

Certification Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0529-2010

for

Renesas HD65256D1 Version 02

from

Renesas Technology Corp.

sponsored by

Renesas Technology Europe Ltd.

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Deutsches

erteilt vom



IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-0529-2010

security controller

Renesas HD65256D1 Version 02

from Renesas Technology Corp.
sponsored by Renesas Technology Europe Ltd.
PP Conformance: Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
July 2001, Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and
AVA_VLA.4



Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4



The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 24 March 2010

For the Federal Office for Information Security



SOGIS - MRA

Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department

L.S.

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Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG¹ Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

¹ Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

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A Certification

1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- BSIG²
- BSI Certification Ordinance³
- BSI Schedule of Costs⁴
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN 45011 standard
- BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)⁵ [1]
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
- Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above EAL4 (AIS 34)

2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

² Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

³ Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

⁴ Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

⁵ Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730

2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC became initially effective in March 1998.

This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April 1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates

An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC.

As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site: <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.

3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product Renesas HD65256D1 Version 02 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0434-2007. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0434-2007 were re-used.

The evaluation of the product Renesas HD65256D1 Version 02 was conducted by Brightsight BV. The evaluation was completed on 12 February 2010. Brightsight BV is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)⁶ recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Renesas Technology Corp.

The product was developed by: Renesas Technology Corp.

⁶ Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

4 Validity of the Certification Result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

5 Publication

The product Renesas HD65256D1 Version 02 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: <https://www.bsi.bund.de>) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer⁷ of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

⁷ Renesas Technology Corp.
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B Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

1 Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Renesas HD65256D1 version 02 smartcard integrated circuit manufactured in Naka (Japan), see chap. 2. The HD65256D1 version 02 is an integrated circuit (IC) providing a hardware platform to a smart card operating system and smart card application software.

The TOE is intended for use in a range of high security applications, including high speed security authentication, data encryption or electronic signature. Several security features independently implemented in hardware or controlled by software will be provided to ensure proper operation and integrity and confidentiality of stored data. This includes for example measures for memory protection, leakage protection and sensors to allow operations only under specified conditions.

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001 [10].

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.

The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.1.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functions:

TOE Security Function	Addressed issue
SF.HWProtect	Protection from attacks on the operation of the hardware
SF.LeakProtect	Protection against leakage of information from the IC
SF.RNG	Random Number Generator
SF.DES	DES Coprocessor
SF.FMU	Firewall Management Unit
SF.EFunction	Embedded Software Functions
SF.TestModeControl	Test Mode Control
SF.Inject	Data injection

Table 1: TOE Security Functions

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1.

The claimed TOE's Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as indicated in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.2 is confirmed. The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and

decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.2 to 3.4.

This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: Renesas HD65256D1 version 02 smartcard integrated circuit manufactured in Naka (Japan).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

Renesas HD65256D1 Version 02

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
1	HW	HD65256D1 smartcard integrated circuit	02	Packaged module Package type: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BGA41 pin • BGA64 pin
2	SW	IC Dedicated 'Test Software Test ROM software	0.23	Included in HD65256D1 test ROM
3	SW	RNG online test software	1.0	Hardcopy: Provided as part of [13] (This is implemented in the Embedded Software by the user)
4	DOC	Hardware Manual [11]	1.0	Electronic data/ Hardcopy
5	DOC	User Guidance Manual (for software developers) [12]	0.60	Electronic data/ Hardcopy
6	DOC	User Guidance Manual (for chip user) [13]	1.0	Electronic data/ Hardcopy
7	DOC	Option List for Mask ROM Data [15]	0.50	Electronic data/ Hardcopy
8	DOC	Option List for EEPROM Write [14]	0.60	Electronic data/ Hardcopy

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

The TOE is identified by HD65256D1 version 02 (stored as version number in the EEPROM), produced in Naka (indicated by chip manufacturing site code '10' for Naka). The pre-personalisation data are injected into the EEPROM as specified by the customer using the option list.

To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated version, the delivery procedures described in the guidance manuals have to be followed. The Option Lists are used by the user for ordering the device and for verifying the product received.

The version number is indicated in EEPROM address H'100000. The value for this TOE is "02". The chip manufacturer site code is indicated in address H'100001. The value for this TOE is "10" for Naka.

3 Security Policy

The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functions to be used by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a random number generation of appropriate quality.

As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:

- maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE and
- maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functions (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance:

- Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
- Usage of Hardware Platform
- Treatment of User Data
- Usage of Key-dependent Functions
- Injected Data Support

Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9] chapter 3.2.

5 Architectural Information

The Renesas HD65256D1 smartcard integrated circuit version 02 is an integrated circuit (IC) providing a hardware platform to a smart card operating system and smart card application software. The top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target. The complete hardware description and the complete instruction set of the Renesas HD65256D1 smartcard integrated circuit version 02 is to be found in the Hardware Manual [11].

