

BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V6-2021

for

**Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Steps
D11 and G12, with the optional libraries
RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, EC
v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, Toolbox
v2.03.008 or v2.07.003 and symmetric crypto
library v2.02.010, as well as with specific IC
dedicated firmware, including the Flash Loader
enhanced by the Mutual Authentication Extension
(MAE)**

from

Infineon Technologies AG

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Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik

Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom



Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V6-2021(*)

Smartcard Controller

Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with the optional libraries RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, EC v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, Toolbox v2.03.008 or v2.07.003 and symmetric crypto library v2.02.010, as well as with specific IC dedicated firmware, including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE)

from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement



Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only

The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.

(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 23 November 2021

For the Federal Office for Information Security

Sandro Amendola
Head of Division

L.S.

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

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A. Certification

1. Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG¹ Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- Act on the Federal Office for Information Security¹
- BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance²
- BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs³
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
- BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-Produkte) [3]
- BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]

¹ Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

² Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231

³ BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365

- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1⁴ [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408.
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]

3. Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at <https://www.sogis.eu>.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.

This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.

3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: <https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.

⁴ Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730

This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.

4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with the optional libraries RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, EC v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, Toolbox v2.03.008 or v2.07.003 and symmetric crypto library v2.02.010, as well as with specific IC dedicated firmware, including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE), has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V4-2019. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V4-2019 were re-used.

The evaluation of the product Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with the optional libraries RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, EC v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, Toolbox v2.03.008 or v2.07.003 and symmetric crypto library v2.02.010, as well as with specific IC dedicated firmware, including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE), was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 18 November 2021. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)⁵ recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.

The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

5. Validity of the Certification Result

This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk

⁵ Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.

In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 23 November 2021 is valid until 22 November 2026. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.

The owner of the certificate is obliged:

1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be informed.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

6. Publication

The product Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with the optional libraries RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, EC v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, Toolbox v2.03.008 or v2.07.003 and symmetric crypto library v2.02.010, as well as with specific IC dedicated firmware, including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE), has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: <https://www.bsi.bund.de> and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer⁶ of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

⁶ Infineon Technologies AG
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85579 Neubiberg

B. Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

1. Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Technologies AG Security Controller (Integrated Circuit IC), M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with specific IC dedicated firmware and the following optional software: RSA 2048/4096 v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, EC v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, Toolbox v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, Base v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, and Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL) v2.02.010. The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the Intel 80251 architecture. The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit), and the MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The dual interface controller is able to communicate using either the contact based or the contactless interface.

The TOE consists of the hardware part, the firmware part, and the software part. The software part can be separated into the cryptographic libraries RSA, EC, SHA-2, and SCL as well as the supporting libraries Toolbox and Base. The Base library does not provide the smartcard embedded software with specific functionalities; however, it is required in order to use the RSA, EC, and Toolbox libraries.

This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant applications and as a developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard Embedded Software.

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionality:

TOE Security Functionality	Addressed issue
SF_DPM	Device Phase Management: The life cycle of the TOE is split up into several phases. Different operation modes help to protect the TOE during each phase of its lifecycle.
SF_PS	Protection against Snooping: The TOE uses various means to protect from snooping of memories and busses and prevents single stepping.
SF_PMA	Protection against Modifying Attacks: This TOE implements protection against modifying attacks of memories, alarm lines and sensors.

