



# Common Criteria v 3.1 Tutorial part I

9ICCC Korea, 24/09/2008

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E P O C H E & E S P R I

**a. IT Security Evaluations**

b. The Common Criteria

c. Key Concepts

d. Security Specifications

# IT Security Evaluations

## The security search

It is possible to determine the security of a product? NO.

We can only demonstrate the insecurity of the products.

Then?

We can offer confidence degrees in the product security.

How to obtain this confidence?

If a method that generates secure products is followed and vulnerabilities have not been found, we will affirm that it is secure,

**BUT**

What conviction do we have?

In relation to the **effort** applied searching vulnerabilities.

# IT Security Evaluations



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## The security search

### What method does generate secure products?

Any "generic" development method should be able to obtain secure products, if the security is a desirable attribute.

# IT Security Evaluations

## The certification process

Independent inspection of the results of the **evaluation** leading to the production of the final certificate.



The security evaluation is a perfect gear in the certification process

# IT Security Evaluations

## What does it mean a CC certificate?

- a) The security specification is true.
- b) The confidence level in this assertion.

A technical report  
determines




- if the evaluation of the security specifications and of the product have been satisfactory, and
- if the security assurance level have been obtained in the evaluation.

# IT Security Evaluations

## Certificates maintenance: “Assurance Continuity”

We have already certified a product. If we change the external colour does it lose the certification?



Out of the scope of CC

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a. IT Security Evaluations

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# The Common Criteria



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## What is the ISO 15408 standard?

- Is an international agreement on the **secure development method and 7 discreet effort levels.**
- Is a **security architecture paradigm** to which a coherent **security functional requirements catalogue** is applied allowing the establishment of a common language for the expression of the IT products and systems security.

# The Common Criteria



E P O C H E & E S P R I

## Application of the CC

### Specially useful for:

- **Specifying security features** in a product
- Assisting in the **building of security features** into a product
- **Evaluating the security features** of products
- **Supporting the procurement of products** with security features.

# The Common Criteria



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## CC structure: current version 3.1 R2 (Rome 2007)

- Part 1: Introduction and general model (R1)
- Part 2: Security functional components (R2)
- Part 3: Security assurance components (R2)
- CEM - Evaluation methodology (R2)
- Supporting documents

## Target audience

- Consumers
- Developer
- Evaluators .....

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# Key Concepts




E P O C H E & E S P R I

## The security concept

Security is concerned with the **protection of assets**.

Maintenance and safeguard of three basic aspects:


- **Confidentiality**
- **Integrity**
- **Availability**



# Key Concepts



## The evaluation concept



# Key Concepts



E P O C H É & E S P R I

## The Target of Evaluation

A **TOE** is a set of software, firmware and/or hardware accompanied by guidance documentation.

The evaluation of a TOE containing only part of an IT product should not be misrepresented as the evaluation of the entire IT product.

Multiple configurations are collective called “the TOE” and each configuration must meet the TOE requirements.

# Key Concepts



E P O C H E & E S P R I

## Functionality

Defines the TOE security characteristics (SFRs)

## Assurance

Confidence degree in the enforcement of the security objectives of a TOE (SARs)  $\Leftrightarrow$  **Correctness & Effectiveness**

**Greater assurance results from the application of greater evaluation effort:  
Scope, Depth and Rigour**



# Key Concepts

## Descriptive material: Security requirements expression

### Component organization

Classes, Families, Components, Elements

### Operations

Iteration, Assignment, Selection, Refinement

### Dependencies

### Extended Components



# Key Concepts

## Security Specifications

CC Security Specifications:

- Protection Profile (PP)
- Security Target (ST)


The end result of an evaluation is never  
**“this IT product is secure”,**  
but is always  
**“this IT product meets, or not, this security  
specification”**

# Key Concepts



E P O C H E & E S P R I

## The process vs. The product



\*CM Documentation = CM Usage Doc. + CM Output Doc.



# Key Concepts

## Vulnerability Analysis

Determines the existence of exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE in its operational environment:

- the identification of potential vulnerabilities;
- penetration testing

Determines whether the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing an attack potential **Basic, Enhanced basic, Moderate, High.**

# Key Concepts

## The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs)

7 predefined assurance packages increasing assurance

The assurance is increased by replacing components of the same family by another of higher hierarchy

The notion of augmentation allows adding components of higher hierarchy

EALs are the base for the mutual recognition

# Key Concepts




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## Evaluator Outputs

- ETR: Evaluation Technical Report
- OR: Observation Reports

The evaluator will report the conclusions of the evaluation, providing an overall verdict determined by all the constituent activities verdicts.



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# Security Specifications

## Definition

**Protection Profile (PP):** an implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type.

**Security Target (ST):** an implementation-dependent statement of security needs for an identified TOE.





# Security Specifications


## The role of the Security Specifications.

Two possibilities to buy a product:

- specification-based purchasing process.
- selection-based purchasing process.

Difficulty – hard to determine for a customer:

- what kind of IT security he needs
- the security of a product is sufficient to meet his needs
- the security properties declared in a product are true




**an evaluation of the product using CC may be useful, and in this case, PPs and STs play an important role.**

# Security Specifications

## The Process



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


# Security Specifications

## PP&ST. Content.



E P O C H E & E S P R I



CC language

# Security Specifications

## Readable Parts.



E P O C H E & E S P R I

### Introduction

- **PP/ST reference. TOE reference (only ST).**
- **TOE overview:** usage, TOE type, non-TOE HW/SW/firmware
- **TOE Description (only ST):** physical and logical scope

### Conformance claim

Conformance with the CC itself, PPs, Packages.

The PP **conformance statement** states how STs or other PPs must conform to that PP (“strict” or “demonstrable”).




# Security Specifications

## Security Problem Definition

Many approaches: risk/threat analysis, threat DB, ....., a simple one:


ASSETS / IMPACT	C	I	A
A1	X		
A2	X	X	
.....			
An		X	X

Attack patterns (agent, action,...)  
derive



# Security Specifications

## Final conclusion



## Conclusion


If all SFRs and SARs are satisfied and all SOs for the operational environment are achieved, then the security problem is solved.

# Security Specifications



E P O C H E & E S P R I

## PP&ST for low assurance. Content.



# Security Specifications



E P O C H E & E S P R I

## Protection Profile

### How a PP should be used

- part of a specification for a specific consumer
- part of a regulation from a specific regulatory entity;
- as a baseline defined by a group of IT developers.

### How a PP should NOT be used

- a detailed specification;
- a complete specification;
- a specification of a single product.



# Security Specifications



E P O C H E & E S P R I

## Security Target

### How an ST should be used

- Before and during the evaluation, the ST specifies **“what is to be evaluated”**.
- After the evaluation, the ST specifies **“what was evaluated”**.

### How an ST should NOT be used


- a detailed specification;
- a complete specification.

# Security Specifications

## How-to.



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## Questions welcomed & Thanks!

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