



IFX_CCI_oooo7Dh, IFX_CCI_oooo7Eh, IFX_CCI_oooo7Fh H11 with optional CryptoSuite

Security Target Lite

Release

About this document

Scope and purpose

This document is the Security Target for the Infineon IFX_CCI_00007Dh/7Eh/7Fh H11 security controllers.

Intended audience

Composite product developers, Common Criteria Evaluators and Certifiers.

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Introduction (ASE_INT) 1

ST reference 1.1

The ST has the title IFX_CCI_00007Dh, IFX_CCI_00007Eh, IFX_CCI_00007Fh H11 with optional CryptoSuite, Rev. 1.0.3 and is dated 2024-01-15.

TOE reference 1.2

The full TOE name is:

IFX_CCI_00007Dh, IFX_CCI_00007Eh, IFX_CCI_00007Fh, design step H11 with firmware version 80.506.04.1, optional CryptoSuite version 4.06.002, optional HSL version 04.05.0030, optional UMSLC version 02.01.0040, optional NRG[™] version o6.10.0003 and user guidance documents

The TOE is identified by the components as described in the physical scope, chapter 1.4.2.

- The Hardware version, design step and Firmware version can be read out form the chip by the Generic Chip • Identification Mode (GCIM). The procedure how to read that data is described in the Programmers Reference Manual.
- The correct library versions can be verified by the corresponding hash values as defined in chapter 8.

TOE overview 1.3

TOE definition and usage 1.3.1

The TOE consists of a smart card IC (Security Controller), firmware and user guidance meeting high requirements in terms of performance and security. The TOE is designed by Infineon Technologies AG and is intended to be used in smart cards for security-relevant applications and as developing platform for smart card operating systems according to the life cycle model from [PPoo84]. The TOE is the platform for the Embedded Software but the Embedded Software itself is not part of the TOE. The TOE does not require any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware.

TOE major security features 1.3.2

- Dual CPU in lockstep mode to detect integrity errors during processing. •
- Memory integrity protection •
- Memory encryption •
- Bus masking for security peripherals ٠
- Hardware True RNG .
- Symmetric coprocessor for AES and TDES encryption and decryption •
- Coprocessor to accelerate long integer and modular arithmetic operations for asymmetric cryptography. It • relies on the embedded software to implement securely cryptographic algorithms.
- Global alarm system with security life control •
- Tearing safe NVM write •
- Armv8-M compliant MPU and SAU •
- Robust set of sensors and detectors •

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Introduction (ASE_INT)


- Redundant alarm propagation and system deactivation principle
- Peripheral access control
- Leakage control of data dependent code execution
- Device phase management
- The optional CryptoSuite provides hardened cryptographic functions for AES, TDES, RSA, ECC, finite field DH, Hash functions and a physical and hybrid physical random number generator.
- Instruction Stream Signature (ISS) coprocessor. The ISS can optionally be used to protect the CPU instruction flow. The hardware-based integrity protection concept of the TOE already provides a very effective program flow protection, such that the ISS is not needed. The ISS can nevertheless be used for compatibility reasons or as a very conservative additional countermeasure.
- 1.4 TOE description

1.4.1 TOE components

1.4.1.1 TOE hardware

Figure 1 shows schematically the TOE hardware.

Figure 1 TOE hardware



The TOE hardware consists of the following blocks:

Processor

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- CPU according to Armv8-M mainline architecture.
- Armv8-M compatible NVIC controller
- Armv8-M compatible Memory Protection Unit (MPU) with 8 regions
- Armv8-M compatible Security Attribution Unit (SAU) with 8 regions
- Instruction Stream Signature (ISS) coprocessor
- Fast Random Source (FRS) nonce generator coprocessor.
- EDC protected caches for memory access and instruction fetch.
- MCICE provides encryption and EDC protection for RAM, ROM and NVM
- Memories
 - encrypted and EDC protected ROM.
 - encrypted and EDC protected RAM.
 - encrypted and EDC protected NVM.
- Peripherals
 - Timers
 - Watchdog
 - CRC accelerator
- System peripherals
 - Clock unit
 - Interface Management Module (IMM)
 - Power Management
 - System Peripheral Access Unit (SPAU) to manage access to peripherals.
 - Cryptographic peripherals
 - RNG according to class PTG.2 of [AIS 31]
 - Crypto2304T coprocessor for long modular integer arithmetic
 - SCP for secure AES and TDES computation
 - μSM4 accelerator for SM4 cryptographic algorithm.
 - μSCP accelerator for TDES cryptographic algorithm.
- Security peripherals
 - UMSLC
 - Sensors
- I/O Interfaces
 - UART for ISO 7816-3
 - I2C slave
 - RFI (ISO 14443/NFC contactless interface)
 - Miller interface
 - GPIO ports

The TOE has a global alarm system that puts the TOE into a secure state after tamper detection.

1.4.1.2 Firmware

The TOE Firmware consists of the Boot software, which provides secure start-up and contains the Flash Loader code.



1.4.1.3 Libraries

The TOE can be ordered with the following libraries to support the security coding of embedded software:

- UMSLC library to test the chips sensors.
- HSL library to provide tearing safe write for the NVM.
- CryptoSuite to provide security hardened cryptographic algorithms.

The TOE can be ordered with the NRG[™] SW library. This is a proprietary cryptographic protocol for transport and ticketing applications. Please note that NRG[™] is not part of the TSF.

The TOE can also be ordered with RF and CL libraries. Both libraries can be used to help the customer implementing ISO14443 contactless protocols. The NVM parts of the RF and CL libraries are not part of the TOE.

1.4.2 Physical scope

1.4.2.1 Hardware/Firmware

Table 1Hardware/Firmware components

•		
Component	Version	
Hardware	IFX_CCI_oooo7Dh, IFX_CCI_oooo7Eh, IFX_CCI_oooo7Fh	
Design step	H11	
Firmware	80.506.04.1	
Flash Loader	09.30.0001	

Note: The TOE Firmware version includes the Boot software, which provides secure start-up, and the Flash Loader code. The Firmware version also contains the ROM parts of HSL, RF API and NRG API.

1.4.2.2 Libraries

The following libraries can be optionally ordered.

Table 2 Libraries

Component	Version	Date
HSL	04.05.0030	2022-06-23
UMSLC	02.01.0040	2022-09-06
NRG™	06.10.0003	2022-11-21
CryptoSuite	4.06.002	2023-12-11

Note: The user guidance for the UMSLC, NRG™ and HSL libraries is in the Programmers Reference Manual. The CryptoSuite library comes with dedicated user guidance.



1.4.2.3 User guidance documents

Table 3 User guidance

Component	Version	Date
TEGRION™ SLC26 (32-bit Security Controller – V19) Hardware Reference Manual	Revision 3.1	2023-08-08
SLx2 Security Controller Family Production and Personalization Manual Flash Loader V9	9.30	2023-08-11
SLC26 32-bit Security Controller - V19 Security Guidelines	1.00-3003	2023-07-26
TEGRION™ SLx2 security controller family Programmer's Reference Manual SLx2_DFP	1.3.0	2023-10-19
Crypto2304T V4, User Manual	2.0	2023-07-14
TEGRION™ SLC26 (32-bit Security Controller - V19) Errata sheet	5.0	2023-12-12
CS-SLC26V19 CryptoSuite 32-bit Security Controller User interface manual	4.06.002	2023-12-11

1.4.3 Logical scope

The logical scope of the TOE consists of the logical security features provided by the TOE. These features are listed in chapter 1.3.2. This chapter explains the features in more detail.

The following features of the TOE are part of the TSF:

- The Processor has a duplicated CPU running in lockstep mode to detect integrity errors. The CPU registers and the cache RAM are protected by 32-bit ECC codes used as an EDC.
- ROM, RAM and NVM content is cryptographically encrypted according to [AIS 46]
- ROM, RAM and NVM content is integrity protected by an EDC with at least 28 bits.
- A hardware true RNG according to class PTG.2 of [AIS 31].
- A symmetric coprocessor for performing masked AES and TDES ECB encryption.
- The data buses connecting the CPU and the cryptographic peripherals are encrypted using a bus encryption with dynamic keys which are changed in each transfer.
- Peripheral access control can be used to provide individual access control of all peripherals for the different security states of the processor (i.e., secure/non-secure, privilege/non-privilege).
- The chip has the following sensors.
 - voltage low and high
 - temperature low and high
 - low frequency
 - light fault attack detectors

If the values are out of range a security alarm is issued.

- Security Life control is used to check proper working of sensors and alarm system by runtime triggered tests.
- In case the core or a peripheral detects a security violation it performs three countermeasures
 - goes into local alarm state.
 - propagates the alarm to the other peripherals and core which then go also into alarm state.
 - triggers a security reset.

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- The HSL detects if NVM has not been correctly written due to a tearing event. The next time an HSL function is called, the embedded software is informed by the HSL that a tearing event has occurred. The HSL provides functions to correct the corrupted data by either roll-back or roll-forward.
- The Armv8-M Memory Protection Unit (MPU) and Security Attribution Unit (SAU) with 8 regions each are provided which can be used as a logical firewall for the embedded software.
- If the chip is switched to User mode it cannot be switched back to Test mode. If the Flash Loader is permanently disabled, it cannot be reactivated again.
- The optional CryptoSuite supporting.
 - RSA key generation, encryption, and signature up to 4224 bits
 - ECDSA and ECDH up to 521 bits
 - Brainpool and NIST curves
 - AES 128, 192,256 in ECB and CBC chaining modes and CMAC
 - TDES 112, 168 bits in ECB and CBC chaining mode and Retail Mac
 - SHA-1 and SHA-2 Hash
 - RNG functions supporting PTG.2 and PTG.3
- The processor system comes with several supporting features to assist side-channel protected software implementations. One common software countermeasure is masking. However, the user needs to take special care when processing masked data together with its masks to avoid that they (or parts of them) are unintentionally combined in hardware resulting in a degradation of the desired side-channel security level. Therefore, the processor system has several measures in place to support the software in keeping the masked data and masks separated.
- Fast Random Source (FRS) nonce generator coprocessor. This RNG was not evaluated according to [AIS 31] and its output shall therefore not be used for applications requiring a certified RNG. It is used internally to support security features of the security architecture.
- Program flow integrity protection: The Instruction Stream Signature (ISS) coprocessor can optionally be used by the IC embedded software to detect illegal program flows and trigger an alarm.
- A coprocessor for accelerating long arithmetic operations to support RSA and ECC cryptography. This coprocessor has no dedicated security countermeasures. The embedded software must implement security countermeasures. Appropriate countermeasures are provided by the optional CryptoSuite library.