TOE Security Functionality	Addressed issue
SF_PLA	<p>Protection against Logical Attacks:</p> <p>The memory access control of the TOE uses a memory management unit (MMU) to control the access to the available physical memory by using virtual memory addresses and to segregate the code and data to a privilege level model. The MMU controls the address permissions of up to seven privileged levels and gives the software the possibility to define different access rights.</p>
SF_CS	<p>Cryptographic Support:</p> <p>The TOE is equipped with several hardware accelerators and software modules to support the standard symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic operations. The components are a coprocessor, as well as the optional SCL, supporting the DES and AES algorithms and a combination of a coprocessor and software modules to support RSA cryptography (decryption and signature generation/verification), RSA key generation, ECDSA signature generation and verification, ECDH key agreement and EC public key calculation and public key testing. Furthermore, the TOE is equipped with an optional SHA-2 library as well as an AIS31 conformant TRNG that meets the functionality class PTG.2.</p>
SF_MAE	<p>Mutual Authentication Extension (optional):</p> <p>In TOE provides a mutual authentication between production equipment and the TOE according to ISO 9798-2. Only if the production equipment was successfully authenticated by an external authenticate command, the Flash Loader is activated to download software to the TOE's Non Volatile Memory. Furthermore, it contains an internal authenticate command by which the authenticity of a copy of the TOE can be verified.</p>

Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 8.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.1.3 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.

This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.

The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

2. Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with the optional libraries RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, EC v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, Toolbox v2.03.008 or v2.07.003 and symmetric crypto library v2.02.010, as well as with specific IC dedicated firmware, including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE),

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
1.	HW	M7892 Security Controller	D11 and G12	Complete modules, with or without inlay mounting, in form of plain wafers or in any IC case (for example TSSOP28, VQFN32, VQFN40, CCS-modules, etc.) or in bare dies or whatever type of package or even in no package.
2.	FW	STS Self-Test Software (the IC Dedicated Test Software), RMS Resource Management System (the IC Dedicated Support Software), SAM (Service Algorithm Minimal), NRG4 Software Interface Routines, and FL (Flash Loader)	FW Identifier 78.015.14.0 or 78.015.14.1 or 78.015.14.2 or 78.015.18.2	Stored in reserved area of the ROM on the IC (patch in NVM).
3.		Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE)	v8.00.006	Optional; depending on order.
4.	SW	NVM image (including Embedded Software)	-	Stored in Flash memory on the IC.
5.		RSA library	v2.03.008 or v2.07.003	Optional; depending on order.
6.		EC library	v2.03.008 or v2.07.003	Optional; depending on order.
7.		Toolbox ⁷ library	v2.03.008 or v2.07.003	Optional; depending on order.
8.		Base library	v2.03.008 or v2.07.003	Optional; depending on presence of RSA, EC, and Toolbox library.
9.		SHA-2 library	v1.01	Optional; depending on order.
10.		Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL)	v2.02.010	Optional; depending on order.
11.		DOC	M7892 SOLID FLASH™ Controller for Security Applications Hardware Reference Manual [11]	Version 3.0, 2019-06-24
12.	SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User's Manual [12]		2015-04-01	
13.	16-bit Controller Family SLE 70 Programmer's Reference Manual [13]		9.14 2019-12-03	
14.	M7892 Security Guidelines [14]		2021-08-04	
15.	M7892 Errata Sheet[15]		Version 7.1, 2019-12-18	
16.	Crypto@2304T User Manual [16]		2010-03-23	Optional; delivered if asymmetric

⁷The Toolbox library does not provide any TOE security functionality (TSF) and is not part of the evaluation.

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
				crypto co-processor is ordered.
17.		AMM Advanced Mode for NRG SAM Addendum to M7892 Hardware Reference Manual [17]	Version 2.0, 2019-10-28	Optional; delivered if AMM is ordered.
18.		Production and Personalization Mutual Authentication Extension for the SLx70 family in 90 nm [18]	Version 1.2, 2017-07-26	Optional; delivered if the MAE is ordered.
19.		SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User Interface [19]	Version 2.07.003, 2021-07-26	Optional; delivered if (parts of) ACL v2.07.003 ordered.
20.		CL70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User Interface [20]	Version 2.03.008, 2021-07-27,	Optional; delivered if (parts of) ACL v2.03.008 ordered.
21.		SCL78 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCP v3, DES/AES, User Interface [21]	Version 2.02.010, 2016-12-09	Optional; delivered if the SCL is ordered.
22.		SLx70 Family Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/221, SHA 512/384) Library Version V1.01 [22]	Version V1.01, 2020-08,	Optional; delivered if the SHA-2 library is ordered.

