



**Swedish Certification Body for IT Security**

## Certification Report - WatchGuard

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Swedish Certification Body for IT Security  
Certification Report - WatchGuard

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## 1 Executive Summary

The WatchGuard Firebox is an all-in-one network and content security boundary protection device.

The TOE consists of both software and hardware. The evaluation covers the Fireware v11.11.2.508770 operating system, running on a dedicated hardware appliance, and the WatchGuard Dimension 2.1 software for audit log viewing and sorting.

The ST does not claim conformance to any Protection Profiles (PPs).

There are four assumptions being made in the ST regarding the secure usage and environment of the TOE. The TOE relies on these to counter the eight threats and comply with the three organisational security policies (OSPs) in the ST. The assumptions, threats and OSPs are described in chapter 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.

The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB in Växjö and Sundbyberg, Sweden, partly with the assistance of Electronic Warfare Associates-Canada Ltd. In Ottawa, Canada. A site-visit has been performed in the developer's premises in Seattle, USA.

The evaluation was completed in 2017-04-11. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria (CC) and the Common Methodology (CEM), version 3.1 release 4. The evaluation was performed at the evaluation assurance level EAL 4, augmented by ALC\_FLR.2 Flaw Reporting Procedures.

Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB are also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria.

Electronic Warfare Associates-Canada Ltd. Operates as a Foreign Location for Combitech AB within the scope of the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme.

The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive versions of the evaluation reports, and by observing testing. The certifier determined that the evaluation results confirm the security claims in the Security Target (ST) and the Common Methodology for evaluation assurance level EAL 4 augmented by ALC\_FLR.2

The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target (ST) and the Final Evaluation Report (FER) produced by Combitech AB

The certification results only apply to the versions of the product indicated in the certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate is either expressed or implied.

## 2 Identification

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| Certification Identification                 |   |
|--|---|
| Certification ID                             | CSEC2015010   |
| Name and version of the certified IT product | WatchGuard Firebox Security Appliances with Fireware v11.11 and WatchGuard Dimension 2.1  |
| Security Target Identification               | WatchGuard Fireware v11.11.2.508770 operating system running on one of the security appliances<br>Fireware M200, Fireware M300, Fireware M400, Fireware M440, Fireware M500, Fireware M4600, Fireware M5600, Firebox T10, Firebox T10-W, Firebox T30, Firebox T30-W, Firebox T50, or Firebox T50-W.<br>The WatchGuard Dimension 2.1 audit log viewing and sorting software. |
| EAL  | EAL 4 + ALC_FLR.2   |
| Sponsor                                      | WatchGuard Technologies Inc.  |
| Developer                                    | WatchGuard Technologies Inc.  |
| ITSEF  | Combitech AB and EWA-Canada Ltd.  |
| Common Criteria version                      | 3.1 release 4   |
| CEM version                                  | 3.1 release 4   |
| QMS version                                  | 1.20.3  |
| Recognition Scope <sup>1</sup>               | CCRA, SOGIS, EA/MLA   |
| Certification date                           | 2017-05-05  |

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- <sup>1</sup>Until September 2017, the following text is used in CCRA certificates underneath the logo for products that has been awarded a certificate prior september 2014.  
"CCRA recognition for components up to EAL 4 and ALC\_FLR only"
  - The following text is used in CCRA certificates underneath the logo for products that has not been awarded a certificate prior september 2014.  
"CCRA recognition for components up to EAL 2 and ALC\_FLR only"
  - The following text is used in CCRA certificates underneath the logo for products claiming conformance against a cPP:  
[Ask C CSEC]
  - The following text is always used on SOG-IS MRA certifiates underneath the logo:  
"SOG-IS MRA recognition for components up to EAL 4 and ALC\_FLR.1 only"

## **3 Security Policy**

The TOE provides the following security services:

- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- User Data Protection
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TSF
- Trusted Path/Channels

### **3.1 Security Audit**

The Firebox devices generate audit entries for security related events which are stored as audit logs in the WatchGuard Dimension server. The audit logs are protected from unauthorized modification and deletion and may only be reviewed by authorized administrators.

