



**Common Criteria  
for Information Technology  
Security Evaluation**

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Part 1: Introduction and general model

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# Foreword

This version of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC v3.1) is the first major revision since being published as CC v2.3 in 2005.

CC v3.1 aims to: eliminate redundant evaluation activities; reduce/eliminate activities that contribute little to the final assurance of a product; clarify CC terminology to reduce misunderstanding; restructure and refocus the evaluation activities to those areas where security assurance is gained; and add new CC requirements if needed.

CC version 3.1 consists of the following parts:

- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components

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# Table of Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>SCOPE .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>NORMATIVE REFERENCES .....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>TERMS AND DEFINITIONS .....</b>	<b>15</b>
4.1	Terms and definitions common in the CC .....	15
4.2	Terms and definitions related to the ADV class .....	21
4.3	Terms and definitions related to the AGD class .....	26
4.4	Terms and definitions related to the ALC class .....	26
4.5	Terms and definitions related to the AVA class .....	30
4.6	Terms and definitions related to the ACO class .....	30
<b>5</b>	<b>SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATED TERMS .....</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>OVERVIEW.....</b>	<b>34</b>
6.1	The TOE .....	34
6.1.1	Different representations of the TOE .....	35
6.1.2	Different configurations of the TOE.....	35
6.2	Target audience of the CC.....	36
6.2.1	Consumers .....	36
6.2.2	Developers.....	36
6.2.3	Evaluators .....	36
6.2.4	Others .....	36
6.3	The different parts of the CC .....	37
6.4	Evaluation context.....	38
<b>7</b>	<b>GENERAL MODEL.....</b>	<b>40</b>
7.1	Assets and countermeasures.....	40
7.1.1	Sufficiency of the countermeasures .....	42
7.1.2	Correctness of the TOE .....	44
7.1.3	Correctness of the Operational Environment.....	44
7.2	Evaluation.....	45
<b>8</b>	<b>TAILORING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .....</b>	<b>47</b>
8.1	Operations .....	47
8.1.1	The iteration operation.....	48

## Table of contents

8.1.2	The assignment operation .....	48
8.1.3	The selection operation.....	49
8.1.4	The refinement operation.....	49
<b>8.2</b>	<b>Dependencies between components .....</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>8.3</b>	<b>Extended components .....</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>PROTECTION PROFILES AND PACKAGES.....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>9.1</b>	<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>9.2</b>	<b>Packages.....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>9.3</b>	<b>Protection Profiles .....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>9.4</b>	<b>Using PPs and packages.....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>9.5</b>	<b>Using Multiple Protection Profiles.....</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>9.6</b>	<b>Protection Profiles, PP-Modules and PP-Configurations .....</b>	<b>56</b>
9.6.1	Introduction .....	56
9.6.2	PP-Modules .....	56
9.6.3	PP-Configurations.....	57
9.6.4	Using PP-Modules and PP-Configurations in security targets .....	57
<b>10</b>	<b>EVALUATION RESULTS.....</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>10.1</b>	<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>10.2</b>	<b>Results of a PP evaluation.....</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>10.3</b>	<b>Results of a PP-Configuration evaluation .....</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>10.4</b>	<b>Results of an ST/TOE evaluation.....</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>10.5</b>	<b>Conformance claim .....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>10.6</b>	<b>Use of ST/TOE evaluation results .....</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>A</b>	<b>SPECIFICATION OF SECURITY TARGETS .....</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>A.1</b>	<b>Goal and structure of this Annex .....</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>A.2</b>	<b>Mandatory contents of an ST .....</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>A.3</b>	<b>Using an ST .....</b>	<b>66</b>
A.3.1	How an ST should be used .....	66
A.3.2	How an ST should not be used .....	66
<b>A.4</b>	<b>ST Introduction (ASE_INT).....</b>	<b>66</b>
A.4.1	ST reference and TOE reference .....	67
A.4.2	TOE overview.....	67
A.4.3	TOE description.....	69
<b>A.5</b>	<b>Conformance claims (ASE_CCL) .....</b>	<b>70</b>

## Table of contents

<b>A.6</b>	<b>Security problem definition (ASE_SPD)</b> .....	<b>70</b>
A.6.1	Introduction .....	70
A.6.2	Threats .....	71
A.6.3	Organisational security policies (OSPs) .....	71
A.6.4	Assumptions .....	72
<b>A.7</b>	<b>Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)</b> .....	<b>73</b>
A.7.1	High-level solution .....	73
A.7.2	Part wise solutions .....	73
A.7.3	Relation between security objectives and the security problem definition .....	74
A.7.4	Security objectives: conclusion .....	76
<b>A.8</b>	<b>Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD)</b> .....	<b>76</b>
<b>A.9</b>	<b>Security requirements (ASE_REQ)</b> .....	<b>77</b>
A.9.1	Security functional requirements (SFRs).....	77
A.9.2	Security assurance requirements (SARs).....	79
A.9.3	SARs and the security requirement rationale .....	79
A.9.4	Security requirements: conclusion.....	80
<b>A.10</b>	<b>TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)</b> .....	<b>80</b>
<b>A.11</b>	<b>Questions that may be answered with an ST</b> .....	<b>81</b>
<b>A.12</b>	<b>Low assurance Security Targets</b> .....	<b>82</b>
<b>A.13</b>	<b>Referring to other standards in an ST</b> .....	<b>83</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>SPECIFICATION OF PROTECTION PROFILES</b> .....	<b>85</b>
<b>B.1</b>	<b>Goal and structure of this Annex</b> .....	<b>85</b>
<b>B.2</b>	<b>Mandatory contents of a PP</b> .....	<b>85</b>
<b>B.3</b>	<b>Using the PP</b> .....	<b>86</b>
B.3.1	How a PP should be used .....	86
B.3.2	How a PP should not be used .....	87
<b>B.4</b>	<b>PP introduction (APE_INT)</b> .....	<b>87</b>
B.4.1	PP reference.....	87
B.4.2	TOE overview .....	88
<b>B.5</b>	<b>Conformance claims (APE_CCL)</b> .....	<b>89</b>
<b>B.6</b>	<b>Security problem definition (APE_SPD)</b> .....	<b>89</b>
<b>B.7</b>	<b>Security objectives (APE_OBJ)</b> .....	<b>89</b>
<b>B.8</b>	<b>Extended components definition (APE_ECD)</b> .....	<b>89</b>
<b>B.9</b>	<b>Security requirements (APE_REQ)</b> .....	<b>89</b>
<b>B.10</b>	<b>TOE summary specification</b> .....	<b>89</b>
<b>B.11</b>	<b>Low assurance Protection Profiles</b> .....	<b>89</b>
<b>B.12</b>	<b>Referring to other standards in a PP</b> .....	<b>90</b>
<b>B.13</b>	<b>Interpretation of PP-Configuration as a standard PP</b> .....	<b>91</b>

## Table of contents

B.13.1	TOE type.....	91
B.13.2	Conformance claims .....	91
B.13.3	Security problem definition .....	91
B.13.4	Security objectives .....	91
B.13.5	Extended functional components definition.....	91
B.13.6	Security functional requirements .....	92
<b>B.14</b>	<b>Specification of PP-Modules.....</b>	<b>92</b>
B.14.1	Mandatory content of a PP-Module .....	92
B.14.2	Using the PP-Module .....	93
B.14.3	PP-Module introduction.....	93
B.14.4	Consistency rationale .....	94
B.14.5	Conformance claims .....	95
B.14.6	Security problem definition .....	95
B.14.7	Security objectives .....	96
B.14.8	Extended functional components definition.....	97
B.14.9	Security functional requirements .....	97
B.14.10	Guidance for inclusion of elements from Base-PP .....	97
<b>B.15</b>	<b>Specification of PP-Configurations.....</b>	<b>98</b>
B.15.1	Mandatory content of a PP-Configuration .....	98
B.15.2	Using the PP-Configuration .....	98
B.15.3	PP-Configuration reference.....	98
B.15.4	PP-Configuration components statement .....	99
B.15.5	PP-Configuration conformance statement .....	99
B.15.6	PP-Configuration SAR statement .....	99
B.15.7	Evaluation of a PP-Configuration .....	99
<b>C</b>	<b>GUIDANCE FOR OPERATIONS.....</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>C.1</b>	<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>C.2</b>	<b>Examples of operations .....</b>	<b>100</b>
C.2.1	The iteration operation.....	100
C.2.2	The assignment operation .....	100
C.2.3	The selection operation.....	101
C.2.4	The refinement operation.....	101
<b>C.3</b>	<b>Organisation of components.....</b>	<b>102</b>
C.3.1	Class .....	102
C.3.2	Family.....	102
C.3.3	Component.....	102
C.3.4	Element.....	102
<b>C.4</b>	<b>Extended components .....</b>	<b>103</b>
C.4.1	How to define extended components .....	103
<b>D</b>	<b>PP CONFORMANCE .....</b>	<b>104</b>
<b>D.1</b>	<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>104</b>
<b>D.2</b>	<b>Strict conformance .....</b>	<b>104</b>
<b>D.3</b>	<b>Demonstrable conformance .....</b>	<b>105</b>
<b>E</b>	<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>106</b>

## Table of contents

<b>E.1</b>	<b>ISO/IEC standards and guidance .....</b>	<b>106</b>
<b>E.2</b>	<b>Other standards and guidance .....</b>	<b>106</b>



## List of figures

Figure 1 - Terminology in CM and in the product life-cycle .....	30
Figure 2 - Security concepts and relationships .....	41
Figure 3 - Evaluation concepts and relationships .....	42
Figure 4 - Evaluation results.....	59
Figure 5 - Security Target contents .....	65
Figure 6 - Tracings between security objectives and security problem definition .....	75
Figure 7 - Relations between the security problem definition, the security objectives and the security requirements.....	80
Figure 8 - Contents of a Low Assurance Security Target .....	83
Figure 9 - Protection Profile contents.....	86
Figure 10 - Contents of a Low Assurance Protection Profile.....	90
Figure 11 - PP-Module content .....	92

## List of tables

Table 1 - Road map to the Common Criteria.....	38
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# 1 Introduction

- 1 The CC permits comparability between the results of independent security evaluations. The CC does so by providing a common set of requirements for the security functionality of IT products and for assurance measures applied to these IT products during a security evaluation. These IT products may be implemented in hardware, firmware or software.
- 2 The evaluation process establishes a level of confidence that the security functionality of these IT products and the assurance measures applied to these IT products meet these requirements. The evaluation results may help consumers to determine whether these IT products fulfil their security needs.
- 3 The CC is useful as a guide for the development, evaluation and/or procurement of IT products with security functionality.
- 4 The CC is intentionally flexible, enabling a range of evaluation methods to be applied to a range of security properties of a range of IT products. Therefore users of the standard are cautioned to exercise care that this flexibility is not misused. For example, using the CC in conjunction with unsuitable evaluation methods, irrelevant security properties, or inappropriate IT products, may result in meaningless evaluation results.
- 5 Consequently, the fact that an IT product has been evaluated has meaning only in the context of the security properties that were evaluated and the evaluation methods that were used. Evaluation authorities are advised to carefully check the products, properties and methods to determine that an evaluation will provide meaningful results. Additionally, purchasers of evaluated products are advised to carefully consider this context to determine whether the evaluated product is useful and applicable to their specific situation and needs.
- 6 The CC addresses protection of assets from unauthorised disclosure, modification, or loss of use. The categories of protection relating to these three types of failure of security are commonly called confidentiality, integrity, and availability, respectively. The CC may also be applicable to aspects of IT security outside of these three. The CC is applicable to risks arising from human activities (malicious or otherwise) and to risks arising from non-human activities. Apart from IT security, the CC may be applied in other areas of IT, but makes no claim of applicability in these areas.
- 7 Certain topics, because they involve specialised techniques or because they are somewhat peripheral to IT security, are considered to be outside the scope of the CC. Some of these are identified below.
  - a) The CC does not contain security evaluation criteria pertaining to administrative security measures not related directly to the IT security functionality. However, it is recognised that significant security can often be achieved through or supported by administrative measures such as organisational, personnel, physical, and procedural controls.

- b) The evaluation of some technical physical aspects of IT security such as electromagnetic emanation control is not specifically covered, although many of the concepts addressed will be applicable to that area.
- c) The CC does not address the evaluation methodology under which the criteria should be applied. This methodology is given in the CEM.
- d) The CC does not address the administrative and legal framework under which the criteria may be applied by evaluation authorities. However, it is expected that the CC will be used for evaluation purposes in the context of such a framework.
- e) The procedures for use of evaluation results in accreditation are outside the scope of the CC. Accreditation is the administrative process whereby authority is granted for the operation of an IT product (or collection thereof) in its full operational environment including all of its non-IT parts. The results of the evaluation process are an input to the accreditation process. However, as other techniques are more appropriate for the assessments of non-IT related properties and their relationship to the IT security parts, accreditors should make separate provisions for those aspects.
- f) The subject of criteria for the assessment of the inherent qualities of cryptographic algorithms is not covered in the CC. Should independent assessment of mathematical properties of cryptography be required, the evaluation scheme under which the CC is applied must make provision for such assessments.

8 ISO terminology, such as "can", "informative", "may", "normative", "shall" and "should" used throughout the document are defined in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2. Note that the term "should" has an additional meaning applicable when using this standard. See the note below. The following definition is given for the use of "should" in the CC.

9 **should** — within normative text, "should" indicates "that among several possibilities one is recommended as particularly suitable, without mentioning or excluding others, or that a certain course of action is preferred but not necessarily required." (ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2).

The CC interprets "not necessarily required" to mean that the choice of another possibility requires a justification of why the preferred option was not chosen.

# 2 Scope

- 10 This part of the CC establishes the general concepts and principles of IT security evaluation and specifies the general model of evaluation given by various parts of the standard which in its entirety is meant to be used as the basis for evaluation of security properties of IT products.
- 11 Part one provides an overview of all parts of the CC standard. It describes the various parts of the standard; defines the terms and abbreviations to be used in all parts of the standard; establishes the core concept of a Target of Evaluation (TOE); the evaluation context and describes the audience to which the evaluation criteria are addressed. An introduction to the basic security concepts necessary for evaluation of IT products is given.
- 12 It defines the various operations by which the functional and assurance components given in CC Part 2 and CC Part 3 may be tailored through the use of permitted operations.
- 13 The key concepts of protection profiles (PP), packages of security requirements and the topic of conformance are specified and the consequences of evaluation, evaluation results are described. This part of the CC gives guidelines for the specification of Security Targets (ST) and provides a description of the organization of components throughout the model. General information about the evaluation methodology are given in the CEM and the scope of evaluation schemes is provided.

### 3 Normative references

14 The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this CC part 1. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

[CC-2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017. Part 2: Functional security components.

[CC-3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017. Part 3: Assurance security components.

[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017.

## 4 Terms and definitions

15 For the purpose of the CC, the following terms and definitions apply.

16 This Chapter 4 contains only those terms which are used in a specialised way  
throughout the CC. Some combinations of common terms used in the CC,  
while not meriting inclusion in this Chapter 4, are explained for clarity in the  
context where they are used.

### 4.1 Terms and definitions common in the CC

17 **adverse actions** — actions performed by a threat agent on an asset

18 **assets** — entities that the owner of the TOE presumably places value upon

19 **assignment** — the specification of an identified parameter in a component  
(of the CC) or requirement

20 **assurance** — grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs

21 **attack potential** — measure of the effort to be expended in attacking a TOE,  
expressed in terms of an attacker's expertise, resources and motivation

22 **augmentation** — addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package

23 **authentication data** — information used to verify the claimed identity of a  
user

24 **authorised user** — TOE user who may, in accordance with the SFRs,  
perform an operation

25 **Base Protection Profile** — Protection Profile used as a basis to build a  
Protection Profile Configuration

26 **class** — set of CC families that share a common focus

27 **coherent** — logically ordered and having discernible meaning

For documentation, this addresses both the actual text and the structure of the  
document, in terms of whether it is understandable by its target audience.

28 **complete** — property where all necessary parts of an entity have been  
provided

In terms of documentation, this means that all relevant information is  
covered in the documentation, at such a level of detail that no further  
explanation is required at that level of abstraction.

29 **component** — smallest selectable set of elements on which requirements  
may be based

30        **composed assurance package** — assurance package consisting of requirements drawn from CC Part 3 (predominately from the ACO class), representing a point on the CC predefined composition assurance scale

31        **confirm** — declare that something has been reviewed in detail with an independent determination of sufficiency

The level of rigour required depends on the nature of the subject matter. This term is only applied to evaluator actions.

32        **connectivity** — property of the TOE allowing interaction with IT entities external to the TOE

This includes exchange of data by wire or by wireless means, over any distance in any environment or configuration.

33        **consistent** — relationship between two or more entities such that there are no apparent contradictions between these entities

34        **counter, verb** — meet an attack where the impact of a particular threat is mitigated but not necessarily eradicated

35        **demonstrable conformance** — relation between an ST and a PP, where the ST provides a solution which solves the generic security problem in the PP

The PP and the ST may contain entirely different statements that discuss different entities, use different concepts etc. Demonstrable conformance is also suitable for a TOE type where several similar PPs already exist, thus allowing the ST author to claim conformance to these PPs simultaneously, thereby saving work.

36        **demonstrate** — provide a conclusion gained by an analysis which is less rigorous than a “proof”

37        **dependency** — relationship between components such that if a requirement based on the depending component is included in a PP, ST or package, a requirement based on the component that is depended upon must normally also be included in the PP, ST or package

38        **describe** — provide specific details of an entity

39        **determine** — affirm a particular conclusion based on independent analysis with the objective of reaching a particular conclusion

The usage of this term implies a truly independent analysis, usually in the absence of any previous analysis having been performed. Compare with the terms “confirm” or “verify” which imply that an analysis has already been performed which needs to be reviewed

40        **development environment** — environment in which the TOE is developed



## Terms and definitions

41 **element** — indivisible statement of a security need

42 **ensure** — guarantee a strong causal relationship between an action and its consequences

When this term is preceded by the word “help” it indicates that the consequence is not fully certain, on the basis of that action alone.

