

# eTravel 3.1 EAC on SAC on MultiApp V5.1

Common Criteria / ISO 15408 Security Target – Public version EAL5+

Version 1.2 – 04<sup>th</sup>October 2023



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# 1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION

Title :	MultiApp V5.1 eTravel 3.1 EAC on SAC Security Target
Version :	1.2
ST Reference :	D1569584_LITE
Origin :	THALES
IT Security	LETI CESTI
Evaluation scheme :	
IT Security	Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information (ANSSI)
Certification scheme:	

## 1.1 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE

## **1.2 TOE** REFERENCE

The product is available in two configurations:

- Configuration 1: TOE based on the IC AQUARIUS\_BA\_09- AQUARIUS\_v1 called "revision B"
- Configuration 2: TOE based on the IC AQUARIUS\_CA\_09- AQUARIUS\_v2 called "revision C"
- **Product Name :** eTravel 3.1 (MultiApp V5.1) Security Controllers : For the configuration 1 (Revision B): AQUARIUS BA 09 (Thales DIS France SAS) For the configuration 2 (Revision C): AQUARIUS\_CA\_09 (Thales DIS France SAS) **TOE Name :** eTravel 3.1 EAC on SAC on MultiApp V5.1 **TOE Version :** For configuration 1 (revision B): eTravel 3.1.0.0(\*) For configuration 2 (Revision C): eTravel 3.1.0.1(\*) **TOE documentation :** Guidance [ AGD ] Composition elements: IC TOE identifier: For the configuration 1 (Revision B): AQUARIUS\_BA\_09 - AQUARIUS\_v1 For the configuration 2 (Revision C): AQUARIUS\_CA\_09 - AQUARIUS\_v2 **IC TOE Version:** For the configuration 1 (Revision B): Hardware revision: B For the configuration 2 (Revision C): Hardware revision: C For both configurations: Platform ROM Firmware Revision: A Platform FLASH Firmware Revision: 09 BIOS: Version 1.0-911 Loader: Version 2.2  $\triangleright$

(\*) The TOE version format is 3.1.x.y where x.y are the application revision defined in the CPLC for eTravel.

The TOE identification is provided by the Card Production Life Cycle Data (CPLCD). These data are available by executing a dedicated command.

The TOE and the product differ, as further explained in  $\$  TOE :

- The TOE is the eTravel 3.1 application on MultiApp V5.1.
- The MultiApp V5.1 product also includes other applets.

## **1.3 TOE IDENTIFICATION**

The TOE identification is provided by the Card Production Life Cycle Data (CPLC Data) of the TOE. These data are available by executing a dedicated command.

The TOE identification is provided by a dedicated command GET CARD DATA with the next TAG: 9F7F

The response of the GET CARD DATA is described below. In orange the field of the TOE identification

Name	Values	Description	
IC Fabricator	ʻ1290'	Chip Manufacturer – THALES DIS FRANCE SAS	
ІС Туре	'0013'	Chip Type	
Operating System Identifier	'B06A24'	Atr FAMILY NAME (Javacard Family) +THALES_PRODUCT_NAME (MAV51) +Short Chip ID	
Configuration	'01'	Not relevant for identification	
Application revision	ʻ0000'	Major & minor version of the revision (0.0)	
IC Fabrication Date			
IC Serial Number			
IC Batch Identifier			
IC Module Fabricator			
IC Module Packaging Date			
ICC Manufacturer			
IC Embedding Date		Not relevant for identification	
IC Pre-personalizer			
IC Pre-personalization Date			
IC Pre-personalization Equipment Identifier			
IC Personalizer			
IC Personalization Date			
IC Personalization Equipment Identifier	]		

The identification of the IC type is provided by the Platform.

To read this information, it is needed to make a PACE authentication, a Select ISD and to read the tag 010B as describe in the [STs-Platform]. The command GET CARD DATA can be found in the [AGD-Platform].

Index	Description	IC Revision B Value (Previous)	IC Revision C Value	Part of TOE the identification
0	PRODUCT	0x09	0x09	No
1	HW_REV	0x42	0x43	Yes
2	Not relevant for identification			No
				No
15				No

## 1.4 SECURITY TARGET OVERVIEW

This Security Target defines the security objectives and requirements for the contact/contactless chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods Basic Access Control and Extended Access Control as well as the advanced authentication mechanisms Chip Authentication and Active Authentication.

The Security Target is based on Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control [PP-MRTD-EACV2].

The Security Target defines the security requirements for the TOE. The main security objective is to provide the secure enforcing functions and mechanisms to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of the MRTD application and data during its life cycle.

The main objectives of this ST are:

- To introduce TOE and the MRTD application,
- To define the scope of the TOE and its security features,
- To describe the security environment of the TOE, including the assets to be protected and the threats to be countered by the TOE and its environment during the product development, production and usage.
- To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its environment supporting in terms of integrity and confidentiality of application data and programs and of protection of the TOE.
- To specify the security requirements which includes the TOE security functional requirements, the TOE assurance requirements and TOE security functions.

## **1.5 REFERENCES**

## 1.5.1 External References

[CC]	Common Criteria references	
[CC-1]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation	
	Part 1: Introduction and general model,	
	CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.	
[CC-2]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation	
	Part 2: Security functional components,	
	CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.	
[CC-3]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation	
	Part 3: Security assurance components,	
	CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.	
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Evaluation Methodology - CCMB-2017-04-004, version 3.1 rev 5, April 2017	
[JIL_CPE]	Joint Interpretation Library: Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices,	
	Version 1.5.1 May 2018	
[TDFS]	THALES DIS FRANCE SAS References	
[ST-AQU-IC]	Security Target for AQUARIUS	
	(Microcontroller AQUARIUS_BA_09 & CA_09 - AQUARIUS_v2)	
	Ref: AQUARIUS_ST	
	Revision: 1.0 – 10/03/2023	
[CR-IC]	Certification Report, CERTIFICAT ANSSI-CC-2023/01-M01	
	AQUARIUS_BA_09 & CA_09 - AQUARIUS_v2	
	EAL6 Augmenté (ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.2)	
	Date : 21/06/2023	
	conforme au profil de protection : Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, version 1.0 certifié BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 le 19 février 2014	
[ISO]	ISO references	
[ISO7816]	ISO 7816, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 4: Organization,	
	security and commands for interchange, FDIS2004	
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[ISO9797-1]	ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011: Information technology – Security techniques – Message Authentication	
Codes (MACs) – Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, Second edition 2011-03-01		
[PP]         Protection profiles		
[PP-IC-0084]	Security IC Platform Protection Profile with augmentation Packages- BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014	
[PP-MRTD-EACV2]	Protection Profile, Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control with PACE, version 1.3.2, 2012, December 5th. Certified and maintained by	
	BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) under reference BSI-PP-0056-V2-	
	MA-2012.	
[PP-MRTD-SAC]	Protection Profile, Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure	
	with PACE, version 1.01, 22 juillet 2014. Certified and maintained by BSI (Bundesamt für	
	Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) under reference BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01.	
[PP-MRTD-BAC]	Protection Profile, Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access	
	Control, version 1.10, 25 mars 2009. Certified by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der	
	Informationstechnik) under reference BSI-PP-0055-2009.	



[EXTERNAL]	Other External references	
[SS]	ANNEX to Section III SECURITY STANDARDS FOR MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS,	
	Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1	
	Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003	
[TR-ECC]	Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO 15946, Technical Guideline, TR-ECC, BSI, 2006	
[TR-EAC-1]	Technical Guideline – TR-03110-1, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token, Part 1 – eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, Version 2.20, 26.02.2015	
[ICAO-TR-SAC]	MRTD Technical report - Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents Version - 1.01 Date – November 11, 2010	
[BIO]	BIOMETRICS DEPLOYMENT OF MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, Technical Report, Development and Specification of Globally Interoperable Biometric Standards for Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation using Machine Readable Travel Documents,	
[RGS-B1]	Version 2.0, ICAO TAG MRTD/NTWG, 21 May 2004	
	ANSSI, « Référentiel général de sécurité », https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2021/03/anssi-guide-mecanismes_crypto-2.04.pdf	
	Annexe B1 Mécanismes cryptographiques, règles et recommandations concernant le choix et le dimensionnement des mécanismes cryptographiques; version 2.0.4, 2020-01-01	
[AIS20/31]	A proposal for : Functionality classes for random number generators Version 2.0, 18/09/2011	
[SP 800-90]	NIST Special Publication 800-90A, Revision 1, Recommendation for the Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, June 2015	
[ICAO-9303]	9303 ICAO Machine Readable Travel Document 7th edition, 2015 Part 1-12	
[PKCS#3]	PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard,	
_	An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,	
	Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993	
[PKI]	9303 ICAO Machine Readable Travel Document 7th edition, 2015 Part 11-12	

## 1.5.2 Internal References

[STs]	Security Targets	
[ST-EAC SAC]	D1569584, eTravel 3.1 EAC on SAC Security Target - MultiApp V5.1	
[ST-BAC]	D1569591, BAC Security Target - MultiApp V5.1	
[ST-JCS]	D1572544, MultiApp V5.1: JCS Security Target	
[ST-GP]	D1569436, MultiApp V5.1: GP-SE Security Target	
[STs-Platform]	[ST-JCS] & [ST-GP]	
[AGD]	Guidance Documentation	
[AGD-Ref]	D1584821 – D.2 - eTravel 3.x Reference Manual	
[AGD-GDP]	D1390286R - Global Dispatcher Personalization Applet	
[AGD-OPE]	D1582202 - MultiApp V5.1: AGD OPE document - eTravel v3.1	
[AGD-PRE]	D1574817 - MultiApp V5.1: AGD PRE document - eTravel v3.1	

## 2. <u>TOE OVERVIEW</u>

## 2.1 TOE DESCRIPTION

The TOE is the module designed to be the core of an MRTD passport. The TOE is a contact/contactless integrated circuit. The TOE is connected to an antenna and capacitors and is mounted on a plastic film. This inlay is then embedded in the coversheet or datapage of the MRTD passport and provides a contactless interface for the passport holder identification.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contact/contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD's chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [ICAO-9303] and providing:

- the Basic Access Control (BAC) according to the ICAO document [PKI]
- the Active Authentication (AA) mechanism according to the ICAO document [ICAO-9303]
- the PACE V2 Access Control (SAC) according to the ICAO document [ICAO-TR-SAC]
- the Extended Access Control according to the BSI document [TR-EAC-1]

Additionally to the [PP-MRTD-EACV2], the TOE has a set of administrative commands for the management of the product during the product life.

The TOE comprises of at least

- the circuitry of the MRTD's chip (the integrated circuit, IC),
- the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software,
- the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
- the eTravel 3.1 application on MultiApp V5.1 Open Platform.
- The GDP Applet
- The associated guidance documentation.
- A cryptographic library developed by Thales

The MultiApp V5.1 is an open platform [STs-Platform].

#### The TOE delivery:

The TOE can be delivered under 2 configurations:

- ✓ The configuration called "Standalone" meaning the eTravel 3.1 is the only applet selectable on the platform (GP221 "Final application" privilege).
- ✓ The configuration called "Open" meaning eTravel 3.1 is selectable among other applets on the platform.

The TOE is delivered to the Personalization Agent with data and guidance documentation in order to perform the personalization of the product. In addition, the Personalization Key is delivered from the MRTD Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The Personalization Key is generated on the Manufacturing Site and transmitted to the Personalization Agent through a secured method (Key Ceremony involving Security Agents on a dedicated secure environment with KMS devices). Depending on customer needs and preferences, the Personalization Key could also be generated on the Personalization Agent side (dedicated secure environment with KMS devices) and transmitted to the Manufacturing site through a secure method (Key Ceremony involving Security Agents) in order to be integrated to the TOE.

## 2.2 TOE BOUNDARIES

The eTravel 3.1 EAC/SAC on MultiApp V5.1 Embedded Software (ES) is located in the flash code area.

The figure below gives a description of the TOE and its boundaries (red dash line)




Figure 1: TOE Boundaries

## 2.3 TOE USAGE AND SECURITY FEATURES FOR OPERATIONAL USE

A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveller presents an MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in context of this security target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD's chip according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD.

The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD's. Receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.

For this security target the MRTD is viewed as unit of

- (a) the **physical MRTD** as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
  - (1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
  - (2) the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
  - (3) the printed portrait.



- (b) the **logical MRTD** as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [ICAO-9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
  - (1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
  - (2) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
  - (3) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both,
  - (4) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
  - (5) the Document security object.

The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and the MRTD's chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.

The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD's chip) and organizational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [ICAO-9303]. These security measures include the binding of the MRTD's chip to the passport book.

The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD's chip.

The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication of the MRTD's chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the ICAO Doc 9303 [ICAO-9303] and Password Authenticated Connection Establishment [ICAO-TR-SAC]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism is performed completely and independently of the TOE by the TOE environment.

This security target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Extended Access Control Mechanism. This security target addresses the Chip Authentication Version 1 described in [TR-EAC-1] as an alternative to the Active Authentication stated in [ICAO-9303].

If BAC is supported by the TOE, the MRTD has to be evaluated and certified separately. This is due to the fact that [PP-MRTD-BAC] does only consider extended basic attack potential to the Basic Access Control Mechanism (i.e. AVA\_VAN.3).

The confidentiality Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is a mandatory security feature that shall be implemented by the TOE, too. The MRTD has additionally to fulfil the 'Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access Control' [PP-BAC-MRTD].

For PACE protocol according to [ICAO-TR-SAC], the following steps shall be performed : (i) the MRTD encrypts a nonce with the shared password, derived from the MRZ resp. CAN data and transmits the encrypted nonce together with the domain parameters to the terminal.

(ii) The terminal recovers the nonce using the shared password, by (physically) reading the MRZ resp. CAN data.

(iii) The MRTD and the terminal computer perform a Diffie-Hellmann key agreement together with the ephemeral domain parameters to create a shared secret. Both parties derive the session keys KMAC and KENC from the shared secret.

(iv) Each party generates an authentication token, sends it to the other party and verifies the received token.

After successful key negotiation the terminal and the MRTD provide private communication (secure messaging) [ICAO-TR-SAC], [TR-EAC-1].

The security target requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication defined in [TR-EAC-1]. The Chip Authentication prevents data traces described in [ICAO-9303], informative appendix 7, A7.3.3. The Chip Authentication is provided by the following steps: (i) the inspection system communicates by means

of secure messaging established by Basic Access Control, (ii) the inspection system reads and verifies by means of the Passive Authentication the authenticity of the MRTD's Chip Authentication Public Key using the Document Security Object, (iii) the inspection system generates an ephemeral key pair, (iv) the TOE and the inspection system agree on two session keys for secure messaging in ENC\_MAC mode according to the Diffie-Hellman Primitive and (v) the inspection system verifies by means of received message authentication codes whether the MRTD's chip was able or not to run this protocol properly (i.e. the TOE proves to be in possession of the Chip Authentication Private Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Public Key used for derivation of the session keys). The Chip Authentication requires collaboration of the TOE and the TOE environment.

The security target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as defined in [TR-EAC-1]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 and (ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1). The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 (i) authenticates the MRTD's chip to the inspection system and (ii) establishes secure messaging which is used by Terminal Authentication v.1 to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore Terminal Authentication v.1 can only be performed if Chip Authentication v.1 has been successfully executed. The Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 consists of (i) the authentication of the inspection system as entity authorized by the receiving State or Organization through the issuing State, and (ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference data only to successfully authenticated authorized inspection systems. The issuing State or Organization authorizes the receiving State by means of certification the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System Certificates.

The security target also requires the TOE to implement Active Authentication as defined in [ICAO-9303].

Keys for Chip authentication and Active Authentication can be generated in the card or loaded into it. These operations take place at personalization time.

## 2.4 OS UPDATE CONCEPT

The eTravel 3.1 product embeds an optional functionality to update the embedded software when it is in operation on the field. This functionality of Embedded Software update is also named OS Agility and it is consistent with [JIL\_CPE].

The mechanism will allow to correct product issues or to add a feature requested by issuer when the product is already deployed. The updates are done through a dedicated module (OS-Agility) dealing with a set of update instructions received from trusted environment.

The update instructions are packaged into a block protected in confidentiality and integrity by keys known only by Thales DIS. The block can be transmitted and executed by the TOE only after a successful authentication done with keys only known by the issuer. With such features, Thales DIS is able to load some contents only with the consent of the issuer and the issuer also cannot load a content without the consent of Thales DIS.

Prior to the execution of the instructions of the patch, some prerequisites are verified to confirm ability to perform the correct execution of the instructions. At the end of the execution, the traceability elements are also updated to allow a complete identification of the product (platform version and current patch version). The patch loading mechanism ensures also the atomicity of the updates with change in identification of the TOE.

## 2.5 TOE LIFE-CYCLE

## 2.5.1 Actors

Actors	Identification
Integrated Circuit (IC) Developer	THALES DIS FRANCE SAS
Embedded Software Developer (Also named OS developer for the phase 1 of the Life cycle)	Thales DIS (See [ALC-DVS] for details)
Integrated Circuit (IC) Manufacturer	THALES DIS FRANCE SAS
Module Manufacturer	THALES (when it is done before the TOE delivery)
	THALES (when it is done before the TOE delivery) It can be also an accredited company or the SC Issuer after the TOE delivery
Card manufacturer (Initializer/Pre- personalizer)	THALES (See [ALC-DVS] for details)
	The agent who is acting on the behalf of the Issuer (e.g. issuing State or Organization) and personalize the TOE and applicative data (e.g. MRTD for the holder) by activities establishing the identity of the user (e.g. holder with biographic data).
	Agent who is acting on the behalf of the issuer to load the OS patch on the card
Issuer	The Issuer is the actual owner of the SE. As such, no OS Update operation shall be made without his consent. This concept has already been introduced in the SE PP.
MRTD Holder	The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalizes the MRTD.

Table 1: Identification of the actors



## 2.5.2 TOE Life Cycle




Figure 2: Manufacturing phases description

The Life cycle is described on the figure hereunder:

Phase	Description / com	nments	Who	Where
	MAV5.1 platform development	Platform development & tests (1.a)	Thales R&D team SL Crypto team - secure environment -	Thales Development site (see §2.5.4)
1	Thales MRTD application development	<ul> <li>MRTD Applet Development (1.c)</li> <li>Generation of principal HEX, mapping description</li> <li>Script generation for initialization and pre-personalization</li> <li>Applet tests</li> </ul>	<b>Thales</b> R&D team - secure environment -	Thales Development site (see §2.5.4)
	Patch development	<ul> <li>Patch Development (1.d)</li> <li>Patch tests</li> </ul>	Thales R&D team - secure environment -	Thales Development site (see §2.5.4)
	PSE team	<ul> <li>Platform configuration (1.b)</li> <li>Script development</li> </ul>	Thales PSE team	Thales manufacturing site (see §2.5.4)
2	IC development	Integrated Circuit development	THALES DIS FRANCE SAS - Secure environment -	THALES DIS FRANCE SAS development site(s)
3	IC manufacturing & Testing	Manufacturing of virgin integrated circuits embedding the THALES DIS FRANCE SAS flash loader, and protected by a dedicated transport key.	THALES DIS FRANCE SAS - Secure environment -	THALES DIS FRANCE SAS development site(s)
4	SC manufacturing: IC packaging & Embedding, also called "assembly"	- IC packaging & testing	Thales Production teams - Secure environment -	Thales manufacturing site (see §2.5.4)
5.a	Initialization / Pre-personalization	Loading of the Thales software (platform and applets on top based on script generated)	Thales Production teams	Thales manufacturing site (see §2.5.4)
5.b	Embedding	Put the module on a dedicated form factor (Card, inlay MFF2, other)		
5c	Embedding	Put the module on a dedicated form factor (Card, inlay MFF2, other)	SC Issuer or another accredited company	SC Personalizer or Accredited company site
6	SC Personalization	Creation of files and loading of end-user data	SC Issuer or Another accredited company	SC Personalizer or Accredited company site
_	End-usage	Application verification before loading (7.a)	SC Issuer	Field
		Application Loading (Load, Install and delete instance capabilities) (7.c)	SC Issuer	Field
7		Patch verification before loading (Signature) (7.b)	Thales	Field
		Patch update (7.b)	Thales	Field
		End-usage for cardholder (7.d)	Cardholder	Field

## Figure 3: Life Cycle description

<u>Remark 1</u>: Initialization & pre-personalization operation could be done on module or on other form factor. The form factor does not affect the TOE security.

<u>Remark 2</u>: For initialization/pre-personalization IC flash loader could be used based on the IC manufacturer recommendation.

The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases. (With respect to the [PP-IC-0084], the TOE life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.)

## Phase 1 "Development":

(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.

