



# Certification Report

**BSI-DSZ-CC-0585-2009**

for

**S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5  
Version 2.5.1.1**

from

**OPENLIMIT SignCubes AG**

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# Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom



Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

## BSI-DSZ-CC-0585-2009

Signature application component

### S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5

Version 2.5.1.1

from OPENLIMIT SignCubes AG  
PP Conformance: None  
Functionality: product specific Security Target;  
Common Criteria Part 2 extended  
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant  
EAL 4 augmented by  
AVA\_MSU.3  
AVA\_VLA.4



Common Criteria  
Recognition  
Arrangement  
for components up to  
EAL 4



The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 22 June 2009

For the Federal Office for Information Security



SOGIS - MRA

Bernd Kowalski  
Head of Department

L.S.

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## Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG<sup>1</sup> Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

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<sup>1</sup> Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

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## A Certification

### 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- BSIG<sup>2</sup>
- BSI Certification Ordinance<sup>3</sup>
- BSI Schedule of Costs<sup>4</sup>
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN 45011 standard
- BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)<sup>5</sup> [1]
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
- Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above EAL4 (AIS 34)

### 2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

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<sup>2</sup> Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

<sup>3</sup> Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

<sup>4</sup> Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

<sup>5</sup> Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730

## 2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC became initially effective in March 1998.

This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April 1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

## 2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates

An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC.

As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site: <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

This evaluation contains the components AVA\_MSU.3 and AVA\_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.

## 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5, Version 2.5.1.1 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0552-2009.

The evaluation of the product S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5, Version 2.5.1.1 was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 07. May 2009. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)<sup>6</sup> recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the developer, sponsor and applicant is: OPENLIMIT SignCubes AG

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<sup>6</sup> Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility



The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

## 4 Validity of the certification result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

## 5 Publication

The product S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5, Version 2.5.1.1 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: <http://www.bsi.bund.de>) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer<sup>7</sup> of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

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Switzerland

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## **B Certification Results**

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

# 1 Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) is the software application S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5, Version 2.5.1.1<sup>8</sup>.

S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5, Version 2.5.1.1 is an electronic signature application compliant to the German electronic signature law<sup>9</sup> and ordinance on electronic signatures<sup>10</sup>. The application itself is a set of executables and programming libraries.

The S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5 were developed for the use on the operating systems from Microsoft since Microsoft Windows NT 4.0. In the IT-security environment a smart card terminal with secure pin entry mode as well as a smart card are required to run the required cryptographic operations in the process of electronic signature creation.

The product provides additional cryptographic functionality like data encryption based on symmetric encryption algorithms. These product capabilities are not part of the Common Criteria evaluation of this product.

The TOE itself is limited to the creation of hash values, using the SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RIPEMD 160 algorithms and the RSA-Algorithm for signature validation. It is therefore able to check and ensure the integrity as well as the trustworthiness of signed data based on the components responsible for CRL-processing, OCSP-processing, time stamp processing and PDF processing.

The TOE can be used as a standalone application or can be integrated into third party products. For third party products the TOE includes an API (called S-TRUST Sign-it Job Interface or OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK v2.1) that allows access to the following core functionality of the TOE:

- Computation of hash values implementing the algorithms mentioned above.
- Initiation of the electronic signatures creation process according to the PKCS#7- or XML DSIG-standard.
- Time stamp processing.
- Support for attribute certificates in the process of electronic signature creation.
- Support for OCSP-processing in the process of electronic signature creation.
- Electronic signature verification.
- Protection of data for HBCI-banking.
- Integrity protection of the installed product.

Furthermore, the TOE provides a legal binding displaying unit (S-TRUST Sign-it Viewer) for the Text, TIFF and PDF format. The displaying unit of the TOE allows the examination of the files in order to ensure that the user is assured about the content to be signed or the content of the signed file.

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified Protection Profile.

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<sup>8</sup> Also named S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5 in this report.

<sup>9</sup> see [11]

<sup>10</sup> see [12]

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4 augmented by AVA\_MSU.3 and AVA\_VLA.4.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6]. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.

