# CERTIFICATION REPORT

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|---|---|
| Dossier # | **2019-47** |
| TOE | **Microsoft Windows 10 version 1909 and Microsoft Windows Server version 1909** |
| Applicant | **600413485 - Microsoft Corporation** |
| References | |
| | [EXT-5413] Certification request |
| | [EXT-5839] Evaluation Technical Report v1.0 |

Certification report of the product Microsoft Windows 10 version 1909 and Microsoft Windows Server version 1909, as requested in [EXT-5413] dated 01/10/2019, and evaluated by DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U., as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-5839] received on 09/03/2020.

# CONTENTS

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product:

Windows Operating Systems (OS):

- Microsoft Windows 10 Home edition (November 2019 Update) (32-bit and 64-bit versions)

- Microsoft Windows 10 Pro edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit version)

- Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit version)

- Microsoft Windows Server Standard edition (November 2019 Update)

- Microsoft Windows Server Datacenter edition (November 2019 Update)

TOE Versions:

- Windows 10: build 10.0. 18363 (also known as version 1909)

- Windows Server: build 10.0. 18363 (also known as version 1909)

The following security updates must be applied for:

- Windows 10 and Windows Server: all critical updates as of October 31, 2019

**Developer/manufacturer**: Microsoft Corporation

**Sponsor**: Microsoft Corporation.

**Certification Body**: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).

**ITSEF**: DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U.

**Protection Profile**:

Windows 10 editions:

- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile, Version 4.2.1, April 22, 2019 ([GPOSPP]).

- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/ Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, version 1.0, February 8, 2016 ([GPOSPP-WLAN-EP]).

- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile / Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile / Application Software Protection Profile: PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.1, October 5, 2017 ([GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP]).

Windows Server editions:

- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile, Version 4.2.1, April 22, 2019 ([GPOSPP]).

- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile / Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile / Application Software Protection Profile: PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.1, October 5, 2017 ([GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP]).

**Evaluation Level**: Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5 (assurance packages according to the [GPOSPP], [GPOSPP-WLAN-EP] and [GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP].

**Evaluation end date**: 19/05/2020

**Expiration Date[1]**: 05/06/2025

All the assurance components required by the evaluation level of the [GPOSPP], [GPOSPP-WLAN-EP] and [GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP] have been assigned a "PASS" verdict. Consequently, the laboratory assigns the "PASS" VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the [GPOSPP], [GPOSPP-WLAN-EP] and [GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP] assurance level packages, as defined by the Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5, the [GPOSPP], the [GPOSPP-WLAN-EP], the [GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP] and the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology version 3.1 release 5.

Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the product Microsoft Windows 10 version 1909 and Microsoft Windows Server version 1909, a positive resolution is proposed.

## TOE SUMMARY

All Windows 10 and Windows Server editions, collectively called "Windows", are preemptive multitasking, multiprocessor, and multi-user operating systems. In general, operating systems provide users with a convenient interface to manage underlying hardware. They control the allocation and manage computing resources such as processors, memory, and Input/Output (I/O) devices. Windows expands these basic operating system capabilities to controlling the allocation and managing higher level IT resources such as security principals (user or machine accounts), files, printing objects, services, window station, desktops, cryptographic keys, network ports traffic, directory objects, and web content. Multi-user operating systems such as Windows keep track of which user is using which resource, grant resource requests, account for resource usage, and mediate conflicting requests from different programs and users.

**TOE major security features**

- **Security Audit**: Windows has the ability to collect audit data, review audit logs, protect audit logs from overflow, and restrict access to audit logs. Audit information generated by the

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[1] This date refers to the expiration date of the certificate recognition within the scope of the mutual recognition arrangements signed by this Certification Body.

system includes the date and time of the event, the user identity that caused the event to be generated, and other event specific data. Authorized administrators can review audit logs and have the ability to search and sort audit records. Authorized Administrators can also configure the audit system to include or exclude potentially auditable events to be audited based on a wide range of characteristics. In the context of this evaluation, the protection profile requirements cover generating audit events, selecting which events should be audited, and providing secure storage for audit event entries.