(Step2) The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.

As a result a flash mask is generated (HEX file) with initialisation and pre-personalisation scripts.

#### Phase 2 "Manufacturing":

(Step3) In a first step the IC manufacturer produce virgin chip with IC Identification Data and the flash loader software. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacturer to the MRTD manufacturer.

(Step4) The MRTD manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contactless interface in the passport book

(Step5) The MRTD manufacturer (i) creates the MRTD application and (ii) equips MRTD's chips with prepersonalization Data.

The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.

#### Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD":

(Step6) The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD holder's biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document security object.

The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [5] finalizes the personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD holder for operational use.

#### Phase 4 "Operational Use"

(Step7) The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the "Operational Use" phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State or Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified.

The TOE can be updated by agent acting on the behalf of the issuer to load the OS patch on the TOE under control of Thales DIS and issuer.

Application note: In this ST, the role of the Personalization Agents is strictly limited to the phase 3 Personalization. In the phase 4 Operational Use updating and addition of the data groups of the MRTD application is forbidden.

As a summary description of how the parts of the TOE are delivered to the final customer, the eTravel 3.1 on MultiApp V5.1 application is delivered mainly in form of a smart card or inlay. The form factor is packaged on Thaleso's manufacturing facility and sent to final customer premises.

The different guides accompanying the TOE and parts of the TOE are the ones specified in [AGD] section. They are delivered in form of electronic documents (\*.pdf) by Thales's Technical representative.

## 2.5.3 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE

According to [TR-EAC-1], TOE is able to perform its claimed security features when it communicates with a terminal or an Inspection System using a PCD (Proximity Coupling Device) with a RF (Radio Frequency) reading module and an antenna. It is used for the wireless communication with the electronic identity document's chip in order to establish a connection based on the [ISO/IEC 14443] protocol and optionally [ISO/IEC 7816] protocol.

TOE security features of MRTD application are accessible only for devices having privileges to perform MRTD sensitive operations.

TOE security features of personalization application are accessible only for devices having privileges to perform such personalization operations.

TOE security features of OS update are accessible only for devices having privileges to perform loading and activation of additional code.

## 2.5.4 TOE Delivery

The TOE is delivered as a whole package with the Platform MultiApp V5.1. There is no distinction between the delivery of the platform MultiApp v5.1 and this TOE.

Regarding the documentation to be delivered, a part from the one described on section 2.6.1.4 of the platform Security Target [ST-JCS], and section 2.6.2.2 of the platform Security Target [ST-GP], the documentation found on [AGD] accompanies this TOE.

The documentation is delivered in form of electronic documents (\*.pdf) by Thales's Technical representative via a secure file sharing platform download action.

Item type	Item	Reference/Version	Form of delivery
Document	eTravel 3.x Reference Manual	D1584821 – D.2 May 9 <sup>th</sup> , 2023	Electronic document via secure file download
Document	AGD PRE document - eTravel v3.1	D1574817, Rev 1.2 11/05/2023	Electronic document via secure file download
Document	AGD OPE document - eTravel v3.1	D1582202, Rev 1.2 11/05/2023	Electronic document via secure file download
Document	Global Dispatcher Personalization Applet	D1390286R November 4th, 2022	Electronic document via secure file download

## 2.5.5 Involved Thales-DIS sites

#### **Development and Project Managment**

- La Ciotat (France)
  - CC project management
- o Singapore
  - Platform & eTravel development
- Meudon (France)
  - eTravel development
- o Vantaa
  - eTravel development support

## Manufacturing

Gémenos, Singapore, Vantaa, Tczew, Curitiba, Chanhassen, Pont-Audemer

#### □ IT activities

o Gémenos, Calamba, Les Clayes, Marcoussi, Pune

## 3. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS

## 3.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM

This security target claims conformance to

- [CC-1]
- [CC-2]
- [CC-3]

as follows

- Part 2 extended,
- Part 3 conformant.

## The

• [CEM] has to been taken into account.

## 3.2 PP CLAIM,

The MultiApp V5.1 eTravel 3.1 EAC/SAC security target claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile [PP-MRTD-EACV2].

[PP-MRTD-EACV2] claims strict conformance to [PP-MRTD-SAC].

The MultiApp V5.1 eTravel 3.1 EAC/SAC security target is a composite security target, including the IC security target [ST-AQU-IC]. However, the security problem definition, the objectives, and the SFR of the IC are not described in this document.

## 3.3 PACKAGE CLAIM

This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL5 augmented with ALC\_DVS.2 and AVA\_VAN.5 defined in CC part 3 [CC-3].

## **3.4 CONFORMANCE STATEMENT**

This ST strictly conforms to [PP-MRTD-EACV2].

# 4. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION

## 4.1 INTRODUCTION

## 4.1.1 Assets

## 4.1.1.1 MRTD Assets

The primary assets to be protected by the TOE as long as they are in scope of the TOE are (please refer to the glossary in §9 - Glossary and acronyms for the term definitions)

Object No.	Asset	Definition	Generic security property to be maintained by the current security policy
		travel document	
1	user data stored of the TOE	<ul> <li>All data (being not authentication data) stored in the context of the <i>ePassport</i> application of the travel document as defined in [ICAO-TR-SAC] and being allowed to be <i>read out</i> solely by an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [ICAO-TR-SAC]).</li> <li>This asset covers 'User Data on the MRTD's chip', 'Logical MRTD Data' and 'Sensitive User Data' in [PP-MRTD-BAC].</li> </ul>	Confidentiality <sup>1</sup> Integrity Authenticity
2	user dat transferred betwee the TOE and th terminal connecte (i.e. an authori represented b Basic Inspection System with PACE	transferred in the context of the <i>ePassport</i> application of the travel document as defined in [ICAO-TR-SAC] between the TOE and an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of ICAO-TR-SAC]).	Confidentiality <sup>2</sup> Integrity Authenticity
3	travel documen tracing data	Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel document gathered unnoticeable by the travel document holder recognising the TOE not knowing any PAC E password. TOE tracing data can be provided / gathered.	unavailability <sup>3</sup>

#### Table 2: Primary assets

Application note: Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4) are included in Object 1.

All these primary assets represent User Data in the sense of the CC.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Though not each data element stored on the TOE represents a secret, the specification [ICAO-TR-SAC] anyway requires securing their confidentiality: only terminals authenticated according to [ICAO-TR-SAC] can get access to the user data stored. They have to be operated according to P.Terminal.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Though not each data element being transferred represents a secret, the specification [ICAO-TR-SAC] anyway requires securing their confidentiality: the secure messaging in encrypt-then-authenticate mode is required for all messages according to [ICAO-TR-SAC].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> represents a prerequisite for anonymity of the travel document holder



The secondary assets also having to be protected by the TOE in order to achieve a sufficient protection of the primary assets are:

Object No.	Asset	Definition	Property to be maintained by the current security policy
		travel document	
4	Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects	Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and TSF-data stored in the TOE to authorised subjects only.	Availability
5	Genuineness of the TOE	Property of the TOE to be authentic in order to provide claimed security functionality in a proper way. This asset also covers 'Authenticity of the MRTD's chip' in [PP-MRTD-BAC].	Availability
6	TOE internal secret cryptographic keys	Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material used by the TOE in order to enforce its security functionality.	Confidentiality Integrity
7	TOE internal non- secret cryptographic material	Permanently or temporarily stored non-secret cryptographic (public) keys and other non- secret material (Document Security Object SOD containing digital signature) used by the TOE in order to enforce its security functionality.	Integrity Authenticity
8	travel document communication establishment authorisation data	Restricted-revealable <sup>4</sup> authorisation information for a human user being used for verification of the authorisation attempts as authorised user (PACE password). These data are stored in the TOE and are not to be send to it.	Confidentiality Integrity

## Table 3: Secondary assets

The secondary assets represent TSF and TSF-data in the sense of the CC.

Application note: Due to interoperability reasons the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [ICAO-9303] requires that Basic Inspection Systems may have access to logical travel document data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16. The TOE is not in certified mode, if it is accessed using BAC [ICAO-9303]. Note that the BAC mechanism cannot resist attacks with high attack potential (cf. [PP-MRTD-BAC]). If supported, it is therefore recommended to use PACE instead of BAC. If nevertheless BAC has to be used, it is recommended to perform Chip Authentication v.1 before getting access to data (except DG14), as this mechanism is resistant to high potential attacks

A sensitive asset is the following more general one.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of CAN and MRZ to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to respective regulations and are trustworthy.

## 4.1.1.2 TSF data

## D.JCS\_CODE

The code of the Java Card System.

To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

## D.JCS\_DATA

The internal runtime data areas necessary for the execution of the Java Card VM, such as, for instance, the frame stack, the program counter, the class of an object, the length allocated for an array, any pointer used to chain data-structures.

To be protected from monopolization and unauthorized disclosure or modification.

## 4.1.1.3 Assets for OS Agility

The following assets are related to patch management in post-issuance phase (phase 7). As mentioned in section 2.5.2, there is no patch associated to the present TOE, however the patch mechanisms are within the evaluation scope.

D.OS-UPDATE_DEC-KEY	It is a Thales DIS cryptographic key (K <sub>ENC</sub> ), owned by the OS Developer, and used by the TOE to decrypt the additional code to be loaded.
	Note: no assumption is made on the type of this decryption key, i.e.
	it can be either a symmetric key or the secret component of an
	asymmetric key pair.
	To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.OS-UPDATE_SGNVER-KEY	Thales DIS keys used for the signature
	It is a Thales DIS cryptographic key ( $K_{MAC}$ ), owned by the OS
	Developer, and used by the TOE to verify the signature of the additional code to be loaded.
	Note: no assumption is made on the type of this signature
	verification key, i.e. it can be either a symmetric key or the public
	component of an asymmetric key pair.
	Case of a symmetric key: to be protected from unauthorized
	disclosure and modification.
	Case of an asymmetric public key: to be protected from
	unauthorized modification.
D.OS-UPDATE_ADDITIONALCODE	Code to be added to the OS after TOE issuance. The additional
	code has to be signed by the OS Developer. After successful
	verification of the signature by the Initial TOE, the additional code is
	verification of the signature by the Initial TOE, the additional code is loaded and installed/activated through an atomic activation (to
	verification of the signature by the Initial TOE, the additional code is loaded and installed/activated through an atomic activation (to create an Updated TOE).
	verification of the signature by the Initial TOE, the additional code is loaded and installed/activated through an atomic activation (to create an Updated TOE). To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.OS-UPDATE-CODE-ID	verification of the signature by the Initial TOE, the additional code is loaded and installed/activated through an atomic activation (to create an Updated TOE). To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification. Identification data associated to the additional code. It is loaded
	verification of the signature by the Initial TOE, the additional code is loaded and installed/activated through an atomic activation (to create an Updated TOE). To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification. Identification data associated to the additional code. It is loaded and/or updated in the same atomic operation as additional code
	verification of the signature by the Initial TOE, the additional code is loaded and installed/activated through an atomic activation (to create an Updated TOE). To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification. Identification data associated to the additional code. It is loaded
	verification of the signature by the Initial TOE, the additional code is loaded and installed/activated through an atomic activation (to create an Updated TOE). To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification. Identification data associated to the additional code. It is loaded and/or updated in the same atomic operation as additional code loading.
	<ul> <li>verification of the signature by the Initial TOE, the additional code is loaded and installed/activated through an atomic activation (to create an Updated TOE).</li> <li>To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.</li> <li>Identification data associated to the additional code. It is loaded and/or updated in the same atomic operation as additional code loading.</li> <li>To be protected from unauthorized modification.</li> <li>Application Note: The identification data (D.OS-UPDATE-CODE-ID) may be also protected from unauthorized disclosure (confidentiality</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>verification of the signature by the Initial TOE, the additional code is loaded and installed/activated through an atomic activation (to create an Updated TOE).</li> <li>To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.</li> <li>Identification data associated to the additional code. It is loaded and/or updated in the same atomic operation as additional code loading.</li> <li>To be protected from unauthorized modification.</li> <li>Application Note: The identification data (D.OS-UPDATE-CODE-ID) may be also protected from unauthorized disclosure (confidentiality requirement) to not permitting an attacker to determine if a given</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>verification of the signature by the Initial TOE, the additional code is loaded and installed/activated through an atomic activation (to create an Updated TOE).</li> <li>To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.</li> <li>Identification data associated to the additional code. It is loaded and/or updated in the same atomic operation as additional code loading.</li> <li>To be protected from unauthorized modification.</li> <li>Application Note: The identification data (D.OS-UPDATE-CODE-ID) may be also protected from unauthorized disclosure (confidentiality requirement) to not permitting an attacker to determine if a given TOE has been updated or not (even if it is not possible to</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>verification of the signature by the Initial TOE, the additional code is loaded and installed/activated through an atomic activation (to create an Updated TOE).</li> <li>To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.</li> <li>Identification data associated to the additional code. It is loaded and/or updated in the same atomic operation as additional code loading.</li> <li>To be protected from unauthorized modification.</li> <li>Application Note: The identification data (D.OS-UPDATE-CODE-ID) may be also protected from unauthorized disclosure (confidentiality requirement) to not permitting an attacker to determine if a given TOE has been updated or not (even if it is not possible to distinguish between functional and security updates). However,</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>verification of the signature by the Initial TOE, the additional code is loaded and installed/activated through an atomic activation (to create an Updated TOE).</li> <li>To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.</li> <li>Identification data associated to the additional code. It is loaded and/or updated in the same atomic operation as additional code loading.</li> <li>To be protected from unauthorized modification.</li> <li>Application Note: The identification data (D.OS-UPDATE-CODE-ID) may be also protected from unauthorized disclosure (confidentiality requirement) to not permitting an attacker to determine if a given TOE has been updated or not (even if it is not possible to distinguish between functional and security updates). However, confidentiality is not mandatory since in most cases the</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>verification of the signature by the Initial TOE, the additional code is loaded and installed/activated through an atomic activation (to create an Updated TOE).</li> <li>To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.</li> <li>Identification data associated to the additional code. It is loaded and/or updated in the same atomic operation as additional code loading.</li> <li>To be protected from unauthorized modification.</li> <li>Application Note: The identification data (D.OS-UPDATE-CODE-ID) may be also protected from unauthorized disclosure (confidentiality requirement) to not permitting an attacker to determine if a given TOE has been updated or not (even if it is not possible to distinguish between functional and security updates). However,</li> </ul>

## 4.1.2 Authenticity of the travel document's chip

The authenticity of the travel document's chip personalised by the issuing State or Organisation for the travel document holder is used by the traveller to prove his possession of a genuine travel document.

## 4.1.3 Subjects

This security target considers the following external entities and subjects, defined in [PP-MRTD-SAC]]:

External Entity No.	Subject No.	Role	Definition
1	1	travel document holder	A person for whom the travel document Issuer has personalised the travel document <sup>5</sup> . This entity is commensurate with 'MRTD Holder' in [ST-BAC]. Please note that a travel document holder can also be an attacker (s. below).
2	-	travel document presenter (traveller)	A person presenting the travel document to a terminal <sup>6</sup> and claiming the identity of the travel document holder. This external entity is commensurate with 'Traveller' in [ST-BAC]. Please note that a travel document presenter can also be an attacker (s. below).
3	2	Terminal	A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless/contact interface. The role 'Terminal' is the default role for any terminal being recognised by the TOE as not being PACE authenticated ('Terminal' is used by the travel document presenter). This entity is commensurate with 'Terminal' in [ST-BAC].
-	-	Inspection System (IS)	A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an travel document presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as travel document holder.
4	3	Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS- PACE)	A technical system being used by an inspecting authority <sup>7</sup> and verifying the travel document presenter as the travel document holder (for <i>ePassport</i> : by comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel document presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel document holder). BIS-PACE implements the terminal's part of the PACE protocol and authenticates itself to the travel document using a shared password (PACE password) and supports Passive Authentication. See also §0 above.
-	-	Extended Inspection System (EIS)	The Extended Inspection System (EIS) performs the Advanced Inspection Procedure (Figure 4) and therefore (i) contains a terminal for the communication with the travel document's chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of PACE and/or BAC; (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical travel document either under PACE or BAC by optical reading the travel document providing this information. (iv) implements the Terminal Authentication and Chip Authentication Protocols both Version 1 according to [TR-EAC-1] and (v) is authorized by the issuing State or Organisation through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. Security attributes of the EIS are defined by means of the Inspection

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> i.e. this person is uniquely associated with a concrete electronic Passport

<sup>6</sup> in the sense of [4]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> concretely, by a control officer



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External Entity No.	Subject No.	Role	Definition
			System Certificates. BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the BIS, PACE must be used.
5	-	Document Signer (DS)	An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive authentication. A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the Document Signer Certificate (C <sub>DS</sub> ), see [PKI]. This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent.
6	-	Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA)	An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the travel document and creates the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI. The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (C <sub>CSCA</sub> ) having to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [PKI], 5.5.1.
7	4	Personalisation Agent	An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data in the travel document, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder, (iii) writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical personalisation) and storing them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [PKI], (iv) writing the document details data, (v) writing the initial TSF data, (vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in [PKI] (in the role of DS). Please note that the role 'Personalisation Agent' may be distributed among several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel document Issuer. This entity is commensurate with 'Personalisation agent' in [ST- BAC].
8	5	Manufacturer	Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life cycle phase <sup>8</sup> . The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer. This entity is commensurate with 'Manufacturer' in [ST-BAC].
9	-	Attacker	A threat agent (a person or a process acting on his behalf) trying (i) to undermine the security policy defined by the current ST, especially to change properties of the assets having to be maintained, (ii) to manipulate the logical travel document without authorization, (iii) to read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4), (iv) to forge a genuine travel document, or (iv) to trace a travel document. The attacker is assumed to possess an at most <i>high</i> attack potential. Please note that the attacker might 'capture' any subject role recognised by the TOE. This external entity is commensurate with 'Attacker' in [ST- BAC].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> cf. also par. 1.2.3 in sec. 1.2.3 above



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External Entity No.	Subject No.	Role	Definition
10	-	Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA)	The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing State or Organisation with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the travel document. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
11	-	Document Verifier (DV)	The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the travel document in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organisations in the form of the Document Verifier Certificates.
12		Embedded Software Developer	The additional code to the entity responsible to its deployment. It is represented in TOE by D.ACODE_ SGNVER-KEY and invoked during verification of signature of additional code.
13		Deployment Additional code Agent	The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to deploy the additional code for the post-Issuance loading. It is at delivery point the entity authorized to receive the additional code from Embedded Software Developer to produce the CVCA Link certificate including the additional code. This actor is represented in TOE by a key used to verify the certificate including the additional code.
14		Post-Issuance Additional code Agent / Terminal	The agent or terminal is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to perform the loading of additional code at post- Issuance. It is represented in TOE by authentication key used to perform authentication required prior additional code loading.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> This table defines external entities and subjects in the sense of [CC-1]. Subjects can be recognised by the TOE independent of their nature (human or technical user). As result of an appropriate identification and authentication process, the TOE creates – for each of the respective external entity – an 'image' inside and 'works' then with this TOE internal image (also called subject in [CC-1]). From this point of view, the TOE itself perceives only 'subjects' and, for them, does not differ between 'subjects' and 'external entities'. There is no dedicated subject with the role 'attacker' within the current security policy, whereby an attacker might 'capture' any subject role recognised by the TOE.



## 4.1.4 Advanced Inspection Procedure




Figure 4: Advanced Inspection Procedure

Application note: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged travel document. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.

## 4.2 ASSUMPTIONS

## 4.2.1 MRTD Assumptions

The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used.

## A.Passive\_Auth PKI for Passive Authentication

The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel document. The issuing State or Organisation runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organisations. It is assumed that the Personalisation Agent ensures that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [PKI].

## A.Insp\_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability

The Extended Inspection System (EIS) for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [ICAO-TR-SAC] and/or BAC [ST-BAC]. BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the IS, PACE must be used. The EIS reads the logical travel document under PACE or BAC and performs the Chip Authentication v.1 to verify the logical travel document and establishes secure messaging. EIS supports



the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 in order to ensure access control and is authorized by the issuing State or Organisation through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.

## Justification:

The assumption A.Insp\_Sys does not confine the security objectives of [[PP-MRTD-SAC] as it repeats the requirements of P.Terminal and adds only assumptions for the Inspection Systems for handling the EAC functionality of the TOE.

## A.Auth\_PKI PKI for Inspection Systems

The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organisations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving States or Organisations. The issuing States or Organisations distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their travel document's chip.

#### Justification:

This assumption only concerns the EAC part of the TOE. The issuing and use of card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control is neither relevant for the PACE part of the TOE nor will the security objectives of [PP-MRTD-SAC] be restricted by this assumption. For the EAC functionality of the TOE the assumption is necessary because it covers the pre-requisite for performing the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1.

