Security Target

CubeOne V3.0



eGlobal Systems Co., Ltd

This document is a translation of the Security Target written in Korean which has been evaluated.



Security Target

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eGlobal Systems Co., Itd 4F ilhwan Bldg., 54, Seolleung-ro 93-gil Gangnam-gu, Seoul, Korea, 135-513 www.eglobalsys.co.kr

Telephone +82-2-6447-6988 • Fax +82-2-6447-6989 •

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Table of Contents

1.	ST INTRODUCTION	.10
	1.1. ST reference	.10
	1.2. TOE reference	.10
	1.3. TOE overview	.11
	1.3.1. TOE type and scope	. 11
	1.3.2. TOE usage and major security features	. 12
	1.3.3. TOE operational environment	. 12
	1.3.3.1. Plug-In Type	13
	1.3.3.2. API Type	14
	1.3.4. Non-TOE Hardware/ Software	. 15
	1.4. TOE description	.17
	1.4.1. Physical Scope	. 17
	1.4.2. Logical Scope	. 20
	1.4.2.1. CubeOne Manager	22
	1.4.2.2. CubeOne Server	23
	1.4.2.3. CubeOne Security Server	24
	1.5. Conventions	.26
	1.6. Terms and definitions	.27
	1.7. Security Target Contents	.31
2.	CONFORMANCE CLAIM	.32
	2.1. CC conformance claim	.32
	2.2. PP conformance clam	.32
	2.3. Package conformance claim	.33
	2.4. Conformance claim rationale	.33
3.	SECURITY OBJECTIVES	.36
	3.1. Security objectives for the operational environment	
4.	EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION	.37
	4.1. Cryptographic support	



	4.1.1. Random Bit Generation	37
	4.1.1.1. FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation	37
	4.2. Identification and authentication	38
	4.2.1. TOE Internal mutual authentication	38
	4.2.1.1. FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication	38
	4.3. User data protection	39
	4.3.1. User data encryption	39
	4.3.1.1. FDP_UDE.1 User data encryption	39
	4.4. Security Management	40
	4.4.1. ID and password	40
	4.4.1.1. FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password	40
	4.5. Protection of the TSF	41
	4.5.1. Protection of stored TSF data	41
	4.5.1.1. FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data	41
	4.6. TOE Access	42
	4.6.1. Session locking and termination	12
		42
	4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions	
5.	_	43
5.	4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions	43 44
5.	4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions	43 44 44
5.	4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions SECURITY REQUIREMENTS	43 44 44 45
5.	4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions	43 44 44 45 45
5.	 4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions	43 44 45 45 45
5.	 4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions	43 44 45 45 46 48
5.	 4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions	43 44 45 45 46 48 48
5.	 4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions	43 44 45 45 46 48 48 48
5.	 4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions	43 44 45 45 46 48 48 48 48
5.	 4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions	43 44 45 45 46 48 48 48 48 49 49
5.	 4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions	43 44 45 45 46 48 48 48 48 49 49 49 49 50
5.	 4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions	43 44 45 45 46 48 48 48 48 49 49 49 49 49 50 50



5.1.2.3. FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution	.52
5.1.2.4. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	.53
5.1.2.5. FCS_COP.1 (1) Cryptographic operation (User data encryption)	.53
5.1.2.6. FCS_COP.1 (2) Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption)	.53
5.1.2.7. FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation (Extended)	.54
5.1.3. User data protection (FDP)	54
5.1.3.1. FDP_UDE.1 User data encryption	54
5.1.3.2. FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection	54
5.1.4. Identification and authentication (FIA)	55
5.1.4.1. FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling	
5.1.4.2. FIA_IMA.1 Internal mutual authentication (Extended)	55
5.1.4.3. FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets	55
5.1.4.4. FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action	56
5.1.4.5. FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms	56
5.1.4.6. FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback	56
5.1.4.7. FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action	57
5.1.5. Security management (FMT)	57
5.1.5.1. FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions Behaviour	.57
5.1.5.2. FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data	58
5.1.5.3. FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password (Extended)	58
5.1.5.4. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	.59
5.1.5.5. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	.59
5.1.6. Protection of the TSF (FPT)	59
5.1.6.1. FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection	59
5.1.6.2. FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data (Extended)	59
5.1.6.3. FPT_TST.1 TSF testing	.60
5.1.7. TOE access (FTA)	60
5.1.7.1. FTA_MCS.2 Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent sessions	.60
5.1.7.2. FTA_SSL.5(1) Management of TSF-initiated sessions (Extended)	.61
5.1.7.3. FTA_SSL.5(2) Management of TSF-initiated sessions (Extended)	.61
5.1.7.4. FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment	.61
5.2. Security assurance requirements	62



	5.2.1. Security Target evaluation	. 63
	5.2.1.1. ASE_INT.1 ST introduction	63
	5.2.1.2. ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment	64
	5.2.1.3. ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition	64
	5.2.1.4. ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements	65
	5.2.1.5. ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification	65
	5.2.2. Development	. 66
	5.2.2.1. ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification	66
	5.2.3. Guidance documents	. 66
	5.2.3.1. AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance	66
	5.2.3.2. AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures	67
	5.2.4. Life-cycle support	. 68
	5.2.4.1. ALC_CMC.1 TOE Leveling of the TOE	68
	5.2.4.2. ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage	68
	5.2.5. Tests	. 69
	5.2.5.1. ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing	69
	5.2.5.2. ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance	
	5.2.6. Vulnerability assessment	. 70
	5.2.6.1. AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey	
	5.3. Security requirements rationale	.71
	5.3.1. Dependency rationale of security functional requirements	. 71
	5.3.2. Dependency rationale of security assurance requirements	. 73
6.	TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION	74
	6.1. Security audit (FAU)	.74
	6.1.1. Potential security violation and security alert	. 74
	6.1.2. Audit data generation	. 74
	6.1.3. Audit review	. 76
	6.1.4. Action in case of possible audit data loss and Prevention of audit data	loss
		. 78
	6.2. Cryptographic support (FCS)	.79
	6.2.1. Cryptographic key generation (User data encryption)	. 79



6.2.2. Cryptographic key generation (TSF data encryption)	80
6.2.3. Cryptographic key distribution	81
6.2.4. Cryptographic key destruction	82
6.2.5. Cryptographic operation (User data encryption)	82
6.2.6. Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption)	83
6.3. User data protection	84
6.4. Identification and authentication (FIA)	85
6.4.1. Authentication failure handling	85
6.4.2. Verification of secrets	85
6.4.3. Identification and authentication	86
6.4.4. Mutual authentication between components	86
6.5. Security management (FMT)	88
6.5.1. Security functions and Protection of stored TSF data	88
6.5.2. Management of ID and password	89
6.5.3. Security roles	90
6.6. Protection of the TSF (FPT)	91
6.6.1. Basic internal TSF data transfer protection	91
6.6.2. Basic protection of stored TSF data	91
6.6.3. TSF self-test	
6.6.3.1. Self-test	92
6.6.3.2. Integrity verification of TSF and TSF data	
6.7. TOE access (FTA)	96
6.7.1. TOE session control	



List of Figures

Figure 1. Plug-in type operational environment	14
Figure 2. API type operational environment	15
Figure 3. Physical scope of TOE	18
Figure 4. Logical scope of TOE	21



List of Tables

Table 1. Minimum operation specification of hardware	16
Table 2. 3 rd party software not included in the TOE	17
Table 3. Components of TOE	
Table 4. Validated cryptographic module	20
Table 3. Summary of Security functional requirements	45
Table 6. Auditable event	47
Table 7. Selectable audit review methods	49
Table 8. Approved Cryptographic Algorithm	50
Table 9. Cryptographic key generation	52
Table 10. Cryptographic key distribution	52
Table 11. TSF data Cryptographic operation	54
Table 12. Single-use authentication mechanisms	56
Table 13. List and Action of security functions	57
Table 14. TSF Data list and management ability	58
Table 15. Security assurance requirements	62
Table 16. Rationale for the dependency of the security functional requirements	72
Table 17. Potential security violations audit event	74
Table 18. List and Action of security functions	89
Table 19. TSF Data list and management ability	



1. ST Introduction

This Document is ST of CubeOne V3.0 developed by eGlobal Systems Co. for Database Encryption which is aimed for EAL+1 level of CC.

1.1. ST reference

ltem	Specification	
Title	CubeOne V3.0 Security Target	
Document identification	CubeOne_ST(ENG)_V3.0.0.5_ENG	
Version	V3.0.0.5	
Developer	eGlobal Systems Co., ltd.	
Issue date 2023.11.22		
Common Criteria	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5 • Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017- 04-001, April, 2017) • Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 2: Security Functional Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017- 04-002, April, 2017) • Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 3: Security Assurance Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017- 04-003, April, 2017)	
Common Criteria version CC V3.1 r5		
Evaluation Assurance Level	EAL1+(ATE_FUN.1)	
Keywords	Database, Encryption	

1.2. TOE reference

ltem	Specification
TOE name	CubeOne V3.0
TOE type	Database, Encryption
Detail version	rev.0025



Item		Specification
	CubeOne Manager	- CubeOne_Manager_V3.0.00.03
		[Plug-In]
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_L64_4.18_OR19C
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_A64_7.2_DB11.5
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_L64_4.18_TI7
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_L64_4.18_MY8
TOE	CubeOne Server	- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_W64_10_MS19
components		[API]
components		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_A64_7.2_API
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_S64_5.11_API
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_H64_B.11.31_API
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_L64_4.18_API
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_W64_10_API
	CubeOne Security Server	CubeOne_SServer_V3.0.00.03_L64_4.18_MY
Magual	Operating Manual	- CubeOne_OPE_V3.0.0.3
Manual	Installation Manual	- CubeOne_PRE_V3.0.0.4
	Developer	eGlobal Systems Co., Ltd

1.3. TOE overview

CubeOne V3.0 (hereinafter referred to as "TOE") is the product of eGlobal Systems Co. for database encryption. TOE performs the function of preventing the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information by encrypting column data in table of database (hereinafter referred to as "DB").

1.3.1. TOE type and scope

The TOE is provided as software and shall provide the encryption/decryption function for the user data by each column. The TOE type defined in this ST can be grouped into the 'plug-in type' and 'API type', depending on the TOE operation type. The TOE can support both types.

