1 BAROC Smart Card Protection Profile

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7 Table of contents

8	Table of contents	2
9	List of tables	5
10	List of figures	6
11	1 PP introduction	7
12	1.1 PP identification	7
13	1.2 PP overview	7
14	1.3 CC conformance claims	8
15	1.4 Acknowledgement	8
16	2 TOE description	9
17	2.1 Overview	9
18	2.2 TOE Definition	10
19	2.3 TOE Boundaries	10
20	2.3.1 Physical Boundary	
21	2.3.2 Logical Boundary	
22	2.4 TOE Life Cycle	11
23	2.5 Roles	11
24	2.6 Description of TOE security functionality	
25	2.6.1 TAC generation	
26 27	 2.6.2 Secure key update 2.6.3 Protection of TSF and user data 	
21		12
28	3 TOE security environment	13
29	3.1 Assets	13
30	3.1.1 TAC Key	13
31	3.1.2 Perso and Pre-perso Data	
32	3.1.3 PIN	
33 34	3.1.4 Retry Counter	
34 35	3.1.5 Retry Limit3.1.6 Serial Number for transactions	
36	3.1.7 DTBT (Data To Be TAC'd)	
37	3.2 Assumptions (about the environment)	14
38	3.3 Threats	14
39	3.4 Organisational security policies	
40	4 Security Objectives	
41	4.1 Security objectives for the TOE	
42	4.2 Security objectives for the environment	17
43	5 IT Security Requirements	18
44	5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements	19

45	5.1.1	Cryptographic support (FCS)	
46	5.1.1.1	Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)	
47	5.1.1.2	Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)	
48	5.1.2	User data protection (FDP)	
49	5.1.2.1	Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1).	
50	5.1.2.2	Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1).	
51	5.1.2.3	Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1)	
52	5.1.2.4	Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)	
53 54	5.1.2.5	Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)	
54 55	5.1.2.6 5.1.2.7	Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)	
56	5.1.3	Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1) Identification and authentication (FIA)	
57	5.1.3.1	Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)	
58	5.1.3.2	User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)	
59	5.1.3.3	Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)	
60	5.1.3.4	Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)	
61	5.1.3.5	Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1).	
62	5.1.4	Security management (FMT)	
63	5.1.4.1	Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)	
64	5.1.4.2	Secure security attributes (FMT_MSA.2).	
65	5.1.4.3	Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)	
66	5.1.4.4	Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)	. 23
67	5.1.4.5	Specification of Management Functions(FMT_SMF.1)	. 23
68	5.1.4.6	Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)	
<u>69</u>	5.1.5	Protection of the TSF (FPT)	
70	5.1.5.1	Abstract machine testing (FPT_AMT.1)	
71	5.1.5.2	TOE Emanation (FPT_EMAN.1)	
72	5.1.5.3	Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)	
73	5.1.5.4	Passive detection of physical attack (FPT_PHP.1)	
74	5.1.5.5	Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)	
75 76	5.1.5.6	TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)	
76 77	5.1.6 5.1.6.1	Trusted path/channels (FTP) Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)	
		· _ /	
78		Security Assurance Requirements	
79	5.3 Secu	urity Requirements for the IT Environment	. 27
80	5.3.1	Cryptographic key generation	
81	5.3.1.1	Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1/ENV)	
82	5.3.1.2	Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1/ENV)	
83	5.3.1.3	Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1/ENV)	
84	5.3.1.4	Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1/ENV)	. 27
85	5.4 Secu	urity Requirements for the Non-IT Environment	. 27
86	5.4.1	R.Personalization	. 27
87	5.4.2	R.Key_Protection	. 28
88	5.4.3	R.Development	. 28
~~			
89		nale	
90		urity objectives rationale	
91	6.1.1	Coverage of the Security Objectives	
92	6.1.2	Coverage of the assumptions	
93	6.1.3	Countering the threats	
94	6.1.4	Coverage of the Organisational Security Policies	. 30
95	6.2 Secu	urity requirements rationale	. 32
96	6.2.1	Suitability of minimum strength of function (SoF) level	
97	6.2.2	Fulfilment of TOE objectives by the TOE functional requirements	
98	6.2.3	Fulfilment of IT environment objectives by the IT environment functional requirements	
99	6.2.4	Mutual support and internal consistency of security requirements	. 36
100	6.2.5	Fulfilment of TOE SFR dependencies	
101	6.2.6	Appropriateness of TOE assurance requirements	. 38
101		··· ·	

102	6.3	Rationale for Extensions	38
103	6.3.1	1 FPT_EMAN TOE Emanation	39
104	6.	3.1.1 TOE Emanation (FPT_EMAN.1)	39
105	7 A	ppendix	40
106	7.1	Abbreviations	
		1 TOE related abbreviations	
108	7.1.2	2 CC related abbreviations	41
109	7.2	Glossary	42
110	7.3	References	42

111	List of tables	
112		
113	Table 1: Assumptions1	4
114	Table 2: Threats1	5
115	Table 3: Organisational Security Policies1	5
116	Table 4: Security Objectives for the TOE1	7
117	Table 5: Security Objectives for the environment	7
118	Table 6: Security Objectives Rationale2	9
119	Table 7: TOE related abbreviations4	0
120	Table 8: CC related abbreviations4	1
121		

122	List of figures	
123		
124	Figure 1: Inter-Bank-System	. 9
125	Figure 2: Financial Smart Card Application life cycle	11
126		

127 **1 PP introduction**

128 **1.1 PP identification**

129	Title:	Financial Smart Card Application Protection Profile
130	TOE class:	Financial Smart Card for the Taiwanese Market
131	Document name:	PP_FISC_V1.2
132	Version:	1.2
133	Document Date:	2005-11-11
134	Author:	BAROC/FISC Smart Card Group
135	CC Version	2.1
136 137		All final interpretations until September, 20 th 2005 have been considered
138	EAL:	4+ augmented by AVA_VLA.4 and ADV_IMP.2
139	SOF-claim:	high
140	Certification ID:	BSI-PP-0021
141	Evaluation Body:	TÜViT GmbH, Germany
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143 144	Keywords:	Smart card, TAC, BAROC, financial transaction, FISC, Taiwan Banking System, Common Criteria, Protection Profile

145 **1.2 PP overview**

- Because of serious circumstances of counterfeiting and skimming, and because
 of the functional limitations of magnetic stripe cards, the Bankers Association of
 the Republic of China (BAROC) initiated the Chip Migration Task Force Team in
 Feb. 2001, to evaluate the feasibility of Chip Migration Project and to develop
 related specifications.
- BAROC developed this Protection Profile to serve as a baseline for the security
 of smartcards developed by different vendors. These smartcards will be used for
 the financial transactions within the FISC inter-bank system.
- 154 This PP focuses on a Financial Smart Card which consists of embedded 155 software and a secure IC Controller. The TOE is used as a security token for 156 inter-bank financial transactions, such as cash withdrawal, fund transfer, tax 157 payment and online sale.
- 158 The main objectives of this Protection Profile are:
- To describe the security environment of the TOE including assets to be protected and threats to be countered by the TOE and its environment.
- To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment.
- To specify the security requirements, which include the TOE security
 functional requirements and the assurance requirements