## 4.2.2 OS Update Assumptions

## A.OS-UPDATE-EVIDENCE

For additional code loaded pre-issuance, it is assumed that:

- Evaluated technical and/or audited organizational measures have been implemented to ensure that the additional code:
  - (1) has been issued by the genuine OS Developer
  - (2) has not been altered since it was issued by the genuine OS Developer.

For additional code loaded post-issuance, it is assumed that the OS Developer provides digital evidence to the TOE in order to prove the following:

(1) he is the genuine developer of the additional code and

(2) the additional code has not been modified since it was issued by the genuine OS Developer.

## Justification:

This assumption only concerns the OS UPDATE functionality of the TOE. The security objectives of [PP-MRTD-SAC] will not be restricted by this assumption. This assumption is necessary because it covers the pre-requisite to ensure that the code loaded will not be altered and will be issued by the genuine OS Developper to perform a code update.

## A.SECURE ACODE MANAGEMENT

It is assumed that:

- The Key management process related to the OS Update capability takes place in a secure and audited environment.
- The cryptographic keys used by the cryptographic operations are of strong quality and appropriately secured to ensure confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of those keys.

## Justification:

This assumption only concerns the OS UPDATE functionality of the TOE. The security objectives of [PP-MRTD-SAC] will not be restricted by this assumption. This assumption is necessary because it covers the pre-requisite to ensure that the key used for the OS update will be protected in confidentiality, authenticity and integrity

## 4.3 THREATS

This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.

## 4.3.1 MRTD Threats

The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.

#### T.Skimming Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal Communication

Adverse action:	An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access to the user data stored on or transferred between the TOE and the inspecting authority connected via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
Threat agent:	having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset:	confidentiality of logical travel document data

Application Note: When using BIS-BAC MultiApp V5.1 cannot avert this threat in the context of the security policy defined in this ST.

Application Note: MRZ is printed and CAN is printed or stuck on the travel document. Please note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are restricted-revealable, cf. OE.Travel Document Holder.

T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE and the PACE terminal

Adverse action:	An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel document and the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain the <i>user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected</i> .
Threat agent:	having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset:	confidentiality of logical travel document data

*Application Note*: When using BIS-BAC MultiApp V5.1 cannot avert this threat in the context of the security policy defined in this ST.

## T.Tracing Tracing travel document

Adverse action:	An attacker tries to gather <i>TOE tracing data</i> (i.e. to trace the movement of the travel document) unambiguously identifying it remotely by establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
Threat agent:	having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset:	privacy of the travel document holder

Application Note: This Threat completely covers and extends "T.Chip-ID" from [ST--BAC]. Application Note: When using BIS-BAC MultiApp V5.1 cannot avert this threat in the context of the security policy defined in this ST, see also §0 above.

Application Note: Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any unique-secret-based authentication of the travel document's chip (no Chip Authentication or Active Authentication), a threat like T.Counterfeit (counterfeiting travel document)<sup>10</sup> cannot be averted by the current TOE.

## T.Forgery Forgery of Data

Adverse action:	An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected in order to outsmart the PACE (or EAC) authenticated BIS-PACE (or EIS) by means of changed travel document holder's related reference data (like biographic or biometric data). The attacker does it in such a way that the terminal connected perceives these modified data as authentic one.
Threat agent:	having high attack potential
Asset:	integrity of the travel document

#### **T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality**

Adverse action:	An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational phase in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the <i>User Data stored in the TOE</i> , (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the <i>TSF-data stored in the TOE</i> or (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) <i>soft-coded security functionality of the TOE</i> . This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialisation and personalisation in the operational phase after delivery to the travel document holder.
Threat agent:	having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents
Asset:	integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document

Application Note: Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the test features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software being not specified here.

#### T.Information\_Leakage Information Leakage from travel document

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Such a threat might be formulated like: 'An attacker produces an unauthorised copy or reproduction of a *genuine* travel document to be used as part of a counterfeit Passport: he or she may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine travel document and copy them on another functionally appropriate chip to imitate this genuine travel document. This violates the authenticity of the travel document being used for authentication of a travel document presenter as the travel document holder'.

Adverse action:	An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential <i>User Data</i> or/and <i>TSF-data stored on the travel document</i> or/and <i>exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected</i> . The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Threat agent:	having high attack potential
Asset:	confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document

Application Note: Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission, but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).

## T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering

Adverse action:	An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel document in order (i) to disclose the TSF-data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE's Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the travel document in order to alter (I) its security functionality (hardware and software part, as well), (ii) the User Data or the TSF-data stored on the travel document.
Threat agent:	high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents
Asset:	integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document

Application Note: Physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of the user data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or the TSF data (e.g. authentication key of the travel document) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires a direct interaction with the travel document's internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of the user data and the TSF data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.

#### T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress

Adverse action:	An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document's hardware and Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functionality of the TOE' hardware or to (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE's Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the travel document outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the travel document's Embedded Software or misusing administrative functions. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
Threat agent:	having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents, having information about the functional operation
Asset:	integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document

Application note: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the threat T.Phys-Tamper) assuming a detailed knowledge about TOE's internals.

#### T.Read\_Sensitive\_Data Read the sensitive biometric reference data



Adverse action:	An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface of the travel document's chip.
	The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [ST-BAC]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation
	(to get data stored on the travel document's chip) but differs from those in the
	asset under the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing the PACE
	Password) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive
	biometric reference data are stored only on the travel document's chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical part of the travel document as well.
Threat agent:	having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being in possession of a legitimate travel document.

Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document sensitive user data (i.e. biometric reference)

#### T.Counterfeit Counterfeit of travel document chip data

Adverse action:	An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine travel document's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit travel document. This violates the authenticity of the travel document's chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a travel document.
	The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine travel document's chip and copy them to another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine travel document's chip.
Threat agent:	having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents.
Asset:	authenticity of user data stored on the TOE

Application note:

T.Forgery from the [PP-MRTD-SAC] shall be extended by the Extended Inspection System additionally to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE being outsmarted by the attacker.

## 4.3.2 OS Update Threats

The following threats are related to patch loading in post-issuance.

#### T.UNAUTHORIZED\_TOE\_CODE\_UPDATE

An attacker attempts to update the TOE code with a malicious update that may compromise the security features of the TOE.

Threat agent: Attacker

Targeted asset(s): D.OS-UPDATE\_ADDITIONALCODE, D.JCS\_CODE, D.JCS\_DATA.

#### **T.FAKE-SGNVER-KEY**

An attacker modifies the signature verification key used by the TOE to verify the signature of the additional code. Hence, he is able to sign and successfully load malicious additional code inside the TOE.

Threat agent: Attacker

Targeted assets: D.OS-UPDATE\_SGNVER-KEY, D.OS-UPDATE\_ADDITIONALCODE.

#### T.WRONG-UPDATE-STATE

An attacker prevents the OS Update operation to be performed atomically, resulting in an inconsistency between the resulting TOE code and the identification data:

- The additional code is not loaded within the TOE, but the identification data is updated to mention that the additional code is present;
- The additional code is loaded within the TOE, but the identification data is not updated to indicate the change.
- Threat agent: Attacker

Targeted asset: D.OS-UPDATE-CODE-ID.

#### T.INTEG-OS-UPDATE\_LOAD



The attacker modifies (part of) the additional code when it is transmitted to the TOE for installation. Threat agent: Attacker

Targeted assets: D.OS-UPDATE\_ADDITIONALCODE, D.JCS\_CODE, D.JCS\_DATA.

## T.CONFID-OS-UPDATE\_LOAD

The attacker discloses (part of) the additional code when it is transmitted to the TOE for installation. Threat agent: Attacker Targeted assets: D.OS-UPDATE ADDITIONALCODE, D.JCS CODE, D.JCS DATA.

## 4.4 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES

## 4.4.1 MRTD OSP

The TOE shall comply with the following Organisational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations (see CC part 1, sec. 3.2).

## P.Manufact Manufacturing of the travel document's chip

The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The travel document Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalisation Data which contains at least the Personalisation Agent Key.

#### P.Pre-Operational Pre-operational handling of the travel document

- 1.) The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
- 2.) The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst other of those, concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF-data permanently stored in the TOE<sup>11</sup>.
- 3.) The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE's technical components (IC) which enable traceability of the travel documents in their manufacturing and issuing life cycle phases, i.e. <u>before</u> they are in the operational phase, cf. sec. 1.2.3 above.
- 4.) If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to personalise the travel document for travel document holders, the travel document Issuer has to ensure that the Personalisation Agent acts in accordance with the travel document Issuer's policy.

## P.Card\_PKI PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)

Application Note 20: The description below states the responsibilities of involved parties and represents the logical, but not the physical structure of the PKI. Physical distribution ways shall be implemented by the involved parties in such a way that all certificates belonging to the PKI are securely distributed / made available to their final destination, e.g. by using directory services.

- The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the passive authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the travel document. For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA). The travel document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate (C<sub>CSCA</sub>).
- 2.) The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA shall keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate (C<sub>CSCA</sub>) having to be made available to the travel document Issuer by strictly secure means, see [PKI], 5.5.1. The CSCA shall create the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys (C<sub>DS</sub>) and make them available to the travel document Issuer, see [PKI], 5.5.1.
- 3.) A Document Signer shall (i) generate the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iii) keep the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) securely use the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of travel documents.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> cf. Table 2 and Table 3 above



## P.Trustworthy\_PKI Trustworthiness of PKI

The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be stored on the travel document.

#### P.Terminal Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals

The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their terminals as follows:

- 1.) The related terminals (basic inspection system, cf. above) shall be used by terminal operators and by travel document holders as defined in [PKI].
- 2.) They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [ICAO-TR-SAC], of the Passive Authentication [PKI] and use them in this order<sup>12</sup>. The PACE terminal shall use randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
- 3.) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
- 4.) They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in form of C<sub>CSCA</sub> and C<sub>DS</sub>) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [PKI]).
- 5.) The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to this current ST.

## P.Sensitive\_Data Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data

The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive private personal data of the travel document holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the travel document is presented to the inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The travel document's chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication Version 1.

## P.Personalisation Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or Organisation only

The issuing State or Organisation guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical travel document with respect to the travel document holder. The personalisation of the travel document for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organisation only.

#### P.Active\_Auth Active Authentication

The TOE implements the active authentication protocol as described in [ICAO-9303].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> This order is commensurate with [ICAO-TR-SAC].

## 4.4.2 OS Update OSP

## OSP.ATOMIC\_ACTIVATION

Additional code has to be loaded and installed on the TOE through an atomic activation.

Each additional code shall be identified with unique Identification Data. During such atomic activation, identification Data of the TOE have to be updated to clearly identify the Updated TOE.

In case of interruption or incident during activation, the TOE shall remain in its initial state or set in a failed secure state.

## **OSP.TOE\_IDENTIFICATION**

Identification Data of the resulting Updated TOE shall identify the Initial TOE and the activated additional code. Identification Data shall be protected in integrity.

## OSP.ADDITIONAL\_CODE\_SIGNING

The additional code has to be signed with a cryptographic key pair according to relevant standard and the generated signature is associated to the additional code.

The additional code signature must be checked during loading to assure its authenticity and integrity and to assure that loading is authorized on the TOE.

The cryptographic key used to sign the additional code shall be of sufficient quality and the process for key generation and storage shall be appropriately secured to ensure the authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of the key. The process to deliver the key for signature verification shall be appropriately secured to ensure the authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of the key (not applicable if public key).

## OSP.ADDITIONAL\_CODE\_ENCRYPTION

The additional code has to be encrypted according to relevant standard in order to ensure its confidentiality when it is transmitted to the TOE for loading and installation.

The encryption key shall be of sufficient quality and the process for key generation and storage shall be appropriately secured to ensure the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the key.

## 5. SECURITY OBJECTIVES

This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives for the operational environment.

## 5.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE

This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organisational security policies to be met by the TOE.

## **OT.Data Integrity Integrity of Data**

The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data<sup>13</sup> stored on it by protecting these data against unauthorised modification (physical manipulation and unauthorised modifying). The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.

## **OT.Data Authenticity Authenticity of Data**

The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data<sup>14</sup> stored on it by enabling verification of their authenticity at the terminal-side<sup>15</sup>. The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSFdata during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a verification at the terminal-side (at receiving by the terminal) and by an active verification by the TOE itself (at receiving by the TOE)16.

## **OT.Data\_Confidentiality Confidentiality of Data**

The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data<sup>17</sup> by granting read access only to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE connected. The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.

## **OT.Tracing Tracing travel document**

The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE without knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (PACE passwords) in advance.

Application note: Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any unique-secret-based authentication of the travel document's chip (no Chip Authentication), a security objective like OT.Chip Auth Proof (proof of travel document authenticity)<sup>18</sup> cannot be achieved by the current TOE.

## **OT.Prot\_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality**

The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in TOE operational phase, can be abused in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE, (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the TOE.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> where appropriate, see Table 3 above

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> where appropriate, see Table 3 above

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> verification of SO<sub>D</sub>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> secure messaging after the PACE authentication, see also [ICAO-TR-SAC]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> where appropriate, see Table 3 above

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Such a security objective might be formulated like: 'The TOE must enable the terminal connected to verify the authenticity of the travel document as a whole device as issued by the travel document Issuer (issuing PKI branch of the travel document Issuer) by means of the Passive and Chip Authentication as defined in [PKI] '.

## OT.Prot\_Inf\_Leak Protection against Information Leakage

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored and/or processed by the travel document

- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines,
- by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
- by a physical manipulation of the TOE.

*Application note:* This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker.

#### OT.Prot\_Phys\_Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering

The TOE must provide protection of confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF-data and the travel document's Embedded Software by means of

- measuring through galvanic contacts representing a direct physical probing on the chip's surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
- measuring not using galvanic contacts, but other types of physical interaction between electrical charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis),
- manipulation of the hardware and its security functionality, as well as
- controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF-data)

with a prior

• reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functionality.

#### OT.Prot\_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions

The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation have not been proven or tested. This is to prevent functional errors in the TOE. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency or temperature.

The following TOE security objectives address the aspects of identified threats to be countered *involving TOE's environment*.

#### **OT.Identification Identification of the TOE**

The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation<sup>19</sup> and Pre-Personalisation Data in its non-volatile memory. The Initialisation Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during the manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the travel document. The storage of the Pre-Personalisation data includes writing of the Personalisation Agent Key(s).

#### OT.AC\_Pers Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD

The TOE must ensure that the logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document Security Object according to LDS [PKI] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalisation Agents only. The logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after personalisation of the document.

Application note: The OT.AC\_Pers implies that the data of the LDS groups written during personalisation for travel document holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed using write access after personalisation.

#### OT.Sens\_Data\_Conf Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data

The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical travel document data during their transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> amongst other, IC Identification data



#### OT.Chip\_Auth\_Proof Proof of the travel document's chip authenticity

The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the travel document's chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organisation by means of the Chip Authentication Version 1 as defined in [TR-EAC-1]. The authenticity proof provided by travel document's chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.

Application note: The OT.Chip\_Auth\_Proof implies the travel document's chip to have (i) a unique identity as given by the travel document's Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference data to verify the authentication attempt of travel document's chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the travel document's chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS defined in [ICAO-9303] and (ii) the hash value of DG14 in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer.

#### OT.Active\_Auth\_Proof Proof of MRTD's chip authenticity through AA

The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRTD's chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active Authentication as defined in [ICAO-9303]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD's chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.

### 5.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR OS-AGILITY

Security Target of a TOE embedding a Loader shall include the following Security Objectives.

#### O.SECURE\_LOAD\_ACODE

The TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the additional code to be loaded.

The TOE enforces that only an allowed version of the additional code can be loaded. The TOE shall forbid the loading of an additional code not intended to be assembled with the TOE.

During the loading of the additional code, the TOE shall remain secure.

#### The additional code can be loaded from a terminal at border control

- Document Verifier entities generate new Terminal certificates signed by the new DV certificates and propagate the certificate chain to all the border controls.
- At border control the EAC mechanism is enforced on the Inspection System with the use of the new certificate chain.
- > TOE application is updated during the document verification (Terminal Authentication).

#### The additional code can be loaded from a terminal as the user mobile

- Document Verifier entities or Thales generate new Terminal certificate (Certificate Holder Authorization Template set to inexistent DG for security reason) signed by the new DV certificates and embed it with a mobile application
- > The mobile application is provided to the citizen from an application store.
- Citizen uses the mobile application and scans the MRZ of the document with the camera of the smartphone
- BAC/SAC followed by EAC is performed. TOE application is updated. Citizen is informed that the TOE application has been updated by mobile application.

#### The additional code can be loaded using a tool in personalization phase

> TOE application is updated during the document personalization (Issuer Authentication).

#### O.SECURE\_AC\_ACTIVATION

Activation of the additional code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the Updated TOE shall be completed before activation.

If the atomic activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Updated TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Updated TOE), the TOE shall preserve a secure state.

#### O.TOE\_IDENTIFICATION

The TOE provides means to store Identification Data in its non-volatile memory and guarantees the integrity of these data.

After atomic activation of the additional code, the Identification Data of the Updated TOE allows identifications of both the Initial TOE and additional code.

The user must be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and additional code(s) which are embedded in the Updated TOE.

#### O.CONFID-OS-UPDATE.LOAD

The TOE shall decrypt the additional code prior installation.

Application Note: Confidentiality protection must be enforced when the additional code is transmitted to the TOE for loading (See OE.OS-UPDATE-ENCRYPTION). Confidentiality protection can be achieved either through direct encryption of the additional code, or by means of a trusted path ensuring the confidentiality of the communication to the TOE.

### 5.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

#### Travel document Issuer as the general responsible

The travel document Issuer as the general responsible for the global security policy related will implement the following security objectives for the TOE environment:

#### OE.Legislative\_Compliance Issuing of the travel document

The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.

#### Travel document Issuer and CSCA: travel document's PKI (issuing) branch

The travel document Issuer and the related CSCA will implement the following security objectives for the TOE environment:

#### OE.Passive\_Auth\_Sign Authentication of travel document by Signature

The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel document Issuer must (i) generate a cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) publish the Certificate of the CSCA Public Key (C<sub>CSCA</sub>). Hereby authenticity and integrity of these certificates are being maintained.A Document Signer acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must (i) generate a cryptographically secure Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents in a secure operational environment only. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all hash values for each data group in use according to [PKI]. The Personalisation Agent has to ensure that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [PKI]. The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be stored on travel document.

#### **OE.Personalisation Personalisation of travel document**

The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting on his behalf (i) establish the correct identity of the travel document holder and create the biographical data for the travel document, (ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the travel document holder, (iii) write a subset of these data on the physical Passport (optical personalisation) and store them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [PKI]<sup>20</sup>, (iv) write the document details data, (v) write the initial TSF data, (vi) sign the Document Security Object defined in [PKI] (in the role of a DS). **Terminal operator: Terminal's receiving branch** 

#### **OE.Terminal Terminal operating**

The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows:

- 1.) The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal operators and by travel document holders as defined in [PKI].
- 2.) The related terminals implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [ICAO-TR-SAC], of the Passive Authentication [ICAO-TR-SAC] (by verification of the signature of the Document Security Object) and use them in this order<sup>21</sup>. The PACE terminal uses randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
- 3.) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
- 4.) The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in form of C<sub>CSCA</sub> and C<sub>DS</sub>) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication of the travel document (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [PKI]).
- 5.) The related terminals and their environment must ensure confidentiality and integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to this current ST.

#### **Travel document holder Obligations**

#### OE.Travel\_Document\_Holder Travel document holder Obligations

The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to respective regulations and are trustworthy.

#### OE.Active\_Auth\_Sign Active Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature

The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) generate the MRTD's Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD's Active Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.

#### OE.Active\_Auth\_Verif Verification by Active Authentication

In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the verification by active authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the MRTD.

The following security objectives for the operational environment are additions to [PP-MRTD-SAC]:

#### **Issuing State or Organisation**

The issuing State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.

#### OE.Auth\_Key\_Travel\_Document Travel document Authentication Key

The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) generate the travel document's Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or Organisations to verify the authenticity of the travel document's chip used for genuine travel document by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.

<sup>20</sup> see also [PKI] , sec. 10

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> This order is commensurate with [ICAO-TR-SAC].

**Justification:** This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those from [PP-MRTD-SAC] in order to counter the Threat T.Counterfeit as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 which is one of the additional features of the TOE described only in this security target and not in [PP-MRTD-SAC].