TOE has following	components.
-------------------	-------------

Item	Specification
CubeOne Manager	Configure and control cryptographic policy like role definition of TOE



Item	Specification
CubeOne Server	Perform cryptographic operation of user data for TOE
CubeOne Security Server	Save cryptographic policy and security audit log of TOE.
	Perform latent violation analysis and security alert of TOE.

Encryption keys and TSF data used to encrypt and decrypt user data are created and managed through CubeOne Manager. The encryption key and TSF data are encrypted using the verification target encryption algorithm of the verified encryption module.

1.3.2. TOE usage and major security features

The TOE provides the ability to server user data according to sections set by authorized administrators to prevent unauthorized opposition to information to be protected. The TOE provides a security audit function that records and manages audit data on major auditable events so that authorized administrators can safely operate the TOE within the organization's operating environment. In addition, the TOE provides cryptographic support functions such as encryption key management for user and TSF data encryption, cryptographic operation, user data protection function to encrypt user data and protect residual information, authorized administrator identity verification, authentication failure handling, and TOE configuration. Identification and authentication functions such as mutual authentication between elements, security management functions for security functions and role definitions, environment settings, etc., protection of TSF data transmitted between TOE components, protection of TSF data stored in storage controlled by the TSF, and the TSF itself. It provides TSF protection functions such as testing, and TOE access functions for access session management by authorized administrators.

1.3.3. TOE operational environment

The TOE operational environment defined in this ST can be classified into two types: plug-in type and API type. The plug-in type, which is installed in the protected DB server, performs encryption/decryption of the user data and API type which is installed in Application server, which is not protected DB server, encrypts/decrypts user data on it. The authorized policy administrator can connect to CubeOne Manager for security control. The authorized log administrator can connect CubeOne Security Server to check security alert and audit log.



1.3.3.1. Plug-In Type

The authorized policy administrator creates user data encryption/decryption keys and sets policies through the GUI provided in CubeOne Manager. CubeOne Manager sends and receives TSF data to CubeOne Security Server when login/logout.

CubeOne Server encrypts user data according to the policy set in CubeOne Manager and deletes the original plaintext data. Additionally, when an application service user requests user data, CubeOne Server decrypts it according to policy and delivers it to the Application Server.

CubeOne Security Server stores user data encryption/decryption keys and policies transmitted from CubeOne Manager, and stores encryption and decryption performance history generated by CubeOne Server and audit data generated from TOE components. Additionally, when the CubeOne Server is restarted, the key and policy for encrypting and decrypting user data are transmitted to the CubeOne Server.

The authorized log administrator can check security alert and audit log through CubeOne Security Server.



Figure 1. show the general operational environment of the plug-in type




Figure 1. Plug-in type operational environment


1.3.3.2. API Type

The authorized policy administrator creates user data encryption/decryption keys and sets policies through the GUI provided in CubeOne Manager. CubeOne Manager send/receive TSF data to CubeOne Security Server when login/logout. The application service users can encrypt/decrypt data with API provided by TOE and must delete the original data after encrypt it. When application service users save user data, it is encrypted by CubeOne Server and stored in the Database Server. When a user searches, the CubeOne Server decrypts it and delivers it to the application service user.

CubeOne Security Server stores user data encryption/decryption keys and policies transmitted from CubeOne Manager, and stores encryption/decryption performance history generated by CubeOne Server and audit data generated from TOE components. Additionally, when the CubeOne Server is restarted, the key and policy for encrypting and decrypting user data are transmitted to the CubeOne Server.

The authorized log administrator can check security alert and audit log through CubeOne Security Server.








Figure 2. API type operational environment

The communication channel between components of TOE shall be encrypted using approved algorithm of validated cryptographic module. And the reliable communication between authorized log administrator and WEB Server shall be guaranteed.

1.3.4. Non-TOE Hardware/ Software

The hardware/software lists of non-TOE under TOE operational environment are as follows.

Classification	Minimum Requirement				
	CPU	POWER7 3.0 Ghz	Intel Dual Core 1.8 GHz	Intel Dual Core 1.8 GHz	
		or above	or above	or above	
CubeOne Server	Memory	4 GB or above			
(Plug-In)	HDD	At least 200 MB of space required to install TOE			
	NIC	10/100/1000 Mbp	s X 1 Port or above		



Classification	Minimum Requirement								
	OS	AIX 7.2 (64 bit)		Rocky Lin	nux 8.7 (64 bit)	Windo	ws S	Server	2019
				(kernel 4.	-	(64 bit	:)		
	DBMS	DB2 11.5		Oracle 1 Mysql 8.0	9c, Tibero 7,).35	MSSQ	L 2019	9	
	CPU	POWER7 3.0 Ghz or above	284	arcv9 18 MHz above	Intel(R) Itanium 2 1.6 GHz or above	Intel Core GHz above	Dual 1.8 or	Intel Core GHz above	Dual 1.8 or
	Memory	4 GB or above	4 GB or above						
CubeOne Server	HDD	At least 200 N	ИВ о	f space rec	quired to install	TOE			
(API)	NIC	10/100/1000	Mbp	s X 1 Port	or above				
	OS	AIX 7.2 (64 bit)		nOS 5.11 bit)	HP-UX B.11.31 (64 bit)	Rocky Linux (64 (kerne 4.18.0)	8.7 bit) I	Wind Serve 2019 bit)	
	CPU	Intel Core 2 D	Duo 2	2.40 GHz o	r above			1	
	Memory	4 GB or above							
CubeOne Manager	HDD	At least 200 MB of space required to install TOE							
	NIC	10/100/1000 Mbps X 1 Port or above							
	OS	Windows Server 2019 (64 bit)							
	CPU	Intel Core 2 D	Duo 2	2.26 GHz o	r above				
	Memory	4 GB or above							
CubeOne Security	HDD	At least 200 MB of space required to install TOE							
Server	NIC	10/100/1000 Mbps X 1 Port or above							
	OS	Rocky Linux 8.7 (64 bit) (kernel 4.18.0)							
	essential S/W	- Mysql 8.0.35 - Apache tomcat 9.0.82							
Authorized log administrator	Web browser	Chrome V 118.0 (64 bit)							

Table 1. Minimum operation specification of hardware



The uses of 3rd party software not included in the TOE are as follows.

Item	Software	Specification
CubOne Securty	Mysql 8.0.35	Database used for the audit repository of TOE
Server	Apache tomcat 9.0.82	WAS server for CubeOne Security Server

Table 2. 3rd party software not included in the TOE

1.4. TOE description

According to operational environment of CubeOne Server, the TOE can be classified into two types: plug-in and API type. It means that type is determined by what kinds of subject perform encryption/decryption. If subject is DB, type is plug-in. If subject is Application server, type is API. The TOE provides the functions that the authorized administrator can create policy and distribute it through CubeOne Manager and then CubeOne Server can perform encryption/decryption according to policy. The histories of encryption or decryption and audit log data of TOE are sent to CubeOne Security Server. The authorized log administrator can review TOE through CubeOne Security Server.

1.4.1. Physical Scope

The physical scope of the TOE consists of CubeOne Manager, CubeOne Server, and CubeOne Security Server, which are software provided in CD form, and the verified cryptographic module is included in the TOE. The physical scope of the TOE also includes 'Operation Manual' and 'Installation Manual' that are distributed to end users in electronic document (CD) form to ensure that they operate the TOE in a safe manner. Software and certificates such as hardware, OS, DBMS, etc. required to operate the TOE are excluded from the physical scope of the TOE.

The physical scope of TOE is graphically represented as follows.



Security Target

CubeOne Manager System	CubeOne Server System	-CubeOne Security Server
Hardware	Hardware	Hardware
os	OS	os
CubeOne Manager	CubeOne Server	Cube One Security Server
Validated Cryptographic Module(COLib V1.2.0)	Validated Cryptographic Module(COLib V1.2.0)	Validated Cryptographic Module(COLib V1.2.0)
	DBMS(ORACLE,TIBERO, DB2, MYSQL, MSSQL)	Mysql 8.0.35
		Apache Tomcat 9.0.82
	×	
Manual		
Operation Manual		
Installation Manual		: TOE etc. : Non-TOE

Figure 3. Physical scope of TOE



The product box is comprised of TOE-related materials. The product box is labeled and delivered after packing the product CD case, manuals, and certification into the product box. The components are as follows.

Item		Content	status		
TOE Name		CubeOne V3.0			
Detail	version	rev.0025			
	CubeOne	- CubeOne_Manager_V3.0.00.03	Included in		
	Manager	: CubeOne_Manager_V3.0.00.03.exe	CD		
		[Plug-In]			
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_L64_4.18_OR19C			
		: CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_L64_4.18_OR19C.tar			
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_A64_7.2_DB11.5			
		: CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_ A64_7.2_DB11.5.tar			
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_L64_4.18_TI7			
		: CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_L64_4.18_TI7.tar			
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_L64_4.18_MY8			
		: CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_L64_4.18_MY8.tar			
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_W64_10_MS19			
TOE	CubeOne	: CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_W64_10_MS19.exe	Included in		
Components	Server	[API]	CD		
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_A64_7.2_API			
		: CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_A64_7.2_API.tar			
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_S64_5.11_API			
		: CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_S64_5.11_API.tar			
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_H64_B.11.31_API			
		: CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_H64_B.11.31_API.tar			
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_L64_4.18_API			
		: CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_L64_4.18_API.tar			
		- CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_W64_10_API			
		: CubeOne_Server_V3.0.00.03_W64_10_API.exe			
	CubeOne	- CubeOne_SServer_V3.0.00.03_L64_4.18_MY	Included in		
	Security Server	: CubeOne_SServer_V3.0.00.03_L64_4.18_MY.tar	CD		
	Operation	- CubeOne_OPE_V3.0.0.3	prints,		
Manuals	Manual	: CubeOne_OPE_V3.0.0.3.pdf	Included in		
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	CD		



lter	m	Content	status
	Installation Manual	- CubeOne_PRE_V3.0.0.4 : CubeOne_PRE_V3.0.0.4.pdf	prints, Included in CD

Table 3. Components of TOE

The contents of validated cryptographic module used in TOE are as follows.

Item	Content
Module Name	COLib V1.2.0
Certification Number	CM-231-2028.6
Developer	Eglobal system
Issue Date	2023-06-19
Expiration Date	2028-06-19

Table 4. Validated cryptographic module

1.4.2. Logical Scope

Below represent security function of TOE.



Security Target




Figure 4. Logical scope of TOE



1.4.2.1. CubeOne Manager

[Security audit]

The TOE generates audit records of the auditable events like cryptographic support, identification and authentication, etc. and the audit record include the date of the event, the type of event, the identity and the outcome of the event. Audit records created in CubeOne Manager are sent to CubeOne Security Server when CubeOne Manager logs out.