For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components AE-5 Series CPU, EEPROM, System Control Registers, DES coprocessor, Firewall Management Unit, a Random Number Generator, the analog block with security sensors and the random logic module for security logic are used. Security measures for physical protection are realized within the layout of the whole circuitry.

The TOE IC Dedicated Software, stored on the chip, is used for testing purposes during production only and is completely separated from the use of the embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery.

6 Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

7 IT Product Testing

The tests performed by the developer were divided into four categories:

- tests which are performed in a simulation environment,
- functional production tests, which are done as a last step of the production process (phase 3) and additionally done as a last step of IC Packaging. These tests are done for every chip to check its correct functionality,
- characterization tests, which were used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating conditions and
- special verification tests for security functions which were done with samples of the TOE.

The developer tests cover all security functions and all security mechanisms as identified in the functional specification and the high level design. Chips from the production site in Naka were used for tests (see annex A of this report).

The evaluators repeated the tests of the developer either using the library of programs and tools delivered to the evaluator or at the developers site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests performed by the developer by sampling. Besides repeating exactly the developers tests, test parameters were varied and additional analysis was done. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections.

The evaluators gave evidence that the actual version of the TOE (version 02 with IC manufacturer's ID number '10' for Naka) provides the security functions as specified. The test results confirm the correct implementation of the TOE security functions.

For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functions into consideration. Intensive penetration testing was performed to consider the physical tampering of the TOE using highly sophisticated equipment and expert know how.

8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is identified by Renesas HD65256D1 version 02 and the IC manufacturer's ID number '10' for Naka. This is the only evaluated configuration of the TOE. All information of how to use the TOE and its security functions by the software is provided within the user documentation.

The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode. Thus, the evaluation was mainly performed in the user mode. For all evaluation activities performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid for the user mode, too.

9 Results of the Evaluation

9.1 CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).

The following guidance specific for the technology was used:

- Supporting Document – Mandatory Technical Document, The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
- Supporting Document – Mandatory Technical Document, Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
- Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for true (physical) random number generators
- Supporting Document - Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation

(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS31, AIS37) were used.

The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE.

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the class ASE
- All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
- The components ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0434-2007. All evaluation evidence is assessed although some part of the evaluation evidence is similar or even the same. Re-use of results from site visits performed by T-Systems is applied.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- PP Conformance: Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001 [10]
- for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
- The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : high
 - SF.LeakProtect
 - SF.RNG
 - SF.TestModeControl

In order to assess the Strength of Function the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 31 (see [4]) was used.

For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report.

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment

The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for:

- The TOE Security Function SF.DES (DES Coprocessor)

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for these functions it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (www.bsi.bund.de).

The Cryptographic Functionality DES provided by the TOE achieves a security level of lower than 80 Bits (in general context).

10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.

11 Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])

12 Definitions

12.1 Acronyms

BSI	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology
CPU	Central processing unit
DES	Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM	Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
FMU	Firewall Management Unit
HW	Hardware
IC	Integrate circuit
IT	Information Technology
PP	Protection Profile
RAM	Random Access Memory
RNG	Random Number Generator
ROM	Read Only Memory
SF	Security Function
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	TOE Security Functional Requirements
SOF	Strength of Function
ST	Security Target
SW	Software
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSC	TSF Scope of Control
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSP	TOE Security Policy

12.2 Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations.

Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.

Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.

Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.

SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.

SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.

SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.

Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.

Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.

TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.

TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and distributed within a TOE.

TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.

13 Bibliography

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3, August 2005
- [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
- [3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
- [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.⁸
- [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list published also on the BSI Website
- [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0529, Version 5.0, 14 July 2009, HD65256D1 Version 02 Smartcard Security Target, Renesas Technology Corp. (confidential document)
- [7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3.0, 8 February 2010, Evaluation Technical Report AE56D1 version 02 (HD65256D1), Brightsight (confidential document)
- [8] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 0.6.6, 22 July 2009, Document Version for the Common Criteria (confidential document)
- [9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0529, Version 2.0, 14 July 2009, HD65256D1 Version 02 Smartcard Security Target, Renesas Technology Corp. (sanitised public document)
- [10] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July, 2001, BSI registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs, Hitachi Europe Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductor
- [11] HD65256D1 Hardware Manual, Renesas 32-bit Secure Microcontroller AE-5 Series HD65256D1 Rev 1.0, 28 October 2008
- [12] HD65256D1 User Guidance Manual (for software developers) Rev 0.60, 29 August 2008
- [13] KURA Chip (HD65256D1) User Guidance Manual Rev 1.0, 30 September 2008

⁸ specifically

- AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
- AIS 26, Version 6, 7 May 2009, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
- AIS 31, Version 1, 25 September 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
- AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
- AIS 34, Version 2, 24 October 2008, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
- AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
- AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results

- [14] Option List for EEPROM Write (for HD65256D1), HD65256D1_v0.6, AE56D1 EEPROM Option List, Rev 0.6, 10 April 2008
- [15] Option List for Mask ROM Data (for HD65256D1), HD65256D1_v0.5, AE56D1 ROM Option List, Rev 0.5, 28 February 2008
- [16] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0434-2007, 30 May 2007

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C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part1:

Conformance results (chapter 7.4)

„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).