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

The delivery documentation describes all procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE or parts of it to the users site including the necessary intermediate delivery procedures.

The delivery documentation describes in a sufficient manner how the various procedures and technical measures provide for the detection of modifications and any discrepancies between the TOE respective parts of it send by the TOE Manufacturer and the version received by the Composite Product Manufacturer.

Therefore, three different delivery procedures have to be taken into consideration:

1. Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the TOE Manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.
2. Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-personalisation data) from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the TOE Manufacturer.
3. Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite Product Manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers, after phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).

Respective distribution centers are listed in Appendix B (see below).

The hardware part of the TOE is identified as M7892 D11 and G12. The hardware of the TOE can be ordered in various configurations (see ST [6],[9] section 1.1). All differences between these TOE variants are realized by means of blocking without changing the hardware. Therefore, all TOE variants are equal regarding their hardware.

The firmware of the TOE can be identified via the firmware identifier⁸ (see Table 2). The TOE can be provided with optional software libraries ST [6],[9] section 2.2.2 as listed in Table 2. The user can identify the versions of the optional libraries by calculating the hash signatures of the provided library files. The mapping of these hash signatures to the version numbers is provided in the ST [6],[9] section 10.

The user guidance as part of the TOE is identified in Table 4. Each user guidance document can be identified by the combination of its title, date, and version number.

In the field, the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM) allows the unique identification of each hardware via an individual chip identification number together with the design step. The GCIM further includes the firmware identifier and provides several detailed production parameters as well as the fabrication facility, tracking information, wafer number, production start (year and week) and lot. For clear differentiation between the mask sets, each of it has assigned an individual value in the data output of the GCIM. Thereby, the exact and clear identification of any product with its exact configuration of this TOE is given. The GCIM data is explained in the Hardware Reference Manual [11] section 7.11.3.

Note that any hardware configuration comes with its own chip identifier byte. The chip identifier bytes are aimed to be used for the logistical processes but are available to the user as well. For the user's clear TOE identification, the development code allowing reading out the present configuration of the TOE is sufficient.

The GCIM is accessible by a dedicated power-on sequence and also by the customer software.

The version of the optional MAE firmware can be identified (i) either by comparing the hash signature of the provided file with the one given in [6],[9] section 10 or (ii) by using the FLASH_GET_CHIP_STATUS command, as described in the handbook for Production and Personalization Mutual Authentication Extension [18] section 5.3.

Note: The TOE can be delivered with or without the SCL library and / or the RSA library and / or the EC library and / or the SHA-2 library and / or the Toolbox library and / or the Base library.

3. Security Policy

The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:

The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the smart card operating system and the smart card application, thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm (TDES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a true random number generator (TRNG).

The RSA library is used to provide a high-level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto@2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. Please note that RSA encryption is not part of the evaluation and certification. The EC library is used to provide a high-level

⁸The firmware identifier defines a clear and complete firmware package containing all patches and all versions of the firmware belonging to the TOE.

interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto@2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks.

Furthermore, the TOE provides the user with an optional library for SHA-2 calculations, an optional MAE firmware component, which safeguards the access to the Flash Loader and thus, the secure download of the user software or parts of it to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM, and the optional SCL library, which is used to provide a high level interface to the TDES and AES calculations of the symmetric coprocessor of the TOE.

As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic keys during AES, TDES, RSA, and EC cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence, the TOE shall

- maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE and
- maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.

Specific details concerning the above-mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter 7 and 8 of the Security Target (ST).

4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance:

The ST includes the following security objective for the IC Embedded Software Developer: OE.Resp-Appl.

The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC Embedded Software Developer shall treat user data (especially keys) appropriately. The IC Embedded Software Developer gets sufficient information on how to protect user data adequate in the security guidelines [14].