The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.3.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functions:

TOE Security Function	Addressed issue
SF.1	<p>Hash value computation and initiation of the electronic signature creation process using certificates, smart card terminals and secure signature creation devices.</p> <p>The user can optionally include OCSP-responses for the validation of certificates and add timestamps to a digital signature. Furthermore, the S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5 allow the creation of more than one signature without entering the PIN for every document. This feature is only available for the S-TRUST Sign-it Job Interface and not for the graphical user interface included in the S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5.</p>
SF.2	<p>Verification of hash values and electronic signatures using certificate revocation lists, OCSP responses (optional) and timestamps (optional)</p> <p>Apart from the extraction of the original and the comparison with the calculated hash value the S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5 verify the certificate chain using the chain model or RFC 3280.</p>
SF.3	<p>Program module manipulation detection</p> <p>The files and libraries constituting the S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5 are digitally signed. Each time the application starts a specific module is responsible for verifying these signatures mathematically.</p>
SF.4	<p>Unambiguous presentation of the data to be signed</p> <p>The S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5 present the data to be signed unambiguously to the user. To accomplish this, a parser determines whether the format of the data to be signed complies to the Adobe PDF-, the TIFF-standard or is a text file. The data is checked for active content, unknown tags and elements or control characters that cannot be displayed. If any irregularities are detected, the user is informed with appropriate error messages or warnings.</p>
SF.5	<p>Protection against hash value manipulation</p> <p>Before the electronic signature is initiated, the S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5 compute the hash value of the data to be signed. After the electronic signature creation process the S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5 verify the electronic signature using the public key of the given signer certificate. If the original hash value and the hash value encoded in the electronic signature are not identical, the signature is discarded.</p>
SF.6	<p>Assurance of the TOE's integrity</p> <p>For the integrity check the S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5</p>

TOE Security Function	Addressed issue
	comprise a JAVA-applet that is provided online. When assessing this applet it calculates the hash value of each file belonging to the S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5 and compares it to the values that were initially calculated by the manufacturer. If any value does not match, an error message is displayed.
SF.7	<p>Processing of OCSP information for certificate validation</p> <p>The S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5 is able to process OCSP-responses. First the mathematical correctness of the signature of the OCSP-response is checked. If the OCSP-response is used for the validation of a certificate, the complete chain for the signing certificate of the OCSP-response is verified.</p>
SF.8	<p>Application of Timestamps</p> <p>The S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5 apply timestamps to files if the timestamp is electronically signed and the certificate belonging to the signature of the timestamp is already available. Otherwise the timestamp is not imported.</p>
SF.9	<p>Validation of Timestamps</p> <p>The S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5 validate the electronic signature of a timestamp mathematically. Furthermore, the certificate underlying the electronic signature of the timestamp is validated according to the chain model or RFC 3280. A prerequisite for this security function is that the signing certificate of the timestamp is already available.</p>
SF.10	<p>Management of Security Functions depending on licenses</p> <p>The S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5 support different licenses. E.g. for the verification of electronic signatures no special license key must be purchased, whereas the creation of embedded PDF-signatures requires the availability of the most comprehensive license</p>

Table 1: TOE Security Functions

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.

The claimed TOE's Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 8 is confirmed. The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSI Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.

The TOE is a software application that does not require a special configuration. The TOE has to be configured in accordance with the Security Target and the respective guidance documents. This means among other aspects that for the application of qualified electronic signatures a smartcard reader and a secure signature creation device must be used that was approved in accordance with the German signature law [11]. The Security Target names the products the TOE can be used with.

Further information about the configuration of the TOE and the technical environment is available in

- the Security Target [6],

- chapter 1, chapter 4 and chapter 8 of this report,
- the user guidance [9],
- and the guidance of the API provided by the TOE [9].

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

## 2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

### **S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5, Version 2.5.1.1**

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No	Type	Term	Version	Date	Form of Delivery
1	Software (program)	S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5.1.1	2.5.1.1	18.12.2008	File
2	Documentation	S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5 (German language)	2.5.1.1	18.12.2008	chm-Files
3	Documentation	OPENLiMiT® SignCubes SDK v2.5 Documentation	1.5	27.10.2008	PDF-File
4	Documentation	Auslieferungshinweise für Terminalserverlizenzen, OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1, v2.1.6.3	Version 1.0		PDF_File
5	Header File	siqSDK.h		14.10.2008	File
6	Library File	siqSDK.lib		12.12.2008	File
7	Integrity-Tool	IntegrityTool.jar		18.12.2008	File

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

The TOE deliverables No.1, No.2, No. 7 are provided for a standard customer, who purchases the TOE.

The TOE deliverables No.3 to 6 are delivered upon request only and may have to be purchased separately.