43 **evaluation** — assessment of a PP, an ST or a TOE, against defined criteria

44 **evaluation assurance level** — set of assurance requirements drawn from CC Part 3, representing a point on the CC predefined assurance scale, that form an assurance package

45 **evaluation authority** — body that sets the standards and monitors the quality of evaluations conducted by bodies within a specific community and implements the CC for that community by means of an evaluation scheme

46 **evaluation scheme** — administrative and regulatory framework under which the CC is applied by an evaluation authority within a specific community

47 **exhaustive** — characteristic of a methodical approach taken to perform an analysis or activity according to an unambiguous plan

This term is used in the CC with respect to conducting an analysis or other activity. It is related to “systematic” but is considerably stronger, in that it indicates not only that a methodical approach has been taken to perform the analysis or activity according to an unambiguous plan, but that the plan that was followed is sufficient to ensure that all possible avenues have been exercised.

48 **explain** — give argument accounting for the reason for taking a course of action

This term differs from both “describe” and “demonstrate”. It is intended to answer the question “Why?” without actually attempting to argue that the course of action that was taken was necessarily optimal.

49 **extension** — addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC Part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC Part 3

50 **external entity** — human or IT entity possibly interacting with the TOE from outside of the TOE boundary

51 **family** — set of components that share a similar goal but differ in emphasis or rigour

52 **formal** — expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts

## Terms and definitions

53 **guidance documentation** — documentation that describes the delivery, preparation, operation, management and/or use of the TOE

54 **identity** — representation uniquely identifying entities (e.g. a user, a process or a disk) within the context of the TOE

An example of such a representation is a string. For a human user, the representation can be the full or abbreviated name or a (still unique) pseudonym.

55 **informal** — expressed in natural language

56 **inter TSF transfers** — communicating data between the TOE and the security functionality of other trusted IT products

57 **internal communication channel** — communication channel between separated parts of the TOE

58 **internal TOE transfer** — communicating data between separated parts of the TOE

59 **internally consistent** — no apparent contradictions exist between any aspects of an entity

In terms of documentation, this means that there can be no statements within the documentation that can be taken to contradict each other.

60 **iteration** — use of the same component to express two or more distinct requirements

61 **justification** — analysis leading to a conclusion

“Justification” is more rigorous than a demonstration. This term requires significant rigour in terms of very carefully and thoroughly explaining every step of a logical argument.

62 **object** — passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations

63 **operation (on a component of the CC)** — modification or repetition of a component

Allowed operations on components are assignment, iteration, refinement and selection.

64 **operation (on an object)** — specific type of action performed by a subject on an object

65 **operational environment** — environment in which the TOE is operated

## Terms and definitions

66            **organisational security policy** — set of security rules, procedures, or guidelines for an organisation

A policy may pertain to a specific operational environment.

67            **package** — named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements

An example of a package is “EAL 3”.

68            **Protection Profile Configuration** — Protection Profile composed of Base Protection Profiles and Protection Profile Module

69            **Protection Profile evaluation** — assessment of a PP against defined criteria

70            **Protection Profile** — implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type

71            **Protection Profile Module** — implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base Protection Profiles

72            **prove** — show correspondence by formal analysis in its mathematical sense

It is completely rigorous in all ways. Typically, “prove” is used when there is a desire to show correspondence between two TSF representations at a high level of rigour.

73            **refinement** — addition of details to a component

74            **role** — predefined set of rules establishing the allowed interactions between a user and the TOE

75            **secret** — information that must be known only to authorised users and/or the TSF in order to enforce a specific SFP

76            **secure state** — state in which the TSF data are consistent and the TSF continues correct enforcement of the SFRs

77            **security attribute** — property of subjects, users (including external IT products), objects, information, sessions and/or resources that is used in defining the SFRs and whose values are used in enforcing the SFRs

78            **security function policy** — set of rules describing specific security behaviour enforced by the TSF and expressible as a set of SFRs

79            **security objective** — statement of an intent to counter identified threats and/or satisfy identified organisation security policies and/or assumptions

80            **security problem** — statement which in a formal manner defines the nature and scope of the security that the TOE is intended to address

This statement consists of a combination of:

- threats to be countered by the TOE and its operational environment,
- the OSPs enforced by the TOE and its operational environment, and
- the assumptions that are upheld for the operational environment of the TOE.

81 **security requirement** — requirement, stated in a standardised language, which is meant to contribute to achieving the security objectives for a TOE

82 **Security Target** — implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE

83 **selection** — specification of one or more items from a list in a component

84 **semiformal** — expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics

85 **specify** — provide specific details about an entity in a rigorous and precise manner

86 **strict conformance** — hierarchical relationship between a PP and an ST where all the requirements in the PP also exist in the ST

This relation can be roughly defined as “the ST shall contain all statements that are in the PP, but may contain more”. Strict conformance is expected to be used for stringent requirements that are to be adhered to in a single manner.

87 **ST evaluation** — assessment of an ST against defined criteria

88 **subject** — active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects

89 **target of evaluation** — set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance

90 **threat agent** — entity that can adversely act on assets

91 **TOE evaluation** — assessment of a TOE against defined criteria

92 **TOE resource** — anything useable or consumable in the TOE

93 **TOE security functionality** — combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs

94 **trace, verb** — perform an informal correspondence analysis between two entities with only a minimal level of rigour

## Terms and definitions

95            **transfers outside of the TOE** — TSF mediated communication of data to entities not under the control of the TSF

96            **translation** — describes the process of describing security requirements in a standardised language.

use of the term translation in this context is not literal and does not imply that every SFR expressed in standardised language can also be translated back to the security objectives.

97            **trusted channel** — a means by which a TSF and another trusted IT product can communicate with necessary confidence

98            **trusted IT product** — IT product, other than the TOE, which has its security functional requirements administratively coordinated with the TOE and which is assumed to enforce its security functional requirements correctly

An example of a trusted IT product would be one that has been separately evaluated.

99            **trusted path** — means by which a user and a TSF can communicate with the necessary confidence

100           **TSF data** — data for the operation of the TOE upon which the enforcement of the SFR relies

101           **TSF interface** — means by which external entities (or subjects in the TOE but outside of the TSF) supply data to the TSF, receive data from the TSF and invoke services from the TSF

102           **user** — see external entity

103           **user data** — data for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF

104           **verify** — rigorously review in detail with an independent determination of sufficiency

Also see “confirm”. This term has more rigorous connotations. The term “verify” is used in the context of evaluator actions where an independent effort is required of the evaluator.

## 4.2 Terms and definitions related to the ADV class

105           The following terms are used in the requirements for software internal structuring. Some of these are derived from the [IEEE Std 610.12-1990]IEEE Std 610.12-1990, *Standard glossary of software engineering terminology, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers*.

106           **administrator** — entity that has a level of trust with respect to all policies implemented by the TSF

Not all PPs or STs assume the same level of trust for administrators. Typically administrators are assumed to adhere at all times to the policies in the ST of the TOE. Some of these policies may be related to the functionality of the TOE, others may be related to the operational environment.

107      **call tree** — identifies the modules in a system in diagrammatic form showing which modules call one another

Adapted from [IEEE Std 610.12-1990]

108      **cohesion** — module strength manner and degree to which the tasks performed by a single software module are related to one another

[IEEE Std 610.12-1990]

Types of cohesion include coincidental, communicational, functional, logical, sequential, and temporal. These types of cohesion are described by the relevant term entry.

109      **coincidental cohesion** — module with the characteristic of performing unrelated, or loosely related, activities

[IEEE Std 610.12-1990]

See “cohesion”.

110      **communicational cohesion** — module containing functions that produce output for, or use output from, other functions within the module

[IEEE Std 610.12-1990]

111      See “cohesion”.

112      An example of a communicationally cohesive module is an access check module that includes mandatory, discretionary, and capability checks.

113      **complexity** — measure of how difficult software is to understand, and thus to analyse, test, and maintain

[IEEE Std 610.12-1990]

114      Reducing complexity is the ultimate goal for using modular decomposition, layering and minimisation. Controlling coupling and cohesion contributes significantly to this goal.

115      A good deal of effort in the software engineering field has been expended in attempting to develop metrics to measure the complexity of source code. Most of these metrics use easily computed properties of the source code, such as the number of operators and operands, the complexity of the control flow graph (cyclomatic complexity), the number of lines of source code, the ratio of comments to executable code, and similar measures. Coding

## Terms and definitions

standards have been found to be a useful tool in generating code that is more readily understood.

116 The TSF internals (ADV\_INT) family calls for a complexity analysis in all components. It is expected that the developer will provide support for the claims that there has been a sufficient reduction in complexity. This support could include the developer's programming standards, and an indication that all modules meet the standard (or that there are some exceptions that are justified by software engineering arguments). It could include the results of tools used to measure some of the properties of the source code, or it could include other support that the developer finds appropriate.

117 **coupling** — manner and degree of interdependence between software modules

[IEEE Std 610.12-1990]

Types of coupling include call, common and content coupling. These are characterised below:

118 **call coupling** — relationship between two modules

Examples of call coupling are data, stamp, and control:

119 **call coupling (data)** — relationship between two modules communicating strictly through the use of call parameters that represent single data items.

See “call coupling”

120 **call coupling (stamp)** — relationship between two modules through the use of call parameters that comprise multiple fields or that have meaningful internal structures.

See “call coupling”

121 **call coupling (control)** — relationship between two modules if one passes information that is intended to influence the internal logic of the other.

See “call coupling”

122 **common coupling** — relationship between two modules sharing a common data area or other common system resource

123 Global variables indicate that modules using those global variables are common coupled. Common coupling through global variables is generally allowed, but only to a limited degree.

124 For example, variables that are placed into a global area, but are used by only a single module, are inappropriately placed, and should be removed. Other factors that need to be considered in assessing the suitability of global variables are:

- a) The number of modules that modify a global variable: In general, only a single module should be allocated the responsibility for controlling the contents of a global variable, but there may be situations in which a second module may share that responsibility; in such a case, sufficient justification must be provided. It is unacceptable for this responsibility to be shared by more than two modules. (In making this assessment, care should be given to determining the module actually responsible for the contents of the variable; for example, if a single routine is used to modify the variable, but that routine simply performs the modification requested by its caller, it is the calling module that is responsible, and there may be more than one such module). Further, as part of the complexity determination, if two modules are responsible for the contents of a global variable, there should be clear indications of how the modifications are coordinated between them.
- b) The number of modules that reference a global variable: Although there is generally no limit on the number of modules that reference a global variable, cases in which many modules make such a reference should be examined for validity and necessity.

125 **content coupling** — relationship between two modules where one makes direct reference to the internals of the other

Examples include modifying code of, or referencing labels internal to, the other module. The result is that some or all of the content of one module are effectively included in the other. Content coupling can be thought of as using unadvertised module interfaces; this is in contrast to call coupling, which uses only advertised module interfaces.

126 **domain separation** — security architecture property whereby the TSF defines separate security domains for each user and for the TSF and ensures that no user process can affect the contents of a security domain of another user or of the TSF

127 **functional cohesion** — functional property of a module which performs activities related to a single purpose

[IEEE Std 610.12-1990]

A functionally cohesive module transforms a single type of input into a single type of output, such as a stack manager or a queue manager. See also “cohesion”.

128 **interaction** — general communication-based activity between entities

129 **interface** — means of communication with an entity

130 **layering** — design technique where separate groups of modules (the layers) are hierarchically organised to have separate responsibilities such that one



## Terms and definitions

layer depends only on layers below it in the hierarchy for services, and provides its services only to the layers above it

Strict layering adds the constraint that each layer receives services only from the layer immediately beneath it, and provides services only to the layer immediately above it.

131 **logical cohesion** — procedural cohesion characteristics of a module performing similar activities on different data structures

A module exhibits logical cohesion if its functions perform related, but different, operations on different inputs. See also “cohesion”.

132 **modular decomposition** — process of breaking a system into components to facilitate design, development and evaluation

[IEEE Std 610.12-1990]

133 **non-bypassability (of the TSF)** — security architecture property whereby all SFR-related actions are mediated by the TSF

134 **procedural cohesion** — See “logical cohesion”

135 **security domains** — environments provided by the TSF for the use by untrusted entities in such a way that these environments are isolated and protected from each other

136 **sequential cohesion** — module containing functions each of whose output is input for the following function in the module

[IEEE Std 610.12-1990]

An example of a sequentially cohesive module is one that contains the functions to write audit records and to maintain a running count of the accumulated number of audit violations of a specified type.

137 **software engineering** — application of a systematic, disciplined, quantifiable approach to the development and maintenance of software; that is, the application of engineering to software

[IEEE Std 610.12-1990]

As with engineering practices in general, some amount of judgement must be used in applying engineering principles. Many factors affect choices, not just the application of measures of modular decomposition, layering, and minimisation. For example, a developer may design a system with future applications in mind that will not be implemented initially. The developer may choose to include some logic to handle these future applications without fully implementing them; further, the developer may include some calls to as-yet unimplemented modules, leaving call stubs. The developer's justification for such deviations from well-structured programs will have to

be assessed using judgement, as well as the application of good software engineering discipline.

138 **temporal cohesion** — characteristics of a module containing functions that need to be executed at about the same time

Adapted from [IEEE Std 610.12-1990]. Examples of temporally cohesive modules include initialisation, recovery, and shutdown modules.

139 **TSF self-protection** — security architecture property whereby the TSF cannot be corrupted by non-TSF code or entities

### 4.3 Terms and definitions related to the AGD class

140 **installation** — procedure performed by a human user embedding the TOE in its operational environment and putting it into an operational state

This operation is performed normally only once, after receipt and acceptance of the TOE. The TOE is expected to be progressed to a configuration allowed by the ST. If similar processes have to be performed by the developer they are denoted as “generation” throughout ALC: Life-cycle support. If the TOE requires an initial start-up that does not need to be repeated regularly, this process would be classified as installation.

141 **operation** — usage phase of the TOE including “normal usage”, administration and maintenance of the TOE after delivery and preparation

142 **preparation** — activity in the life-cycle phase of a product, comprising the customer's acceptance of the delivered TOE and its installation which may include such things as booting, initialisation, start-up and progressing the TOE to a state ready for operation

### 4.4 Terms and definitions related to the ALC class

143 **acceptance criteria** — criteria to be applied when performing the acceptance procedures (e.g. successful document review, or successful testing in the case of software, firmware or hardware)

144 **acceptance procedures** — procedures followed in order to accept newly created or modified configuration items as part of the TOE, or to move them to the next step of the life-cycle

145 These procedures identify the roles or individuals responsible for the acceptance and the criteria to be applied in order to decide on the acceptance.

146 There are several types of acceptance situations some of which may overlap:

- a) acceptance of an item into the configuration management system for the first time, in particular inclusion of software, firmware and hardware components from other manufacturers into the TOE (“integration”);

## Terms and definitions

- b) progression of configuration items to the next life-cycle phase at each stage of the construction of the TOE (e.g. module, subsystem, quality control of the finished TOE);
- c) subsequent to transports of configuration items (for example parts of the TOE or preliminary products) between different development sites;
- d) subsequent to the delivery of the TOE to the consumer.

147 **configuration management** — discipline applying technical and administrative direction and surveillance to: identify and document the functional and physical characteristics of a configuration item, control changes to those characteristics, record and report change processing and implementation status, and verify compliance with specified requirements.

[IEEE Std 610.12-1990]

148 **CM documentation** — all CM documentation including CM output, CM list (configuration list), CM system records, CM plan and CM usage documentation

149 **configuration management evidence** — everything that may be used to establish confidence in the correct operation of the CM system

For example, CM output, rationales provided by the developer, observations, experiments or interviews made by the evaluator during a site visit.

150 **configuration item** — object managed by the CM system during the TOE development

These may be either parts of the TOE or objects related to the development of the TOE like evaluation documents or development tools. CM items may be stored in the CM system directly (for example files) or by reference (for example hardware parts) together with their version.

151 **configuration list** — configuration management output document listing all configuration items for a specific product together with the exact version of each configuration management item relevant for a specific version of the complete product

This list allows distinguishing the items belonging to the evaluated version of the product from other versions of these items belonging to other versions of the product. The final configuration management list is a specific document for a specific version of a specific product. (Of course the list can be an electronic document inside of a configuration management tool. In that case it can be seen as a specific view into the system or a part of the system rather than an output of the system. However, for the practical use in an evaluation the configuration list will probably be delivered as a part of the evaluation documentation.) The configuration list defines the items that are under the configuration management requirements of ALC\_CMC.

152 **configuration management output** — results, related to configuration management, produced or enforced by the configuration management system

These configuration management related results could occur as documents (for example filled paper forms, configuration management system records, logging data, hard-copies and electronic output data) as well as actions (for example manual measures to fulfil configuration management instructions). Examples of such configuration management outputs are configuration lists, configuration management plans and/or behaviours during the product life-cycle.

153 **configuration management plan** — description of how the configuration management system is used for the TOE

The objective of issuing a configuration management plan is that staff members can see clearly what they have to do. From the point of view of the overall configuration management system this can be seen as an output document (because it may be produced as part of the application of the configuration management system). From the point of view of the concrete project it is a usage document because members of the project team use it in order to understand the steps that they have to perform during the project. The configuration management plan defines the usage of the system for the specific product; the same system may be used to a different extent for other products. That means the configuration management plan defines and describes the output of the configuration management system of a company which is used during the TOE development.

154 **configuration management system** — set of procedures and tools (including their documentation) used by a developer to develop and maintain configurations of his products during their life-cycles

Configuration management systems may have varying degrees of rigour and function. At higher levels, configuration management systems may be automated, with flaw remediation, change controls, and other tracking mechanisms.

155 **configuration management system records** — output produced during the operation of the configuration management system documenting important configuration management activities

Examples of configuration management system records are configuration management item change control forms or configuration management item access approval forms.

156 **configuration management tools** — manually operated or automated tools realising or supporting a configuration management system

For example tools for the version management of the parts of the TOE.

157 **configuration management usage documentation** — part of the configuration management system, which describes, how the configuration

## Terms and definitions

management system is defined and applied by using for example handbooks, regulations and/or documentation of tools and procedures

158 **delivery** — transmission of the finished TOE from the production environment into the hands of the customer

This product life-cycle phase may include packaging and storage at the development site, but does not include transportations of the unfinished TOE or parts of the TOE between different developers or different development sites.

159 **developer** — organisation responsible for the development of the TOE

160 **development** — product life-cycle phase which is concerned with generating the implementation representation of the TOE

Throughout the ALC: Life-cycle support requirements, development and related terms (developer, develop) are meant in the more general sense to comprise development and production.

161 **development tools** — tools (including test software, if applicable) supporting the development and production of the TOE

For example for a software TOE, development tools are usually programming languages, compilers, linkers and generating tools.