The ST includes the following security objectives for the operational environment, which are relevant for the Composite Product Manufacturer: OE.Process-Sec-IC, OE.Lim_Block_Loader, OE.Loader_Usage/Package1+, and OE.TOE_Auth.

OE.Process-Sec-IC states that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or, unauthorised use).

OE.Lim_Block_Loader states that the Composite Product Manufacturer will protect the Loader functionality against misuse, limit the capability of the Loader, and terminate the Loader irreversibly after the intended usage of the Loader.

OE.Loader_Usage/Package1+ states that the authorized user must fulfil the access conditions required by the Loader, whereby OE.TOE_Auth states that the operational environment shall support the authentication verification mechanism and know authentication reference data of the TOE.

The Composite Product Manufacturer is informed about these requirements resulting from OE.Process-Sec-IC and OE.Lim_Block_Loader in the SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User's Manual [12] and Programmer's Reference Manual, [13] section 15.1.

The requirements resulting from OE.Loader_Usage/Package1+ and OE.TOE_Auth are given in the Production and Personalization Mutual Authentication Extension Manual [18].

Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.3.

5. Architectural Information

The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the Intel 80251 architecture. The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit), and the MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The dual interface controller is able to communicate using either the contact based or the contactless interface.

The TOE consists of the hardware part, the firmware part, and the software part. The software part can be separated into the cryptographic libraries RSA, EC, SHA-2, and SCL as well as the supporting libraries Toolbox and Base. The Base library does not provide the smartcard embedded software with specific functionalities; however, it is required in order to use the RSA, EC, and Toolbox libraries.

This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant applications and as a developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard Embedded Software.

An overview of the hardware of the TOE is given in the Security Target [6] or [9], section 1.1 / 2.2.1.

6. Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

7. IT Product Testing

The tests performed by the developer were divided into five categories:

- Simulation tests (design verification),
- Qualification tests,
- Verification Tests,
- Security Evaluation Tests,
- Production Tests.

The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as identified in the functional specification.

The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer by using the library of programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the ITSEF or at the developer's site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests performed by the developer. For the developer tests, repeated by the evaluators, other test parameters were used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.

The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct implementation of the TOE security functionalities.

For penetration testing the evaluators considered all security functionalities. Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks, which do not modify the TOE physically. The results of the penetration tests confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.

8. Evaluated Configuration

This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:

- Smartcard IC M7892 D11 (IFX Dresden),
- Smartcard IC M7892 G12 (TSMC Tainan).

Hardware Configuration

The hardware of the TOE can be ordered in various configurations, as described in the Security Target [6],[9] section 1.1.

In regard to the security functionality of the TOE, the cryptographic coprocessors are of special importance. The Crypto@2304T coprocessor provides functionalities for asymmetric cryptography and the SCP provides functionalities for symmetric cryptography. The TOE can be ordered with or without either the Crypto@2304T or the SCP. If a TOE is ordered without a coprocessor, it is deactivated during the manufacturing process and cannot be reactivated by the user. Deselecting a cryptographic coprocessor has no impact on any other security policy of the TOE. It is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the functionality.

Firmware Configuration

There are four firmware variants (firmware packages) with the following firmware identifiers available:

- 78.015.14.0,
- 78.015.14.1,
- 78.015.14.2,
- 78.015.18.2.

An overview of the firmware is given in [6],[9] section 2.2.2.

The NRG™ Software interfaces do not provide any TOE security functionality (TSF) and are not part of the evaluation.

The Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE) is an optional firmware component and is as such not included in the firmware package.

Optional Software Libraries

The TOE can be delivered with optional software libraries, as described in [6],[9] section 1.1 / 2.2.2.

