FDP_ETC.2 /EFTPOS	Export of user data with security attributes						X
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION	Subset information flow control						X
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMMUNICATION	Subset information flow control						X

FDP_IFF.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION	Simple security attributes						X
FDP_IFF.1/EFT-POSCOMMUNICATION	Simple security attributes						X
FDP_ITC.1	Import of user data without security attributes	X					
FDP_ITC.2/TSM	Import of user data with security attributes						X
FDP_ITC.2/EFTPOS	Import of user data with security attributes						X
FDP_SDI.2/MEMORY	Stored data integrity monitoring and action			X			
FDP_SDI.2/DAILY and PRMTR	Stored data integrity monitoring and action			X			
FIA_AFL.1/MANUFACTURER	Authentication failure handling				X		
FIA_AFL.1/AUTHORISED	Authentication failure handling				X		
FIA_UAU.1	Timing of authentication				X		
FIA_UAU.4	Single-use authentication mechanisms				X		
FIA_UID.1	Timing of identification				X		
FMT_MOF.1	Management of security functions behaviour					X	
FMT_MSA.1/USER IDENTITY	Management of security attributes	X					
FMT_MSA.1/PRIVILEGES	Management of security attributes	X					
FMT_MSA.1/IP:PORT INFO	Management of security attributes						X

FMT_MSA.1/FILE NAME and INFO-LABEL	Management of security attributes						X
FMT_MSA.1/EFTPOS SOURCE PORT INFO	Management of security attributes						X
FMT_MSA.1/EFT-POS LABEL INFO	Management of security attributes						X
FMT_MSA.3/USERS and SYSTEMS	Static attribute initialisation	X					X
FMT_MSA.3/EFTPOS	Static attribute initialisation						X
FMT_MTD.1/FCR AUTHORIZED USER	Management of TSF data	X			X		
FMT_MTD.1/AUTHORIZED MANUFACTURER USER	Management of TSF data	X					
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions	X					
FMT_SMR.2	Restrictions on security roles	X					
FPT_FLS.1	Failure with preservation of secure state					X	
FPT_PHP.2	Notification of physical attack			X			X
FPT_RCV.1	Manual recovery					X	
FPT_RCV.4	Function recovery					X	
FPT_STM.1	Reliable time stamps		X				
FPT_TDC.1	Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency			X			
FPT_TEE.1/EXT	Testing of external entities					X	

FPT_TEE.1/TIME	Testing of external entities					X	
FPT_TST.1	TSF testing			X		X	
FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF trusted channel						X

A detailed justification of required for suitability of the security functional requirements to achieve the security objectives is given in Table 5

**Table 5** Suitability of the SFRs

Security Objective	Security Functional Requirement	
O.AccessControl	FDP_ACC.1	Provides security functional policy for functions and data
	FDP_ACF.1	Defines security attributes for functions and data
	FDP_ITC.1	Provides protection of P <sub>PRA</sub> ,P <sub>TSM</sub> integrity during import operation
	FAU_SAR.1	Allows users to read audit records
	FMT_MSA.1/USER IDENTITY	Provides the functions to restrict the ability to modify the security attribute(User Identity) to FCR Authorised User
	FMT_MSA.1/PRA-IS and TSM IDENTITY	Provides the functions to restrict the ability to modify the security attribute(PRA-IS and TSM Identity) to Authorised Manufacturer User
	FMT_MSA.1/PRIVILEGES	Provides the functions to restrict the ability to modify the security attributes (privileges) to nobody.
	FMT_MSA.3/USERS and SYSTEMS	Provides the functions to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP and allows nobody to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_SMF.1	Describe the specification of management functions being allowed to use in maintenance mode and secure state mode.	



