Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1 Release 5
Security Target

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Author: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
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1 Introduction

This Security Target is for the evaluation of Huawei’s Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1 Release 5.

1.1 Security Target Identification

Title: Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1 Release 5 Security Target
Version: 0.28
Date: 2011-03-09
Sponsor: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Developer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Keywords: CGP, core network, network device management

1.2 Target of Evaluation (TOE) Identification

Title: Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) software
Version: Version 1 Release 5 (Unique version identifier: CGP V100R005C00)
This evaluation includes the following patch:
• V100R005C00SPC604
Sponsor: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Developer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Keywords: Authentication, Role-based access control, Lawful Interception (LI) support, Communications security, Auditing, Security function management.

1.3 Target of Evaluation (TOE) Overview

The TOE is Huawei’s Carrier Grade Platform, a software for the management of (cellular) core network devices, such as Home Location Registers, Mobile Softswitch Centers, Service GPRS Support Nodes, or Call Session Control Functions. It is commonly used as a component throughout a number of Huawei networking products to offer management functionality for these products.

The central (server) side of CGP runs within a physical Operation and Management Unit (OMU) on top of a Linux operating system. OMUs are boards (blades) that get inserted into network device cabinets (racks) which also contain application-specific boards, resulting in a product offering.

Remote clients (a GUI, called LMT client, and a web-based interface) are available for management access to the server.

This evaluation of CGP covers the use of CGP in six particular products, the Huawei CSC3300, HLR9820, MSOFTX3000, SGSN9810, ATS9900, and HSS9820. The application-specific functionality of these products is out of scope for this evaluation.

The major security features implemented by CGP and subject to evaluation are:
• Authentication. Operators using the GUI client or a web browser to access the TOE in order to execute device management functions are identified by individual user names and authenticated by passwords.
• Role-based access control. CGP implements role-based access control, limiting access to different management functionality to different roles as defined in administrator-defined access control associations.
• Communications security. CGP offers SSL/TLS channels for FTP, HTTP, and SOAP access to the OMU, as well as the encryption of X1/X2 channels for LIG communication. This includes the possibility to restrict remote sessions to the CGP server to specific client IP addresses.
• Auditing. Audit records are created for security-relevant events related to the use of CGP.
• Security function management. The TOE offers management functionality for its security functionality.
The operational environment of the TOE comprises, on the server side, an operating system that runs within the OMU board hardware and hosts both the TOE and a relational database (which is part of the operational environment as well) used by the TOE to store configuration and audit data. The LMT client part of the TOE runs on top of a Windows operating system. The remaining parts of the assembly products, where the TOE is located, are part of the operational environment.

1.4 TOE Description

1.4.1 Architectural overview

The TOE is Huawei’s Carrier Grade Platform – in particular the software that provides the Operation Administration and Maintenance (OAM) functionality for core network devices to their users. As depicted in Figure 1, the TOE is implemented based on a client/server architecture – the server functionality is located in the network device itself, while a client GUI – commonly referred to as Local Maintenance Terminal (LMT) – can be run on PCs for remote management of the device.
Physically, the server part of the TOE is located on an OMU board, a type of Universal Process Blade that is located within the network device. The TOE server communicates product-internally with application-specific boards (Network Elements) of the product in order to provide management and maintenance functionality for the device.

Remote communication between LMT client and the OMU of a device is based on TCP/IP. In addition to using the proprietary link between the LMT client software and the OMU, the OMU also serves a web interface – commonly referred to as WebUI – that remote users can access directly using their web browsers in order to obtain performance statistics, access the OMU via a console provided by a virtual KVM switch, perform software upgrades, and download a copy of the LMT GUI.

Also, a SOAP interface is available for communication with the operational environment (namely Huawei’s Enterprise Management System, a separate product offering), as well as an SNMPv3 interface.

Via these interfaces, the OMU offers management functionality for the network device. To be more precise, the LMT GUI implements security function management. The management functionality offered by the WebUI is not security-relevant in terms of the TOE – but authentication and communications security provided for the interface are.

The TOE supports Lawful Interception (LI) technology. CGP offers the management of LI functionality via X1/X2 channels. In particular, this includes the configuration of communication parameters that instruct CGP how to interoperate with a Lawful Interception Gateway (LIG) in the operational environment for exchanging control messages and alerts.

The TOE stores configuration data, such as user attributes and access control associations, as well as audit records, in a configuration database in the operational environment.

### 1.4.2 Physical scope

As depicted in Figure 1, the TOE is software only. It is used in a number of Huawei’s core network devices that are comprised of elements compatible with the Advanced Telecommunications Computing Architecture (ATCA). Within these networking devices, the OMU board hosting the server part of the TOE is a common board that is paired with different combinations of application-specific boards (network elements). The server part of the TOE is the actual Carrier Grade Platform software running on the OMU that implements the generic device management capabilities for these products.

The server part of the TOE depends on the following hard- and software in its operational environment:

- the cabinet (rack and subrack) housing the OMU and application-specific boards, comprising an actual network device product assembly
- the physical OMU board providing processing resources and physical interfaces
- the operating system running on the OMU, SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 10
- a database product used to store configuration and other maintenance data, Oracle Database 11g

The client part of the TOE is comprised of the LMT client, running on a designated LMT workstation. The web browser needed to access the web-based WebUI provided by the server is part of the operational environment.

The client part of the TOE depends on the following hard- and software in its operational environment:

- the workstation providing the processing resources and physical interfaces for the LMT client, or a web browser for access to the WebUI
- Windows 2000/XP/Vista as operating system

The TOE is distributed as a component of a larger product assembly, and the guidance that is part of the TOE is integrated into the product manuals of the individual product.