162 **implementation representation** — least abstract representation of the TSF, specifically the one that is used to create the TSF itself without further design refinement

Source code that is then compiled or a hardware drawing that is used to build the actual hardware are examples of parts of an implementation representation.

163 **life-cycle** — sequence of stages of existence of an object (for example a product or a system) in time

164 **life-cycle definition** — definition of the life-cycle model

165 **life cycle model** — description of the stages and their relations to each other that are used in the management of the life-cycle of a certain object, how the sequence of stages looks like and which high level characteristics the stages have

166 **production** — production life-cycle phase follows the development phase and consists of transforming the implementation representation into the implementation of the TOE, i.e. into a state acceptable for delivery to the customer

This phase may comprise manufacturing, integration, generation, internal transports, storage, and labelling of the TOE.




Figure 1 - Terminology in CM and in the product life-cycle

#### 4.5 Terms and definitions related to the AVA class

167 **covert channel** — enforced, illicit signalling channel that allows a user to surreptitiously contravene the multi-level separation policy and unobservability requirements of the TOE

168 **encountered potential vulnerabilities** — potential weakness in the TOE identified by the evaluator while performing evaluation activities that could be used to violate the SFRs

169 **exploitable vulnerability** — weakness in the TOE that can be used to violate the SFRs in the operational environment for the TOE

170 **monitoring attacks** — generic category of attack methods that includes passive analysis techniques aiming at disclosure of sensitive internal data of the TOE by operating the TOE in the way that corresponds to the guidance documents

171 **potential vulnerability** — suspected, but not confirmed, weakness

Suspicion is by virtue of a postulated attack path to violate the SFRs.

172 **residual vulnerability** — weakness that cannot be exploited in the operational environment for the TOE, but that could be used to violate the SFRs by an attacker with greater attack potential than is anticipated in the operational environment for the TOE

173 **vulnerability** — weakness in the TOE that can be used to violate the SFRs in some environment

#### 4.6 Terms and definitions related to the ACO class

174 **base component** — entity in a composed TOE, which has itself been the subject of an evaluation, providing services and resources to a dependent component

## Terms and definitions

- 175            **compatible (components)** — property of a component able to provide the services required by the other component, through the corresponding interfaces of each component, in consistent operational environments
- 176            **component TOE** — successfully evaluated TOE that is part of another composed TOE
- 177            **composed TOE** — TOE comprised solely of two or more components that have been successfully evaluated
- 178            **dependent component** — entity in a composed TOE, which is itself the subject of an evaluation, relying on the provision on services by a base component
- 179            **functional interface** — external interface providing a user with access to functionality of the TOE which is not directly involved in enforcing security functional requirements

In a composed TOE these are the interfaces provided by the base component that are required by the dependent component to support the operation of the composed TOE.

## 5 Symbols and abbreviated terms

180 The following abbreviations are used in one or more parts of the CC:

<b>API</b>	Application Programming Interface
<b>CAP</b>	Composed Assurance Package
<b>CC</b>	Common Criteria
<b>CCRA</b>	Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of IT Security
<b>CM</b>	Configuration Management
<b>DAC</b>	Discretionary Access Control
<b>EAL</b>	Evaluation Assurance Level
<b>GHz</b>	Gigahertz
<b>GUI</b>	Graphical User Interface
<b>IC</b>	Integrated Circuit
<b>IOCTL</b>	Input Output Control
<b>IP</b>	Internet Protocol
<b>IT</b>	Information Technology
<b>MB</b>	Mega Byte
<b>OS</b>	Operating System
<b>OSP</b>	Organisational Security Policy
<b>PC</b>	Personal Computer
<b>PCI</b>	Peripheral Component Interconnect
<b>PKI</b>	Public Key Infrastructure
<b>PP</b>	Protection Profile
<b>RAM</b>	Random Access Memory
<b>RPC</b>	Remote Procedure Call
<b>SAR</b>	Security Assurance Requirement
<b>SFR</b>	Security Functional Requirement
<b>SFP</b>	Security Function Policy
<b>SPD</b>	Security Problem Definition
<b>ST</b>	Security Target
<b>TCP</b>	Transmission Control Protocol
<b>TOE</b>	Target of Evaluation
<b>TSF</b>	TOE Security Functionality
<b>TSFI</b>	TSF Interface



## **Symbols and abbreviated terms**

**VPN** Virtual Private Network

## 6 Overview

181 This Chapter introduces the main concepts of the CC. It identifies the  
concept “TOE”, the target audience of the CC, and the approach taken to  
present the material in the remainder of the CC.

### 6.1 The TOE

182 The CC is flexible in what to evaluate and is therefore not tied to the  
boundaries of IT products as commonly understood. Therefore in the context  
of evaluation, the CC uses the term “TOE” (Target of Evaluation).

183 A TOE is defined as a set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly  
accompanied by guidance.

184 While there are cases where a TOE consists of an IT product, this need not  
be the case. The TOE may be an IT product, a part of an IT product, a set of  
IT products, a unique technology that may never be made into a product, or a  
combination of these.

185 As far as the CC is concerned, the precise relation between the TOE and any  
IT products is only important in one aspect: the evaluation of a TOE  
containing only part of an IT product should not be misrepresented as the  
evaluation of the entire IT product.

186 Examples of TOEs include:

- A software application;
- An operating system;
- A software application in combination with an operating system;
- A software application in combination with an operating system and  
a workstation;
- An operating system in combination with a workstation;
- A smart card integrated circuit;
- The cryptographic co-processor of a smart card integrated circuit;
- A Local Area Network including all terminals, servers, network  
equipment and software;
- A database application excluding the remote client software normally  
associated with that database application.

## Overview

### 6.1.1 Different representations of the TOE

187 In the CC, a TOE can occur in several representations, such as (for a software TOE):

- a list of files in a configuration management system;
- a single master copy, that has just been compiled;
- a box containing a CD-ROM and a manual, ready to be shipped to a customer;
- an installed and operational version.

188 All of these are considered to be a TOE: and wherever the term “TOE” is used in the remainder of the CC, the context determines the representation that is meant.

### 6.1.2 Different configurations of the TOE

189 In general, IT products can be configured in many ways: installed in different ways, with different options enabled or disabled. As, during a CC evaluation, it will be determined whether a TOE meets certain requirements, this flexibility in configuration may lead to problems, as all possible configurations of the TOE must meet the requirements. For these reasons, it is often the case that the guidance part of the TOE strongly constrains the possible configurations of the TOE. That is: the guidance of the TOE may be different from the general guidance of the IT product.

190 An example is an operating system IT product. This product can be configured in many ways (e.g. types of users, number of users, types of external connections allowed/disallowed, options enabled/disabled etc.).

191 If the same IT product is to be a TOE, and is evaluated against a reasonable set of requirements, the configuration should be much more tightly controlled, as many options (e.g. allow all types of external connections or the system administrator does not need to be authenticated) will lead to a TOE not meeting the requirements.

192 For this reason, there would normally be a difference between the guidance of the IT product (allowing many configurations) and the guidance of the TOE (allowing only one or only configurations that do not differ in security-relevant ways).

193 Note that if the guidance of the TOE still allows more than one configuration, these configurations are collectively called “the TOE” and each such configuration must meet the requirements levied on the TOE.

## 6.2 Target audience of the CC

194 There are three groups with a general interest in evaluation of the security properties of TOEs: consumers, developers and evaluators. The criteria presented in this CC part 1 have been structured to support the needs of all three groups. They are all considered to be the principal users of the CC. The three groups can benefit from the criteria as explained in the following paragraphs.

### 6.2.1 Consumers

195 The CC is written to ensure that evaluation fulfils the needs of the consumers as this is the fundamental purpose and justification for the evaluation process.

196 Consumers can use the results of evaluations to help decide whether a TOE fulfils their security needs. These security needs are typically identified as a result of both risk analysis and policy direction. Consumers can also use the evaluation results to compare different TOEs.

197 The CC gives consumers, especially in consumer groups and communities of interest, an implementation-independent structure, termed the Protection Profile (PP), in which to express their security requirements in an unambiguous manner.

### 6.2.2 Developers

198 The CC is intended to support developers in preparing for and assisting in the evaluation of their TOEs and in identifying security requirements to be satisfied by those TOEs. These requirements are contained in an implementation-dependent construct termed the Security Target (ST). This ST may be based on one or more PPs to show that the ST conforms to the security requirements from consumers as laid down in those PPs.

199 The CC can then be used to determine the responsibilities and actions to provide evidence that is necessary to support the evaluation of the TOE against these requirements. It also defines the content and presentation of that evidence.

### 6.2.3 Evaluators

200 The CC contains criteria to be used by evaluators when forming judgements about the conformance of TOEs to their security requirements. The CC describes the set of general actions the evaluator is to carry out. Note that the CC does not specify procedures to be followed in carrying out those actions. More information on these procedures may be found in Section 6.4.

### 6.2.4 Others

201 While the CC is oriented towards specification and evaluation of the IT security properties of TOEs, it may also be useful as reference material to all parties with an interest in or responsibility for IT security. Some of the

## Overview

additional interest groups that can benefit from information contained in the CC are:

- a) system custodians and system security officers responsible for determining and meeting organisational IT security policies and requirements;
- b) auditors, both internal and external, responsible for assessing the adequacy of the security of an IT solution (which may consist of or contain a TOE);
- c) security architects and designers responsible for the specification of security properties of IT products;
- d) accreditors responsible for accepting an IT solution for use within a particular environment;
- e) sponsors of evaluation responsible for requesting and supporting an evaluation; and
- f) evaluation authorities responsible for the management and oversight of IT security evaluation programmes.

### 6.3 The different parts of the CC

202 The CC is presented as a set of distinct but related parts as identified below. Terms used in the description of the parts are explained in Chapter 7.

- a) **Part 1, Introduction and general model** is the introduction to the CC. It defines the general concepts and principles of IT security evaluation and presents a general model of evaluation.
- b) **Part 2, Security functional components** establishes a set of functional components that serve as standard templates upon which to base functional requirements for TOEs. CC Part 2 catalogues the set of functional components and organises them in families and classes.
- c) **Part 3, Security assurance components** establishes a set of assurance components that serve as standard templates upon which to base assurance requirements for TOEs. CC Part 3 catalogues the set of assurance components and organises them into families and classes. CC Part 3 also defines evaluation criteria for PPs and STs and presents seven pre-defined assurance packages which are called the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs).

203 In support of the three parts of the CC listed above, other documents have been published, the CEM provides the methodology for IT security evaluation using the CC as a basis. It is anticipated that other documents will be published, including technical rationale material and guidance documents.

204 The following table presents, for the three key target audience groupings, how the parts of the CC will be of interest.

	Consumers	Developers	Evaluators
Part 1	Use for background information and are obliged to use for reference purposes. Guidance structure for PPs.	Use for background information and reference purposes. Are obliged to use for the development of security specifications for TOEs.	Are obliged to use for reference purposes and for guidance in the structure for PPs and STs.
Part 2	Use for guidance and reference when formulating statements of requirements for a TOE.	Are obliged to use for reference when interpreting statements of functional requirements and formulating functional specifications for TOEs.	Are obliged to use for reference when interpreting statements of functional requirements.
Part 3	Use for guidance when determining required levels of assurance.	Use for reference when interpreting statements of assurance requirements and determining assurance approaches of TOEs.	Use for reference when interpreting statements of assurance requirements.

Table 1 - Road map to the Common Criteria

## 6.4 Evaluation context

205 In order to achieve greater comparability between evaluation results, evaluations should be performed within the framework of an authoritative evaluation scheme that sets the standards, monitors the quality of the evaluations and administers the regulations to which the evaluation facilities and evaluators must conform.

206 The CC does not state requirements for the regulatory framework. However, consistency between the regulatory frameworks of different evaluation authorities will be necessary to achieve the goal of mutual recognition of the results of such evaluations.

207 A second way of achieving greater comparability between evaluation results is using a common methodology to achieve these results. For the CC, this methodology is given in the CEM.

208 Use of a common evaluation methodology contributes to the repeatability and objectivity of the results but is not by itself sufficient. Many of the evaluation criteria require the application of expert judgement and background knowledge for which consistency is more difficult to achieve. In order to enhance the consistency of the evaluation findings, the final evaluation results may be submitted to a certification process.

209 The certification process is the independent inspection of the results of the evaluation leading to the production of the final certificate or approval, which is normally publicly available. The certification process is a means of gaining greater consistency in the application of IT security criteria.

## Overview

210 The evaluation schemes and certification processes are the responsibility of the evaluation authorities that run such schemes and processes and are outside the scope of the CC.

## 7 General model

211 This chapter presents the general concepts used throughout the CC, including the context in which the concepts are to be used and the CC approach for applying the concepts. CC Part 2 and CC Part 3, which are obliged to be consulted by users of the CC Part 1, expand on the use of these concepts and assume that the approach described is used. Further, for users of the CC who intend to perform evaluation activities the CEM is applicable. This chapter assumes some knowledge of IT security and does not propose to act as a tutorial in this area.

212 The CC discusses security using a set of security concepts and terminology. An understanding of these concepts and the terminology is a prerequisite to the effective use of the CC. However, the concepts themselves are quite general and are not intended to restrict the class of IT security problems to which the CC is applicable.

### 7.1 Assets and countermeasures

213 Security is concerned with the protection of assets. Assets are entities that someone places value upon. Examples of assets include:

- contents of a file or a server;
- the authenticity of votes cast in an election;
- the availability of an electronic commerce process;
- the ability to use an expensive printer;
- access to a classified facility.

but given that value is highly subjective, almost anything can be an asset.

214 The environment(s) in which these assets are located is called the operational environment. Examples of (aspects of) operational environments are:


- a) the computer room of a bank;
- b) a computer network connected to the Internet;
- c) a LAN;
- d) a general office environment.

215 Many assets are in the form of information that is stored, processed and transmitted by IT products to meet requirements laid down by owners of the information. Information owners may require that availability, dissemination and modification of any such information are strictly controlled and that the



## General model

assets are protected from threats by countermeasures. Figure 2 illustrates these high level concepts and relationships.



**Figure 2 - Security concepts and relationships**

216 Safeguarding assets of interest is the responsibility of owners who place value on those assets. Actual or presumed threat agents may also place value on the assets and seek to abuse assets in a manner contrary to the interests of the owner. Examples of threat agents include hackers, malicious users, non-malicious users (who sometimes make errors), computer processes and accidents.

217 The owners of the assets will perceive such threats as potential for impairment of the assets such that the value of the assets to the owners would be reduced. Security-specific impairment commonly includes, but is not limited to: loss of asset confidentiality, loss of asset integrity and loss of asset availability.

218 These threats therefore give rise to risks to the assets, based on the likelihood of a threat being realised and the impact on the assets when that threat is realised. Subsequently countermeasures are imposed to reduce the risks to assets. These countermeasures may consist of IT countermeasures (such as firewalls and smart cards) and non-IT countermeasures (such as guards and procedures). See also ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 for a more general discussion on security countermeasures (controls).

219 Owners of assets may be (held) responsible for those assets and therefore should be able to defend the decision to accept the risks of exposing the assets to the threats.

220 Two important elements in defending this decision are being able to demonstrate that:

- the countermeasures are sufficient: if the countermeasures do what they claim to do, the threats to the assets are countered;
- the countermeasures are correct: the countermeasures do what they claim to do.

221 Many owners of assets lack the knowledge, expertise or resources necessary to judge sufficiency and correctness of the countermeasures, and they may not wish to rely solely on the assertions of the developers of the countermeasures. These consumers may therefore choose to increase their confidence in the sufficiency and correctness of some or all of their countermeasures by ordering an evaluation of these countermeasures.




Figure 3 - Evaluation concepts and relationships

7.1.1 Sufficiency of the countermeasures

222 In an evaluation, sufficiency of the countermeasures is analysed through a construct called the Security Target. In this Section a simplified view on this construct is provided: a more detailed and complete description may be found in Annex A.

223 The Security Target begins with describing the assets and the threats to those assets. The Security Target then describes the countermeasures (in the form of Security Objectives) and demonstrates that these countermeasures are

## General model

sufficient to counter these threats: if the countermeasures do what they claim to do, the threats are countered.

- 224 The Security Target then divides these countermeasures in two groups:
- a) the security objectives for the TOE: these describe the countermeasure(s) for which correctness will be determined in the evaluation;
  - b) the security objectives for the Operational Environment: these describe the countermeasures for which correctness will not be determined in the evaluation.

- 225 The reasons for this division are:
- The CC is only suitable for assessing the correctness of IT countermeasures. Therefore the non-IT countermeasures (e.g. human security guards, procedures) are always in the Operational Environment.
  - Assessing correctness of countermeasures costs time and money, possibly making it infeasible to assess the correctness of all IT countermeasures.
  - The correctness of some IT countermeasures may already have been assessed in another evaluation. It is therefore not cost-effective to assess this correctness again.

226 For the TOE (the IT countermeasures whose correctness will be assessed during the evaluation), the Security Target requires a further detailing of the security objectives for the TOE in Security Functional Requirements (SFRs). These SFRs are formulated in a standardised language (described in CC Part 2) to ensure exactness and facilitate comparability.

- 227 In summary, the Security Target demonstrates that:
- The SFRs meet the security objectives for the TOE;
  - The security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the operational environment counter the threats;
  - And therefore, the SFRs and the security objectives for the operational environment counter the threats.

228 From this it follows that a correct TOE (meeting the SFRs) in combination with a correct operational environment (meeting the security objectives for the operational environment) will counter the threats. In the next two sections correctness of the TOE and correctness of the operational environment are discussed separately.

### 7.1.2 Correctness of the TOE

229 A TOE may be incorrectly designed and implemented, and may therefore contain errors that lead to vulnerabilities. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, attackers may still damage and/or abuse the assets.

230 These vulnerabilities may arise from accidental errors made during development, poor design, intentional addition of malicious code, poor testing etc.

231 To determine correctness of the TOE, various activities can be performed such as:

- testing the TOE;
- examining various design representations of the TOE;
- examining the physical security of the development environment of the TOE.

232 The Security Target provides a structured description of these activities to determine correctness in the form of Security Assurance Requirements (SARs). These SARs are formulated in a standardised language (described in CC Part 3) to ensure exactness and facilitate comparability.

233 If the SARs are met, there exists assurance in the correctness of the TOE and the TOE is therefore less likely to contain vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers. The amount of assurance that exists in the correctness of the TOE is determined by the SARs themselves: a few “weak” SARs will lead to a little assurance, a lot of “strong” SARs will lead to a lot of assurance.