1.4.3.1 Non-TSF

The following features are part of the TOE, but not part of the TSF:

• NRG[™] library

This ST does not make any security claims for the features listed in this section.

1.4.4 TOE delivery

The TOE delivery formats and delivery lifecycle according to [PPoo84] application note 1 are shown in the following table.

Component	Format	Life cycle	Delivery method
Hardware	bare die (sawn wafer) 150µ Class 2 antenna	3	Postal transfer in cages
	S-COM8.4-6-2/-4 + ID 2/3 antenna	4	Postal transfer in cages

Table 4 Forms of delivery



Component	Format	Life cycle	Delivery method
Firmware	binary image	3 or 41	In ROM/NVM of hardware
Libraries	object files		secure download via iShare
Documents	personalized PDF		secure download via iShare

1.4.5 Production sites

The TOE may be handled at different production sites, but the silicon is produced at TSMC fab 15 in Taiwan only. The production site can be determined by reading out the GCIM.

1.4.6 Configurations

This TOE is represented by various configurations called products. The module design, layout, and footprint, of all products are identical. The degree of freedom for configuring the TOE is predefined by Infineon Technologies AG. The following table shows TOE hardware/firmware configurations. The chip must be ordered with the desired NVM value. The value cannot be changed afterwards. Bill per Use is not supported.

Component	Values	Identification
NVM	280, 360 kb	IFX mailbox
RAM	14, 20kb	IFX mailbox
uSCP	Available / not available	Hardware register
uSM4	Available / not available	Hardware register
RFI type A	Available / not available	Hardware register
RFI type B	Available / not available	Hardware register
RFI type F	Available / not available	Hardware register
RFIHBR	Available / not available	Hardware register
RFI VHBR	Available / not available	Hardware register
RFI AFM	Available / not available	Hardware register
NRG	Available / not available	Hardware register
RF antenna impedance	27, 56, 78 pf	GCIM

Table 5TOE configuration options

Further the Flash Loader can be configured in different ways as explained in the following section.

1.4.7 Initialisation with embedded software

This TOE is equipped with Flash Loader software (FL) to download user software, i.e., an operating system and applications. Various options can be chosen by the user to store software onto the NVM.

Table 6	Order Options to initialize the TOE with customer software
---------	--

Option	TOE status
The user or/and a subcontractor downloads the software into the NVM. Infineon Technologies does not receive any user software.	The Flash Loader can be activated or reactivated by the user or subcontractor to download software into NVM. In case the Flash Loader is active, it may be either in life cycle stage "Pinletter" or "Activated". When "Activated" a mutual authentication needs to be performed. In "Pinletter" a valid Pinletter provided by

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Option	TOE status
	Infineon Technologies AG needs to be presented to enter "Activated" stage.
The user provides software to download into NVM to Infineon Technologies AG. The software is loaded into NVM during chip production.	There is no Flash Loader present.
The user provides software to download into NVM to Infineon Technologies AG. The software is loaded into NVM during chip production.	The Flash Loader is blocked by Infineon but can be activated or reactivated by the user or subcontractor to download software into NVM. The user is required to provide a reactivation procedure as part of the software to Infineon Technologies AG
The user provides software to download into NVM to Infineon Technologies AG. The software is loaded into NVM during chip production.	The Flash Loader is active. The user can either download software or activate the software already present in NVM.



2 Conformance (ASE_CCL)

2.1 Conformance claims

This ST and TOE claim conformance to

- [CC2] extended
- [CC₃] conformant

2.1.1 PP claims

This ST is strictly conformant to [PPoo84]. The assurance level is EAL6 with the augmentation ALC_FLR.1.

The Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages is registered and certified by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference [PPoo84].

2.1.2 Package claims

This ST claims conformance to the following additional packages taken from [PPoo84]:

- Package Authentication of the Security IC, section 7.2, conformant.
- Package Loader, Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only, section 7.3.1, conformant.
- Package Loader, Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only, section 7.3.2, augmented.
- Package TDES: section 7.4.1, augmented.
- Package AES: section 7.4.2, augmented.

The assurance level for the TOE is EAL6 augmented with the component ALC_FLR.1. Therefore, this ST is package-augmented to the packages in [PPoo84].

2.2 Conformance rationale

The TOE is a typical security IC as defined in [PPoo84].

The security problem definition of [PPoo84] is enhanced by adding the Organisational Security Policy P.Firewall due to addition of the Armv8-M Memory Protection Unit and Security Extension. The security target remains conformant to [CC1] due to claim 289 as the possibility to introduce additional restrictions is given. The security target fulfils the strict conformance claim of [PPoo84] due to application note 5.



3 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD)

3.1 Threats

3.1.1 Threats from PPoo84

The following threats are defined and described in [PPoo84] sections 3.2 and 7.2.1.

Table 7 Threats from [PPoo84]		
Threat	Description	
T.Phys-Manipulation	Physical Manipulation	
T.Phys-Probing	Physical Probing	
T.Malfunction	Malfunction due to Environmental Stress	
T.Leak-Inherent	Inherent Information Leakage	
T.Leak-Forced	Forced Information Leakage	
T.Abuse-Func	Abuse of Functionality	
T.RND	Deficiency of Random Numbers	
T.Masquerade_TOE	Masquerade the TOE	

Table 7 Threats from [PPoo84]

3.1.2 Threats defined in this ST

There are no additional threats defined in this ST.

3.1.3 Assets regarding the Threats

The asset description from [PP0084] section 3.1 applies.

3.2 Organizational security policies

3.2.1 Organizational security policies from PPoo84

The organizational policies from [PPoo84] sections 3.3, 7.3.1, 7.3.2 and 7.4 are applicable.

Table 8 Organisational Security Policies from [PPoo84]

OSP	Description
P.Process-TOE	Protection during TOE Development and Production
P.Crypto-Service	Cryptographic services of the TOE
P.Lim_Block_Loader	Limiting and Blocking the Loader Functionality
P.Ctrl_Loader	Controlled usage to Loader Functionality

3.2.2 Organizational security policies defined in this ST

This ST defines an additional organisational security policy specific to the MPU Extension and Security Extension.

Table 9Memory region-based access control

OSP	Definition
P.Firewall	The TOE must enable the IC dedicated software and the end-user
	embedded software to manage and control access to regions in memory.



3.3 Assumptions

3.3.1 Assumptions defined in [PPoo84]

The TOE assumptions about the operational environment are defined and described in [PPoo84] section 3.4.

Table 10 Assumptions from [PPoo84]

Assumption	Description
A.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization
A.Resp-Appl	Treatment of User Data

3.3.2 Assumptions defined in this ST

There are no additional assumptions defined in this ST.



4 Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ)

4.1 Security objectives for the TOE

4.1.1 Security objectives for the TOE defined in PPoo84

Table 11 Security objectives for the TOE from [PPoo84]

Objective	Description	
O.Phys-Manipulation	Protection against Physical Manipulation	
O.Phys-Probing	Protection against Physical Probing	
O.Malfunction	Protection against Malfunctions	
O.Leak-Inherent	Protection against Inherent Information Leakage	
O.Leak-Forced	Protection against Forced Information Leakage	
O.Abuse-Func	Protection against Abuse of Functionality	
O.Identification	TOE Identification	
O.RND	Random Numbers	
O.Cap_Avail_Loader	Capability and availability of the Loader	
O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader	Access control and authenticity for the Loader	
O.Authentication	Authentication to external entities	
O.AES	Cryptographic service AES	
O.TDES	Cryptographic service DES	

4.1.2 Security objectives for the TOE defined in this ST

Table 12 Security Objectives for the TOE

Objective	Definition
O.Firewall	Firewall based Access Control
	The TOE must provide the IC dedicated software and the end-user embedded software with the capability to define restricted memory access and code execution to memory addresses. The TOE must enforce the access of software to these memory regions depending on access attributes.
O.FFC	Finite Field cryptographic services
	The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to the
	Smartcard Embedded Software: Finite Field cryptographic services
O.RSA	RSA cryptographic services
	The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to the
	Smartcard Embedded Software: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA)
O.ECC	Elliptic Curve cryptographic services
	The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to the
	Smartcard Embedded Software: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
O.AES-CMAC	AES Cryptographic services
	The TOE provides secure cryptographic services for AES CMAC generation.
O.TDES-RMAC	TDES Cryptographic services



Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ)

Objective	Definition
	The TOE provides secure cryptographic services for TDES Retail MAC
	generation.
O.Hash	Cryptographic service hash
	The TOE provides secure cryptographic services for SHA-1 and SHA-2
	generation.

4.2 Security objectives for the operational environment (OE)

4.2.1 OEs defined in [PPoo84]

Table 13	Security object	ctives for the one	rational environmer	t from [PPoo8/]
Table 13	Seconcy object	cuves for the ope		[[]]]

Objective	Description
OE.Resp-Appl	Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE
OE.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during composite product manufacturing
OE.Lim_Block_Loader	Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader
OE.Loader_Usage	Secure communication and usage of the Loader
OE.TOE_Auth	External entities authenticating of the TOE

Note: OE.TOE_Auth is available if the Flash Loader is available.

4.2.2 OEs defined in this ST

There are no additional OEs defined in this ST.

4.3 Security objectives rationale

The security objectives rationale of the TOE is defined and described in [PPoo84] section 4.4, 7.3.1, 7.3.2 and section 7.4.2.

The objectives O.Firewall added in this ST cover the organisational security policy P.Firewall that states that IC dedicated software and end-user embedded software must be able to manage and control access to regions in memory.

The objectives O.FFC, O.RSA, O.ECC, O.AES-CMAC, O.TDES-RMAC and O.Hash cover the policy P.Crypto-Service. This policy intends to allow adding various cryptographic services to the TSF.



Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD)

5 Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD)

5.1 Extended components defined in [PPoo84]

The [PPoo84] defines the following extended components used in this ST:

- FMT_LIM.1
- FMT_LIM.2
- FAU_SAS.1
- FDP_SDC.1
- FCS_RNG.1
- FIA_API.1

5.2 Extended components defined in this ST

There are no extended components defined in this ST.



6.1 Security functional requirements

For the CC operations the following convention is used:

- CC operations which have been already completed in [PPoo84] or [AIS 31] are typeset without underline.
- CC (nested) iteration operations are started by a slash "/" symbol, followed by an iteration identifier text. Iterations may be recursively nested.
- CC operations which are completed in this ST are <u>underlined</u> and the assigned footnote shows the original template text. Iteration operations are typed in normal font (i.e., without underline).

6.1.1 Hardware random number generators

Random numbers generation according to Class PTG.2 of [AIS 31].

FCS_RNG.1/TRNG	Random Number Generation
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1/TRNG	The TSF shall provide a physical random number generator that implements: (PTG.2.1) A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the RNG has started. When a total failure is detected, no random numbers will be output. (PTG.2.2) If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated, the RNG prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source ¹ . (PTG.2.3) The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random numbers sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while the RNG is being operated. The TSF must not output any random numbers before the power-up online test has finished successfully or when a defect has been detected. (PTG.2.4) The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non- tolerable weaknesses of the random numbers soon. (PTG.2.5) The online test procedure checks the quality of the raw random number sequence. It is triggered <u>continuously</u> ² . The online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable statistical defects of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers within an acceptable period of time.
FCS_RNG.1.2/TRNG	The TSF shall provide <u>32-bit numbers³</u> that meet (PTG.2.6) Test procedure A <u>(None)</u> ⁴ does not distinguish the internal random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG.

Table 14 FCS_RNG.1/TRNG

¹ [selection: prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source, generates the internal random numbers with a post-processing algorithm of class DRG.2 as long as its internal state entropy guarantees the claimed output entropy]

² [selection: externally, at regular intervals, continuously, applied upon specified internal events].

³ [selection: bits, octets of bits, numbers [assignment: format of the numbers]]

⁴ [assignment: additional standard test suites]



FCS_RNG.1/TRNG	Random Number Generation
	(PTG.2.7) The average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.997.

6.1.2 Hardware based cryptographic services

Table 15 FCS_COP.1/AES

FCS_COP.1/AES	Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]
	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1/AES	The TSF shall perform decryption and encryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES in <u>ECB mode¹</u> and cryptographic key sizes <u>128 bit</u> , <u>192 bit</u> , <u>256 bit</u> ² that meet the following: [FIPS 197], [SP 800-38A].

Note: The input to the AES algorithm must be provided in two XOR shares. By fixing one share to zero a standard ECB mode results.

Table 16 FCS_CKM.4/AES

FCS_CKM.4/AES	Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4.1/AES	The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method <u>overwriting or zeroing</u> ³ that meets the following: <u>None</u> ⁴ .

Table 17 FCS_COP.1/TDES

FCS_COP.1/TDES	Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1/TDES	The TSF shall perform decryption and encryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm TDES in <u>ECB mode</u> ⁵ and cryptographic key sizes <u>112bit</u> , <u>168bit</u> ⁶ that meet the following: [SP 800-67], [SP 800-38A].

Note: The input to the TDES algorithm must be provided in two XOR shares. By fixing one share to zero standard ECB mode results.

¹ [selection: 128 bit, 192 bit, 256 bit]

² [selection: 128 bit, 192 bit, 256 bit]

³ [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]

⁴ [assignment: list of standards]

⁵ [selection: 128 bit, 192 bit, 256 bit]

⁶ [selection: 128 bit, 192 bit, 256 bit]

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FCS_CKM.4/TDES	Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4.1/TDES	The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method <u>overwriting or zeroing</u> ¹ that meets the following: <u>None</u> ² .

Table 18 FCS_CKM.4/TDES

6.1.3 TSF testing

An attacker may try to circumvent the alarm system and secure wiring by physical manipulation (e.g. by cutting alarm lines). To counter those threats, the chip provides the User Mode Life Cycle (UMSLC) tests to check the integrity of those security features. Those test functions are provided as a software library and can be triggered on demand of the Embedded Software of the Composite TOE.

Table 19 TSF testing

FPT_TST.1	TSF testing
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1	The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests <u>at the request of the authorized</u> <u>user³</u> to demonstrate the correct operation of <u>alarm test and security</u> <u>optimized wiring tests</u> ⁴ .
FPT_TST.1.2	The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of <u>the boot code</u> ⁵ .
FPT_TST.1.3	The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of <u>alarm behaviour and security optimized wiring</u> ⁶ .

Note: If the integrity of the boot code is violated, a security reset is triggered. The authorized user (i.e. the embedded software) can check if a security reset has been performed by reading the reset status register.

6.1.4 Malfunctions

This chapter relates to the section "Malfunctions" in [PPoo84] ch. 6.1.

The SFRs FRU_FLT.2 and FPT_FLS.1 are specified in [PPoo84].

Secure state of the TOE

Application note 14 of FPT_FLS.1 requires to define the secure state of the TOE.

¹ [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]

² [assignment: list of standards]

³ [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-test should occur]]

⁴ [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]

⁵ [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data]

⁶ [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF]

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Definition: A secure state of the TOE is either a correct operation or one of the following exceptional states

- security reset
- global deactivation of the TOE (a.k.a. alarm state)
- fault handler

6.1.5 Abuse of Functionality

This chapter relates to the section "Abuse of Functionality" in [PPoo84] ch. 6.1.

The SFRs FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 are specified in [PPoo84].

FAU_SAS.1	Audit Storage
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1	The TSF shall provide <u>the test process before TOE delivery</u> ¹ with the capability to store <u>the initialization data and/or pre-personalization</u> <u>data and/or supplements of the security IC embedded software</u> ² in the <u>access protected and not changeable areas of the non-volatile</u> <u>memory</u> ³ .

6.1.6 Physical Manipulation and Probing

This chapter relates to the section "Physical Manipulation and Probing" in [PPoo84] ch. 6.1.

The SFR FPT_PHP.3 is specified in [PPoo84].

Automatic response of the TOE

Application note 19 of FPT_PHP.3 requires to define the automatic response of the TOE. Definition: An **automatic response of the TOE** means entering a secure state of the TOE.

Note on FPT_PHP.3 from [PPoo84]

The methods as follows claim resistance towards leakage only in the context of the PACE protocols as defined in [ICAO]. Please note that obligations from the user guidelines with respect to these methods must be respected by the IC embedded software. The composite evaluator must assess the implementation of the PACE protocols.

Please see the confidential Security Target [ST] for details.

Table 21 FDP_SDC.1

¹ [assignment: list of subjects]

² [assignment: list of audit information]

³ [assignment: type of persistent memory]



FDP_SDC.1	Stored data confidentiality
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies
FDP_SDC.1.1	The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the information of the user data while it is stored in the <u>RAM, ROM, and NVM</u> ¹ .

Table 22 FDP_SDI.2

FDP_SDI.2	Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to	FDP_SDI.1
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1	The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for <u>EDC integrity errors</u> ² on all objects, based on the following attributes: <u>the corresponding EDC value with a length of at least 28</u> <u>bits in the RAM, ROM, and NVM</u> ³ .
FDP_SDI.2.2	Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall <u>enter a secure</u> <u>state</u> ⁴ .

6.1.7 Leakage

This chapter relates to the section "Leakage" in [PPoo84] ch. 6.1.

The SFRs FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1 and FDP_IFC.1 are specified in [PPoo84].

6.1.8 Application Firewall

The Application Firewall allows the embedded software to execute in four security levels and to assign access conditions to the address space related to the security levels. The security levels are:

- secure privilege
- secure non-privilege
- non-secure privilege
- non-secure non-privilege

The policy allows the embedded software to enforce the following trust relationship

- secure doesn't trust non-secure independent of the privilege level.
- secure privilege doesn't trust secure non-privilege.
- non-secure privilege doesn't trust non-secure non-privilege.

6.1.8.1 Policy definition

Subjects:

Processor

¹ [assignment: memory area]

² [assignment: integrity errors]

³ [assignment: user data attributes]

⁴ [assignment: action to be taken]



Objects:

Memory addresses

Operations:

- FETCH(x): any instruction fetch from address x.
- READ(x): any read access from address x.
- WRITE(x): any write access to address x.
- SG: secure gateway instruction.
- BNS: any of the branch to non-secure code instructions.
- FNC_RETURN: return from secure mode to non-secure mode.
- HANDLER_S: call of any secure handler code. Of specific importance for this policy are the following handlers:
 - MEMFAULT_S: memory fault handler in secure mode
 - SECFAULT: security fault handler
- HANDLER_NS: call of any non-secure handler code. Of specific importance for this policy is the following handler:
 - MEMFAULT_NS: memory fault handler in non-secure mode
- EXC_RETURN: return from handler code.

Security attributes for processor:

- sec: Boolean attribute designating secure/non-secure with values.
 - true: processor is in secure mode.
 - false: processor is non-secure mode.
- handlermode: Boolean attribute designating handler / thread mode:
 - true: processor is in handler mode.
 - false: processor is in thread mode.
- nPriv_S: Boolean attribute designating privilege mode when sec = true with values.
 - true: processor runs in non-privilege mode.
 - false: processor runs in privilege mode.
- nPriv_NS: Boolean attribute designating privilege mode when sec = false with values.
 - true: processor runs in non-privilege mode.
 - false: processor runs in privilege mode.

Security attributes for addresses:

- PO(x): Boolean attribute assigned to address x.
 - true: Only privilege mode has access.
 - false: Privilege and non-privilege mode have access.



- acc(x): {N, R, RW} attribute assigned to address x.
 - N: no access allowed.
 - R: write access is declined
 - RW: read and write access is not declined.
- sec(x): {S, NS, NSC} attribute assigned to address x.
 - S: secure address.
 - NS: non-secure address.
 - NSC: secure address which is callable from non-secure address.
- XN(x): Boolean variable assigned to address x.
 - true: instruction fetch is declined.
 - false: instruction fetch is not declined.