	FMT_SMR.2	Maintains the roles with restrictions
	FMT_MTD.1/ FCR AUTHORISED USER	Provides authorised processing of FCR Authorised User's authentication data
	FMT_MTD.1/ AUTHORIZED MANUFACTURER USER	Provides authorised processing of FCR Manufacturer User's authentication data
O.Event	FAU_GEN.1	Generates correct audit events
	FPT_STM.1	Provides accurate time for logging events
O.Integrity	FAU_STG.1	Protects stored audit data integrity from unauthorised deletion
	FAU_STG.4	Prevents loss of audit data loss
	FPT_PHP.2	Generation of audit event detection of physical tampering
	FCS_CKM.4	Destroys cryptographic keys in the TOE
	FDP_SDI.2/MEMORY	Monitors user data stored for integrity errors
	FDP_SDI.2/DAILY and PRMTR	Monitors user data stored for integrity errors
	FPT_TST.1	Ensures accuracy of its functions working by conducting self test
	FPT_TDC.1	Provides the capability to consistently interpret TSF data (checksum)
O.Authentication	FIA_AFL.1/MANUFACTURER	Detects and records authentication failure events for Authorised Manufacturer User
	FIA_AFL.1/ AUTHORISED	Detects and records authentication failure events for FCR Authorised User
	FIA_UAU.1	Defines user authentication before allowing to do fiscal sales

	FIA_UAU.4	Provides single use authentication mechanism for Authorised Manufacturer User
	FIA_UID.1	Defines user identification before allowing to do fiscal sales
	FMT_MTD.1/ FCR AUTHORISED USER	Provides authorised processing of FCR Authorised User's authentication data
O.Function	FMT_MOF.1	Restricts the ability to enable the functions to nobody and, thus, prevents an unintended access to data in the operational phase.
	FPT_FLS.1	Failure types which makes new generation cash register fiscal application software continue working in secure state
	FPT_RCV.1	Provides new generation cash register fiscal application software start working in maintenance mode in failure. (has ability to switch to the secure state manually)
	FPT_RCV.4	Provides new generation cash register fiscal application software start working in maintenance mode in failure. (has ability to switch to the secure state automatically with functions)
	FPT_TEE.1/EXT	Provides test for IT environment for functioning accurately
	FPT_TEE.1/TIME	Provides test for time information for accuracy
	FPT_TST.1	Ensures accuracy of its

		functions working by conducting self test
O.Transfer	FCS_CKM.1/TRMK	Generates session keys for communication between FCR-PRA-IS and FCR-TSM
	FCS_CKM.1/TRMKD	Generates session keys for communication between FCR-PRA-IS and FCR-TSM
	FCS_CKM.2	Provides cryptographic key distribution to generate keys
	FMT_MSA.1/ EFT-POS LABEL INFO	Provides the functions to restrict the ability to modify the security attribute(EFT-POS label) to nobody
	FMT_MSA.1/FILE NAME and INFO-LABEL	Provides the functions to restrict the ability to modify the security attribute(file name) to nobody
	FMT_MSA.1/ IP:PORT	Provides the functions to restrict the ability to modify the security attribute(IP/Port)to Authorized Manufacturer User
	FMT_MSA.1/EFTPOS SOURCE PORT INFO	Provides the functions to restrict the ability to modify the security attribute(EFT-POS source port) to nobody
	FMT_MSA.3/USERS and SYSTEMS	Provides the functions to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP and allows nobody to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created

FMT_MSA.3/EFTPOS	Provides the functions to provide permissive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP and allows nobody to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created
FCS_CKM.4	Destroys cryptographic keys in the TOE
FCS_COP.1/TREK	Provides the cryptographic operation for secure communication between PRA-IS and TOE
FCS_COP.1/TRAK	Provides authentication and integrity protection for communication between PRA-IS and TOE
FCS_COP.1/TDK	Provides the cryptographic operation for secure communication between TSM and TOE
FCS_COP.1/TRMK-DEC	Provides the cryptographic operation for secure communication between PRA-IS and TOE
FCS_COP.1/TRMKD-DEC	Provides the cryptographic operation for secure communication between TSM and TOE
FCS_COP.1/PUB-ENC	Provides the cryptographic operation for secure communication between PRA-IS-TOE and TOE-TSM
FCS_COP.1/SIGN-VER	Provides non-repudiation for TREK and TRAK sharing between PRA-IS and TOE. Provides non-repudiation for FCR parameters which are transferred to

