# SERTIT-015 MR Maintenance Report

Issue 1.0, 17 January 2014.

Thales Trusted Security Filter - TSF 101

Software version: 3AQ 21850 CAAA version 3.1.1
Hardware versions 3AQ 21564 AAAA ICS5, -ICS5A, -ICS6, -ICS6A, -ICS6B -ICS7, -ICS7A, -ICS7B

1. Introduction

The certified TOE was evaluated according to Common Criteria version 2.3 and Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5 augmented with ALC_FLR.3.

The IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF/EVIT) was Secode Norge AS.

The sponsor/developer is Thales Norway AS. The Security Developer Analyst at Thales Norway for this Maintenance process was Bent Larsen.

Thales Norway submitted an Impact Analysis Report (IAR) [5] to SERTIT on December 17th 2013. The IAR is intended to satisfy requirements outlined in version 1.0 of the Common Criteria document CCIMB-2004-02-009: Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes the changes made to the TOE.

2. Certified TOE identification:

Thales Trusted Security Filter - TSF 101 with

Software version:

- 3AQ 21850 CAAA 2.1.4

Hardware versions:

- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ICS5
- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ICS5A
- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ICS6
- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ICS6A
- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ICS6B
- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ISC7
- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ICS7A
- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ISC7B

Documents:

[1] Trusted Security Filter Security Target, 3AQ 21840 AAAA SCZZA Ed. 2.2, 28 October 2009.
[2] SERTIT-015 CR Certification Report, Issue 1.0, 03 May 2010
[3] SERTIT-015 C Certificate, Issue 1.0, 03 May 2010
[4] Evaluation Technical Report, Common Criteria EAL5 re-evaluation of Thales – Trusted Security Filter – TSF 101, S23.23/20.06, Issue1.2 23.03.2010

3. Maintained TOE identification

Thales Trusted Security Filter - TSF 101 with

Software version:

- 3AQ 21850 CAAA 3.1.1

Hardware versions:

- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ICS5
- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ICS5A
- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ICS6
- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ICS6A
- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ICS6B
- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ISC7
- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ICS7A
- 3AQ 21564 AAAA ISC7B

Documents:

[5] TSF 101 Impact Analysis Report SERTIT-015 3AQ 21840 CAAA IAR Ed. 3.1.2, 15 January 2014
[6] TSF 101 Security Target, 3AQ 21840 AAAA SCZZA Ed. 3.1.1, 18 November 2013.
[7] TSF 101 Security Design - part 1, 3AQ 21840 CAAA Ed. 3.1.
[8] TSF 101 Security Design - part 2, 3AQ 21841 CAAA Ed. 3.1.
[9] SERTIT-015 MR Maintenance Report, Issue 1.0, 17 January 2014 (This document).

4. Description of Changes

The TSF 101 hardware is unchanged.

Change related to the TSF 101 software (Change ID C5288):

Customer requirements define a new set of messages which shall be allowed to pass through the filtering mechanism in the TSF 101, i.e. another filter setting.

UDP:

- The software filtering mechanism is updated in accordance with the new set of messages in order to test relevant parameters in each message

Summary of new functionality:

NTP:

- This is a new function, but the specified messages are all sent in UDP packets and relevant parameters are therefore tested by the filter.

Multicast:

- This is a new function, but the specified messages are all sent as UDP multicast packets and relevant parameters are therefore tested by the filter.

IGMP:

- This is a new protocol necessary for the Multicast function. However IGMP is sent from Black to Red side of the filter only and therefore the messages will not be tested.

5. Affected Developer Evidence

Affected item	Modification purpose	Modification description
TSF 101 Security Target	Reflecting the new variant of the TOE reflecting the new message set	The new customised variant of the TSF 101 software is included in the TOE specification. The TOE "Security Target" document now lists all customised variants of the TSF 101 software. It is emphasised that one and only one of the variants can be active at any given time.
TSF 101 Document status list	Reflecting all new editions of related documents	Version updated for the documents changed to reflect the new version of the CAAA variant of the TSF 101..
TSF 101 Security Design - part 1	At security level "BEGRENSET": Reflecting the basic design description for the new message set	Added table describing the new message set. Added table describing the layout of the firewall's message statistics for the new message set.
TSF 101 Security Design - part 2	At security level "KONFIDENSIELLT": Reflecting the detailed design description for the new message set	Included the new message set in the filtering mechanism. Detailed description of each message in the new set, including which parameters that will be checked. Added new chapter with pseudo code description of the filtering mechanism for the new message set. Covert channel calculations for the new message set.
TSF 101 Requirement Specification	Specifies the requirements for the handling of the new messages	Included reference to message specification for the new set of messages and selection of corresponding filter.
TSF 101 Source Code	Configuration of the filtering software in accordance with customer needs	The filtering software is modified to test relevant parameters in the new customer specified message set. The basic of the software architecture is not changed.
TSF 101 Module Test Results	Document the module test results	Mandatory log of the results from the module tests with the new version of the TSF 101 filtering software.
TSF 101 Integration Test Specification & Log	Document the integration test results	Mandatory log of the results from the integration tests with the new version of the TSF 101 filtering software.
TSF 101 System Test Specification & Log	Document the system test results	Mandatory log of the results from the system tests with the new version of the TSF 101 filtering software.

6. Conclusion

Customer requirements to the set of messages allowed to pass through the TSF 101 product's filtering mechanism cause changes in the TSF 101 software.

The TOE's security functionality described by the Security Function Requirements specified in the ST [1] is not affected by this change. Through functional testing of the TSF 101, assurance gained in the original TOE certification was maintained. As change to the TOE has been classified as minor, it is the conclusion of SERTIT that the maintained TOE is appropriate for assurance continuity and re-evaluation is not required.

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Date approved	17 January 2014	