Definitions:

• privileged := handlermode or (not nPriv_S and sec) or (not nPriv_NS and not sec)

Rules:

- FETCH(x) is declined if (sec = false and sec(x) = S) or (sec = false and sec(x) = NSC and FETCH(x) ≠ SG)
- 2. READ(x) is declined if sec = false and sec(x) \neq NS
- WRITE(x) is declined if sec = false and sec(x) ≠ NS
- FETCH(x) is declined if
 (privileged = false and PO(x) = true)
 or (XN(x) = true)
 or (acc(x) = N)
- READ(x) is declined if (privileged = false and PO(x) = true) or (acc(x) =N)
- WRITE(x) is declined if (privileged = false and PO(x) = true) or (acc(x) ≠ RW)
- 7. If one of rules 1, 2, 3 apply then the SECFAULT handler will be called.
- 8. If one of rules 4, 5 or 6 apply but none of rules 1, 2, 3 and sec=true then MEMFAULT_S handler will be called.
- 9. If one of rules 4, 5 or 6 apply but none of rules 1, 2, 3 and sec=false then MEMFAULT_NS handler will be called.

10. Modification of sec to value true is only allowed for SG, FNC_RETURN, EXC_RETURN or HANDLER_S.

11. Modification of sec to value false is only allowed for BNS and EXC_RETURN.

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- 12. Modification of nPriv_S to value false is only allowed when handlermode = true and sec = true.
- 13. Modification of nPriv_S to value true is only allowed when sec = true.
- 14. Modification of nPriv_NS to value false is only allowed when handlermode = true or (sec = true and nPriv_S = false).
- 15. Modification of handlermode to value true is only allowed for HANDLER_S or HANDLER_NS.
- 16. Modification of handlermode to value false is only allowed for EXC_RETURN.
- 17. Modification of nPriv_NS to value true is only allowed when privileged = true

Roles for management:

The parameter x designates any address.

- secure AF management: privileged = true and sec = true
- non-secure AF management: privileged = true

6.1.8.2 SFRs

Table 23 FDP_ACC.2/AF

FDP_ACC.2/AF	Complete access control
	•
Hierarchical to	FDP_ACC.1
Dependencies	FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.2.1/AF	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Application Firewall access control policy</u> ¹ on <u>subjects, objects and operations defined in 6.1.8.1</u> ² and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2/AF	The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.

Table 24 FDP_ACF.1/AF

FDP_ACF.1/AF	Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	FDP_ACC.1
	FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1.1/AF	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Application Firewall access control policy</u> ³ to objects based on the following: <u>The subjects, objects, operations and associated security attributes defined in 6.1.8.1</u> ⁴ .
FDP_ACF.1.2/AF	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: <u>Rules</u> <u>defined in 6.1.8.1⁵</u> .

¹ [assignment: access control SFP]

² [assignment: list of subjects and objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]

³ [assignment: access control SFP]

⁴ [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]

⁵ [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects]



FDP_ACF.1/AF	Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.3/AF	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <u>None¹</u> .
FDP_ACF.1.4/AF	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <u>None</u> ² .

Table 25 FMT_MSA.3/AF

FMT_MSA.3/AF	Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	FMT_MSA.1
	FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.3.1/AF	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Application Firewall access control policy</u> ³ to provide <u>restrictive</u> ⁴ default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA. ₃ .2/AF	The TSF shall allow the <u>none⁵</u> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

Note: Restrictive means that the security attributes for all addresses are sec(x) = S

Table 26 FMT_MSA.1/AF/S

FMT_MSA.1/AF/S	Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1]
	FMT_SMR.1
	FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1.1/AF/S	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Application Firewall access control policy</u> ⁶ to restrict the ability to <u>modify</u> ⁷ the security attributes <u>PO(x), acc(x),</u> <u>sec(x), XN(x)</u> ⁸ to <u>secure AF management in case sec(x) = S</u> ⁹ .

Table 27 FMT_MSA.1/AF/NS

FMT_MSA.1/AF/NS	Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1]
	FMT_SMR.1
	FMT_SMF.1

¹ [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].

² [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].

³ [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]

⁵ [assignment: the authorized identified roles]

⁸ [assignment: list of security attributes]

⁹ [assignment: the authorized identified roles]

⁴ [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]

⁶ [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]

⁷ [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]

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FMT_MSA.1/AF/NS	Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1/AF/NS	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Application Firewall access control policy</u> ¹ to
	restrict the ability to <u>modify</u> ² the security attributes <u>PO(x), acc(x)</u> ,
	$XN(x)^{3}$ to secure or non-secure AF management in case sec(x) = NS ⁴ .

Table 28 FMT_SMF.1/AF

FMT_SMF.1/AF	Specification of management functions
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1/AF	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: <u>Modification of the security attributes PO(x), acc(x), sec(x), XN(x)</u> ⁵ .

Table 29 FMT_SMR.1/AF

FMT_SMR.1/AF	Security Roles
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	FIA_UID.1
FMT_SMR.1.1/AF	The TSF shall maintain the roles <u>secure AF management and non-</u> <u>secure AF management</u> ⁶ .
FMT_SMR.1.2/AF	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

Authentication of the Security IC 6.1.9

The TOE shall implement the Package "Authentication of the Security IC" from [PPoo84], ch. 7.2.

Tab	ole 30 FIA_API.1	
I	FIA_API.1	Authentication Proof of Identity
I	Hierarchical to	No other components.
[Dependencies	No dependencies.
I	FIA_API.1.1	The TSF shall provide a <u>authentication mechanism according to</u> [ISO9798_2] section 7.3.3, Mechanism MUT.CR-Three-pass <u>authentication</u> ⁷ to prove the identity of the TOE to an external entity.
		<u>authentication</u> to prove the identity of the TOE to all external entity.

Tabl

Note: FIA_API is only available, if the Flash Loader is active.

¹ [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]

² [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]

³ [assignment: list of security attributes]

⁴ [assignment: the authorized identified roles]

⁵ [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]

⁶ [assignment: the authorised identified roles]

⁷ [assignment: authentication mechanism]



6.1.10 Flash loader

The TOE provides a Flash Loader to download user data into the NVM, either during production of the TOE or at customer site. This TOE shall support both Loader packages from [PPoo84] section 7.3.

- Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only.
- Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only.

The SFRs FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 are specified in [PPoo84].

FMT_LIM.1/Loader	Limited Capabilities - Loader
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.1.1/Loader	The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced: Deploying Loader functionality after <u>permanent deactivation</u> ¹ does not allow stored user data to be disclosed or manipulated by unauthorized user.

Table 31 FMT_LIM.1/Loader

Table 32 FMT_LIM.2/Loader

FMT_LIM.2/Loader	Limited availability - Loader
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2.1/Loader	The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced: The TSF prevents deploying the Loader functionality after <u>permanent deactivation</u> ² .

Note: The User Guidance for this TOE requires the Flash Loader to be permanently deactivated prior delivery to the end user (Phase 7).

Table 33 FTP_ITC.1

FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1	The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and <u>Administrator User or Download Operator User and Image Provider</u> ³ that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2	The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

¹ [assignment: action]

² [assignment: action]

³ [assignment: users authorized for using the Loader]



FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF trusted channel		
FTP_ITC.1.3	The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for		
	deploying Loader for downloading User Data and modification of		
	authentication keys ¹ .		

Note: The download operation is authenticated by the Administrator User or the Download Operator User but the download image may be encrypted and authenticated by a different role. This role is called the "Image Provider". Thus, the download operation provides in effect a trusted channel between the Image Provider and the Flash Loader.

Table 34	FDP_ACC.1/Loader
----------	------------------

FDP_ACC.1/Loader	ader Subset access control - Loader			
Hierarchical to	No other components.			
Dependencies	FDP_ACF.1			
FDP_ACC.1.1/Loader	The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP on			
	(1) the subjects Administrator User, Download Operator User and			
	Image Provider ² ,			
	(2) the objects user data in <u>NVM</u> ³ ,			
	(3) the operation deployment of Loader.			

Table 35 FDP_ACF.1/Loader

FDP_ACF.1/Loader	Security attribute based access control - Loader			
Hierarchical to	No other components.			
Dependencies	FMT_MSA.3			
FDP_ACF.1.1/Loader	 The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP to objects based on the following: (1) the subjects <u>Administrator User</u>, <u>Download Operator User and</u> <u>Image Provider</u>⁴ with security attributes <u>None⁵</u>. (2) the objects user data in <u>NVM</u>⁶ with security attributes <u>None⁷</u>. 			
FDP_ACF.1.2/Loader	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: <u>The authenticated Administrator User or authenticated Download</u> <u>Operator User can replace the user data by new user data when the new</u> <u>user data is authorized by the Image Provider⁸</u> .			
FDP_ACF.1.3/Loader	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <u>None</u> ⁹ .			
FDP_ACF.1.4/Loader	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <u>None</u> ¹⁰ .			

¹ [assignment: rules]

Release

² [assignment: authorized roles for using Loader]

³ [assignment: memory areas]

⁴ [assignment: authorized roles for using Loader]

⁵ [assignment: SFP relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP relevant security attributes]

⁶ [assignment: memory areas]

⁷ [assignment: SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]

⁸ [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects]

⁹ [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].

¹⁰ [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]



Note: The Image provider authenticates with the flash loader implicitly by providing a correctly signed and encrypted download image. An Image provider authentication must always be preceded by an Administrator User or Download Operator User authentication.

6.1.10.1 SFRs added in this ST

The following SFRs have been added to the SFRs from Flash Loader package 2 of [PPoo84] in order to describe the management of the various Flash Loader authentication keys.

FMT_MTD.1/Loader Management of TSF data				
Hierarchical to	No other components.			
Dependencies	FMT_SMR.1			
	FMT_SMF.1			
FMT_MTD.1.1/Loader	The TSF shall restrict the ability to <u>modify, delete¹ the Authentication</u> <u>keys for Administrator User, Download Operator User and Image</u>			
	Provider ² to Administrator User, Download Operator User ³ .			

Table 36 FMT_MTD.1/Loader

Note: The Administrator User can manage the keys for Administration User, Download Operator User and Image Provider.

The Download Operator User can delete the key for Image Provider and Download Operator and modify keys for the Download Operator User only.

The image provider cannot modify any keys or perform authentication with the Flash Loader. It can only build encrypted and authenticated loadable images.