The following optional software libraries are available:

Optional Software	Version	Functionality
RSA2048 Library	v2.03.008 or v2.07.003	A high-level interface to the RSA functionality implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T using 512 to 4096 bit keys. Note, that RSA encryption is not in scope of the evaluation. Part of the Asymmetric Cryptographic Library (ACL).
RSA4096 Library	v2.03.008 or v2.07.003	A high-level interface to the RSA functionality implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T using 512 to 4096 bit keys. Note, that RSA encryption is not in scope of the evaluation. Part of the Asymmetric Cryptographic Library (ACL).
EC Library	v2.03.008 or v2.07.003	A high-level interface to the Elliptic Curve cryptography functionality. Part of the Asymmetric Cryptographic Library (ACL).
Toolbox Library	v2.03.008 or v2.07.003	Basic long integer and modular arithmetic functions. The Toolbox is not part of the TSF. Part of the Asymmetric Cryptographic Library (ACL)
Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL)	v2.03.008 or v2.07.003	A high-level interface to perform the cryptographic operations DES, TDES, and AES with different key lengths on the symmetric cryptographic coprocessor (SCP).
SHA-2 Library	V1.01	Provides the calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data input.

Table 3:Optionale Software Libraries

The optional software libraries ACL, SCL, and SHA-2 listed in Table 3 above can be freely combined according to the demands of the user. However, the versions of the individual parts of the ACL must not differ.

If at least one of the RSA2048, RSA4096, EC, or Toolbox libraries is selected, a Base library with the same version number is automatically included. If none of the RSA/EC/Toolbox libraries is selected, the Base library is not included. These libraries are part of the Asymmetric Cryptographic Library (ACL). The two RSA libraries RSA2048 and RSA4096 only differ in the maximum supported key size, otherwise they are identical.

If the user decides not to use the RSA2048, RSA4096, EC, Toolbox, SCL, or SHA-2 libraries, the library is not delivered to the user and the accompanying additional specific security functionality as listed in Table 10 above is not provided by the TOE. Deselecting the RSA2048, RSA4096, EC, Toolbox, SCL, or SHA-2 library means excluding the code implementing functionality, which the user decided not to use.

Hence, the TOE can be delivered with or without the functionality of the optional cryptographic libraries. This is considered in the developer documentation and corresponding notes are added where required. Excluding the code of the deselected functionality has no impact on any other security policy of the TOE, i.e. it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the functionality.

9. Results of the Evaluation

9.1. CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).

The following guidance specific for the technology was used:

- The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
- The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards,
- Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number generators(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31)

For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).

To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on top.

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
- The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V4-2019, re-use of specific evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation were the crypto-librarys and a variety of improved Penetration Tests has been conducted, leading to restrictions in the guidance.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8]
- for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1

For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report.

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSI Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (<https://www.bsi.bund.de>).

The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.

Note in particular:

- RSA encryption is only in the scope of the evaluation up to 2048 bits.

No.	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits
Cryptographic Primitive				
1.	TDES in ECB mode (SCP, SCL v2.02.010), CBC mode (SCP, SCL v2.02.010), CTR mode (SCL v2.02.010), CFB mode (SCL v2.02.010), BLD (blinding) and Recrypt (SCP)	[NIST SP800-67], [NIST SP800-38A] [NIST SP800-38A] [NIST SP800-38A] [NIST SP800-38A] proprietary implementation	k = 112	no no no no no
2.	TDES in ECB mode (SCP, SCL v2.02.010), CBC mode (SCP, SCL v2.02.010), CTR mode (SCL v2.02.010), CFB mode (SCL v2.02.010), BLD (blinding) and Recrypt(SCP)	[NIST SP800-67], [NIST SP800-38A] [NIST SP800-38A] [NIST SP800-38A] [NIST SP800-38A] proprietary implementation	k = 168	no yes yes yes no