### 7.1.3 Correctness of the Operational Environment

234 The operational environment may also be incorrectly designed and implemented, and may therefore contain errors that lead to vulnerabilities. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, attackers may still damage and/or abuse the assets.

235 However, in the CC, no assurance is obtained regarding the correctness of the operational environment. Or, in other words, the operational environment is not evaluated (see the next Section).

236 As far as the evaluation is concerned, the operational environment is assumed to be a 100% correct instantiation of the security objectives for the operational environment.

237 This does not preclude a consumer of the TOE from using other methods to determine the correctness of his operational environment, such as:

- If, for an OS TOE, the security objectives for the operational environment state “The operational environment shall ensure that

## General model

entities from an untrusted network (e.g. the Internet) can only access the TOE by ftp”, the consumer could select an evaluated firewall, and configure it to only allow ftp access to the TOE;

- If the security objectives for the operational environment state “The operational environment shall ensure that all administrative personnel will not behave maliciously”, the consumer could adapt his contracts with administrative personnel to include punitive sanctions for malicious behaviour, but this determination is not part of a CC evaluation.

## 7.2 Evaluation

238 The CC recognises two types of evaluation: an ST/TOE evaluation, which is described below, and an evaluation of PPs, which is defined in CC Part 3. In many places, the CC uses the term evaluation (without qualifiers) to refer to an ST/TOE evaluation.

239 In the CC an ST/TOE evaluation proceeds in two steps:

- a) An ST evaluation: where the sufficiency of the TOE and the operational environment are determined;
- b) A TOE evaluation: where the correctness of the TOE is determined. As said earlier, the TOE evaluation does not assess correctness of the operational environment.

240 The ST evaluation is carried out by applying the Security Target evaluation criteria (which are defined in CC Part 3) to the Security Target. The precise method to apply the ASE criteria is determined by the evaluation methodology that is used.

241 The TOE evaluation is more complex. The principal inputs to a TOE evaluation are: the evaluation evidence, which includes the TOE and ST, but will usually also include input from the development environment, such as design documents or developer test results.

242 The TOE evaluation consists of applying the SARs (from the Security Target) to the evaluation evidence. The precise method to apply a specific SAR is determined by the evaluation methodology that is used.

243 How the results of applying the SARs are documented, and what reports need to be generated and in what detail, is determined by both the evaluation methodology that is used and the evaluation scheme under which the evaluation is carried out.

244 The result of the TOE evaluation process is either:

- A statement that not all SARs have been met and that therefore there is not the specified level of assurance that the TOE meets the SFRs as stated in the ST;

- A statement that all SARs have been met, and that therefore there is the specified level of assurance that the TOE meets the SFRs as stated in the ST.

245 The TOE evaluation may be carried out after TOE development has finished, or in parallel with TOE development.

246 The method of stating ST/TOE evaluation results is described in Chapter 10. These results also identify the PP(s) and package(s) to which the TOE claims conformance, and these constructs are described in the next Chapter.

# 8 Tailoring Security Requirements

## 8.1 Operations

247 The CC functional and assurance components may be used exactly as defined in CC Part 2 and CC Part 3, or they may be tailored through the use of permitted operations. When using operations, the PP/ST author should be careful that the dependency needs of other requirements that depend on this requirement are satisfied. The permitted operations are selected from the following set:

- Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations;
- Assignment: allows the specification of parameters;
- Selection: allows the specification of one or more items from a list; and
- Refinement: allows the addition of details.

248 The assignment and selection operations are permitted only where specifically indicated in a component. Iteration and refinement are permitted for all components. The operations are described in more detail below.

249 The CC Part 2 Annexes provide the guidance on the valid completion of selections and assignments. This guidance provides normative instructions on how to complete operations, and those instructions shall be followed unless the PP/ST author justifies the deviation:

- a) “None” is only available as a choice for the completion of a selection if explicitly provided.

The lists provided for the completion of selections must be non-empty. If a “None” option is chosen, no additional selection options may be chosen. If “None” is not given as an option in a selection, it is permissible to combine the choices in a selection with “and”s and “or”s, unless the selection explicitly states “choose one of”.

Selection operations may be combined by iteration where needed. In this case, the applicability of the option chosen for each iteration should not overlap the subject of the other iterated selection, since they are intended to be exclusive.

- b) For the completion of assignments, the CC Part 2 Annexes shall be consulted in order to determine when “None” would be a valid completion.

### 8.1.1 The iteration operation

250 The iteration operation may be performed on every component. The PP/ST author performs an iteration operation by including multiple requirements based on the same component. Each iteration of a component shall be different from all other iterations of that component, which is realised by completing assignments and selections in a different way, or by applying refinements to it in a different way.

251 Different iterations should be uniquely identified to allow clear rationales and tracings to and from these requirements.

252 It is important to note that sometimes an iteration operation can be used with components where could also be possible to perform an assignment operation with a range or list of values instead of iterate them. In that case the author can select the most appropriate alternative, considering if there is a necessity of providing a whole rationale for the range of values or if it is necessary to have a separate one for each of them. The author should also keep in mind if individual traces are required for those values.

### 8.1.2 The assignment operation

253 An assignment operation occurs where a given component contains an element with a parameter that may be set by the PP/ST author. The parameter may be an unrestricted variable, or a rule that narrows the variable to a specific range of values.

254 Whenever an element in a PP contains an assignment, a PP author shall do one of four things:

- a) leave the assignment uncompleted. The PP author could include FIA\_AFL.1.2 “When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall **[assignment: list of actions]**.” in the PP.
- b) complete the assignment. As an example, the PP author could include FIA\_AFL.1.2 “When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall **prevent that external entity from binding to any subject in the future.**” in the PP.
- c) narrow the assignment, to further limit the range of values that is allowed. As an example, the PP author could include FIA\_AFL.1.1 “The TSF shall **detect when [assignment: positive integer between 4 and 9] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur ...**” in the PP.
- d) transform the assignment to a selection, thereby narrowing the assignment. As an example, the PP author could include FIA\_AFL.1.2 “When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall



## Tailoring Security Requirements

[selection: prevent that user from binding to any subject in the future, notify the administrator].” in the PP.

255 Whenever an element in an ST contains an assignment, an ST author shall complete that assignment, as indicated in b) above. Options a), c) and d) are not allowed for STs.

256 The values chosen in options b), c) and d) shall conform to the indicated type required by the assignment.

257 When an assignment is to be completed with a set (e.g. subjects), one may list a set of subjects, but also some description of the set from which the elements of the set can be derived such as:

- all subjects
- all subjects of type X
- all subjects except subject a
- as long as it is clear which subjects are meant.

### 8.1.3 The selection operation

258 The selection operation occurs where a given component contains an element where a choice from several items has to be made by the PP/ST author.

259 Whenever an element in a PP contains a selection, the PP author may do one of three things:

- a) leave the selection uncompleted.
- b) complete the selection by choosing one or more items.
- c) restrict the selection by removing some of the choices, but leaving two or more.

260 Whenever an element in an ST contains a selection, an ST author shall complete that selection, as indicated in b) above. Options a) and c) are not allowed for STs.

261 The item or items chosen in b) and c) shall be taken from the items provided in the selection.

### 8.1.4 The refinement operation

262 The refinement operation can be performed on every requirement. The PP/ST author performs a refinement by altering that requirement. The first rule for a refinement is that a TOE meeting the refined requirement also meets the unrefined requirement in the context of the PP/ST (i.e. a refined requirement must be “stricter” than the original requirement). If a refinement

## Tailoring Security Requirements

does not meet this rule, the resulting refined requirement is considered to be an extended requirement and shall be treated as such.

263 The first rule for a refinement is that a TOE meeting the refined requirement also meets the unrefined requirement in the context of the PP/ST (i.e. a refined requirement must be “stricter” than the original requirement)

264 The only exception to this rule is that a PP/ST author is allowed to refine a SFR to apply to some but not all subjects, objects, operations, security attributes and/or external entities.

265 However, this exception does not apply to refining SFRs that are taken from PPs that compliance is being claimed to; these SFRs may not be refined to apply to fewer subjects, objects, operations, security attributes and/or external entities than the SFR in the PP.

266 The second rule for a refinement is that the refinement shall be related to the original component.

267 A special case of refinement is an editorial refinement, where a small change is made in a requirement, i.e. rephrasing a sentence due to adherence to proper English grammar, or to make it more understandable to the reader. This change is not allowed to modify the meaning of the requirement in any way.

### **8.2 Dependencies between components**

268 Dependencies may exist between components. Dependencies arise when a component is not self sufficient and relies upon the presence of another component to provide security functionality or assurance.

269 The functional components in CC Part 2 typically have dependencies on other functional components as do some of the assurance components in CC Part 3 which may have dependencies on other CC Part 3 components. CC Part 2 dependencies on CC Part 3 components may also be defined. However, this does not preclude extended functional components having dependencies on assurance components or vice versa.

270 Component dependency descriptions are determined by consulting the CC Part 2 and CC Part 3 component definitions. In order to ensure completeness of the TOE security requirements, dependencies should be satisfied when requirements based on components with dependencies are incorporated into PPs and STs. Dependencies should also be considered when constructing packages.

271 In other words: if component A has a dependency on component B, this means that whenever a PP/ST contains a security requirement based on component A, the PP/ST shall also contain one of :

- a) a security requirement based on component B, or

## Tailoring Security Requirements

- b) a security requirement based on a component that is hierarchically higher than B, or
- c) a justification why the PP/ST does not contain a security requirement based on component B.

272 In cases a) and b), when a security requirement is included because of a dependency, it may be necessary to complete operations (assignment, iteration, refinement, selection) on that security requirement in a particular manner to make sure that it actually satisfies the dependency.

273 In case c), the justification that a security requirement is not included should address either:

- why the dependency is not necessary or useful, or
- that the dependency has been addressed by the operational environment of the TOE, in which case the justification should describe how the security objectives for the operational environment address this dependency, or
- that the dependency has been addressed by the other SFRs in some other manner (extended SFRs, combinations of SFRs etc.)

### 8.3 Extended components

274 In the CC it is mandatory to base requirements on components from CC Part 2 or CC Part 3 with two exceptions:

- a) there are security objectives for the TOE that can not be translated to Part 2 SFRs, or there are third party requirements (e.g., laws, standards) that can not be translated to Part 3 SARs (e.g. regarding evaluation of cryptography);
- b) a security objective can be translated, but only with great difficulty and/or complexity based on components in CC Part 2 and/or CC Part 3.

275 In both cases the PP/ST author is required to define his own components. These newly defined components are called extended components. A precisely defined extended component is needed to provide context and meaning to the extended SFRs and SARs based on that component.

276 After the new components have been defined correctly, the PP/ST author can then base one or more SFRs or SARs on these newly defined extended components and use them in the same way as the other SFRs and SARs. From this point on, there is no further distinction between SARs and SFRs based on the CC and SARs and SFRs based on extended components. Refer to CC Part 3 Extended components definition (APE\_ECD) and Extended components definition (ASE\_ECD) for further requirements on extended components.

## 9 Protection Profiles and Packages

### 9.1 Introduction

277 To allow consumer groups and communities of interest to express their security needs, and to facilitate writing STs, this part of the CC provides two special constructs: packages and Protection Profiles (PPs). In the following two sections these constructs are described in more detail, followed by a section on how these constructs can be used.

### 9.2 Packages

278 A package is a named set of security requirements. A package is either

- a functional package, containing only SFRs, or
- an assurance package, containing only SARs.

279 Mixed packages containing both SFRs and SARs are not allowed.

280 A package can be defined by any party and is intended to be re-usable. To this goal it should contain requirements that are useful and effective in combination. Packages can be used in the construction of larger packages, PPs and STs. At present there are no criteria for the evaluation of packages, therefore any set of SFRs or SARs can be a package.

281 Examples of assurance packages are the evaluation assurance levels (EALs) that are defined in CC Part 3. At the time of writing there are no functional packages for this version of the CC.

### 9.3 Protection Profiles

282 Whereas an ST always describes a specific TOE (e.g. the MinuteGap v18.5 Firewall), a PP is intended to describe a TOE type (e.g. firewalls). The same PP may therefore be used as a template for many different STs to be used in different evaluations. A detailed description of PPs is given in Annex B.

283 In general an ST describes requirements for a TOE and is written by the developer of that TOE, while a PP describes the general requirements for a TOE type, and is therefore typically written by:

- A user community seeking to come to a consensus on the requirements for a given TOE type;
- A developer of a TOE, or a group of developers of similar TOEs wishing to establish a minimum baseline for that type of TOE;
- A government or large corporation specifying its requirements as part of its acquisition process.

## Protection Profiles and Packages

284 The PP determines the allowed type of conformance of the ST to the PP. That is, the PP states (in the PP conformance statement, see section B.5) what the allowed types of conformance for the ST are:

- if the PP states that strict conformance is required, the ST shall conform to the PP in a strict manner;
- if the PP states that demonstrable conformance is required, the ST shall conform to the PP in a strict or demonstrable manner.

285 Restating this in other words, an ST is only allowed to conform in a PP in a demonstrable manner, if the PP explicitly allows this.

286 If an ST claims conformance to multiple PPs, it shall conform (as described above) to each PP in the manner ordained by that PP. This may mean that the ST conforms strictly to some PPs and demonstrably to other PPs.

287 Note that either the ST conforms to the PP in question or it does not. The CC does not recognise “partial” conformance. It is therefore the responsibility of the PP author to ensure the PP is not overly onerous, prohibiting PP/ST authors in claiming conformance to the PP.

288 An ST is equivalent or more restrictive than a PP if:

- all TOEs that meet the ST also meet the PP, and
- all operational environments that meet the PP also meet the ST.

or, informally, the ST shall levy the same or more, restrictions on the TOE and the same or less restrictions on the operational environment of the TOE.

289 This general statement can be made more specific for various sections of the ST:

- a) **Security problem definition:** The conformance rationale in the ST shall demonstrate that the security problem definition in the ST is equivalent (or more restrictive) than the security problem definition in the PP. This means that:
  - all TOEs that would meet the security problem definition in the ST also meet the security problem definition in the PP;
  - all operational environments that would meet the security problem definition in the PP would also meet the security problem definition in the ST.
- b) **Security objectives:** The conformance rationale in the ST shall demonstrate that the security objectives in the ST is equivalent (or more restrictive) than the security objectives in the PP. This means that:

## Protection Profiles and Packages

- all TOEs that would meet the security objectives for the TOE in the ST also meet the security objectives for the TOE in the PP;
- all operational environments that would meet the security objectives for the operational environment in the PP would also meet the security objectives for the operational environment in the ST.

290 If strict conformance for protection profiles is specified then the following requirements apply:

a) **Security problem definition:**

- The ST shall contain the security problem definition of the PP and may specify additional threats and OSPs; it shall contain all assumptions as defined in the PP, with two possible exceptions as explained in the next two bullets;
- an assumption (or a part of an assumption) specified in the PP may be omitted from the ST, if all security objectives for the operational environment defined in the PP addressing this assumption (or this part of an assumption) are replaced by security objectives for the TOE in the ST;
- a new assumption may be added in the ST to the set of assumptions defined in the PP, if this new assumption does not mitigate a threat (or part of a threat) meant to be addressed by security objectives for the TOE in the PP and if this assumption doesn't fulfil an OSP (or a part of an OSP) meant to be addressed by security objectives for the TOE in the PP;

b) **Security objectives:** The ST:

- shall contain all security objectives for the TOE of the PP but may specify additional security objectives for the TOE;
- shall contain all security objectives for the operational environment as defined in the PP with two exceptions as explained in the next two bullet points;
- may specify that certain objectives for the operational environment in the PP are security objectives for the TOE in the ST. This is called re-assigning a security objective. If a security objective is re-assigned to the TOE the security objectives justification has to make clear which assumption or part of the assumption may not be necessary any more;
- may specify additional objectives for the operational environment, if these new objectives do not mitigate a threat (or part of a threat) meant to be addressed by security

## Protection Profiles and Packages

objectives of the TOE in the PP and if these new objectives do not fulfil an OSP (or a part of an OSP) meant to be addressed by security objectives of the TOE in the PP

- c) **Security requirements:** The ST shall contain all SFRs and SARs in the PP, but may claim additional or hierarchically stronger SFRs and SARs. The completion of operations in the ST must be consistent with that in the PP; either the same completion will be used in the ST as that in the PP or one that makes the requirement more restrictive (the rules of refinement apply).

291 If demonstrable conformance for protection profiles is specified then the following requirements apply:

- the ST shall contain a rationale on why the ST is considered to be “equivalent or more restrictive” than the PP.
- Demonstrable conformance allows a PP author to describe a common security problem to be solved and provide generic guidelines to the requirements necessary for its resolution, in the knowledge that there is likely to be more than one way of specifying a resolution.

292 PP evaluation is optional. Evaluation is performed by applying the APE criteria to them as listed in CC Part 3. The goal of such an evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent, and technically sound and suitable for use as a template on which to build another PP or an ST.

293 Basing a PP/ST on an evaluated PP has two advantages:

- There is much less risk that there are errors, ambiguities or gaps in the PP. If any problems with a PP (that would have been caught by evaluating that PP) are found during the writing or evaluation of the new ST, significant time may elapse before the PP is corrected.
- Evaluation of the new PP/ST may often re-use evaluation results of the evaluated PP, resulting in less effort for evaluating the new PP/ST.

### 9.4 Using PPs and packages

294 If an ST claims to be conformant to one or more packages and/or Protection Profiles, the evaluation of that ST will (among other properties of that ST) demonstrate that the ST actually conforms to these packages and/or PPs that they claim conformance to. Details of this determination of conformance can be found in Annex A.

295 This allows the following process:

- a) An organisation seeking to acquire a particular type of IT security product develops their security needs into a PP, then has this evaluated and publishes it;

- b) A developer takes this PP, writes an ST that claims conformance to the PP and has this ST evaluated;
- c) The developer then builds a TOE (or uses an existing one) and has this evaluated against the ST.

296 The result is that the developer can prove that his TOE is conformant to the security needs of the organisation: the organisation can therefore acquire that TOE. A similar line of reasoning applies to packages.

### 9.5 Using Multiple Protection Profiles

297 The CC also allows PPs to conform to other PPs, allowing chains of PPs to be constructed, each based on the previous one(s).

298 For instance, one could take a PP for an Integrated Circuit and a PP for a Smart Card OS, and use these to construct a Smart Card PP (IC and OS) that claims conformance to the other two. One could then write a PP on Smart Cards for Public Transport based on the Smart Card PP and a PP on Applet Loading. Finally, a developer could then construct an ST based on this Smart Cards for Public Transport PP.