The TOE provides a pop-up alarm to the authorized policy administrator when detecting a potential security violation like authentication failure event, integrity violation of auditable events.

An authorized policy administrator can review all audit data from audit records Authorized policy administrators can read all audit data generated by CubeOne Manager from audit records and selectively review audit data according to criteria that has a logical relationship

If the audit trail exceeds 80% of the audit repository capacity, notify the authorized policy administrator by pop-up. If the audit trail is saturated, the policy manager is notified in a pop-up and the audited event is ignored.

[Cryptographic support]

The key for user data encryption and TSF data encryption is generated by random number generator of validated cryptographic module.

The authorized policy administrator generates the user data encryption key through CubeOne Manager and distributes it to CubeOne Server and CubeOne Security Server.

When encrypting and decrypting TSF data, the ARIA encryption algorithm of the verified encryption module is used. For stored data, a key length of 256 bits is used, and for transmitted data, a key length of 128 bits is used.

After using the TSF data encryption key, the memory area of key is overwritten by '0' 3 times.

[Identification and authentication]

CubeOne Manager performs mutual authentication by using the public key cipher and digital signature method of validated cryptographic module before communication with CubeOne Server, CubeOne Security Server. Random number are used to prevent reuse of administrator authentication information.

CubeOne Manager provides the identification and authentication method based on their ID and password and passwords entered are masked so that they cannot be seen on the screen (" \bullet "). The reason for their failure is not provided. And it provides the method that if five consecutive failed certifications occur, the authentication function is prevented for five minutes.



When creating a password, it must be combined with English letters/special characters/numeric characters, and the password length must be between 9 and 30 characters.

[Security Management]

The security function provided by Cubeone Manager and ability to manage TSF data is performed only for authorized policy administrator.

The ID and password for authentication of CubeOne Manager is registered during installation.

In TOE, administrators are divided into policy administrator who can set up security policies and log administrators who can review security alerts and audit data.

The policy administrator connects to the CubeOne Manager to perform security management while the log administrator connects to the CubeOne Security Server to perform security management.

[Protection of the TSF]

When sending TSF data between TOE components, TSF data is protected from exposure and change by using hash function(SHA-256) and block cipher (ARIA-128) of validated cryptographic module. The TSF data such as encryption key and TOE setting are stored by encrypting it through DEK and then DEK is stored by encrypting it through KEK.

The TOE provides the self-test and integrity verification functions of TSF execution code and TSF data.

[TOE Access]

CubeOne Manager limits sessions that can be accessed at the same time to a maximum of one. CubeOne Manger locks the session after 10 minutes of administrator inactivity, and security functions can be performed only after administrator re-authentication.

1.4.2.2. CubeOne Server

[Security audit]

The TOE generates audit records of the auditable events like cryptographic support, identification and authentication, etc. and the audit record consist of the date of the event, the type of event, the identity and the outcome of the event. The audit data generated by CubeOne Server is sent to CubeOne Security Server.

[Cryptographic support]

The TSF data encryption key is generated by random number generator of validated cryptographic module. When encrypting and decrypting TSF data, the ARIA encryption algorithm of the verified



encryption module is used. For stored data, a key length of 256 bits is used, and for transmitted data, a key length of 128 bits is used.

The algorithms for user data encryption use only the block cipher and hash function of validated cryptographic module. The ARIA and SEED algorithm is used for block cipher, SHA-256/384/512 for hash function. And ARIA uses 128/192/256 bit key length, SEED uses only 128 bit key length.

After using the TSF data encryption key and user data encryption key, the memory area of key is overwritten by '0' 3 times.

[User data protection]

CubeOne Server provides encryption and decryption functions for each column when encrypting and decrypting user data, and after encryption, the original user data in plain text is overwritten with '0' three times to completely delete it, ensuring that the previous information is not available.

[Identification and authentication]

CubeOne Server performs mutual authentication by using the public key cipher and digital signature method of validated cryptographic module before communication with CubeOne Manager, CubeOne Security Server.

[Protection of the TSF]

When sending TSF data between TOE components, TSF data is protected from exposure and change by using hash function(SHA-256) and block cipher (ARIA-128) of validated cryptographic module. The TSF data such as encryption key and TOE setting are stored by encrypting it through DEK and then DEK is stored by encrypting it through KEK.

The TOE provides the self-test and integrity verification functions of TSF execution code and TSF data.

1.4.2.3. CubeOne Security Server

[Security audit]

CubeOne Security Server creates audit records according to auditable events such as password support, identification, and authentication. Audit records include event date, event type, identity, and event outcome. Audit records created in CubeOne Security Server, CubeOne Server, CubeOne Manager are stored in the DBMS where CubeOne Security Server is installed.

If a potential security violation, such as an authentication failure audit event or an integrity violation audit event, is detected during an audit event, a real-time warning screen is provided to the authorized log administrator.



Authorized log administrator can search all audit data stored in DBMS through CubeOne Security Server and can perform selective audit searches based on criteria with logical relationships.

If the audit trail exceeds 80% of the audit storage capacity, a real-time warning screen is provided to the authorized log administrator.

If the audit trail is saturated, a real-time warning screen is provided to the authorized log administrator and old audit records are overwritten.

[Cryptographic support]

The TSF data encryption key is generated by random number generator of validated cryptographic module. The cryptographic operation to encrypt/decrypt TSF data uses ARIA algorithm of validated cryptographic module and its key length is 256 bits. After using the TSF data encryption key, the memory area of key is overwritten by '0' 3 times.

[Identification and authentication]

CubeOne Security Server performs mutual authentication by using the public key cipher and digital signature method of validated cryptographic module before communication with CubeOne Server, CubeOne Manager. Session ID are used to prevent reuse of administrator authentication information.

CubeOne Security Server provides the identification and authentication method based on their ID and password and passwords entered are masked so that they cannot be seen on the screen (" \bullet "). The reason for their failure is not provided. And it provides the method that if five consecutive failed certifications occur, the authentication function is prevented for five minutes.

When creating a password, it must be combined with English letters/special characters/numeric characters, and the password length must be between 9 and 30 characters.

[Security Management]

The password for authentication of CubeOne Security Server is registered during installation. The log administrator connects to the CubeOne Security Server and can perform the security management of IP setting for connection, change of password.

[Protection of the TSF]

When sending TSF data between TOE components, TSF data is protected from exposure and change by using hash function(SHA-256) and block cipher (ARIA-128) of validated cryptographic module. The TSF data such as encryption key and TOE setting are stored by encrypting it through DEK and then DEK is stored by encrypting it through KEK.



The TOE provides the self-test and integrity verification functions of TSF execution code and TSF data.

[TOE Access]

Simultaneous access to CubeOne Security Server is limited to a maximum of 1 person. CubeOne Security Server terminates sessions after 10 minutes of administrator inactivity, and security functions can be performed only after administrator must be identified and authenticated. CubeOne Security Server provides IP-based management access session control.

1.5. Conventions

The notation, formatting and conventions used in this ST are consistent with the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation.

The CC allows several operations to be performed for functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection and refinement. Each operation is used in this ST.

Operation	Content
	Iteration is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. The result
Iteration	of iteration is marked with an iteration number in parenthesis following the
	component identifier, i.e., denoted as (iteration No.).
	This is used to assign specific values to unspecified parameters (e.g., password
Assignment	length). The result of assignment is indicated in square brackets like
	[assignment_value].
This is used to select one or more options provided by the CC i	
Selection	requirement. The result of selection is shown as <i>underlined and italicized.</i>
Definement	This is used to add details and thus further restrict a requirement. The result of
Refinement	refinement is shown in bold text .



1.6. Terms and definitions

Terms used in this ST, which are the same as in the CC, must follow those in the CC

Terms	Definition
CubeOne	Trademark of cryptographic product made by eGlobal Systems Co. ltd.
CubeOne Manager	Security management part of CubeOne. It provides GUI
	Interface for authorized administrator.
CubeOne Server	Cryptographic processing part of CubeOne. It is installed at
	server where need encryption/decryption with access control.
	This takes charge of storing TSF data, audit log, cryptographic
CubeOne Security Server	policy of CubeOne.
Cubeone security server	Security monitoring part of CubeOne. The administrator can
	monitor TOE through it.
	A cryptographic key which is used in an asymmetric
Private Key	cryptographic algorithm and is uniquely associated with an
	entity (the subject using the private key), not to be disclosed
Object	Passive entity in the TOE containing or receiving information
Object	and on which subjects perform operations
Approved made of approxim	The mode of cryptographic module using approved
Approved mode of operation	cryptographic algorithm
	A cryptographic algorithm selected by Korea Cryptographic
	Module Validation Authority for block cipher, secure hash
Approved energy phic algorithm	algorithm, message authentication code, random bit
Approved cryptographic algorithm	generation, key agreement, public key cipher, digital signatures
	cryptographic algorithms considering safety, reliability and
	interoperability
Attack potential	Measure of the effort to be expended in attacking a TOE
Attack potential	expressed as an attacker's expertise, resources and motivation
	A cryptographic key which is used in an asymmetric
Public Key	cryptographic algorithm and is associated with an unique entity
	(the subject using the public key), it can be disclosed
Public Key(asymmetric)	A cryptographic algorithm that uses a pair of public and private
cryptographic algorithm	keys
	The access to the TOE by using the HTTPS, SSH, TLS, etc. to
Management access	manage the TOE by administrator, remotely



Terms	Definition
	Encryption scheme that uses the same secret key in mode of
Symmetric cryptographic technique	encryption and decryption, also known as secret key
	cryptographic technique
	A set of data that is compiled according to a certain structure
	in order to receive, save, and provide data in response to the
Database (or DB)	demand of multiple users to support multiple application
	duties at the same time. The database related to encryption by
	column, which is required by this ST, refers to the relational
	database.
Data Encryption Key (DEK)	Key that encrypts and decrypts the data
Iteration	Use of the same component to express two or more distinct
	requirements
	A Set of rules that describes the specific security action
Security Function Policy (SFP)	performed by TSF (TOE security functionality) and describe
	them as SFR (security function requirement)
Security Target (ST)	Implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a
	specific identified TOE
	The characteristics of the subject used to define the SFR, user
Security attribute	(including the external IT product), object, information, session
	and/or resources. These values are used to perform the SFR
	Hardware device that implements key generation and digital
Security Token	signature generation inside the device to save/store
	confidential information safely
Protection Profile (PP)	Implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
	TOE type
Decryption	The act that restoring the cipher text into the plaintext using
	the decryption key
	A cryptographic key which is used in an symmetric
Secret Key	cryptographic algorithm and is uniquely associated with one or
	several entity, not to be disclosed
User	Refer to "External entity"
User Data	Data for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF
Selection	Specification of one or more items from a list in a component