The product assemblies supported by this evaluation of CGP are:

- Huawei CSC3300, offering Call Session Control Functions for IMS networks
- Huawei HLR9820, offering Home Location Register functionality in mobile networks
- Huawei MSOFTX3000, a Mobile Softswitch Center for mobile networks
- Huawei SGSN9810, a GPRS Support Node for mobile networks
• Huawei ATS9900, a SIP Application Server in IMS network, offering Telephony services and IP Centrex services
• Huawei HSS9820, offering the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) and the Subscription Locator Function (SLF) in IMS networks

The LMT client is shipped with the respective network device.
Please note that the application-specific functionality offered by these product assemblies is not subject to this evaluation. The TOE is only concerned with the provision of operational and maintenance functionality that is common to these products.

1.4.3 Summary of Security Features

1.4.3.1 Authentication
The TOE authenticates its users via individual user names and passwords. The TOE is able to enforce password policies as well as "lockout" policies to deter password guessing attacks. Further, it is possible to limit login of specific users to specific time frames and to define expiry dates for accounts and passwords.

The TOE entertains two user domains: LI users and service users.
LI users differentiate between service users, i.e. the operators responsible for the day-to-day operation of the TOE, and LI users who can access the TOE in order to configure lawful interception functionality to be executed by network elements.

By means of implementing a separate user ID space described above, the TOE ensures that the realms of service and LI management are kept completely separate – service users do not know about the existence of and cannot interfere with the operations of LI users, and vice versa.

1.4.3.2 Access control
The TOE offers the management of network devices. The TOE implements access control that allows limitation of access both in terms of operations that a user is authorized to perform and in terms of objects that a user can perform these operations on.

The TOE allows the definition of User Groups, as well as Command Groups and Managed Object Groups, in order to define roles that can be assigned to users.

The TOE differentiates between service users and LI users by implementing a separate access control functionality for two user domains.

1.4.3.3 Communications security
The TOE offers SSL/TLS encryption for client communications with the WebUI, as well as for communication between the LMT client and the OMU and for communication between the operational environment and the TOE via SOAP.

The TOE is furthermore able to restrict session establishment to administrator-specified IP source addresses in LMT client requests.
CGP implements encryption for the FTPS protocol that allows users to access the FTP server hosted by CGP.

The TOE also implements encryption of the communication between its Lawful Interception module and a Lawful Interception Gateway in the operational environment, commonly referred to as the X1 / X2 interfaces.

1.4.3.4 Auditing
The TOE records and reviews audit data, which is stored in the database and it can be queried using TOE-provided tools (i.e., via the LMT client).

The TOE differentiates between service users and LI users, service users can use the LMT client to review the audit records available in the database for everything except LI-related actions. LI users can review only audit records related to LI functionality and actions initiated by LI users.
1.4.3.5 Security function management

The following means are provided by the TOE for management of security functionality:

- User and group management
- Access control management (by means of defining command groups, managed object groups, and association of users with particular managed elements, managed objects, and commands)
- Enabling/disabling of SSL for communications security.
- Enabling and disabling of the LI feature.

1.4.4 Logical Scope

1.4.4.1 Evaluated configuration

The evaluated configuration of CGP is based on the physical and logical scope and security functions described above. In addition, the following configuration specifics are applicable to the TOE:

- CGP supports standby configurations between two OMUs for the same product. This functionality has not been evaluated.
- CGP supports DES encryption for various communication channels, such as the channel between CGP and a Lawful Interception Gateway, for legacy reasons. This evaluation does not cover the use of the DES algorithm.
- CGP supports DES for encryption of configuration data. CGP must be configured so that AES is used instead of DES.
2 CC Conformance Claim

This ST is CC Part 2 conformant [CC] and CC Part 3 conformant [CC]. The CC version of [CC] is 3.1R3.

This ST is EAL3-conformant as defined in [CC] Part 3.

No conformance to a Protection Profile is claimed.
3 TOE Security Environment

3.1 Assets

The classification of the different data types is given in the following:

- **User data**: User Data is information stored in TOE resources that can be operated upon by users in accordance with the TSP and upon which the TSF places no special meaning. In this category falls all data that is not listed under TSF data since according to the CC, all data is either user or TSF data. For example, user data includes performance data collected from Managed Elements that the TOE makes available to users upon request.

- **TSF data**: TSF data is information used by the TSF in making TSP decisions:
  - audit records
  - configuration parameters (for auditing, authentication, access control, communications security, etc.)
  - Command Group definitions
  - Manage Authority and Operate Authority definitions
  - Source IP addresses in remote client session establishment requests
  - AES keys for encryption of X1/X2 communication channels
  - the **security attributes** given below for the objects they belong to:
    - for users:
      - passwords
      - unsuccessful authentication attempt since last successful authentication attempt counter
      - User Group membership
      - account expiration date
      - password expiration date
      - login start and end time
    - for Managed Objects:
      - Managed Object Group membership

3.2 Threats

The assumed security threats are listed below.

The **information assets** to be protected comprise the information stored, processed or generated by the TOE. This information contains configuration data for the network device that the TOE is a part of, TSF data (such as user account information and passwords, audit records, etc.) and other information that the TOE facilitates access to (such as performance data of the individual elements in the product).