#### OE.Authoriz\_Sens\_Data Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data

The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of travel document holders to authorized receiving States or Organisations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.

**Justification:** This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those from [PP-MRTD-SAC] in order to handle the Threat T.Read\_Sensitive\_Data, the Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive\_Data and the Assumption A.Auth\_PKI as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the need of an PKI for this protocol and the responsibilities of its root instance. The Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 is one of the additional features of the TOE described only in this security target and not in [PP-MRTD-SAC].

#### **Receiving State or Organisation**

The receiving State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.

#### OE.Exam\_Travel\_Document Examination of the physical part of the travel document

The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation must examine the travel document presented by the traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel document. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organisation, and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [4] and/or the Basic Access Control [6]. Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to these points the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel document's chip.

**Justification:** This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those from [PP-MRTD-SAC] in order to handle the Threat T.Counterfeit and the Assumption A.Insp\_Sys by demanding the Inspection System to perform the Chip Authentication protocol v.1. OE.Exam\_Travel\_Document also repeats partly the requirements from OE.Terminal in [PP-MRTD-SAC] and therefore also counters T.Forgery and A.Passive\_Auth from [PP-MRTD-SAC]. This is done because a new type of Inspection System is introduced in this ST as the Extended Inspection System is needed to handle the additional features of a travel document with Extended Access Control.

#### OE.Prot\_Logical\_Travel\_Document Protection of data from the logical travel document

The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical travel document. The inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1.

**Justification:** This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those from [PP-MRTD-SAC] in order to handle the Assumption A.Insp\_Sys by requiring the Inspection System to perform secure messaging based on the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1.

#### OE.Ext\_Insp\_Systems Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems

The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organisations authorizes Extended Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the logical travel document. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the travel document's chip for access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System Certificate.

**Justification:** This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those from [PP-MRTD-SAC] in order to handle the Threat T.Read\_Sensitive\_Data, the Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive\_Data and the Assumption A.Auth\_PKI as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the responsibilities of the Document Verifier instance and the Inspection Systems.

### 5.4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FOR OS AGILITY

The following security objectives for the operational environment shall also be considered for the present evaluation:

OE.OS-UPDATE-EVIDENCE	For additional code loaded pre-issuance, evaluated technical measures implemented by the TOE or audited organizational measures must ensure that the additional code (1) has been issued by the genuine OS Developer (2) has not been altered since it was issued by the genuine OS Developer. For additional code loaded post-issuance, the OS Developer shall provide digital evidence to the TOE that (1) he is the genuine developer of the additional code and (2) the additional code has not been modified since it was issued by the genuine OS Developer.
OE.OS-UPDATE-ENCRYPTION	For additional code loaded post-issuance, the OS Developer shall encrypt the additional code so that its confidentiality is ensured when it is transmitted to the TOE for loading and installation.
OE.SECURE_ACODE_MANAGEMENT	Key management processes related to the OS Update capability shall take place in a secure and audited environment. The key generation processes shall guarantee that cryptographic keys are of sufficient quality and appropriately secured to ensure confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the keys.

# 5.5 SECURITY OBJECTIVE RATIONALE

# 5.5.1 Rationale between objectives and threats, assumptions, OSP

The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage. Table and following explanations are copied from [PP-MRTD-EACV2]. Only the shaded parts are added.

	OT.Sens_Data_Conf	OT.Chip_Auth_Proof	0T.AC_Pers <sup>22</sup>	OT.Data_Integrity	OT.Data_Authenticity	0T.Data_Confidentiality	0T.Tracing	0T. Prot_Abuse-Func	0T.Prot_Inf_Leak	OT. Identification	0T.Prot_Phys-Tamper	OT.Prot_Malfuntion	OT.Active_Auth_Proof	OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document	OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data	OE.Exam_Travel_Document	OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document	OE.Ext_Insp_Systems	OE. Personalisation	OE.Passive_Auth_Sign	OE. Terminal	OE.Travel_Document_Holder	OE.Legislative_Compliance	OE.Active_Auth_Sign	OE.Active_Auth_Verif	OE.OS-UPDATE-EVIDENCE	OE.OS-UPDATE-ENCRYPTION	OE.SECURE_ACODE_MANAGEMENT		O.SECURE_AC_ACTIVATION	O.TOE_IDENTIFICATION	O.CONFID-OS-UPDATE.LOAD
T.UNAUTHORIZED_TOE_CODE_UPDATE																													Х			
T.FAKE-SGNVER-KEY		$\square$	$\square$																										Х			
T.WRONG-UPDATE-STATE																														Х	X	
T.INTEG-OS-UPDATE_LOAD T.CONFID-OS-UPDATE_LOAD		$\square$																									<u> </u>	_	Х			V
	V	⊢													V			V											$\vdash$	┢━╋	$\rightarrow$	Х
T.Read_Sensitive_Data T.Counterfeit	Х	Х	-											Х	Х	Х		Х											$\square$			
T.Skimming <sup>23</sup>		^	$\left  - \right $	v	Х	Х								^		~						Х					<u> </u>	-				
T.Eavesdropping	-	$\left  \right $	$\vdash$	^	^	×																^										
T.Tracing		$\vdash$	$\vdash$			~	Х															Х										
T.Abuse-Func		$\vdash$					~	Х														~										
T.Information_Leakage		$\square$							Х																							
T.Phys-Tamper											Х																					
T.Malfunction												Х																				
T.Forgery			Х	Х	Х			Х			Х					Х			Х	Х	Х											
P.Sensitive_Data	Х														Х			Х														
P.Personalisation			Х							Х									Х													
P.Manufact										Х																						
P.Pre-Operational			Х							Х									Х				Х									
P.Terminal																Х					Х											
P.Card_PKI																				Х												
P.Trustworthy_PKI																				Х												
P.Active_Auth				-				-					Х					-						Х	Х							
OSP.ATOMIC_ACTIVATION																														Х		
OSP.TOE_IDENTIFICATION																															Х	
OSP.ADDITIONAL_CODE_SIGNING														_													X		Х			X
OSP.ADDITIONAL_CODE_ENCRYPTION					_	_	_	_		_		-		_		-											Х				_	Х
A.OS-UPDATE-EVIDENCE A.SECURE_ACODE_MANAGEMENT								_																		Х		Х				
A.SECURE_ACODE_MANAGEMENT A.Insp_Sys																Х	V											^				
A.Insp_Sys A.Auth_PKI		$\vdash$	$\vdash$		_	_	_		-	-	-	-		-	х	<u> </u>	^	Х	_	_	$\vdash$	_										
A.Passive_Auth	1		L						1																							

Threats and assumptions included from the claimed PACE-PP [PP-MRTD-SAC] are marked in italic letters.<sup>24</sup>

#### Table 5: Security Objective Rationale

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> The Objectives marked *in italic letters* are included from the claimed [PP-MRTD-SAC]. They are listed for the complete overview of the security objectives.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Threats and assumptions included from the claimed [PP-MRTD-SAC] are marked *in italic letters*. They are listed for the complete overview of threats and assumptions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> The rational comes from the [PP-MRTD-SAC] and it is not reproduced below.

The OSP **P.Personalisation** "Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or Organisation only" addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical travel document by the Personalisation Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.Personalisation** "Personalisation of logical travel document", and (ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective **OT.AC\_Pers** "Access Control for Personalisation of logical travel document". Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalisation Agent Key(s) according to **OT.Identification** "Identification and Authentication of the TOE". The security objective **OT.AC\_Pers** limits the management of TSF data and the management of TSF to the Personalisation Agent.

The OSP **P.Sensitive\_Data** "Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data" is fulfilled and the threat **T.Read\_Sensitive\_Data** "Read the sensitive biometric reference data" is countered by the TOE-objective **OT.Sens\_Data\_Conf** "Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data" requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data's confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organisation as required by **OE.Authoriz\_Sens\_Data** "Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data". The Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection Systems "Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems".

The OSP **P.Terminal** "Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals" is countered by the security objective **OE.Exam\_Travel\_Document** additionally to the security objectives from PACE PP [7]. **OE.Exam\_Travel\_Document** enforces the terminals to perform the terminal part of the PACE protocol.

The OSP **P.Active\_Auth** "Active Authentication" addresses the active authentication protocol as described in [ICAO-9303]. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will be created according to **OE.Active\_Auth\_Sign** "Active Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature" and verified by the inspection system according to **OE.Active\_Auth\_Verif** "Verification by Active Authentication". This is possible only because genuine TOE enforce AA as specified in **OT.Active\_Auth\_Proof**.

The threat **T.Counterfeit** "Counterfeit of travel document chip data" addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine travel document's chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification and authenticity proof required by **OT.Chip\_Auth\_Proof** "Proof of travel document's chip authentication" using an authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organisation. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by **OE.Auth\_Key\_Travel\_Document** "Travel document Authentication Key". According to **OE.Exam\_Travel\_Document** "Examination of the physical part of the travel document" the General Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the authenticity of the travel document's chip.

The threat **T.Forgery** addresses the fraudulent, complete or partial alteration of the User Data or/and TSFdata stored on the TOE or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal. The security objective **OT.AC\_Pers** requires the TOE to limit the write access for the travel document to the trustworthy Personalisation Agent (cf. **OE.Personalisation**). The TOE will protect the integrity and authenticity of the stored and exchanged User Data or/and TSF-data as aimed by the security objectives **OT.Data\_Integrity** and **OT.Data\_Authenticity**, respectively. The objectives **OT.Prot\_Phys-Tamper** and **OT.Prot\_Abuse-Func** contribute to protecting integrity of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE. A terminal operator operating his terminals according to **OE.Terminal** and performing the Passive Authentication using the Document Security Object as aimed by **OE.Passive\_Auth\_Sign** will be able to effectively verify integrity and authenticity of the data received from the TOE.

#### OE.Personalisation.

Additionally to the security objectives from PACE PP [PP-MRTD-SAC] which counter this threat, the examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to **OE.Exam\_Travel\_Document** "Examination of the physical part of the travel document" shall ensure its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel document.



The threat **T.Skimming** addresses accessing the User Data (stored on the TOE or transferred between the TOE and the terminal) using the TOE's contactless/contact interface. This threat is countered by the security objectives **OT.Data\_Integrity**, **OT.Data\_Authenticity** and **OT.Data\_Confidentiality** through the PACE authentication. The objective **OE.Travel\_Document\_Holder** ensures that a PACE session can only be established either by the travel document holder itself or by an authorised person or device, and, hence, cannot be captured by an attacker.

The threat **T.Eavesdropping** addresses listening to the communication between the TOE and a rightful terminal in order to gain the User Data transferred there. This threat is countered by the security objective **OT.Data\_Confidentiality** through a trusted channel based on the PACE authentication.

The threat **T.Tracing** addresses gathering TOE tracing data identifying it remotely by establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE, whereby the attacker does not a priori know the correct values of the PACE password. This threat is directly countered by security objectives **OT.Tracing** (no gathering TOE tracing data) and OE. Travel document-Holder (the attacker does not a priori know the correct values of the shared passwords).

The threat **T.Abuse-Func** addresses attacks of misusing TOE's functionality to manipulate or to disclosure the stored User- or TSF-data as well as to disable or to bypass the soft-coded security functionality. The security objective **OT.Prot\_Abuse-Func** ensures that the usage of functions having not to be used in the operational phase is effectively prevented.

The threats **T.Information\_Leakage**, **T.Phys-Tamper** and **T.Malfunction** are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats is obviously addressed by the directly related security objectives **OT.Prot\_Inf\_Leak**, **OT.Prot\_Phys-Tamper** and **OT.Prot\_Malfunction**, respectively.

The OSP **P.Manufact** "Manufacturing of the travel document's chip" requires a unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalisation Data as being fulfilled by **OT.Identification** 

The OSP **P.Pre-Operational** is enforced by the following security objectives:**OT.Identification** is affine to the OSP's property 'traceability before the operational phase';**OT.AC\_Pers** and **OE.Personalisation** together enforce the OSP's properties 'correctness of the User- and the TSF-data stored' and 'authorisation of Personalisation Agents';**OE.Legislative\_Compliance** is affine to the OSP's property 'compliance with laws and regulations'.

The OSP **P.Card\_PKI** is enforced by establishing the issuing PKI branch as aimed by the objectives **OE.Passive\_Auth\_Sign** (for the Document Security Object).

The OSP P.Trustworthy\_PKI is enforced by OE.Passive\_Auth\_Sign (for CSCA, issuing PKI branch).

The examination of the travel document addressed by the assumption **A.Insp\_Sys** "Inspection Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment **OE.Exam\_Travel\_Document** "Examination of the physical part of the travel document" which requires the inspection system to examine physically the travel document, the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control, and the Extended Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel document's chip. The security objectives for the TOE environment **OE.Prot\_Logical\_Travel\_Document** "Protection of data from the logical travel document" require the Inspection System to protect the logical travel document data during the transmission and the internal handling.

The assumption **A.Passive\_Auth** "PKI for Passive Authentication" is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.Passive\_Auth\_Sign** "Authentication of travel document by Signature" from PACE PP [7] covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification procedures is covered by **OE.Exam\_Travel\_Document** "Examination of the physical part of the travel document".



The assumption **A.Auth\_PKI** "PKI for Inspection Systems" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment **OE.Authoriz\_Sens\_Data** "Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data" requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometrics by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving States or Organisations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by **OE.Ext\_Insp\_Systems** "Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems" to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the receiving issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure.

The threat **T.UNAUTHORISED-TOE-CODE-UPDATE** is covered by the O.SECURE\_LOAD\_ACODE security objective that ensures the authenticity and the integrity of the additional code. It ensure also that that only the allowed code will be load in a secure process.

The threat **T.FAKE-SGNVER-KEY** is covered by the O.SECURE\_LOAD\_ACODE security objective which ensures the authenticity and the integrity of the additional code to avoid loading malicious additional code.

The threat **T.WRONG-UPDATE-STATE** is covered by the O.SECURE\_AC\_ACTIVATION and O.TOE\_IDENTIFICATION security objective that ensures that the update state stay secure during all the loading process

The threat **T.INTEG-OS-UPDATE\_LOAD** is covered by the O.SECURE\_LOAD\_ACODE security objective that ensures the authenticity and the integrity of the additional code.

The threat **T.CONFID-OS-UPDATE\_LOAD** is covered by the O.CONFID-OS-UPDATE.LOAD security objective that ensures the confidentiality of the additional code when transmitted until installation.

The **OSP.ADDITIONAL\_CODE\_ENCRYPTION** is enforced by the TOE security objective O.CONFID-OS-UPDATE.LOAD and the security objective of environment OE.OS-UPDATE-ENCRYPTION which ensure the confidentiality of the additional code

The **OSP.ADDITIONAL\_CODE\_SIGNING** is enforced by the TOE security objective of the environment O.SECURE\_LOAD\_ACODE which ensure the integrity of the additional code

The **OSP.ATOMIC\_ACTIVATION** is enforced by the TOE security objective of the environment O.SECURE\_AC\_ACTIVATION which ensure the atomicity of the activation of the additional code

The **OSP.TOE\_IDENTIFICATION** is enforced by the TOE security objective of the environment O.TOE\_IDENTIFICATION which ensure the identification of the additional code

The assumption **A.OS-UPDATE-EVIDENCE** is upheld by the security objective on the operational environment OE.OS-UPDATE-EVIDENCE that guarantees that the additional code has been issued by the genuine OS Developer, has not been altered since it was issued by the genuine OS Developer.

The assumption **A.SECURE\_ACODE\_MANAGEMENT** is upheld by the security objective on the operational environment OE.SECURE\_ACODE\_MANAGEMENT that guarantees that cryptographic keys are of sufficient quality and appropriately secured to ensure confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the keys.

# 5.5.2 Justifications for adding objectives on the environment

### 5.5.2.1.1 Additions to [PP-MRTD-EACV2]

The only additional objectives on the environment are OE.Active\_Auth\_Sign and OE.Active\_Auth\_Verif. These objectives request the environment to support Active Authentication. AA is an operation outside [PP-MRTD-EACV2]. Therefore the added objectives on the environment do not weaken the TOE.

#### 5.5.2.2 Addition for OS Update feature

The additional objectives on the environment for ES update are:

- OE.OS-UPDATE-EVIDENCE,
- OE.OS-UPDATE-ENCRYPTION,
- OE.SECURE\_ACODE\_MANAGEMENT.

These additional objectives on the environment for OS update does not directly interact with objectives on the environment for MRTD application.

# 5.5.3 Compatibility between objectives of [ST-EAC SAC] and [ST-AQU-IC]

### 5.5.3.1 Compatibility between objectives for the TOE

The following table lists the relevant security objectives of the IC and provides the link to the security objectives related to the composite product, showing that there is no contradiction between the two.

IC objective label	Platform objective short description (refer to [AQU-IC-CCI] for the full description)	Link to the composite- product
O.Phys-Manipulation	Protection against Physical Manipulation	OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
O.Phys-Probing	Protection against Physical Probing	OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, OT.Data_Integrity
O.Malfunction	Protection against Malfunction	OT_Prot_Malfunction
O.Leak-Inherent	Protection against Inherent Information Leakage	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak OT.Tracing
O.Leak-Forced	Protection against Forced Information Leakage	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak OT.Tracing
O.Abuse-Func	Protection against Abuse of Functionality	OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
O.Identification	TOE Identification	OT.Identification OT.Tracing
O.RND	Random Numbers	This platform security objectives is used to endure the security of the composite TOE
O.Cap_Avail_Loader	Capability and availability of the Loader Valid only for the TOE derivatives delivered with activated Flash Loader.	No direct link with the composite product security objectives, but this platform
O.Authentication	Authentication to external entities Valid only for the TOE derivatives delivered with activated Flash Loader	security objective is used to endure the security of the composite TOE
O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader	Access control and authenticity for the Loader - valid only for the TOE derivatives delivered with activated Flash Loader	



IC objective label	Platform objective short description (refer to [AQU-IC-CCI] for the full description)	Link to the composite- product
O.Mem Access	Area based Memory Access Control	OT.Data_Confidentiality
		OT.Sens_Data_Conf
O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality	Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF	OT.Data_Confidentiality
		OT.Sens_Data_Conf

The other objectives of the platform are not relevant for this composite TOE.

The OT.AC\_Pers, OT.Chip\_Auth\_Proof and OT.Active\_Auth\_Proof are specific to [ST-SAC] and they do not conflict with the objectives of [ST-AQU-IC].

O.SECURE\_LOAD\_ACODE, O.SECURE\_AC\_ACTIVATION, O.TOE\_IDENTIFICATION and O.CONFID-OS-UPDATE.LOAD are objectives added to this Security Target and it does no conflict with the objectives of [ST-AQU-IC].

We can therefore conclude that the objectives for the TOE of [ST- SAC] and [ST-AQU-IC] are consistent.

#### 5.5.3.2 Compatibility between objectives for the environment

IC Environment objective label	Platform Environment Objective short description (refer to [AQU-IC-CCI] for the full description)	Link to the composite- product			
OE.Resp-Appl	Treatment of User data of the Composite TOE	For Phase 1 - No direct link with the composite product security objectives			
OE.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during composite product manufacturing	OE.Personalization			
OE.Lim_Block_Loader	Limitation of capability and blocking the loader.	No direct link with the composite product security			
OE.TOE_Auth	Authentication to external entities	objectives, but this platform security objective is used to			
OE.Loader_Usage	Secure communication and usage of the Loader	endure the security of the composite TOE			

OE.Legislative\_Compliance,OE.Terminal,OE.Travel\_Document\_Holder,OE.Auth\_Key\_Travel\_Document,OE.Authoriz\_Sens\_Data,OE.Exam\_Travel\_Document,OE.Prot\_Logical\_Travel\_Document,OE.Ext\_Insp\_Systems,OE.Passive\_Auth\_Sign,OE.Active\_Auth\_Sign,OE.Active\_Auth\_Verif, are specific to [ST-SAC] and they do no conflict with the objectives of [ST-AQU-IC].OE.Travel\_Document\_Holder,

We can therefore conclude that the objectives for the environment of [ST-SAC] and [ST-AQU-IC] are consistent.

# 6. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION

This security target uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these components are defined in protection profile [PP-IC-0002]; others are defined in the protection profile [PP-MRTD-EACV2].

# 6.1 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU\_SAS

To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU\_SAS) of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU\_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.

The family "Audit data storage (FAU\_SAS)" is specified as follows.

#### FAU\_SAS Audit data storage

Family behaviour This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.

Component levelling

	FAU_SAS Audit data storage			
FAU_SAS.1	Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.			
Management:	FAU_SAS.1 There are no management activities foreseen.			
Audit:	FAU_SAS.1 There are no actions defined to be auditable.			
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage				

Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No dependencies

FAU\_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: *authorized users*] with the capability to store [assignment: *list of audit information*] in the audit records.

