Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0938-2016-MA-01

Morpho_HC_Germany_G2_COS V1

from

IDEMIA Germany GmbH

SOGIS
Recognition Agreement

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements,* version 2.1, June 2012 and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-0938-2016 updated by a new ETR dated 1 February 2019.

The certified product itself did not change. The changes are related to an update of the TOE's life cycle security aspects and cover mainly a change in the sites used to build the TOE. The life cycle security has continuously been assured for each site involved.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a <u>minor change</u> and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has <u>not</u> been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0938-2016 dated 28 October 2016 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0938-2016.

Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components

up to EAL 2 only

Bonn, 8 February 2019

The Federal Office for Information Security

DAkkS
Deutsche
Akkreditierungsstelle
D-ZE-19615-01-00

Assessment

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target [4] and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the Morpho_HC_Germany_G2_COS V1, IDEMIA Germany GmbH (formely Morpho Cards GmbH), submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The certified product Morpho_HC_Germany_G2_COS V1 itself did not change.

The changes are related to an update of the TOE's life cycle security aspects. The ALC re-evaluation was performed by the ITSEF SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The procedure led to an updated version of the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] as well as an editorial update of the Security Target [5]. The Common Criteria assurance requirements for ALC are fulfilled as claimed in the Security Target [5].

The development and production sites and related certificates listed in Annex B of the Certification Report [3] for Morpho_HC_Germany_G2_COS V1 are replaced by the following development and production sites:

a) Morpho Cards GmbH, An der Talle 89, D-33102 Paderborn, (Development)

b) Achelos GmbH, Vattmannstraße 1, D-33100 Paderborn, (Development)

c) Morpho Osny, now IDEMIA Osny, 18 Chaussée Jules César, 95520 Osny, France, (Development)

d) Morpho Cards GmbH, now IDEMIA Germany GmbH, Konrad-Zuse-Ring 1, D-24220 Flintbek, (OS Pre-Personalisation)

e) Swiss Post Solutions GmbH, Systemformstr. 5, D-83209 Prien am Chiemsee, (OS Pre-Personalisation)

f) GNC TCS • TECHNOLOGIE, CARDS & SERVICES GMBH, Odenwaldstraße 19, D-63263 Neu-Isenburg, (OS Pre-Personalisation)

g) TCS • CARDS & SERVICES GMBH, Kronacher Straße 61, Bamberg, D-96052 Bamberg, (OS Pre-Personalisation)

h) IDEMIA-Sittard, Fischerpad 100 6135KS, Sittard, Netherlands, (OS Pre-Personalisation)

i) IDEMIA-Haarlem, Oudeweg 32, Postbus 5300 2000 GH, Haarlem, Netherlands, (OS Pre-Personalisation)

j) NedCard BV, Bijsterhuizen 25-29, NL-6604LM Wijchen, Netherlands, (Card Embedding including Module Production)

k) NedCard Shanghai Microelectronics Co. Ltd., Standardized Plant Building #8, No. 789 Puxing Road, Caohejing Hi-Tech Park, EPZ, 201114 Shanghai, People's Republic of China, (Card Embedding including Module Production)

l) For development and production sites regarding the underlying platform please refer to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015.

In particular, three production sites for OS Pre-Personalisation are added (see f), g) and h)), and one production variant is deleted which results in the reduced scope of the production site in d). Furthermore, the companies' names in a), c) and d) changed.

In their combination, the sites listed above fulfil the Common Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support as those are claimed in the Security Target [5]. Hereby, renewed Site Certificates for specific sites were taken into account during the present evaluation.

Accordingly, the Security Target was editorially updated. Refer to the updated Security Target [5].

Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of an update of the TOE's life cycle security aspects. The change has no effect on product assurance.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. The updates of the vulnerability assessment of the underlying hardware carried out in successors of the certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015 were not considered in this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0938-2016 ([3]) dated 28 October 2016 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG[1] Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

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1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

References

[1]   Common Criteria document "Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements", Version 2.1, June 2012

[2]   Impact Analysis Report, Morpho_HC_Germany_G2_COS V1, Version 0.4, 29 November 2018, IDEMIA Germany GmbH (confidential document)

[3]   Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0938-2016 for Morpho_HC_Germany_G2_COS V1 from Morpho Cards GmbH, 28 October 2016, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

[4]   Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0938-2016, Security Target Lite Morpho_HC_Germany_G2_COS V1, Version 1.02, 30 August 2016, Morpho Cards GmbH (sanitised public document)

[5]   Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0938-2016-MA-01, Security Target Lite Morpho_HC_Germany_G2_COS V1, Version 1.05, 1 February 2019, IDEMIA Germany GmbH (sanitised public document)

[6]   Configuration List Morpho_HC_Germany_G2_COS V1 V1 R1.1.2 - Software Release Sheet, IDEMIA Germany GmbH, Version 1.16, 1 February 2019, IDEMIA Germany GmbH (confidential document)

[7]   Evaluation Technical Report for Morpho_HC_Germany_G2_COS V1, BSI-DSZ-CC-0938-2016-MA-01, Version 3.4, 1 February 2019, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)