165 **1.3 CC conformance claims**

- This PP is claimed to be [CC] part 2 extended (FPT_EMAN.1) and [CC] part 3
 conformant. This PP does not claim conformance to any other PP. The CC
 version used is: ISO/IEC 15408: Common Criteria, Version 2.1 All final
 interpretations until September, 20th 2005 have been considered.
- 170 The minimum strength level of the TOE security functions is SOF-high.
- 171 The assurance level is EAL4 augmented by AVA_VLA.4 (highly resistant) and
- 172 ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF).
- 173

174 **1.4 Acknowledgement**

- The authors would like to highlight the significant impact of [SSCD] to the development of this Protection Profile. Due to the special requirements for the Taiwanese Financial Market it has unfortunately not been possible to directly use [SSCD]. Nevertheless many of the requirements for this PP and especially the extension of CC part II with FPT_EMAN.1 have been taken from or inspired by the requirements in [SSCD].
- 181

2 TOE description 182

183 2.1 Overview

184 The TOE is a smart card which consists of embedded software and a secure IC 185 Controller. The main purpose of the TOE is to act as a token in the FISC Inter-186 bank System (see Figure 2.1) where a cardholder can do financial transactions 187 such as cash withdrawal, fund transfer, tax payment and purchase with it. The 188 FISC Inter-bank System is a general-purpose platform for switching financial transactions between banks. The FISC Inter-bank System includes Issuer Bank, 189 FISC, Acquire Bank and its Card Accepted Devices (CAD). The Issuer Bank is in 190 charge of issuing cards to customers and authorizing online transactions from 191 192 customers. FISC is in charge of switching, clearing and settlement of financial transactions. The Acquire Bank is in charge of Card Accepted Devices or so-193 194 called application channels and acquiring transactions from aforementioned 195 application channels. The Issuer Bank and Acquire Bank shall be recognized by 196 FISC.



1	07

197		
198		Figure 1: Inter-Bank-System
199	Take	e fund transfer as an example; the transaction flow is as following:
200	1.	A cardholder inserts its smartcard into the CAD and enters its PIN
201	2.	The cardholder selects the "fund transfer" function.
202	3.	The cardholder confirms the transaction. The CAD prepares transaction
203		data characteristic for the type of transaction and sends it to the TOE via
204		APDU command (following [ISO7816] part 4, augmented with TAC
205		generation).
206	4.	The TOE generates a serial number and a TAC in response to the CAD
207		request.
208	5.	The serial number and TAC are then transmitted to Issuer Bank via the
209		FISC inter-bank system for transaction approval.
210	6.	If the transaction is approved by Issuer Bank, the transaction amount is
211		transferred.
212		


213 2.2 TOE Definition

- The TOE is composed of a Smart Card IC and embedded software. Within the
 Taiwanese banking system aforementioned, the TOE is used to secure financial
 transactions.
- Therefore, the TOE is able to generate a transaction authentication code (TAC) for a transaction record (also called DTBT = Data to be TAC'd) which is representing a kind of digital signature to secure the authenticity and integrity of the transaction.
- Within this system, the major scope of the TOE is to protect the key which is used to generate a TAC.

223 2.3 TOE Boundaries

- 224 2.3.1 Physical Boundary
- The TOE consists of a SmartCard with a physical interface compliant to ISO
 7816 part 2 with its dedicated software as well as the SmartCard embedded
 software and the related guidance documentation.
- 228 2.3.2 Logical Boundary
- The TOE logical interface is represented by a set of APDU commands which is compliant to ISO 7816 part 4 (augmented with additional commands).
- At its logical boundary, the TOE provides functions to generate a TAC for DTBT which can be sent to the TOE. The TOE provides no possibility to read out any cryptographic key but only to update the key which is used for TAC generation.
- The TOE is acting as a kind of signature token which produces a TAC for every DTBT which is sent to the TOE. Before TAC generation, the user has to enter a PIN to confirm the TAC generation. However, disclosure of a confirmation PIN during entry by the CAD is not considered as a threat, and therefore, no trusted channels have to be provided by the TOE.

239 2.4 TOE Life Cycle



240 The TOE life cycle (LC) is shown in the following figure.

241 242

Figure 2: Financial Smart Card Application life cycle

- 243 The stages shown are listed below:
- Phase 1: This phase covers the development and production process of the
 hardware and software the TOE is consisting of.
- Phase 2: During the Pre-personalization process, the TOE is initialized. This is
 typically done at the site of card manufacturer. The delivery is done in a
 secure manner after this phase.
- Phase 3: This phase includes provisioning all user data into the TOE which
 is necessary for the usage. This process is typically done at the site of
 issuing bank.
- Phase 4: The cardholder can use the TOE to secure financial transactions via the
 FISC Inter-bank System.

254 2.5 Roles

261

- 255 The TOE maintains the following roles:
- Administrator
 Administrator
 An administrator is the only role which is allowed to use the key update functionality of the TOE provided during the phases 3 and 4.
 Cardholder
 Cardholder
 A cardholder is a person who handles the TOE in usage phase. The person who holds the TOE is allowed to use it

to generate a TAC in phase 4 (see TOE Life Cycle).

262 **2.6 Description of TOE security functionality**

- The TOE security functionality consists of TAC generation, secure key update, and protection of TSF and user data.
- 265 2.6.1 TAC generation
- The TOE calculates a TAC (Transaction Authentication Code) on transaction data. The TAC ensures authenticity and integrity of the transaction data. In addition to the TAC, the TOE also generates a transaction S/N (serial number) which participates in the calculation of the TAC. In order to generate a TAC, the user has to enter a PIN for confirmation.
- 271 2.6.2 Secure key update
- The TOE is providing a secure means to update cryptographic keys (especially the key which is used for TAC generation) that will be stored in the TOE.
- 274 2.6.3 Protection of TSF and user data
- The TOE protects its TSF and user data from unauthorized modification and disclosure.

278 **3 TOE security environment**

279 **3.1 Assets**

- Assets are security relevant elements of the TOE. Generally speaking, the following groups of assets are available:
- Embedded software including specifications, implementation and related documentation
- Application data of the TOE (e.g. IC and software specific data, Initialisation data, Personalisation data)
- 286 3.1.1 TAC Key

The TAC (Transaction Authentication Code) Key is a cryptographic key and is used by the "TAC Generation" within the TOE. The TAC key is stored in the EEPROM of the IC Controller during Phase 3. The TOE has to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the TAC Key.

- 291 3.1.2 Perso and Pre-perso Data
- 292 This data consists of user data and cryptographic keys.

293 3.1.3 PIN

The PIN (Personal Identification Number) of the TOE is used to authenticate the user of the TOE. The PIN length shall be at least 6 digits and can be up to 12 digits. The PIN is initially generated and stored in the EEPROM of IC controller by the administrator during Phase 3, and can be changed by Cardholder and Administrator during Phase 4. The TOE has to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the PIN when stored on the card.

300 3.1.4 Retry Counter

There is one retry counter stored in the EEPROM of IC Controller during Phase
2-4. It is for accumulating consecutive failure attempts of Terminal
Authentication and User Authentication. The status is blocked as the Retry
Counter reaches the Retry Limit. The TOE has to ensure the integrity and
confidentiality of the Retry Counter (Phase 2-4).