## 6.2 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS\_RND

To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FCS\_RND) of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The component FCS\_RND is not limited to generation of cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS\_CKM.1. The similar component FIA\_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.

The family "Generation of random numbers (FCS\_RND)" is specified as follows.

#### FCS\_RND Generation of random numbers

Family behaviour

This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.

Component levelling:



FCS\_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality metric.

Management:	FCS_RND.1	There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:	FCS_RND.1	There are no actions defined to be auditable.

#### FCS\_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No dependencies

FCS\_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: *a defined quality metric*].

#### 6.3 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FIA\_API

To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA\_API) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity.

#### FIA\_API Authentication Proof of Identity

Family behaviour

This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be verified by an external entity in the TOE IT environment.

Component levelling:

FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity	 1

 FIA\_API.1
 Authentication Proof of Identity.

 Management:
 FIA\_API.1 The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.

Audit: There are no actions defined to be auditable.

#### FIA\_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No dependencies

FIA\_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: *authentication mechanism*] to prove the identity of the [assignment: *authorized user or role*].

## 6.4 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT\_LIM

The family FMT\_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.


The family "Limited capabilities and availability (FMT\_LIM)" is specified as follows.

#### FMT\_LIM Limited capabilities and availability

Family behavior

This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined manner. Note that FDP\_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.

Component leveling:



FMT\_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.

FMT\_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to Limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE's life-cycle.

Management: FMT\_LIM.1, FMT\_LIM.2 There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FMT\_LIM.1, FMT\_LIM.2 There are no actions defined to be auditable.

To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT\_LIM) of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.

The TOE Functional Requirement "Limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1)" is specified as follows.

#### FMT\_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.

FMT\_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT\_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: *Limited capability and availability policy*].

The TOE Functional Requirement "Limited availability (FMT\_LIM.2)" is specified as follows.

#### FMT\_LIM.2 Limited availability

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FMT LIM.1 Limited capabilities.

FMT\_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: *Limited capability and availability policy*].

**Application note:** The functional requirements FMT\_LIM.1 and FMT\_LIM.2 assume that there are two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that

(i) the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced

or conversely

(ii) the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or disabled in, the product prior to the Operational Use Phase.

The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.

### 6.5 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT\_EMS

The sensitive family FPT\_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE's electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [CC-2].

The family "TOE Emanation (FPT\_EMS)" is specified as follows.

#### Family behaviour

This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.

Component levelling:

FPT\_EMSEC TOE emanation 1

FPT\_EMS.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:

FPT\_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF data or user data.

FPT\_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF data or user data.

Management:	FPT_EMS.1	There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:	FPT_EMS.1	There are no actions defined to be auditable.

#### **FPT\_EMS.1 TOE Emanation**

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No dependencies.

- FPT\_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: *types of emissions*] in excess of [assignment: *specified limits*] enabling access to [assignment: *list of types of TSF data*] and [assignment: *list of types of user data*].
- FPT\_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: *type of users*] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: *type of connection*] to gain access to [assignment: *list of types of TSF data*] and [assignment: *list of types of user data*].

# 7. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

The definition of the subjects "Manufacturer", "Pre-personalizer", "Personalization Agent", "Extended Inspection System", "Country Verifying Certification Authority", "Document Verifier" and "Terminal" used in the following chapter is given in section 2.4.1. Note, that all these subjects are acting for homonymous external entities. All used objects are defined either in section 10 "Glossary and acronyms" or in the following table. The operations "write", "modify", "read" and "disable read access" are used in accordance with the general linguistic usage. The operations "store", "create", "transmit", "receive", "establish communication channel", "authenticate" and "re-authenticate" are originally taken from [CC-2]. The operation "load" is synonymous to "import" used in [CC-2].

Definition of security attributes:

security attribute	values	meaning
terminal authentication status	none (any Terminal)	default role (i.e. without authorisation after start-up)
	CVCA	roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf. [TR-EAC-1], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as Country Verifying Certification Authority after successful CA and TA
	DV (domestic)	roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf. [TR-EAC-1], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as domestic Document Verifier after successful CA and TA
	DV (foreign)	roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf. [TR-EAC-1], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as foreign Document Verifier after successful CA and TA
	IS	roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf. [TR-EAC-1], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as Extended Inspection System after successful CA and TA
Terminal Authorization	none	
	DG4 (Iris)	Read access to DG4: (cf. [TR-EAC-1], A.5.1)
	DG3 (Fingerprint)	Read access to DG3: (cf. [TR-EAC-1], A.5.1)
	DG3 (Fingerprint) / DG4 (Iris)	Read access to DG3 and DG4: (cf. [TR-EAC-1], A.5.1)

The following table provides an overview of the keys and certificates used:

Name	Data
Country Verifying Certification Authority Private Key (SKCVCA)	The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) holds a private key (SKCVCA) used for signing the Document Verifier Certificates.
Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key (PKCVCA)	The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key (PKCVCA) as part of the TSF data to verify the Document Verifier Certificates. The PKCVCA has the security attribute Current Date as the most recent valid effective date of the Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate or of a domestic Document Verifier Certificate.
Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate (CCVCA)	The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate may be a self- signed certificate or a link certificate (cf. [TR-EAC-1] and Glossary). It contains (i) the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key (PKCVCA) as authentication reference data, (ii) the coded access control rights of the Country Verifying Certification Authority, (iii) the Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.



Name	Data
Document Verifier Certificate (CDV)	The Document Verifier Certificate CDV is issued by the Country Verifying Certification Authority. It contains (i) the Document Verifier Public Key (PKDV) as authentication reference data (ii) identification as domestic or foreign Document Verifier, the coded access control rights of the Document Verifier, the Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Inspection System Certificate (CIS)	The Inspection System Certificate (CIS) is issued by the Document Verifier. It contains (i) as authentication reference data the Inspection System Public Key (PKIS), (ii) the coded access control rights of the Extended Inspection System, the Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Chip Authentication Public Key Pair	The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SKICC, PKICC) are used for Key Agreement Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to RFC 2631 or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman according to ISO 15946.
Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC)	The Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC) is stored in the EF.DG14 Chip Authentication Public Key of the TOE's logical MRTD and used by the inspection system for Chip Authentication of the MRTD's chip. It is part of the user data provided by the TOE for the IT environment.
Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC)	The Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC) is used by the TOE to authenticate itself as authentic MRTD's chip. It is part of the TSF data.
Country Signing Certification Authority Key Pair	Country Signing Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization signs the Document Signer Public Key Certificate with the Country Signing Certification Authority Private Key and the signature will be verified by receiving State or Organization (e.g. a Basic Inspection System) with the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key.
Document Signer Key Pairs	Document Signer of the issuing State or Organization signs the Document Security Object of the logical MRTD with the Document Signer Private Key and the signature will be verified by a Basic Inspection Systems of the receiving State or Organization with the Document Signer Public Key.
Document Basic Access Keys	The Document Basic Access Key is created by the Personalization Agent, loaded to the TOE, and used for mutual authentication and key agreement for secure messaging between the Basic Inspection System and the MRTD's chip.
BAC Session Keys	Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed between the TOE and a BIS in result of the Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol.
Chip Session Key	Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed between the TOE and a GIS in result of the Chip Authentication Protocol.

**Application note 20:** The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document Verifier as "domestic" in the Document Verifier Certificate if it belongs to the same State as the Country Verifying Certification Authority. The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document Verifier as "foreign" in the Document Verifier Certificate if it does not belong to the same State as the Country Verifying Certification Authority. From MRTD's point of view the domestic Document Verifier belongs to the issuing State or Organization.

## 7.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE

This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section following the main security functionality.

Refinements in this section are in underline font when the SFR's refinement is already present in [PP-MRTD-EACV2], and in bold font when the refinement is done in this ST. When the SFR is refined in the [PP-MRTD-EACV2] and additionally refined in this ST then the font is bold and underline.

For this section, a presentation choice has been selected. Each SFR present a table with different type of algorithms treated. For each case, there is no distinction regarding the technical objectives fulfilled by each row on the table (thus algorithm family). The technical objectives are the same disregarding this differentiation.

# 7.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Audit storage (FAU\_SAS.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

#### FAU\_SAS.1 Audit storage

Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No dependencies

FAU\_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide <u>the Manufacturer</u> with the capability to store <u>the IC Identification Data</u> in the audit records.

# 7.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Cryptographic key generation (FCS\_CKM.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.

#### FCS\_CKM.1/DH\_PACE Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman for PACE session keys

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]: fulfilled by FCS\_COP.1/PACE\_ENC and FCS\_COP.1/PACE\_MAC FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS\_CKM.4.

FCS\_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm as in **Table 6 algorithm column** and specified cryptographic key sizes as in **Table 6 column Key size** that meet the following: **Table 6 standard column**.

Algorithm type	algorithm	Key size	standard
/SKPICC	ECDH Key Agreement Algorithm – [IEEE- P1363]	160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512, and 521 bits	[TR-03111]]
/TDESsession- ECDH	ECDH Key Agreement Algorithm – 160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512, and 521 bits	112 bits	[TR-03111]]
/AESsession-ECDH	ECDH Key Agreement Algorithm – 160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512, and 521 bits	128, 192, 256	[TR-03111]]

Table 6: FCS\_CKM.1/DH\_PACE iteration explanation

# FCS\_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman for Chip Authentication session keys

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or				
	FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]: fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,				
	FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC and FCS_COP.1/PACE_CAM				
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4				

FCS\_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm as in **Table 7 algorithm column** and specified cryptographic key sizes as in **Table 7 Key size column** that meet the following: **Table 7 standard column standard**.

Algorithm type	algorithm	Key size	standard
/TDESsession-DH	DH Key Agreement Algorithm - PKCS#3 – 1024, 1280, 1536 and 2048 bits	112 bits	Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol compliant to [PKCS#3]
/AESsession-DH	DH Key Agreement Algorithm - PKCS#3 – 1024, 1280, 1536 and 2048 bits	128, 192, and 256 bits	Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol compliant to [PKCS#3]
/TDESsession-ECDH	ECDH Key Agreement Algorithm - ISO 15946 – 160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and 521 bits	112 bits	[TR-EAC-1] , based on an ECDH protocol compliant to [TR-ECC]
/AESsession-ECDH	ECDH Key Agreement Algorithm - ISO 15946 – 160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and 521 bits	128, 192, and 256 bits	[TR-EAC-1] , based on an ECDH protocol compliant to [TR-ECC]

Table 7: FCS\_CKM.1/CA iteration explanation

### FCS\_CKM.1/KeyPair Cryptographic key generation for AA and CA Key Pair

 Hierarchical to:
 No other components

 Dependencies:
 [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or

 FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]: fulfilled by FCS\_COP.1/AA,

 FCS\_COP.1/CA\_MAC, FCS\_COP.1/CA\_ENC and FCS\_COP.1/PACE\_CAM

 FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: not fulfilled, see application note

FCS\_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm as in **Table 8 algorithm column** and specified cryptographic key sizes as in **Table 8 Key size column** that meet the following: **Table 8 standard column**.

Algorithm type	algorithm	Key size	standard
/RSA	RSA CRT Key generation	1024, 1280, 1536 and 2048 bits	none (generation of random numbers and Miller- Rabin primality testing)
/ECC	ECC Key generation	160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and 521 bits	FIPS 186-3 Appendix B.4.1
CA/DH	DH key generation	1024, 1280, 1536 and 2048 bits	ANSI X9.42
CA/ECDH	ECDH Key generation	160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and 521 bits	[IEEE-P1363]

Table 8: FCS\_CKM.1/KeyPair iteration explanation

#### Application notes:

- The dependency of FCS\_CKM1/KeyPair on FCS\_COP.1 is partly fulfilled by FCS\_COP.1/CA\_MAC and FCS\_COP.1/CA\_ENC. This dependence is not direct: FCS\_CKM1/KeyPair generates a static key which in turn generate session keys, via FCS\_CKM1/CA. These session keys then use FCS\_COP.1/CA\_MAC and FCS\_COP.1/CA\_ENC.
- The dependency of FCS\_CKM1/KeyPair on FCS\_CKM.4 is not fulfilled as these are permanent keys used on the card during its life-time.

#### FCS\_CKM.1/PERSO Cryptographic key generation for Session keys

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
	FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]: fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/PERSO
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4

FCS\_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm as in **Table 9 algorithm column** and specified cryptographic key sizes as in **Table 9 Key size column** that meet the following: **Table 9 standard column**.

Algorithm type	algorithm	Key size	standard
/TDES	TDES ISK key derivation	112 bits	[ICAO-9303] normative appendix 5
/GP	GP session keys	112, 128 bits (and 192 & 256 bits for SCP03)	[GP211] SCP01, SCP02, or SCP03

#### Table 9: FCS\_CKM.1/PERSO iteration explanation

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Cryptographic key destruction (FCS\_CKM.4)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

#### FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
-	FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
	FCS_CKM.1/CA, and FCS_CKM.1/PERSO.
	FCS_CKM.1/CA, and FCS_CKM.1/PERSO.

FCS\_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method **Secure erasing of the value** that meets the following: **None**.

Application note: Secure erasing of data is performed by overwriting the data with random numbers.

#### FCS\_COP.1/PACE\_ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption AES / 3DES

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1 /PACE_ENC	The TSF shall perform <u>secure messaging – encryption and decryption</u> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>Table 10 algorithm</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>Table 10 Key size</b> that meet the following: <b>Table 10 list of standards</b> .



Algorithm type	algorithm	Key size	List of standards
/ENC_TDES	TDES in CBC mode	112 bits	<u>ISO 10116</u>
/ENC_AES	AES in CBC mode	128, 192, 256	ISO 10116

#### Table 10: FCS\_COP.1/PACE\_ENC iteration explanation

#### FCS\_COP.1/PACE\_MAC Cryptographic operation – MAC

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by <b>FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE</b> FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by <b>FCS_CKM.4</b> .
FCS_COP.1.1 /PACE_MAC	The TSF shall perform <u>secure messaging – message authentication code</u> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>Table 11 algorithm</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>Table 11 Key size</b> that meet the following: <b>Table 11 standard column</b> .

Algorithm type	algorithm	Key size	List of standards
/MAC_TDES	TDES Retail MAC	112 bits	<u>ISO 9797-1</u>
/MAC_AES	AES CMAC	128, 192, 256	[NIST-800-38B]

Table 11: FCS\_COP.1/PACE\_MAC iteration explanation

#### FCS\_COP.1/PACE\_CAM Cryptographic operation – Modular Multiplication

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or			
	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE [FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4			
FCS_COP.1.1 /PACE_CAM	The TSF shall perform modular multiplication with specify cryptography algorithm as in <b>Table 12 algorithm column</b> and cryptographic key sizes as in <b>Table 12 Key</b> size that meet the following: <b>Table 12 standards column</b> .			

Algorithm type	algorithm	Key size	standards
/CAM_ECDH	ECC	160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512, 521	[TR-ECC] ECKA - DH

Table 12: FCS\_COP.1/PACE\_CAM iteration explanation

#### FCS\_COP.1/CA\_ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption AES / 3DES

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by <b>FCS_CKM.1/CA</b> FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by <b>FCS_CKM.4</b> .			
FCS_COP.1.1 /CA_ENC	The TSF shall perform <u>secure messaging – encryption and decryption</u> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>Table 13 algorithm</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>Table 13 Key size</b> that meet the following: <b>Table 13 list of standards</b> .			
Algorithm type	algorithm	Key size	List of standards	



/ENC_TDES	TDES in CBC mode	112 bits	<u>ISO 10116</u>
/ENC AES	AES in CBC mode	128, 192, 256	ISO 10116

#### Table 13: FCS\_COP.1/CA\_ENC iteration explanation

#### FCS\_COP.1/SIG\_VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by travel document

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1 /SIG_VER	The TSF shall perform <u>digital signature verification</u> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>Table 14 algorithm</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>Table 14 Key size</b> that meet the following: <b>Table 14 list of standards</b> .

Algorithm type	algorithm	Key size	List of standards
/RSA_VER	RSA (STD )	1024, 1280, 1536, 2048, 3072, and 4096	RSA SHA PKCS#1 RSA SHA PKCS#1 PSS
/ECC_VER	ECC	160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512, 521	

Table 14: FCS\_COP.1/SIG\_VER iteration explanation

#### FCS\_COP.1/CA\_MAC Cryptographic operation – MAC

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1 /CA_MAC	The TSF shall perform <u>secure messaging – message authentication code</u> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>Table 15 algorithm</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>Table 15 Key size</b> that meet the following: <b>Table 15 list of standards</b> .

Algorithm type	algorithm	Key size	List of standards
/MAC_TDES	TDES Retail MAC	112 bits	ISO 9797-1
/MAC_AES	AES CMAC	128, 192, 256	[NIST-800-38B]

Table 15: FCS\_COP.1/CA\_MAC iteration explanation

# FCS\_COP.1/PERSO Cryptographic operation – Symmetric encryption, decryption, and MAC during manufacturing

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by <b>FCS_CKM.1/PERSO</b> . FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by <b>FCS_CKM.4</b> .
FCS_COP.1.1 /PERSO	The TSF shall perform <b>symmetric encryption and decryption</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>Table 16 algorithm</b> and cryptographic

with a specified cryptographic algorithm **Table 16 algorithm** and cryptographic key sizes **Table 16 Key size** that meet the following: **Table 16 List of standards**.

Algorithm type	algorithm	Key size	List of standards
/ENC_TDES	TDES encryption and decryption	112 bits	[SP 800-67]
/ENC_AES	AES encryption and decryption	128, 192, 256	[FIPS 197]



/MAC_TDES	TDES Retail MAC	112 bits	ISO 9797-1
/MAC_AES	AES CMAC	128, 192, 256	[NIST-800-38B]

# Table 16: FCS\_COP.1/ PERSO iteration explanation FCS\_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation – Active Authentication

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: not fulfilled, see application note.
FCS_COP.1.1	The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a specified

FCS\_COP.1.1The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a specified<br/>cryptographic algorithm Table 17 algorithm and cryptographic key sizes Table<br/>17 Key size that meet the following: Table 17 List of standards.

Algorithm type	algorithm	Key size	List of standards
/AA_RSA	RSA	1024, 1280, 1536, 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits	ISO9796-2
/AA_ECDSA	ECDSA	160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and 521	[TR-ECC]

#### Table 17: FCS\_COP.1/AA iteration explanation

Application note:

• The dependency of FCS\_COP.1/AA on FCS\_CKM.4 is not fulfilled as these are permanent keys used on the card during its life-time.

#### FCS\_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No dependencies

FCS\_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet RGS [RGS-B1], [AIS20/31] and [SP 800-90] with seed entropy at least 128 bits.

**Application note:** This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for the authentication protocols as required by FIA\_UAU.4.

# 7.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication

Table 18 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used.

Name		SFR for the TOE
Authentication Mechanism for	Pre-	FIA_UAU.1/PERSO
personalisation Agents		FIA_AFL.1/PERSO
Authentication Mechanism	for	FIA_UAU.4/PACE
Personalisation Agents		
Chip Authentication Protocol v.1		FIA_API.1/CA,
		FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
		FIA_UAU.6/EAC
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1		FIA_UAU.5/PACE
PACE protocol		FIA_UAU.1/PACE
		FIA_UAU.5/PACE
		FIA_AFL.1/PACE
Passive Authentication		FIA_UAU.5/PACE

Table 18: Overview on authentication SFR

Note the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 as defined in this protection profile includes

- the asymmetric key agreement to establish symmetric secure messaging keys between the TOE and the terminal based on the Chip Authentication Public Key and the Terminal Public Key used later in the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1,
- the check whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication code with the expected key for any message received by the terminal.

The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 may be used independent of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1. But if the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 is used the terminal shall use the same public key as presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1.

# FIA\_AFL.1/PERSO Authentication failure handling during pre-personalization and personalization phases

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication: fulfilled by <b>FIA_UAU.1/PACE</b>
FIA_AFL.1.1 /Perso	The TSF shall detect when <b>Number in Table 19</b> unsuccessful authentication attempts occurs related to <b>Authentication type in Table 19</b> .
FIA_AFL.1.2 /Perso	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been <u>met</u> , the TSF shall <b>Actions in Table 19</b> .

Authentication	Number	Actions
type		
GP	3	Block GP authentication.
ISK key	3	Block ISK Key.