## 9.6 Protection Profiles, PP-Modules and PP-Configurations

### 9.6.1 Introduction

299 To allow the definition of modular Protection Profiles that address optional TOE's security features, this chapter introduces two constructs: PP-Modules and PP-Configurations, as well as the way they can be used to evaluate compliant products.

### 9.6.2 PP-Modules

300 A PP-Module is a consistent set of elements (threats, assumptions, organisational policies, objectives and security requirements) with a unique reference.

301 Unlike Protection Profiles, PP-Modules address optional security features of a given type of TOE that cannot be required uniformly for all products of this kind.

302 Each PP-Module refers to at least one Base Protection Profile (or Base-PP) that provides the definition of the TOE type and the mandatory requirements to fulfill. The PP-Module specifies the modified TOE type, complements these requirements and has to be used with the Base-PPs: a PP-Module may introduce new elements to the Base-PPs and may also refine or interpret some of the elements of the Base-PPs.

303 If the PP-Module refers to several Base Protection Profiles, this set of Base-PPs have to be used simultaneously for the evaluation and usage of the PP-Module.



## Protection Profiles and Packages

304 The PP-Module can also refer to alternative sets of Base-PPs, in the case the PP-Module could comply with alternative Base-PPs depending of the usage.

305 The evaluation of a PP-Module alone is meaningless. A PP-Module has to be evaluated as part of a PP-Configuration, at least with its mandatory Base-PPs.

### 9.6.3 PP-Configurations

306 A PP-Configuration results from the combination of at least one PP-Module with its Base-PPs, without any additional content: a PP-Configuration is much like a Protection Profile that would include all the elements from the Base-PPs and the PP-Modules.

307 A PP-Configuration can select more PPs than the Base-PPs of the PP-Modules, but at least all of the Base-PPs of the referred PP-Modules must be included in the PP-Configuration.

308 If the PP-Module defines alternative sets of Base-PPs, only one of these sets must be used in the PP-Configuration.

309 A PP-Configuration holds a unique reference and identifies all the PP components: selected Base-PPs and selected PP-Modules.

310 A PP-Configuration can only combine certified Base-PPs to PP-Modules.

311 Evaluation rules for PP-Configurations are similar to the ones for standard PPs. These rules are described in Class ACE, in CC Part 3.

### 9.6.4 Using PP-Modules and PP-Configurations in security targets

312 PP-Modules are used to build specific PP-Configurations on top of one or more Base-PPs. PP-Modules are used in Security Targets only as part of well-identified PP-Configurations.

313 PP-Configurations are used like Protection Profiles. A Security Target can claim conformity to a PP-Configuration provided this PP-Configuration has been evaluated. Henceforth, the evaluation of the ST can rely on the results of the PP-Configuration evaluation results as usual.

314 Note that the evaluation of a PP-Configuration can arise in two situations, with no impact on the evaluation methodology:

- Independently of any product evaluation, or

- As the first step of the evaluation of a Security Target that claims conformity with the PP-Configuration. Otherwise the conformance claim is meaningless and the ST evaluation would fail in this aspect.

315 In practice, a ST that claims conformance with a non-certified PP-Configuration can still be evaluated with a conformance claim against the Base-PP of the PP-Configuration; the elements of the ST that meet the PP-

Modules of the PP-Configuration would be evaluated as standard additions to the Base-PP, proper to the TOE.

# 10 Evaluation results


## 10.1 Introduction

316 This chapter presents the expected results from PP and ST/TOE evaluations performed according to the CEM.

317 PP evaluations lead to catalogues of evaluated PPs.

318 An ST evaluation leads to intermediate results that are used in the frame of a TOE evaluation.

319 ST/TOE evaluations lead to catalogues of evaluated TOEs. In many cases these catalogues will refer to the IT products that the TOEs are derived from rather than the specific TOE. Therefore, the existence of an IT product in a catalogue should not be construed as meaning that the whole IT product has been evaluated; instead the actual extent of the ST/TOE evaluation is defined by the ST. Refer to the bibliography for examples of such catalogues.



**Figure 4 - Evaluation results**

320 STs may be based on packages, evaluated PPs or non-evaluated PPs - however this is not mandatory, as STs do not have to be based on anything at all.

321 Evaluation should lead to objective and repeatable results that can be cited as evidence, even if there is no absolute objective scale for representing the results of a security evaluation. The existence of a set of evaluation criteria is a necessary pre-condition for evaluation to lead to a meaningful result and provides a technical basis for mutual recognition of evaluation results between evaluation authorities.

322 An evaluation result represents the findings of a specific type of investigation of the security properties of a TOE. Such a result does not automatically guarantee fitness for use in any particular application environment. The decision to accept a TOE for use in a specific application environment is based on consideration of many security issues including the evaluation findings.

### 10.2 Results of a PP evaluation

323 CC Part 3 contains the evaluation criteria that an evaluator is obliged to consult in order to state whether a PP is complete, consistent, and technically sound and hence suitable for use in developing an ST.

324 The results of the evaluation shall also include a “Conformance Claim” (see Section 10.5)).

### 10.3 Results of a PP-Configuration evaluation

325 This chapter presents the expected results from PP-Configuration evaluation and ST/TOE evaluations according to the Class ACE (Protection Profile Configuration Evaluation) presented in CEM class ACE.

326 The evaluated PP-Configurations integrate the catalogue of evaluated PPs, linked to the Base-PPs of the PP-Configurations.

327 STs may be based on packages, evaluated PPs or non-evaluated PPs, evaluated PP-Configurations or non-evaluated PP-Configurations, or built-in independently.

328 CC Part 3 ACE contains the evaluation criteria that an evaluator is obliged to follow in order to state whether a PP-Configuration is complete, consistent, and technically sound and hence suitable for use in developing an ST.

329 The results of the evaluation shall also include a "Conformance Claim" (see Section 10.5).

### 10.4 Results of an ST/TOE evaluation

330 CC Part 3 contains the evaluation criteria that an evaluator is obliged to consult in order to determine whether sufficient assurance exists that the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Evaluation of the TOE shall therefore result in a pass/fail statement for the ST. If both the ST and the TOE evaluation have resulted in a pass statement, the underlying product is eligible for inclusion in a registry. The results of evaluation shall also include a “Conformance Claim” as defined in the next section.

331 It may be the case that the evaluation results are subsequently used in a certification process, but this certification process is outside the scope of the CC.

### 10.5 Conformance claim

332 The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC conformance claim that:

- a) describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
- b) describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
  - **CC Part 2 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
  - **CC Part 2 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
- c) describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
  - **CC Part 3 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
  - **CC Part 3 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.

333 Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:

- *Package name Conformant* - A PP or ST is conformant to a predefined package (e.g. EAL) if:
  - the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
  - the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
- *Package name Augmented* - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if:
  - the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package.

- the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the package.

334 Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.

335 Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection Profiles:

- a) *PP Conformant* - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.
- b) *Conformance Statement* (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex B.

336 Besides the standard CC conformance claim regarding the version of the CC, the CC Part 2 and Part 3, the SFR and SAR packages, and the standard PP claim,

- a PP-Configuration has to provide a conformance statement applicable to the conformant STs, either *strict* or *demonstrable*, that meet the conformance statements of the Base-PP(s),

- a ST may claim conformity with one or more PP-Configurations.

### 10.6 Use of ST/TOE evaluation results

337 Once an ST and a TOE have been evaluated, asset owners can have the assurance (as defined in the ST) that the TOE, together with the operational environment, counters the threats. The evaluation results may be used by the asset owner in deciding whether to accept the risk of exposing the assets to the threats.

338 However, the asset owner should carefully check whether:

- a) the Security Problem Definition in the ST matches the security problem of the asset owner;
- b) the Operational Environment of the asset owner conforms (or can be made to conform) to the security objectives for the Operational Environment described in the ST.

339 If either of these is not the case, the TOE may not be suitable for the purposes of the asset owner.

340 Additionally, once an evaluated TOE is in operation, it is still possible that previously unknown errors or vulnerabilities in the TOE may surface. In that case, the developer may correct the TOE (to repair the vulnerabilities) or

## Evaluation results

change the ST to exclude the vulnerabilities from the scope of the evaluation. In either case, the old evaluation results may no longer be valid.

341 If it is deemed necessary that confidence is regained, re-evaluation is needed. The CC may be used for this re-evaluation, but detailed procedures for re-evaluation are outside the scope of this part of the CC.

# A Specification of Security Targets (informative)

## A.1 Goal and structure of this Annex

342 The goal of this annex is to explain the Security Target (ST) concept. This annex does not define the ASE criteria; this definition can be found in CC Part 3 and is supported by the documents given in the bibliography.

343 This annex consists of four major parts:

- a) *What an ST must contain.* This is summarised in Section A.2, and described in more detail in Sections A.4 - A.10. These sections describe the mandatory contents of the ST, the interrelationships between these contents, and provide examples.
- b) *How an ST should be used.* This is summarised in Section A.3, and described in more detail in section A.11. These sections describe how an ST should be used, and some of the questions that can be answered with an ST.
- c) *Low Assurance STs.* Low Assurance STs are STs with reduced content. They are described in detail in section A.12.
- d) *Claiming compliance with standards.* Section A.13 describes how an ST writer can claim that the TOE meets a particular standard.

## A.2 Mandatory contents of an ST

344 Figure 5 portrays the mandatory contents of an ST that are given in CC Part 3. Figure 5 may also be used as a structural outline of the ST, though alternative structures are allowed. For instance, if the security requirements rationale is particularly bulky, it could be included in an appendix of the ST instead of in the security requirements section. The separate sections of an ST and the contents of those sections are briefly summarised below and explained in much more detail in sections A.4 to A.10. An ST normally contains:

- a) *an ST introduction* containing three narrative descriptions of the TOE on different levels of abstraction;
- b) *a conformance claim*, showing whether the ST claims conformance to any PPs and/or packages, and if so, to which PPs and/or packages;
- c) *a security problem definition*, showing threats, OSPs and assumptions;




## Specification of Security Targets

- d) *security objectives*, showing how the solution to the security problem is divided between security objectives for the TOE and security objectives for the operational environment of the TOE;
- e) *extended components definition* (optional), where new components (i.e. those not included in CC Part 2 or CC Part 3) may be defined. These new components are needed to define extended functional and extended assurance requirements;
- f) *security requirements*, where a translation of the security objectives for the TOE into a standardised language is provided. This standardised language is in the form of SFRs. Additionally this section defines the SARs;
- g) *a TOE summary specification*, showing how the SFRs are implemented in the TOE.

345

There also exists low assurance STs which have reduced contents; these are described in detail in section A.12. All other parts of this Annex assume an ST with full contents.



**Figure 5 - Security Target contents**

### A.3 Using an ST

#### A.3.1 How an ST should be used

346 A typical ST fulfils two roles:

- Before and during the evaluation, the ST specifies “what is to be evaluated”. In this role, the ST serves as a basis for agreement between the developer and the evaluator on the exact security properties of the TOE and the exact scope of the evaluation. Technical correctness and completeness are major issues for this role. Section A.7 describes how the ST should be used in this role.
- After the evaluation, the ST specifies “what was evaluated”. In this role, the ST serves as a basis for agreement between the developer or re-seller of the TOE and the potential consumer of the TOE. The ST describes the exact security properties of the TOE in an abstract manner, and the potential consumer can rely on this description because the TOE has been evaluated to meet the ST. Ease of use and understandability are major issues for this role. Section A.11 describes how the ST should be used in this role.

#### A.3.2 How an ST should not be used

347 Two roles (among many) that an ST should not fulfil are:

- *a detailed specification*: An ST is designed to be a security specification on a relatively high level of abstraction. An ST should, in general, not contain detailed protocol specifications, detailed descriptions of algorithms and/or mechanisms, long description of detailed operations etc.
- *a complete specification*: An ST is designed to be a security specification and not a general specification. Unless security-relevant, properties such as interoperability, physical size and weight, required voltage etc. should not be part of an ST. This means that in general an ST may be a part of a complete specification, but not a complete specification itself.

### A.4 ST Introduction (ASE\_INT)

348 The ST introduction describes the TOE in a narrative way on three levels of abstraction:

- a) the ST reference and the TOE reference, which provide identification material for the ST and the TOE that the ST refers to;
- b) the TOE overview, which briefly describes the TOE;
- c) the TOE description, which describes the TOE in more detail.

## Specification of Security Targets

### A.4.1 ST reference and TOE reference

349 An ST contains a clear ST reference that identifies that particular ST. A typical ST reference consists of title, version, authors and publication date. An example of an ST reference is “MauveRAM Database ST, version 1.3, MauveCorp Specification Team, 11 October 2002”.

350 An ST also contains a TOE reference that identifies the TOE that claims conformance to the ST. A typical TOE reference consists of developer name, TOE name and TOE version number. An example of a TOE reference is “MauveCorp MauveRAM Database v2.11”. As a single TOE may be evaluated multiple times, for instance by different consumers of that TOE, and therefore have multiple STs, this reference is not necessarily unique.

351 If the TOE is constructed from one or more well-known products, it is allowed to reflect this in the TOE reference, by referring to the product name(s). However, this should not be used to mislead consumers: situations where major parts or security functionalities were not considered in the evaluation, yet the TOE reference does not reflect this are not allowed.

352 The ST reference and the TOE reference facilitate indexing and referencing the ST and TOE and their inclusion in summaries of lists of evaluated TOEs/Products.

### A.4.2 TOE overview

353 The TOE overview is aimed at potential consumers of a TOE who are looking through lists of evaluated TOEs/Products to find TOEs that may meet their security needs, and are supported by their hardware, software and firmware. The typical length of a TOE overview is several paragraphs.

354 To this end, the TOE overview briefly describes the usage of the TOE and its major security features, identifies the TOE type and identifies any major non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE.

#### A.4.2.1 Usage and major security features of a TOE

355 The description of the usage and major security features of the TOE is intended to give a very general idea of what the TOE is capable of in terms of security, and what it can be used for in a security context. This section should be written for (potential) TOE consumers, describing TOE usage and major security features in terms of business operations, using language that TOE consumers understand.

356 An example of this is “The MauveCorp MauveRAM Database v2.11 is a multi-user database intended to be used in a networked environment. It allows 1024 users to be active simultaneously. It allows password/token and biometric authentication, protects against accidental data corruption, and can roll-back ten thousand transactions. Its audit features are highly configurable, so as to allow detailed audit to be performed for some users and transactions, while protecting the privacy of other users and transactions.”

### A.4.2.2 TOE type

357 The TOE overview identifies the general type of TOE, such as: firewall, VPN-firewall, smart card, crypto-modem, intranet, web server, database, web server and database, LAN, LAN with web server and database, etc.

358 It may be the case that the TOE is not of a readily available type, in which case “none” would be acceptable.

359 In some cases, a TOE type can mislead consumers. Examples include:

- certain functionality can be expected of the TOE because of its TOE type, but the TOE does not have this functionality. Examples include:
  - an ATM-card type TOE, which does not support any identification/authentication functionality;
  - a firewall type TOE, which does not support protocols that are almost universally used;
  - a PKI-type TOE, which has no certificate revocation functionality.
- the TOE can be expected to operate in certain operational environments because of its TOE type, but it cannot do so. Examples include:
  - a PC-operating system type TOE, which is unable to function securely unless the PC has no network connection, floppy drive, and CD/DVD-player;
  - a firewall, which is unable to function securely unless all users that can connect through that firewall are benign.

### A.4.2.3 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware

360 While some TOEs do not rely upon other IT, many TOEs (notably software TOEs) rely on additional, non-TOE, hardware, software and/or firmware. In the latter case, the TOE overview is required to identify such non-TOE hardware, software and/or firmware. A complete and fully detailed identification of the additional hardware, software and/or firmware is not necessary, but the identification should be complete and detailed enough for potential consumers to determine the major hardware, software and/or firmware needed to use the TOE.

361 Example hardware/software/firmware identifications are:

- a standard PC with a 1GHz or faster processor and 512MB or more RAM, running version 3.0 Update 6b, c, or 7, or version 4.0 of the Yaiza operating system;

## Specification of Security Targets

- a standard PC with a 1GHz or faster version processor and 512MB or more RAM, running version 3.0 Update 6d of the Yaiza operating system and the WonderMagic 1.0 Graphics card with the 1.0 WM Driver Set;
- a standard PC with version 3.0 of the Yaiza OS (or higher);
- a CleverCard SB2067 integrated circuit;
- a CleverCard SB2067 integrated circuit running v2.0 of the QuickOS smart card operating system;
- the December 2002 installation of the LAN of the Director-General's Office of the Department of Traffic.

### A.4.3 TOE description

362 A TOE description is a narrative description of the TOE, likely to run to several pages. The TOE description should provide evaluators and potential consumers with a general understanding of the security capabilities of the TOE, in more detail than was provided in the TOE overview. The TOE description may also be used to describe the wider application context into which the TOE will fit.

363 The TOE description discusses the physical scope of the TOE: a list of all hardware, firmware, software and guidance parts that constitute the TOE. This list should be described at a level of detail that is sufficient to give the reader a general understanding of those parts.

364 The TOE description should also discuss the logical scope of the TOE: the logical security features offered by the TOE at a level of detail that is sufficient to give the reader a general understanding of those features. This description is expected to be in more detail than the major security features described in the TOE overview.

365 An important property of the physical and logical scopes is that they describe the TOE in such a way that there remains no doubt on whether a certain part or feature is in the TOE or whether this part or feature is outside the TOE. This is especially important when the TOE is intertwined with and cannot be easily separated from non-TOE entities.

366 Examples where the TOE is intertwined with non-TOE entities are:

- the TOE is a cryptographic co-processor of a smart card IC, instead of the entire IC;
- the TOE is a smart card IC, except for the cryptographic processor;
- the TOE is the Network Address Translation part of the MinuteGap Firewall v18.5.

### A.5 Conformance claims (ASE\_CCL)

367 This section of an ST describes how the ST conforms with:

- Part 2 and Part 3 of this International Standard;
- Protection Profiles (if any);
- Packages (if any).

368 The description of how the ST conforms to the CC consists of two items: the version of the CC that is used and whether the ST contains extended security requirements or not (see Section A.8).

369 The description of conformance of the ST to Protection Profiles means that the ST lists the packages that conformance is being claimed to. For an explanation of this, see Section 10.5.