No.	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits
3.	AES in, ECB mode (SCP, SCL v2.02.010), CBC mode (SCP, SCL v2.02.010), CTR mode (SCL v2.02.010), CFB mode (SCL v2.02.010),	[FIPS197] [NIST SP800-38A] [NIST SP800-38A] [NIST SP800-38A] [NIST SP800-38A]	k = 128, 192, 256	no yes yes yes
4.	RSA decryption / signature generation / verification (only modular exponentiation part) (ACL v2.03.008 and v2.07.003)	[PKCS-1], [IEEE_P1363]	Modulus length = 1976 - 4096	yes
5.	ECDSA signature generation / verification (ACL v2.03.008 and v2.07.003)	[ANS X9.62], [IEEE_P1363], [ISO_14888-3]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{192, 224}, K-{233, 163}, B-233 [FIPS186-4] and brainpoolP{160, 192, 224}r1, brainpoolP{160, 192, 224}t1 [RFC5639]	no
6.	ECDSA signature generation / verification (ACL v2.03.008 and v2.07.003)	[ANS X9.62], [IEEE_P1363], [ISO_14888-3]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{256, 384, 521}, K-409, B-{283, 409} [FIPS186-4], brainpoolP{256,320,384,512}r1, brainpoolP{256,320,384,512}t1 [RFC5639]	yes
7.	Physical True RNG PTG.2	[AIS31]	N/A	n/a
Key agreement				
8.	ECDH (ACL v2.03.008 and ACL v2.07.003)	[ANS X9.63], [IEEE_P1363], [ISO_11770-3]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{192, 224}, K-{163, 233}, B-233 [FIPS186-4] and brainpoolP{160, 192, 224}r1, brainpoolP{160, 192, 224}t1 [RFC5639]	no
9.	ECDH (ACL v2.03.008 and ACL v2.07.003)	[ANS X9.63], [IEEE_P1363], [ISO_11770-3]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{256, 384, 521}, K-409, B-{283, 409} [FIPS186-4], brainpoolP{256,320,384,512}r1, brainpoolP{256,320,384,512}t1 [RFC5639]	yes

No.	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Security Level above 100 Bits
Key generation				
10.	RSA key generation using CryptoGeneratePrime (ACL v2.07.003)	Proprietary The generated keys meet [PKCS #1, 3.1 / 3.2] and [IEEE_P1363, 8.1.3.1].	1976 – 4096 (note: TOE supports larger and smaller key sizes, which are generally out of scope of evaluation in BSI scheme)	yes
11.	RSA key generation using CryptoGeneratePrime Mask (ACL v2.03.008 and ACL v2.07.003)	Proprietary The generated keys meet [PKCS #1, 3.1 / 3.2] and [IEEE_P1363, 8.1.3.1].	1976 – 4096	<i>Not rated by BSI</i>
12.	EC key generation using ECC_ECDSAKeyGen (ACL v2.03.008 and ACL v2.07.003)	[ANS X9.62, A 4.3] [ISO_14888-3, 6.6.3] [IEEE_P1363, A.16.9]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{192, 224}, K-{233, 163}, B-233 [FIPS186-4] and brainpoolP{160, 192, 224}r1, brainpoolP{160, 192, 224}t1 [RFC5639]	no
13.	EC key generation using ECC_ECDSAKeyGen (ACL v2.03.008 and ACL v2.07.003)	[ANS X9.62, A 4.3] [ISO_14888-3, 6.6.3] [IEEE_P1363, A.16.9]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{256, 384, 521}, K-409, B-{283, 409} [FIPS186-4], brainpoolP{256,320,384,512}r1, brainpoolP{256,320,384,512}t1 [RFC5639]	yes
14.	EC key generation using ECC_ECDSAKeyGen Mask (ACL v2.03.008 and ACL v2.07.003)	[ANS X9.62, A 4.3] [ISO_14888-3, 6.6.3] [IEEE_P1363, A.16.9]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{192, 224}, K-{233, 163}, B-233 [FIPS186-4] and brainpoolP{160, 192, 224}r1, brainpoolP{160, 192, 224}t1 [RFC5639]	no
15.	EC key generation using ECC_ECDSAKeyGen Mask (ACL v2.03.008 and ACL v2.07.003)	[ANS X9.62, A 4.3] [ISO_14888-3, 6.6.3] [IEEE_P1363, A.16.9]	Key sizes corresponding to the used elliptic curves P-{256, 384, 521}, K-409, B-{283, 409} [FIPS186-4], brainpoolP{256,320,384,512}r1, brainpoolP{256,320,384,512}t1 [RFC5639]	yes
Digest computation				
21.	SHA-256 (SHA-2 v1.01)	[FIPS180-4]	N/A	n/a (keyless operation)
22.	SHA-512 (SHA-2 v1.01)	[FIPS180-4]	N/A	n/a (keyless operation)