Table 19: FIA\_AFL.1/PERSO iteration explanation

# FIA\_AFL.1/PACE Authentication failure handling – PACE authentication using non-blocking authorisation data

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication: fulfilled by <b>FIA_UAU.1/PACE</b>
FIA_AFL.1.1 /PACE	The TSF shall detect when [ <b>Number in Table 20</b> ] unsuccessful authentication attempt occurs related to <u>authentication attempts using the PACE password as</u> <u>shared password</u> .
FIA_AFL.1.2 /PACE	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been <u>met</u> , the TSF shall [ <b>Actions in Table 20</b> ].

Password	Number	Actions
MRZ, CAN	1	Exponentially increase time delay before new authentication attempt is possible.
PIN	3	Block PIN.

#### Table 20: FIA\_AFL.1/PACE iteration explanation

#### FIA\_UID.1/PERSO Timing of identification

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 /PERSO	The TSF shall allow <b>1. to establish a communication channel,</b> <b>2. to carry out the mutual authentication Protocol according to [GP]</b> on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 /PERSO	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

#### FIA\_UAU.1/PERSO Timing of authentication

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification: fulfilled by <b>FIA_UID.1/PERSO</b>
FIA_UAU.1.1 /PERSO	The TSF shall allow <b>1. to establish a communication channel,</b> <b>2. to carry out the mutual authentication Protocol according to [GP]</b> on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 /PERSO	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

Application note:

• FIA\_AFL.1/PERSO, FIA\_UID.1/PERSO, and FIA\_UID.1/PERSO are extensions to [PP-MRTD-EACV2], in order to deal with identification and authentication in pre-personalisation and personalisation phases.

#### FIA\_UID.1/PACE Timing of identification

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components No dependencies
FIA_UID.1.1 /PACE	<ol> <li>The TSF shall allow</li> <li>to establish the communication channel,</li> <li>carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [ICAO-TR-SAC],</li> <li>to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS</li> <li>to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR-EAC-1]</li> <li>to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR-EAC-1]</li> <li>on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.</li> </ol>
FIA_UID.1.2	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-

mediated actions on behalf of that user. /PACE

Application note: The SFR FIA\_UID.1/PACE in the current ST covers the definition in [PP-MRTD-SAC] and extends it by EAC aspects 4 & 5. This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.

#### FIA\_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification: fulfilled by <b>FIA_UID.1/PACE</b>
FIA_UAU.1.1 /PACE	<ol> <li>The TSF shall allow</li> <li>to establish the communication channel,</li> <li>carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [ICAO-TR-SAC],</li> <li>to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS</li> <li>to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key</li> <li>to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR-EAC-1]</li> <li>to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR-EAC-1]</li> <li>on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.</li> </ol>
FIA_UAU.1.2 /PACE	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

Application note: The SFR FIA\_UAU.1/PACE in the current ST covers the definition in [PP-MRTD-SAC] and extends it by EAC aspects 5 & 6. This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.

#### FIA UAU.4/PACE Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the Terminal by the TOE

Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No dependencies

#### The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to FIA UAU.4.1

- 1. PACE Protocol according to [ICAO-TR-SAC],
- Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES, AES 2.
- Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR-EAC-1] 3.

Application note: The authentication mechanisms use a challenge freshly and randomly generated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a successful authentication attempt.

Application note: The SFR FIA\_UAU.4/PACE in the current ST covers the definition in [PP-MRTD-SAC] and extends it by EAC aspect 3. This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.

/PACE



#### FIA\_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components No dependencies
FIA_UAU.5.1 /PACE	<ol> <li>The TSF shall provide</li> <li>PACE Protocol according to [ICAO-TR-SAC],</li> <li>Passive Authentication according to [ICAO-9303]</li> <li>Secure messaging in MAC-ENC according to [ICAO-TR-SAC],</li> <li>Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES, AES</li> <li>Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR-EAC-1] to support user authentication.</li> </ol>
FIA_UAU.5.2 /PACE	<ol> <li>The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the following rules:</li> <li><b>TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Pre-personalization Agent by the</b>         Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Pre-personalization Agent Key.</li> <li>Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE accepts only received commands         with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with the         key agreed with the terminal by means of the PACE protocol.</li> <li>The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the         Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent key.</li> <li>After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 the TOE accepts only received         commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure         messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication         <u>Mechanism v.1.</u></li> <li>The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal Authentication</li> </ol>

Protocol v.1 only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 and the secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism.

**Application note:** The SFR FIA\_UAU.5.1/PACE in the current ST covers the definition in [PP-MRTD-SAC] and extends it by EAC aspect 5. The SFR FIA\_UAU.5.2/PACE in the current ST covers the definition in [PP-MRTD-SAC] and extends it by EAC aspects 4 and 5. These extensions do not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.

#### FIA\_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE

No other components

Depe	ndencies:	No dependencies
FIA_U /PAC	JAU.6.1 E	The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions <u>each command sent to the</u> <u>TOE after successful run of the PACE Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the PACE</u> <u>terminal</u> .

#### FIA\_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE

Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No dependencies

Hierarchical to:

FIA\_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions <u>each command sent to the</u> /EAC <u>TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol shall be verified as being sent</u> by the GIS.

#### FIA\_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity – Chip Authentication

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No dependencies

FIA\_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a <u>Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR-EAC-1]</u> to prove the identity of the <u>TOE</u>.

**Application note:** This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication Mechanism specified in [TR-EAC-1]. The TOE and the terminal generate a shared secret using the Diffie-Hellman Protocol (DH or EC-DH) and two session keys for secure messaging in ENC\_MAC mode according to [ICAO-9303], normative appendix 5, A5.1. The terminal verifies by means of secure messaging whether the MRTD's chip was able or not to run his protocol properly using its Chip Authentication Private Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Key (EF.DG14).

#### FIA\_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity – Active Authentication

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No dependencies

FIA\_API.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide an **Active Authentication Protocol according to [ICAO-9303]** to prove the identity of the **TOE**.

**Application note:** This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Active Authentication Mechanism specified in [ICAO-9303]. The terminal generates a challenge then verifies whether the MRTD's chip was able or not to sign it properly using its Active Authentication private key corresponding to the Active Authentication public key (EF.DG15).

# 7.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Subset access control (FDP\_ACC.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

#### FDP\_ACC.1/TRM Subset access control

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control: fulfilled by <b>FDP_ACF.1/TRM</b>
FDP_ACC.1.1 /TRM	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Access Control SFP</u> on <u>terminals gaining write, read and</u> modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical <u>MRTD</u> .

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Security attribute based access control (FDP\_ACF.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

#### FDP\_ACF.1/TRM Security attribute based access control

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control; fulfilled by <b>FDP_ACC.1/TRM</b> FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 /TRM	The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following:           1.         Subjects:           a.         Terminal,           b.         BIS-PACE           c.         Extended Inspection System ,
	2 Objects:

- 2. <u>Objects:</u>
  - a. data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16,



#### EF.COM and EF.SOD of the logical travel document

- b. data in EF.DG3 of the logical travel document
- c. data in EF.DG4 of the logical travel document
- d. All TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in the travel document
- 3. <u>Security attributes:</u>
  - a. PACE authentication,
  - b. Terminal Authentication v.1
  - c. <u>Authorization of the Terminal.</u>
- FDP\_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:<u>A BIS-PACE is allowed to read data objects from</u> FDP\_ACF.1.1/TRM according to [ICAO-TR-SAC],after a successful PACE authentication as required by FIA\_UAU.1/PACE.
- FDP\_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <u>none</u>.
- FDP\_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
  - 1. <u>Any terminal being not authenticated as PACE authenticated BIS-PACE is not allowed</u> to read, to write, to modify, to use any User Data stored on the travel document.
  - 2. <u>Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use any data stored on the travel document.</u>
  - 3. <u>Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System with</u> <u>the Read access to DG 3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder</u> <u>authorization encoding is not allowed to read the data objects 2b) of</u> <u>FDP\_ACF.1.1/TRM.</u>
  - 4. <u>Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System with</u> <u>the Read access to DG 4 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization</u> <u>encoding is not allowed to read the data objects 2c) of FDP\_ACF.1.1/TRM.</u>
  - 5. Nobody is allowed to read the data objects 2d) of FDP\_ACF.1.1/TRM.
  - 6. <u>Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3</u> and EF.DG4

#### FDP\_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.

# FDP\_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the **deallocation of the resource from** the following objects:

- 1. Session Keys (immediately after closing related communication session).
- 2. <u>ephemeral private key ephem SKPICC</u>- <u>PACE</u> (by having generated a <u>DH shared secret *K*).</u>

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP\_UCT.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).



#### FDP\_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	
FDP_UCT.1.1 /TRM	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Access Control SFP</u> to be able to <u>transmit and receive</u> user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Data exchange integrity (FDP\_UIT.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

#### FDP\_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	
FDP_UIT.1.1 /TRM	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Access Control SFP</u> to be able to <u>transmit and receive</u> user data in a manner protected from <u>modification, deletion, insertion and replay</u> errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 /TRM	The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.

**Rationale for Refinement:** Note that the Access Control SFP (cf. FDP\_ACF.1.2) allows the Extended Inspection System (as of [ICAO-9303] and [PP-MRTD-BAC]) to access the data EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. Nevertheless there is explicitly no rule for preventing access to these data. More over their data integrity (cf. FDP\_UIT.1) and confidentiality (cf. FDP\_UCT.1) is ensured by the BAC mechanism being addressed and covered by [PP-MRTD-BAC]. The fact that the BAC mechanism is not part of the ST in hand is addressed by the refinement "after Chip Authentication".

# 7.1.5 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels

#### FTP\_ITC.1/PACE Inter-TSF trusted channel after PACE

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

- FTP\_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT /PACE product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
- FTP\_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
- FTP\_ITC.1.3The TSF shall initiate enforce communication via the trusted channel for any data<br/>exchange between the TOE and the Terminal.



# 7.1.6 Class FMT Security Management

Application note: The SFR FMT\_SMF.1 and FMT\_SMR.1 provide basic requirements to the management of the TSF data.

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Specification of Management Functions (FMT SMF.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

#### FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No dependencies

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: FMT\_SMF.1.1

- 1. Initialization,
- <u>Pre-personalization</u>,
   <u>Personalization</u>.
- 4. Configuration.

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Security roles (FMT SMR.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

#### FMT SMR.1/PACE Security roles

/PACE

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification fulfilled by <b>FIA_UID.1/PACE</b>

FMT\_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles

- 1. Manufacturer ,
  - 2. Personalization Agent,
  - 3. Terminal,
  - 4. PACE authenticated BIS-PACE

FMT SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. /PACE

Application note: The MRTD also maintains the role Basic Inspection System due to a direct consequence of P.BAC-PP resp. OE.BAC-PP. Nevertheless this role is not explicitly listed in FMT SMR.1.1, above since the TSF cannot maintain the role with respect to the assumed high attack potential due to the known weaknesses of the Document Basic Access Keys.

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Limited capabilities (FMT LIM.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

#### FMT LIM.1 Limited capabilities

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FMT_LIM.2 Limited capabilities: fulfilled by <b>FMT_LIM.2</b> .
FMT_LIM.1.1	The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction
	with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
	Deploying test features after TOE delivery do not allow
	1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
	2.TSF data to be manipulated or disclosed,
	3.software to be reconstructed,
	4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other
	attacks.



The TOE shall meet the requirement "Limited availability (FMT\_LIM.2)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

#### FMT\_LIM.2 Limited availability

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities: fulfilled by <b>FMT_LIM.1</b> .
FMT_LIM.2.1	The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced: <u>Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow</u> 1. <u>User Data to be manipulated and disclosed</u> , 2. <u>TSF data to be manipulated or disclosed</u> , 3. <u>software to be reconstructed</u> , 4. <u>substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks</u>

**Application note:** The term "software" in item 4 of FMT\_LIM.1.1 and FMT\_LIM.2.1 refers to both IC Dedicated and IC Embedded Software.

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Management of TSF data (FMT\_MTD.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and different TSF data.

#### FMT\_MTD.1/INI\_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and Prepersonalization Data

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by <b>FMT_SMF.1</b> FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by <b>FMT_SMR.1/PACE</b>
FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_ENA	The TSF shall restrict the ability to <u>write</u> the <u>Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data</u> to the <u>Manufacturer</u> .

**Application note:** The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the authentication reference data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric cryptographic Personalization Agent Key.

# FMT\_MTD.1/INI\_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by <b>FMT_SMF.1</b> FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by <b>FMT_SMR.1/PACE</b>
FMT_MTD.1.1/	The TSF shall restrict the ability to read out the Initialisation Data and the Pre-personalisation

# FMT\_MTD.1/CVCA\_INI Management of TSF data – Initialization of CVCA Certificate and Current Date

Data to the Personalisation Agent

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by <b>FMT_SMF.1</b> FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by <b>FMT_SMR.1/PACE</b>
FMT_MTD.1.1/ CVCA_INI	<ul> <li>The TSF shall restrict the ability to <u>write</u> the</li> <li><u>initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,</u></li> <li><u>initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,</u></li> <li><u>initial Current Date</u></li> <li>to the Personalization Agent.</li> </ul>

INI DIS



DATE

 FMT\_MTD.1/CVCA\_UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifying Certification

 Authority
 No other components

 Dependencies:
 No other components

 FMT\_SMF.1
 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT\_SMF.1

 FMT\_SMR.1
 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT\_SMR.1/PACE

FMT\_MTD.1.1/The TSF shall restrict the ability to update theCVCA\_UPD1.Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,<br/>2.Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate<br/>to Country Verifying Certification Authority.

#### FMT\_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data – Current date

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE

- FMT\_MTD.1.1/ The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the <u>Current date</u> to
  - 1. <u>Country Verifying Certification Authority</u>,
    - 2. Document Verifier,
    - 3. domestic Extended Inspection System.

FMT\_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key

- Hierarchical to:
   No other components

   Dependencies:
   FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT\_SMF.1

   FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT\_SMR.1/PACE
- FMT\_MTD.1.1/ The TSF shall restrict the ability to <u>create and load</u> the <u>Chip Authentication Private Key</u> to CAPK the Personalization Agent.

#### FMT\_MTD.1/AAK Management of TSF data – Active Authentication Private Key

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE

FMT\_MTD.1.1/ The TSF shall restrict the ability to <u>create and load</u> the <u>Active Authentication Private Key</u> to AAK the Personalization Agent.

#### FMT\_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data – Personalisation Agent

- Hierarchical to:
   No other components.

   Dependencies:
   FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT\_SMF.1

   FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT\_SMR.1/PACE
- FMT\_MTD.1.1The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Security Object (SOD) to<br/>the Personalisation Agent.

#### FMT\_MTD.1/KEY\_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read

Hierarchical to: No other components

- Dependencies: FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT\_SMF.1 FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT\_SMR.1/PACE
- FMT\_MTD.1.1/ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
- KEY\_READ 1. PACE passwords
  - 2. Document Basic Access Keys,
  - 3. Chip Authentication Private Key,
  - 4. Active Authentication Private Key
  - 5. <u>Personalization Agent Keys</u>

to <u>none</u>.

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Secure TSF data (FMT\_MTD.3)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2):

#### FMT\_MTD.3 Secure TSF data

 Hierarchical to:
 No other components

 Dependencies:
 FMT\_MTD.1 Management of TSF data: fulfilled by : fulfilled by

 FMT\_MTD.1/CVCA\_INI, FMT\_MTD.1/CVCA\_UPD

FMT\_MTD.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values <u>of the certificate chain</u> are accepted for <u>TSF</u> data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access Control.

Refinement: The certificate chain is valid if and only if

- (1) the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
- (2) the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
- (3) the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE.

The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection System.

The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System.

**Application note:** The Terminal Authentication is used for Extended Inspection System as required by FIA\_UAU.4 and FIA\_UAU.5. The Terminal Authorization is used as TSF data for access control required by FDP\_ACF.1.

# 7.1.7 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions

The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF Data. The security functional requirement FPT\_EMS.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security functional requirements "Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT FLS.1)" and "TSF testing (FPT TST.1)" on the one hand and "Resistance to physical attack (FPT\_PHP.3)" on the other. The SFRs "Limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1)", "Limited availability (FMT LIM.2)" and "Resistance to physical attack (FPT PHP.3)" together with the SAR "Security architecture description" (ADV ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.

The TOE shall meet the requirement "TOE Emanation (FPT EMS.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended):

#### **FPT EMS.1 TOE Emanation**

- Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FPT EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit electromagnetic and current emissions in excess of intelligible threshold enabling access to
  - 1. Chip Authentication Session Keys
  - 2. PACE session Keys (PACE-K MAC, PACE-KEnc),
  - 3. the ephemeral private key ephem SK PICC-PACE,
  - 4. Personalization Agent Key(s)
  - 5. Chip Authentication Private Key
  - 6. Active Authentication Key, EF.DG3 and EF.DG4
- FPT\_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
  - 1. Chip Authentication Session Keys
  - 2. PACE session Keys (PACE-K MAC, PACE-KEnc),
  - 3. the ephemeral private key ephem SK PICC-PACE,
  - Personalization Agent Key(s)
  - Chip Authentication Private Key 5.
  - 6. Active Authentication Key.

The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit information leakage including physical manipulation.

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

#### FPT\_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state

No other components Hierarchical to:

No dependencies. **Dependencies:** 

- FPT\_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
  - 1. Exposure to operating conditions causing a TOE malfunction,
  - 2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT TST.1.

The TOE shall meet the requirement "TSF testing (FPT TST.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

#### FPT\_TST.1 TSF testing

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies.

- The TSF shall run a suite of self tests Conditions under which self test should occur to FPT TST.1.1 demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF at condition:
  - 1. During initial start-up
  - 2. Periodically during normal operation
  - 3. After cryptographic computation
  - 4. Before any use or update of TSF data



The description of the self test is the following (for each corresponding number):

- 1. RNG live test, sensor test, FA detection, Integrity Check of NVM ES
- 2. RNG monitoring, FA detection
- 3. FA detection
- 4. FA detection, Integrity Check of related TSF data
- FPT\_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of <u>TSF data</u>.
- FPT\_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of <u>stored TSF</u> <u>executable code</u>.

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Resistance to physical attack (FPT\_PHP.3)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).

### FPT\_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No dependencies.

FPT\_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist <u>physical manipulation and physical probing</u> to the <u>TSF</u> by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

# 7.1.8 Security Functional Requirements for Patch Management

### FMT\_SMR.1/OS-UPDATE Security roles

FMT\_SMR.1.1/OS-UPDATE The TSF shall maintain the roles OS Developer, OS Patch Loader, Issuer.

**FMT\_SMR.1.2/OS-UPDATE** The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

#### FMT\_SMF.1/OS-UPDATE Specification of Management Functions

**FMT\_SMF.1.1/OS-UPDATE** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: activation of additional code.

Application Note:

Once verified and installed, additional code is become immediately effective.

## FIA\_ATD.1/OS-UPDATE User attribute definition

**FIA\_ATD.1.1/OS-UPDATE** The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: **additional code ID for each activated additional code**.

Refinement: "Individual users" stands for additional code.

#### FDP\_ACC.1/OS-UPDATE Subset access control

FDP\_ACC.1.1/OS-UPDATE The TSF shall enforce the OS Update Access Control Policy on the following list of subjects, objects and operations:

- Subjects: S.OS-Developer is the representative of the OS Developer within the TOE, who responsible for verifying the signature and decrypting the additional code before authorizing its loading, installation and activation, [None]
- Objects: additional code and associated cryptographic signature
- Operations: loading, installation and activation of additional code

## FDP\_ACF.1/OS-UPDATE Security attribute based access control

**FDP\_ACF.1.1/OS-UPDATE** The TSF shall enforce the **OS Update Access Control Policy** to objects based on the following:

- Security Attributes:
  - The additional code cryptographic signature verification status
  - $\circ~$  The Identification Data verification status (between the Initial TOE and the additional code)

**FDP\_ACF.1.2/OS-UPDATE** The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

- The verification of the additional code cryptographic signature (using D.OS-UPDATE\_SGNVER-KEY) by S.OS-Developer is successful.
- The decryption of the additional code prior installation (using D.OS-UPDATE\_DEC-KEY) by S.OS-Developer is successful.
- The comparison between the identification data of both the Initial TOE and the additional code demonstrates that the OS Update operation can be performed.
- [None]
- **FDP\_ACF.1.3/OS-UPDATE** The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **[None]**.
- **FDP\_ACF.1.4/OS-UPDATE** The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **[None].**

#### Application Note:

Identification data verification is necessary to ensure that the received additional code is actually targeting the TOE and that its version is compatible with the TOE version.

Confidentiality protection must be enforced when the additional code is transmitted to the TOE for loading (See OE.OS-UPDATE-ENCRYPTION). Confidentiality protection can be achieved either through direct encryption of the additional code, or by means of a trusted path ensuring the confidentiality of the communication to the TOE.