Terms	Definition	
Identity	Representation uniquely identifying entities (e.g. user, process	
	or disk) within the context of the TOE	
Encryption	The act that converts the plaintext into the cipher text using	
	the encryption key	
Element	Indivisible statement of a security need	
Role	Predefined set of rules on permissible interactions between a	
	user and the TOE	
Operation	Modification or repetition of a component. Allowed operations	
(on a component of the CC)	on components are assignment, iteration, refinement and	
(selection	
Operation (on a subject)	Specific type of action performed by a subject on an object	
External Entity	Human or IT entity possibly interacting with the TOE from	
	outside of the TOE boundary	
Threat Agent	Entity that can adversely act on assets	
Authorized Administrator	Authorized user to securely operate and manage the TOE	
Authorized User	The TOE user who may, in accordance with the SFRs, perform	
	an operation	
Authentication Data	Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user	
Self-test	Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the	
	cryptographic module	
Assets	Entities that the owner of the TOE presumably places value	
	upon	
Refinement	Addition of details to a component	
	Set of security rules, procedures, or guidelines for an	
Organizational Security Policies	organization wherein the set is currently given by actual or	
	virtual organizations, or is going to be given	
	Relationship between components such that if a requirement	
Dependency	based on the depending component is included in a PP, ST or	
	package, a requirement based on the component that is	
	depended upon must normally also be included in the PP, ST	
	or package	
Subject	Active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects	
Augmentation	Addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package	



Terms	Definition	
Column	A set of data values of a particular simple type, one for each	
Column	row of the table in a relational database	
Component	Smallest selectable set of elements on which requirements may	
Component	be based	
Class	Set of CC families that share a common focus	
Key Encryption Key (KEK)	Key that encrypts and decrypts another cryptographic key	
	Set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly	
Target of Evaluation (TOE)	accompanied by guidance	
	Set of assurance requirements drawn from CC Part 3,	
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL)	representing a point on the CC predefined assurance scale, that	
	form an assurance package	
Family	Set of components that share a similar goal but differ in	
Family	emphasis or rigour	
Assignment	The specification of an identified parameter in a component (of	
	the CC) or requirement	
	Information related to security that can erode the security of	
Critical Security Parameters (CSP)	the encryption module if exposed or changed (e.g., verification	
Childa Security Farameters (CSF)	data such as secret key/private key, password, or Personal	
	Identification Number).	
	The application server defined in this ST refers to the server	
	that installs and operates the application, which is developed to	
	provide a certain application service by the organization that	
Application Server	operates the TOE. The pertinent application reads the user data	
	from the DB, which is located in the database server, by the	
	request of the application service user, or sends the user data	
	to be stored in the DB to the database server.	
	The database server defined in this ST refer to the server in	
Database Server	which the DBMS managing the protected DB is installed in the	
	organization that operates the TOE	
	A software system composed to configure and apply the	
DBMS database. The DBMS related to encryption by column, which		
(Database Management System)	required by this ST, refers to the database management system	
	based on the relational database model.	
SSL	This is a security protocol proposed by Netscape to ensure	



Terms	Definition	
(Secure Sockets Layer)	confidentiality, integrity and security over a computer network	
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	Set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly	
	accompanied by guidance	
TSF Data	Data for the operation of the TOE upon which the enforcement	
	of the SFR relies	
	It is used in the actual encryption function and contains the	
ITEM	contents related to the policy including the encryption key of	
	user data.	

1.7. Security Target Contents

Chapter 1 introduces to the Security Target, providing Security Target and TOE references, TOE overview, TOE description and terms and definitions.

Chapter 2 provides the conformance claims to the CC, PP and package; and describes the claim's conformance rationale and PP conformance statement.

Chapter 3 describes the security objectives for the operational environment.

Chapter 4 defines the extended components for the database encryption.

Chapter 5 describes the security functional and assurance requirements. If required, Application notes are provided to clarify the meaning of requirements and provide an explanation of detailed guidelines to the ST author for correct operations.

Chapter 6 describes the security functions and warranty requirements of TOE that satisfy the security requirements in the TOE summary statement.



2. Conformance claim

2.1. CC conformance claim

		Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
cc		Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5
		- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
		Evaluation. Part 1: Introduction and General Model,
		Version 3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-001, April, 2017)
		- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
		Evaluation. Part 2: Security Functional Components,
		Version 3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-002, April, 2017)
		- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
		Evaluation. Part 3: Security Assurance Components,
		Version 3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017)
	Part 2 Security	Extended: FCS_RBG.1, FIA_IMA.1, FDP_UDE.1, FMT_PWD.1,
	functional components	FPT_PST.1, FTA_SSL.5
Conformance	Part 3 Security	Conformant
claim	assurance components	Conformant
	Package	Augmented: EAL1 augmented (ATE_FUN.1)

2.2. PP conformance clam

This Protection Profile conform 'Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1'

ltem	Content
Title	Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption
Version	V1.1
Evaluation Assurance Level	EAL1+(ATE_FUN.1)
Issue Date	2019.12.11
Certification Number	KECS-PP-0820a-2017
Conformance status	Strict PP conformance



2.3. Package conformance claim

This ST claims conformance to assurance package EAL1 augmented with ATE_FUN.1

2.4. Conformance claim rationale

This ST comply with 'strict PP conformance' through conformances of TOE type, security objectives for the operational environment, security requirement which is required by 'Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1' - hereinafter referred to as "DBEnc-PP".

ltem	ST	РР	Rationale
TOE type	DB encryption product	The same as DBEnc-PP	The same as DBEnc-PP
	OE.PHYSICAL_CONTROL		
	OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN		
	OE.SECURE_DEVELOPMENT	The same as DBEnc-PP The same	The same as DBEnc-PP
	OE.LOG_BACKUP		The sume as obline in
	OE.OPERATION_SYSTEM_REINFO RCEMENT		
Security objectives for the operational	OE.SECURE_DBMS	Add	The same as DBEnc-PP - added according to the Application notes of FAU_STG.1 which is the optional SFR
environmen t	OE.TIMESTAMP	Add	The same as DBEnc-PP - added according to the Application notes of FAU_STM.1 which is the optional SFR
	OE.SECURE_CHANNEL	Add	The same as DBEnc-PP - added according to the Application notes of FAU_TRP.1 which is the optional SFR
	FAU_ARP.1	FAU_ARP.1	The same as DBEnc-PP.
Security requirement	FAU_GEN.1	FAU_GEN.1	The same as DBEnc-PP
requirement	FAU_SAA.1	FAU_SAA.1	The same as DBEnc-PP



Item	ST	РР	Rationale
	FAU_SAR.1	FAU_SAR.1	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FAU_SAR.3	FAU_SAR.3	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FAU_STG.3	FAU_STG.3	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FAU_STG.4(1)	FAU_STG.4	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FAU_STG.4(2)	FAU_STG.4	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FCS_CKM.1(1)	FCS_CKM.1(1)	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FCS_CKM.1(2)	FCS_CKM.1(2)	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FCS_CKM.2	FCS_CKM.2	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.4	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FCS_COP.1(1)	FCS_COP.1(1)	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FCS_COP.1(2)	FCS_COP.1(2)	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FCS_RBG.1(Extended)	FCS_RBG.1(Extended)	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FDP_UDE.1	FDP_UDE.1	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FDP_RIP.1	FDP_RIP.1	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FIA_AFL.1	FIA_AFL.1	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FIA_IMA.1(Extended)	FIA_IMA.1(Extended)	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FIA_SOS.1	FIA_SOS.1	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UAU.1	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FIA_UAU.2	FIA_UAU.1	The same as DBEnc-PP - Use FIA_UAU.2 in hierarchical relationships according to Application notes of FIA_UAU.1
	FIA_UAU.4	FIA_UAU.4	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FIA_UAU.7	FIA_UAU.7	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FIA_UID.2	FIA_UID.1	The same as DBEnc-PP - Use FIA_UID.2 in hierarchical relationships according to Application notes of FIA_UID.1



ltem	ST	РР	Rationale
	FMT_MOF.1	FMT_MOF.1	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FMT_MTD.1	FMT_MTD.1	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FMT_PWD.1(Extended)	FMT_PWD.1(Extended)	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FPT_TST.1	FPT_TST.1	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FPT_ITT.1	FPT_ITT.1	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FPT_PST.1(Extended)	FPT_PST.1(Extended)	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FTA_MCS.2	FTA_MCS.2	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FTA_SSL.5(Extended)	FTA_SSL.5(Extended)	The same as DBEnc-PP
	FTA_TSE.1	FTA_TSE.1	The same as DBEnc-PP



3. Security objectives

The followings are the security objectives handled by technical and procedural method supported from operational environment in order to provide the TOE security functionality accurately.

3.1. Security objectives for the operational environment

Item	Content	
	The place where the TOE components are installed and operated	
OE.PHYSICAL_CONTROL	shall be equipped with access control and protection facilities so	
	that only authorized administrator can access	
	The authorized administrator of the TOE shall be non-malicious	
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN	users, have appropriately trained for the TOE management functions	
	and accurately fulfill the duties in accordance with administrator	
	guidance.	
	The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user	
	identification and authentication function in the operational	
OE.SECURE_DEVELOPMENT	environment of the business system shall ensure that the security	
	functions of the TOE are securely applied in accordance with the	
	requirements of the manual provided with the TOE.	
	The authorized administrator of the TOE shall periodically checks a	
	spare space of audit data storage in case of the audit data loss, and	
OE.LOG_BACKUP	carries out the audit data backup (external log server or separate	
	storage device, etc.) to prevent audit data loss.	
	The authorized administrator of the TOE shall ensure the reliability	
OE.OPERATION_SYSTEM_RE-	and security of the operating system by performing the	
INFORCEMENT	reinforcement on the latest vulnerabilities of the operating system in	
	which the TOE is installed and operated.	
	The TOE accurately records incidents related to security by receiving	
OE.TIMESTAMP	reliable time stamps provided by the TOE operating environment.	
	DBMS that saves the TSF data and audit data is operated in a	
OE.SECURE_DBMS	physically safe environment.	
	All information that is sent when an authorized log administrator	
OE.SECURE_CHANNEL	connect to the Web server through the Web browser shall be	
	protected through a secure channel.	