- 306 3.1.5 Retry Limit
- An upper bound of the Retry Counter stored in the EEPROM of IC Controller by
 Issuer Bank during Phase 3 to prohibit further attempts of authentication when
 the Retry Counter reaches its associated Retry Limit. The TOE has to ensure
 the integrity of the retry limit (Phase 2-3).
- 311 3.1.6 Serial Number for transactions
- A number which is incremented automatically by TOE after each transaction. It participates in TAC generation to ensure that the TAC calculation is not only
- 314 based on DTBT but also based on the serial number.

315 3.1.7 DTBT (Data To Be TAC'd)

This is the data which is received by the TOE to generate a TAC over. In the case of this TOE the DTBT is a transaction record which is used to secure a financial transaction.

319 **3.2** Assumptions (about the environment)

Assumption name	Description
A.PERSO	The Personalization and Pre-Personalization process is assumed to take place in an environment providing adequate physical security and performed by trustworthy personnel.
	Any data which is handled during these processes must be kept confidential.
	During key update, a secure CAD which is able to provide authentication and encryption has to be used.
A.KEY	All cryptographic keys which are created in the environment to be used within the TOE have to be created and handled in a secure manner and must have sufficient quality.
A.DEVELOPMENT	TOE development and test information during phases 1 and 2 is protected in a secure environment for its integrity and confidentiality. In case of delivery between different actors like IC manufacturer and embedded software developer, this information is also protected in the same manner as aforementioned.

320

Table 1: Assumptions

321 3.3 Threats

The threats in this chapter have been developed based on the following definition of an attacker:

An attacker is a person who is trying to access sensitive information. His motivation is to get able to copy or clone the TOE to compromise the whole financial system which is secured by the TOE. However misuse of one single TOE in the way of generating a TAC without the authorization of the owner of the card is not considered as an attack. To perform his attack, the attacker has access to nearly unlimited resources in terms of money and time. Therefore the attacker has a high attack potential in terms of CC.

Threat name	Description
T.HACK_PHYS Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces	An attacker may obtain knowledge of cryptographic keys via physical attacks such as probing.
T.LEAKAGE Leakage of information from the TOE	An attacker may obtain TSF-data which is leaked from the TOE during normal usage. Leakage of information may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by

Threat name	Description
	changes in processing time requirements.
T.KEY_COMPROMISE Copying, releasing or unauthorized modification of the cryptographic keys	An attacker may try to compromise the secret cryptographic key of the TOE. He may try to copy secret keys from the TOE using the user visible interfaces of the TOE. He may also try to use a brute force attack against the authentication mechanism of the administrator to
	overwrite or delete the key. An attacker may try to perform this attack during the usage phase of the TOE or during the key update process.
T.KEY_DERIVE Derive the TAC key	An attacker derives the TAC key from public known data, such as a TAC created by means of the TAC key or any other data communicated outside the TOE, which is a threat against the secrecy of the TAC key.
T.INTEGRITY Integrity of security relevant data	An attacker may change security relevant data in the storage of the TOE. Security relevant data includes cryptographic keys, TAC and DTBT.

332

Table 2: Threats

333 3.4 Organisational security policies

Financial Smart Card Application Protection Profile

OSP Name	Description
OSP.TAC	The TOE has to provide a function to generate a TAC over a DTBT. The TOE has to use a cryptographic operation to generate the TAC with the TAC key. The TAC is comparable to a digital signature while as the DTBT to the data to be signed.
	The TAC generation has to include an automatically incremented unique serial number. The serial number participates in the TAC generation process to achieve that TAC calculation is not only based on DTBT but also the serial number.
OSP.PIN	In order to use the "TAC Generation" function of the TOE, the user of the TOE has to enter a PIN beforehand. This PIN is primarily thought of as a confirmation from the user. To perform more than one transaction the user has to enter the PIN only one time.
	The TOE shall not provide any function to read out the PIN.
OSP.KEY_UPDATE	The TOE has to provide a secure communication channel and authentication to update cryptographic keys in a secure manner.

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335 **4 Security Objectives**

336 4.1 Security objectives for the TOE

Objective Name	Description
SO.EMAN_DESIGN <i>Provide physical emanations</i> <i>security</i>	The TOE has to be designed and built in such a way as to control the production of intelligible emanations within specified limits.
SO.SELF_TEST Self Testing	The TOE shall provide self-testing functionality for all TOE security functions which can detect flaws during pre-personalisation, personalisation and operational usage phases.
SO.KEY_SECRECY Secrecy of the cryptographic keys	The secrecy of <i>cryptographic keys</i> (e.g. the TAC key that is used for TAC generation) is reasonably assured against attacks with a high attack potential.
SO.TAMPER_ID Tamper detection	The TOE provides system features that detect physical tampering of a system component.
SO.TAMPER_RESISTANCE Tamper resistance	The TOE prevents or resists physical tampering with specified system devices and components.
SO.KEY_UPDATE Secure updates of the cryptographic keys	The TOE has to provide a secure mechanism to update <i>cryptographic keys</i> . This includes mechanisms to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of <i>cryptographic keys</i> transferred to the TOE as well as the authentication of the terminal which is sending the keys. The TOE shall provide safe destruction techniques for the cryptographic keys in case of key updates.
SO.TAC_CONFIRM TAC generation function after confirmation only	The TOE provides the TAC generation function only after the user has entered his PIN for confirmation. For multiple TAC generations the user has to enter the PIN only one time.
	The TOE must not provide a function which would allow anybody to read out the PIN.
SO.TAC_SECURE <i>Cryptographic security of the</i> <i>TAC</i>	The TOE generates a TAC that cannot be forged without access to the TAC key through robust encryption techniques. The TAC key must not be reconstructible from publicly available data, such as a TAC or its DTBT. The TAC generation includes an automatically incremented unique serial number. The serial number participates in the TAC generation process to achieve that TAC calculation is not only based on DTBT but also based on this serial number.

SO.INTEGRITY	The TOE protects data in its storage against any
Integrity Protection	unauthorized modification.

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Table 4: Security Objectives for the TOE

338 4.2 Security objectives for the environment

Objective name	Description
SOE.PERSO	The Personalization and Pre-Personalization process must take place in an environment providing adequate physical security and performed by trustworthy personnel.
	Any data which is handled during these processes must be kept confidential.
	During key update, a secure CAD which is able to provide authentication and encryption has to be used.
SOE.KEY	All cryptographic keys which are created in the environment to be used within the TOE have to be created and handled in a secure manner and have to have sufficient quality.
SOE.DEVELOPMENT	TOE development and test information during phases 1 and 2 is protected in a secure environment for its integrity and confidentiality. In case of delivery between different actors like IC manufacturer and embedded software manufacturer, this information is also protected in the same manner as aforementioned.