- **Cryptographic Support**: Windows provides FIPS 140-2 CAVP validated cryptographic functions that support encryption/decryption, cryptographic signatures, cryptographic hashing, cryptographic key agreement, and random number generation. The TOE additionally provides support for public keys, credential management and certificate validation functions and provides support for the National Security Agency's Suite B cryptographic algorithms. Windows also provides extensive auditing support of cryptographic operations, the ability to replace cryptographic functions and random number generators with alternative implementations, and a key isolation service designed to limit the potential exposure of secret and private keys. In addition to using cryptography for its own security functions, Windows offers access to the cryptographic support functions for user-mode and kernel-mode programs. Public key certificates generated and used by Windows authenticate users and machines as well as protect both user and system data in transit.

  o TLS: Windows implements Transport Layer Security to provide protected, authenticated, confidential, and tamper-proof networking between two peer computers

  o IPsec: Windows implements IPsec to provide protected, authenticated, confidential, and tamper-proof networking between two peer computers.

  o Wi-Fi: Windows implements IEEE 802.11 wireless networking to provide protected, authenticated, confidential, and tamper-proof networking between Windows clients and Wi-Fi access points.

- **User Data Protection**: In the context of this evaluation Windows protects user data and provides virtual private networking capabilities.

- **Identification and Authentication**: Each Windows user must be identified and authenticated based on administrator-defined policy prior to performing any TSF-mediated functions. An interactive user invokes a trusted path in order to protect his I&A information. Windows maintains databases of accounts including their identities, authentication information, group associations, and privilege and logon rights associations. Windows account policy functions include the ability to define the minimum password length, the number of failed logon attempts, the duration of lockout, and password age. Windows provides the ability to use, store, and protect X.509 certificates that are used for IPsec VPN sessions.

- **Protection of the TOE Security Functions**: Windows provides a number of features to ensure the protection of TOE security functions. Windows protects against unauthorized data disclosure and modification by using a suite of Internet standard protocols including IPsec, IKE, and ISAKMP. Windows ensures process isolation security for all processes through private virtual address spaces, execution context, and security context. The Windows data structures defining process address space, execution context, memory protection, and security context are stored in protected kernel-mode memory. Windows includes self-testing features that ensure the integrity of executable program images and its cryptographic functions. Finally, Windows provides a trusted update mechanism to update Windows binaries itself.

- **Session Locking**: Windows provides the ability for a user to lock their session either immediately or after a defined interval. Windows constantly monitors the mouse, keyboard, and touch display for activity and locks the computer after a set period of inactivity.

- **TOE Access**: Windows allows an authorized administrator to configure the system to display a logon banner before the logon dialog.

- **Trusted Path for Communications**: Windows uses TLS, HTTPS, DTLS, EAP-TLS, and IPsec to provide a trusted path for communications.

- **Security Management**: Windows includes several functions to manage security policies. Policy management is controlled through a combination of access control, membership in administrator groups, and privileges.

## SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS

The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the assurance packages defined in [GPOSPP], according to Common Criteria v3.1 release 5. The TOE meet the following SARs:

| Requirement Class | Requirement Component |
|---|---|
| Security Target (ASE) | ST Introduction (ASE_INT.1)<br>Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL.1)<br>Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ.2)<br>Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD.1)<br>Derived Security Requirements (ASE_REQ.2)<br>Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)<br>TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS.1) |
| Design (ADV) | Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1) |
| Guidance (AGD) | Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)<br>Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1) |
| Lifecycle (ALC) | Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)<br>TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)<br>Timely Security Updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1) |
| Testing (ATE) | Independent Testing – Conformance (ATE_IND.1) |
| Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) | Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1) |

The detailed specification of the SARs can be found in the Security Target, section 5.2.

## SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The Windows 10 editions security functionality satisfies functional requirements according to the Common Criteria v3.1 release 5, [GPOSPP], [GPOSPP-WLAN-EP] and [GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP]. All of them are listed in the table below.