4. Extended components definition

4.1. Cryptographic support

4.1.1. Random Bit Generation

Family Behaviour	This family defines requirements for the TSF to provide the capability that generates random bits required for TOE cryptographic operation.		
	FCS_RBG Random bit generation 1		
Component leveling	FCS_RBG.1	random bit generation, requires TSF to provide the capability that generates random bits required for TOE cryptographic operation.	
Management	FCS_RBG.1	There are no management activities foreseen.	
Audit	FCS_RBG.1	There are no auditable events foreseen.	

4.1.1.1. FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation

Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
FSC_RBG.1.1	The TSF shall generate random bits required to generate a cryptographic key using the specified random bit generator that meets the following [assignment: <i>list of standards</i>].



4.2. Identification and authentication

4.2.1. TOE Internal mutual authentication

Family Behaviour	This family defines requirements for providing mutual authentication between TOE components in the process of user identification and authentication.		
Component leveling	FIA_IMA TOE Internal mutual authentication 1		
	FIA_IMA.1	TOE Internal mutual authentication requires that the TSF provides mutual authentication function between TOE components in the process of user identification and authentication.	
Management	FIA_IMA.1	There are no management activities foreseen.	
Audit	FIA_IMA.1	The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation family is included in the PP/ST: a) Minimal: Success and failure of mutual authentication b) Minimal: Modification of authentication protocol	

4.2.1.1. FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication

Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
	The TSF shall perform mutual authentication between [assignment: different parts
FIA_IMA.1.1	of TOE] using the [assignment: authentication protocol] that meets the following
	[assignment: <i>list of standards</i>].



4.3. User data protection

4.3.1. User data encryption

Family Behaviour	This family provides requirements to ensure confidentiality of user data.		
Component leveling	FDP_UDE User data encryption 1		
	FDP_UDE.1	User data encryption requires confidentiality of user data.	
Management	FDP_UDE.1	The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: a) Management of user data encryption/decryption rules	
Audit	FDP_UDE.1	The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST: a) Minimal : Success and failure of user data encryption/decryption	

4.3.1.1. FDP_UDE.1 User data encryption

No other components.
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
TSF shall provide TOE users with the ability to encrypt/decrypt user data according to [assignment: <i>the list of encryption/decryption methods</i>] specified.



4.4. Security Management

4.4.1. ID and password

Family Behaviour	This family defines the capability that is required to control ID and password management used in the TOE and set or modifies ID and/or password by authorized users.		
Component leveling		MT_PWD ID and password	
	FMT_PWD.1	ID and password management, requires that the TSF provides the management function of ID and password.	
Management	FMT_PWD.1	The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: a) Management of ID and password configuration rules.	
Audit	FMT_PWD.1	The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST: a) Minimal: All changes of the password.	

4.4.1.1. FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password

Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
Dependencies	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
	The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the password of [assignment: list of
	functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
FMT_PWD.1.1	1. [assignment: password combination rules and/or length]
	2. [assignment: other management such as management of special characters
	unusable for password, etc.]
	The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the ID of [assignment: list of functions]
	to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
FMT_PWD.1.2	1. [assignment: ID combination rules and/or length]
	2. [assignment: other management such as management of special characters
	unusable for ID, etc.]
	The TSF shall provide the capability for [selection, choose one of: setting ID and
FMT_PWD.1.3	password when installing, setting password when installing, changing the ID and



password when the authorized administrator accesses for the first time, changing the password when the authorized administrator accesses for the first time].

4.5. Protection of the TSF

4.5.1. Protection of stored TSF data

Family Behaviour	This family defines rules to protect TSF data stored within containers controlled by the TSF from the unauthorized modification or disclosure.		
Component leveling	FPT_PST Protection of stored TSF data 1		
	FPT_PST.1	Basic protection of stored TSF data requires the protection of TSF data stored in containers controlled by the TSF.	
Management	FTP_PST.1	There are no management activities foreseen.	
Audit	FTP_PST.1	There are no auditable events foreseen.	

4.5.1.1. FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data

Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies.
	The TSF shall protect [assignment: TSF data] stored in containers controlled by the
FPT_PST.1.1	TSF from the unauthorized [selection: disclosure, modification].



4.6. TOE Access

4.6.1. Session locking and termination

	-	efines requirements for the TSF to provide the capability for
Family Behaviour	TSF-initiated and user-initiated locking, unlocking, and termination of interactive sessions.	
Component leveling		Session locking and termination 4 5
	FTA_SSL.5	The management of TSF-initiated sessions provides requirements that the TSF locks or terminates the session after a specified time interval of user inactivity.
Management	FTA_SSL.5	 The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: a) Specification for the time interval of user inactivity that is occurred the session locking and termination for each user b) Specification for the time interval of default user inactivity that is occurred the session locking and termination
Audit	FTA_SSL.5	The following action should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST. a) Minimal: Termination of an interactive session by the user. The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST: a) Minimal: Locking or termination of interactive session



4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions

Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	FIA_UAU.1 authentication
FTA_SSL.5.1	 The TSF shall [selection: <i>lock the session and re-authenticate the user before unlocking the session,</i> <i>terminate</i>] an interactive session after a [assignment: <i>time interval of user inactivity</i>].



5. Security requirements

The security requirements specify security functional requirements and assurance requirements that must be satisfied by the TOE that claims conformance to this ST.

The security functional requirements included in this ST are derived from CC Part 2 and Chapter 4 Extended Components Definition.

5.1. Security functional requirements

Security functional class		Security functional component		
	FAU_ARP.1	Security alarms		
	FAU_GEN.1	Audit data generation		
	FAU_SAA.1	Potential violation analysis		
	FAU_SAR.1	Audit review		
FAU	FAU_SAR.3	Selectable audit review		
	FAU_STG.3	Protected audit trail storage		
	FAU_STG.4(1)	Action in case of possible audit data loss(CubeOne Manager)		
	FAU_STG.4(2)	Action in case of possible audit data loss(CubeOne Security Server)		
	FCS_CKM.1(1)	Cryptographic key generation (User data encryption)		
	FCS_CKM.1(2)	Cryptographic key generation (TSF data encryption)		
	FCS_CKM.2	Cryptographic key distribution		
FCS	FCS_CKM.4	Cryptographic key destruction		
	FCS_COP.1(1)	Cryptographic operation (User data encryption)		
	FCS_COP.1.(2)	Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption)		
	FCS_RBG.1(Extended)	Random bit generation		
	FDP_UDE.1(Extended)	User data encryption		
FDP	FDP_RIP.1	Subset residual information protection		
FIA	FIA_AFL.1	AFL.1 Authentication failure handling		

The TOE that claims conformance to this ST must meet the following 'SFRs'.



Security functional class		Security functional component
	FIA_IMA.1(Extended)	TOE Internal mutual authentication
	FIA_SOS.1	Verification of secrets
	FIA_UAU.2	User authentication before any action
	FIA_UAU.4	Single-use authentication mechanisms
	FIA_UAU.7	Protected authentication feedback
	FIA_UID.2	User identification before any action
	FMT_MOF.1	Management of security functions Behaviour
	FMT_MTD.1	Management of TSF data
FMT	FMT_PWD.1(Extended)	Management of ID and password
	FMT_SMF.1	Specification of management functions
	FMT_SMR.1	Security roles
	FPT_ITT.1	Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT	FTP_PST.1(Extended)	Basic protection of stored TSF data
	FTP_TST.1	TSF testing
FTA	FTA_MCS.2	Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
	FTA_SSL.5(1)(Extended)	Management of TSF-initiated sessions(CubeOne Manager)
	FTA_SSL.5(2)(Extended)	Management of TSF-initiated sessions(CubeOne Security Server)
	FTA_TSE.1	TOE session establishment

Table 5. Summary of Security functional requirements

5.1.1. Security audit (FAU)

5.1.1.1. FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms

Hierarchical to	No other components.		
Dependencies	FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis		
FAU_ARP.1.1	The TSF shall take [Expose warning screen in real-time Security Server, No.		
FAU_AKP.1.1	Manager as Popup] upon detection of a potential security violation		



5.1.1.2. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

Hierarchical to	No other components		
Dependencies	FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps		
	The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:		
	a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;		
FAU_GEN.1.1	b) All auditable events for the <i>not specified level</i> of audit; and		
	c) [Refer to the "auditable events" in [Table 6], <i>no other components</i>].		
	The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:		
	a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the		
	outcome (success or failure) of the event; and		
FAU_GEN.1.2	b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the		
	functional components included in the PP/ST [Refer to the contents of "Additional		
	audit record" in [Table 6], <u>no other components</u>].		

Security functional component	Auditable event	Additional audit record
FAU_ARP.1	Actions taken due to potential security violations	
FAU_SAA.1	Enabling and disabling of any of the analysis mechanisms, Automated responses performed by the tool	
FAU_STG.3	Actions taken due to exceeding of a threshold	
FAU_STG.4(1)	Actions taken due to the audit starage failure	
FAU_STG.4(2)	Actions taken due to the audit storage failure	
FCS_CKM.1(1)	Success and failure of the activity	
FCS_CKM.1(2)	Success and failure of the activity	
FCS_CKM.2	Success and failure of the activity (only applying to distribution of key related to user data encryption/decryption)	
FCS_CKM.4	Success and failure of the activity (only applying to destruction of key related to user data encryption/decryption)	
FCS_COP.1(1)	Success and failure of the activity	
FCS_COP.1(2)	Success and failure of the activity	
FDP_UDE.1(Extended)	Success and failure of user data	



Security functional component	Auditable event	
	encryption/decryption	
FIA_AFL.1	The reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts and the actions taken, and the subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal state	
FIA_IMA.1(Extended)	Success and failure of mutual authentication Modify of authentication protocol	
FIA_UAU.2	All use of the authentication mechanism	
FIA_UAU.4	Attempts to reuse authentication data	
FIA_UID.2	All use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided	
FMT_MOF.1	All modifications in the Behaviour of the functions in the TSF	
FMT_MTD.1	All modifications to the values of TSF data	Modified values of TSF data
FMT_PWD.1(Extended)	All changes of the password	
FMT_SMF.1	Use of the management functions	
FMT_SMR.1	Modifications to the user group of rules divided	
FPT_TST.1	Execution of the TSF self-tests and the results of the tests	Modified TSF data or execution code in case of integrity violation
FTA_MCS.2 Denial of a new session based on the limitation of multiple concurrent sessions		
FTA_SSL.5(1)(Extended) FTA_SSL.5(2)(Extended)	Locking or termination of interactive session	
Denial of a session establishment due to the sessionFTA_TSE.1establishmentmechanismAllattemptsatestablishment of a user session		

Table 6. Auditable event



5.1.1.3. FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis

Hierarchical to	No other components.		
Dependencies	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation		
FAU_SAA.1.1	The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the audited events and based upon these rules indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs.		
FAU_SAA.1.2	 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited events: a) Accumulation or combination of [authentication failure audit event among auditable events of FIA_UAU.1, integrity violation audit event and selftest failure event of validated cryptographic module among auditable events of FPT_TST.1, [audit event for response Behaviour when threshold is exceeded among the auditable events of FAU_STG.3, audit event for response actions if audit arrest fails among the auditable event of FAU_STG.4.]] known to indicate a potential security violation b) [no other rules] 		

5.1.1.4. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

Hierarchical to	No other components.	
Dependencies	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation	
FAU_SAR.1.1	The TSF shall provide [authorized log administrator] with the capability to read [All	
FAU_SAR.I.I	the audit data] from the audit records.	
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the authorize		
FAU_SAR.1.2	administrator to interpret the information.	