To identify the Header, Library and Jar Files the SHA-256 values of these files are listed in the table 3.

No.	File	SHA-256-value
1.	siqSDK.h	bd49e685989465c465815f8bceb1c60f932b9151d745cc90dd1d390d47d1ba8b
2.	siqSDK.lib	a1ad421421fe8dcae6552d930ac74a9141f8f95691558515712b8a11fd24677e
3.	IntegrityTool.jar	1b29d018e8e8095bc56cb42eb34547f0407f4b700d099ee399b6d46b245da059

Table 3: Hash Values of TOE deliverables

The vendor provides the product either as a complete setup that comprises the user guidance and supports all smart cards as well as all smart card terminals that are listed in chapter 4.

Alternatively, the TOE is distributed in different parts comprising the compulsory minimal setup and optional add-on setups.

The minimal setup contains the following constituent parts of the evaluated product:

- the user guidance and user prompting in German,
- all binary files with exception of the ones that are required for the support of the smart cards and smart card terminals listed in chapter 4 and
- especially the S-TRUST Sign-it Integrity Tool.

After the installation of the minimal setup all functionalities of the product are available that the most restrictive license allows to use.

The add-on setups are composed according to the needs of the customer and contain the libraries required to support specific smart cards and smart card terminals. To use the functionalities of other licenses of the product than the most restrictive one the installation of the corresponding add-on setup in addition to the installation of the minimal setup is required.

As a third alternative the vendor provides single setups that contain the minimal setup and the support for a selected set of smart cards and smart card terminals. This alternative may be chosen to provide a software package for a set of hardware that a Trust Center or a major reseller dispenses.

The end-customer can acquire the TOE through different sales channels:

- The customer buys a CD-ROM that contains the required setup directly from OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG or resellers.
- Resellers or the OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG make the software available on their webpages. The download process must comply to the following guidelines:
  - The webpage where the software is offered must be secured by means of https. The fingerprint of the certificate must be published separately on the website of the corresponding company.
  - The website must explicitly instruct the user to execute the integrity tool first before using the TOE.

After installing the product the user is compelled to execute the S-TRUST Sign-it Integrity Tool. This applet is provided on the website

**<https://www.s-trust.de/sign-it/sicherheit>**



The S-TRUST Sign-it Integrity Tool checks whether the TOE is correctly installed on the computer of the user and displays the versions of the different files composing the TOE. Thus, the user can easily recognize whether he installed the correct version of the software and which parts of the evaluated product are installed.

The TOE deliverables No. 3 to No. 5 can only be acquired from OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG. They are handed over to end customers (i.e. application developers) either online or by a delivery service on CD-ROM as a compressed zip-archive. The archive is digitally signed with a qualified electronic signature. The belonging qualified certificate can be identified by means of the following information:

Subject:	Armin Lunkeit
Issuer:	S-TRUST Qualified Signature CA 2005-001:PN
Valid From:	11th of October 2005
Valid Until:	31 of December 2009
Serial Number:	0x6A 41 76 EC AB 31 41 3B DC B3 87 A0 2A 62 E6 BF
SHA-1 Fingerprint:	49 DA 34 B5 BF C2 8A 41 38 1D 52 2C 6E C6 24 BD C3 0E 08 38

The receiver of the archive must verify this qualified electronic signature to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the software.

### 3 Security Policy

The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:

- The TOE clearly indicates the creation of a qualified electronic signature and enables the user to unambiguously identify the data to be signed.
- The TOE ensures that the identification data are not disclosed and are stored only on the relevant secure signature creation device. The application enforces the rule that a signature is provided only at the initiation of the authorized signing person.
- The TOE shows, to which data the signature refers, whether the signed data is unchanged and to which signature-code owner the signature is to be assigned.
- The TOE presents the contents of the qualified certificate on which the signature is based, the appropriate qualified attribute certificates and the results of the subsequent check of certificates.
- If data to be signed or data already signed is displayed by the TOE certain rules for the treatment of nonreadable signs are enforced.
- For the verification of a qualified electronic signature the TOE reliably verifies the correctness of a signature and displays this fact appropriately.
- Using the TOE it can be clearly determined whether the verified qualified certificates were present in the relevant register of certificates at the given time and were not revoked.
- The TOE ensures, that security-relevant changes in the technical components are apparent to the user.