370 The description of conformance of the ST to packages means that the ST lists the packages that conformance is being claimed to. For an explanation of this, see Section 10.5.

371 A Security Target can use PP-Configurations in the same way as standard Protection Profiles. That is, the *Conformance claim* of a ST can contain a *PP claim* that identifies the PP-Configurations the ST is conformant with.

### A.6 Security problem definition (ASE\_SPD)

#### A.6.1 Introduction

372 The security problem definition defines the security problem that is to be addressed. The security problem definition is, as far as the CC is concerned, axiomatic. That is, the process of deriving the security problem definition falls outside the scope of the CC.

373 However, it should be noted that the usefulness of the results of an evaluation strongly depends on the ST, and the usefulness of the ST strongly depends on the quality of the security problem definition. It is therefore often worthwhile to spend significant resources and use well-defined processes and analyses to derive a good security problem definition.

374 Note that according to CC Part 3 it is not mandatory to have statements in all sections, an ST with threats does not need to have OSPs and vice versa. Also, any ST may omit assumptions.

375 Also note that where the TOE is physically distributed, it may be better to discuss the relevant threats, OSPs and assumptions separately for distinct domains of the TOE operational environment.

## Specification of Security Targets

### A.6.2 Threats

376 This section of the security problem definition shows the threats that are to be countered by the TOE, its operational environment, or a combination of the two.

377 A threat consists of an adverse action performed by a threat agent on an asset.

378 Adverse actions are actions performed by a threat agent on an asset. These actions influence one or more properties of an asset from which that asset derives its value.

379 Threat agents may be described as individual entities, but in some cases it may be better to describe them as types of entities, groups of entities etc.

380 Examples of threat agents are hackers, users, computer processes, and accidents. Threat agents may be further described by aspects such as expertise, resources, opportunity and motivation.

381 Examples of threats are:

- a hacker (with substantial expertise, standard equipment, and being paid to do so) remotely copying confidential files from a company network;
- a worm seriously degrading the performance of a wide-area network;
- a system administrator violating user privacy;
- someone on the Internet listening in on confidential electronic communication.

### A.6.3 Organisational security policies (OSPs)

382 This section of the security problem definition shows the OSPs that are to be enforced by the TOE, its operational environment, or a combination of the two.

383 OSPs are security rules, procedures, or guidelines imposed (or presumed to be imposed) now and/or in the future by an actual or hypothetical organisation in the operational environment. OSPs may be laid down by an organisation controlling the operational environment of the TOE, or they may be laid down by legislative or regulatory bodies. OSPs can apply to the TOE and/or the operational environment of the TOE.

384 Examples of OSPs are:

- All products that are used by the Government must conform to the National Standard for password generation and encryption;

- Only users with System Administrator privilege and clearance of Department Secret shall be allowed to manage the Department Fileserver.

### A.6.4 Assumptions

385 This section of the security problem definition shows the assumptions that are made on the operational environment in order to be able to provide security functionality. If the TOE is placed in an operational environment that does not meet these assumptions, the TOE may not be able to provide all of its security functionality anymore. Assumptions can be on physical, personnel and connectivity of the operational environment.

386 Examples of assumptions are:

- Assumptions on physical aspects of the operational environment:
  - It is assumed that the TOE will be placed in a room that is designed to minimise electromagnetic emanations;
  - It is assumed that the administrator consoles of the TOE will be placed in a restricted access area.
- Assumptions on personnel aspects of the operational environment:
  - It is assumed that users of the TOE will be trained sufficiently in order to operate the TOE;
  - It is assumed that users of the TOE are approved for information that is classified as National Secret;
  - It is assumed that users of the TOE will not write down their passwords.
- Assumptions on connectivity aspects of the operational environment:
  - It is assumed that a PC workstation with at least 10GB of disk space is available to run the TOE on;
  - It is assumed that the TOE is the only non-OS application running on this workstation;
  - It is assumed that the TOE will not be connected to an untrusted network.

387 Note that during the evaluation these assumptions are considered to be true: they are not tested in any way. For these reasons, assumptions can only be made on the operational environment. Assumptions can never be made on the behaviour of the TOE because an evaluation consists of evaluating assertions made about the TOE and not by assuming that assertions on the TOE are true.



## Specification of Security Targets

### A.7 Security objectives (ASE\_OBJ)

388 The security objectives are a concise and abstract statement of the intended solution to the problem defined by the security problem definition. The role of the security objectives is threefold:

- provide a high-level, natural language solution of the problem;
- divide this solution into two part wise solutions, that reflect that different entities each have to address a part of the problem;
- demonstrate that these part wise solutions form a complete solution to the problem.

#### A.7.1 High-level solution

389 The security objectives consist of a set of short and clear statements without overly much detail that together form a high-level solution to the security problem. The level of abstraction of the security objectives aims at being clear and understandable to knowledgeable potential consumers of the TOE. The security objectives are in natural language.

#### A.7.2 Part wise solutions

390 In an ST the high-level security solution, as described by the security objectives, is divided into two part wise solutions. These part wise solutions are called the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the operational environment. This reflects that these part wise solutions are to be provided by two different entities: the TOE, and the operational environment.

##### A.7.2.1 Security objectives for the TOE

391 The TOE provides security functionality to solve a certain part of the problem defined by the security problem definition. This part wise solution is called the security objectives for the TOE and consists of a set of objectives that the TOE should achieve in order to solve its part of the problem.

392 Examples of security objectives for the TOE are:

- The TOE shall keep confidential the content of all files transmitted between it and a Server;
- The TOE shall identify and authenticate all users before allowing them access to the Transmission Service provided by the TOE;
- The TOE shall restrict user access to data according to the Data Access policy described in Annex 3 of the ST.

393 If the TOE is physically distributed, it may be better to subdivide the ST section containing the security objectives for the TOE into several sub-sections to reflect this.

### **A.7.2.2 Security objectives for the operational environment**

394 The operational environment of the TOE implements technical and procedural measures to assist the TOE in correctly providing its security functionality (which is defined by the security objectives for the TOE). This part wise solution is called the security objectives for the operational environment and consists of a set of statements describing the goals that the operational environment should achieve.

395 Examples of security objectives for the operational environment are:

- The operational environment shall provide a workstation with the OS Inux version 3.01b to execute the TOE on;
- The operational environment shall ensure that all human TOE users receive appropriate training before allowing them to work with the TOE;
- The operational environment of the TOE shall restrict physical access to the TOE to administrative personnel and maintenance personnel accompanied by administrative personnel;
- The operational environment shall ensure the confidentiality of the audit logs generated by the TOE before sending them to the central Audit Server.

396 If the operational environment of the TOE consists of multiple sites, each with different properties, it may be better to subdivide the ST section containing the security objectives for the operational environment into several sub-sections to reflect this.

### **A.7.3 Relation between security objectives and the security problem definition**

397 The ST also contains a security objectives rationale containing two sections:


- a tracing that shows which security objectives address which threats, OSPs and assumptions;
- a set of justifications that shows that all threats, OSPs, and assumptions are effectively addressed by the security objectives.

#### **A.7.3.1 Tracing between security objectives and the security problem definition**

398 The tracing shows how the security objectives trace back to the threats, OSPs and assumptions as described in the security problem definition.

## Specification of Security Targets

- a) *No spurious objectives*: Each security objective traces to at least one threat, OSP or assumption.
- b) *Complete with respect to the security problem definition*: Each threat, OSP and assumption has at least one security objective tracing to it.
- c) *Correct tracing*: Since assumptions are always made by the TOE on the operational environment, security objectives for the TOE do not trace back to assumptions. The tracings allowed by CC Part 3 are depicted in Figure 6.



**Figure 6 - Tracings between security objectives and security problem definition**

399 Multiple security objectives may trace to the same threat, indicating that the combination of those security objectives counters that threat. A similar argument holds for OSPs and assumptions.

### A.7.3.2 Providing a justification for the tracing

400 The security objectives rationale also demonstrates that the tracing is effective: All the given threats, OSPs and assumption are addressed (i.e. countered, enforced and upheld respectively) if all security objectives tracing to a particular threat, OSP or assumption are achieved.

401 This demonstration analyses the effect of achieving the relevant security objectives on countering the threats, enforcing the OSPs and upholding the assumptions and leads to the conclusion that this is indeed the case.

402 In some cases, where parts of the security problem definition very closely resemble some security objectives, the demonstration can be very simple. An example is: a threat “T17: Threat agent X reads the Confidential Information in transit between A and B”, a security objective for the TOE: “OT12: The TOE shall ensure that all information transmitted between A and B is kept confidential”, and a demonstration “T17 is directly countered by OT12”.

### A.7.3.3 On countering threats

403 Countering a threat does not necessarily mean removing that threat, it can also mean sufficiently diminishing that threat or sufficiently mitigating that threat.

404 Examples of removing a threat are:

## Specification of Security Targets

- removing the ability to execute the adverse action from the threat agent;
- moving, changing or protecting the asset in such a way that the adverse action is no longer applicable to it;
- removing the threat agent (e.g. removing machines from a network that frequently crash that network).

405 Examples of diminishing a threat are:

- restricting the ability of a threat agent to perform adverse actions;
- restricting the opportunity to execute an adverse action of a threat agent;
- reducing the likelihood of an executed adverse action being successful;
- reducing the motivation to execute an adverse action of a threat agent by deterrence;
- requiring greater expertise or greater resources from the threat agent.

406 Examples of mitigating the effects of a threat are:

- making frequent back-ups of the asset;
- obtaining spare copies of an asset;
- insuring an asset;
- ensuring that successful adverse actions are always timely detected, so that appropriate action can be taken.

### **A.7.4 Security objectives: conclusion**

407 Based on the security objectives and the security objectives rationale, the following conclusion can be drawn: if all security objectives are achieved then the security problem as defined in Security problem definition (ASE\_SPD) is solved: all threats are countered, all OSPs are enforced, and all assumptions are upheld.

### **A.8 Extended Components Definition (ASE\_ECD)**

408 In many cases the security requirements (see the next section) in an ST are based on components in CC Part 2 or CC Part 3. However, in some cases, there may be requirements in an ST that are not based on components in CC Part 2 or CC Part 3. In this case, new components (extended components) must be defined, and this definition should be done in the Extended Components Definition. For more information on this, see Annex C.4.

## Specification of Security Targets

409 Note that this section is intended to contain only the extended components and not the extended requirements (requirements based on extended components). The extended requirements should be included in the security requirements (see the next section) and are for all purposes the same as requirements based on components in CC Part 2 or CC Part 3.

### A.9 Security requirements (ASE\_REQ)

410 The security requirements consist of two groups of requirements:

- a) *the security functional requirements (SFRs)*: a translation of the security objectives for the TOE into a standardised language;
- b) *the security assurance requirements (SARs)*: a description of how assurance is to be gained that the TOE meets the SFRs.

411 These two groups are discussed in the following two sections:

#### A.9.1 Security functional requirements (SFRs)

412 The SFRs are a translation of the security objectives for the TOE. They are usually at a more detailed level of abstraction, but they have to be a complete translation (the security objectives must be completely addressed) and be independent of any specific technical solution (implementation). The CC requires this translation into a standardised language for several reasons:

- to provide an exact description of what is to be evaluated. As security objectives for the TOE are usually formulated in natural language, translation into a standardised language enforces a more exact description of the functionality of the TOE.
- to allow comparison between two STs. As different ST authors may use different terminology in describing their security objectives, the standardised language enforces using the same terminology and concepts. This allows easy comparison.

413 There is no translation required in the CC for the security objectives for the operational environment, because the operational environment is not evaluated and does therefore not require a description aimed at its evaluation. See the bibliography for items relevant to the security assessment of operational systems.

414 It may be the case that parts of the operational environment are evaluated in another evaluation, but this is out of scope for the current evaluation. For example: an OS TOE may require a firewall to be present in its operational environment. Another evaluation may subsequently evaluate the firewall, but this evaluation has nothing to do with the evaluation of the OS TOE.

##### A.9.1.1 How the CC supports this translation

415 The CC supports this translation in three ways:

## Specification of Security Targets

- a) by providing a predefined precise “language” designed to describe exactly what is to be evaluated. This language is defined as a set of components defined in CC Part 2. The use of this language as a well-defined translation of the security objectives for the TOE to SFRs is mandatory, though some exceptions exist (see Section 8.3).
- b) by providing operations: mechanisms that allow the ST writer to modify the SFRs to provide a more accurate translation of the security objectives for the TOE. This part of the CC defines the four allowed operations: assignment, selection, iteration, and refinement. These are described further in Section 8.1.
- c) by providing dependencies: a mechanism that supports a more complete translation to SFRs. In the CC Part 2 language, an SFR can have a dependency on other SFRs. This signifies that if an ST uses that SFR, it generally needs to use those other SFRs as well. This makes it much harder for the ST writer to overlook including necessary SFRs and thereby improves the completeness of the ST. Dependencies are described further in Section 8.2.

### A.9.1.2 Relation between SFRs and security objectives

416 The ST also contains a security requirements rationale, consisting of two sections about SFRs:

- a tracing that shows which SFRs address which security objectives for the TOE;
- a set of justifications that shows that all security objectives for the TOE are effectively addressed by the SFRs.

#### A.9.1.2.1 Tracing between SFRs and the security objectives for the TOE

417 The tracing shows how the SFRs trace back to the security objectives for the TOE as follows:

- a) *No spurious SFRs*: Each SFR traces back to at least one security objective.
- b) *Complete with respect to the security objectives for the TOE*: Each security objective for the TOE has at least one SFR tracing to it.

418 Multiple SFRs may trace to the same security objective for the TOE, indicating that the combination of those security requirements meets that security objective for the TOE.

#### A.9.1.2.2 Providing a justification for the tracing

419 The security requirements rationale demonstrates that the tracing is effective: if all SFRs tracing to a particular security objective for the TOE are satisfied, that security objective for the TOE is achieved.

## Specification of Security Targets

420 This demonstration should analyse the effects of satisfying the relevant SFRs on achieving the security objective for the TOE and lead to the conclusion that this is indeed the case.

421 In cases where SFRs very closely resemble security objectives for the TOE, the demonstration can be very simple.

### A.9.2 Security assurance requirements (SARs)

422 The SARs are a description of how the TOE is to be evaluated. This description uses a standardised language for two reasons:

- to provide an exact description of how the TOE is to be evaluated. Using a standardised language assists in creating an exact description and avoids ambiguity.
- to allow comparison between two STs. As different ST authors may use different terminology in describing the evaluation, the standardised language enforces using the same terminology and concepts. This allows easy comparison.

423 This standardised language is defined as a set of components defined in CC Part 3. The use of this language is mandatory, though some exceptions exist. The CC enhances this language in two ways:

- a) by providing operations: mechanisms that allow the ST writer to modify the SARs. The CC has four operations: assignment, selection, iteration, and refinement. These are described further in Section 8.1.
- b) by providing dependencies: a mechanism that supports a more complete translation to SARs. In CC Part 3 language, an SAR can have a dependency on other SARs. This signifies that if an ST uses that SAR, it generally needs to use those other SARs as well. This makes it much harder for the ST writer to overlook including necessary SARs and thereby improves the completeness of STs. Dependencies are described further in Section 8.2.

### A.9.3 SARs and the security requirement rationale

424 The ST also contains a security requirements rationale that explains why this particular set of SARs was deemed appropriate. There are no specific requirements for this explanation. The goal for this explanation is to allow the readers of the ST to understand the reasons why this particular set was chosen.


425 An example of an inconsistency is if the security problem description mentions threats where the threat agent is very capable, and a low (or no) Vulnerability analysis (AVA\_VAN) is included in the SARs.

**A.9.4 Security requirements: conclusion**

426 In the security problem definition of the ST, the security problem is defined as consisting of threats, OSPs and assumptions. In the security objectives section of the ST, the solution is provided in the form of two sub-solutions:

- security objectives for the TOE;
- security objectives for the operational environment.

427 Additionally, a security objectives rationale is provided showing that if all security objectives are achieved, the security problem is solved: all threats are countered, all OSPs are enforced, and all assumptions are upheld.



**Figure 7 - Relations between the security problem definition, the security objectives and the security requirements**

428 In the security requirements section of the ST, the security objectives for the TOE are translated to SFRs and a security requirements rationale is provided showing that if all SFRs are satisfied, all security objectives for the TOE are achieved.

429 Additionally, a set of SARs is provided to show how the TOE is evaluated, together with an explanation for selecting these SARs.

430 All of the above can be combined into the statement: If all SFRs and SARs are satisfied and all security objectives for the operational environment are achieved, then there exists assurance that the security problem as defined in ASE\_SPD is solved: all threats are countered, all OSPs are enforced, and all assumptions are upheld. This is illustrated in Figure 7.

431 The amount of assurance obtained is defined by the SARs, and whether this amount of assurance is sufficient is defined by the explanation for choosing these SARs.

**A.10 TOE summary specification (ASE\_TSS)**

432 The objective for the TOE summary specification is to provide potential consumers of the TOE with a description of how the TOE satisfies all the



## Specification of Security Targets

SFRs. The TOE summary specification should provide the general technical mechanisms that the TOE uses for this purpose. The level of detail of this description should be enough to enable potential consumers to understand the general form and implementation of the TOE.

433 For instance if the TOE is an Internet PC and the SFRs contain FIA\_UAU.1 to specify authentication, the TOE summary specification should indicate how this authentication is done: password, token, iris scanning etc. More information, like applicable standards that the TOE uses to meet SFRs, or more detailed descriptions may also be provided.

### A.11 Questions that may be answered with an ST

434 After the evaluation, the ST specifies “what was evaluated”. In this role, the ST serves as a basis for agreement between the developer or re-seller of the TOE and the potential consumer of the TOE. The ST can therefore answer the following questions (and more):

- a) *How can I find the ST/TOE that I need given the multitude of existing STs/TOEs?* This question is addressed by the TOE overview, which gives a brief (several paragraphs) summary of the TOE;
- b) *Does this TOE fit in with my existing IT-infrastructure?* This question is addressed by the TOE overview, which identifies the major hardware/firmware/software elements needed to run the TOE;
- c) *Does this TOE fit in with my existing operational environment?* This question is addressed by the security objectives for the operational environment, which identifies all constraints the TOE places on the operational environment in order to function;
- d) *What does the TOE do (interested reader)?* This question is addressed by the TOE overview, which gives a brief (several paragraphs) summary of the TOE;
- e) *What does the TOE do (potential consumer)?* This question is addressed by the TOE description, which gives a less brief (several pages) summary of the TOE;
- f) *What does the TOE do (technical)?* This question is addressed by the TOE summary specification which provides a high-level description of the mechanisms the TOE uses;
- g) *What does the TOE do (expert)?* This question is addressed by the SFRs which provide an abstract highly technical description, and the TOE summary specification which provide additional detail;
- h) *Does the TOE address the problem as defined by my government/organisation?* If your government/organisation has defined packages and/or PPs to define this solution, then the answer

can be found in the Conformance Claims section of the ST, which lists all packages and PPs that the ST conforms to

- i) *Does the TOE address my security problem (expert)?* What are the threats countered by the TOE? What organisational security policies does it enforce? What assumptions does it make about the operational environment? These questions are addressed by the security problem definition;
- j) *How much trust can I place in the TOE?* This can be found in the SARs in the security requirements section, which provide the assurance level that was used to evaluate the TOE, and hence the trust that the evaluation provides in the correctness of the TOE.

