

# **Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report**

BSI-DSZ-CC-1098-2020-MA-01 IDEMIA\_HC\_Germany\_NEO\_G2.1\_COS, V1 from

IDEMIA Germany GmbH



Recognition Agreement

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements, version 2.1, June 2012 and the developer's Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) under BSI-DSZ-CC-1098-2020.

The change to the certified product is at the level of implementation changes related to the product's communication interface and a corresponding adaptation of the TOE related guidance documentation and Wrapper. The identification of the maintained product is indicated by a new version number of the TOE's operating system and Wrapper compared to the certified product.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1098-2020 dated 30 July 2020 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product. Details can be found on the following pages.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1098-2020.





Recognition Arrangement recognition for components up to EAL 2 only

Bonn, 14 September 2021 The Federal Office for Information Security



#### **Assessment**

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1] and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [2]. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report of the certified product (Target of Evaluation, TOE) [3], its Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report as outlined in [3].

The vendor for the IDEMIA\_HC\_Germany\_NEO\_G2.1\_COS, V1, IDEMIA Germany GmbH, submitted an IAR [2] to the BSI for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document *Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements* [1]. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

The IDEMIA\_HC\_Germany\_NEO\_G2.1\_COS, V1 was changed due to implementation changes related to the product's communication interface and a corresponding adaptation of the TOE related guidance documentation and Wrapper. Configuration Management procedures required a change in the product identifier. Hereby, the version number of the TOE's operating system changed from version 2.2.4 to version 2.2.6, and the Wrapper version changed from 2.2.6 to 2.2.7.

On implementation level the changes cover the following topics:

- Rework of the contactless communication interface concerning technical issues for improvement of the communication stability.
- Flexible choice of the antenna technology used with the TOE.
- Insertion of the new product identifier (operating system version 2.2.6) in the TOE and its Wrapper.

The aforementioned implementation changes result in adapted guidance documentation [7] to [9], addressing in particular the new version number of the operating system and the Wrapper as well as a new Fingerprint value for the operating system and a new SHA256 hash value for the Wrapper. Refer to [8], chapter 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2 and [9], chapter 1.1.

The changed TOE IDEMIA\_HC\_Germany\_NEO\_G2.1\_COS, V1 is as well known under the following product identificator:

Manufacturer: '44 45 49 44 4D' (DEIDM)

Product: '4D 48 43 47 5F 47 32 32' (MHCG G22)

OS Version Number: '02 02 06' (2.2.6)

As before, the TOE is related to Release R3.1.1-1 and Product Type Version (PTV) 4.5.0-0 as defined by gematik.

## Conclusion

The maintained change is at the level of implementation changes related to the product's communication interface and a corresponding adaptation of the guidance documentation. The change has no effect on product assurance.

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has <u>not</u> been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance statement as outlined in the Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1098-2020 dated 30 July 2020 is of relevance and has to be considered when using the product.

## Obligations and notes for the usage of the product:

All aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on top, e.g. the Application Software using the TOE.

For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation which contains obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top how to securely use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.

In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top.

Additional Note: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product certification and this maintenance procedure (see BSIG<sup>1</sup> Section 9, Para 4, Clause 2).

For details on results of the evaluation of cryptographic aspects refer to the Certification Report [3] chapter 9.2.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report [3].

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

### References

- [1] Common Criteria document "Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements", version 2.1, June 2012
- [2] Impact Analysis Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1098-2020, Auswirkungsanalyse Management Version Patch IDEMIA Health Card Germany G2.1 COS NEO V1, Version 1.3, IDEMIA Germany GmbH (confidential document)
- [3] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1098-2020 for IDEMIA\_HC\_Germany\_NEO\_G2.1\_COS, V1, 30 July 2020, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
- [4] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1098-2020, Security Target IDEMIA\_HC\_Germany\_NEO\_G2.1\_COS, V1, Version 1.18, 3 July 2020, IDEMIA Germany GmbH (confidential document)
- [5] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1098-2020, Security Target Lite IDEMIA\_HC\_Germany\_NEO\_G2.1\_COS, V1, Version 1.05, 2 July 2020, IDEMIA Germany GmbH (sanitised public document)
- [6] Configuration List BSI-DSZ-CC-1098-2020, Configuration List IDEMIA\_HC\_Germany\_NEO\_G2.1\_COS, V1, Version 3.30, 17 August 2021, IDEMIA Germany GmbH (confidential document)
- [7] IDEMIA\_HC\_Germany\_NEO\_G2.1\_COS, V1 Preparative Guidance, Version 1.11, 2 August 2021, IDEMIA Germany GmbH
- [8] IDEMIA\_HC\_Germany\_NEO\_G2.1\_COS, V1 Operational User Guidance, Version 2.2, 2 August 2021, IDEMIA Germany GmbH
- [9] IDEMIA\_HC\_Germany\_NEO\_G2.1\_COS, V1 Wrapper Guidance, Version 1.8, 2 August 2021, IDEMIA Germany GmbH
- [10] ETR BSI-DSZ-CC-1098-2020, Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) Summary for IDEMIA\_HC\_Germany\_NEO\_G2.1\_COS, V1, Version 1.1, 17 July 2020, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
- [11] Evaluierungsvotum zu IDEMIA\_HC\_Germany\_NEO\_G2.1\_COS, V1 (BSI-DSZ-CC-1098-2020), 20 August 2021, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)