Table 37 FMT_SMR.1/Loader

FMT_SMR.1/Loader	Security roles
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	FIA_UID.1
FMT_SMR.1.1/Loader	The TSF shall maintain the roles Administrator User, Download
	Operator User, Image Provider ⁴ .
FMT_SMR.1.2/Loader	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

Note: Image provider is the role who maintains the key which is used to encrypt and integrity protect the download image.

Table 38 FMT_SMF.1/Loader

FMT_SMF.1/Loader Specification of Management Functions			
Hierarchical to	No other components.		
Dependencies	No dependencies.		
FMT_SMF.1.1/Loader The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management			
	functions: <u>Change Key, Invalidate Key</u> ⁵ .		

¹ [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]

² [assignment: list of TSF data]

³ [assignment: the authorised identified roles]

⁴ [assignment: the authorised identified roles]

⁵ [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]



Note: "Change Key" of this SFR means the "modify" operations from SFR FMT_MTD.1/Loader, "Invalidate Key" of this SFR means the "delete" operation from SFR FMT_MTD.1/Loader.

Table 39 FIA_UID.2/Loader

FIA_UID.2/Loader	User identification before any action	
Hierarchical to	FIA_UID.1	
Dependencies	No dependencies.	
FIA_UID.2.1/Loader	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.	

6.1.11 CryptoSuite

This chapter defines the SFRs related to the optional CryptoSuite. Please note that the SFRs from this chapter are only applicable if the optional CryptoSuite is delivered.

6.1.11.1 AES

This section describes AES ciphers provided by the CryptoSuite.

FCS_COP.1/CS/AES/ <iter></iter>	Cryptographic operation		
Dependencies	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]		
	FCS_CKM.4		
FCS_COP.1.1/CS/AES/ <iter></iter>	The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithms] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].		

Table 40 FCS_COP.1/CS/AES/<iter>

The operations performed in this SFR are defined in the following table. Please note that **<iter>** is a placeholder for different SFR iterations defined in the first column.

<iter></iter>	[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]	[assignment: cryptographic algorithms]	[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]	[assignment: list of standards]
ENC	encryption and decryption	AES ECB, CBC mode	128,192,256 bits	[FIPS 197] [SP 800-38A]
MAC	MAC generation	AES CMAC mode	128,192,256 bits	[FIPS 197] [SP 800-38B]

Table 41 Cryptographic table for FCS_COP.1/CS/AES/<iter>



6.1.11.2 TDES

This section describes DES ciphers provided by the CryptoSuite.

FCS_COP.1/CS/TDES/ <iter></iter>	Cryptographic operation		
Dependencies	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]		
	FCS_CKM.4		
FCS_COP.1.1/CS/TDES/ <iter></iter>	The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithms] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].		

Table 42 FCS_COP.1/CS/TDES/<iter>

The operations performed in this SFR are defined in the following table. Please note that **<iter>** is a placeholder for different SFR iterations defined in the first column.

<iter></iter>	[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]	[assignment: cryptographic algorithms]	[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]	[assignment: list of standards]
ENC	encryption and decryption	TDES ECB, CBC mode	112, 168 bits	[SP 800-67] [SP 800-38A]
MAC	MAC calculation	TDES Retail MAC	112 bits	[SP 800-67] [ISO9797_1]

Table 43 Cryptographic table for FCS_COP.1/CS/TDES/<iter>

Note: The CryptoSuite also provides hardened single DES (56 bits) algorithms. This algorithm is also hardened and evaluated but is not part of the formal certification scope.


6.1.11.3 FFC

This section describes Finite Field algorithms provided by the CryptoSuite.

Table 44 FCS_COP.1/CS/FFC/<iter>

FCS_COP.1/CS/FFC/ <iter></iter>	Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]
	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1/CS/FFC/ <iter></iter>	The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithms] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

The operations performed in this SFR are defined in the following table. Please note that **<iter>** is a placeholder for different SFR iterations defined in the first column.





			1	
<iter></iter>	[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]	[assignment: cryptographic algorithms]	[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]	[assignment: list of standards]
DH	key agreement	Finite field Diffie- Hellman	1024-2048 bits	[PKCS#3], ch 7.2

Table 45 Cryptographic table for FCS_COP.1/CS/FFC/<iter>

6.1.11.4 RSA

This section describes RSA related algorithms provided by the CryptoSuite.

Table 46 FCS_COP.1/CS/RSA/<iter>

FCS_COP.1/CS/RSA/ <iter></iter>	Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]
	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1/CS/RSA/ <iter></iter>	The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithms] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

The operations performed in this SFR are defined in the following table. Please note that **<iter>** is a placeholder for different SFR iterations defined in the first column.

Table 47 Cryptographic table for FCS_COP.1/CS/RSA/<iter>

<iter></iter>	[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]	[assignment: cryptographic algorithms]	[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]	[assignment: list of standards]
ENC	encryption	RSAEP	1024-4224 bits	[PKCS#1], ch. 5.1.1
DEC	decryption	RSADP	1024-2112 bits	[PKCS#1], ch. 5.1.2, 2a
DEC_CRT	decryption	RSADP(CRT)	1024-4224 bits	[PKCS#1], ch. 5.1.2, 2b
SIG	signature generation	RSASP1	1024-2112 bits	[PKCS#1], ch. 5.2.1, 2a
SIG_CRT	signature generation	RSASP1(CRT)	1024-4224 bits	[PKCS#1], ch. 5.2.1, 2b
VER	signature verification	RSAVP1	1024-4224 bits	[PKCS#1], ch. 5.2.2



6.1.11.5 ECC

This section describes ECC related algorithms provided by the CryptoSuite.

FCS_COP.1/CS/ECC/ <iter></iter>	Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]
	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1/CS/ECC/ <iter></iter>	The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithms] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

Table 48 FCS_COP.1/CS/ECC/<iter>

The operations performed in this SFR are defined in the following table. Please note that **<iter>** is a placeholder for different SFR iterations defined in the first column.

Table 49 Cryptographic table for FCS_COP.1/CS/ECC/<iter>

<iter></iter>	[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]	[assignment: cryptographic algorithms]	[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]	[assignment: list of standards]
ECDSA_SIG	EC signature generation	ECDSA	160-521 bits	[FIPS 186-4], ch. 6.4
ECDSA_VER	EC signature verification	ECDSA	160-521 bits	[FIPS 186-4], ch. 6.4
ECDH	key agreement	ECDH	160-521 bits	[SP 800-56A], ch. 5.7.1.2

Note: The ECDH operation returns the y-coordinate in addition to the x-coordinate.

Note: The ECDSA_SIG and ECDSA_VER operations will not hash the message input.

The following table lists the certified elliptic curves.

Table 50Certified elliptic curves

Curve	Reference
NIST curves over prime fields	[FIPS 186-4]
Brainpool curves	[RFC 5639]

Note: The CryptoSuite supports any elliptic curve in short Weierstrass form up to 521 bits.

Table 51 FCS_CKM.1/CS/I

FCS_CKM.1/CS/ECC	Cryptographic operation	
Hierarchical to	No other components.	



FCS_CKM.1/CS/ECC	Cryptographic operation
Dependencies	FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1]
	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1.1/CS/ECC	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <u>EC key generation</u> and specified cryptographic key sizes of <u>160-521 bits</u> ² that meet the following: <u>[FIPS 186-4], ch. B.4.1</u> ³ .

6.1.11.6 Hash

This section describes hash related algorithms provided by the CryptoSuite.

Table 52 FCS_COP.1/CS/Hash/ <it< th=""><th>:er></th></it<>	:er>
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FCS_COP.1/CS/Hash/ <iter></iter>	Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]
	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1.1/CS/Hash/ <iter></iter>	The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithms] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

The operations performed in this SFR are defined in the following table. Please note that **<iter>** is a placeholder for different SFR iterations defined in the first column.

Table 53 Cr	ryptographic table for FCS_	_COP.1/CS/Hash/ <iter></iter>
-------------	-----------------------------	-------------------------------

<iter></iter>	[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]	[assignment: cryptographic algorithms]	[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]	[assignment: list of standards]
SHA1	Hash digest	SHA-1	none	[FIPS 180-4]
SHA2	Hash digest	SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2- 512/224, SHA2- 512/226	none	[FIPS 180-4]

6.1.11.7 Random

This section describes random number generation provided by the CryptoSuite.

¹ [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]

² [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

³ [assignment: list of standards]



Table 54 FCS_RNG.1/CS/PTG2

FCS_RNG.1/CS/PTG2	Random Number Generation
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1/CS/PTG2	The TSF shall provide a physical random number generator that implements:
	(PTG.2.1) A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the RNG has started. When a total failure is detected, no random numbers will be output.
	(PTG.2.2) If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated, the RNG <u>prevents the output of any internal random</u> <u>number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been</u> <u>generated after the total failure of the entropy source¹</u> .
	(PTG.2.3) The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random number sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while the RNG is being operated. The TSF must not output any random numbers before the power-up online test has finished successfully or when a defect has been detected.
	(PTG.2.4) The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non- tolerable weaknesses of the random numbers soon.
	(PTG.2.5) The online test procedure checks the quality of the raw random number sequence. It is triggered <u>continuously</u> ² . The online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable statistical defects of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers within an acceptable period of time.
FCS_RNG.1.2/CS/PTG2	The TSF shall provide <u>32-bit numbers³</u> that meet
	(PTG.2.6) Test procedure A <u>(None)</u> ⁴ does not distinguish the internal random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG.
	(PTG.2.7) The average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.997.

Note: The PTG.2 API provided by the CryptoSuite is only a wrapper to the hardware-provided PTG.2 defined in section 6.1.1.

