

Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021-MA-03

SMGW, Version 1.2

from

Power Plus Communications AG



SOGIS Recognition Agreement for components up to EAL 4

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements,* version 2.1, June 2012 and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021 updated by BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021-MA-01 and BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021-MA-02.

The certified product itself did not change. The changes are related to an update of life cycle security aspects (changes at an already certified production site).

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a <u>minor change</u> and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has <u>not</u> been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021 dated 05 September 2021 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021.

Common Criteria



Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement recognition for components up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR only



Bonn, 4 March 2022

The Federal Office for Information Security

Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the SMGW, Version 1.2, Power Plus Communications AG submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The certified product itself did not change.

The changes are related to an update of life cycle security aspects.

The audited production area was enlarged. The security measures from the already certified production area were expanded to also cover the new production area.

The ALC re-evaluation was performed by the ITSEF TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The procedure led to an updated version of the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [5]. The Common Criteria assurance requirements for ALC are fulfilled as claimed in the Security Target [4].

Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of life cycle security aspects (changes at an already certified production site). The change has no effect on product assurance.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has <u>not</u> been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021 dated 05 September 2021 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate. Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG¹ Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

¹ Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

References

- [1] Common Criteria document "Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements", version 2.1, June 2012
- [2] Impact Analysis Report, Anpassung Produktionsstandort, Version 1.0, 26 October 2021, Power Plus Communications AG (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021 for SMGW Version 1.2, 05 September 2021, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
- [4] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021, Version 4.9, 2021-05-28, "Security Target SMGW Version 1.2", Power Plus Communications AG
- [5] Evaluation Technical Report Summary, Version 1, 07 February 2022, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)