| Security functional requirements for Windows 10 editions | |
|---|---|
| **Requirement Class** | **Requirement Component** |
| **Security Audit (FAU)** | Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1)<br>Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1 (WLAN))<br>Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1 (IPSEC))<br>Selective Audit (FAU_SEL.1) |
| **Cryptographic Support (FCS)** | Cryptographic Key Generation (FCS_CKM.1)<br>Cryptographic Key Generation for WPA2 connections (FCS_CKM.1(WLAN))<br>Cryptographic Key Generation for (FCS_CKM.1(VPN))<br>Cryptographic Key Establishment (FCS_CKM.2)<br>Cryptographic Key Distribution (FCS_CKM.2 (WLAN))<br>Cryptographic Key Storage (FCS_CKM_EXT.2)<br>Cryptographic Key Destruction (FCS_CKM_EXT.4)<br>Cryptographic Operation for Data Encryption/Decryption (FCS_COP.1(SYM))<br>Cryptographic Operation for Hashing (FCS_COP.1(HASH))<br>Cryptographic Operation for Signing (FCS_COP.1(SIGN))<br>Cryptographic Operation for Keyed Hash Algorithms (FCS_COP.1(HMAC))<br>IPsec (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1)<br>Random Bit Generation (FCS_RBG_EXT.1)<br>Storage of Sensitive Data (FCS_STO_EXT.1)<br>TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1)<br>Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 (WLAN))<br>TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.2)<br>TLS Client Protocol (FSC_TLSC_EXT.2 (WLAN))<br>TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.3)<br>TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.4)<br>DTLS Implementation (FCS_DTLS_EXT.1) |
| **User Data Protection (FDP)** | Access Controls for Protecting User Data (FDP_ACF_EXT.1)<br>Information Flow Control (FDP_IFC_EXT.1)<br>Subset Information Flow Control (FDP_IFC_EXT.1 (IPSEC))<br>Full Residual Information Protection (FDP_RIP.2) |
| **Identification & Authentication (FIA)** | Authorization Failure Handling (FIA_AFL.1)<br>Port Access Entity Authentication (FIA_PAE_EXT.1)<br>Pre-Shared Key Composition (FIA_PSK_EXT.1)<br>Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)<br>X.509 Certification Validation (FIA_X509_EXT.1)<br>X.509 Certificate Authentication (FIA_X509_EXT.2)<br>Extended: X.509 Certificate Validation (FIA_X509_EXT.1 (WLAN))<br>Certificate Authentication (EAP-TLS) (FIA_X509_EXT.2 (WLAN))<br>X.509 Certificate Use and Management (FIA_X509_EXT.3)<br>Certificate Storage and Management (FIA_X509_EXT.4) |
| **Security Management (FMT)** | Management of Security Functions Behavior (FMT_MOF_EXT.1)<br>Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF_EXT.1)<br>Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF_EXT.1(WLAN))<br>Specification of Management Functions (VPN) (FMT_SMF.1 (VPN)) |

| Protection of the TSF (FPT) | Access Controls (FPT_ACF_EXT.1) |
| | Address Space Layout Randomization (FPT_ASLR_EXT.1) |
| | Stack Buffer Overflow Protection (FPT_SBOP_EXT.1) |
| | Software Restriction Policies (FPT_SRP_EXT.1) |
| | Boot Integrity (FPT_TST_EXT.1) |
| | TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing (FPT_TST_EXT.1 (WLAN)) |
| | Self-Test (FPT_TST_EXT.1 (IPSEC)) |
| | Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.1) |
| | Trusted Update for Application Software (FPT_TUD_EXT.2) |
| TOE Access (FTA) | Default TOE Access Banners (FTA_TAB.1) |
| | Wireless Network Access (FTA_WSE_EXT.1) |
| Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) | Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1) |
| | Trusted Channel Communication (FTP_ITC_EXT.1(TLS)) |
| | Trusted Channel Communication (FTP_ITC_EXT.1(DTLS)) |
| | Trusted Channel Communication (FTP_ITC_EXT.1 (WLAN)) |
| | Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (FTP_ITC.1 (IPSEC)) |

The <u>Windows Server editions</u> security functionality satisfies functional requirements according to the Common Criteria v3.1 release 5, [GPOSPP] and [GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP]. All of them are listed in the table below.