Table 7 TOE cryptographic functionality

For the Cryptographic Functionality

- CryptoGeneratePrimeMask(), which might be used in conjunction with RSA Key Generation in ACL v2.07.003 and v2.08.007,

no statement on the respective cryptographic strength can be given.

Reference of Legislatives and Standards quoted above:

[NIST SP800-67]	NIST Special Publication 800-67 – Revision 2, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, November 2017, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
[NIST SP800-38A]	NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, 2001, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST SP 800-38B]	NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CMAC Mode for Authentication, 2005-05, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
[FIPS197]	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), November 2001, U.S. department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[AIS31]	Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[ANS X9.62]	American National Standard for Financial Services ANS X9.62-2005, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), November 16, 2005, American National Standards Institute.
[ANS X9.63]	American National Standard for Financial Services X9.63-2011, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement and key transport using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, 2011-12-21, American National Standards Institute.
[IEEE_P1363]	IEEE P1363. Standard specifications for public key cryptography. IEEE, 2000.
[ISO_11770-3]	International Standard ISO/IEC 11770-3: 2008, Technical Corrigendum 1, Information technology - Security techniques – Key management Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques, 2009-09-15.
[CIPURSE-1]	CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol issued by OSPT™ Alliance, 2012-09-28

[CIPURSE-2]	CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol issued by OSPT™ Alliance, 2014-09-18 (with errata and precision list)
[ISO_18033-3]	ISO/IEC 18033-3: Information technology -- Security techniques -- Encryption algorithms -- Part 3: Block ciphers, 2005.
[ISO_9797-1]	Information technology – Security techniques – Message Authentication Codes (MACs), Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, 2011-03-01, ISO/IEC.
[Schneier]	Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, B. Schneier, John Wiley & Sons, 1996
[PKCS-1]	PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.2, 2012-10-27, RSA Cryptographic Standard, RSA Laboratories.
[ISO_14888-3]	International Standard ISO/IEC 14888-3: 2006, Technical Corrigendum 2: Information technology – Security techniques – Digital signatures with appendix – Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms, 2009-02-15.
[AIS31]	Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS 31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15.

10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.

Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on top, e.g. the Embedded Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document "ETR for composite evaluation" [10].

At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified

products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.

All security hints described in the delivered documents [14], [11], [13], [22], [16], [15], [21], [20], and [19] have to be considered.

The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.

- All security hints described in [12] and [18] have to be considered.

In addition, the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect has to be considered:

- The Security IC Embedded Software Developer can deliver his software either to Infineon to let them implement it in the TOE (in the Flash memory) or to the Composite Product Manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.
- The delivery procedure from the Security IC Embedded Software Developer to the Composite Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is required.
- Please note that – in agreement with the BSI – the ALC aspect of this certification is rated and accepted as PASS only under one of the two conditions stated in Section 7.1 of the Evaluation Plan of this project (Evaluation Plan M7892 G12 and D11, version 3, 2021-10-19).

The different design steps D11 and G12 of the M7892 indicate a transfer of design sources from one wafer production facility to another. The question was raised if test results gained on a device from one production site (e.g. G12) could be transferred to a device from the other production site (e.g. D11). Therefore, ITSEF performed comparison tests for side channel analysis and fault injection.

Based on the results of the performed tests ITSEF can state that the transferability regarding Fault attack and side channel analysis from one HW revision to the other is not possible.

11. Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).