## 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance:

### 4.1 Usage assumptions

According to the ST [6], chapter 3.1, the following assumption for the usage of the TOE is made:

- **A.Personnel**

The user, the administrator and the maintenance staff are trustworthy and follow the user guide of the TOE. Especially the user verifies the integrity of the installed TOE as described in the user documentation and on the website where from the different setups can be downloaded.

### 4.2 Environmental assumptions

- A.Platform

The user utilizes an Intel 586 compatible computer as hardware platform, which contains at least 64 MB of RAM and 120 MB of free disk space. On the computer one of the following operating systems is installed:

- Windows NT 4.0 SP 6
- Windows 2000 SP 2
- Windows 2003
- Windows XP Home
- Windows XP Professional
- Windows XP Tablet PC Edition
- Windows XP 64 Bit Edition
- Windows Vista
- Windows Vista 64 Bit Edition
- Windows 2008
- Windows 2008 x64 Edition

Additionally the TOE supports a terminal server environment under Windows operating systems Windows 2000 with Citrix Metaframe, Windows 2003 with and without Citrix Metaframe and Windows 2008 without Citrix Metaframe.

In a terminal server environment the communication between server and client/s is conducted via an encrypted channel and is therefore to be considered trustworthy.

In addition to these requirements, the Internet Explorer version 5.01 or higher is installed. Moreover, the Microsoft smart card base components are installed on the computer<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> The manual installation of the Microsoft SmartCard base components is required for Microsoft Windows NT 4.0, SP 6

In addition to that, a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) is installed on the computer, which complies at least with the Java Runtime Environment v1.4.

The user ensures that all components of the operating system are correct. The user ensures that no malicious or harmful program is installed on the system.

The user ensure that the system time is correct. The system time may be used for certain steps during the creation or the verification of electronic signatures.

The user utilizes a secure signature creation system, which consists of a smart-card terminal with secure pin entry capabilities together with a smart card. The user utilizes one of the following SigG approved smart cards:

- ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2b NP and 6.2f NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
- ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2 NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
- ZKA Banking signature card v6.31 NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
- ZKA Banking signature card v6.32, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
- ZKA Banking Signature Card, Version 6.4 from Giesecke & Devrient
- ZKA Banking Signature Card, Version 6.51 from Giesecke & Devrient
- ZKA Banking Signature Card, v6.6 from Giesecke & Devrient
- ZKA signature card, version 5.02 from Gemplus-mids GmbH
- ZKA signature card, version 5.10 (ZKA 680 V5A) from Gemplus-mids GmbH
- ZKA signature card, version 5.11 from Gemplus-mids GmbH
- ZKA signature card, version 5.11 M from Gemplus GmbH (Gemalto)
- ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3 from Sagem Orga GmbH
- ZKA Banking Signature Card, Version 7.1.2 from Giesecke & Devrient
- ZKA Banking Signature Card, Version 7.2.1 from Giesecke & Devrient
- ZKA signature card, version 6.01 (ZKA 680 V6A) from Gemplus GmbH (Gemalto)

In addition to the listed smart cards, the user utilizes any smart card that provides a PKCS #15 interface or a SigG-application for qualified electronic signatures.

The user utilizes one of the following smart-card terminals:

- Cherry ST-2000
- Fujitsu Siemens S26381-K329-V2xx HOS:01
- Kobil B1 Pro USB
- Kobil TriB@nk
- Kobil KAAAN Advanced
- Omnikey Cardman 3621
- Omnikey Cardman 3821
- Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0

- Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v3.0
- Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com plus v3.0
- Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
- Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v3.0
- Reiner SCT cyberJack secoder
- SCM Microsystems SPRx32

The used components are approved components according to the German signature law. The certificates can be obtained from the BSI ([www.bsi.bund.de](http://www.bsi.bund.de)).

#### ● **A.Network**

The computer where the TOE is installed may have internet access. In this case a firewall is used to ensure that no system services or components are compromised through internet attacks. In addition to this, the user utilizes a virus scanner, which is able to detect virus programs as well as backdoor programs and root kits. At least the virus scanner is able to inform the user about attacks or detected malicious programs.

#### ● **A.Access**

The computer on which the TOE is installed is located in an environment where the user has full control about inserted storage devices and shared network storage places. The TOE is protected in such way that it is not possible to access parts of the TOE or the TOE as a whole through existing network connections.