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Table 5: Security Objectives for the environment

340 **5 IT Security Requirements**

- This chapter gives the security functional requirements and the security assurance requirements for the TOE and the environment.
- Security functional requirements components given in section 5.1 "TOE security
 functional requirements", excepting FPT_EMAN.1 which is explicitly stated, are
 drawn from Common Criteria part 2 [CC]. Operations for assignment and selection
 have been made. Operations not performed in this PP are identified in order to
 enable instantiation of the PP to a Security Target (ST).
- All operations which have been performed from the original text of part 2 of [CC]
 are written in *italics* for assignments and <u>underlined</u> for selections. Furthermore
 the [brackets] from part 2 of [CC] are kept in the text.
- All operations which have to be completed by the ST author are marked with the words: "assignment" or "selection" respectively.
- 353 The TOE security assurance requirements statement given in section 5.2 "TOE
- Security Assurance Requirement" is drawn from the security assurance
 components from Common Criteria part 3 [CC].
- Section 5.3 identifies the IT security requirements that are to be met by the ITenvironment of the TOE.
- 358 The non-IT environment is described in section 5.4

359 5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements

360

The following table provides an overview about the used SFRs:

SFR	Description
FCS_CKM.4	Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1	Cryptographic operation
FDP_ACC.1/KEY	Subset access control for cryptographic keys
FDP_ACC.1/TAC	Subset access control for the TAC generation
FDP_ACF.1/KEY	Security attribute based access control for cryptographic keys
FDP_ACF.1/TAC	Security attribute based access control for the TAC generation
FDP_ITC.1	Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_RIP.1	Subset residual information protection
FDP_SDI.2	Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FDP_UCT.1	Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1	Data exchange integrity
FIA_AFL.1/PIN	Authentication failure handling regarding the PIN
FIA_AFL.1/KEY	Authentication failure handling regarding the Key
FIA_ATD.1	User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.1	Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.5	Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UID.1	Timing of identification
FMT_MSA.1/TAC	Management of security attributes for TAC
FMT_MSA.1/KEY	Management of security attributes for keys
FMT_MSA.2	Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.3/TAC	Static attribute initialisation for TAC
FMT_MSA.3/KEY	Static attribute initialisation for keys
FMT_MTD.1	Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1/PIN	Specification of Management Functions for PIN
FMT_SMF.1/KEY	Specification of Management Functions for TAC
FMT_SMR.1	Security roles
FPT_AMT.1	Abstract machine testing
FPT_EMAN.1	TOE Emanation
FPT_FLS.1	Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_PHP.1	Passive detection of physical attack
FPT_PHP.3	Resistance to physical attack
FPT_TST.1	TSF testing
FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF trusted channel

362 5.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)

		-			
363	5111	Cryptographic key	/ destruction ((FCS_CKM 4)
000	0.1.1.1	or yprographic no y			/

364FCS_CKM.4.1The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment:366cryptographic key destruction method] that meets the following:
[assignment: list of standards].

368 Application Note: It must be assured that cryptographic keys are destroyed securely e.g. 369 by overwriting by new keys.

- 370 5.1.1.2 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
- 371FCS_COP.1.1The TSF shall perform [TAC generation including a unique transaction372serial number] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm373[assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes374[assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [listed in375[FIPS_A]].
- Application Note:
 TAC shall include an automatically incremented unique serial number.
 The serial number participates in the TAC generation process to achieve that TAC calculation is not only based on DTBT but also based on the serial number.
- 380 5.1.2 User data protection (FDP)
- 381 5.1.2.1 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)

382	FDP_ACC.1.1/KEY	The TSF shall enforce the [Key Import/export SFP] on [subjects: user,
383		objects: cryptographic keys and operation: import and export of keys].

- 384FDP_ACC.1.1/TACThe TSF shall enforce the [TAC Generation SFP] on [subjects: user,385objects: DTBT and operation: generate a TAC].
- 386 5.1.2.2 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
- 387FDP_ACF.1.1/KEYThe TSF shall enforce the [Key Import/export SFP] to objects based on
the following: [subject attribute: Administrator {yes/no} and object
attribute: cryptographic key {yes/no}].
- FDP_ACF.1.2/KEY
 FDP_ACF.1.2/KEY
 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [users with subject attribute administrator set to {yes} are allowed to update objects with attribute cryptographic key set to {yes}].
- 394FDP_ACF.1.3/KEYThe TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based395on the following additional rules: [no other rule].
- 396FDP_ACF.1.4/KEYThe TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the [*rules:*397397
- 398Nobody is allowed to read out objects with attribute secret key set to
{yes}].
- 401FDP_ACF.1.1/TACThe TSF shall enforce the [TAC Generation SFP] to objects based on
the following: [subject attribute: Cardholder {yes/no}, object attribute403PIN {yes/no}].
- 404FDP_ACF.1.2/TACThe TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation405among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [users

406 407		with subject attribute Cardholder set to {yes} are allowed to generate a TAC for DTBT sent to the TOE].
408 409	FDP_ACF.1.3/TAC	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [none].
410 411 412	FDP_ACF.1.4/TAC	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [nobody is allowed to read out an object with attribute PIN set {yes}].
413	5.1.2.3 Import of u	ser data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1)
414 415	FDP_ITC.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the [<i>Key Import/export SFP</i>] when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TSC.
416 417	FDP_ITC.1.2	The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TSC.
418 419 420 421	FDP_ITC.1.3	The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TSC: [<i>The key must only be accepted when sent by an authorized administrator via the trusted channel</i>]
422	5.1.2.4 Subset res	idual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)
423 424 425 426	FDP_RIP.1.1	The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: [cryptographic keys, PIN, [assignment: none or a list of objects]].
427	5.1.2.5 Stored data	a integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)
428 429 430	FDP_SDI.2.1	The TSF shall monitor user data stored within the TSC for [assignment: integrity errors] on all objects, based on the following attributes [assignment: user data attributes].
431	FDP_SDI.2.2	Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [
432		1. Prohibit the use of the altered data
433		2. Inform the user about integrity errors]
434	5.1.2.6 Basic data	exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)
435 436	FDP_UCT.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the [<i>Key Import/export SFP</i>] to be able to [receive] objects in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
437	5.1.2.7 Data excha	ange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)
438 439 440	FDP_UIT.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the [<i>Key Import/export SFP</i>] to be able to [<u>receive</u>] user data in a manner protected from [<u>modification</u> , <u>insertion</u>] errors.
441 442	FDP_UIT.1.2	The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether [modification, insertion] has occurred.

443 5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)

444	5.1.3.1 Authenticat	tion failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)
445 446 447	FIA_AFL.1.1/PIN	The TSF shall detect when [an administrator configurable positive integer within 1 to 15] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [<i>PIN based authentication of the Cardholder</i>].
448 449 450	FIA_AFL.1.2/PIN	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall [<i>block the PIN based authentication of the Cardholder</i>].
451 452 453	Application Note:	Even though the PIN entry of the user is more seen as a confirmation mechanism than as to be an authentication mechanism, this mechanism is modelled using SFRs from class FIA.
454		
455 456 457	FIA_AFL.1.1/KEY	The TSF shall detect when [an administrator configurable positive integer within 1 to 15] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [Key based authentication of the Administrator].
458 459 460	FIA_AFL.1.2/KEY	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall [block the Key based authentication of the Administrator].
461 462 463	Application Note:	For the first assignment in FIA_AFL.1.1/PIN and FIA_AFL.1.1/KEY it would also be acceptable if the number of allowed unsuccessful authentication attempts is fixed and not configurable by the admin.
464		
465	5.1.3.2 User attribu	ute definition (FIA_ATD.1)
466 467 468	FIA_ATD.1.1	The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [<i>PIN, Cardholder {yes/no}, Administrator {yes/no}, number of unsuccessful authentication attempts</i>]
469	5.1.3.3 Timing of a	uthentication (FIA_UAU.1)
470 471	FIA_UAU.1.1	The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
472 473	FIA_UAU.1.2	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
474 475	Application Note:	The ST author must not specify one of the following TSF mediated actions in the assignment of FIA_UAU.1.1:
476		1. TAC generation
477		2. Key update
478		3. Management functions provided by the TOE
479	5.1.3.4 Multiple au	thentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)
480 481	FIA_UAU.5.1	The TSF shall provide [<i>PIN based and Key based authentication mechanisms</i>] to support user authentication.
482 483 484	FIA_UAU.5.2	The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [<i>PIN based authentication is used for authenticating a Cardholder and Key based authentication is used for authenticating an Administrator</i>].