| Security functional requirements for <u>Windows Server editions</u> | |
| --- | --- |
| **Requirement Class** | **Requirement Component** |
| Security Audit (FAU) | Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1) |
| | Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1 (IPSEC)) |
| | Selective Audit (FAU_SEL.1) |
| Cryptographic Support (FCS) | Cryptographic Key Generation for (FCS_CKM.1) |
| | Cryptographic Key Generation for (FCS_CKM.1(VPN)) |
| | Cryptographic Key Establishment (FCS_CKM.2) |
| | Cryptographic Key Storage (FCS_CKM_EXT.2) |
| | Cryptographic Key Destruction (FCS_CKM_EXT.4) |
| | Cryptographic Operation for Data Encryption/Decryption(FCS_COP.1(SYM)) |
| | Cryptographic Operation for Hashing (FCS_COP.1(HASH)) |
| | Cryptographic Operation for Signing (FCS_COP.1(SIGN)) |
| | Cryptographic Operation for Keyed Hash Algorithms(FCS_COP.1(HMAC)) |
| | IPsec (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1) |
| | Random Bit Generation (FCS_RBG_EXT.1) |
| | Storage of Sensitive Data (FCS_STO_EXT.1) |
| | TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1) |
| | TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.2) |
| | TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.3) |
| | TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.4) |
| | DTLS Implementation (FCS_DTLS_EXT.1) |
| User Data Protection (FDP) | Access Controls for Protecting User Data (FDP_ACF_EXT.1) |
| | Information Flow Control (FDP_IFC_EXT.1) |
| | Subset Information Flow Control (FDP_IFC_EXT.1 (IPSEC)) |
| | Full Residual Information Protection (FDP_RIP.2) |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Identification & Authentication (FIA)** | Authorization Failure Handling (FIA_AFL.1)<br>Pre-Shared Key Composition (FIA_PSK_EXT.1)<br>Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)<br>X.509 Certification Validation (FIA_X509_EXT.1)<br>X.509 Certificate Authentication (FIA_X509_EXT.2)<br>X.509 Certificate Use and Management (FIA_X509_EXT.3) |
| **Security Management (FMT)** | Management of Security Functions Behavior (FMT_MOF_EXT.1)<br>Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF_EXT.1)<br>Specification of Management Functions (VPN) (FMT_SMF.1 (VPN)) |
| **Protection of the TSF (FPT)** | Access Controls (FPT_ACF_EXT.1)<br>Address Space Layout Randomization (FPT_ASLR_EXT.1)<br>Stack Buffer Overflow Protection (FPT_SBOP_EXT.1)<br>Software Restriction Policies (FPT_SRP_EXT.1)<br>Boot Integrity (FPT_TST_EXT.1)<br>Self-Test (FPT_TST_EXT.1 (IPSEC))<br>Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)<br>Trusted Update for Application Software (FPT_TUD_EXT.2) |
| **TOE Access (FTA)** | Default TOE Access Banners (FTA_TAB.1) |
| **Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)** | Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1)<br>Trusted Channel Communication (FTP_ITC_EXT.1(TLS))<br>Trusted Channel Communication (FTP_ITC_EXT.1(DTLS))<br>Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (FTP_ITC.1 (IPSEC)) |

The detailed specification of the SFRs can be found in the Security Target, section 5.1.

## IDENTIFICATION

**Product**:

Windows Operating Systems (OS):

- Microsoft Windows 10 Home edition (November 2019 Update) (32-bit and 64-bit versions)

- Microsoft Windows 10 Pro edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit version)

- Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit version)

- Microsoft Windows Server Standard edition (November 2019 Update)

- Microsoft Windows Server Datacenter edition (November 2019 Update)

TOE Versions:

- Windows 10: build 10.0. 18363 (also known as version 1909)

- Windows Server: build 10.0. 18363 (also known as version 1909)

The following security updates must be applied for:

- Windows 10 and Windows Server: all critical updates as of October 31, 2019

**Security Target:**

 Microsoft Windows 10, Windows Server version 1909 Security Target. Version 0.03, January 16, 2020.

**Protection Profile**:

Windows 10 editions:

- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile, Version 4.2.1, April 22, 2019 ([GPOSPP]).

- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/ Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, version 1.0, February 8, 2016 ([GPOSPP-WLAN-EP]).

- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile / Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile / Application Software Protection Profile: PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.1, October 5, 2017 ([GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP]).

Windows Server editions:

- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile, Version 4.2.1, April 22, 2019 ([GPOSPP]).

- General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile / Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile / Application Software Protection Profile: PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.1, October 5, 2017 ([GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP]).

**Evaluation Level**:

 Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5 (assurance packages according to the [GPOSPP], [GPOSPP-WLAN-EP] and [GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP].

## SECURITY POLICIES

There are no Organizational Security Policies for the protection profile or extended package.

### *ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT*

The assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target. These assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.

In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.

The complete list of assumptions can be found in the Security Target, section 3.3.

## CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS

The threats detailed in [ST], chapter 3.1 (Threats to security) do not suppose a risk for the product Microsoft Windows 10 version 1909 and Microsoft Windows Server version 1909, based on conformance to [GPOSPP], [GPOSPP-WLAN-EP] and [GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP].

For any other threat not included in the [ST], the evaluation results of the product security properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.

## OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY

The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the objectives of the defined security problem.

The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are categorized in the Security Target, in the section 4.2.