The **threat agents** can be categorized as either:

1. A user (not a user of the TOE) who gets access to data communicated over unprotected networks ("remote attacker"). This person has no access to the TOE interfaces and no access to the system the TOE is integrated into.
2. A user (not a user of the TOE) who gains access to the TOE.
3. An authorized user of the TOE who has been granted authority to access certain information and perform certain actions.

In the first and second cases, the users are assumed to be potentially hostile with a clear motivation to get access to the data.

In the third case, all authorized users of the TOE are entrusted with performing certain administrative or management activities with regard to the managed device. Consequently, organizational means are expected to be in place to establish a certain amount of trust into these users. However,
accidental or casual attempts to perform actions or access data outside of their authorization are expected.

3.2.1 Threats

T.AccountabilityLoss
Records of security-relevant actions of users for forensic and accountability purpose are not created properly.

T.Eavesdrop
An eavesdropper (remote attacker) in the management network that is served by the TOE is able to intercept, and potentially modify or re-use, information assets that are exchanged between TOE (LMT) and non-TOE (WebUI) clients, and the TOE server part (OMU).

T.UnauthenticatedAccess
A user who is not a user of the TOE gains access to the TOE.

T.UnauthorizedAccess
A user of the TOE authorized to perform certain actions and access certain information gains access to commands or information he is not authorized to access.

3.3 Assumptions

3.3.1 Environment of use of the TOE

3.3.1.1 Physical

A.PhysicalProtection
It is assumed that the TOE and its operational environment (in particular, the network device that the TOE is a component of, but also the workstation that is hosting the client part of the TOE) are protected against unauthorized physical access.

3.3.1.2 Personnel

A.TrustworthyUsers
It is assumed that the organization responsible for the TOE and its operational environment has measures in place to establish trust into and train users of the TOE commensurate with the extent of authorization that these users are given on the TOE. (For example, super users and users that are assigned similar privileges are assumed to be fully trustworthy and capable of operating the TOE in a secure manner abiding by the guidance provided to them.)

3.3.1.3 Connectivity

A.NetworkSegregation
It is assumed that the network interfaces that allow access to the TOE’s user interfaces are in a management network that is separate from the application (or, public) networks that the network device hosting the TOE serves.

This includes the assumption that the operational environment implements measures that ensure that the source IP address in remote client session establishment requests has not been tampered with, and that no bogus OMU servers exist in the management network.

A.Support
The operational environment must provide the following supporting mechanisms to the TOE:

- Reliable time stamps for the generation of audit records.
- The database that stores the data of TOE must be protected and available.
4 Security Objectives

4.1 Objectives for the TOE

O.Audit  The TOE must be able to generate audit records for security-relevant events.

O.Communication  The TOE must implement logical protection measures for network communication between the server part of the TOE and both clients that are part of the TOE and that are part of the operational environment.

O.Authentication  The TOE must authenticate users of its user interfaces.

O.Authorization  The TOE must implement an access control mechanism to differentiate between different authorities for TOE users.

4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment

OE.Administration  Those responsible for the operation of the TOE and its operational environment must ensure that only authorized users have access to the OMU, and in particular to the part of the TOE and its data that is running on the OMU. This includes ensuring that audit records stored in the operational environment are protected against unauthorized access, and that cryptographic keys and certificates are properly managed to support the communications security mechanisms implemented by the TOE.

This also includes the restriction of physical access to the network device that contains the OMU to authorized personnel, and making the OMU unavailable to access from the consumer/application networks served by the network device.

The TOE must be operated in its evaluated configuration as specified in this ST and the guidance that is part of the TOE.

OE.Support  Those responsible for the operation of the TOE and its operational environment must ensure that the operational environment provides the following supporting mechanisms to the TOE:

- Reliable time stamps for the generation of audit records.
- The database that stores the data of TOE must be protected and available.

OE.Users  Those responsible for the operation of the TOE and its operational environment must be trustworthy, and trained such that they are capable of securely managing the TOE and following the provided guidance.

4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

4.3.1 Coverage

The following table provides a mapping of TOE objectives to threats and policies, showing that each objective is at least covered by one threat or policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Threat / Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O.Audit</td>
<td>T.AccountabilityLoss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.Communication</td>
<td>T.Eavesdrop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.Authentication</td>
<td>T.UnauthenticatedAccess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.Authorization</td>
<td>T.UnauthorizedAccess</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Mapping Objectives to Threats and Policies
The following table provides a mapping of the objectives for the operational environment to assumptions, threats and policies, showing that each objective is at least covered by one assumption, threat or policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Objective</th>
<th>Threat / Assumption / Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OE.Administration</td>
<td>A.NetworkSegregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A.PhysicalProtection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OE.Support</td>
<td>A.Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OE.Users</td>
<td>A.TrustworthyUsers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Mapping Objectives for the Environment to Threats, Assumptions and Policies

### 4.3.2 Sufficiency

The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives are suitable to counter each individual threat and that each security objective tracing back to a threat, when achieved, actually contributes to the removal, diminishing or mitigation of that threat:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Rationale for security objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T.AccountabilityLoss</td>
<td>The threat that records of security-relevant actions are not created properly is countered by a requirement to generate audit records for such events (O.Audit). The generation of audit records is supported by the operating system on the OMU providing reliable time stamps to the TOE (OE.Support).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.Eavesdrop</td>
<td>The threat of eavesdropping is countered by requiring communications security for network communication between clients and the TOE (O.Communication).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.UnauthenticatedAccess</td>
<td>The threat of unauthenticated access to the TOE or its data is countered by requiring the TOE to implement an authentication mechanism for its users (O.Authentication).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.UnauthorizedAccess</td>
<td>The threat of unauthorized access is countered by requiring the TOE to implement an access control mechanism (O.Authorization).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Sufficiency analysis for threats

The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives for the environment are suitable to cover each individual assumption, that each security objective for the environment that traces back to an assumption about the environment of use of the TOE, when achieved, actually contributes to the environment achieving consistency with the assumption, and that if all security objectives for the environment that trace back to an assumption are achieved, the intended usage is supported:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumption</th>
<th>Rationale for security objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.NetworkSegregation</td>
<td>The assumption that the TOE is not accessible via the application networks hosted by the networking device is addressed by requiring just this in OE.Administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.PhysicalProtection</td>
<td>The assumption that the TOE will be protected against unauthorized physical access is expressed by a corresponding requirement in OE.Administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.Support</td>
<td>Assumptions on support for the TOE’s security functionality provided by the operational environment are addressed in OE.Support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.TrustworthyUsers</td>
<td>The assumption that users are trained and trustworthy is expressed by a corresponding requirement in OE.Users.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Sufficiency analysis for assumptions
5 Extended Components Definition

No extended components have been defined for this ST.
6 Security Requirements

6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following table shows the Security functional requirements for the TOE, and the operations performed on the components according to CC part 2: iteration (Iter.), refinement (Ref.), assignment (Ass.) and selection (Sel.). Typographical distinctions are used throughout this chapter in the reproduction of the SFRs to further identify these operations: assignments and selections are formatted in **bold**, refinements in *bold and italics*, and iterations by appending an alphabetic counter (a, b, c, ...) to the component identifier.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Audit (FAU)</td>
<td>FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation</td>
<td>FAU_GEN.1</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FAU_GEN.2 User identity association</td>
<td>FAU_GEN.2</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FAU_SAR.1 Audit review</td>
<td>FAU_SAR.1</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review</td>
<td>FAU_SAR.3</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss</td>
<td>FAU_STG.3</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptographic Support (FCS)</td>
<td>FCS_COP.1: Cryptographic operation</td>
<td>FCS_COP.1</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User Data Protection (FDP)</td>
<td>FDP_ACC.1: Subset access control</td>
<td>FDP_ACC.1</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FDP_ACF.1: Security attribute based access control</td>
<td>FDP_ACF.1</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification and Authentication (FIA)</td>
<td>FIA_AFL.1: Authentication failure handling</td>
<td>FIA_AFL.1</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FIA_ATD.1: User attribute definition</td>
<td>FIA_ATD.1</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FIA_SOS.1: Verification of secrets</td>
<td>FIA_SOS.1</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FIA_UAU.2: User authentication before any action</td>
<td>FIA_UAU.2</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FIA_UID.2: User identification before any action</td>
<td>FIA_UID.2</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Management (FMT)</td>
<td>FMT_MSA.1: Management of security attributes</td>
<td>FMT_MSA.1</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FMT_MSA.3: Static attribute initialization</td>
<td>FMT_MSA.3</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FMT_MSA.3: Static attribute initialization</td>
<td>FMT_MSA.3a</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FMT_MSA.3: Static attribute initialization</td>
<td>FMT_MSA.3b</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions</td>
<td>FMT_SMF.1</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of the TSF (FPT)</td>
<td>FPT_ITT.1: Basic internal TSF data transfer protection</td>
<td>FPT_ITT.1</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOE Access (FTA)</td>
<td>FTA_TSE.1: TOE session establishment</td>
<td>FTA_TSE.1</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)</td>
<td>FTP_TRP.1: Trusted path</td>
<td>FTP_TRP.1</td>
<td>CC Part 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Security Functional Requirements of the TOE

6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)

6.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;

b) All auditable events for the **not specified** level of audit; and

c) The following auditable events:

   i. user activity
      1. login, logout
      2. operation (MML command) requests
   
   ii. user management
      1. locking, unlocking (manual or automatic)
      2. add, delete, modify
      3. group membership change
      4. password change
      5. management authority change
      6. operation authority change
      7. online user query
      8. session termination
   
   iii. user group management
      1. add, delete, modify
      2. management authority change
      3. operation authority change
   
   iv. command group management
      1. add, delete, modify
   
   v. authentication policy modification
   
   vi. workstation management
      1. modification of access list
   
   vii. system management
      1. reset to factory settings
      2. LI function enabled, disabled
   
   viii. log management
      1. log policy modification
   
   ix. LI information management
      1. modification of configuration settings

The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, interface (if applicable), workstation IP (if applicable), Managed Element ID (if applicable), and MML command name (if applicable).

6.1.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each audit event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

6.1.1.3 FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide users authorized per FDP_ACF.1 with the capability to read all information from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

6.1.1.4 FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to apply querying of audit data based on date and time range, user ID, terminal, Managed Element ID, interface, and/or result.

6.1.1.5 FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.3.1 The TSF shall transfer the oldest 10,000 audit records into a file stored on the underlying OS if the audit trail in the database exceeds 200,000 entries.

6.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
6.1.2.1 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform symmetric de- and encryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES (CBC mode) and cryptographic key sizes 128 bits that meet the following: FIPS 197.

6.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP)
6.1.3.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the CGP access control policy on users as subjects, Managed Elements and Managed Objects of Managed Elements as objects, and commands and queries issued by the subjects targeting the objects.

6.1.3.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the CGP access control policy to objects based on the following:
   a) users and their following security attributes:
      i. user type (service user or LI user)
      ii. User Group membership
      iii. ME authorizations
   b) Managed Elements and their following security attributes:
      i. Command Groups
   c) Managed Objects and their following security attributes:
      i. Managed Object Group
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

a) If the user is a service user, the request is granted if:
   i. the user, or a User Group that the user is a member of, has been granted ME authorization for the Managed Element targeted by the request, and
   ii. the user, or a User Group that the user is a member of, is associated with a Command Group of the Managed Element targeted that contains the requested command, and
   iii. the user, or a User Group that the user is a member of, is associated with a Managed Object Group for the Managed Object targeted; and if a configuration change is requested, the requested parameter is within the range authorized by the Managed Object Group definition

b) If the user is an LI user, the request is granted if:
   i. the user has been granted ME authorization for the Managed Element targeted by the request, and
   ii. the user is member of a User Group that is authorized to perform the requested command or query

FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

a) If the user is a service user and is the super user requesting a service operation, access is granted without performing the checks in FDP_ACF.1.2 a).

FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

a) Service users cannot
   i. perform LI operations
   ii. disable the TOE’s LI feature

b) LI users cannot
   i. perform service operations
   ii. enable the TOE’s LI feature

6.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

6.1.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within 1 and 5 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to login event since the last successful authentication of the indicated user identity and before the counter for these attempts is reset after an administrator configurable time frame either between 1 and 60 minutes or “never”, and only if the user is not the super user.

FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been surpassed, the TSF shall lockout the account for an administrator configurable duration either between 1 and 1440 minutes or “indefinitely”.

6.1.4.2 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition

FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users:
a) user ID
b) user type (service user or LI user)
c) password
d) unsuccessful authentication attempt since last successful authentication attempt counter
e) User Group membership
f) ME authorizations
g) account expiration date
h) password expiration date
i) login start and end time.

6.1.4.3 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet:
   a) if enabled, an administrator configurable minimum length between 6 and 32 characters, and
   b) if enabled, an administrator configurable combination of the following:
      i. at least one lower-case alphanumerical character,
      ii. at least one upper-case alphanumerical character,
      iii. at least one numerical character,
      iv. at least one special character.

6.1.4.4 FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

6.1.4.5 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

6.1.5 Security Management (FMT)

6.1.5.1 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the CGP access control policy to restrict the ability to query, modify the security attributes identified in FDP_ACF.1 and FIA_ATD.1 to administrator-defined roles, service user super users.

6.1.5.2 FMT_MSA.3a Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.3.1a The TSF shall enforce the CGP access control policy to provide permissive default values for security attributes Managed Object Group membership(all service users are associated with the “PUBLIC” MOG by default) that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2a The TSF shall allow administrator-defined roles, service user super users to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
6.1.5.3 FMT_MSA.3b  Static attribute initialisation

FMT_MSA.3.1b The TSF shall enforce the CGP access control policy to provide restrictive default values for security attributes User Group membership that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT_MSA.3.2b The TSF shall allow administrator-defined roles, service user super users to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

6.1.5.4 FMT_SMF.1  Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

a) configuration of authentication failure handling policy
b) configuration of password policy
c) user management (creation, deletion, modification of lockout status or password, User Group membership)
d) definition of Managed Object Groups and Command Groups
e) definition of IP addresses and address ranges that will be accepted as source addresses in client session establishment requests
f) enabling/disabling of the TOE’s LI feature.

6.1.5.5 FMT_SMR.1  Security roles

FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles

a) service user
b) service user super user
c) LI user
d) administrator-defined roles, i.e. defined by association of service users with User Groups, Command Groups, and Managed Object Groups, or by association of LI users with User Groups.

FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

6.1.6.1 FPT_ITT.1  Basic internal TSF data transfer protection

FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure, modification when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.

6.1.7 TOE access (FTA)

6.1.7.1 FTA_TSE.1  TOE session establishment

FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on

a) account expiration date
b) password expiration date
c) login start and end time
d) source IP address.
6.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

6.1.8.1 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path

FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and remote users of the WebUI that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from modification, disclosure.

FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit remote users to initiate communication via the trusted path.

FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial user authentication, remote management.

6.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale

6.2.1 Coverage

The following table provides a mapping of SFR to the security objectives, showing that each security functional requirement addresses at least one security objective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Functional Requirements</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAU_GEN.1</td>
<td>O.Audit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAU_GEN.2</td>
<td>O.Audit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAU_SAR.1</td>
<td>O.Audit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAU_SAR.3</td>
<td>O.Audit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAU_STG.3</td>
<td>O.Audit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS_COP.1</td>
<td>O.Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP_ACC.1</td>
<td>O.Authorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP_ACF.1</td>
<td>O.Authorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIA_AFL.1</td>
<td>O.Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIA_ATD.1</td>
<td>O.Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIA_ATD.1</td>
<td>O.Authorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIA_SOS.1</td>
<td>O.Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIA_UAU.2</td>
<td>O.Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIA_UID.2</td>
<td>O.Audit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIA_UID.2</td>
<td>O.Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIA_UID.2</td>
<td>O.Authorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMT_MSA.1</td>
<td>O.Authorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMT_MSA.3a</td>
<td>O.Authorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMT_MSA.3b</td>
<td>O.Authorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMT_SMF.1</td>
<td>O.Audit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMT_SMF.1</td>
<td>O.Authentic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMT_SMF.1</td>
<td>O.Authorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMT_SMF.1</td>
<td>O.Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMT_SMR.1</td>
<td>O.Authorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPT_ITT.1</td>
<td>O.Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA_TSE.1</td>
<td>O.Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTP_TRP.1</td>
<td>O.Communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Mapping SFRs to objectives
6.2.2 Sufficiency

The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE, showing that the security functional requirements are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security objectives</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O.Audit</td>
<td>The generation of audit records is implemented by FAU_GEN.1. Audit records are supposed to include user identities (FAU_GEN.2) where applicable, which are supplied by the authentication mechanism (FIA_UID.2). Since the TOE generates audit records in a binary format, tools are provisioned to read and search these records (FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3). Functionality to swap audit records into the file system is provided if the amount of records in the database becomes too large (FAU_STG.3). Management functionality for the audit mechanism is spelled out in FMT_SMF.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.Communication</td>
<td>Communications security is implemented by the establishment of a secure communications channel between TOE parts in FPT_ITT.1, and a trusted path for remote users in FTP_TRP.1. FCS_COP.1 addresses the AES encryption of X1/X2 channels. Management functionality to enable these mechanisms is provided in FMT_SMF.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.Authentication</td>
<td>User authentication is implemented by FIA_UAU.2 and supported by individual user identities in FIA_UID.2. The necessary user attributes (passwords) are spelled out in FIA_ATD.1. The authentication mechanism supports authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1), restrictions as to the validity of accounts for logon (FTA_TSE.1), and a password policy (FIA_SOS.1). Management functionality is provided in FMT_SMF.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.Authorization</td>
<td>The requirement for access control is spelled out in FDP_ACC.1, and the access control policies are modeled in FDP_ACF.1. Unique user IDs are necessary for access control provisioning (FIA_UID.2), and user-related attributes are spelled out in FIA_ATD.1. Access control is based on the definition of roles (FMT_SMR.1), and management functionality for the definition of access control policies is provided (FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3a, FMT_MSA.3b, FMT_SMF.1).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: SFR sufficiency analysis

6.2.3 Security Requirements Dependency Rationale

Dependencies within the EAL3 package selected for the security assurance requirements have been considered by the authors of CC Part 3 and are not analyzed here again.

The security functional requirements in this Security Target do not introduce dependencies on any security assurance requirement; neither do the security assurance requirements in this Security Target introduce dependencies on any security functional requirement.

The following table demonstrates the dependencies of SFRs modeled in CC Part 2 and how the SFRs for the TOE resolve those dependencies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Functional Requirement</th>
<th>Dependencies</th>
<th>Resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAU_GEN.1</td>
<td>FPT_STM.1</td>
<td>Not resolved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Time stamps are provided to the TOE by the operational environment. This is spelled out in A.Support / OE.Support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAU_GEN.2</td>
<td>FIA_UID.1</td>
<td>FIA_UID.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAU_SAR.1</td>
<td>FAU_GEN.1</td>
<td>FAU_GEN.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAU_SAR.3</td>
<td>FAU_SAR.1</td>
<td>FAU_SAR.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAU_STG.3</td>
<td>FAU_STG.1</td>
<td>Not resolved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Audit records are stored in (and protected by) the operational environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS_COP.1</td>
<td>[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]</td>
<td>Not resolved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FCS_CKM.4</td>
<td>Keys are configured manually by administrators and stored in the configuration database. They may be deleted or replaced in the database, i.e. key destruction is addressed in the operational environment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 6.3 Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirements for the TOE are the Evaluation Assurance Level 3 components as specified in [CC] Part 3. No operations are applied to the assurance components.

### 6.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

The evaluation assurance level has been chosen commensurate with the threat environment that is experienced by typical consumers of the TOE.
7 TOE Summary Specification

7.1 TOE Security Functionality

7.1.1 Authentication
The TOE differentiates between service users and Lawful Interception (LI) users, as further described in section 7.1.2. The authentication mechanism for both types of users is the same, but user and policy management for the two realms is separated as described below.

The TOE authenticates the users of its user interfaces based on individual user IDs and passwords. User IDs are unique within the TOE and stored together with associated passwords and other (security) attributes in the TOE’s configuration database.

In order to avoid collisions in the name space for service users and Lawful Interception (LI) users (see also section 7.1.2), LI user IDs are always preceded by “tt”.

For service users, authorized administrators are able to configure a system-wide password policy that is then enforced by the TOE. Besides the minimum length of the password, which can be set to be between 6 and 32 characters, administrators have the option to enforce the use of specific characters (numeric, alphanumeric low or capital, and special characters).

A separate policy with the same configuration options can be specified for LI users.

The TOE also offers the enforcement of permanent or timer-based account lockouts: administrators can specify after how many consecutively failed authentication attempts an account will be permanently or temporarily locked, and whether the counter for failed attempts will be reset automatically after a certain amount of minutes. Separate policies with the same configuration options exist for both service users and LI users.

If applicable, i.e., if an administrator has specified values for these parameters for a specific user, the TOE will deny authentication of the user if the number of “account valid days” configured for the user has been exceeded, if the password has not been changed within the timeframe specified in the “password valid days” configuration for the user, or if the user tries to authenticate in a timeframe that lies outside of the “login start time” and “login end time” specified for the user.

Authentication based on user name and password is enforced prior to any other interaction with the TOE for all external interfaces of the TOE, namely the MML interface (typically accessed via the LMT GUI by service and LI users), the Web UI used by service users, the LI interface used by a Lawful Interception Gateway, as well as the SOAP interface used by remote service users.

(FIA_AFL.1, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, FTA_TSE.1)

7.1.2 Access control
Access control is enforced on two levels:

On a high level, the TOE differentiates between service users and lawful interception (LI) users. Service users do not have any access to LI functionality or configuration data, and vice versa. Depending on the type of user, the corresponding access control mechanism below applies.

The LI functionality of the TOE can be en- and disabled. If the LI functionality is disabled, only authorized administrators from the service user population can enable it. If the LI functionality is enabled, only authorized administrators from the LI user population can disable it.

The operations of LI users and service users are completely separated in the TOE on a logical basis. As far as security functionality is concerned, the management functionality available to both service and LI users is widely the same: user populations can be managed the same for both user types, password policies and account lockout policies can be defined separately for LI users and service users, and audit record are created in both “realms” and then made available to authorized users of the respective realm: service users can review records related to service operations (such as, actions initiated by service users for the configuration of network elements) but not related to LI operations (such as, definition of interception targets), and vice versa.

LI users cannot logon to the TOE if the LI functionality is disabled.
7.1.2.1 Access control – service users

The TOE controls which operations users can perform on Managed Elements.

Managed Elements (MEs) are logical representations of product units that can be managed using the TOE. For example, the TOE itself (CGP) is a ME. The individual network elements that the product is comprised of, such as a signaling unit, are Managed Elements. The racks and subracks holding the network and management elements are Managed Elements. Etc. MEs are identified by a unique, vendor-specified ID within the product.

Each Managed Element contains one or more Managed Objects (MOs) that are associated with a number of tables in the configuration database that specify parameters for these objects (for example, IP addresses for the network ports that an ME might have).

Access control is enforced three-fold:

- Managed Element authorization: operators can be authorized to see a Managed Element (for example, when listing the available MEs in a system)
- Operation authorization: operators can be authorized to perform specific commands on a Managed Element (for example, DSP COMM to display the status of communication links of a ME)
- Managed Object authorization: operators can be authorized to modify objects of (configuration data for) a Managed Element (for example, SET ALMLVL to set the severity of specific alarms that can be generated on an ME)

In order to implement role-based access control, users can be grouped into User Groups. Users and User Groups can be given ME authorization (also referred to as “Manage Authority” or “ME rights”) for specific Managed Elements. This merely represents the fact that users are authorized to know about the existence of the ME (the ME will show up in lists, etc.) – additional authorization to perform any specific management commands on the ME (and their objects) are then assigned in separate steps.

The Operation authorization specifies the MML commands a user can execute on a specific ME, such as “LST ME” to list all Managed Elements present (in fact, all MEs the user has “Manage Authority” for) and “ADD USER” to add a new OMU user (if the ME in question is the OMU itself). This authorization is implemented by means of Command Groups:

Authorized administrators can define Command Groups for Managed Elements, containing a subset of the available MML commands. Users or User Groups can be assigned to these Command Groups, which grants them the right to execute the specified commands on the specified ME. Managed Elements come with pre-defined Command Groups, such as “Alarm Management Command Group” and “Performance Query Command Group”. These can be modified or deleted by authorized administrators, who can also create additional Command Groups to reflect operational needs.

Lastly, the TOE allows authorized administrators to specify Managed Object Groups (MOGs), which define for a specific Managed Element the Managed Objects of the ME that a user is authorized to manage, and potential configuration limits that define limits for configuration parameters for these objects. By default, the TOE comes pre-configured with a Managed Object Group called “PUBLIC”, and all Managed Elements and their objects (without configuration limits) are part of this group. Newly created users are automatically assigned the PUBLIC MOG, which means that – unless further granularity is desired and administrators either change members of the PUBLIC MOG or dis-associate the PUBLIC MOG from a user – access control can be abstracted to the management of ME authorization and Operation authorization.

As a result, authorized administrators who add new users to the system must specify which MEs these users are allowed to see (ME authorization) and which Command Groups for these MEs the users belong to (with “none” and “all” being valid assignments), and can specify which Managed Object Groups they belong to if the default PUBLIC assignment is not desired.

Command Groups and MOGs can also be assigned to User Groups instead of individual users.

A few service users in the TOE are associated with special roles:

- A service level super user exists who is not subject to any access control on the service user level. While the user name for this user can be changed, the exemption of the user from access control enforcement can not.
• An EMS and a NMS user exist for EMS and NMS systems connecting to the TOE. These systems provide network management functionality to their users and, by default and when enabled, are authorized to perform a subset of commands on all MEs without limitations. In other words: They have ME authorization for all MEs, Operation authorization for a specific set of commands, and are associated with the PUBLIC MOG.

(FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FIA_ATD.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMR.1)

7.1.2.2 Access control – LI users

The access control mechanism for LI users works as follows:

• Three pre-defined User Groups (Administrators, Operators, Users) exist. They define the commands that a LI user can execute. (For example, only members of the Administrators group can manage other LI users.)
• ME authorizations are implemented in the same fashion as for service users. LI users can be authorized to perform the operations granted by their User Group association on specific MEs.

A few LI users in the TOE are associated with special roles:

• A hard-coded user tt/Admin exists who is a member of the Administrator Group, and thus, can perform all management commands that are available to LI users.
• A LIG user exists that is used to authenticate the LI Gateway in the operational environment that can be used to set up and monitor lawful interception activities.

(FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMR.1)

7.1.3 Communications security

The TOE provides communications security for network connections to the OMU. This includes connections via the following interfaces:

• MML connections between LMT clients and the OMU (using SSL/TLS)
• SOAP connections between the operational environment (EMS server) and the OMU (using SSL/TLS)
• HTTPS connections between WebUI and the OMU (using SSL/TLS)
• FTPS between the operational environment and the OMU (using SSL/TLS)
• XI / X2 interface between the LIG in the operational environment and the OMU (using AES)

The SSL/TLS cipher suites supported for SSL connections are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cipher suite</th>
<th>TLS 1.0</th>
<th>TLS 1.1</th>
<th>SSL 3.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA</td>
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<td>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA</td>
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For communication between the TOE’s LI module and a Lawful Interception Gateway in the operational environment via so called X1 (control instructions) and X2 (event notification) channels, the TOE implements AES encryption as defined in FCS_COP.1:

The TOE and the LIG agree on a randomly generated AES session key that is exchanged in an AES-encrypted message using a FixKey, a static key configured by administrators via the LMT interface and stored in the TOE’s configuration database.

Also, the TOE will deny session establishment requests from LMT clients whose IP source address is not part of an administrator-defined list of IP addresses and subnets (referred to as "workstations"). Separate lists for service users and LI users exist.

(FCS_COP.1, FPT_ITT.1, FTA_TSE.1, FTP_TRP.1)

7.1.4 Auditing

The TOE generates audit records for security-relevant events. (Please refer to FAU_GEN.1 for a list of event types, and the type of information recorded.) Where appropriate, the data recorded with each audit record includes the unique user ID associated with a subject during authentication.

The auditing functionality of the TOE cannot be started or stopped independently from the operational TOE. However, the TOE generates audit records for the start and shutdown of CGP, and of its individual subsystems.

Out of the audit logs that the TOE generates, the following to comprise the logs relevant for the security functionality modeled in this ST:

- an operation log, containing the audit records for particular MML operations performed by service users
- a security log, containing audit records for security-related events, such as user login and management

These logs are stored in the operational environment, i.e. in the database that is used by CGP to store configuration and other data. If the audit records stored in any of the logs exceed 200,000 entries, the TOE will extract the oldest 10,000 records from the database and transfer them into a flat file in the operational environment in order to keep the database from overflowing.

Service users can use the LMT client to review the audit records available in the database for everything except LI-related actions. LI users can review only audit records related to LI functionality and actions initiated by LI users. The client offers search functionality based on time intervals, user IDs, interface, workstation IP, result, ME ID, and command name (in case of MML commands).

(FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3, FAU_STG.3)

7.1.5 Security function management

The TOE offers management functionality for its security functions, where appropriate. This is partially already addressed in more detail in the previous sections of the TSS, but includes:

- User management, including User Group memberships, passwords, account lockout, validity periods for an account and/or password, etc.
- Access control management, including the definition of Managed Object Groups, Command Groups, and the association of users and User Groups with Managed Elements, Managed Object Groups, and Command Groups in Manage Authority and Operate Authority relationships.
- Enabling/disabling of SSL for the communication between LMT clients and the OMU.
- Defining IP addresses and address ranges for clients that are allowed to connect to the OMU server.
- Configuration of a FixKey (static key) stored in the TOE’s configuration database and used for the negotiation of session keys for LI traffic encryption.
• Enabling and disabling of the LI feature.
All of these management options are typically available both via the LMT GUI and the MML CLI. (FMT_SMF.1)
8 Abbreviations, Terminology and References

8.1 Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Common Criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>Carrier Grade Platform</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLI</td>
<td>Command Line Interface</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUI</td>
<td>Graphical User Interface</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Identifier</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMS</td>
<td>IP Multimedia Subsystem</td>
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<tr>
<td>LI</td>
<td>Lawful Interception</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMT</td>
<td>Local Maintenance Terminal</td>
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<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>Managed Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>MML</td>
<td>Man Machine Interface</td>
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<td>MOG</td>
<td>Managed Object Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NE</td>
<td>Network Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAM</td>
<td>Operation Administration and Maintenance</td>
</tr>
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<td>OMU</td>
<td>Operation and Management Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Protection Profile</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDBMS</td>
<td>Relational Database Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFR</td>
<td>Security Functional Requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLES</td>
<td>SuSE Linux Enterprise Server</td>
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<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Security Target</td>
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<td>TOE</td>
<td>Target of Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSF</td>
<td>TOE Security Functions</td>
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</table>

8.2 Terminology

This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning specific to this document. Terms defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise.

**Administrator:** An administrator is a user of the TOE who may have been assigned specific administrative privileges within the TOE. This ST may use the term administrator occasionally in an informal context, and not in order to refer to a specific role definition – from the TOE’s point of view, an administrator is simply a user who is authorized to perform certain administrative actions on the TOE and the objects managed by the TOE.

**LI User:** A user in the Lawful Interception realm of the TOE. Those users are managed separately from Service Users of the TOE.

**Managed Element**
Operational unit of a product. For example, a signaling or switching unit.

**Managed Element authorization**
Authorization to access/see a Managed Element. See section 7.1.2.

**Managed Object**
Objects of a Managed Element that can be configured or queried. (E.g., a network interface.)

**Managed Object authorization**
Authorization to modify objects of a Managed Element. See section 7.1.2.
Operator  

See User.

Operation authorization

Authorization to perform a specific command on a Managed Element. See section 7.1.2.

Service User:

A user in the service realm of the TOE. Those users are responsible for the operational management of the TOE and the products managed by the TOE from the carrier perspective. They are managed separately from the Lawful Interception (LI) Users of the TOE.

User:

A user is a human or a product/application using the TOE.

8.3 References