Table 55 FCS_RNG.1/CS/PTG3

FCS_RNG.1/CS/PTG3	Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1/CS/PTG3	The TSF shall provide a hybrid physical random number generator that implements:

¹ [selection: prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source, generates the internal random numbers with a post-processing algorithm of class DRG.2 as long as its internal state entropy guarantees the claimed output entropy]

² [selection: externally, at regular intervals, continuously, applied upon specified internal events]

³ [selection: bits, octets of bits, numbers [assignment: format of the numbers]]

⁴ [assignment: additional standard test suites]



FCS_RNG.1/CS/PTG3	Cryptographic operation
	(PTG.3.1) A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the RNG has started. When a total failure is detected, no random numbers will be output.
	(PTG.3.2) If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated, the RNG <u>prevents the output of any internal random</u> <u>number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been</u> <u>generated after the total failure of the entropy source</u> ¹ .
	(PTG.3.3) The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random number sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while the RNG is being operated. The TSF must not output any random numbers before the power-up online test and the seeding of the DRG.3 post-processing algorithm have been finished successfully or when a defect has been detected.
	 (PTG.3.4) The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non-tolerable weaknesses of the random numbers soon. (PTG.3.5) The online test procedure checks the raw random number sequence. It is triggered <u>continuously</u>². The online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable statistical defects of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers within an acceptable period of time. (PTG.3.6) The algorithmic post-processing algorithm belongs to Class DRG.3 with cryptographic state transition function and cryptographic output function, and the output data rate of the post-processing algorithm shall not exceed its input data rate.
FCS_RNG.1.2/CS/PTG3	The TSF shall provide <u>numbers in 32-bit packets</u> ³ that meet: (PTG.3.7) Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the internal random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG. The internal random numbers must pass test procedure A <u>(none)</u> ⁴ . (PTG.3.8) The internal random numbers shall <u>use PTRNG of class PTG.2 as</u> <u>random source for the post processing</u> ⁵ .

6.2 Security assurance requirements

In the following Table 56, the security assurance requirements and compliance rationale for augmented refinements are given.

Table 56SAR list and refinements

SAR	Refinement
ADV_ARC.1	Refined in [PPoo84]
ADV_FSP.5	The refinement of ADV_FSP.4 from [PPoo84] can also be applied to the assurance level EAL 6 comprising ADV_FSP.5. The assurance component


¹ [selection: prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source, generates the internal random numbers with a post-processing algorithm of class DRG.3 as long as its internal state entropy guarantees the claimed output entropy]

² [selection: externally, at regular intervals, continuously, upon specified internal events]

³ [assignment: format of the numbers]]

⁴ [assignment: additional test suites]

⁵ [selection: use PTRNG of class PTG.2 as random source for the post-processing, have [assignment: work factor], require [assignment: guess work]]





SAR	Refinement
	ADV_FSP.4 is extended to ADV_FSP.5 with aspects regarding the level of description. ADV_FSP.5 requires a semi-formal description in addition. The refinement is still valid.
ADV_IMP.2	The refinement of ADV_IMP.1 in [PPoo84] requires the evaluator to check for completeness. In case of ADV_IMP.2 the entire implementation representation has to be provided anyhow. A check for completeness is also applicable in case the entire implementation representation is provided.
ADV_INT.3	No refinement
ADV_TDS.5	No refinement
ADV_SPM.1	No refinement
AGD_OPE.1	Refined in [PPoo84]
AGD_PRE.1	Refined in [PPoo84]
ALC_CMC.5	The refinement of ALC_CMC.4 from [PPoo84] details how configuration management has to be also applied to production. This is also applicable for ALC_CMC.5. ALC_CMC.5 is not specifically focused on production.
ALC_CMS.5	The refinement of ALC_CMS.4 from [PPoo84] can also be applied to the assurance level EAL 6 comprising ALC_CMS.5. The assurance package ALC_CMS.4 is extended to ALC_CMS.5 with aspects regarding the configuration control system for the TOE. The refinement is still valid.
ALC_DEL.1	Refined in [PPoo84]
ALC_DVS.2	Refined in [PPoo84]
ALC_FLR.1	No refinement
ALC_LCD.1	No refinement
ALC_TAT.3	No refinement
ASE_CCL.1	No refinement
ASE_ECD.1	No refinement
ASE_INT.1	No refinement
ASE_OBJ.2	No refinement
ASE_REQ.2	No refinement
ASE_SPD.1	No refinement
ASE_TSS.1	No refinement
ATE_COV.3	The refinement of ATE_COV.2 in [PPoo84] clarifies how to deal with testing of security mechanisms for physical protection. It further requests the TOE to be tested under different operating conditions. These refinements are also applicable for ATE_COV.3, which requires complete TSFI coverage.
ATE_DPT.3	No refinement
ATE_FUN.2	No refinement
ATE_IND.2	No refinement
AVA_VAN.5	Refined in [PPoo84]

6.2.1 Security Policy Model (SPM) details

[CC₃] requires in ADV_SPM.1.1D to define the not modelled SFRs.

The rational for the excluded SFRs are as follows:

public IFX_CCI_oooo7Dh/7Eh/7Fh H11 Security Target Lite



Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)

- SFRs for cryptographic services are not modelled by convention.
- SFRs for physical functions cannot be logically modelled.
- SFRs for internal functions have no visible logical interface.

The developer shall provide a formal security policy model for the <u>SFRs of this ST with the exception of the SFRs</u> from the following table¹.

SFR	Reason for exclusion
FCS_RNG.1/*	cryptographic services
FCS_COP.1/*	cryptographic services
FCS_CKM.1/*	cryptographic services
FCS_CKM.4/*	cryptographic services
FPT_TST.1	physical function
FRU_FLT.2	physical function
FPT_FLS.1	physical function
FPT_PHP.3	physical function
FDP_SDC.1	physical function
FDP_ITT.1	internal function
FPT_ITT.1	Internal function
FDP_IFC.1	Internal function

Table 57SFRs excluded from SPM

Note: A star "*" means all iterations of that SFR

6.3 Security requirements rationale

6.3.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements


The security requirements rationale identifies the modifications and additions made to the rationale presented in [PPoo84].

6.3.1.1 Additional SFRs related to O.Firewall

Table 58Rationale for SFRs related to O.Firewall

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACC.2/AF	The SFR with the respective SFP require the implementation of an area- based memory access control.
FDP_ACF.1/AF	The SFR allows the TSF to enforce access to objects within the respective SFP based on security attributes and defines these attributes and defines the rules based on these attributes that enable explicit decisions.
FMT_MSA.3/AF	The SFR requires that the TOE provides default values for the security attributes used in the SFP. Because the TOE is a hardware platform, these default values are generated by the reset procedure.

¹ [assignment: list of policies that are formally modelled] Release





SFR	Rationale	
FMT_MSA.1/AF/S	The SFR requires that authorized users can manage TSF attributes. It ensures that the access control attributes associated to secure addresses can be managed only by code running in secure and privilege mode.	
FMT_MSA.1/AF/NS	The SFR requires that authorized users can manage TSF attributes. It ensures that the access control attributes associated to non-secure addresses can be managed by code running in secure or non-secure privilege mode.	
FMT_SMF.1/AF	The SFR is used for the specification of the management functions to be provided by the TOE. Being a hardware platform, the TOE allows the management of the security attributes by making the hardware registers accessible to software to enable modification.	
FMT_SMR.1/AF	This SFR defines the roles used for management of the security attributes. The roles are defined by the security attribute of the fetch address of the CPU instruction.	

6.3.1.2 Additional SFRs related to O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader

Table 59	Rationale for additional SFRs related to O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader

SFR	Rationale	
FMT_MTD.1/Loader	This SFR requires that the TOE provides management functions for modification and deletion of authentication keys.	
FMT_SMR.1/Loader	This SFR requires that the roles to management keys are defined	
FMT_SMF.1/Loader	This SFR requires that the key management functions are defined	
FIA_UID.2/Loader	This SFR requires that management functions can only be executed by authorized roles.	

6.3.1.3 Additional SFRs related to O.Phys-Manipulation

The FPT_TST.1 component allows that particular parts of the security mechanisms and functions provided by the TOE can be tested after TOE delivery. This feature is important to detect direct physical manipulations by a FIB device in order to disable the alarm system of the chip.

6.3.1.4 Additional SFRs related to O.AES

The optional CryptoSuite provides the AES chaining modes ECB and CBC. The associated SFR is FCS_COP.1/CS/AES/ENC from chapter 6.1.11.1.

6.3.1.5 Additional SFRs related to O.AES-CMAC

The optional CryptoSuite provides the AES CMAC. The associated SFR is FCS_COP.1/CS/AES/MAC from chapter 6.1.11.1.

6.3.1.6 Additional SFRs related to O.TDES

The optional CryptoSuite provides the TDES chaining modes ECB and CBC. The associated SFR is FCS_COP.1/CS/TDES/ENC from chapter 6.1.11.2.



6.3.1.7 Additional SFRs related to O.TDES-RMAC

The optional CryptoSuite provides the TDES Retail Mac. The associated SFR is FCS_COP.1/CS/TDES/MAC from chapter 6.1.11.2.

6.3.1.8 Additional SFRs related to O.FFC

The optional CryptoSuite provides Finite Field cryptographic services. The associated SFRs are defined in chapter 6.1.11.3.

6.3.1.9 Additional SFRs related to O.RSA

The optional CryptoSuite provides RSA functions. The associated SFRs are defined in chapter 6.1.11.4.

6.3.1.10 Additional SFRs related to O.ECC

The optional CryptoSuite provides ECC functions. The associated SFRs are defined in chapter 6.1.11.5.

6.3.1.11 Additional SFRs related to O.Hash

The optional CryptoSuite provides Hash functions. The associated SFRs are defined in chapter 6.1.11.6.

6.3.1.12 Additional SFRs related to O.RND

The optional CryptoSuite provides Random generating functions. The associated SFRs are defined in chapter 6.1.11.7.

6.3.2 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements

The dependencies of the SFRs which are defined in [PPoo84] are resolved in [PPoo84], ch. 6.3.2. The following table lists the dependencies of the additional SFRs which are defined in this ST.