### **4.3 Clarification of scope**

The TOE cannot assure the correctness of the following functions:

- Private Key material. The secure signature creation device must assure the correctness and integrity of the private key material.
- Assurance of the operating system integrity. The TOE does not contain any capabilities for ensuring the integrity of the operating system and its environment. The user must assure that sufficient actions are undertaken to avoid that the operating system may be compromised.
- Strength and security of cryptographic operations. The TOE uses libraries for hash value creation and the RSA algorithm for signature validation. Therefore the TOE can only assure the compliance to given standardization documentation and test vectors but must not make any statement about the strength of the cryptographic operations.

The capability characteristics of the TOE are limited to the computation of hash values and the usage of secure signature creation devices for electronic signature creation and the usage of the RSA algorithm for signature verification. Manipulations on the IT-security environment cannot be recognized or even prevented by the TOE.

Applications that use the TOE via the evaluated API are **not** in the focus of this evaluation.

### **4.4 Restrictions and Exceptions**

The following tables show the combinations between operating system, smart card and smart card reader that are not supported.

Table 4 depicts which smart card terminals are not supported by the corresponding operating system.

<b>Operating system</b>	<b>Smart card terminal</b>
Windows NT 4 SP 6	Cherry St 2000 (Firmware version 5.08)
	Cherry ST2000 (Firmware version 5.11)
	Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v3.0
	Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v3.0
	Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com plus v3.0
	Reiner SCT cyberJack secoder
	Kobil KAAN Advanced
	Kobil TriB@nk
	Kobil B1 Pro USB
	Fujitsu Siemens S26381-K329-V2xx HOS: 01
	Omnikey Cardman 3621
	Omnikey Cardman 3821
	Windows XP 64 Bit Edition
Kobil TriB@nk	
Kobil B1 Pro USB	
SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)	
Windows Vista	Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
	Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
	SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
Windows Vista 64 Bit Edition	Kobil KAAN Advanced
	Kobil B1 Pro USB
	Kobil TriB@nk
	SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
	Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
	Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
Windows 2003	Kobil B1 Pro USB
	SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
Windows 2003 64 Bit Edition	Kobil B1 Pro USB
	Kobil KAAN Advanced
	Kobil TriB@nk
	SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
	Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0

Operating system	Smart card terminal
	Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
Windows 2008	SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
	Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
	Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
Windows 2008 64 Bit Edition	Kobil B1 Pro USB
	Kobil KAAN Advanced
	Kobil TriB@nk
	SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
	Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
	Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
Windows 2008 Server	Kobil B1 Pro USB
	Kobil KAAN Advanced
	Kobil TriB@nk
	Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
	Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
Windows 2000 Server with Citrix Meta Frame	SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
Windows 2003 Server with Citrix Meta Frame	SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
Windows 2003 Server	SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
Windows 2008 Server	SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)

Table 4: Incompatibilities between operating systems and smart card terminals

**These combinations are not included in the evaluation and therefore not included in the certificate.**

Details can be found in the Security Target [6].

## 5 Architectural Information

The TOE S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5, Version 2.5.1.1 is a signature application component compliant to the German electronic signature law and ordinance on electronic signatures. The application itself is a set of executables and programming libraries. This means that the may be used as a single application but also may be integrated into third party products. The TOE comprises three different parts:

- the S-Trust Sign-it Security Environment Manager
- the S-Trust Sign-it Viewer

- the S-Trust Sign-it Integrity Tool

The first two parts represent the main components of the TOE whereas the S-Trust Sign-it Integrity Tool is a separate application implemented as a Java Applet. The S-Trust Sign-it Integrity Tool is used to allow the user to check the integrity of the installed product.

The figure below provides an overview of the main components and their interfaces as described in the High-Level Design.




Figure 1: Decomposition of the main components of the TOE

In Figure 1 the lined boxes represent the subsystems of the main components of the TOE whereas the arrows indicate interfaces between subsystems. Dashed boxes refer to external subsystems that are part of the IT environment of the TOE (see chapter 4 in this report).

The S-Trust Sign-it Viewer is a software component for displaying signed data or data to be signed according to the signature law §17 paragraph 2. The S-Trust Sign-it Viewer is able to display TIFF documents following the Adobe TIFF specification, PDF documents that follow the PDF 1.7 document format as well as documents that contain ASCII characters. If the user decides to sign the document that is currently displayed with the S-Trust Sign-it Viewer, he can start the process of electronic signature creation using the S-Trust Sign-it Viewer as an indirect interface to that functionality provided by the S-Trust Sign-it Security Environment Manager.