5.1.1.5. FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review

Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1	The TSF shall provide the capability to apply [Table 7. Selectable audit review
FAU_SAR.S.T	methods] of audit data based on [criteria with following logical relations].

ltem	Selection/ordering	dering Logical relation	
Manager	query	AND of the entire period with one of the items below	



Item	Selection/ordering		Logical relation
			Total, Server, Database Name, Workgroup, In Workgroup, Item
		query	AND of the entered value among the items below
	Service		- server name, date(start~end), level (inform, warning, critical,
	error		fatal)
	enor	ordering	ascending/ descending order based on one of the items below
			- no., date, server name, server type, detail description, level
	Detection of massive decryption	query	AND of the entered value among the items below
Socurity			- server name, date(start~end), level (warning, critical, fatal)
Security Server		ordering	ascending/ descending order based on one of the items below
			- no., date, server name CubeOne type, username, table,
			decryption/encryption count, IP, program name, level
		query	AND of the entered value among the items below
	Audit log		- server name, date(start~end), level (success, fail)
		g ordering	ascending/ descending order based on one of the items below
			- no., date, server name CubeOne type, username, table, column,
			sql statement, item, IP, program name, detail of audit

Table 7. Selectable audit review methods

5.1.1.6. FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss

Hierarchical to	No other components.		
Dependencies	FAU_GEN.1 Protected audit trail storage		
FAU_STG.3.1	The TSF shall [Notification to the authorized administrator, [a pop-up warning is		
	provided to authorized policy administrator and a warning screen is displayed to		
	authorized log administrator.]] if the audit trail exceeds [when reached threshold		
	(80%) of audit storage].		

5.1.1.7. FAU_STG.4 (1) Prevention of audit data loss

Hierarchical to	FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss		
Dependencies	FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage		
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall <u>ignore audited events</u> and [send pop-up message to authors			
FA0_310.4.1	policy administrator] if the audit trail is full		

* Application notes: This requirement applies to audit data loss of CubeOne Manager.



5.1.1.8. FAU_STG.4 (2) Prevention of audit data loss

Hierarchical to	FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss		
Dependencies	AU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage		
The TSF shall overwrite the oldest stored audit records and [show alert s			
FAU_STG.4.1	CubeOne Security Server] if the audit trail is full		

* Application notes: This requirement applies to audit data loss of CubeOne Security Server.

5.1.2. Cryptographic support (FCS)

The encryption algorithms supported by the TOE are as follows, supports only the approved cryptographic algorithm.

ltem	Approved algorithm	Detail	Standard criteria
	ARIA	Operation mode: CBC, CFB-128, OFB	KS X 1213-1
Plack ciphor	ARIA	Key Length: 128/192/256 bit	KS X 1213-2
Block cipher	SEED	Operation mode: CBC, CFB-128, OFB	TTAS.KO-12.0004/R1
	SEED	Key Length: 128 bit	TTAS.KO-12.0025
	SHA-224		
Hash function	SHA-256		ISO/IEC 10118-3
	SHA-384		ISO/IEC TOTTO-S
	SHA-512		
Random number generator	HASH_DRBG	Hash: SHA-256	TTAK.KO-12.0331
		n : 2048bit	
Public key cipher	RSAES	e: 65537	ISO/IEC 18033-2
		Hash: SHA-256	
Digital		n : 2048bit	
Digital	RSA-PSS	e: 65537	ISO/IEC 14888-2
signatures		Hash: SHA-256	
MAC	HMAC	Hash:SHA-256	ISO/IEC 9797-2

Table 8. Approved Cryptographic Algorithm

5.1.2.1. FCS_CKM.1 (1) Cryptographic key generation (User data encryption)

Hierarchical to No other components



	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or			
Dependencies	FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]			
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction			
FCS_CKM.1.1	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified			
	cryptographic key generation algorithm [Random number generator standard			
	(TTAK.KO-12.0331) of "Table 8. appoved Cryptographic Algorithm"] and specified			
	cryptographic key sizes [HASH_DRBG of "Table 8. appoved Cryptographic			
	Algorithm"] that meet the following: [128, 192, 256 bit].			

5.1.2.2. FCS_CKM.1 (2) Cryptographic key generation (TSF data encryption)

Hierarchical to	No other components.		
	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or		
Dependencies FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]			
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction		
	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified		
	cryptographic key generation algorithm [Key generation algorithm of "Table 9.		
FSC_CKM.1.1 Cryptographic key generation"] and specified cryptographic key sizes [key			
	of "Table 9. Cryptographic key generation"] that meet the following: [standard of		
	"Table 9. Cryptographic key generation"]		

ltem		Standard	Key generation algorithm	Key length	Key Description
Mutual authentication among TOE's	private key, public key	ISO/IEC 18033-2	RSAES(SHA-256)	2048bit	Asymmetric key to encrypt mutual authentication data
components	private key, public key	ISO/IEC 14888-2	RSA-PSS(SHA- 256)	2048bit	Asymmetric key pair for digital signature
Basic protection of internally transmitted TSF data	session Key	TTAK.KO- 12.0331	HASH_DRBG(SHA- 256)	128bit	Session key using session information as a key to encrypt internal transmission data
Basic protection of stored TSF data	Drived Key(DK)	TTAK.KO- 12.0334	Password Based Key Derivation Functions, HMAC-	256bit	Generating a derivation key to be used as the key of KEK through user



Iten	ı	Standard	Key generation algorithm	Key length	Key Description
			SHA-2		input
	Master	TTAK.KO-	HASH_DRBG(SHA-	256bit	Generating a KEK to
	Key(KEK)	12.0331	256)	230010	encrypt DEK
	Secondary	TTAK.KO-	HASH_DRBG(SHA-	256bit	Generating a DEK to
	Key(DEK)	12.0331	256)	230011	encrypt TSF data

Table 9. Cryptographic key generation

5.1.2.3. FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution

Hierarchical to	No other components.		
	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or		
Demondencies	FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or		
Dependencies	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]		
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction		
	The TSF shall destruct cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified		
FCS_CKM.2.1	cryptographic key destruction method [Distribution method of "Table 10.		
	Cryptographic key distribution"] that meets the following [standard of "Table 10.		
	Cryptographic key distribution"]		

ltem	Standard	Approved algorithm	Distribution method	
Key distribution for the user	KS X 1213-1 KS X 1213-2	ARIA- 256(CBC)	block cipher (ARIA) and hash function (SHA256) provided by	
data encryption	ISO/IEC 10118-3	SHA256	validated cryptographic module.	
Kan distribution for the	KS X 1213-1	ARIA-	hlad sicker (ADIA), hash fursting	
Key distribution for the	KS X 1213-2	128(CBC)	block cipher (ARIA), hash function	
basic protection of internally transmitted TSF	ISO/IEC 10118-3	SHA256	(SHA256) and public key encryption(RSAES) provided by	
data	ISO/IEC 18033-2	RSAES(2048)	validated cryptographic module	

Table 10. Cryptographic key distribution



5.1.2.4. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

Hierarchical to	No other components		
	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or		
Dependencies	FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or		
	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]		
	The TSF shall destruct cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified		
FCS_CKM.4.1	cryptographic key destruction method [Free memory after overwrite the memory		
	area to '0' 3 times] that meets the following: [no other standard].		

5.1.2.5. FCS_COP.1 (1) Cryptographic operation (User data encryption)

Hierarchical to	No other components.
	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
Dependencies	FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
Dependencies	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1	The TSF shall perform the [user data encryption/decryption] in accordance with a
	specified cryptographic algorithm [ARIA, SEED, and SHA-256/384/512 of "Table 8.
	Approved Cryptographic Algorithm"] and cryptographic key sizes [key length
	(ARIA 128/192/256, SEED 128) of "Table 8. Approved Cryptographic Algorithm"]
	that meet the following: [block cipher and hash function of "Table 8. Approved
	Cryptographic Algorithm"].

5.1.2.6. FCS_COP.1 (2) Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption)

Hierarchical to	No other components.		
	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or		
	FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or		
Dependencies	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]		
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction		
FCS_COP.1.1Cryptographic operation"] in accord [algorithm of "Table 11. TSF data Cryptographic operation"]	The TSF shall perform [Cryptographic operations of "Table 11. TSF data		
	Cryptographic operation"] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm		
	[algorithm of "Table 11. TSF data Cryptographic operation"] and cryptographic key		
	sizes [key length of "Table 11. TSF data Cryptographic operation"] that meet the		



following: [standard of "Table 11. TSF data Cryptographic operation"]

Cryptographic operation	Standard	Algorithm	Key length
Mutual authentication among the TOE	ISO/IEC 18033-2	RSAES(SHA-256)	2048bit
components	ISO/IEC 14888-2	RSA-PSS(SHA-256)	2048bit
Designments then of the intermelly	KS X 1213-1	ARIA CBC 모드	128bit
Basic protection of the internally	KS X 1213-2		
transmitted TSF data	ISO/IEC 10118-3	SHA-256	-
	KS X 1213-1	ARIA CBC 모드	256bit
Basic protection of the stored TSF data	KS X 1213-2		25001
	ISO/IEC 10118-3	SHA-256	-

Table 11. TSF data Cryptographic operation

5.1.2.7. FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation (Extended)

Hierarchical to	No other components.	
Dependencies	No dependencies.	
FCS_RBG.1.1	The TSF shall generate random bits required to generate a cryptographic key using the specified random bit generator that meets [TTAK.KO-12.0331]	

5.1.3. User data protection (FDP)

5.1.3.1. FDP_UDE.1 User data encryption

Hierarchical to	No other components.	
Dependencies	FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation	
	The TSF shall provide a function that can encrypt/decrypt the user data to the	
FDP_UDE.1.1	TOE user according to the specified [encryption/decryption method by column,	
	[no method]].	