#### FMT\_MSA.3/OS-UPDATE Security attribute initialisation

**FMT\_MSA.3.1/OS-UPDATE** The TSF shall enforce the **OS Update Access Control Policy** to provide **restrictive** default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

**FMT\_MSA.3.2/OS-UPDATE** The TSF shall allow the **OS Developer** to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

#### Application Note:

The additional code signature verification status must be set to "Fail" by default, therefore preventing any additional code from being installed until the additional code signature is actually successfully verified by the TOE.

#### FTP\_TRP.1/OS-UPDATE Trusted Path

- **FTP\_TRP.1.1/OS-UPDATE** The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and **remote** that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from **[none]**.
- FTP\_TRP.1.2/OS-UPDATE The TSF shall permit remote users to initiate communication via the trusted path.
- FTP\_TRP.1.3/OS-UPDATE The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for the transfer of the additional code to the TOE.

### Application Note:

During the transmission of the additional code to the TOE for loading the confidentiality shall be ensured either through direct encryption of the additional code, or by means of a trusted path ensuring the confidentiality of the communication to the TOE.

In case that the additional code is encrypted independently of the trusted path the ST writer can select 'none' in FTP\_TRP.1.1/OS-UPDATE.

Otherwise, the trusted path shall ensure the confidentiality of the transmitted additional code. In this case the ST writer shall select 'disclosure' in FTP\_TRP.1.1/OS-UPDATE.

### FCS\_COP.1/OS-UPDATE-DEC Cryptographic operation

FCS\_COP.1.1/OS-UPDATE-DEC The TSF shall perform Decryption of the additional code prior installation in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES-CBC] and cryptographic key sizes [AES-256] that meet the following: [assignment: AES-CBC ISO9797-M2 NIST SP800-38A].

#### FCS\_COP.1/OS-UPDATE-VER Cryptographic operation

FCS\_COP.1.1/OS-UPDATE-VER The TSF shall perform digital signature verification of the additional code to be loaded in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES-CMAC] and cryptographic key sizes [AES-256] that meet the following: [assignment: NIST SP800-38B].

### FPT\_FLS.1/OS-UPDATE Failure with preservation of secure state

**FPT\_FLS.1.1/OS-UPDATE** The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: **interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Updated TOE**.

#### Application Note:

The OS Update operation must be either successful, or fail securely. The TOE code and identification data must be updated in an atomic way in order to always be consistent. In case of interruption or incident during the OS Update operation, the OS Developer may choose to implement any technical behavior, provided that the TOE remains in a secure state, for example by canceling the operation (the TOE remains the Initial TOE) or entering an error state, and consistency is maintained between the TOE code and the ID data. The ST writer shall describe the "secure state" to which the OS update might lead.

## 7.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE

The SAR for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those taken from the

Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5)

and augmented by taking the following components:

ALC\_DVS.2 and AVA\_VAN.5.

# 7.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE

# 7.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale

## 7.3.1.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale for MRTD

The rationale in this paragraph comes from [PP-MRTD-EACV2] §6.3.1. Additions due to Active Authentication and secure messaging in personalisation are shaded.

	OT.Sens_Data_Conf	OT Chin Auth Broof		OT.Data_Integrity	OT.Data_Authenticity	OT.Data_Confidentiality	OT.Identification	OT_Prot_Abuse_Func	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak	OT.Tracing	OT.Prot_Phys_Tamper	OT.Prot_Malfunction	OT.Active_Auth_Proof
FAU SAS.1			Х				Х						
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE				Х	Х	Х							
FCS_CKM.1/CA	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х							
FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair		Х											Х
FCS_CKM.1/PERSO				Х	Х	Х							
FCS_CKM.4	Х		Х	Х	Х	Х							
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC						Х							
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC				Х	Х								
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC	Х	Х	Х	X		Х							
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER	Х		Х										
FCS COP.1/CA MAC	Х	Х	Х	Х									
FCS_COP.1/PACE_CAM	X	X											
FCS_COP.1/PERSO				Х	Х	Х							
FCS_COP.1/AA													Х
FCS_RND.1	Х		Х	Х	Х	Х							
FIA_AFL.1/PERSO	X			X	X	X							
FIA_AFL.1/PACE	~				~	~				Х			
FIA_UID.1/PERSO	Х			Х	Х	Х				~			
FIA_UAU.1/PERSO	X			X	X	X							
FIA_UID.1/PACE	X		Х	X	X	X							
FIA_UAU.1/PACE	X		X	X	X	X							
FIA_UAU.4/PACE	X		X	X	X	X							
FIA_UAU.5/PACE	X		X	X	X	X							
FIA UAU.6/PACE	~		~	X	X	X							
FIA_UAU.6/EAC	Х		Х	X	X	X							
FIA_API.1/CA	~	Х	~	~	~	~							
FIA API.1/AA		~											Х
FDP_ACC.1/TRM	Х		Х	Х		Х							~
FDP_ACF.1/TRM	X		X	X		X							
FDP_RIP.1	^		~	X	Х	X							
FDP_CT.1/TRM	Х			~	~	X							
FDP_UIT.1/TRM	^			Х		X							
FTP ITC.1/PACE				X	Х	X				Х			
FIF_IIC.I/FACE FMT_SMF.1		Х	Х	X	X	X	Х			^			
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1/PACE		X	<u>х</u>	X	X	X	X						
FMT_SMR.I/FACE		^	^	^	^	^	^	Х					
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2								X					
—			Х				v	^					
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA							X						
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS	v		Х				Х						
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI	Х												



	OT.Sens_Data_Conf	OT Chin Auth Broof	ers	OT.Data_Integrity	OT.Data_Authenticity	OT.Data_Confidentiality	<b>OT.Identification</b>	OT_Prot_Abuse_Func	OT.Prot_Inf_Leak	OT.Tracing	OT.Prot_Phys_Tamper	OT.Prot_Malfunction	OT.Active_Auth_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD	Х												
FMT_MTD.1/DATE	Х												
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK	Х	Х		Х									
FMT_MTD.1/AAK													Х
FMT_MTD.1/PA			Х	Х	Х	Х							
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х							Х
FMT_MTD.3	Х												
FPT_EMS.1			Х						Х				
FPT_FLS.1									Х			Х	
FPT_TST.1									Х			Х	
FPT_PHP.3				Х					Х		Х		

Table 21: Security functional requirement rationale

The security objective **OT.Identification** "Identification of the TOE" addresses the storage of Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its non-volatile memory, whereby they also include the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the TOE's chip. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU\_SAS.1. The SFR FMT\_MTD.1/INI\_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialisation and Pre-personalisation Data (including the Personalisation Agent key). The SFR FMT\_MTD.1/INI\_DIS requires the Personalisation Agent to disable access to Initialisation and Pre-personalisation Data in the life cycle phase 'operational use'. The SFRs FMT\_SMF.1 and FMT\_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.

The security objective **OT.AC\_Pers** "Access Control for Personalisation of logical travel document" addresses the access control of the writing the logical travel document. The justification for the SFRs FAU\_SAS.1, FMT\_MTD.1/INI\_ENA and FMT\_MTD.1/INI\_DIS arises from the justification for OT.Identification above with respect to the Pre-personalisation Data. The write access to the logical travel document data are defined by the SFR

FIA\_UID.1/PACE, FIA\_UAU.1/PACE, FDP\_ACC.1/TRM and FDP\_ACF.1/TRM in the same way: only the successfully authenticated Personalisation Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document only once. FMT\_MTD.1/PA covers the related property of OT.AC\_Pers (writing SO<sub>D</sub> and, in generally, personalisation data). The SFR FMT\_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles (including Personalisation Agent) and the SFR FMT\_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalisation). The SFRs FMT\_MTD.1./KEY\_READ and FPT\_EMS.1 restrict the access to the Personalisation Agent Keys and the Chip Authentication Private Key.

The authentication of the terminal as Personalisation Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SFR FIA\_UAU.4/PACE and FIA\_UAU.5/PACE. If the Personalisation Terminal want to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 (after Chip Authentication v.1) with the Personalisation Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS\_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge), FCS\_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication v.1), and FCS\_COP.1/CA\_ENC and FCS\_COP.1/CA\_MAC (for the ENC\_MAC\_Mode secure messaging), FCS\_COP.1/SIG\_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1) and FIA\_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-authentication). If the Personalisation Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the FCS\_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge) and FCS\_COP.1/CA\_ENC (to verify the authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to FCS\_CKM.4 after use.

The security objective **OT.Data\_Integrity** "Integrity of personal data" requires the TOE to protect the integrity of the logical travel document stored on the travel document's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. Physical manipulation is addressed by FPT\_PHP.3. Logical manipulation of stored user data is addressed by (FDP\_ACC.1/TRM, FDP\_ACF.1/TRM): only the Personalisation Agent is allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document (FDP\_ACF.1.2/TRM, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document (FDP\_ACF.1.2/TRM, rule 1)



document (cf. FDP\_ACF.1.4/TRM). FMT\_MTD.1/PA requires that SO<sub>D</sub> containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy. The Personalisation Agent must identify and authenticate themselves according to FIA\_UID.1/PACE and FIA\_UAU.1/PACE before accessing these data. FIA\_UAU.4/PACE, FIA\_UAU.5/PACE and FCS\_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols used. The SFR FMT\_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles and the SFR FMT SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.

Unauthorised modifying of the exchanged data is addressed, in the first line, by FTP\_ITC.1/PACE using FCS\_COP.1/PACE\_MAC. For PACE secured data exchange, a prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE Authentication (FIA\_UID.1/PACE, FIA\_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS\_CKM.1/DH\_PACE and possessing the special properties FIA\_UAU.5/PACE, FIA\_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA\_UAU.6/EAC. The trusted channel is established using PACE, Chip Authentication v.1, and Terminal Authentication v.1. FDP\_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for K<sub>MAC</sub>).

The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical travel document data after Chip Authentication v.1. The SFR FIA\_UAU.6/EAC and FDP\_UIT.1/TRM requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after Chip Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS\_CKM.1/CA (for the generation of shared secret and for the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS\_COP.1/CA\_ENC and FCS\_COP.1/CA\_MAC for the ENC\_MAC\_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS\_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT\_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT\_MTD.1/KEY\_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.

The SFR FCS\_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed.

In pre-personalisation, the SFR FCS\_CKM.1/PERSO and FCS\_COP.1/PERSO ensure the integrity of data transfers after successful authentication of the pre-personalisation agent according to FIA\_UID.1/PERSO and FIA\_UAU.1/PERSO, with the support of FIA\_AFL.1/PERSO.

The security objective **OT.Data\_Authenticity** aims ensuring authenticity of the User- and TSF data (after the PACE Authentication) by enabling its verification at the terminal-side and by an active verification by the TOE itself. This objective is mainly achieved by FTP\_ITC.1/PACE using FCS\_COP.1/PACE\_MAC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1 (FIA\_UID.1/PACE, FIA\_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS\_CKM.1/DH\_PACE resp. FCS\_CKM.1/CA and possessing the special properties FIA\_UAU.5/PACE, FIA\_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA\_UAU.6/EAC. FDP\_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for KMAC). FIA\_UAU.4/PACE, FIA\_UAU.5/PACE and FCS\_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols used. The SFR FMT\_MTD.1./KEY\_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords and the Chip Authentication Private Key. FMT\_MTD.1/PA requires that SO<sub>D</sub> containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy.The SFR FCS\_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed. The SFRs FMT\_SMF.1 and FMT\_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.

In pre-personalisation, the SFR FCS\_CKM.1/PERSO and FCS\_COP.1/PERSO ensure the authenticity of data transfers after successful authentication of the pre-personalisation agent according to FIA\_UID.1/PERSO and FIA\_UAU.1/PERSO, with the support of FIA\_AFL.1/PERSO.

The security objective OT.Data\_Confidentiality aims that the TOE always ensures confidentiality of the User- and TSF-data stored and, after the PACE Authentication resp. Chip Authentication, of these data exchanged. This objective for the data stored is mainly achieved by (FDP\_ACC.1/TRM, FDP\_ACF.1/TRM). FIA\_UAU.4/PACE, FIA\_UAU.5/PACE and FCS\_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols used. This objective for the data exchanged is mainly achieved by FDP\_UCT.1/TRM, FDP UIT.1/TRM and FTP ITC.1/PACE using FCS COP.1/PACE ENC resp. FCS COP.1/CA ENC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1 (FIA\_UID.1/PACE, FIA\_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS\_CKM.1/DH\_PACE resp. FCS\_CKM.1/CA and possessing the special properties FIA UAU.5/PACE, FIA UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA UAU.6/EAC. FDP RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for  $K_{ENC}$ ). The SFR FMT\_MTD.1./KEY\_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords and the Chip Authentication Private Key. FMT\_MTD.1/PA requires that SO<sub>D</sub> containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered trustworthy .The SFR FCS\_RND.1 represents the general support for cryptographic operations needed. The SFRs FMT\_SMF.1 and FMT\_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.

In pre-personalisation, the SFR FCS\_CKM.1/PERSO and FCS\_COP.1/PERSO ensure the confidentiality of data transfers after successful authentication of the pre-personalisation agent according to FIA\_UID.1/PERSO and FIA\_UAU.1/PERSO, with the support of FIA\_AFL.1/PERSO.

The security objective **OT.Sens\_Data\_Conf** "Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data" is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP\_ACC.1/TRM and FDP\_ACF.1/TRM allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorized by a valid certificate according FCS\_COP.1/SIG\_VER.

The SFRs FIA\_UID.1/PACE and FIA\_UAU.1/PACE require the identification and authentication of the inspection systems. The SFR FIA\_UAU.5/PACE requires the successful Chip Authentication (CA) v.1 before any authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. During the protected communication following the CA v.1 the reuse of authentication data is prevented by FIA\_UAU.4/PACE. The Chip Authentication (CA) v.1 can be replace by the PACE CAM endorsed by the SFR FCS\_COP.1/PACE\_CAM. The SFR FIA\_UAU.6/EAC and FDP\_UCT.1/TRM requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after Chip Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS\_RND.1 (for the generation of the terminal authentication challenge), FCS\_CCP.1/CA\_ENC and FCS\_COP.1/CA\_MAC for the ENC\_MAC\_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS\_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT\_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT\_MTD.1/KEY\_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.

To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT\_MTD.3 the CVCA's public key and certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role as of FMT\_MTD.1/CVCA\_INI, FMT\_MTD.1/CVCA\_UPD and FMT\_MTD.1/DATE.

The SFRs FIA\_UID.1/PERSO and FIA\_UAU.1/PERSO, with the support of FIA\_AFL.1/PERSO, require the identification and authentication of the pre-personalisation agent.

The security objective **OT.Chip\_Auth\_Proof** "Proof of travel document's chip authenticity" is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 provided by FIA\_API.1/CA proving the identity of the TOE or by the PACE CAM mechanism defined by the SFR FCS\_COP.1/PACE\_CAM. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 defined by FCS\_CKM.1/CA is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT\_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT\_MTD.1/KEY\_READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 [5] requires additional TSF according to FCS\_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation of the session keys), FCS\_COP.1/CA\_ENC and FCS\_COP.1/CA\_MAC (for the ENC\_MAC\_Mode secure messaging).The SFRs FMT\_SMF.1 and FMT\_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related. The asymetrics keys used during the Chip Authentication Protocol are initialized during the personalization process by key importation or On Board Key Generation covered by FCS\_CKM.1/KeyPair.

The security objective **OT\_Prot\_Abuse\_Func** "Protection against Abuse of Functionality" is ensured by the SFR FMT\_LIM.1 and FMT\_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.

The security objective **OT.Prot\_Inf\_Leak** "Protection against Information Leakage" requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the travel document's chip against disclosure

- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT\_EMS.1,
- by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT\_FLS.1 and FPT\_TST.1, and/or
- by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT\_PHP.3.

The security objective **OT.Tracing** aims that the TOE prevents gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless interface of the TOE without a priori knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (CAN, MRZ). This objective is achieved as follows:(i) while establishing PACE communication with CAN or MRZ (non-blocking authorisation data) – by FIA\_AFL.1/PACE;(ii) for listening to PACE communication (is of importance for the current PP, since SO<sub>D</sub> is card-individual) – FTP\_ITC.1/PACE.

The security objective **OT.Prot\_Phys\_Tamper** "Protection against Physical Tampering" is covered by the SFR FPT\_PHP.3.

The security objective **OT.Prot\_Malfunction** "Protection against Malfunctions" is covered by (i) the SFR FPT\_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to

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verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.

The security objective OT.Activ\_Auth\_Proof Error! Reference source not found. "Proof of MRTD's c hip authenticity through AA" is covered by FIA API.1/AA that proves the identity of the TOE. FCS COP.1/AA provides the signature. FMT MTD.1/AAK and FMT MTD.1/KEY READ participate to confidentiality of AA private key.

The asymetrics keys used during the Active Authentication are initialized during the personalization process by key importation or On Board Key Generation covered by FCS\_CKM.1/KeyPair.

# 7.3.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale for Patch Management

	O.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE	O.SECURE_AC_ACTIVATION	O.TOE_IDENTIFICATION	O.CONFID-OS-UPDATE.LOAD
FDP_ACC.1/OS-UPDATE	Х	Х	Х	Х
FDP_ACF.1/OS-UPDATE	Х	Х	Х	Х
FIA_ATD.1/OS-UPDATE			Х	
FMT_MSA.3/OS-UPDATE	Х	Х	Х	Х
FMT_SMR.1/OS-UPDATE	Х	Х	Х	Х
FMT_SMF.1/OS-UPDATE	Х	Х	Х	Х
FTP_TRP.1/OS-UPDATE				Х
FCS_COP.1/OS-UPDATE-DEC				Х
FCS_COP.1/OS-UPDATE-VER	Х			
FPT_FLS.1/OS-UPDATE	Х	Х	Х	

Table 22: Security Functional Requirement Rationale for Patch Management

O.SECURE LOAD ACODE This security objective specifies that the TOE shall check the authenticity and the integrity of the additional code to be loaded. This is covered by FDP\_ACC.1/OS-UPDATE, FDP\_ACF.1/OS-UPDATE, FMT\_MSA.3/OS-UPDATE, FMT\_SMR.1/OS-UPDATE, FMT\_SMF.1/OS-UPDATE, SFR FCS COP.1/OS-UPDATE-VER that define the different access control policies for the authenticity and the integrity.

Any interruption or incident will prevent the forming and activation of the additional code. It is covered by the FPT FLS.1/OS-UPDATE.

**O.SECURE AC ACTIVATION** This security objective specifies that the activation of the additional code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an atomic way. This is covered by FDP\_ACC.1/OS-UPDATE, FDP\_ACF.1/OS-UPDATE, FMT\_MSA.3/OS-UPDATE, FMT\_SMR.1/OS-UPDATE, FMT\_SMF.1/OS-UPDATE that define the different access control policies.

Any interruption or incident will prevent the forming and activation of the additional code. It is covered by the FPT\_FLS.1/OS-UPDATE.

O.TOE\_IDENTIFICATION This security objective specifies the identifications of both the Initial TOE and additional code. This is covered by FDP\_ACC.1/OS-UPDATE, FDP\_ACF.1/OS-UPDATE, FIA\_ATD.1/OS-UPDATE, FMT\_MSA.3/OS-UPDATE, FMT\_SMR.1/OS-UPDATE, FMT\_SMF.1/OS-UPDATE Any interruption or incident will prevent any change of the identification data. It is covered by the FPT FLS.1/OS-UPDATE.

**O.CONFID-OS-UPDATE.LOAD** This security objective specifies that The TOE shall decrypt the additional code prior installation. This is covered by FDP\_ACC.1/OS-UPDATE, FDP\_ACF.1/OS-UPDATE, FMT\_MSA.3/OS-UPDATE, FMT\_SMR.1/OS-UPDATE, FMT\_SMF.1/OS-UPDATE, FTP\_TRP.1/OS-UPDATE, FCS\_COP.1/OS-UPDATE-DEC to cover this confidentiality objective.

# 7.3.3 Dependency Rationale

# 7.3.3.1 SFR Dependencies for MRTD

The rationale in this paragraph comes from [PP-MRTD-EACV2] §6.3.2. Additions due to Active Authentication are shaded.