### A.12 Low assurance Security Targets

435 Writing an ST is not a trivial task, and may, especially in low assurance evaluations, be a major part of the total effort expended by the developer and the evaluator in the whole of the evaluation. For this reason, it is also possible to write a low assurance ST.

436 The CC allows the use of a low assurance ST for an EAL 1 evaluation, but not for EAL 2 and up. A low-assurance ST may only claim conformance to a low-assurance PP (see Annex B). A regular ST (i.e., one with full contents) may claim conformance with a low assurance PP.

437 A low assurance ST has a significantly reduced content compared to a regular ST:

- there is no need to describe the security problem definition;
- there is no need to describe the security objectives for the TOE. The security objectives for the operational environment must still be described;
- there is no need to describe the security objectives rationale as there is no security problem definition in the ST;
- the security requirements rationale only needs to justify (any) dependencies not being satisfied as there are no security objectives for the TOE in the ST.

438 All that remains are:

- a) the references to TOE and ST;
- b) a conformance claim;
- c) the various narrative descriptions;
  - 1. the TOE overview;

## Specification of Security Targets

2. the TOE description;
  3. the TOE summary specification.
- d) security objectives for the operational environment;
- e) the SFRs and the SARs (including the extended components definition) and the security requirements rationale (only if the dependencies are not satisfied).

439

The reduced content of a low assurance ST is shown in Figure 8.




Figure 8 - Contents of a Low Assurance Security Target

### A.13 Referring to other standards in an ST

440

In some cases, an ST writer may wish to refer to an external standard, such as a particular cryptographic standard or protocol. The CC allows three ways of doing this:

- a) As an organisational security policy (or part of it).

If, for example, there exists a government standard defining how passwords have to be chosen, this may be stated as an organisational security policy in an ST. This may lead to an objective for the environment (e. g. if users of the TOE need to choose passwords accordingly), or it may lead to security objectives for the TOE and then to appropriate SFRs (likely of the FIA class), if the TOE

## Specification of Security Targets

generates passwords. In both cases the rationale of the developer needs to make plausible that the security objectives for the TOE and the SFRs are suitable to fulfil the OSP. The evaluator will examine if this is in fact plausible (and may decide to look into the standard for this), if the OSP is implemented by SFRs, as explained below.

- b) As a technical standard (for example a cryptographic standard) used in a refinement of an SFR.

In this case conformance to the standard is part of the fulfilment of the SFR by the TOE and is treated as if the full text of the standard is part of the SFR. Conformance is subsequently determined like any other conformance to SFRs: during ADV: Development and ATE: Tests it is analysed, by design analysis and tests, that the SFR is completely and fully implemented in the TOE. If reference to only a certain part of a standard is desired, that part should be unambiguously stated in the SFR refinement.

- c) As a technical standard (for example a cryptographic standard) mentioned in the TOE summary specification.

The TOE summary specification is only considered as an explanation of how the SFRs are realised, and is not strictly used as a strict implementation requirement like the SFRs or the documents delivered for ADV: Development. So the evaluator may detect an inconsistency if the TSS references a technical standard and this is not reflected in ADV: Development documentation, but there is no routine activity to test fulfilment of the standard.

# B Specification of Protection Profiles (informative)

## B.1 Goal and structure of this Annex

441 The goal of this Annex is to explain the Protection Profile (PP) concept. This  
Annex does not define the APE criteria; this definition can be found in CC  
Part 3 and is supported by the documents given in the bibliography.

442 As PPs and STs have a significant overlap, this Annex focuses on the  
differences between PPs and STs. The material that is identical between STs  
and PPs is described in Annex A.

443 This annex consists of four major parts:

- a) *What a PP must contain.* This is summarised in Section B.2, and described in more detail in Sections B.4-B.9. These chapters describe the mandatory contents of the PP, the interrelationships between these contents, and provide examples.
- b) *How a PP should be used.* This is summarised in Section B.3.
- c) *Low Assurance PPs.* Low Assurance PPs are PPs with reduced content. They are described in detail in Section B.11.
- d) *Claiming compliance with standards.* Section B.12 describes how a PP writer can claim that the TOE is to meet a particular standard.

## B.2 Mandatory contents of a PP


444 Figure 9 portrays the mandatory content for a PP that is given in CC Part 3. Figure 9 may also be used as a structural outline of the PP, though alternative structures are allowed. For instance, if the security requirements rationale is particularly bulky, it could be included in an appendix of the PP instead of in the security requirements section. The separate sections of a PP and the contents of those sections are briefly summarised below and explained in much more detail in Sections B.4 - B.9. A PP contains:

- a) a PP *introduction* containing a narrative description of the TOE type;
- b) a *conformance claim*, showing whether the PP claims conformance to any PPs and/or packages, and if so, to which PPs and/or packages;
- c) a *security problem definition*, showing threats, OSPs and assumptions;
- d) *security objectives*, showing how the solution to the security problem is divided between security objectives for the TOE and security objectives for the operational environment of the TOE;

- e) *extended components definition*, where new components (i.e. those not included in CC Part 2 or CC Part 3) may be defined. These new components are needed to define extended functional and extended assurance requirements;
- f) *security requirements*, where a translation of the security objectives for the TOE into a standardised language is provided. This standardised language is in the form of SFRs. Additionally this section defines the SARs;

445

There also exist low assurance PPs, which have reduced contents; these are described in detail in Section B.11. With this exception, all other parts of this Annex assume a PP with full contents.



**Figure 9 - Protection Profile contents**

## B.3 Using the PP

### B.3.1 How a PP should be used

446

A PP is typically a statement of need where a user community, a regulatory entity, or a group of developers define a common set of security needs. A PP gives consumers a means of referring to this set, and facilitates future evaluation against these needs.

447

A PP is therefore typically used as:

- part of a requirement specification for a specific consumer or group of consumers, who will only consider buying a specific type of IT if it meets the PP;

## Specification of Protection Profiles

- part of a regulation from a specific regulatory entity, who will only allow a specific type of IT to be used if it meets the PP;
- a baseline defined by a group of IT developers, who then agree that all IT that they produce of this type will meet this baseline.

though this does not preclude other uses.

### B.3.2 How a PP should not be used

448 Three roles (among many) that a PP should not fulfil are:

- *a detailed specification*: A PP is designed to be a security specification on a relatively high level of abstraction. A PP should, in general, not contain detailed protocol specifications, detailed descriptions of algorithms and/or mechanisms, long description of detailed operations etc.
- *a complete specification*: A PP is designed to be a security specification and not a general specification. Unless security-relevant, properties such as interoperability, physical size and weight, required voltage etc. should not be part of a PP. This means that in general a PP is a part of a complete specification, but not a complete specification itself.
- *a specification of a single product*: Unlike an ST, a PP is designed to describe a certain type of IT, and not a single product. When only a single product is described, it is better to use an ST for this purpose.

## B.4 PP introduction (APE\_INT)

449 The PP introduction describes the TOE in a narrative way on two levels of abstraction:

- a) the PP reference, which provides identification material for the PP;
- b) the TOE overview, which briefly describes the TOE.

### B.4.1 PP reference

450 A PP contains a clear PP reference that identifies that particular PP. A typical PP reference consists of title, version, authors and publication date. An example of a PP reference is “Atlantean Navy CablePhone Encryptor PP, version 2b, Atlantean Navy Procurement Office, April 7, 2003”. The reference must be unique so that it is possible to tell different PPs and different versions of the same PP apart.

451 The PP reference facilitates indexing and referencing the PP and its inclusion in lists of PPs.

### B.4.2 TOE overview

452 The TOE overview is aimed at potential consumers of a TOE who are looking through lists of evaluated products to find TOEs that may meet their security needs, and are supported by their hardware, software and firmware.

453 The TOE overview is also aimed at developers who may use the PP in designing TOEs or in adapting existing products.

454 The typical length of a TOE overview is several paragraphs.

455 To this end, the TOE overview briefly describes the usage of the TOE and its major security features, identifies the TOE type and identifies any major non-TOE hardware/software/firmware available to the TOE.

#### B.4.2.1 Usage and major security features of a TOE

456 The description of the usage and major security features of the TOE is intended to give a very general idea of what the TOE should be capable of, and what it can be used for. This section should be written for (potential) TOE consumers, describing TOE usage and major security features in terms of business operations, using language that TOE consumers understand.

457 An example of this is “The Atlantean Navy CablePhone Encryptor is an encryption device that should allow confidential communication between ships across the Atlantean Navy CablePhone system. To this end it should allow at least 32 different users and support at least 100 Mbps encryption speed. It should allow both bilateral communication between ships and broadcast across the entire network.”

#### B.4.2.2 TOE Type

458 The TOE overview identifies the general type of TOE, such as: firewall, VPN-firewall, smart card, crypto-modem, intranet, web server, database, web server and database, LAN, LAN with web server and database, etc.

#### B.4.2.3 Available non-TOE hardware/software/firmware

459 While some TOEs do not rely upon other IT, many TOEs (notably software TOEs) rely on additional, non-TOE, hardware, software and/or firmware. In the latter case, the TOE overview is required to identify the non-TOE hardware/software/firmware.

460 As a Protection Profile is not written for a specific product, in many cases only a general idea can be given of the available hardware/software/firmware. In some other cases, e.g. a requirements specification for a specific consumer where the platform is already known, (much) more specific information may be provided.

461 Examples of hardware/software/firmware identifications are:

- None. (for a completely stand-alone TOE);



## Specification of Protection Profiles

- The Yaiza 3.0 Operating System running on a general PC;
- a CleverCard SB2067 integrated circuit;
- a CleverCard SB2067 IC running v2.0 of the QuickOS smart card operating system;
- the December 2002 installation of the LAN of the Director-General's Office of the Department of Traffic.

### **B.5 Conformance claims (APE\_CCL)**

462 This section of a PP describes how the PP conforms with other PPs and with packages. It is identical to the conformance claims section for an ST (see Section A.5), with one exception: the conformance statement.

463 The conformance statement in the PP states how STs and/or other PPs must conform to that PP. The PP author selects whether “strict” or “demonstrable” conformance is required. See Annex D for more details on this.

### **B.6 Security problem definition (APE\_SPD)**

464 This section is identical to the security problem definition section of an ST as explained in Section A.6.

### **B.7 Security objectives (APE\_OBJ)**

465 This section is identical to the security objectives section of an ST as explained in Section A.7.

### **B.8 Extended components definition (APE\_ECD)**

466 This section is identical to the extended components section of an ST as explained in Section A.8.

### **B.9 Security requirements (APE\_REQ)**

467 This section is identical to the security requirements section of an ST as explained in Section A.9. Note however that the rules for completing operations in a PP are slightly different from the rules for completing operations in an ST. This is explained in more detail in Section 8.1.

### **B.10 TOE summary specification**

468 A PP has no TOE summary specification.

### **B.11 Low assurance Protection Profiles**


469 A low assurance PP has the same relationship to a regular PP (i.e., one with full contents), as a low assurance ST has to a regular ST. This means that a low-assurance PP consists of

## Specification of Protection Profiles

- a) a PP introduction, consisting of a PP reference and a TOE overview;
- b) a conformance claim;
- c) security objectives for the operational environment;
- d) the SFRs and the SARs (including the extended components definition) and the security requirements rationale (only if the dependencies are not satisfied).

470 A low-assurance PP may only claim conformance to a low-assurance PP (see  
B.5). A regular PP may claim conformance with a low assurance PP.

471 The reduced content of a low assurance PP is shown in Figure 10.



**Figure 10 - Contents of a Low Assurance Protection Profile**

### **B.12 Referring to other standards in a PP**

472 This section is identical to the section on standards for STs as described in  
Section A.13, with one exception: as a PP has no TOE summary  
specification, the third option is not valid for PPs.

473 The PP author is reminded that referring to a standard in SFRs may impose a  
significant burden on a developer developing a TOE to meet that PP  
(depending on the size and complexity of the standard and the assurance  
level required), and that it may be more suitable to require alternative (non-  
CC related) ways to assess conformance to that standard.

### B.13 Interpretation of PP-Configuration as a standard PP

474 Once evaluated, a PP-Configuration can be refined and used in the same way as a standard Protection Profile. This chapter explains how to combine the content of the Base-PP(s) and PP-Module(s) of a PP-Configuration so as to interpret it as a standard PP.

#### B.13.1 TOE type

475 The TOE type of a PP to interpret in the same way as the PP-Configuration would be constituted of the TOE type of the Base-PP(s) with the additions introduced in the PP-Module(s) TOE types. The evaluation of the PP-Configuration ensures that it forms a consistent TOE type.

#### B.13.2 Conformance claims

476 The Conformance claims of a PP to interpret in the same way as the PP-Configuration would contain:

- The conformance to the PP(s) whose conformance is claimed in the Base-PP(s).
- The conformance to SAR packages (including predefined EAL) from the Base-PPs. The issue of ANDEd Base-PPs with different EALs has to be dealt with like in an ST conformant to all those PPs (meaning that the ST has to claim the level of the minimum EAL of all the Base-PPs).
- The conformance statement (strict or demonstrable) from the Base-PPs. The issue of ANDEd Base-PPs with different conformance statements has to be dealt with like in an ST conformant to all those PPs.

#### B.13.3 Security problem definition

477 The SPD of a PP to interpret in the same way as the PP-Configuration would contain the union of the elements from the Base-PP(s) and PP-Module(s) of the PP-Configuration.

#### B.13.4 Security objectives

478 The security objectives of a PP to interpret in the same way as the PP-Configuration would contain the union of the security objectives from the Base-PP(s) and PP-Module(s) of the PP-Configuration.

#### B.13.5 Extended functional components definition

479 The extended functional components of a PP to interpret in the same way as the PP-Configuration would contain all extended functional components from the Base-PP(s) and PP-Module(s) of the PP-Configuration.

**B.13.6 Security functional requirements**

480 The set of SFRs of a PP to interpret in the same way as the PP-Configuration would contain:


- all the SFRs from the PP-Module(s) of the PP-Configuration.
- all the SFRs from the Base-PP(s) except those which are refined in the PP-Module(s).

481 The consistency analysis performed on PP-Configuration during evaluation shall ensure this set is valid.

**B.14 Specification of PP-Modules**

**B.14.1 Mandatory content of a PP-Module**

482 Figure 11 shows the mandatory content of a PP-Module.



**Figure 11 - PP-Module content**

483 The content of the PP-Module is summarized below and explained in detail in sections from B.14.3 to B.14.10. A PP-Module contains:

- an *Introduction* that identifies the PP-Module, identifies the Base-PP(s) and states the correspondence rationale, and provides a description of the TOE within its environment that meets the descriptions underlying the Base-PPs,

## Specification of Protection Profiles

- a *Consistency rationale* that states the correspondence between the Module and its Base-PP(s),
- a *Conformance claim* regarding the CC, with inherited EAL and conformance statement,
- a *Security problem definition* with threats, assumptions and organisational security policies,
- a *Security objectives* section presenting the solution to the security problem in terms of objectives for the TOE and its operational environment,
- an optional *Extended functional components definition* where new functional components not included in CC Part 2 are introduced,
- a *Security functional requirements* section with a standardized statement of the TOE security objectives.

### B.14.2 Using the PP-Module

484 A PP-Module is a security statement of a group of users or developers, regulators, administration, or any other entity that meets specific consumer needs. A PP-Module complements one or more Base-PPs and allows consumers to refer to this statement, facilitates the evaluation against it and the comparison of conformant evaluated TOEs.

### B.14.3 PP-Module introduction

#### B.14.3.1 PP-Module reference

485 The PP-Module introduction provides a clear and unambiguous reference that allows identifying the PP-Module. A typical reference is made of the title of the PP-Module, its version, their authors and the publication date.

486 The PP-Module reference will be used to index the document in Protection Profiles databases.

#### B.14.3.2 Base-PP identification

487 The PP-Module introduction identifies the Base Protection Profile(s) the Module relies on. The identification consists of a list of PP references.

488 The PP-Module may require to be used with a set of Base-PPs simultaneously, say  $\{PP_1, \dots, PP_n\}$ ; the identification list states:

$PP_1 \text{ AND} \dots \text{ AND } PP_n$ , with  $n \geq 1$

489 The PP-Module may allow the use with alternative sets of Base-PPs, say  $\{S_1, \dots, S_k\}$ ; the identification list states:

$S_1 \text{ OR } \dots \text{ OR } S_k$ , with  $k \geq 1$

490 The general form of the Base-PP identification is then

$(PP_{1,1} \text{ AND } \dots \text{ AND } PP_{1,n_1}) \text{ OR } \dots \text{ OR } (PP_{k,1} \text{ AND } \dots \text{ AND } PP_{k,n_k})$ , with  $n_i \geq 1, k \geq 1$

491 Note that a PP-Module that states a list with an "OR" can be replaced by as many PP-Modules as elements in the list. That is, the list with an "OR" is a means to avoid managing similar PP-Modules for different usages, which does not introduce any complexity to the security specification itself.

### B.14.3.3 TOE overview

492 The *TOE overview* of the PP-Module may complete the TOE overviews of the Base-PPs, provided the supplements do not contradict the Base-PPs:

- The *TOE type* of the PP-Module can be the same of the Base-PPs or introduce specificities that meet the purpose of the PP-Module.
- The PP-Module can introduce additional *usage and major security features* to those stated in the Base-PPs.
- The PP-Module can specify particular *non-TOE hardware, software and/or firmware* compliant with the statement in the Base-PPs.

493 The possibility of supplementing the *TOE overview* of one or more Base-PPs in a PP-Module has the same meaning as the supplements of a ST regarding the *TOE overview* of a PP or the supplements of a PP that is conformant to another PP.