12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)

None

13. Definitions

13.1. Acronyms

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
APB™	Advance Peripheral Bus
AIS	Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme

BSI	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG	BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CIM	Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI)
CPU	Central Processing Unit
cPP	Collaborative Protection Profile
Crypto2304T	Asymmetric Cryptographic Processor
DES	Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DFA	Differential Fault Analysis
DPA	Differential Power Attack
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
EC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECC	Error Correction Code
EBC	Electronic Code Book Mode
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
GCIM	Generic Chip Identification Mode
HW	Hardware
IC	Integrated Circuit
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MMU	Memory
MED	Memory Encryption and Decryption
NVM	Non-Volatile Memory
RMS	Resource Management System
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SOLID FLASH™	An Infineon Trade Mark and Stands for Flash EEPROM Technology
SPA	Simple Power Analysis
ST	Security Target
STS	Self-Test Software
TDES	Triple DES

TOE	Target of Evaluation
TRNG	True Random Number Generator
TSF	TOE Security Functionality

13.2. Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements

Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific consumer needs.

Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.

TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.

14. Bibliography

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Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
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<https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>
- [3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), <https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung>

- [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE⁹
<https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS>
- [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also on the BSI Website, <https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte>
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- [10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V6-2021, Version 1.0, 2021-10-22, EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR COMP), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
- [11] M7892 SOLID FLASH™ Controller for Security Applications Hardware Reference Manual, Version 3.0, 2019-06-24, Infineon Technologies AG
- [12] SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User's Manual, 2015-04-01, Infineon Technologies AG

⁹specifically

- AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
- AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an den Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
- AIS 19, Version 9, Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS)
- AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
- AIS 23, Version 4, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler
- AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
- AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
- AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
- AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
- AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
- AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
- AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results

- [13] 16-bit Controller Family SLE 70 Programmer's Reference Manual, Version 9.14, 2019-12-03, Infineon Technologies AG
- [14] M7892 Security Guidelines, 2021-08-04, Infineon Technologies AG
- [15] M7892 Errata Sheet, Version 7.1, 2019-12-18, Infineon Technologies AG
- [16] Crypto@2304T User Manual, 2010-03-23, Infineon Technologies AG
- [17] AMM Advanced Mode for NRG SAM Addendum to M7892 Hardware Reference Manual, Version 2.0, 2019-10-28, Infineon Technologies AG
- [18] Production and Personalization Mutual Authentication Extension for SLx 70 family in 90 nm, Version 1.2, 2017-07-26, Infineon Technologies AG
- [19] SLE70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User Interface(2.07.003), Version 2.07.003, 2021-07-26, Infineon Technologies AG
- [20] CL70 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User Interface(2.03.008), 2.03.008 2021-07-27, Infineon Technologies AG
- [21] SCL78 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCP v3, DES/AES, User Interface (v2.02.010), v2.02.010, 2016-12-09, Infineon Technologies AG
- [22] SLx70 Family Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/221, SHA 512/384) Library Version V1.01, 2020-08, Infineon Technologies AG

C. Excerpts from the Criteria

For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the Common Criteria can be followed:

- On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
- On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3 chapter 7.1
- On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
- On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3 chapter 12
- On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
- The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and components.

The CC are published at <https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/>

D. Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

- Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
- Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment

Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V6-2021

Evaluation results regarding development and production environment



The IT product Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with the optional libraries RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, EC v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, Toolbox v2.03.008 or v2.07.003 and symmetric crypto library v2.02.010, as well as with specific IC dedicated firmware, including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE) (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.

As a result of the TOE certification, dated 23 November 2021, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3, AL)

are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:

Distribution Center Name	Address
DHL Singapore	DHL Supply Chain Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced Regional Center Tampines LogisPark 1 Greenwich Drive Singapore 533865
K&N Großostheim	Kühne & Nagel Stockstädter Strasse 10 63762 Großostheim Germany
KWE Shanghai	KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd. Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone No. 530 Zheng Ding Road Shanghai, P.R. China

For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.

Note: End of report