### **3.2 Cryptographic Support**

The TOE depends on FIPS validated cryptographic algorithms. The TOE protects the confidentiality and integrity of all information when it passes between the TOE and the remote management workstation, and also when it passes between the TOE and the local management workstation. The TOE achieves this by using validated cryptographic algorithms to perform encryption and the decryption of data according to the SSH and TLS protocols.

### **3.3 User Data Protection**

Information flow control is achieved through the use of policy and policy enforcement.

### **3.4 Identification and Authentication**

The TOE provides two pre-configured administrative accounts. The TOE requires that users associated with these accounts be identified and authenticated before permitted access to the TOE and TOE security functions. Users may authenticate using either local password authentication, or Active Directory.

### **3.5 Security Management**

The TOE provides local management capabilities via serial connection and remote management capabilities via workstation CLI and/or Web-Based GUI. Management functions allow the administrators to configure users, roles, and security policy attributes.

### **3.6 Protection of the TSF**

The operating system clock inside the TOE provides all of the timestamps for the audits.

### **3.7 Trusted Path/Channels**

The communications links between the TOE and its remote administrators are protected using HTTPS (TLS v1.2) for the Web-based GUI and SSH (v2.0) for workstation CLI.

## 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

### 4.1 Usage Assumptions

The Security Target [ST] makes two assumptions on the usage of the TOE.

A.MANAGE - There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it contains.

A.SECALG - Administrators will ensure that their browsers and SSH client applications use only approved cryptographic algorithms.

### 4.2 Environmental Assumptions

The Security Target [ST] makes two assumptions on the operational environment of the TOE.

A.LOCATE - The TOE hardware and software will be located within controlled access facilities and protected from unauthorized physical modification.

A.SINGEN - Information cannot flow among the internal and external networks unless it passes through the TOE.

### 4.3 Clarification of Scope

The Security Target contains eight threats, which have been considered during the evaluation.

T.ACCESS - An unauthorized person on an external network may attempt to by-pass the information flow control policy to access protected resources on the internal network.

T.AUDACC - Persons may not be accountable for the actions that they conduct because the audit records are not reviewed, or records have been compromised, thus allowing an attacker to escape detection.

T.COMDIS - An unauthorized user may attempt to disclose the data collected by the TOE by bypassing a security mechanism.

T.MEDIAT - An unauthorized person may send impermissible information through the TOE that result in the exploitation of resources on the internal network.

T.NOAUTH - An unauthorized person may attempt to bypass the security of the TOE so as to assess and use security functions and/or non- security functions provided by the TOE.

T.NOHALT - An unauthorized user may attempt to compromise the continuity of the TOE functionality by halting execution of the TOE.

T.PRIVIL - An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and exploit system privileges to gain access to TOE security functions and data.

T.PROCOM - An unauthorized person or unauthorized external IT entity may be able to view, modify, and/or delete security related information that is sent between a remotely located authorized administrator and the TOE.

The Security Target contains three Organisational Security Policies (OSPs), which have been considered during the evaluation.

P.ACCACT - Users of the TOE shall be accountable for their actions.

P.DETECT - All events that are indicative of inappropriate activity that may have resulted from misuse, access, or malicious activity must be collected.

P.MANAGE - The TOE shall be manageable only by authorized administrators.

## 5 Architectural Information

The TOE consists of the WatchGuard Fireware v11.11.2.508770 operating system, running on one of the security appliances:

Fireware M200, Fireware M300, Fireware M400,  
Fireware M440, Fireware M500, Fireware M4600,  
Fireware M5600, Firebox T10, Firebox T10-W,  
Firebox T30, Firebox T30-W, Firebox T50, or  
Firebox T50-W.

and the WatchGuard Dimension 2.1 audit log viewing and sorting software.




Figure 1, The TOE parts in a typical operational environment.