494 The statement of the *TOE overview* in a PP-Module is necessary whenever the TOE overview of the Base-PPs present different characteristics that need to be consolidated.

495 The PP-Module may provide as many specific TOE overviews as alternative sets of Base-PPs.

### B.14.4 Consistency rationale

496 The PP-Module has to provide a consistency rationale with respect to its Base-PPs.

497 If the PP-Module specifies alternative sets of Base-PPs, the PP-Module must provide as many conformance claims as the number of alternative set of Base-PPs.

498 If the PP-Module specifies alternative sets of Base-PPs, the PP-Module must provide as many consistency rationales as the number of alternative set of Base-PPs.

499 The consistency analysis must be performed on the TOE type, the SPD, the objectives and the security functional requirements. At the end, the goal is to

## Specification of Protection Profiles

demonstrate that a TOE can meet the TOE type descriptions provided in the Base-PP(s) and in the PP-Module and that can satisfy all the Base-PPs and the PP-Module security functional requirements.

500 The consistency rationale must demonstrate that the unions of the SPD, the objectives and the security functional requirements from the Base-PPs and from the PP-Module do not lead to a contradiction.

501 The consistency rationale may use correspondence tables between SPD/objectives/SFRs in the PP-Module and SPD/objectives/SFRs in the Base-PPs together with textual justifications whenever needed.

502 Note that the consistency at the SFR level implies the consistency of the union of objectives and the union of SPDs provided that the PP-Module does not change the assumptions and objectives for the environment of the Base-PP(s).

### B.14.5 Conformance claims

503 This section describes how the PP-Module conforms to:

- Part 2 of the Common Criteria: CC version and extended security requirements,
- SFR packages.

504 A PP-Module cannot claim conformance to any PP, PP-Module or PP-Configuration.

505 A PP-Module inherits the conformity to SAR packages (including predefined EAL) from the Base-PPs. The issue of ANDED Base-PPs with different EALs has to be dealt with like in an ST conformant to all those PPs.

506 A PP-Module inherits the conformance statement (*strict* or *demonstrable*) from the Base-PPs. The issue of ANDED Base-PPs with different conformance statements has to be dealt with like in an ST conformant to all those PPs.

### B.14.6 Security problem definition

507 This section defines the security problem addressed by the PP-Module. It can contain assumptions, threats and organisational security policies.

508 A PP-Module defines the security problem in relationship with the security problem of the Base-PPs and the definition of the TOE and its environment provided in the PP-Module's *Introduction*.

509 Each element of the SPD may either come from a Base-PP or be entirely new. Let E be an element of the SPD of a PP-Module, one of the following cases holds:

- E belongs to an identified Base-PP; the PP-Module may only contain a reference to the element in the Base-PP,
- E results from the refinement of an element of a Base-PP,
- E is a new element introduced by the PP-Module, related to additional features of the TOE or its environment.

510 Note that the interpreted / refined elements can be dealt with as new elements without any impact on the meaning of the SPD.

511 Note that as for STs, a PP-Module can introduce assumptions provided they cover aspects that are outside the scope of the Base-PPs.

### **B.14.7 Security objectives**

512 This section defines the security objectives for the TOE and for the TOE's operational environment

513 A PP-Module defines the security objectives in relationship with its security problem and with the security objectives of the Base-PPs.

514 Each security objective may either come from a Base-PP or be entirely new. Let O be an objective of a PP-Module, one of the following cases holds:

- O belongs to an identified Base-PP; the PP-Module may only contain a reference to the objective in the Base-PP
- O results from the refinement of an objective of the same kind (for the TOE or for the TOE operational environment) of a Base-PP,
- O is a new objective introduced by the PP-Module.

515 Note that the refined objectives can be dealt with as new objectives without any impact on the meaning of the whole set of objectives.

516 As for STs, a PP-Module can introduce new objectives for the TOE operational environment only provided they address aspects that are outside the scope of the Base-PPs.

517 In the opposite, if this is the purpose of the PP-Module, some security objectives for the environment of the Base-PPs could become security objectives for the TOE in the PP-Module.

518 This section also defines the rationale between the SPD and the security objectives of the PP-Module, which consists of a mapping that traces the SPD of the PP-Module to their security objectives as well as a justification demonstrating that the tracing is effective, as specified in section B.7. Moreover, the mapping has to show not only that all the assumptions, threats and organisational security policies are covered but also that there is no useless security objective.



## Specification of Protection Profiles

519 It may happen that some security objectives of the PP-Module cover also elements of the SPD of the Base-PPs that do not belong to the SPD of the PP-Module itself. This information is not required, but can be provided in application notes.

### **B.14.8 Extended functional components definition**

520 This section is identical to the standard PP and ST extended components section specified in section A.8, applied to functional components only.

### **B.14.9 Security functional requirements**

521 This section defines the security functional requirements for the TOE in relationship with the set of TOE security objectives in the PP-Module and with the security functional requirements of the Base-PPs.

522 Each security functional requirement may either come from a Base-PP or be entirely new. Let R be a security functional requirement of a PP-Module, one of the following cases holds:

- R belongs to an identified Base-PP; the PP-Module may only contain a reference to the requirement in the Base-PP,
- R results from the refinement of a SFR of a Base-PPs,
- R is a new requirement introduced by the PP-Module.

523 Note that the refined requirements can be dealt with as new ones without any impact on the meaning of the whole set of requirements.

524 This section also defines the rationale between the SFRs and the TOE security objectives of the PP-Module, which consists of a mapping that traces the TOE objectives of the PP-Module to one or more SFRs and a justification demonstrating that the tracing is effective, as specified in section B.9. Moreover, the mapping must fulfill the conditions specified in section B.14.10 and has to show not only that all the objectives for the TOE are covered but also that there is no useless security functional requirement.

525 It may happen that some SFRs of the PP-Module cover also TOE security objectives of the Base-PPs that do not belong to the PP-Module itself. This information is not required, but can be provided in application notes.

### **B.14.10 Guidance for inclusion of elements from Base-PP**

526 In order to limit the amount of information contained in the PP-Module, the editor may apply the following rules.

527 Let E, O and R belong to the SPD, the security objectives and the security functional requirements of a Protection Profile Q, respectively, with E mapped to O and O mapped to R.

528 Let P be a PP-Module with Q amongst its Base-PPs. P has to satisfy the following condition:

529 E, O, R and the mappings between them may belong to P only if at least one of these elements is linked to a new element in P, that is

– Either there is a new element E' in the SPD of P such that E' is mapped to O, or

– There is a new objective O' in P such that E is mapped to O' or O' is mapped to R, or

– There is a new requirement R' in P such that O is mapped to R'.

530 That is, a PP-Module would not contain portions of Base-PPs unless they are required to fulfill new needs. Here, refined elements are considered new.

### B.15 Specification of PP-Configurations

#### B.15.1 Mandatory content of a PP-Configuration

531 The content of the PP-Configuration is summarized below and explained in detail in Annexes B.15.3, B.15.4, B.15.5 and B.15.6. A PP-Configuration contains:

– a *Reference* that identifies the PP-Configuration,

– a *Components statement* that identifies the Base-PPs and the PP-Modules composing the PP-Configuration,

– a *Conformance statement*, that specifies whether the conformance to this PP-Configuration has to be strict or demonstrable,

– a *SAR statement*, specifying the EAL, SAR package or list of the selected assurance components applicable to the PP-Configuration.

#### B.15.2 Using the PP-Configuration

532 PP-Configurations are security statements that cover specific needs of groups of users, consumers, organisations, etc. Any PP-Configuration can be used exactly as a standard Protection Profile, as explained in Section B.13.

#### B.15.3 PP-Configuration reference

533 The PP-Configuration reference provides a clear and unambiguous identification, usually made of a title, version number, sponsor and the publication date.

534 The PP-Configuration reference will be used to index the document in Protection Profiles databases.

## Specification of Protection Profiles

### B.15.4 PP-Configuration components statement

535 The *Components statement* identifies the Base-PPs and the PP-Modules that compose the PP-Configuration.

536 The *Components statement* must include at least all Base-PPs referenced in the PP-Modules. If the PP-Module specifies alternative sets of Base-PPs, only one of these sets must be referred to in the PP-Configuration.

### B.15.5 PP-Configuration conformance statement

537 The *Conformance statement* specifies whether the conformance to this PP-Configuration has to be strict or demonstrable.

538 Any ST that claims conformance to the PP-Configuration shall conform to the kind of conformance claimed in the PP-Configuration.

### B.15.6 PP-Configuration SAR statement

539 The *SAR statement* specifies the set of SAR (potentially predefined EAL) applicable to any product evaluation with a ST that claims conformance to this PP-Configuration.

### B.15.7 Evaluation of a PP-Configuration

540 The assurance components for PP-Configuration evaluation, defined in Chapter 11: Class ACE of CC Part 3, are the following: ACE\_INT.1, ACE\_CCL.1, ACE\_SPD.1, ACE\_ECD.1, ACE\_OBJ.1, ACE\_REQ.1, ACE\_MCO.1 and ACE\_CCO.1.

## C Guidance for Operations (informative)

### C.1 Introduction

541 As described in this CC part 1, Protection Profiles and Security Targets contain pre-defined security requirements, as well as providing PP and ST authors the ability to extend the component lists in some circumstances.

### C.2 Examples of operations

542 The four types of operations are given in section 8.1. Examples of the various operations are described below:

#### C.2.1 The iteration operation

543 As described in section 8.1.1 the iteration operation may be performed on every component. The PP/ST author performs an iteration operation by including multiple requirements based on the same component. Each iteration of a component is different from all other iterations of that component, which is realised by completing assignments and selections in a different way, or by applying refinements to it in a different way. Different iterations should be uniquely identified to allow clear rationales and tracings to and from these requirements.

544 A typical example of an iteration is FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation being iterated twice in order to require the implementation of two different cryptographic algorithms. An example of each iteration being uniquely identified is:

- Cryptographic operation (RSA and DSA signatures) (FCS\_COP.1(1))
- Cryptographic operation (TLS/SSL: symmetric operations) (FCS\_COP.1(2))

#### C.2.2 The assignment operation

545 As described in section 8.1.2 an assignment operation occurs where a given component contains an element with a parameter that may be set by the PP/ST author. The parameter may be an unrestricted variable, or a rule that narrows the variable to a specific range of values.

546 An example of an element with an assignment is: FIA\_AFL.1.2 “When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall [**assignment: list of actions**].”

## Guidance for Operations

### C.2.3 The selection operation

547 As described in section 8.1.3 the selection operation occurs where a given component contains an element where a choice from several items has to be made by the PP/ST author.

548 An example of an element with a selection is: FPT\_TST.1.1 “The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of ...”

### C.2.4 The refinement operation

549 As described in section 8.1.4 the refinement operation can be performed on every requirement. The PP/ST author performs a refinement by altering that requirement.

550 An example of a valid refinement is FIA\_UAU.2.1 “The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.” being refined to “The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated **by username/password** before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.”

551 The first rule for a refinement is that a TOE meeting the refined requirement also meets the unrefined requirement in the context of the PP/ST (i.e. a refined requirement must be “stricter” than the original requirement)

552 The only exception to this rule is that a PP/ST author is allowed to refine a SFR to apply to some but not all subjects, objects, operations, security attributes and/or external entities.

553 An example of a such an exception is FIA\_UAU.2.1 “The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.” being refined to “The TSF shall require each user **originating from the internet** to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.”

554 The second rule for a refinement given is that the refinement shall be related to the original component. For example, refining an audit component with an extra element on prevention of electromagnetic radiation is not allowed.

555 A special case of refinement is an editorial refinement, where a small change is made in a requirement, i.e. rephrasing a sentence due to adherence to proper English grammar, or to make it more understandable to the reader. This change is not allowed to modify the meaning of the requirement in any way. Examples of editorial refinements include:

- the SFR FPT\_FLS.1 “The TSF shall continue to preserve a secure state when the following failures occur: **breakdown of one CPU**”

could be refined to FPT\_FLS.1 “The TSF shall continue to preserve a secure state when the following failure occurs: **breakdown of one CPU**” or even FPT\_FLS.1 “The TSF shall continue to preserve a secure state when **one CPU breaks down**”.

### C.3 Organisation of components

556 The CC has organised the components in CC Part 2 and CC Part 3 into hierarchical structures:

- Classes, consisting of
- Families, consisting of
- Components, consisting of
- Elements.

557 This organisation into a hierarchy of class - family - component - element is provided to assist consumers, developers and evaluators in locating specific components.

558 The CC presents functional and assurance components in the same general hierarchical style and use the same organisation and terminology for each.

#### C.3.1 Class

559 An example of a class is the FIA: Identification and authentication class that is focused at identification of users, authentication of users and binding of users and subjects.

#### C.3.2 Family

560 An example of a family is the User authentication (FIA\_UAU) family which is part of the FIA: Identification and authentication class. This family concentrates on the authentication of users.

#### C.3.3 Component

561 An example of a component is FIA\_UAU.3 Unforgeable authentication which concentrates on unforgeable authentication.

#### C.3.4 Element

562 An example of an element is FIA\_UAU.3.2 which concentrates on the prevention of use of copied authentication data.

### C.4 Extended components

#### C.4.1 How to define extended components

- 563 Whenever a PP/ST author defines an extended component, this has to be done in a similar manner to the existing CC components: clear, unambiguous and evaluable (it is possible to systematically demonstrate whether a requirement based on that component holds for a TOE). Extended components must use similar labelling, manner of expression, and level of detail as the existing CC components.
- 564 The PP/ST author also has to make to sure that all applicable dependencies of an extended component are included in the definition of that extended component. Examples of possible dependencies are:
- a) if an extended component refers to auditing, dependencies to components of the FAU: Security audit class may have to be included;
  - b) if an extended component modifies or accesses data, dependencies to components of the Access control policy (FDP\_ACC) family may have to be included;
  - c) if an extended component uses a particular design description a dependency to the appropriate ADV: Development family (e.g. Functional Specification) may have to be included.
- 565 In the case of an extended functional component, the PP/ST author also has to include any applicable audit and associated operations information in the definition of that component, similar to existing CC Part 2 components. In the case of an extended assurance component, the PP/ST author also has to provide suitable evaluation methodology for the component, similar to the methodology provided in the CEM.
- 566 Extended components may be placed in existing families, in which case the PP/ST writer has to show how these families change. If they do not fit into an existing family, they shall be placed in a new family. New families have to be defined similarly to the CC.
- 567 New families may be placed in existing classes in which case the PP/ST writer has to show how these classes change. If they do not fit into an existing class, they shall be placed in a new class. New classes have to be defined similarly to the CC.

## **D PP conformance (informative)**

### **D.1 Introduction**

568 A PP is intended to be used as a “template” for an ST. That is: the PP describes a set of user needs, while an ST that conforms to that PP describes a TOE that satisfies those needs.

569 Note that it is also possible for a PP to be used as a template for another PP. That is PPs can claim conformance to other PPs. This case is completely similar to that of an ST vs. a PP. For clarity this Annex describes only the ST/PP case, but it holds also for the PP/PP case.

570 The CC does not allow any form of partial conformance, so if a PP is claimed, the PP or ST must fully conform to the referenced PP or PPs. There are however two types of conformance (“strict” and demonstrable”) and the type of conformance allowed is determined by the PP. That is, the PP states (in the PP conformance statement, see section B.5) what the allowed types of conformance for the ST are. This distinction between strict and demonstrable conformance is applicable to each PP to which an ST may claim conformance on an individual basis. This may mean that the ST conforms strictly to some PPs and demonstrably to other PPs. An ST is only allowed to conform to a PP in a demonstrable manner, if the PP explicitly allows this, whereas an ST can always conform with strict conformance to any PP.

571 Restating this in other words, an ST is only allowed to conform to a PP in a demonstrable manner, if the PP explicitly allows this.

572 Conformance to a PP means that the PP or ST (and if an ST is of an evaluated product, the product as well) meets all requirements of that PP.

573 Published PPs will normally require demonstrable conformance. This means that STs claiming conformance with the PP must offer a solution to the generic security problem described in the PP, but can do so in any way that is equivalent or more restrictive to that described in the PP. “Equivalent but more restrictive” is defined at length within the CC, but in principle it means that the PP and ST may contain entirely different statements that discuss different entities, use different concepts etc., provided that overall the ST levies the same or more restrictions on the TOE, and the same or less restrictions on the operational environment of the TOE.

### **D.2 Strict conformance**

574 Strict conformance is oriented to the PP-author who requires evidence that the requirements in the PP are met, that the ST is an instantiation of the PP, though the ST could be broader than the PP. In essence, the ST specifies that



## PP conformance

the TOE does at least the same as in the PP, while the operational environment does at most the same as in the PP.

575 A typical example of the use of strict conformance is in selection based purchasing where a product's security requirements are expected to exactly match those specified in the PP.

576 An ST instantiating strict conformance to a PP can still introduce additional restrictions to those given in the PP.

### D.3 Demonstrable conformance

577 Demonstrable conformance is orientated to the PP-author who requires evidence that the ST is a suitable solution to the generic security problem described in the PP.

578 Where there is a clear subset-superset type relation between PP and ST in the case of strict conformance, the relation is less clear-cut in the case of demonstrable conformance. STs claiming conformance with the PP must offer a solution to the generic security problem described in the PP. but can do so in any way that is equivalent or more restrictive to that described in the PP.

## E Bibliography (informative)

579 This bibliography contains references to further material and standards that the reader of the CC may find useful. For undated references the reader is recommended to refer to the latest edition of the referenced document.

### E.1 ISO/IEC standards and guidance

- [ISO/IEC 15292] Information technology -- Security techniques -- Protection Profile registration procedures
- [ISO/IEC 15443] Information technology -- Security techniques -- A framework for IT security assurance - all parts
- [ISO/IEC 15446] Information technology -- Security techniques -- Guide for the production of Protection Profiles and Security Targets
- [ISO/IEC 19790] Information technology -- Security techniques -- Security requirements for cryptographic modules
- [ISO/IEC 19791] Information technology -- Security techniques -- Security assessment of operational systems
- [ISO/IEC 27001] Information technology -- Security techniques -- Information security management systems -- Requirements
- [ISO/IEC 27002] Information technology -- Security techniques -- Code of practice for information security management

### E.2 Other standards and guidance

- [IEEE Std 610.12-1990] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology
- [CC portal] Common Criteria portal, February 2009. CCRA, [www.commoncriteriaportal.org](http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org)