5.1.3.2. FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection

Hierarchical to	No other components.
-----------------	----------------------



Dependencies	No dependencies.
	The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
FDP_RIP.1.1	unavailable upon the <i>allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource</i>
	from the following objects: [user data].

5.1.4. Identification and authentication (FIA)

5.1.4.1. FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to	No other components.	
Dependencies	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication	
	The TSF shall detect when [5] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related	
FIA_AFL.1.1	to [administrator authentication]	
	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met,	
FIA_AFL.1.2	the TSF shall [perform identificationm and authentication function inactivation	
	during 5 minute].	

5.1.4.2. FIA_IMA.1 Internal mutual authentication (Extended)

Hierarchical to	No other components.	
Dependencies	No dependencies.	
FIA_IMA.1.1	The TSF shall perform mutual authentication using [using the public key cipher	
	and digital signatures of validated cryptographic module] in accordance with [no	
	standard] between [CubeOne Manager \leftrightarrow CubeOne Server, CubeOne Server \leftrightarrow	
	CubeOne Security Server, CubeOne Manager ↔ CubeOne Security Server]	

5.1.4.3. FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets

Hierarchical to	No other components.	
Dependencies	No dependencies	
FIA_SOS.1.1	The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [as follows]. [a) Length: min. 9 ~ max. 30 b) English letter, special , number char c) Combination rules	



- Must contain at least one English letter, special, number character

5.1.4.4. FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action

Hierarchical to	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication	
Dependencies	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	
FIA_UAU.2.1	The TSF shall require each authorized administrator to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that	
	authorized administrator.	

5.1.4.5. FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms

Hierarchical to	No other components.	
Dependencies	No dependencies	
FIA_UAU.4.1	The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [authentication mechanisms of "Table 12. Single-use authentication mechanisms"].	

Item	authentication mechanisms
Policy administrator password authentication	Ensure that random number is unique for each session
Log administrator password authentication	Ensure that session ID is unique for each session

Table 12. Single-use authentication mechanisms

5.1.4.6. FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback

Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1	The TSF shall provide only [feedback as following] to the user while the authentication is in progress. [a) Passwords entered are masked so that they cannot be seen on the screen ("●") Password for administrator registration, password entered for policy/log



administrator authentication
b) If the identification is fail, do not provide a reason for their failure.
]

5.1.4.7. FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action

Hierarchical to	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Dependencies	No dependencies
	The TSF shall require each authorized administrator to be successfully identified
FIA_UID.2.1 before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that au	
	administrator.

5.1.5. Security management (FMT)

5.1.5.1. FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions Behaviour

Hierarchical to	No other components.		
Dependencies	No dependencies		
	The TSF shall restrict the ability to <i>conduct management actions of</i> the		
FMT_MOF.1.1	functions ["Table 13. List and Action of security functions"] to [authorized		
	policy administrator and authorized log administrator].		

Authorized	Coqueity function		Ac	tion	
Administrator	Security function	decision	stop	start	change
	Identification and Authentication	0	Х	Х	Х
	Integrity verification	0	Х	Х	Х
Authorized policy	User encryption policy	0	0	0	Х
administrator	Item distribution	0	Х	0	Х
	Audit data review	0	Х	Х	Х
	Password policy	0	Х	Х	Х
	Audit data review	0	Х	Х	Х
Authorized log administrator	Administrator connection IP	0	Х	Х	Х
	Password policy	0	Х	Х	Х

Table 13. List and Action of security functions



5.1.5.2. FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

Hierarchical to	No other components.			
Dependencies	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions			
Dependencies	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles			
	The TSF shall restrict the ability to <i>manage</i> ["Table 14. TSF Data list and			
FMT_MTD.1.1	management ability"] to [authorized policy administrator and authorized log			
	administrator].			

(*Reg.: Registration)

Authorized	TCT data						
Administrator	TSF data	Query	Change	*Reg.	Delete		
	Audit Data	0	Х	Х	Х		
	Administrator password	Х	0	0	Х		
Authorized policy	CubeOne Server information	0	0	0	0		
administrator	CubeOne operation type	0	Х	0	0		
	Group information of cryptographic policy	0	0	0	0		
	ITEM information for encryption	0	Х	0	0		
	Audit Data	0	Х	Х	Х		
Authorized log administrator	Administrator connection IP	0	0	0	Х		
	Administrator password	Х	0	0	Х		

Table 14. TSF Data list and management ability

5.1.5.3. FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password (Extended)

Hierarchical to	No other components.		
Demondencies	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions		
Dependencies FMT_SMR.1 Security roles			
	The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the password of [no function] to		
FMT_PWD.1.1 [nobody].			
FMT_PWD.1.2	The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the ID of [nobody] to [no function].		
FMT_PWD.1.3	The TSF shall provide the capability for <i>setting password when installing</i> .		



5.1.5.4. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [a) security functions lists defined in FMT_MOF.1 b) TSF data management lists defined in FMT_MTD.1 c) ID and password management lists defined in FMT_PWD.1]

5.1.5.5. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1	The TSF shall maintain the roles [a) authorized policy administrator b) authorized log administrator].
FMT_SMR.1.2	TSF shall be able to associate users and their roles defined in FMT_SMR.1.1.

5.1.6. Protection of the TSF (FPT)

5.1.6.1. FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection

Hierarchical to	No other components.
Dependencies	No dependencies
	The TSF shall protect the TSF data from <i>disclosure, modification</i> by verifying
FPT_ITT.1.1	encryption and message integrity when the TSF data is transmitted among
	TOE's separated parts.

5.1.6.2. FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data (Extended)

Hierarchical to	No other components.
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Dependencies	No dependencies		
FPT_PST.1.1	The TSF shall protect [following TSF data] stored in containers controlled by the TSF from the unauthorized <u>disclosure, modification</u> . [a) administrator ID/password b) cryptographic key (symmetric key, public key, DEK) c) TOE setting value (security policy, environment setting parameters) d) critical security parameters e) audit data f) user information(DBMS)]		

5.1.6.3. FPT_TST.1 TSF testing

Hierarchical to	No other components.		
Dependencies	No dependencies		
ETD TCT 1 1	The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests <i>during initial start-up, periodically during</i>		
FTP_TST.1.1	normal operation to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.		
FTP_TST.1.2	The TSF shall provide authorized administrators with the capability to verify the		
	integrity of <u>TSF data</u> .		
FTP_TST.1.3	The TSF shall provide authorized administrators with the capability to verify the		
	integrity of <u>TSF</u> .		

5.1.7. TOE access (FTA)

5.1.7.1. FTA_MCS.2 Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent sessions

Hierarchical to	FTA_MCS.1 Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions		
Dependencies	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification		
	The TSF shall restrict the maximum number of concurrent sessions [belonging to		
the same administrator according to the rules for the list of			
	functions defined in FMT_SMF1.1]		
FTA_MCS.2.1	a) Limit the maximum number of concurrent sessions to 1 for management		
	access by the same administrator who has the right to perform FMT_MOF.1.1		
	"Management actions" and FMT_MTD.1.1 "Management."		
	b) limit the maximum number of concurrent sessions to {1} for management		



	access by the same administrator who doesn't have the right to perform			
	FMT_MOF.1.1 "Management actions" but has the right to perform a query in			
	FMT_MTD.1.1 "Management" only			
	c) [no rule].			
FTA_MCS.2.2	The TSF shall enforce a limit of [1] session per administrator by default.			

5.1.7.2. FTA_SSL.5(1) Management of TSF-initiated sessions (Extended)

Hierarchical to	No other components.		
Dependencies	FIA_UAU.1 authentication or No dependencies.		
FTA_SSL.5.1	The TSF shall <i>lock the session and/or re-authenticate the policy administrator before unlocking the session</i> the administrator's interactive session after a [10		
FTA_33E.3.1	minutes of the policy administrator inactivity].		

* Application note: This requirement applies to session management by TSF for CubeOne Manager.

5.1.7.3. FTA_SSL.5(2) Management of TSF-initiated sessions (Extended)

Hierarchical to	No other components.	
Dependencies	IA_UAU.1 authentication or No dependencies.	
	The TSF shall <i>terminate</i> the administrator's interactive session after a [10 minutes	
FTA_SSL.5.1	of the log administrator inactivity].	

* Application note: This requirement applies to session management by TSF for CubeOne Security Server.

5.1.7.4. FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment

Hierarchical to	No other components.		
Dependencies	No dependencies		
FTA_TSE.1.1	The TSF shall be able to refuse the management access session of the		
FIA_ISE.I.I	policy/log administrator, based on [Access IP, <u>None</u>].		



5.2. Security assurance requirements

Assurance requirements of this ST are comprised of assurance components in CC part 3, and the evaluation assurance level is EAL1+. The following table summarizes assurance components.

Security assurance Item		Security assurance component
	ASE_INT.1	ST introduction
	ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims
Convrite Torget evaluation	ASE_OBJ.1	Security objectives for the operational environment
Security Target evaluation	ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition
	ASE_REQ.1	Stated security requirements
	ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification
Development	ADV_FSP.1	Basic functional specification
	AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance
Guidance documents	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures
Life and a surge at	ALC_CMC.1	Labelling of the TOE
Life-cycle support	ALC_CMS.1	TOE CM coverage
T t	ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing
Tests	ATE_IND.1	Independent testing - conformance
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1	Vulnerability survey

Table 15. Security assurance requirements



5.2.1. Security Target evaluation

5.2.1.1. ASE_INT.1 ST introduction

	ASE_INT.1	ST introduction		
Dependencies	ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition		
	ASE_REQ.1	Stated security requirements		
Developer	ASE_CCL.1.1D	The developer shall provide a conformance claim.		
action	ASE_CCL.1.2D	The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.		
	ASE_CCL.1.1C	The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies the version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim conformance.		
	ASE_CCL.1.2C	The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.		
	ASE_CCL.1.3C	The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.		
	ASE_CCL.1.4C	The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended components definition		
Content and	ASE_CCL.1.5C	The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement packages to which the ST claims conformance.		
presentation	ASE_CCL.1.6C	The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a package as either package-conformant or package-augmented.		
	ASE_CCL.1.7C	The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.		
	ASE_CCL.1.8C	The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of the security problem definition is consistent with the statement of the security problem definition in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.		
	ASE_CCL.1.9C	The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of security objectives is consistent with the statement of security objectives in the PPs for which conformance is being		



		claimed.		
	ASE_CCL.1.10C	The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the		
		statement of security requirements is consistent with the statement		
		of security requirements in the PPs for which conformance is being		
		claimed		
Evaluator	ASE_CCL.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all		
action		requirements for content and presentation of evidence.		