## 6 Documentation

The following documents are included in the scope of the TOE:

WatchGuard Firebox Security Appliances with Fireware v11.11 Guidance Supplement

Fireware Command Line Interface Reference

WatchGuard Firebox M200/M300 Hardware Guide

WatchGuard Firebox M400/M500 Hardware Guide

WatchGuard Firebox M440 Hardware Guide

WatchGuard Firebox M4600 Hardware Guide

WatchGuard Firebox M5600 Hardware Guide

WatchGuard Firebox T10 Hardware Guide

WatchGuard Firebox T30/T50 Hardware Guide

WatchGuard Firebox M200/M300 Quick Start Guide

WatchGuard Firebox M400/M500 Quick Start Guide

WatchGuard Firebox M440 Quick Start Guide

WatchGuard Firebox M4600 Quick Start Guide

WatchGuard Firebox M5600 Quick Start Guide

WatchGuard Firebox T10/T10-W Quick Start Guide

WatchGuard Firebox T30, T30-W/T50, T50-W Quick Start Guide

## **7 IT Product Testing**

### **7.1 Developer Testing**

The developer tested all variants of the TOE. All SFRs were covered by the external testing. Some testing of internal interfaces, i.e. direct calls to cryptographic primitives, was covered in the form of evidence from FIPS CAVP testing.

### **7.2 Evaluator Testing**

The evaluators repeated a subset of the developer tests, on the T30, T30-W, M440 and M5600 hardware appliances. A number of complementary test were added, testing the cryptographic SFRs thoroughly against independent implementations of the primitives, modes schemes and protocols.

### **7.3 Penetration Testing**

The evaluators put particular emphasis in identifying third party modules and to eliminate potential vulnerabilities for those. The penetration testing focused on port scanning (NMAP), and vulnerability scanning (Nessus and Armitage). The penetration tests were performed on the T30, T30-W, M440 and M5600 hardware appliances.

## 8 Evaluated Configuration

The installation and setup of the evaluated configuration is described in [INST].

Note that the following features are not included in the evaluated configuration:

External Network Interface – The external network interface allows for remote administration of the TOE. Authorized administrators can connect to the TOE through the external network and configure the TOE, monitor its operation, and examine the audit logs via remote workstation by logging into a Web-based GUI. To protect the confidentiality and integrity of information the external network connection must be configured to allow HTTPS and TLS (v1.2) at the network port and the remote web browser respectively. The External Network Interface is not to be used in the evaluated configuration.

Telnet – Use of Telnet protocol is not permitted in the evaluated configuration of the TOE.

## 9 Results of the Evaluation

The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of enhanced-basic.

The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluator and determined that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].

The evaluators overall verdict is PASS.

The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the following table:

| <i>Assurance Class/Family</i>  | <i>Short name</i> | <i>Verdict</i> |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|----------------|
| Development                    | ADV               | PASS           |
| Security Architecture          | ADV_ARC.1         | PASS           |
| Functional Specification       | ADV_FSP.4         | PASS           |
| Implementation Representation  | ADV_IMP.1         | PASS           |
| TOE Design                     | ADV_TDS.3         | PASS           |
| Guidance Documents             | AGD               | PASS           |
| Operational User Guidance      | AGD_OPE.1         | PASS           |
| Preparative Procedures         | AGD_PRE.1         | PASS           |
| Life-cycle Support             | ALC               | PASS           |
| CM Capabilities                | ALC_CMC.4         | PASS           |
| CM Scope                       | ALC_CMS.4         | PASS           |
| Delivery                       | ALC_DEL.1         | PASS           |
| Development Security           | ALC_DVS.1         | PASS           |
| Life-cycle Definition          | ALC_LCD.1         | PASS           |
| Tools and Techniques           | ALC_TAT.1         | PASS           |
| Flaw Remediation               | ALC_FLR.2         | PASS           |
| Security Target Evaluation     | ASE               | PASS           |
| ST Introduction                | ASE_INT.1         | PASS           |
| Conformance Claims             | ASE_CCL.1         | PASS           |
| Security Problem Definition    | ASE_SPD.1         | PASS           |
| Security Objectives            | ASE_OBJ.2         | PASS           |
| Extended Components Definition | ASE_ECD.1         | PASS           |
| Security Requirements          | ASE_REQ.2         | PASS           |
| TOE Summary Specification      | ASE_TSS.1         | PASS           |
| Tests                          | ATE               | PASS           |
| Coverage                       | ATE_COV.2         | PASS           |
| Depth                          | ATE_DPT.1         | PASS           |
| Functional Tests               | ATE_FUN.1         | PASS           |
| Independent Testing            | ATE_IND.2         | PASS           |
| Vulnerability Assessment       | AVA               | PASS           |
| Vulnerability Analysis         | AVA_VAN.3         | PASS           |