SFR	Dependencies	Support of the dependencies
FAU_SAS.1	No dependencies	
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1],	FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC,
		FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
	FCS_CKM.4	FCS CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/CA	FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1],	FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
		FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
	FCS_CKM.4	FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC,
	_	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1],	FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
		FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC,
	FCS CKM.4	Not fulfilled, see note 1
FCS_CKM.1/PERSO	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1],	
FC3_CRWLI/FERSO	FCS_CKM.2 01 FCS_COF.1],	FCS_COP.1/PERSO,
		FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1]	FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE,
		FCS_CKM.1/CA,
		FCS_CKM.1/PERSO
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or	FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
	FCS_CKM.1],	
	FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or	FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
	FCS_CKM.1],	
	FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PACE_CAM	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or	FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
	FCS_CKM.1]	
	FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or	FCS_CKM.1/CA
	FCS_CKM.1],	
	FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.4
FCS COP.1/SIG VER	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or	FCS CKM.1/CA
	FCS_CKM.1],	
	FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or	FCS CKM.1/CA
	FCS_CKM.1],	
	FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PERSO	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or	FCS_CKM.1/PERSO
	FCS_CKM.1],	
	FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.4
FCS COP.1/AA	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or	FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair
	FCS CKM.1],	
	FCS_CKM.4	Not fulfilled: see note 1
FCS_RND.1	No dependencies	
FIA_AFL.1/PERSO	FIA_UAU.1	FIA UAU.1/PERSO
FIA_AFL.1/PACE	FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UID.1/PERSO	No dependencies	
FIA_UAU.1/PERSO	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.1/PERSO
FIA_UID.1/PACE	No dependencies	
FIA_UAU.1/PACE	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.1/PACE
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SFR	Dependencies	Support of the dependencies
FIA_UAU.4/PACE	No dependencies	
FIA_UAU.5/PACE	No dependencies	
FIA_UAU.6/PACE	No dependencies	
FIA_UAU.6/EAC	No dependencies	
FIA_API.1/CA	No dependencies	
FIA_API.1/AA	No dependencies	
FDP_ACC.1/TRM	FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/TRM	FDP_ACC.1,	FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
	FMT_MSA.3	Not fulfilled: see note 2
FDP_RIP.1	No dependencies	
FDP_UCT.1/TRM	[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1],	FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
	[FTP_ITC.1, or FTP_TRP.1]	FTP_ITC.1/PACE
FDP_UIT.1/TRM	[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1],	FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
	[FTP_ITC.1, or FTP_TRP.1]	FTP_ITC.1/PACE
FTP_ITC.1/PACE	No dependencies	
FMT_SMF.1	No dependencies	
FMT_SMR.1/PACE	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_LIM.1	FMT_LIM.2	FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2	FMT_LIM.1	FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1,
	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1,
	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1,
	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD	FMT SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1,
	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/DATE	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1,
· ···· _··· _ ··· _ · ··· _	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT MTD.1/CAPK	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1,
	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/AAK	FMT_SMF.1	
	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT MTD.1/PA	FMT_SMF.1	
	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMF.1,
		FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ	FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMF.1,
		FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.3	FMT_MTD.1	FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
		FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FPT_EMS.1	No dependencies	
FPT_TST.1	No dependencies	
FPT_FLS.1	No dependencies	
FPT_PHP.3	No dependencies	

Notes:

 Table 23: Security functional requirement dependencies

- 1. The dependency between FCS\_COP.1/AA and FCS\_CKM.4, and FCS\_CKM.1/KeyPair and FCS\_CKM.4 are not fulfilled because the key is permanently stored on the card.
- 2. The access control TSF according to **FDP\_ACF.1/TRM** uses s ecurity attributes having been defined during the personalisation and fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security attributes (i.e. SFR FMT\_MSA.1 and FMT\_MSA.3) is necessary here.

# 7.3.3.2 SFR Dependencies for OS-Agility

SFRs	CC Dependencies	Satisfied Dependencies
FDP_ACC.1/OS-UPDATE	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute-based access control	FDP_ACF.1/OS-UPDATE
FDP_ACF.1/OS-UPDATE	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization	FDP_ACC.1/OS-UPDATE FMT_MSA.3/OS-UPDATE
FIA_ATD.1/OS-UPDATE	No Dependencies	No Dependencies
FMT_MSA.3/OS-UPDATE	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes	See note 1
	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_SMR.1/OS-UPDATE
FMT_SMR.1/OS-UPDATE	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_SMF.1/OS-UPDATE	No Dependencies	No Dependencies
FTP_TRP.1/OS-UPDATE	No Dependencies	No Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/OS-UPDATE-DEC	(FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation) FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	See note 2
FPT_FLS.1/OS-UPDATE	No Dependencies	No Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/OS-UPDATE-VER	(FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation) FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	See note 2

## Table 24: SFR Dependencies for OS Update

Note 1: The dependency **FMT\_MSA.1** of **FMT\_MSA.3/OS-UPDATE** is unsupported. No history information has to be kept by the TOE.

Note 2: **FDP\_ITC.1** or **FDP\_ITC.2** concerns import of user data and there is no user data (only TSF code) imported by such operation. There is no key generation FCS\_CKM.1 or deletion FCS\_CKM.4 for OS update. Keys are imported in Pre-Personalisation and are never erased.

# 7.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

EAL5 was chosen because it provides a high level of independently assured security in a planned development. It requires a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.

The selection of the component ALC\_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD's development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD's material.

The selection of the component AVA\_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfil the security objectives OT.Sens\_Data\_Conf and OT.Chip\_Auth\_Proof.

For these additional assurance components, all dependencies are met or exceeded in the EAL5 assurance package:

Component	Dependencies required by	Dependency fulfilled by			
	CC Part 3 or ASE_ECD				
TOE security assurance requirements (only additional to EAL5)					
ALC_DVS.2	no dependencies	-			
AVA_VAN.5	ADV_ARC.1	ADV_ARC.1			
	ADV_FSP.4	ADV_FSP.5			
	ADV_TDS.3	ADV_TDS.4			
	ADV_IMP.1	ADV_IMP.1			
	AGD_OPE.1	AGD_OPE.1			
	AGD_PRE.1	AGD_PRE.1			
	ATE_DPT.1	ATE_DPT.3			

Table 25: SAR Dependencies

# 7.3.5 Security Requirements – Mutual support and internal consistency

Cf [PP-MRTD-EACV2] §6.3.4

# 8. <u>TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION</u>

# 8.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS

TOE Security Functions are provided by the eTravel 3.1 embedded software (including the optional NVM ES) and by the chip.

SF	Description
SF.REL	Protection of data
SF.AC	Access control
SF.SYM_AUTH	Symmetric authentication
SF.SM	Secure messaging
SF.CA	Chip Authentication
SF.TA_CER	Validity of the Certificate Chain
SF.TA_AUT	Terminal Authentication Mechanism
SF.AA	Active Authentication
SF.OSAGILITY	OS Agility Management

# 8.1.1 TSFs provided by the eTravel 3.1 (MultiApp V5.1) Software

Table 26: Security Functions provided by the MultiApp V5.1 Software

# 8.1.2 TSFs provided by the Thales [ST-AQU-IC]

The evaluation is a composite evaluation and uses the results of the CC evaluation provided by [CR-IC]. The IC and its primary embedded software have been evaluated at level EAL 6+. These SF are the same for the IC considered in this ST;

SF	Description			
SF_PMODE	Manages the different steps of the product life cycle. At each step (boot mode, test mode and user mode), registers, data and memories accesses are limited or not. This allows to restrict product access according to the step (from manufacturing phase to final user phase). In addition, it is not possible to come back to test mode after the deployment of the product.			
SF_AUDIT_STORAGE	Allows to store specific data which shall remain permanent in the system such as the unique identification of the product stored in the Flash memory, pre-personalization data and security information.			
SF_AUTHENT	Provides mutual authentication between the TOE and the "Terminal" based on cryptographic mechanisms. Authentication is done before the loading operation.			
SF_CONF_INT	<ul> <li>Provides confidentiality and integrity to data stored in the memories (ROM, RAM, FLASH), in registers and in buses. The SF_CONF_INT prevents the disclosure of internal user data thanks to: <ul> <li>Memories encryption.</li> <li>Buses encryption.</li> <li>Register masking and cycling.</li> <li>Address scrambling.</li> <li>Integrity mechanisms on memories, buses and registers.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>			
SF_EXEC	<ul> <li>Provides protection against an un-correct execution of the code such as:</li> <li>Mechanisms to detect code re-routing.</li> <li>Mechanisms to detect illegal opcode execution.</li> <li>Mechanisms to control the operating conditions.</li> </ul>			



	In case of detection of an abnormal execution, an alarm is sent.
	Ensures also the correct operating conditions of the product during the execution and prevents any malfunction using sensors.
SF_MEM_ACCESS	<ul> <li>Provides:</li> <li>A Memory Protection Unit (MPU) that defines access permission on different memories areas.</li> <li>A Flash Protection Unit that defines access permission on NVR areas.</li> <li>Provides also an access control to user data stored in Flash during the deployment of the Loader and after.</li> </ul>
SF_PHY_PRO	<ul> <li>Provides physical protection to the product against physical manipulation and physical probing. The following features are used:</li> <li>Active Shield.</li> <li>Countermeasures added during the layout design.</li> </ul>
SF_ALARM	Enables to trig either an interrupt or a hardware reset. This TSF provides preservation of secure state in case of exposure to operation conditions which are not tolerated.
SF_RANDOM	<ul> <li>Provides mechanisms to prevent access to sensitive assets during the use by the Secure Embedded Software thanks to:</li> <li>Generate variation of the clock frequency around a range of frequency.</li> <li>Randomize the clock stealer.</li> <li>Randomize the execution of the commands.</li> </ul>
SF_RNG	Provides a random number generator (PTRNG) that meets PTG.2 class of BSI-AIS31 (German Scheme). It is used for key generation or for security measures.
SF_SEC_LOAD	Allows to load some code in the product in a secure way and, after the loading, to lock the loading mechanism.

## Table 27: Security Functions provided by the Thales (THALES DIS FRANCE SAS) AQUARIUS\_CA\_09 chips

These SF are described in [ST-AQU-IC].

# 9. GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS

## Glossary

Term	Definition
Active Authentication	Security mechanism defined in [PKI] option by which means the MTRD's chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and authenticity of the MTRD's chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known State of organization.
Agreement	This term is used in the current PP in order to reflect an appropriate relationship between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Application note	Optional informative part of the ST containing sensitive supporting information that is considered relevant or useful for the evaluation or use of the TOE.
Audit records	Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the travel document's chip to store the Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data.
Authenticity	Ability to confirm that the travel document itself and the data elements stored in were issued by the travel document Issuer
Basic Access Control (BAC)	Security mechanism defined in [PKI] by which means the travel document's chip proves and the basic inspection system (with BAC) protects their communication by means of secure messaging with Document Basic Access Keys (see there) based on MRZ information as key seed and access condition to data stored on travel document's chip according to LDS.
Basic Inspection System with Basic Access Control protocol (BIS- BAC)	A technical system being used by an official organisation <sup>25</sup> and operated by a governmental organisation and verifying correspondence between the stored and printed MRZ. BIS-BAC implements the terminal's part of the Basic Access Control protocol and authenticates itself to the travel document using the Document Basic Access Keys drawn form printed MRZ data for reading the less-sensitive data (travel document details data and biographical data) stored on the travel document. See also par. 1.2.5; also [PKI].
Basic Inspection System with PACE protocol (BIS-PACE)	A technical system being used by an inspecting authority <sup>26</sup> and verifying the travel document presenter as the travel document holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel document presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel document holder). BIS-PACE implements the terminal's part of the PACE protocol and authenticates itself to the travel document using a shared password (PACE password) and supports Passive Authentication. A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and verifying the ePass presenter as the ePass holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometrical data (face) of the ePass presenter with the stored biometrical data (DG2) of the ePass holder). The Basic Inspection System with PACE is a PCT additionally supporting/applying the Passive Authentication protocol.
Biographical data (biodata)	The personalised details of the travel document holder appearing as text in the visual and machine readable zones of and electronically stored in the travel document. The biographical data are less-sensitive data.
Biometric reference data	Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document holder in the travel document as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data (e.g. finger and iris).
Card Access Number (CAN)	A short password that is printed or displayed on the document. The CAN is a non-blocking password. The CAN may be static (printed on the Passport), semi- static (e.g. printed on a label on the Passport) or dynamic (randomly chosen by the electronic travel document and displayed by it using e.g. ePaper, OLED or similar technologies), see [ICAO-TR-SAC]

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 25}$  an inspecting authority; concretely, by a control officer  $^{\rm 26}$  concretely, by a control officer



Term	Definition
Counterfeit	An unauthorised copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by whatever means [PKI].
Country Signing CertA Certificate (CCSCA)	Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key (KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority and stored in the rightful terminals.
Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA)	An organisation enforcing the policy of the ePass Issuer with respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the ePass. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the ePasss and creates the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI. The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [PKI], 5.5.1.
Document Basic Access Keys	Pair of symmetric (two-key) Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption (key KBENC) and message authentication (key KBMAC) of data transmitted between the TOE and an inspection system using BAC [PKI]. They are derived from the MRZ and used within BAC to authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ of the passport book; see [PKI].
Document Details Data	Data printed on and electronically stored in the travel document representing the document details like document type, issuing state, document number, date of issue, date of expiry, issuing authority. The document details data are less-sensitive data.
Document Security Object (SOD)	A RFC 3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups: A hash for each Data Group in use shall be stored in the Security Data. It is stored in the ePassport application (EF.SOD) of the travel document. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS); see [PKI], sec. A.10.4.
Document Signer (DS)	An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document Security Object stored on the ePass for passive authentication. A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the Document Signer Certificate (CDS)(CDS), see [PKI]. This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent.
Eavesdropper	A threat agent reading the communication between the travel document and the terminal to gain the data on the travel document.
Enrolment	The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that person's identity; see [PKI].
ePassport application	A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related user data (incl. biometric) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl. MRZ); this application is intended to be used by authorities, amongst other as a machine readable travel document (MRTD). See [ICAO-TR-SAC].
Forgery	Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the biographical data or portrait; see [PKI].
Global Interoperability	The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from systems in other States, and to utilise that data in inspection operations in their respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the standardised specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable data in all travel documents; see [PKI].
IC Dedicated Software	Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC manufacturer. Such software might support special functionality of the IC hardware and be used, amongst other, for implementing delivery procedures between different players. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain life cycle phases.
IC Embedded Software	Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC developer. The IC Embedded Software is designed in the design life cycle phase and embedded into the IC in the manufacturing life cycle phase of the TOE.



Term	Definition
Impostor	A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that person's document; see [PKI].
Improperly documented person	A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel document or visa; (c) someone else's travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if required; see [PKI].
Initialisation Data	Any data defined by the travel document manufacturer and injected into the non- volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer. These data are, for instance, used for traceability and for IC identification as travel document material (IC identification data).
Inspection	The act of an official organisation (inspection authority) examining an travel document presented to it by an travel document presenter and verifying its authenticity as the travel document holder. See also [PKI].
Inspection system	see BIS-PACE for this PP. see also BIS-BAC for general information
Integrated circuit (IC)	Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions. The travel document's chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity	Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements stored upon have not been altered from that created by the travel document Issuer.
Issuing Organisation	Organisation authorised to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United Nations Organisation, issuer of the Laissez-passer); see [PKI].
Issuing State	The country issuing the travel document; see [PKI].
Logical Data Structure (LDS)	The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity expansion technology [PKI]. The capacity expansion technology used is the travel document's chip.
Machine readable zone (MRZ)	Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the travel document or MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the travel document, containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods; see [PKI]. The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable secret that is derived from the machine readable zone and may be used for both PACE and BAC.
Machine-verifiable biometrics feature	A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form that can be read and verified by machine; see [PKI].
Manufacturer	Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life-cycle phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
PACE password	A password needed for PACE authentication, e.g. CAN or MRZ.
PACE Terminal (PCT)	A technical system verifying correspondence between the password stored in the travel document and the related value presented to the terminal by the travel document presenter. PCT implements the terminal's part of the PACE protocol and authenticates itself to the ePass using a shared password (CAN or MRZ).
Passive authentication	Security mechanism implementing (i) verification of the digital signature of the Card/Chip or Document Security Object and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read data fields with the hash values contained in the Card/Chip or Document Security Object. See [PKI].
Passport (physical and electronic)	An optically and electronically readable document in form of a paper/plastic cover and an integrated smart card. The Passport is used in order to verify that identity claimed by the Passport presenter is commensurate with the identity of the Passport holder stored on/in the card.



Term	Definition
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)	A communication establishment protocol defined in [ICAO-TR-SAC]. The PACE Protocol is a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol providing implicit password-based authentication of the communication partners (e.g. smart card and the terminal connected): i.e. PACE provides a verification, whether the communication partners share the same value of a password $\pi$ ). Based on this authentication, PACE also provides a secure communication, whereby confidentiality and authenticity of data transferred within this communication channel are maintained.
Personalisation	The process by which the Personalisation Data are stored in and unambiguously, inseparably associated with the travel document.
Personalisation Agent	An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the following activities: (i)establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data in the travel document, (ii)enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder, (iii)writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical personalisation) and storing them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [PKI], (iv) writing the document details data, (v) writing the initial TSF data, (vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in [PKI] (in the role of DS). Please note that the role 'Personalisation Agent' may be distributed among several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel document Issuer. Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of this role.
Personalisation Data	A set of data incl. (i) individual-related data (biographic and biometric data,) of the travel document holder, (ii) dedicated document details data and (iii) dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Card/Chip Security Object, if installed, and the Document Security Object). Personalisation data are gathered and then written into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the Personalisation Agent in the life cycle phase card issuing.
Pre-personalisation Data	Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the Manufacturer for traceability of the non-personalised travel document and/or to secure shipment within or between the life cycle phases manufacturing and card issuing.
Pre-personalised travel document's chip	travel document's chip equipped with a unique identifier and a unique Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Receiving State	The Country to which the travel document holder is applying for entry; see [PKI].
Reference data	Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication attempt.
RF-terminal	A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip according to ISO/IEC 14443 [ISO14443]
Rightful equipment (rightful terminal or rightful Card)	A technical device being expected and possessing a valid, certified key pair for its authentication, whereby the validity of the related certificate is verifiable up to the respective root CertA. A rightful terminal can be either BIS-PACE (see Inspection System).
Secondary image	A repeat image of the holder's portrait reproduced elsewhere in the document by whatever means; see [PKI].
Secure messaging in combined mode	Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [ISO7816]
Skimming	Imitation of a rightful terminal to read the travel document or parts of it via the contactless/contact communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ and CAN dataPACE password.



Term	Definition
Standard Inspection Procedure	A specific order of authentication steps between an travel document and a terminal as required by [ICAO-TR-SAC], namely (i) PACE and (ii) Passive Authentication with SOD. SIP can generally be used by BIS-PACE and BIS-BAC.
Supplemental Access Control	A Technical Report which specifies PACE v2 as an access control mechanism that is supplemental to Basic Access Control.
Terminal	A Terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through a contactless / contact interface.
TOE tracing data	Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel document gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel document holder) recognising the travel document
Travel document	Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read; see [PKI] (there "Machine readable travel document").
Travel document (electronic)	The contactless/contact smart card integrated into the plastic or paper, optical readable cover and providing the following application: ePassport.
Travel document holder	A person for whom the ePass Issuer has personalised the travel document.
Travel document Issuer (issuing authority)	Organisation authorised to issue an electronic Passport to the travel document holder
Travel document presenter	A person presenting the travel document to a terminal and claiming the identity of the travel document holder.
TSF data	Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE (CC part 1 [CC-1]).
Unpersonalised travel document	travel document material prepared to produce a personalised travel document containing an initialised and pre-personalised travel document's chip.
User Data	All data (being not authentication data) (i)stored in the context of the ePassport application of the travel document as defined in [PKI]and (ii)being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [ICAO-TR-SAC]). CC give the following generic definitions for user data:
	Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF (CC part 1 [CC-1]). Information stored in TOE resources that can be operated upon by users in accordance with the SFRs and upon which the TSF places no special meaning (CC part 2 [CC-2]).
Verification data	Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the reference data known for the claimed identity.

## Acronyms

Acronym	Term
AA	Active Authentication
BAC	Basic Access Control
BIS-BAC	Basic Inspection System with BAC (equivalent to Basic Inspection System as used in [9])
BIS-PACE	Basic Inspection System with PACE
CAN	Card Access Number
CC	Common Criteria
CertA	Certification Authority
MRZ	Machine readable zone
n.a.	Not applicable
OSP	Organisational security policy
PACE	Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PCD	Proximity Coupling Device
PICC	Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip
PP	Protection Profile
RF	Radio Frequency
SAC	Supplemental Access Control
SAR	Security assurance requirements
SFR	Security functional requirement
SIP	Standard Inspection Procedure, see [ICAO-TR-SAC]
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE security functionality
TSP	TOE Security Policy (defined by the current document)

# END OF DOCUMENT