# ARCHITECTURE

## LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE

Conceptually the Windows TOE can be thought of as a collection of the following security services which the security target describes with increasing detail:

- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- User Data Protection
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TOE Security Functions
- Access to the TOE
- Trusted Path and Channels

These services are primarily provided by Windows components:

- The Boot Manager, which is invoked by the computer's bootstrapping code.
- The Windows Loader which loads the operating system into the computer's memory.
- Windows OS Resume which reloads an image of the executing operating system from a hibernation file as part of resuming from a hibernated state.
- The Windows Kernel which contains device drivers for the Windows NT File System, full volume encryption, the crash dump filter, and the kernel-mode cryptographic library.

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- The IPv4 / IPv6 network stack in the kernel.

- The IPsec module in user-mode.

- The IKE and AuthIP Keying Modules service which hosts the IKE and Authenticated Internet Protocol (AuthIP) keying modules. These keying modules are used for authentication and key exchange in Internet Protocol security (IPsec).

- The Remote Access Service device driver in the kernel, which is used primarily for ad hoc or user-defined VPN connections; known as the "RAS IPsec VPN" or "RAS VPN".

- The IPsec Policy Agent service which enforces IPsec policies.

- The Key Isolation Service which protects secret and private keys.

- The Local Security Authority Subsystem which identifies and authenticates users prior to log on and generates events for the security audit log.

- FIPS-Approved cryptographic algorithms to protect user and system data.

- Local and remote administrative interfaces for security management.

- Windows Explorer which can be used to manage the OS and check the integrity of Windows files and updates.

- The Windows Trusted Installer which installs updates to the Windows operating system.

## *PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE*

Each instance of the general-purpose OS TOE runs on a tablet, convertible, workstation or server computer. The TOE executes on processors from Intel (x86 and x64) or AMD (x86 and x64) along with peripherals for input/output (keyboard, mouse, display, and network).

The TOE does not include any hardware or network infrastructure components between the computers that comprise the distributed TOE. The security target assumes that any network connections, equipment, peripherals and cables are appropriately protected in the TOE security environment.

## DOCUMENTS

The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available together to the users of the evaluated version in .pdf format:

- *Microsoft Windows 10 and Windows Server (version 1909) GP OS Operational and Administrative Guidance* version 5.0, January 16, 2020 (along with all the documents referenced therein).

## PRODUCT TESTING

The tests performed by the evaluator are based on the assurance activities defined for the ATE activity in the [GPOSPP], [GPOSPP-WLAN-EP] and [GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP] for each SFR that is included in the [ST].

The evaluator has performed an installation and configuration of the TOEs and their operational environment following the steps included in the installation and operation manual. The TOE configuration used to execute the independent tests is consistent with the evaluated configuration according to security target [ST].

The independent testing has covered 100% of SFRs of the [ST] and assurance activities defined in the [GPOSPP], [GPOSPP-WLAN-EP] and [GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP] for each SFR. There has not been any deviation from the expected results under the environment defined in security target [ST].

### PENETRATION TESTING

According to the [GPOSPP], [GPOSPP-WLAN-EP] and [GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP], the vulnerability analysis scope has taken into account the public vulnerabilities affecting to all the operating system versions. The lab has performed a search on public sources to discover known vulnerabilities of the TOE belonging to the period from October 31, 2019 to January 15, 2020.

- The evaluator checked that all the public vulnerabilities published until January 15, 2020 were fixed in the evaluated configuration.

- The evaluator ensured that for all the public vulnerabilities belonging to the period from October 31, 2019 to January 15, 2020, the vendor had published the corresponding update fixing the vulnerabilities.

Therefore, the evaluator concluded that there were not exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE operational environment according to the scope of this evaluation.

## EVALUATED CONFIGURATION

The TOE under evaluation is composed of the following operating system editions:

- Microsoft Windows 10 Home Edition (November 2019 Update) (32-bit and 64-bit versions).
- Microsoft Windows 10 Pro Edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit version).
- Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise Edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit version).
- Microsoft Windows Server Standard Edition (November 2019 Update)
- Microsoft Windows Server Datacenter Edition (November 2019 Update).

The build tested for all Windows 10 and Windows Server editions has been [version 10.0.18363 (a.k.a. 1909)].