## **10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations**

None.

## 11 Glossary

|       |   |
|-------|---|
| CEM   | Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, document describing the methodology used in Common Criteria evaluations |
| ITSEF | IT Security Evaluation Facility, test laboratory licensed to operate within a evaluation and certification scheme               |
| ST    | Security Target, document containing security requirements and specifications , used as the basis of a TOE evaluation           |
| TOE   | Target of Evaluation  |
| TSF   | TOE Security Functionality  |
| TCBC  | TDEA Cipher Block Chaining  |

## 12 Bibliography

- ST WatchGuard Firebox Security Appliances with Fireware v11.11 Security Target, WatchGuard, 2016-10-17, document version 1.3
- INST WatchGuard Firebox Security Appliances with Fireware v11.11 Guidance Supplement, EWA-Canada and WatchGuard, 2016-08-31, v1.0
- CLI Fireware Command Line Interface Reference, WatchGuard, 2016, version 11.11.4
- HG M200/300 WatchGuard Firebox M200/M300 Hardware Guide, WatchGuard, 2015-06-01
- HG M400/500 WatchGuard Firebox M400/M500 Hardware Guide, WatchGuard, 2015-03-10
- HG 440 WatchGuard Firebox M440 Hardware Guide, WatchGuard, 2015-07-14
- HG M4600 WatchGuard Firebox M4600 Hardware Guide, WatchGuard, 2016-02-11
- HG M5600 WatchGuard Firebox M5600 Hardware Guide, WatchGuard, 2016-02-11
- HG T10 WatchGuard Firebox T10 Hardware Guide, WatchGuard, 2015-02-11
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- QG M440 WatchGuard Firebox M440 Quick Start Guide, WatchGuard, 2015-07-22, Rev D
- QG M4600 WatchGuard Firebox M4600 Quick Start Guide, WatchGuard, 2016-01-28, Rev A
- QG M5600 WatchGuard Firebox M5600 Quick Start Guide, WatchGuard, 2016-01-28, Rev A
- QG T10 WatchGuard Firebox T10/T10-W Quick Start Guide, WatchGuard, 2014-08-21, Rev D
- QG T30/50 WatchGuard Firebox T30, T30-W/T50, T50-W Quick Start Guide, WatchGuard, 2016-02-12, Rev B
- CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001
- CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-002
- CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-003

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CC CCpart1 + CCpart2 + CCpart3  
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security  
Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004



## Appendix A Scheme Versions

### A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System

During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification scheme has been used:

| Version | Introduced  | Impact of changes |
|---------|-------------|-------------------|
| 1.20.3  | 2017-04-24  | <i>None</i>       |
| 1.20.2  | 2017-02-27  | <i>None</i>       |
| 1.20.1  | 2017-01-12  | <i>None</i>       |
| 1.20    | 2016-10-20  | <i>None</i>       |
| 1.19.3  | Application | Initial version   |

In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has examined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system. The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in “Ändringslista QMS 1.20.3”. The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.19.3 to the current QMS 1.20.3, there are no changes with impact on the result of the certification.

### A.2 Scheme Notes

The following Scheme Notes have been considered during the evaluation:

- Scheme Note 15 - Demonstration of test coverage
- Scheme Note 18 - Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target