The conformance result consists of one of the following:

- **CC Part 2 conformant** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
- **CC Part 2 extended** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.

plus one of the following:

- **CC Part 3 conformant** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
- **CC Part 3 extended** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:

- **Package name Conformant** - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
- **Package name Augmented** - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.

Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:

- **PP Conformant** - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.“

CC Part 3:

Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)

“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation	TOE description (APE_DES)
	Security environment (APE_ENV)
	PP introduction (APE_INT)
	Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
	IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
	Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)

Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”

Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)

“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE evaluation.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation	TOE description (ASE_DES)
	Security environment (ASE_ENV)
	ST introduction (ASE_INT)
	Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
	PP claims (ASE_PPC)
	IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
	Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
	TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)

Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”

Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)

“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table 1.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management	CM automation (ACM_AUT)
	CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
	CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation	Delivery (ADO_DEL)
	Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development	Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
	High-level design (ADV_HLD)
	Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
	TSF internals (ADV_INT)
	Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
	Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
	Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents	Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
	User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support	Development security (ALC_DVS)
	Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
	Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
	Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests	Coverage (ATE_COV)
	Depth (ATE_DPT)
	Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
	Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
	Misuse (AVA_MSU)
	Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
	Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)

Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”

Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)

“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Assurance Evaluation Assurance Level Components							by
		EAL1	EAL2	EAL3	EAL4	EAL5	EAL6	EAL7	
Configuration management	ACM_AUT				1	1	2	2	
	ACM_CAP	1	2	3	4	4	5	5	
	ACM_SCP			1	2	3	3	3	
Delivery and operation	ADO_DEL		1	1	2	2	2	3	
	ADO_IGS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Development	ADV_FSP	1	1	1	2	3	3	4	
	ADV_HLD		1	2	2	3	4	5	
	ADV_IMP				1	2	3	3	
	ADV_INT					1	2	3	
	ADV_LLD				1	1	2	2	
	ADV_RCR	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	
	ADV_SPM				1	3	3	3	
Guidance documents	AGD_ADM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	AGD_USR	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Life cycle support	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2	
	ALC_FLR								
	ALC_LCD				1	2	2	3	
	ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3	
Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3	
	ATE_DPT			1	1	2	2	3	
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2	
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_CCA					1	2	2	
	AVA_MSU			1	2	2	3	3	
	AVA_SOF		1	1	1	1	1	1	
	AVA_VLA		1	1	2	3	4	4	

Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”

Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)

“Objectives

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified threats.”

Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)

“Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 11.5)

“Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practices.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.”

Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)**“Objectives**

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)**“Objectives**

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”

Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)**“Objectives**

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)**“Objectives**

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”

Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)**“Objectives**

Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”

Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)**“Objectives**

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”

“Application notes

A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”

“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”

D Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.

Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment

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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0529-2010

Evaluation results regarding development and production environment



The IT product Renesas HD65256D1 Version 02 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).

As a result of the TOE certification, dated 24 March 2010, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria Security Assurance Requirements

- ACM – Configuration management (ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2),
- ADO – Delivery and operation (ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
- ALC – Life cycle support (ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),

are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:

The sites involved and audited under certification project BSI-DSZ-CC-0489-2008 are:

- a) Musashi
Renesas Technology Corp., 5-20-1 Jousuichon-cho, Kodaira-shi, Tokyo 187-8588, Japan
Role: Design
- b) Plaza
Hitachi ULSI Systems Co., Ltd., 5-22-1 Jousuichon-cho, Kodaira-shi, Tokyo 187-8522, Japan
Role: ROM support
- c) Kofu
Renesas Technology Corp., 4617 Nishiyahata, Kai-shi, Yamanashi 400-0117, Japan
Role: Wafer Test
- d) Toyo
Toyo Electronics Co., 2781-1, Shimosome-cho, Kofu-shi, Yamanashi 400-1508, Japan
Role: Wafer Test
- e) MTEX
MTEX Matsumura Corp., 2-2-2 Kitamachi, Obanazawa-shi, Yamagata 999-4231, Japan
Role: Packaging

The sites involved and audited under certification project BSI-DSZ-CC-0541 are:

- f) Naka
Renesas Technology Corp., 751 horiguchi, Hitachinaka-shi Ibaraki 312-0034, Japan
Role: Manufacturing
- g) Enzan
Enzan Factory Co., 276 Enzanshimoozo, Kosshu-shi, Yamanashi 404-0043, Japan
Role: Dicing
- h) Apollo
Apollo Electronics Co., 610 Shimoimasuwa, Minami-alps-shi, Yamanashi 400-0212,
Japan
Role: Back Grind
- l) Toppan
Toppan Printing Co., 7-21-33 Nobidome, Niiza-shi, Saitama 352-0011, Japan
Role: Mask Maker

For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [6]). The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.