485	5.1.3.5 Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)	
486 487	FIA_UID.1.1	The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
488 489	FIA_UID.1.2	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
490 491	Application Note:	The ST author must not specify one of the following TSF mediated actions in the assignment of FIA_UID.1.1:
492		1. TAC generation
493		2. Key update
494		3. Management functions provided by the TOE
495		
496	5.1.4 Security mar	nagement (FMT)
497	5.1.4.1 Manageme	nt of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
498 499	FMT_MSA.1.1/TAC	The TSF shall enforce the [<i>TAC generation SFP</i>] to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [<i>Cardholder {yes/no}</i>] to [<i>Cardholder</i>]
500		
501 502 503	FMT_MSA.1.1/KEY	The TSF shall enforce the [<i>Key Import/export SFP</i>] to restrict the ability to [query, [set]] the security attributes [administrator {yes/no}, <i>cryptographic key {yes/no}</i>] to [<i>administrator</i>].
504	5.1.4.2 Secure sec	urity attributes (FMT_MSA.2)
505 506	FMT_MSA.2.1	The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for security attributes.
507	5.1.4.3 Static attrib	ute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)
508 509	FMT_MSA.3.1/TAC	The TSF shall enforce the [<i>TAC generation SFP</i>] to provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
510 511	FMT_MSA.3.2/TAC	The TSF shall allow the [<i>no roles</i>] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
512		
513 514 515	FMT_MSA.3.1/KEY	The TSF shall enforce the [<i>Key Import/export SFP</i>] to provide [<u>restrictive</u>] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
516 517	FMT_MSA.3.2/KEY	The TSF shall allow the [<i>no roles</i>] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
518	5.1.4.4 Manageme	nt of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)
519 520	FMT_MTD.1.1	The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify] the [<i>PIN</i>] to [<i>Cardholder or Administrator</i>].
521	5.1.4.5 Specification	on of Management Functions(FMT_SMF.1)
522 523 524	FMT_SMF.1.1/PIN	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: [<i>Modify the PIN, Set number of unsuccessful authentication attempts</i>].

- 525 FMT_SMF.1.1/KEY The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security 526 management functions: [query and set the security attributes of 527 cryptographic key, start the self test of the TOE. 528 5.1.4.6 Security roles (FMT SMR.1) 529 FMT SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [Administrator and Cardholder]. 530 FMT SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. 531 5.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT) 532 5.1.5.1 Abstract machine testing (FPT_AMT.1) 533 FPT AMT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of tests [during initial start-up, periodically 534 during normal operation, at the request of an authorised user, 535 [assignment: other conditions]] to demonstrate the correct operation of 536 the security assumptions provided by the abstract machine that 537 underlies the TSF. 538 5.1.5.2 TOE Emanation (FPT_EMAN.1) 539 FPT EMAN.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of 540 [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to secret data including 541 cryptographic keys, especially the TAC key.
- 542FPT_EMAN.1.2The TSF shall ensure that nobody is able to use [assignment: types of
emissions] to gain access to secret data including cryptographic keys,
especially the TAC key.
- 545 **Application Note:** The TOE shall prevent attacks against cryptographic keys and other 546 secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical 547 phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at the 548 interfaces of the TOE or may origin from internal operation of the TOE 549 or may origin by an attacker that varies the physical environment under 550 which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena 551 is influenced by the technology employed to implement the TOE. 552 Examples of measurable phenomena are variations in the power 553 consumption, the timing of transitions of internal states, 554 electromagnetic radiation due to internal operation, radio emission. 555 Due to the heterogeneous nature of the technologies that may cause 556 such emanations, evaluation against state-of-the-art attacks applicable to the technologies employed by the TOE is assumed. Examples of 557 558 such attacks are, but are not limited to, evaluation of TOE's 559 electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential 560 power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc.
- 561 5.1.5.3 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)
- 562 FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF].
- 564 5.1.5.4 Passive detection of physical attack (FPT_PHP.1)
- 565FPT_PHP.1.1The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering566that might compromise the TSF.
- 567FPT_PHP.1.2The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical
tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.

- 569 5.1.5.5 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)
- 570FPT_PHP.3.1The TSF shall resist [assignment: physical tampering scenarios] to the
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements] by responding automatically
such that the TSP is not violated.
- 573 5.1.5.6 TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)

574 575 576 577	FPT_TST.1.1	The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
511		should occurly to demonstrate the contect operation of the Tor.

- 578 FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data.
- 580 FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
- 582 **Application Note:** According to SO.SELF_TEST, TOE self-test should be provided for pre-personalisation, personalisation and operational usage phases.
- 584 5.1.6 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
- 585 5.1.6.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)

586 587 588 589 590	FTP_ITC.1.1	The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
591 592	FTP_ITC.1.2	The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, the remote trusted IT product] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

593FTP_ITC.1.3The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [import594of cryptographic key, [assignment: any other functions for which a595trusted channel is required]].

596 5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

597 The evaluation assurance package is EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VLA.4 and 598 ADV_IMP.2.

599

5.3 Security Requirements for the IT Environment

600 5.3.1 Cryptographic key generation

601	5.3.1.1 Cryptograp	hic key generation (FCS_CKM.1/ENV)
602 603 604 605 606	FCS_CKM.1.1/ENV	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
607	5.3.1.2 Basic data	exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1/ENV)
608 609 610	FDP_UCT.1.1/ENV	The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to [<u>transmit]</u> objects in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
611	5.3.1.3 Data excha	ange integrity (FDP_UIT.1/ENV)
612 613 614 615 616	FDP_UIT.1.1/ENV FDP_UIT.1.2/ENV	The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to [<i>transmit</i>] user data in a manner protected from [<i>modification</i> , <i>insertion</i>] errors. The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether [<i>modification</i> , <i>insertion</i>] has occurred.
617		
618	5.3.1.4 Inter-TSF to	rusted channel (FTP_ITC.1/ENV)
619 620 621 622 623	FTP_ITC.1.1/ENV	The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
624 625	FTP_ITC.1.2/ENV	The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, the remote trusted IT product] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
626 627 628	FTP_ITC.1.3/ENV	The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [export of cryptographic key, [assignment: any other functions for which a trusted channel is required]].
629		
630 631	Note that the deper been considered.	ndencies of the security requirements in the environment have not
632 633		s mentioned in this chapter as SFRs for the environment the II of [CC] have been modified with a suffix.
634		
635	5.4 Security Req	uirements for the Non-IT Environment

636 **5.4.1 R.Personalization**

637 The Personalization and Pre-Personalization process must take place in an
638 environment providing adequate physical security and performed by trustworthy
639 personnel.