The S-Trust Sign-it Security Environment Manager provides the following functionality that may be accessed in parts or completely through the use of the S-Trust Sign-it SDK:

- Computation of hash values using the SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RIPEMD-160 algorithms.
- Creation of electronic signatures using a smart card and a secure pin entry device (smart card reader).
- Timestamp processing during the process of electronic signature creation.
- Support for attribute certificates in the process of electronic signature creation.
- Support for OCSP processing during the electronic signature creation.
- Electronic signature verification including OCSP and CRL processing as well as timestamp processing. The use of attribute certificates is supported.
- API's for applications/product parts that want to use the provided functionality.
- Ensuring the integrity and correctness of the S-Trust Sign-it base components installed on the user's computer.
- Providing graphical interfaces in the process of signature creation, verification and product configuration.
- Providing data for the creation of a report that describes the result of a signature verification.<sup>12</sup>

## 6 Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

## 7 IT Product Testing

### 7.1 Developer Tests

The developer has tested the TSF defined in the ST [6] for the TOE version S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5, Version 2.5.1.1. The TOE tested configuration consists of

- the configured software (S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5, Version 2.5.1.1) used to implement the electronic signature application and

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<sup>12</sup> The library that is responsible for the creation of the report itself is not part of the TOE.



- the pertaining guidance documentation S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5.

The tests cover the configurations of the newly added signature cards and card readers in combinations with the operating systems listed in section 4.2.

The test description demonstrates that the developer performed his testing on a subsystems level. All three defined subsystems have been tested.

The test effort of the developer demonstrates that the TSF defined in the security target have been implemented as required.

## 7.2 Independent and penetration tests

The evaluators spent adequate testing effort for the desired resistance of the TOE against attackers with a high attack potential. Overall, the evaluators spent several days each for the following activities concerning the TOE and previous, certified versions of the software:

- Analysis of the test specification,
- creation of ideas for evaluator tests,
- ensuring that the test environment delivers correct test results and then for repeating developer tests.

Evaluator tests were identified based on the developer tests already available. The tests have been compared with the ST, the FSP and the HLD in order to determine the fields of investigations. As the developer incorporates previous evaluator independent tests into his own developer test plan, the main focus of the evaluator test effort lay on the repetition of developer tests.

Furthermore, the evaluators performed additionally penetration tests for this evaluation.

According to EAL4, testing is performed on subsystem interfaces level.

The tests showed that the TOE behaves as expected. The depth of testing is adequate for the evaluation assurance level chosen (EAL4+). The TOE has successfully passed independent testing.

## 8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE was evaluated in the configuration as described in the Evaluation Technical Report [7] and summarized in chapter 15 of this report.

The TOE allows only one mode of operation though several different functionalities are bound to purchasing a corresponding license. Depending on the license, the user may use only parts of the functionality evaluated and certified. In any case, the evaluation and the certificate cover all functionalities that the purchase of the most comprehensive license provides.

## 9 Results of the Evaluation

### 9.1 CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 [4] (AIS 34).

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the class ASE
- All components of the EAL4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
- The components AVA\_MSU.3 and AVA\_VLA.4 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0552-2009, re-use of specific evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the integration of new signature request dialogues especially to improve the support for HBCI-banking.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- for the Functionality: product specific Security Target ; Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant  
EAL 4 augmented by  
AVA\_MSU.3  
AVA\_VLA.4

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

## 9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment

The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for the following security functions:

- SF.1 (Hash value computation and initiation of the electronic signature creation)
- SF.2 (Verification of hash values and electronic signatures)
- SF.3 (Program module manipulation detection)
- SF.5 (Protection against hash value manipulation)
- SF.6 (Assurance of the TOE's integrity)
- SF.7 (Processing of OCSP information for certificate validation)
- SF.8 (Application of Timestamps)
- SF.9 (Validation of Timestamps)
- SF.10 (Management of Security Functions depending on licenses)

The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:

- hash functions:  
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RIPEMD 160
- algorithms for the encryption and decryption:  
RSA-Algorithms with bitlengths between 1024-2048 bits

ECC with parameters  $p=192$ ,  $q \geq 180$  for  $E(F_p)$ ,  $m=191$ ,  $q \geq 180$  for  $E(F_2^m)$

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation (see BSI Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to the catalogue of the Bundesnetzagentur [15] the algorithms are suitable for the creation of qualified electronic signatures. The validity period of each algorithm is mentioned in the official catalogue [15] and summarized in chapter 10.

