

# **Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report**

# BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-2020-MA-01 CONEXA 3.0, Version 1.0


from

#### Theben AG



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements, version 2.1, June 2012 and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-2020.



Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a <u>minor change</u> and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has <u>not</u> been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-2020 dated 24.07.2020 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-2020.





Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC\_FLR
only

Bonn, 30 November 2020
The Federal Office for Information Security



#### **Assessment**

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the CONEXA 3.0, Version 1.0, Theben AG, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The CONEXA 3.0, Version 1.0 was changed due to providing alternative authentication methods PAP and CHAP for LTE connections, to not security relevant improvements of the module interfacemanager and an improvement of TCP alive values. Configuration Management procedures required a change in the product identifier. Therefore the version number changed for the Software from v3.33.0-cc to v3.33.3-cc.

The Security Target [6] was editorially updated. bn

## Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of the implementation representation. The change has no effect on product assurance.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has <u>not</u> been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-2020 dated 24.07.2020 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

# Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG<sup>1</sup> Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

## References

- [1] Common Criteria document "Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements", version 2.1, June 2012
- [2] Impact Analysis Report Smart Meter Gateway CONEXA 3.0, version 0.3, 19.11.2020, Theben AG (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0918-2020 for CONEXA 3.0 Version 1.0, Federal Office for Information Security, 24.07.2020
- [4] CONEXA 3.0 Security Target, Version 1.86, 19 June 2020, Theben AG
- [5] Configuration List für Firmware Version v3.33.3-cc, 26.11.2020, Theben AG (Confidential document)
- [6] Security Target CONEXA 3.0 SMART METER GATEWAY, version 1.87, 23.11.2020, Theben AG