		the FCR from TSM
	FCS_COP.1/HASHING	Provides the cryptographic operation for secure communication between PRA-IS-TOE and TOE-TSM
	FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV $K_{ENC}$	Provides symmetric encryption in order to establish secure communication with External Devices.
	FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV $K_{HMAC}$	Provides authentication and integrity protection for communication with External Devices.
	FCS_CKM.1/DHE-KEY	Generates private key for DHE key agreement
	FCS_CKM.1/EXT-DEV $K_{ENC}$	Generates keys for communication between TOE and External Devices
	FCS_CKM.1/EXT-DEV $K_{HMAC}$	Generates keys for communication between TOE and External Devices
	FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV KEYEXCHANGE	Provides key transport operation with External Devices
	FPT_PHP.2	Generation of audit event detection of physical tampering
	FCO_NRO.2	Generates evidence of origin of the data to be transferred to the PRA-IS
	FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV ENC/DEC	Provides symmetric encryption in order to establish secure communication with EFT-POS Devices.
	FCS_CKM.1/EXT-DEV	Generates keys for communication between

	FCR-EFTPOS
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV KEYEXCHANGE	Provides asymmetric decryption for secure exchange of the symmetric key with EFT-POS
FDP_ETC.2/TSM	Provides export of sales data and event data from the TOE to the PRA-IS using the information flow control SFP with TSM and PRA-IS
FDP_ETC.2/EFTPOS	Provides export of amount information in sales data from the TOE to the EFT-POS using the information flow control SFP with EFT-POS Devices
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION	Provides information flow control policy for TSM and PRA-IS communication
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMMUNICATION	Provides information flow control policy for EFT-POS communication
FDP_IFF.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION	Provides information flow control policy rules for TSM and PRA-IS communication
FDP_IFF.1/EFTPOSCOMMUNICATION	Provides information flow control policy rules for EFT-POS communication
FDT_ITC.2/TSM	Provides protection of FCR Parameters confidentiality and integrity during import from TSM
FDT_ITC.2/EFTPOS	Provides protection of confidentiality and integrity of outcome of the operation conducted by the EFT-POS device and AES keys ( <u>K<sub>ENC</sub></u> and <u>K<sub>HMAC</sub></u> ) during import from EFT-POS device

	FTP_ITC.1	Provides protection of sales data and event data (confidentiality+integrity) during communication with PRA-IS by the help of secure channel
--	-----------	---

### 6.3.2 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements dependencies

Selected security functional requirements include related dependencies. Table 6 below provides a summary of the security functional requirements dependency analysis.

**Table 6** Security Functional Requirements dependencies

	Dependencies:	Included / not included
FAU_GEN.1	FPT_STM.1	included
FAU_SAR.1	FAU_GEN.1	included
FAU_STG.1	FAU_GEN.1	included
FAU_STG.4	FAU_STG.1	included
FCO_NRO.2	FIA_UID.1	included
FCS_CKM.1/TRMK	FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1; FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.2; FCS_COP.1 TRMK-DEC; FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_CKM.1/TRKMD	FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1; FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.2; FCS_COP.1/TRMKD-DEC; FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_CKM.2	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]; FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 (FCS_CKM.1/TRKMD and FCS_CKM.1/TRMK); FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/ DHE-KEY	FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1; FCS_CKM.4	FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV KEYEXCHANGE and FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV K <sub>ENC</sub>	FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1; FCS_CKM.4	FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV K <sub>ENC</sub> and FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV K <sub>HMAC</sub>	FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1; FCS_CKM.4	FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV K <sub>HMAC</sub> and FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_CKM.4	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1	FCS_CKM.1(FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV K <sub>ENC</sub> , FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV K <sub>HMAC</sub> , FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC,



		FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES and FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV KEYEXCHANGE) included
FCS_COP.1/TREK	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4	FDP_ITC.2 and FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/TRAK	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4	FDP_ITC.2 and FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/TDK	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4	FDP_ITC.2 and FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/HASHING	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4	FDP_ITC.2/TSM and no key for destruction
FCS_COP.1/TRMK-DEC	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1/TRMK; FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/TRMKD- DEC	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1/TRMKD; FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PUB-ENC	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4	FDP_ITC.1 included. According to PRA messaging protocol, P <sub>PRA</sub> and P <sub>TSM</sub> public key should not be deleted. Tamper system of the TOE protects keys from misuse, disclosure or modification.
FCS_COP.1/SIGN-VER	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4	FDP_ITC.1 included. According to PRA messaging protocol, P <sub>PRA-SIGN</sub> and P <sub>TSM- SIGN</sub> public key should not be deleted. Tamper system of the TOE protects keys from misuse, disclosure or modification.
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV K <sub>ENC</sub>	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV K <sub>ENC</sub> ; FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV K <sub>HMAC</sub>	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or	FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV K <sub>HMAC</sub> ;

	FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV KEYEXCHANGE	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1/ DHE-KEY and FCS_CKM.4 included
FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACF.1	included
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACC.1; FMT_MSA.3	FDP_ACC.1; FMT_MSA.3/USERS and SYSTEMS included
FDP_ETC.2/TSM	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	FDP_ACC.1; FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNI CATION included
FDP_ETC.2 /EFTPOS	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	FDP_ACC.1; FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMM UNICATION included
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMM UNICATION	FDP_IFF.1	FDP_IFF.1/TSMCOMMUNI CATION included
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOS COMMUNICATION	FDP_IFF.1	FDP_IFF.1/EFT- POSCOMMUNICATION included
FDP_IFF.1/TSMCOMM UNICATION	FDP_IFC.1; FMT_MSA.3	FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNI CATION; FMT_MSA.3/USERS and SYSTEMS included
FDP_IFF.1/EFT- POSCOMMUNICATION	FDP_IFC.1; FMT_MSA.3	FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMM UNICATION; FMT_MSA.3/EFTPOS included
FDP_ITC.1	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 ; FMT_MSA.3	FDP_ACC.1 included. The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes having been defined during the manufacturing and fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security attributes (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and

		FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
FDP_ITC.2/TSM	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 ; FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 ; FPT_TDC.1	FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION; FTP_ITC.1; FPT_TDC.1 included
FDP_ITC.2/EFTPOS	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 ; FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 ; FPT_TDC.1	FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMMUNICATION; FTP_ITC.1; FPT_TDC.1 included
FDP_SDI.2/MEMORY	No dependencies.	-
FDP_SDI.2/DAILY and PRMTR	No dependencies.	-
FIA_AFL.1/MANUFACTURER	FIA_UAU.1	included
FIA_AFL.1/AUTHORIZED	FIA_UAU.1	included
FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UID.1	included
FIA_UAU.4	No dependencies	-
FIA_UID.1	No dependencies	-
FMT_MOF.1	FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.2 is hierarchical to FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/USER IDENTITY	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	FDP_ACC.1 included
FMT_MSA.1/PRIVILEGES	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	FDP_ACC.1 included
FMT_MSA.1/ IP:PORT INFO	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION included
FMT_MSA.1/FILE NAME and INFO-LABEL	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION included
FMT_MSA.1/EFTPOS SOURCE PORT INFO	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMMUNICATION included
FMT_MSA.1/ EFT-POS LABEL INFO	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMMUNICATION included
FMT_MSA.3/USERS and SYSTEMS	FMT_MSA.1 ; FMT_SMR.1	FMT_MSA.1 (FMT_MSA.1/USER