## 10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE

The operational documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.

The following table describes the validity period of hash functions for the creation of according to the publication of the Bundesnetzagentur [15].

Hash function	Valid until end of
SHA-1	Not valid any more
RIPMD 160	2010
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	2015

Table 5: Validity period of hash functions

As the S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5, Version 2.5.1.1 implement certain cryptographic algorithms for the verification of electronic signatures, the following tables summarizes the validity period of these algorithms as published by the Bundesnetzagentur.

Algorithm with bitlength	Valid until end of
RSA 1280	Not valid any more
RSA 1536	2009
RSA 1728	2010
RSA 1976	2014

Table 6: Validity period of RSA

A bitlength of 2048 Bits is recommended for an acceptable long term security level.

Bitlength for DSA based on $E(F_p)$ with point $P$ on the elliptic curve $E$	Valid until end of
$\text{ord}(P) = 180$ , $p=180$	2009
$\text{ord}(P) = 224$ , no restrictions on $p$	2015
Bitlength for DSA based on $E(F_2^m)$ with point $P$ on the elliptic curve $E$	Gültig bis Ende
$m= 191$ , $\text{ord}(P)=180$	2009
$\text{ord}(P)= 224$ , no restrictions on $m$	2015

Table 7: Validity period for ECDSA

Detailed information about suitable algorithms for the application of qualified electronic signatures can be obtained from the website of the Bundesnetzagentur (see [www.bundesnetzagentur.de](http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de)).

## 11 Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.

## 12 Definitions

### 12.1 Acronyms

<b>API</b>	Application Programming Interface
<b>BSI</b>	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
<b>BSIG</b>	BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
<b>CCRA</b>	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
<b>CC</b>	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
<b>EAL</b>	Evaluation Assurance Level
<b>HBCI</b>	Homebanking Computer Interface
<b>IT</b>	Information Technology
<b>ITSEF</b>	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
<b>PP</b>	Protection Profile
<b>SF</b>	Security Function
<b>SFP</b>	Security Function Policy
<b>SOF</b>	Strength of Function
<b>ST</b>	Security Target
<b>TOE</b>	Target of Evaluation
<b>TSC</b>	TSF Scope of Control
<b>TSF</b>	TOE Security Functions
<b>TSP</b>	TOE Security Policy

### 12.2 Glossary

**Augmentation** - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.

**Extension** - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.

**Formal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

**Informal** - Expressed in natural language.

**Object** - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations.

**Protection Profile** - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.

**Security Function** - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.

**Security Target** - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.

**Semiformal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

**Strength of Function** - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.

**SOF-basic** - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.

**SOF-medium** - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.

**SOF-high** - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.

**Subject** - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.

**Target of Evaluation** - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.

**TOE Security Functions** - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.

**TOE Security Policy** - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and distributed within a TOE.

**TSF Scope of Control** - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.

## 13 Bibliography

### 13.1 CC-documentation

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3, August 2005
- [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
- [3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
- [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.<sup>13</sup>
- [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list published also on the BSI Website
- [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0585-2009, Version 1.2, 2008-12-17, Security Target Electronic Signature Application S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5, Version 2.5.1.1, OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
- [7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.20, 2009-04-29, Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0585 BSI.02116.TE.05.2009, T-Systems GEI GmbH (confidential document)
- [8] Configuration list for S-TRUST Sign-it base components v2.5, 2.5.1.1, OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG, 03.04.2009(confidential document)

### 13.2 Guidance documentation

- [9] S-TRUST Sign-it base components 2.5, Version 2.5.1.1, OPENLiMiT SignCubes GmbH, file: deuS-TRUST Sign-it.chm, 4.674.382 bytes, 18.12.2008
- [10] OPENLiMiT® SignCubes SDK v2.5 Documentation, Version 1.5, OPENLiMiT SignCubes GmbH, 27.10.2008
- [11] Auslieferungshinweise für Terminalserverlizenzen, OPENLiMiT SignCubes base components 2.1, v2.1.6.3, Version 1.0, OPENLiMiT SignCubes GmbH

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<sup>13</sup> specifically

- AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
- AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results

