




# COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT

EMC® VNXe1600™ OE v3.1.3

16 May 2016





# FOREWORD

This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security Establishment (CSE). Suggestions for amendments should be forwarded through departmental communications security channels to your Client Services Representative at CSE.

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established under the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme – using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4. This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian CC Scheme, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by the Communications Security Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Communications Security Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.

If your department has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more detailed information, please contact:

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## OVERVIEW

The Canadian Common Criteria Scheme provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Communications Security Establishment.

A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025:2005, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories. Accreditation is performed under the Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN), administered by the Standards Council of Canada.

The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is EWA-Canada.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCEF.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Certified Products list (CPL) for the Canadian CC Scheme, and to the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Project).



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>1 Identification of Target of Evaluation</b> .....	<b>2</b>
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance.....	2
1.2 TOE description .....	2
1.3 TOE architecture.....	2
<b>2 Security policy</b> .....	<b>3</b>
<b>3 Assumptions and Clarifications of Scope</b> .....	<b>4</b>
3.1 Usage and Environmental assumptions .....	4
3.2 Clarification of Scope.....	4
<b>4 Evaluated Configuration</b> .....	<b>5</b>
4.1 Documentation.....	5
<b>5 Evaluation Analysis Activities</b> .....	<b>6</b>
5.1 Development .....	6
5.2 Guidance Documents .....	6
5.3 Life-cycle Support .....	6
<b>6 Testing Activities</b> .....	<b>7</b>
6.1 Assessment of Developer Tests.....	7
6.2 Conduct of Testing.....	7
6.3 Independent Functional Testing.....	7
6.4 Independent Penetration Testing .....	8
<b>7 Results of the Evaluation</b> .....	<b>9</b>
<b>8 Supporting Content</b> .....	<b>10</b>
8.1 List of Abbreviations .....	10
8.2 References .....	11



## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 TOE Architecture .....2

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 TOE Identification .....2



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EMC® VNXe1600™ OE v3.1.3 (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from EMC Corporation, was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Table 1 for the evaluated security functionality.

The TOE is a midrange capacity storage system comprised of the VNXe1600 hardware platform and the VNXe Operating Environment (OE) software. The VNXe1600 hardware houses the disks in the storage array which are managed by the VNXe storage processors. It provides Storage Area Network (SAN) services by interfacing with the front-end clients (application hosts such as database servers, web servers, etc.) and the back-end storage disks.

Application Hosts access the storage arrays via Internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI) and/or Fibre Channel (FC). The TOE presents storage to application hosts in the form of Logical Units (or LUNs) using block storage protocols. Each LUN is a useable storage system volume that the TOE can expose to individual hosts. Application hosts can only access LUNs for which permission has been granted by an authorized administrator.

EWA-Canada is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 16 May 2016 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

Communications Security Establishment, as the Certification Body, declares that the TOE evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Project).

# 1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:

Table 1 TOE Identification

TOE Name and Version	EMC® VNXe1600™ OE
Developer	EMC Corporation
Conformance Claim	EAL 2+ (ALC_FLR.2)

## 1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4.

## 1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION

The TOE is a midrange capacity storage system comprised of the VNXe1600 hardware platform and the VNXe Operating Environment (OE) software. The VNXe1600 hardware houses the disks in the storage array which are managed by the VNXe storage processors. It provides Storage Area Network (SAN) services by interfacing with the front-end clients (application hosts such as database servers, web servers, etc.) and the back-end storage disks.

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## 1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE

A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:




Figure 1 TOE Architecture



## 2 SECURITY POLICY

The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:

- Security Audit
- User Data Protection
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TSF

Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in section 8.2.





## 3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS OF SCOPE

Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.

### 3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:

- The TOE will be located within controlled access facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical access.
- The authorized administrators are not careless, wilfully negligent, or hostile, are appropriately trained and will follow the instructions provided by the TOE documentation.