640 Any data which is handled during these processes have to be kept confidential.

641 **5.4.2 R.Key_Protection**

642 All cryptographic keys which are created in the environment to be used within 643 the TOE have to be handled in a secure manner.

644 **5.4.3 R.Development**

TOE development and test information during phases 1 and 2 must be protected
in a secure environment for its integrity and confidentiality. In case of delivery
between different actors like IC manufacturer and embedded software
manufacturer, this information must be also protected in the same manner as
aforementioned.

650 6 Rationale

651 6.1 Security objectives rationale

Threats, Assumptions, OSP / Security Objectives	SO.EMAN_DESIGN	SO.SELF_TEST	SO.KEY_SECRECY	SO.TAMPER_ID	SO.TAMPER_RESISTANCE	SO.KEY_UPDATE	SO.TAC_CONFIRM	SO.TAC_SECURE	SO.INTEGRITY	SOE.PERSO	SOE. KEY	SOE.DEVELOPMENT
T.HACK_PHYS				X	X							
T.LEAKAGE	X											
T.KEY_COMPROMISE		X	X			X				X		
T.KEY_DERIVE		X						X				
T.INTEGRITY		X							X			
OSP.TAC		X						X				
OSP.PIN		X					X					
OSP.KEY_UPDATE		X				X						
A.PERSO										X		
A.KEY											X	
A.DEVELOPMENT												X

652

Table 6: Security Objectives Rationale

- 653 6.1.1 Coverage of the Security Objectives
- 654 **SO.EMAN_DESIGN** can be traced back to the threats **T.LEAKAGE** as the 655 design which is described in **SO.EMAN_DESIGN** prevents any emanations 656 which could be used to perform **T.LEAKAGE**.
- 657 SO.SELF_TEST can be traced back to many threats as it is supporting all
 658 security functions which are provided by the TOE because it ensures that these
 659 functions are working correctly.
- 660 **SO.KEY_SECRECY** can be traced back to the threats **T.KEY_COMPROMISE** 661 as **SO.KEY_SECRECY** describes that the confidentiality of the cryptographic 662 keys has to be ensured by the TOE.
- 663 **SO.TAMPER_ID** can be traced back to the threats **T.HACK_PHYS** as one have 664 to identify an attack via physical means before one is able to handle this attack.
- 665 **SO.TAMPER_RESISTANCE** can be traced back to the threats **T.HACK_PHYS** 666 as **SO_TAMPER_RESISTANCE** defines that the TOE has to prevent or resist 667 physical hacking as described in **T.HACK_PHYS**.

- SO.KEY_UPDATE can be traced back to the threats T.KEY_COMPROMISE as
 it ensures that the confidentiality of the cryptographic key is ensured when
 transmitted to the TOE and OSP.KEY_UPDATE as this objective describes the
 functionality as required by the OSP.
- 672 **SO.TAC_CONFIRM** can directly be traced back to the **OSP.PIN**.
- SO.TAC_SECURE can be traced back to OSP.TAC as it describes the
 requirements from the OSP and to the threat T.KEY_DERIVE as the
 mechanism as described in SO.TAC_SECURE are used to block the possibility
- to gain knowledge of the secret keys with public knowledge.
- 677 **SO.INTEGRITY** can obviously be traced back to **T.INTEGRITY**.
- 678 6.1.2 Coverage of the assumptions
- 679 **A.PERSO** is obviously covered by **SOE.PERSO**.
- 680 **A.KEY** is obviously covered by **SOE.KEY**.
- 681 **A.DEVELPOPMENT** is obviously covered by **SOE.DEVELOPMENT**.
- 682 All the security objectives for the environment are stated in a way that it is 683 obvious that they are suitable to fulfil the assumption.
- 684 6.1.3 Countering the threats
- 685 SO.SELF_TEST is a supportive security objective which is enlisted against
 686 many threats. It will therefore not be explicitly mentioned in the following
 687 paragraphs. It ensures that the security functions which are provided by the
 688 TOE are working correctly and is therefore a supportive objective for all threats
 689 which are actively blocked by functions of the TOE.
- 690 T.HACK_PHYS is covered by SO.TAMPER_ID which detects physical
 691 tampering and SO.TAMPER_RESISTANT which requires that the TOE has to
 692 be resistant against this kind of attacks.
- 693 **T.LEAKAGE** is obviously covered by **SO_EMAN_DESIGN**.
- T.KEY_COMPROMISE is covered by SO.KEY_SECRECY which secures the
 cryptographic keys when stored in the TOE and SO.KEY_UPDATE which
 protects the key when transmitted to the TOE. Furthermore SOE.PERSO
 supports the blocking of this threat as it ensures that the confidentiality of the
 key is ensured during the perso- or update process.
- T.KEY_DERIVE is directly covered by SO.TAC_SECURE as this objective
 defines that any algorithm which is used to calculate the TAC has to ensure that
 it is not feasible to derive the secret key from any publicly available data.
- 702**T.INTEGRITY** is directly covered by **SO.INTEGRITY** as it is not feasible for an
attacker to change any kind of security relevant data as long as the TOE
- 704 protects its data against unauthorized modification.
- 705 6.1.4 Coverage of the Organisational Security Policies
- 706 **OSP.TAC** is obviously covered by **SO.TAC_SECURE**.
- 707 **OSP.PIN** is obviously covered by **SO.TAC_CONFIRM**.

708 **OSP.KEY_UPDATE** is obviously covered by **SO.KEY_UPDATE**.

All these security objectives are stated in a way that it is obvious that they aresuitable to fulfil the OSP.

711 6.2 Security requirements rationale

- 712 6.2.1 Suitability of minimum strength of function (SoF) level
- 713 The TOE shall be highly resistant against penetration attacks in order to meet
- the security objectives. The protection against attacks with a high attack
- 715 potential dictates a strength of function rating of "high". This SoF claim is only
- applicable to functions in the TOE which are realised using probabilistic or
 permutational mechanisms
- 717 permutational mechanisms.