### 13.3 Legal Regulations

- [12] Signaturgesetz vom 16. Mai 2001 (BGBl. I S. 876), zuletzt geändert durch Artikel 4 des Gesetzes vom 26. Februar 2007 (BGBl. I S. 179)
- [13] Signaturverordnung vom 16. November 2001 (BGBl. I S. 3074), zuletzt geändert durch Artikel 9 Abs. 18 des Gesetzes vom 23. November 2007 (BGBl. I S. 2631)
- [14] Maßnahmenkatalog für technische Komponenten nach dem Signaturgesetz, Stand 15. Juli 1998, publisher RegTP
- [15] Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen) vom 17. November 2008, Bundesnetzagentur, published 27 January 2009 in the Bundesanzeiger Nr. 13, page 346

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## C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part1:

### Conformance results (chapter 7.4)

„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).

The conformance result consists of one of the following:

- **CC Part 2 conformant** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
- **CC Part 2 extended** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.

plus one of the following:

- **CC Part 3 conformant** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
- **CC Part 3 extended** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:

- **Package name Conformant** - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
- **Package name Augmented** - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.

Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:

- **PP Conformant** - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.“

CC Part 3:

**Protection Profile criteria overview** (chapter 8.2)

“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation	TOE description (APE_DES)
	Security environment (APE_ENV)
	PP introduction (APE_INT)
	Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
	IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
	Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)

Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”

**Security Target criteria overview** (Chapter 8.3)

“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE evaluation.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation	TOE description (ASE_DES)
	Security environment (ASE_ENV)
	ST introduction (ASE_INT)
	Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
	PP claims (ASE_PPC)
	IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
	Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
	TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)

Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”

**Assurance categorisation** (chapter 7.5)

“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table 1.

<b>Assurance Class</b>	<b>Assurance Family</b>
ACM: Configuration management	CM automation (ACM_AUT)
	CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
	CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation	Delivery (ADO_DEL)
	Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development	Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
	High-level design (ADV_HLD)
	Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
	TSF internals (ADV_INT)
	Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
	Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
	Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents	Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
	User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support	Development security (ALC_DVS)
	Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
	Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
	Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests	Coverage (ATE_COV)
	Depth (ATE_DPT)
	Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
	Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
	Misuse (AVA_MSU)
	Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
	Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)

Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”

## **Evaluation assurance levels** (chapter 11)

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

### **Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview** (chapter 11.1)

“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Assurance Evaluation Assurance Level Components							by
		EAL1	EAL2	EAL3	EAL4	EAL5	EAL6	EAL7	
Configuration management	ACM_AUT				1	1	2	2	
	ACM_CAP	1	2	3	4	4	5	5	
	ACM_SCP			1	2	3	3	3	
Delivery and operation	ADO_DEL		1	1	2	2	2	3	
	ADO_IGS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Development	ADV_FSP	1	1	1	2	3	3	4	
	ADV_HLD		1	2	2	3	4	5	
	ADV_IMP				1	2	3	3	
	ADV_INT					1	2	3	
	ADV_LLD				1	1	2	2	
	ADV_RCR	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	
	ADV_SPM				1	3	3	3	
Guidance documents	AGD_ADM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	AGD_USR	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Life cycle support	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2	
	ALC_FLR								
	ALC_LCD				1	2	2	3	
	ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3	
Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3	
	ATE_DPT			1	1	2	2	3	
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2	
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_CCA					1	2	2	
	AVA_MSU			1	2	2	3	3	
	AVA_SOF		1	1	1	1	1	1	
	AVA_VLA		1	1	2	3	4	4	

Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”

**Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested** (chapter 11.3)

## “Objectives

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified threats.”

**Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested** (chapter 11.4)

## “Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

**Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked** (chapter 11.5)

## “Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practices.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.”

**Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed**  
(chapter 11.6)

## “Objectives

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”

**Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested**  
(chapter 11.7)

## “Objectives

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”

**Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested**  
(chapter 11.8)

## “Objectives

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”

**Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested**  
(chapter 11.9)**“Objectives**

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”

**Strength of TOE security functions (AVA\_SOF)** (chapter 19.3)**“Objectives**

Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”

**Vulnerability analysis (AVA\_VLA)** (chapter 19.4)**“Objectives**

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”

**“Application notes**

A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”

“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA\_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA\_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA\_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”



## **D Annexes**

### **List of annexes of this certification report**

Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.

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