### 3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE

The following TOE features are supported but not included in this evaluation:

- Common Event Enabler (CEE)
- File-level retention
- Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)
- Simple Network Transfer Protocol (SNMP)
- Replication
- Network Data Management Protocol (NDMP)
- Common Anti-Virus Agent (CAVA)
- EMC Secure Remote Support (ESRS)

The following TOE interfaces are supported but not included in this evaluation:

- Representational State Transfer (REST) Interface
- Storage Management Initiative Specification (SMI-S) Interface
- vStorage APIs for Storage Awareness (VASA) Interface
- Storage Processor (SP) Ethernet Service Port connection
- VNXe Service Secure Shell (SSH) Interface



## 4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION

The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:

The TOE software;

- VNXe Operating Environment (OE) 3.1.3.7141854
- VNXe Unisphere 3.1.3. 7141854
- VNXe Unisphere CLI version 3.0.0.1.16

Installed on a VNXe1600 hardware appliance. With support from the environment of a Microsoft Active Directory server.

### 4.1 DOCUMENTATION

The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:

- a. EMC VNXe 1600 Applied Best Practices Guide, HJ4494, September 2015
- b. EMC® VNXe® Series Unisphere Command Line interface User Guide, 302-000-194 REV.03, May 20 15
- c. EMC® VNXe 1600™ OE v3.1.3 UEMCLJ and Unisphere GUI Error Messages, December 14, 2015
- d. EMC® VNXe 1600 Hardware information Guide, REV 01, July 2015
- e. EMC® VNXe 1600 installation Guide, REV 0 1, July 2015
- f. introduction to the EMC VNXe 1600, H14385.2, August 2015
- g. EMC® VNXe I600™ OE v3.1.3 Guidance Supplement, Version 0.1, March 28, 2016



## 5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES

The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.

### 5.1 DEVELOPMENT

The evaluators analyzed the TOE functional specification and design documentation; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces, the TSF subsystems and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators analyzed the TOE security architectural description and determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained. The evaluators also independently verified that the correspondence mappings between the design documents are correct.

### 5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.

### 5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT

An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.

The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.

The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by developer for the TOE. During a site visit, the evaluators also examined the evidence generated by adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded that the procedures are adequate to track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and corrections to consumers of the TOE.



## 6 TESTING ACTIVITIES

Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.

### 6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS

The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR.

The evaluators analyzed the developer's test coverage analysis and found it to be complete and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer's test documentation and the functional specification was complete.

### 6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING

The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.

### 6.3 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING

During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance documentation.

All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:

- a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The evaluator repeated a subset of the developers tests;
- b. Enforcement of Password rules: The evaluator confirmed that the password composition rules are enforced for all users; and
- c. Information Leakage Verification: The evaluator verified that there is no login information is exposed during access to the TOE.

#### 6.3.1 FUNCTIONAL TEST RESULTS

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.



## 6.4 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING

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Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:

- a. Use of automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform and application layer vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed, Shellshock, FREAK, POODLE, and GHOST; and
- b. Network Outage: The evaluator attempted to gain unauthorized access to the TOE by simulating a network outage.

### 6.4.1 PENETRATION TEST RESULTS

The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.



## 7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION

This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for the evaluation is **PASS**. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

The IT product identified in this report has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4. These evaluation results apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete certification report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSE or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CSE or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, is expressed or implied.



## 8 SUPPORTING CONTENT

### 8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Term	Definition
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCEF	Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CCS	Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
CM	Configuration Management
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
GC	Government of Canada
IT	Information Technology
ITS	Information Technology Security
ITSET	Information Technology Security Evaluation and Testing
PALCAN	Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories – Canada
PP	Protection Profile
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function
UEMCLI	Unified Element Manager Command Line Interface



## 8.2 REFERENCES

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Reference
CCS Publication #4, Technical Oversight, Version 1.8, October 2010.
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
EMC® VNxe 1600™ OE v3.1.3 Security Target, Version 0.7, March 18, 2016
Evaluation Technical Report for EAL 2+ Common Criteria Evaluation of EMC Coporation EMC VNxe1600 OE v3.1.3, v1.0, 16 May 2016