



Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0916-2015-MA-01

STARCOS 3.6 COS C1

from

Giesecke & Devrient GmbH



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements*, version 2.1, June 2012 and the developers Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0916-2015.

The certified product itself did not change. The changes are related to the document ETR Addendum for gSMC-K Composite Evaluation ([6]) that is added to the certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0916-2015.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0916-2015 dated 7 August 2015 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0916-2015.



Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4

Bonn, 28 January 2016

The Federal Office for Information Security



Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the STARCOS 3.6 COS C1, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The certified product itself did not change. The changes to the base certification are related to the document ETR Addendum for gSMC-K Composite Evaluation ([6]) that is added to the certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0916-2015. This additional document is intended to be used for a composite evaluation of a Konnektor in the German health care system that integrates a gSMC-K card product from Giesecke & Devrient GmbH running on the TOE according to the certification procedure BSI-K-TR-0227-2016 ([7]).

Conclusion

The certified product itself did not change. The Security Target [4] and [5] is still valid for the TOE. The changes to the base certification are related to the document ETR Addendum for gSMC-K Composite Evaluation ([6]) that is added to the certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0916-2015.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, BSI agrees that the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [3] is maintained for this version of the product.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0916-2015 dated 7 August 2015 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

Additional obligations and notes for the usage of the product

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Some security measures are partly implemented in the TOE and require additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the applications running on the TOE.

For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation which contains guidelines for the developer of the applications running on the TOE on how to securely use the TOE and which measures have to be implemented in the applications in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.

The document ETR Addendum for gSMC-K Composite Evaluation ([6]) is intended to be used for a composite evaluation of a Konnektor in the German health care system that integrates a gSMC-K card product from Giesecke & Devrient GmbH running on the TOE according to the certification procedure BSI-K-TR-0227-2016 ([7]).

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

References

- [1] Common Criteria document “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, Version 2.1, June 2012
- [2] IAR for STARCOS 3.6 COS C1, 27 November 2015, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0916-2015 for STARCOS 3.6 COS C1, 7 August 2015, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
- [4] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0916-2015, Security Target STARCOS 3.6 COS C1, Version 1.0.87, 31 July 2015, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (confidential document)
- [5] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0916-2015, Security Target Lite STARCOS 3.6 COS C1, Version 1.5, 31 July 2015, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (sanitised public document)
- [6] ETR Addendum for gSMC-K Composite Evaluation, Version 1.0, 28 January 2016, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
- [7] Certification Report BSI-K-TR-0227-2016 for STARCOS 3.6 Health SMC-K R1, 5 January 2016, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik