

SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0

ASSURANCE CONTINUITY MAINTENANCE REPORT

Certification No. : KECS-ISIS-0271a-2010

December 2010



National Intelligence Service IT Security Certification Center

1. TOE

SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0

2. Data of Application

3 December 2010

3. Data of Activity

31 December 2010

4. Overview

The change is that IC Chip (Samsung S3CT9KC) as a platform of the TOE is simply added. S3CT9KC and S3CT9KW are almost the same except EEPROM size. The change to the certified product has no effect on assurance.

Therefore, the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report KECS-ISIS-0271-2010 is maintained for this version of the product.

This report is an addendum to Certification Report KECS-ISIS-0271-2010

5. Changes to TOE

The IC Chip (Samsung S3CT9KC) as a platform of the TOE is added, but the security relevant implementations (source code) for the TOE are not changed. The reason is that S3CT9KC and S3CT9KW are almost the same except EEPROM size. The difference between S3CT9KW and S3CT9KC is the following table.

	S3CT9KW	S3CT9KC
CR No.	BSI-DSZ-CC-0639-2010	BSI-DSZ-CC-0639-2010-MA-01 ※ Maintenance version of S3CT9KW
EAL	EAL5+(ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5)	EAL5+(ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5)

Main H/W Elements	16bit SecuCalm16 CPU	16bit SecuCalm16 CPU
	384 kB ROM	384 kB ROM
	144 kB EEPROM	80 kB EEPROM
	8 interrupt source/vectors	8 interrupt source/vectors
	6 + 2.5(crypto) kB RAM	6 + 2.5(crypto) kB RAM
	Built-in DES/TDES	Built-in DES/TDES
	Built-in AES	Built-in AES
	Tornado 2Mx2	Tornado 2Mx2
16-bit TRNG&DRNG	16-bit TRNG&DRNG	

6. Assessment

The vendor for SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0 submitted and IAR [2] to IT Security Certification Center of NIS for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy the requirements outlined in the document Assurance Continuity [1]. The IAR includes the following items;

- A. The changes made to the certified TOE
- B. The evidence updated as a result of the changes and,
- C. The security impact of the changes

The vendor added S3CT9KC as H/W platform of SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0.

S3CT9KW was certified by BSI (BSI-DSZ-CC-0639-2010) and the assurance for S3CT9KC was maintained by BSI (BSI-DSZ-CC-0639-2010-MA-01).

The TOE with S3CT9KC is correctly operated and meets all the SFRs in its security target.

7. Conclusion

The change to the TOE is that the IC Chip (Samsung S3CT9KC) as a platform of the TOE is added. There were editorially updated in some evidences due to add H/W platform (S3CT9KC). Examination of the evidence indicates that the change performed is limited to the following documents.

- SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0 Security Target V1.01
- SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0 Security Architecture V1.01
- SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0 Functional Specification V1.01
- SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0 Implementation V1.01
- SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0 TOE Design Document V1.21
- SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0 Test V1.01
- SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0 Test Plan V0.6
- SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0 Life Cycle Support Document V1.34
- SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0 User Operation Manual V1.01

Consideration of the nature of the change leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a minor change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance

Therefore, IT Security Certification Center of NIS agrees that the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report [3] is maintained for this version of the product.

8. References

- [1] Common Criteria document CCIMB-2004-02-2009 “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements”, version 1.0, February 2004
- [2] Security Impact Analysis Report, “SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0 Security Impact Analysis Report”, version 1.0, December 2010
- [3] Certification Report, “SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0 CR(KECS-ISIS-0271-2010)”, October 2010
- [4] Security Target of SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0, version 1.0, July 2010(confidential document)
- [5] Evaluation Technical Report, “SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0 ETR”, version 1.0, August 2010, KISA(confidential document)
- [6] Security Target Lite of SAMSUNG SDS SPass V2.0, version 1.01, December 2010