They have been tested in the following evaluated platforms:

- Microsoft Surface Go

- Microsoft Surface Go LTE

- Microsoft Surface Pro LTE

- Microsoft Surface Book 2

- Microsoft Surface Pro 6

- Microsoft Surface Laptop 2

- Microsoft Surface Studio 2

- Microsoft Windows Server 2019 Hyper-V

- Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Hyper-V

- Dell Latitude 7200 2-in1

- Dell Latitude 5300 2-in-1

- Dell PowerEdge R740

- Dell PowerEdge R7425

- HP ZBook 15G6

- HP ProBook 650G5

- Panasonic Toughbook CF-33

- Samsung Galaxy Book 10.6"

- Samsung Galaxy Book 12"

The next list summarizes the combination between hardware platforms and operating system editions used for the vulnerability analysis:

- Microsoft Surface Go with Windows 10 Pro edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit)

- Microsoft Surface Go LTE with Windows 10 Enterprise edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit)

- Microsoft Surface Pro LTE with Windows 10 Pro edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit)

- Microsoft Surface Pro 6 with Windows 10 Enterprise edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit)

- Microsoft Surface Laptop 2 with Windows 10 Pro edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit)

- Microsoft Surface Book 2 with Windows 10 Enterprise edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit)

- Microsoft Surface Studio 2 with Windows 10 Pro edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit)

- Microsoft Windows Server 2019 Hyper-V with Windows 10 Home edition (November 2019 Update) (32-bit)

- Microsoft Windows Server 2016 Hyper-V with Windows Server Standard edition (November 2019 Update)

- Dell Latitude 7200 2-in-1 with Windows 10 Pro edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit)

- Dell Latitude 5300 2-in-1 with Windows 10 Home edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit)

- Dell PowerEdge R740 with Windows Server Datacenter edition (November 2019 Update)

- Dell PowerEdge R7425 with Windows Server Standard edition (November 2019 Update)

- HP ZBook15 15G6 with Windows 10 Pro edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit)

- HP ProBook 650G5 with Windows 10 Enterprise edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit)

- Panasonic Thoughbook CF-33 with Windows 10 Enterprise edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit)

- Samsung Galaxy Book 10.6" with Windows 10 Pro edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit)

- Samsung Galaxy Book 12" with Windows 10 Enterprise edition (November 2019 Update) (64-bit)

## EVALUATION RESULTS

The product Microsoft Windows 10 version 1909 and Microsoft Windows Server version 1909 has been evaluated against the Security Target: Microsoft Windows 10, Windows Server version 1909 Security Target. Version 0.03, January 16, 2020.

All the assurance components defined in the [GPOSPP], [GPOSPP-WLAN-EP] and [GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP] have been assigned a "PASS" verdict. Consequently, the laboratory DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U. assigns the "PASS" VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the assurances packages defined in the [GPOSPP], [GPOSPP-WLAN-EP] and [GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP] and included in the [ST], as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 release 5, the [GPOSPP], [GPOSPP-WLAN-EP], [GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP] and the CEM v3.1 release 5.

## COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM

Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product.

- It is mandatory to strictly follow the steps indicated in the installation documentation in order to download and install the correct version of the TOE in a proper manner.

- The user guidance must be read and understood in order to operate the TOE in an adequate manner according to the security target.

## CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the product DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U., a positive resolution is proposed.

## GLOSSARY

CCN     Centro Criptológico Nacional

CNI     Centro Nacional de Inteligencia

EAL     Evaluation Assurance Level

ETR     Evaluation Technical Report

ITSEF   Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

OC      Organismo de Certificación

TOE     Target Of Evaluation

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:

[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.

[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.

[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.

[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.

[GPOSPP] General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile, Version 4.2.1, April 22, 2019.

[GPOSPP-WLAN-EP] General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile / Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, version 1.0, February 8, 2016.

[GPOSPP-IPSEC-CLIENT-EP] General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile / Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile / Application Software Protection Profile: PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.1, October 5, 2017

[ST] Microsoft Windows 10, Windows Server version 1909 Security Target. Version 0.03, January 16, 2020.

[ST-Lite] Microsoft Windows 10, Windows Server version 1909 Security Target. Version 0.04, January 16, 2020

## SECURITY TARGET

Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is stored and protected in the Certification Body premises. This document is identified as:

- Microsoft Windows 10, Windows Server version 1909 Security Target. Version 0.03, January 16, 2020.

The public version of this document constitutes the ST Lite. The ST Lite has also been reviewed for the needs of publication according to [CCDB-2006-04-004], and it is published along with this certification report in the Certification Body and CCRA websites. The ST Lite identifier is:

- Microsoft Windows 10, Windows Server version 1909 Security Target. Version 0.04, January 16, 2020.

# RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

## *European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)*

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices", a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.org.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.

## *International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)*

The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).

The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification)of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.

As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.