SFR	Dependencies	Rationale	
FDP_ACC.2/AF	FDP_ACF.1	Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1/AF	
FDP_ACF.1/AF	FDP_ACC.1	Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.2/AF, which is hierarchically higher	
FMT_MSA.3/AF	FMT_MSA.1	Fulfilled by FMT_MSA.1/AF/S and FMT_MSA.1/AF/NS	
	FMT_SMR.1	Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1/AF	
FMT_MSA.1/AF/S FMT_MSA.1/AF/NS	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.2/AF, which is hierarchically higher	
	FMT_SMR.1	Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1/AF	
	FMT_SMF.1	Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1/AF	
	FMT_SMR.1	Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1/AF	
	FMT_SMF.1	Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1/AF	
FMT_SMR.1/AF	FIA_UID.1	The dependency is satisfied, because the role is identified by the execution context of the processor.	
FMT_SMF.1/AF	None	No dependency	
FDP_ACC.1/Loader	FDP_ACF.1	Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1/Loader	
FDP_ACF.1/Loader	FMT_MSA.3	Not applicable, because there are no security attributes defined	
FMT_MTD.1/Loader	FMT_SMR.1	Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/Loader	

Table 60Dependencies of SFRs

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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)



SFR	Dependencies	Rationale	
	FMT_SMF.1	Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1/Loader	
FMT_SMR.1/Loader	FIA_UID.1	Fulfilled by FIA_UID.2/Loader	
FMT_SMF.1/Loader	None	No dependency	
FIA_UID.2/Loader	None	No dependency	
FPT_TST.1	None	No dependency	
FCS_CKM.4/AES	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	The TOE does not provide services to generate or import symmetric keys. This will be done by the embedded software for the composite TOE.	
FCS_COP.1/CS/AES/ <iter></iter>	FCS_CKM.4	Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4/AES	
	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	The TOE does not provide services to generate or import symmetric keys. This will be done by the embedded software for the composite TOE.	
FCS_COP.1/CS/TDES/ <iter></iter>	FCS_CKM.4	Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4/TDES	
	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	The TOE does not provide services to generate or import symmetric keys. This will be done by the embedded software for the composite TOE.	
FCS_CKM.4/TDES	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	The TOE does not provide services to generate or import symmetric keys. This will be done by the embedded software for the composite TOE.	
FCS_COP.1/CS/FFC/ <iter></iter>	FCS_CKM.4	The TOE does not provide services to destroy FFC keys. This will be done by the embedded software for the composite TOE.	
	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	The TOE does not provide services to generate or import FFC keys. This will be done by the embedded software for the composite TOE.	
FCS_COP.1/CS/RSA/ <iter></iter>	FCS_CKM.4	The TOE does not provide services to destroy RSA keys. This will be done by the embedded software for the composite TOE.	
	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	The TOE does not provide services to generate or import RSA keys. This will be done by the embedded software for the composite TOE.	
FCS_COP.1/CS/ECC/ <iter></iter>	FCS_CKM.4	The TOE does not provide services to destroy ECC keys. This will be done by the embedded software for the composite TOE.	
	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CS/ECC/ <iter></iter>	
FCS_CKM.1/CS/ECC/ <iter></iter>	FCS_CKM.2	Fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/CS/ECC/ <iter></iter>	
	FCS_COP.1]		
	FCS_CKM.4	The TOE does not provide services to destroy ECC keys. This will be done by the embedded software for the composite TOE.	
FCS_COP.1/CS/Hash/ <iter></iter>	FCS_CKM.4	n/A, as a hash function does not use keys.	



SFR	Dependencies	Rationale
	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	n/A, as a hash function does not use keys.
FCS_RNG.1/CS/PTG2	None	No dependency
FCS_RNG.1/CS/PTG3	None	No dependency

6.3.3 Rationale of the Assurance Requirements

The TOE is a typical security IC as defined in [PPoo84]. The rationale for EAL level and augmentation is as follows.

An assurance level EAL6 with the augmentations ALC_FLR.1 is required for this type of TOE since it is intended to defend against highly sophisticated attacks without a protective environment. This evaluation assurance package was selected to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial practices. To provide a meaningful level of assurance that the TOE provides an adequate level of defence against such attacks, the evaluators should have access to all information regarding the TOE including the TSF internals, the low-level design and source code including the testing of the modular design. Additionally, the mandatory technical document [JIL] shall be taken as a basis for the vulnerability analysis of the TOE.



7 TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS)

The product overview is given in section 1.3.1. The Security Features are described below and the relation to the security functional requirements is shown. The TOE is equipped with the following security features to meet the security functional requirements:

Security Feature	Description	
SF_DPM	Device Phase Management	
SF_PS	Protection against Snooping	
SF_PMA	Protection against Modification Attacks	
SF_PLA	Protection against Logical Attacks	
SF_HC	Hardware provided Cryptography	
SF_CS	CryptoSuite Services	

Table 61 TOE Security Features

7.1 SF_DPM: Device Phase Management

The life cycle of the TOE is split up into several phases (see [PPoo84], ch. 1.2.3). Chip development and production (phase 2, 3, 4) and final use (phases 4-7) is a rough split-up from the TOE point of view. These phases are implemented in the TOE as test mode (phase 3) and user mode (phases 4-7). In addition, a chip identification mode exists which is active in all phases. The chip identification data (O.Identification) is stored in a non-modifiable configuration page area of the non-volatile memory. Further TOE configuration data is stored in the same area. In addition, user initialization data can be stored in the NVM during the production phase as well. During this first data programming, the TOE is still in the secured environment and in test mode.

The covered security functional requirement is FAU_SAS.1 "Audit storage".

During start-up of the TOE the decision for one of the various operation modes is taken dependent on phase identifiers. The decision of accessing a certain mode is defined as phase entry protection. The phases follow also a defined and protected sequence. The sequence of the phases is protected by means of authentication.

The covered security functional requirements are FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2.

During the production phase (phase 3 and 4) or after the delivery to the customer (phase 5 or phase 6), the TOE provides the possibility to download a user specific encryption key and user code and data into the empty (erased) NVM area as specified by the associated control information of the Flash Loader software. Alternatively in case the user has ordered TOE derivatives without Flash Loader, software download by the user (phase 5 or phase 6) is disabled and all user data of the embedded software is stored on the TOE at Infineon premises. In case the user has ordered the TOE derivatives with Flash Loader enabled, the Flash Loader may either be received in a way, which requires an authentic Pinletter and authentication afterwards, or it may be received in a state, which immediately requires successful mutual authentication. The Pinletter process can exchange the default authentication key. Successful authentication is required before being able to use the download functionality of the Flash Loader. Once authenticated, the functionality to exchange the Flash Loader keys depending on the user's identity is enabled. One of the keys, which can be exchanged is the Image Provider key. This key is used to decrypt and verify the integrity protected and encrypted download image. The authenticated user may also invalidate authentication keys depending on the user's identity. After finishing the download operation, the Flash Loader must be permanently deactivated prior delivery to the end user, so that no further load operation with the Flash Loader is possible. The Flash Loader uses AES CCM mode [SP 800-38C] for encryption and integrity protection of payload and for authentication. For key usage diversification, the Flash Loader uses key derivation according to [SP 800-108].

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TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS)

The covered security functional requirements are FMT_LIM.1/Loader, FMT_LIM.2/Loader, FTP_ITC.1, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1, FDP_ACC.1/Loader, FDP_ACF.1/Loader, FMT_MTD.1/Loader, FMT_SMR.1/Loader, FMT_SMF.1/Loader, FIA_UID.2/Loader and FIA_API.1.

Note that the SFRs FTP_ITC.1, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1, FDP_ACC.1/Loader, FDP_ACF.1/Loader, FMT_MTD.1/Loader, FMT_SMR.1/Loader, FMT_SMF.1/Loader, FIA_UID.2/Loader and FIA_API.1 are only part of the TOE if the flash loader is active.

Each operation phase is protected by means of authentication and encryption.

The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ITT.1 and FPT_ITT.1.

7.2 SF_PS: Protection against Snooping

All contents of the memories RAM, ROM and NVM of the TOE are encrypted on chip to protect them against data analysis. The encryption of the memory content is done by the MCICE using a proprietary cryptographic algorithm. A complex key management and address scrambling provides protection against cryptographic analysis attacks. All security relevant transfers via the peripheral bus are dynamically masked and thus protected against readout and analysis. Leakage of data dependent code execution can be reduced by employing specific hardware features.

The covered security functional requirements are FDP_SDC.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FPT_ITT.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FDP_ITT.1.

Most components of the design are synthesized to disguise allocation of elements to certain modules of the IC. Physical regularity of the logic functions is thereby removed. The covered security functional requirement is FPT_PHP.3.

A further protective design method used is security optimized wiring. Certain security-critical wires have been identified and protected by special routing measures against probing. Additionally specific signal lines, required to operate the device, are embedded into shield lines of the chip to prevent successful probing. The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1 and FDP_IFC.1.

A low system frequency sensor FSE is implemented to prevent the TOE from single stepping. The sensor is tested by the User Mode Security Life Control UMSLC. The UMSLC library provides some wrapper functionality around the UMSLC hardware part containing measures against fault attacks. The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3 and FPT_FLS.1.

7.3 SF_PMA: Protection against Modifying Attacks

The TOE has implemented a dual CPU running in lockstep mode and registers protected with 32-bit EDC. This mechanism reliably detects attacks on the code flow and data processed by the CPU. In the case of a detected attack, the TOE enters the secure state.

The TOE is equipped with a 28-bit EDC in RAM, a 28 bit EDC in NVM and a 32 bit EDC in ROM, which is realized in the MCICE peripheral. The EDC detects detect single- and multi-bit errors. In the case of an EDC error, the TOE enters the secure state.

The covered security functional requirements are FRU_FLT.2, FPT_PHP.3 and FDP_SDI.2.

A life test on internal security features is provided – it is called User Mode Security Life Control (UMSLC), which checks alarm lines for correct operation. This test can be triggered by user software during normal operation or via the UMSLC lib. If physical manipulation or a physical probing attack is detected, the TOE enters the secure state (as defined in chapter 6.1.4). To further decrease the risk of manipulation and tampering of the detection system a redundant alarm propagation and system deactivation is provided.

The covered security functional requirements are FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3 and FPT_TST.1

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TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS)

The Instruction Stream Signature Checking (ISS) calculates a hash over all executed instructions and automatically checks the correctness of this hash value. If the code execution follows an illegal path an alarm is triggered. This feature can optionally be used for program flow integrity protection, but it is not needed as the dual CPU and memory EDC mechanisms are far better suited to detect such attacks.

The Online Configuration Check (OCC) function controls the modification of relevant system settings. It is also useful as a measure against fault attacks and accidental changes. The content of the protected registers is permanently hashed and checked against a reference value. A violation generates an alarm event and leads to the secure state.