	SO. EMAN_DESIGN	SO.SELF_TEST	SO.KEY_SECRECY	SO.TAMPER_ID	SO.TAMPER_RESISTANCE	SO.KEY_UPDATE	SO.TAC_CONFIRM	SO.TAC_SECURE	SO.INTEGRITY
FCS_CKM.4			X			X			
FCS_COP.1								X	
FDP_ACC.1/KEY			Х			Х			Х
FDP_ACC.1/TAC							Х		X
FDP_ACF.1/KEY			Х			Х			X X X
FDP_ACF.1/TAC							Х		X
FDP_ITC.1						Х			
FDP_RIP.1			Х				Х		
 FDP_SDI.2			X					Х	Х
FDP_UCT.1						Х			
FDP_UIT.1						X			
FIA_AFL.1/PIN							Х		
FIA_AFL.1/KEY						Х			
FIA_ATD.1							Х		
FIA_UAU.1									
FIA_UAU.5						Х	Х		
FIA_UID.1						X X	X X X X		
FMT_MSA.1/TAC							Х	Х	
FMT_MSA.1/KEY						Х			
FMT_MSA.2								Х	
FMT_MSA.3/TAC							Х	Х	
FMT_MSA.3/KEY						Х			
FMT_MTD.1							Х		
FMT_SMF.1/PIN							Х		
FMT_SMF.1/KEY						Х			
FMT_SMR.1				ļ		Х	Х		ļ
FPT_AMT.1		Х		ļ		ļ		Х	ļ
FPT_EMAN.1	X		X						
FPT_FLS.1		<u> </u>	Х					<u> </u>	
FPT_PHP.1				Х					
FPT_PHP.3					Х				
FPT_TST.1		X							
FTP_ITC.1						Х			


718 6.2.2 Fulfilment of TOE objectives by the TOE functional requirements

- SO.EMAN_DESIGN which requires that the TOE is built in such a way as to
 control the production of intelligible emanations within specified limits is directly
 fulfilled by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1 as this requires that the TOE does not emit
 intelligible emanations which exceed a certain limit and that it shall not be
 possible to determine user data of the TOE using these emanations.
- SO.SELF_TEST which requires that the TOE has to provide self testing
 functionality for all security functions is fulfilled by a combination of FPT_AMT.1
 describes that the TOE has to provide a test for the hardware the TOE is relying
 on and FPT_TST.1 which describes that the TOE has to be able to run a suite of
 tests to ensure the correct operation of the TSF.
- 731 **SO.KEY SECRECY** which describes that the TOE assures the TAC key against 732 attacks is fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4 which ensures the secure destruction of the kevs after an update has been performed, FDP_ACC.1/KEY and 733 734 **FDP ACF.1/KEY** which specify that nobody is allowed to read out the key, **FDP RIP.1** which ensures that key in memory which are no longer used are 735 736 destroyed, FDP SDI.2 which specifies the integrity protection of the key and 737 FPT FLS.1 which detects insecure states of the TOE. Furthermore 738 **FPT EMAN.1** contributes to SO.KEY SECRECY as the design of the TOE 739 which is described in FPT_EMAN.1 is used to protect the key.
- SO.TAMPER_ID which requires that the TOE detects physical tampering
 directly and completely covered by FPT_PHP.1.
- SO.TAMPER_RESISTANCE which requires that the TOE has to be resistant
 against physical tampering is directly and completely covered by FPT_PHP.3.
- SO.KEY_UPDATE specifies that the TOE has to provide a secure mechanism
 to update the key. This includes the secure transmission to the TOE, the
 authentication of the terminal which is sending the key and the secure
 destruction of old keys.
- This objective is fulfilled by a combination of FCS_CKM.4 which describes the
 secure key destruction method after the key update has been performed,
 FDP_ACC.1/KEY and FDP_ACF.1/KEY which define that only an administrator
 is allowed to update the keys, FDP_ITC.1 which defines the import policy for the
- key update, **FDP_UCT.1** which describes that the keys have to be kept 752 confidential during key update, **FDP_UIT.1** which describes that the TOE has to 753 754 ensure the integrity of the keys, **FIA_AFL.1/KEY** which ensures that the process 755 of key update is blocked after a certain number of unsuccessful authentication 756 attempts, FIA UAU.1 and FIA UAU.5 which describe the authentication mechanisms of the terminal, FIA_UID.1 which requires user identification, 757 **FMT MSA.1/KEY** which limits the ability to change security attributes for key 758 759 update to administrators, FMT_MSA.3/KEY which defines that nobody is 760 allowed to overwrite the initial values for the security attributes, 761 **FMT SMF.1/KEY** which defines the management functions for the key update,
- FMT_SMR.1 which describes the roles, the TOE has to maintain and
 FTP_ITC.1 which describes the requirements for the trusted channel which also
 include terminal authentication.
- SO.TAC_CONFIRM describes that the TOE has to provide a confirmation
 mechanism which requires the user to confirm the TAC generation. In terms of
 SFRs this mechanism is modelled as an authentication mechanism as follows:

768 FDP ACC.1/TAC and FDP ACF.1/TAC describe the rules for access control 769 related to the TAC generation and the PIN, **FDP_RIP.1** defines that PINs which 770 are no longer used are securely destroyed from memory, FIA_AFL.1/PIN defines the authentication failure handling for the TAC generation, FIA_ATD.1 771 772 defines the user attributes which are used for access control, FIA_UAU.1, 773 FIA UAU.5 and FIA UID.1 describe the multiple authentication mechanisms 774 and that each user has to be identified/authenticated before he is allowed to generate the TAC, FMT MSA.1/TAC defines that nobody is allowed to change 775 776 the security attribute regarding the card holder, **FMT_MTD.1** defines that only 777 the card holder and an administrator are allowed to change the PIN, FMT SMF.1/PIN defines the management function to change the PIN and 778 779 FMT SMR.1 describes the roles, the TOE has to maintain. 780 **SO.TAC SECURE** which requires that the TAC which is generated by the TOE 781 cannot be forged is covered by a combination of FCS COP.1 which defines the 782 cryptographic operation to generate the TAC, FDP_SDI.2 which is used to 783 ensure the integrity of the data which is used to generate the TAC. 784 FMT_MSA.1/TAC, FMT_MSA.3/TAC and FMT_MSA.2 which describe the handling of the security attributes which are involved in the TAC generation, 785 786 **FPT_AMT.1** to ensure the correct operation of the function to generate a TAC. 787 **SO.INTEGRITY** which requires that the TOE protects that data in its storage 788 against unauthorized modification is covered by FDP_ACC.1/KEY which 789 describes the access control policy for the cryptographic keys together with FDP_ACF.1/KEY and FDP_ACC.1/TAC which describes the access control 790 791 policy together with **FDP_ACF.1/TAC** for the TAC. Beside these requirements 792

which are used to decide whether an access attempt to an asset is authorized,
FDP_SDI.2 is used to ensure the integrity of data when stored in the memory of
the TOE.

- 795
- Fulfilment of IT environment objectives by the IT environment functionalrequirements



- Only SOE.PERSO and SOE.KEY contain requirements for the IT-environment.
 The requirements for the key out of SOE.KEY are directly and completely
 covered by FCS_CKM.1/ENV.
- 802The requirements from SOE.PERSO are covered by a combination of803FDP_UCT.1/ENV which deals with the confidentiality of data and

- 804 **FDP_UIT.1/ENV** and **FTP_ITC.1/ENV** which describe the requirements for the 805 trusted channel.
- 806 6.2.4 Mutual support and internal consistency of security requirements
- From the details given in this rationale it becomes evident that the functional
 requirements form an integrated whole and, taken together, are suited to meet
 all security objectives. Requirements from [CC] part 2 are used to fulfil the
 security objectives.
- 811 The core TOE functionality is represented by the requirements for TAC 812 generation, the handling of the key and the mechanisms for key update. 813 (FCS CKM.4, FCS COP.1, FTP ITC.1)
- 814 Furthermore a set of requirements is used to describe the way these functions 815 should be used and who is allowed to uset them (e.g. FDP_ACC.1/KEY)
- 816 In the end this PP contains a set of SFRs which deals with the detection and 817 defeating of attacks to the TOE, resp. SFRs which are used to show that the
- 818 TOE is working correctly (e.g. FPT PHP.1, FPT PHP.3, FPT TST.1)
- 819 Therefore it becomes clear that the SFRs in this PP mutually support each other 820 and form a consistent whole.

