



Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007-MA-06

**NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B with
specific IC Dedicated Software**

from

NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH



Common Criteria Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to EAL4

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements*, version 1.0, February 2004 and the developers Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 and BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007-MA-05.

The change to the certified product is the inclusion of an additional production site, a change that has no effect on assurance. The TOE did not change.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 is maintained for this version of the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007.

Bonn, 16. September 2009



Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], the Security Target [4], the Evaluation Technical Report [7] and ETR for composition as outlined in [8].

The vendor for the NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B with specific IC Dedicated Software submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The Common Criteria assurance requirements

ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),

ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and

ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),

are fulfilled for all audited sites of the TOE including the additional production site Smartrac Regensburg, which is used for inlay production:

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The NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B with specific IC Dedicated Software was changed due to the additionally included production site, a change that has no effect on assurance. The TOE did not change. The change is not significant from the standpoint of security.

Conclusion

The change to the certified product is at the level of the included production site, a change that has no effect on assurance. The TOE did not change.

The Security Target [4] is still valid for the changed TOE. Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, BSI agrees that the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [3] is maintained for this version of the product. Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). In addition to the baseline certificate BSI notes, that cryptographic functions with a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks with high attack potential

without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functions it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (www.bsi.bund.de). This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

References

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-001
- [2] Impact Analysis Report, NXP P5CD080V0B Secure Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors, Version 1.3, August 28th, 2009 (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 5 July 2007
- [4] Security Target, Evaluation of the NXP P5CD080/ P5CN080/ P5CC080/ P5CC073V0B Secure Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification, Rev.1.6, February 25th, 2009, BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 (Confidential document)
- [5] Configuration List of the NXP P5Cx012/02x/040/073/080/144 family of Secure Smart Card Controllers, Version 1.8, 12 March 2009, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification (Confidential document)
- [6] Security Target Lite, Evaluation of the NXP P5CD080/ P5CN080/ P5CC080/ P5CC073V0B Secure Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification, Rev.1.6, February 25th, 2009, BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
- [7] ETR for the NXP P5CD080V0B Secure Smart Card Controller, BSI-DSZ-CC-0410, T-Systems GEI GmbH, Version 1.2, June 25th, 2009 (Confidential document)
- [8] ETR for composition for the NXP P5CD080V0B Secure Smart Card Controller, BSI-DSZ-CC-0410, T-Systems GEI GmbH, Version 1.2, June 23th, 2009 (Confidential document)