The TOE supports dynamical locking of dedicated peripherals by the SPAU. This way data flow between CPU and peripherals can be controlled. Manipulations utilizing access to specific peripherals can be prevented with this locking mechanism.

As physical effects or manipulative attacks may also target the program flow of the user software, a watchdog timer and a check point register are implemented. These features allow the user to check the correct processing time and the integrity of the program flow of the user software.

The covered security functional requirements are FPT_FLS.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1 and FPT_PHP.3.

The HSL provides tearing safe write operations which can be utilized by the embedded software.

The covered security functional requirement is FPT_PHP.3.

The correct function of the TOE is only given in the specified range of environmental operating parameters. To prevent an attack exploiting that circumstance the TOE is equipped with a temperature sensor, glitch sensor and voltage sensor as well as backside light detection. The TOE falls into the defined secure state in case of a specified range violation. The defined secure state causes the chip internal reset process.

The covered security functional requirements are FRU_FLT.2 "Limited fault tolerance" and FPT_FLS.1 "Failure with preservation of secure state ".

7.4 SF_PLA: Protection against Logical Attacks

The TOE implements the Armv8-M Memory Protection Unit (MPU) with 8 regions and the Security Attribution Unit (SAU) with 8 regions according to [Armv8-M], ch. B10.

The SAU contains an Implementation Defined Attribution Unit (IDAU). The IDAU exempts the address ranges 4000 0000н - 5FFF FFFFH and Аооо 0000н - FFFF FFFFH from Security attribution.

During each start-up of the TOE the address ranges and MPU access rights are initialized by the Boot Software (BOS) with predefined values. The BOS maps a small region containing the start-up code for access of privilege software.

The SAU is disabled, and all addresses are marked secure and non-secure not callable.

The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.2/AF, FDP_ACF.1/AF, FMT_MSA.1/AF/S, FMT_MSA.1/AF/NS, FMT_MSA.3/AF, FMT_SMF.1/AF and FMT_SMR.1/AF.

7.5 SF_HC: Hardware provided cryptography

The TOE is equipped with a random number generator as defined in the SFRs FCS_RNG.1/TRNG in chapter 6.1.1.

The covered security functional requirement is FCS_RNG.1/TRNG.

The TOE supports the encryption and decryption in accordance with the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and cryptographic key sizes of 128 bits or 192 bits or 256 bits that meet the standards as defined in chapter 6.1.2.

The TOE supports the encryption and decryption in accordance with the Triple TES (TDES) and cryptographic key sizes of 112 bits or 168 bits that meet the standards as defined in chapter 6.1.2.

Release



TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS)

The covered security functional requirement are FCS_COP.1/AES, FCS_COP.1/TDES and FCS_CKM.4.

7.6 SF_CS: CryptoSuite Services

The optional CryptoSuite utilizes the symmetric coprocessor and the asymmetric coprocessor of the hardware to implement standard cryptographic algorithms.

Please see the confidential Security Target [ST] for details.



Hash values of libraries

Hash values of libraries 8

This chapter list the SHA256 hashes of the libraries from section 6.1.11

Table 62 SHA256 hash values

SHA256
f16fc3955c07c279de59201c291356890e48a59e62f9b75230873e25babo868c
74091c50254bc348a48a2e261a125735dca41f2419cd9541c3e6fbfdff63b529
b4b63cc2fc97a52ede25b1ceba4333f3d77576ce7ae42228c48o454oo5a95436
CS-SLC26V19-sym-cipher-aes.lib:
SHA256=b7dffd597478595a49f6b4do13cedo83ebbdd3o47ec5716def5afo8o92a3o939
CS-SLC26V19-asym.lib:
SHA256=66448342dfd4fac41576883bb5oc25c821824cb4f752d1f838ffaa1272697656
CS-SLC26V19-asym-base.lib:
SHA256=c84408aedcfcbo65082fdbffc25f1e606d71a94850be3ce5dc65f147ad3c8b6c
CS-SLC26V19-sym-cipher.lib:
SHA256=2984b13b2b85a9556oo4c6b5ddo67o6o79221c4oco37cc3c8734286bdo47d77b
CS-SLC26V19-sym-mac-cmac.lib:
SHA256=34ed79cf7046d17340240b4a44ed956f621f42cod4db1ddcb819ddde4da27c78
CS-SLC26V19-sym-mac-cmac-aes.lib:
SHA256=d9135e7aee35a936a41772c430433d3e6554b7c23f189b7471d303cbcc8e1eb8
CS-SLC26V19-core.lib:
SHA256=50c92b0a71704d9005f488ae039d0d0713343465fea188817c1d0c2064of03ef
CS-SLC26V19-sym-cipher-des.lib:
SHA256=be9bd42do7oo3de93dbba556b39d9f279f578fof1cad97fdc12e8c5217513843
CS-SLC26V19-asym-ecc.lib:
SHA256=5554a35f13184o78ob11d796dfe8a194c4bdao3292fc29c6oa9bd8d74c4oob6a
CS-SLC26V19-sym-hash.lib:
SHA256=abf3d371711623c2202d2bd0593007be505ce17f263c3f40d4a60387d76a3078
CS-SLC26V19-rng-hwrng.lib:
SHA256=3cc9b9327d423e27425f2cd4odd6o514o54f03373090399f9cfd2098af30eb7a
CS-SLC26V19-sym-mac.lib:
SHA256=bfb66c47301735fof8edaboe49ofc405b6d6afd88fac514cf7c91a6ec15b093a
CS-SLC26V19-sym-mac-retailmac.lib:
SHA256=c3be4a9431d750a8f470ce7ccfd54db80ebbd9d10b89c3558910cff08f98501c
CS-SLC ₂ 6V ₁₉ -rng.lib:
SHA256=76bb07548a4eb32f517dd021727d95b8090268bf16d3fde67b55b4ff83ee25dd
CS-SLC26V19-asym-rsa.lib:
SHA256=bdc31248aeadco8795c354c3a42eo52112defo5fd627c955o9ac3fo1afc52a2b
CS-SLC26V19-sym-hash-sha.lib:
SHA256=e5e6o3b8521f4b726ee63o96bb4a1bc68b5263b544ao61ebcb61of3db8abdo12
CS-SLC26V19-sym.lib:
SHA256=19eb1aod2e713c5f5a73a55f6bf33f339c7fb274d9376b95o8e46447865cdoe3 CS-SLC26V19-asym-tlbx.lib:
SHA256=d37c33afed257o948161ce87eoc6ff498bb8d89b65d24159b92feo88o94b3453

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Cryptographic Table 9

Table 63 Cryptographic table

Purpose	Cryptographic operation	Key size in bits	Standards
Confidentiality	AES in ECB mode provided by hardware	128, 192, 256	[FIPS 197] [SP 800-38A]
Confidentiality	AES encryption and decryption in ECB, CBC mode	128, 192, 256	[FIPS 197] [SP 800-38A]
Integrity	AES CMAC mode	128, 192, 256	[FIPS 197] [SP 800-38B]
Confidentiality	TDES in ECB mode provided by hardware	112, 168	[SP 800-67] [SP 800-38A]
Confidentiality	TDES encryption and decryption in ECB, CBC mode	112, 168	[SP 800-67] [SP 800-38A]
Integrity	TDES Retail MAC mode	112	[SP 800-67] [ISO9797_1]
Confidentiality	RSAEP RSA encryption	1024 - 4224	[PKCS#1], ch. 5.1.1
Confidentiality	RSADP RSA decryption with exponential representation	1024 -2112	[PKCS#1], ch. 5.1.2, 2a
Confidentiality	RSADP RSA decryption with CRT representation	1024 -4224	[PKCS#1], ch. 5.1.2, 2b
Integrity	RSA signature generation RSASP1	1024 -4224	[PKCS#1], ch. 5.2.1, 2b
Integrity	RSA signature verification RSAVP1	1024 -4224	[PKCS#1], ch. 5.2.2
Integrity	ECDSA signature generation	160-521	[FIPS 186-4], ch. 6.4
Integrity	rity ECDSA signature verifications		[FIPS 186-4], ch. 6.4
Key agreement	ECDH key agreement	160-521	[SP 800-56A], ch. 5.7.1.2
Authenticated encryption	AES CCM ¹	128	[SP 800-38C]
Key agreement	Finite Field Diffie-Hellman	1024-2048	[PKCS#3], ch. 7.2
Key derivation	KDF in counter mode with AES CMAC as PRF ¹	128	[SP 800-108], ch. 5.1 [SP 800-38B], ch. 6.2
Hash	SHA-1 Hash digest	N/A	[FIPS 180-4]
Hash	SHA-2 Hash digest 224, 256, 384, 512, 512/224, 512/256 bits	N/A	[FIPS 180-4]
Random	Physical RNG PTG.2	N/A	[AIS 31]
Random	Hybrid physical RNG PTG.3	N/A	[AIS 31]

¹This algorithm is only used by the Flash Loader and not provided as service for the Embedded Software Release 52



Acronyms

Acronyms

Acronym	Description		
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard		
AFM	Advanced Framing Mode		
CL	ContactLess		
CSP	Chip Scale Package		
DES	Data Encryption Standard		
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography or Error Correction Code		
EDC	Error Detection Code		
FFC	Finite Field Cryptography		
HBR	High Baud Rate		
ISS	Instruction Stream Signature		
MCICE	Memory Cache Integrity Confidentiality Engine		
MPU	Memory Protection Unit		
NVIC	Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller		
NVM	Non-Volatile Memory		
осс	Online Configuration Check		
RAM	Random Access Memory		
RF	Radio Frequency		
RNG	Random Number Generator		
ROM	Read Only Memory		
RSA	Rivest Shamir Adleman		
SAU	Security Attribution Unit		
SDM	Software Debug Module		
SE	Security Extension		
SPI	Serial Peripheral Interface		
SPM	Security Policy Model		
SWP	Single Wire Protocol		
TDES	Triple DES		
TOE	Target Of Evaluation		
UMSLC	User Mode Security Life Control		
VHBR	Very High Baud Rate		

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Revision history

Revision history

Rev.	Date	Description
1.0.3	2024-01-15	Released Version

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