SFR	Dependencies	Dependency fulfilled?
FCS_CKM.4	FDP_ITC.1, FMT_MSA.2	Yes
FCS_COP.1	FDP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2	Yes
FDP_ACC.1/KEY	FDP_ACF.1	Yes
FDP_ACC.1/TAC	FDP_ACF.1	Yes
FDP_ACF.1/KEY	FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3	Yes
FDP_ACF.1/TAC	FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3	Yes
FDP_ITC.1	FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3	Yes
FDP_RIP.1	-	-
FDP_SDI.2	-	-
FDP_UCT.1	FTP_ITC.1, FDP_ACC.1	Yes
FDP_UIT.1	FTP_ITC.1, FDP_ACC.1	Yes
FIA_AFL.1/PIN	FIA_UAU.1	Yes
FIA_AFL.1/KEY	FIA_UAU.1	Yes
FIA_ATD.1	-	-
FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UID.1	Yes
FIA_UAU.5	-	-
FIA_UID.1	-	-
FMT_MSA.1/TAC	FDP_ACC.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1	Yes
FMT_MSA.1/KEY	FDP_ACC.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1	Yes
FMT_MSA.2	ADV_SPM.1, FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1	Yes
FMT_MSA.3/TAC	FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1	Yes
FMT_MSA.3/KEY	FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1	Yes
FMT_MTD.1	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1	Yes
FMT_SMF.1/PIN	-	-
FMT_SMF.1/KEY	-	-
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1	Yes
FPT_AMT.1	-	
FPT_EMAN.1	-	
FPT_FLS.1	ADV_SPM.1	Yes
FPT_PHP.1	-	-
FPT_PHP.3	-	-

821 6.2.5 Fulfilment of TOE SFR dependencies

FPT_TST.1	FPT_AMT.1	Yes
FTP_ITC.1	-	-

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823 6.2.6 Appropriateness of TOE assurance requirements

The assurance level for this protection profile is EAL4 augmented. EAL4 allows a developer to attain a reasonably high assurance level without the need for highly specialized processes and practices.

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828 It is considered to be the highest level that could be applied to an existing product line
829 without undue expense and complexity. As such, EAL4 is appropriate for commercial
830 products that can be applied to moderate to high security functions.
831

The TOE described in this protection profile is just such a product. Augmentation results from
the selection of:

835 AVA_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF

836 AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability Assessment - Vulnerability Analysis – Highly resistant

The main function of the TOE is to protect the cryptographic key which is used to generate
the TAC. If an attacker would get knowledge of one or more of these keys, the whole
financial system in which the TOE is used may become insecure. Therefore it is reasonable
to assume a high attack potential for an attacker and to augment EAL 4 by AVA_VLA.4.

- 843 AVA_VLA.4 has the following dependencies:
 - ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
 - ADV_HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design
 - ADV_IMP.1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF
 - ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
 - AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
 - AGD_USR.1 User guidance
- All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package. 853

The augmentation by **ADV_IMP.2** requests that the evaluator reviews the complete implementation of the TSF. This is useful as an additional input for AVA_VLA.4 as the evaluation gains knowledge about the complete internal structure of the TOE and is able to use this knowledge for AVA_VLA.4. Therefore it is reasonable to augment EAL4 by **ADV_IMP.2**.

- 860 ADV_IMP.2 has the following dependencies:
- 861 862

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- ADV LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
- ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration
- ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
- 865866 All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.

867 6.3 Rationale for Extensions

868 Remarks: Definition of this family is based on the FPT_EMSEC of the SSCD PP 869 [SSCD].

- 870 The additional family FPT_EMAN (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection 871 of the TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of 872 the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the cryptographic keys and other 873 secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical 874 phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE's 875 electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power
- analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional
- 877 requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations.
- 878 6.3.1 FPT_EMAN TOE Emanation
- 879 Family behaviour
- 880 This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
- 881 Component levelling:

882	FF	PT_EMAN TOE Emanation 1				
883						
884	FPT_EMAN.1 TOE	Emanation has two constituents:				
885 886	• FPT_EMAN.1.1	Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF data or user data.				
887 888	• FPT_EMAN.1.2	Interface Emanation requires not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF data or user data.				
889						
890	Management: FPT_	EMAN.1				
891	There are no manaç	gement activities foreseen.				
892	Audit: FPT_EMAN.1					
893	There are no actions identified that should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data					
894	generation is include	ed in the PP/ST.				
895	6.3.1.1 TOE Ema	nation (FPT_EMAN.1)				
896 897 898	FPT_EMAN.1.1	The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to secret data including cryptographic keys, especially the TAC key.				
899 900 901	FPT_EMAN.1.2	The TSF shall ensure that nobody is able to use [assignment: types of emissions] to gain access to secret data including cryptographic keys, especially the TAC key.				
902	Hie	erarchical to: No other components.				
903	De	pendencies: No other components.				
904						

905 **7 Appendix**

906 7.1 Abbreviations

907 7.1.1 TOE related abbreviations

Abbreviation	Explanation
AEF	Active Elementary File
APDU	Application Protocol Data Unit
ATM	Automated Teller Machine
CD/ATM	Cash Dispenser/Automated Teller Machine
DF	Dedicated File
DFA	Differential Fault Analysis
DPA	Differential Power Attack
ECB	Electronic Codebook
EEPROM	Electrical Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EF	Elementary File
ES	Embedded Software
FISC	Financial Information Services CO., LTD.
ICC	Integrated Circuit Controller
ID	Identification
ITSEC	Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
LC	Life Cycle
LRC	Longitudinal Redundancy Check
MF	Master File
NEF	Neutral Elementary File
P-Code	Process Code
PIN	Personal Identification Number
ROM	Read-Only Memory
TAC	Transaction Authentication Code
SPA	Sequential Power Attack
MAC	Message Authentication Code

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Table 7: TOE related abbreviations

909 7.1.2 CC related abbreviations

Abbreviation	Explanation
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of evaluation
PP	Protection Profile
SFP	Security Function Policy
SF	Security Function
SOE	Security Objectives for the Environment
TSF	TOE Security Function
TSP	TOE Security Policy
NITR	Security requirements for the Non-IT environment

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Table 8: CC related abbreviations

911	7.2 Glossar	У
912		
913	7.3 Referen	ces
914 915	[3DES]	Federal Information Processing Standard Publication, FIPS PUB 46-3 October 1999.
916	[ANSI X9.52]	Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation
917	[ANSI X9.9]	Financial Institution Message Authentication
918 919 920	[CC]	Common Criteria for information Technology Security evaluation, January 2004, Version 2.2 incorporated with all final comments until April 30th 2005
921 922	[CEM]	Common Evaluation Methodology for information Technology Security, January 2004, Version 2.2
923 924	[SSCD]	Secure Signature Creation Device Protection Profile, Type 2, ESIGN Workshop - Expert Group F, Version 1.04, July 2001
925 926	[FIPS_A]	FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex A: Approved Security Functions, Draft Version, May 19 th 2005
927		
928		