		IDENTITY, MT_MSA.1/PRIVILEGES, FMT_MSA.1/IP:PORT_INFO and FMT_MSA.1/FILE NAME and INFO-LABEL) included ; FMT_SMR.1 is hierarchical to FMT_SMR.1 included
FMT_MSA.3/EFTPOS	FMT_MSA.1 ; FMT_SMR.1	FMT_MSA.1/ EFT-POS LABEL INFO ) ; FMT_SMR.2 is hierarchical to FMT_SMR.1 included
FMT_MTD.1/ FCR AUTHORISED USER	FMT_SMR.1 ; FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.2 is hierarchical to FMT_SMR.1 ; FMT_SMF.1 included
FMT_MTD.1/ AUTHORIZED MANUFACTURER USER	FMT_SMR.1 ; FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.2 is hierarchical to FMT_SMR.1 ; FMT_SMF.1 included
FMT_SMF.1	No dependencies.	-
FMT_SMR.2	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 included
FPT_FLS.1	No dependencies	-
FPT_PHP.2	FMT_MOF.1	included
FPT_RCV.1	AGD_OPE.1	included (assurance component)
FPT_RCV.4	No dependencies	-
FPT_STM.1	No dependencies	-
FPT_TDC.1	No dependencies	-
FPT_TEE.1/EXT	No dependencies	-
FPT_TEE.1/TIME	No dependencies	-
FPT_TST.1	No dependencies	-
FPT_ITC.1	No dependencies	-

### 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

The current assurance package was chosen based on the pre-defined assurance packet EAL2. EAL2 is chosen because the threats that were chosen are consistent with an attacker of basic attack potential.

#### **6.3.4 Security Requirements - Internal Consistency**

The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the security assurance requirements (SARs) together forms an internally consistent whole.

The dependency analysis in Table 6 shows that the basis for internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied.

The assurance package EAL2 is a pre-defined set of internally consistent assurance requirements. The assurance requirements are internally consistent as all (additional) dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.

Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise, if there are functional-assurance dependencies being not met. So, there are no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.

## 7. ACRONYMS

AES	: Advanced Encryption Standard
CC	: Common Criteria
CCMB	: Common Criteria Management Board
DEMA	: Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
DES	: Data Encryption Standard
DFA	: Differential Fault Analysis
DPA	: Differential Power Analysis
EAL	: Evaluation Assurance Level (defined in CC)
EFTPOS	: Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale
EMV	: Europay, MasterCard and Visa
ERU	: Electronic Recording Unit
FCR	: Fiscal Cash Register
GPRS	: General Packet Radio Service
GPS	: Global Positioning System
IT	: Information Technology
ITU	: International Telecommunication Union
OSP	: Organizational Security Policy
PP	: Protection Profile
PKI	: Public Key Infrastructure
PRA	: Presidency of Revenue Administration
PRA-IS	: Presidency of Revenue Administration Information Systems
SAR	: Security Assurance Requirements
SEMA	: Simple Electromagnetic Analysis
SFR	: Security Functional Requirements
SHA	: Secure Hash Algorithm

SPA	: Simple Power Analysis
TDK	: Terminal Data Key
TOE	: Target of Evaluation
TREK	: Terminal Random Encryption Key
TRAK	: Terminal Random Authentication Key
TRMK	: Terminal Random Master Key
TRMKD	: Terminal Random Master Key for Data
TSF	: TOE Security Functionality (defined in CC)
TSE	: Turkish Standards Institute
TSM	: Trusted Service Manager
VAT	: Value Added Tax

## **8. BIBLIOGRAPHY**

### **Common Criteria**

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
- [2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
- [3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
- [4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012

### **New Generation Cash Register Directives**

- [5] Technical Guidance Document, version 1.0
- [6] PRA Messaging Protocol Document, version 2.2
- [7] External Device Communication Protocol Document, version 1.0