5.2.1.2. ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment

Dependencies	No dependencies.		
Developer	ASE_OBJ.1.1D	The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.	
action	A3L_ODJ.1.1D	The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.	
Content and	ASE_OBJ.1.1C	The statement of security objectives shall describe the security	
presentation		objectives for the operational environment.	
Evaluator	ASE_OBJ.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all	
action		requirements for content and presentation of evidence.	

5.2.1.3. ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition

Dependencies	No dependencies.		
Developer	ASE_ECD.1.1D	The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.	
action	ASE_ECD.1.2D	The developer shall provide an extended components definition	
	ASE_ECD.1.1C	The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security requirements.	
	ASE_ECD.1.2C	The extended components definition shall define an extended component for each extended security requirement.	
Content and presentation	ASE_ECD.1.3C	The extended components definition shall describe how each extended component is related to the existing CC components, families, and classes.	
	ASE_ECD.1.4C	The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components, families, classes, and methodology as a model for presentation.	
	ASE_ECD.1.5C	The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective elements such that conformance or nonconformance to	



		these elements can be demonstrated.
	ASE_ECD.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
Evaluator		requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
action	ASE_ECD.1.2E	The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be
		clearly expressed using existing components.

5.2.1.4. ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements

Dependencies	ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition
Developer	ASE_REQ.1.1D	The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements
action	ASE_REQ.1.2D	The developer shall provide security requirements rationale.
	ASE_REQ.1.1C	The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the SARs.
	ASE_REQ.1.2C	All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and other terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.
Content and	ASE_REQ.1.3C	The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the security requirements.
presentation	n ASE_REQ.1.4C ASE_REQ.1.5C	All operations shall be performed correctly.
		Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or the security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.
	ASE_REQ.1.6C	The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
Evaluator	ASE_REQ.1.1.E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
action		requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

5.2.1.5. ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification

	ASE_INT.1	ST introduction
Dependencies	ASE_REQ.1	Stated security requirements
	ADV_FSP.1	Basic functional specification
Developer action	ASE_TSS.1.1D	The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification



Content and		The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets
presentation	ASE_TSS.1.1C	each SFR.
	ASE_TSS.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
Evaluator		requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
action	ASE_TSS.1.2E	The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is
		consistent with the TOE overview and the TOE description.

5.2.2. Development

5.2.2.1. ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification

Dependencies	No dependenci	No dependencies.	
Developer	ADV_FSP.1.1D	The developer shall provide a functional specification.	
action	ADV_FSP.1.2D	The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.	
	ADV_FSP.1.1C	The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method	
		of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.	
	ADV_FSP.1.2C	The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated	
Content and presentation		with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.	
	ADV_FSP.1.3C	The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit	
		categorization of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.	
	ADV_FSP.1.4C	The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the	
		functional specification.	
	EvaluatorADV_FSP.1.1EactionADV_FSP.1.2E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all	
Evaluator		requirements for content and presentation of evidence.	
action		The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an	
		accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.	

5.2.3. Guidance documents

5.2.3.1. AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance

Dependencies	ADV_FSP.1	Basic functional specification
Developer action	AGD_OPE.1.1D	The developer shall provide operational user guidance
Content and	AGD_OPE.1.1C	The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role,



presentation		the user-accessible functions and privileges that should be
		controlled in a secure processing environment, including
		appropriate warnings
		The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role,
	AGD_OPE.1.2C	how to use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a
		secure manner.
		The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role,
		the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security
	AGD_OPE.1.3C	parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values
		as appropriate.
		The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly
		present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-
	AGD_OPE.1.4C	accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing
		the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
		The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of
		operation of the TOE (including operation following failure or
	AGD_OPE.1.5C	operational error), their consequences and implications for
		maintaining secure operation.
		The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe
	AGD_OPE.1.6C	the security measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security
		objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
	AGD_OPE.1.7C	The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
Evaluator	AGD_OPE.1.7E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
action		requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

5.2.3.2. AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures

Dependencies	No dependencies.	
Developer		The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative
action	AGD_PRE.1.1D	procedures.
		The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary
Contont and	AGD_PRE.1.1C AGD_PRE.1.2C	for secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the
Content and		developer's delivery procedures.
presentation		The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary
		for secure installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of



		the operational environment in accordance with the security
		objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
	EvaluatorAGD_PRE.1.1EactionAGD_PRE.1.2E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
Evaluator		requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
action		The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm
		that the TOE can be prepared securely for operation.

5.2.4. Life-cycle support

5.2.4.1. ALC_CMC.1 TOE Leveling of the TOE

Dependencies	ALC_CMS.1	TOE CM coverage
Developer		The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
action	ALC_CINC.I.ID	The developer shall provide the role and a relevence for the role.
Content and		The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
presentation	ALC_CIVIC.1.1C	The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
Evaluator	ALC_CMC.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meet
action	ALC_CIVIC.1.1E	requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

5.2.4.2. ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage

Dependencies	No dependencies.	
Developer action	ALC_CMS.1.1D	The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
Content and	ALC_CMS1.1C	The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs.
presentation	ALC_CMS1.2C	The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
Evaluator action	ALC_CMS1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.



5.2.5. Tests

5.2.5.1. ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing

Dependencies	ATE_COV.1	Evidence of coverage
Developer	ATE_FUN.1.1D	The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
action	ATE_FUN.1.2D	The developer shall provide test documentation.
	ATE_FUN.1.1C	The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test
	ATE_FON.T.TC	results and actual test results.
	ATE_FUN.1.2C	The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe
Content and		the scenarios for performing each test. These scenarios shall
Content and presentation		include any ordering dependencies on the results of other tests.
	ATE_FUN.1.3C	The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a
		successful execution of the tests.
	ATE_FUN.1.4C	The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test
		results.
Evaluator	ATE_FUN.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
action		requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

5.2.5.2. ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance

	ADV_FSP.1	Basic functional specification	
Dependencies	AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance	
	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures	
Developer	ATE_IND.1.1D	The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.	
action		the developer shall provide the TOE for testing.	
Content and	ATE IND.1.1C	The TOE shall be suitable for testing	
presentation	ME_MD.I.IC		
	ATE_IND.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all	
Evaluator	ATL_IND.T.TL	requirements for content and presentation of evidence.	
action	ATE IND.1.2E	The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF	
	ATE_IND.1.2E	operates as specified.	



5.2.6. Vulnerability assessment

5.2.6.1. AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey

	ADV_FSP.1	Basic functional specification	
Dependencies	AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance	
	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures	
Developer AVA_VAN.1.1D		The developer shall provide the TOE for testing	
action		The developer shall provide the TOL for testing	
Content and	AVA_VAN.1.1C	The TOE shall be suitable for testing	
presentation			
	AVA_VAN.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all	
		requirements for content and presentation of evidence.	
	AVA_VAN.1.2E	The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to	
Evaluator		identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.	
action	AVA_VAN.1.3E	The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the	
		identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is	
		resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic	
		attack potential.	



5.3. Security requirements rationale

5.3.1. Dependency rationale of security functional requirements

The following table shows dependency of security functional requirements

No	Security functional requirements	Dependency	Reference No.
1	FAU_ARP.1	FAU_SAA.1	3
2	FAU_GEN.1	FPT_STM.1	Rationale (1)
3	FAU_SAA.1	FAU_GEN.1	2
4	FAU_SAR.1	FAU_GEN.1	2
5	FAU_SAR.3	FAU_SAR.1	4
6	FAU_STG.3	FAU_STG.1	Rationale (2)
7	FAU_STG.4(1)	FAU_STG.1	Rationale (2)
8	FAU_STG.4(2)	FAU_STG.1	Rationale (2)
		[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1]	11, 13
9	FCS_CKM.1(1)	FCS_CKM.4	12
10	FCS_CKM.1(2)	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1]	11, 14
		FCS_CKM.4	12
11	FCS_CKM.2	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	9, 10
		FCS_CKM.4	12
12	FCS_CKM.4	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	9, 10
13	FCS_COP.1(1)	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	9
15		FCS_CKM.4	12
14	FCS_COP.1(2)	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	10
14		FCS_CKM.4	12
15	FCS_RBG.1	-	-
16	FDP_UDE.1	FCS_COP.1	13
17	FDP_RIP.1	-	-
18	FIA_AFL.1	FIA_UAU.1	21
19	FIA_IMA.1	-	-



No	Security functional requirements	Dependency	Reference No.
20	FIA_SOS.1	-	-
21	FIA_UAU.2	FIA_UID.1	24
22	FIA_UAU.4	-	-
23	FIA_UAU.7	FIA_UAU.1	21
24	FIA_UID.2	-	-
25	FMT_MOF.1	FMT_SMF.1	28
		FMT_SMR.1	29
26	FMT_MTD.1	FMT_SMF.1	28
26		FMT_SMR.1	29
27	FMT_PWD.1	FMT_SMF.1	28
27		FMT_SMR.1	29
28	FMT_SMF.1	-	-
29	FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1	24
30	FPT_ITT.1	-	-
31	FPT_PST.1	-	-
32	FPT_TST.1	-	-
33	FTA_MCS.2	FIA_UID.1	24
34	FTA_SSL.5(1)	FIA_UAU.1	21
35	FTA_SSL.5(2)	FIA_UAU.1	21
36	FTA_TSE.1	-	-

Table 16. Rationale for the dependency of the security functional requirements

- Rationale (1): FAU_GEN.1 has the dependency on FAU_STG.1. However, This ST satisfies the dependent relationship by using the reliable time stamp provided by the OE.TIMESTAMP for security purposes of operation environment.
- Rationale (2): FAU_STG.3 and FAU_STG.4 have the dependency on FAU_STG.1. However, This ST satisfies the dependent relationship by using the trusted audit storage provided by the OE. SECURE_DBMS for security purposes of operation environment. In addition, the policy manager (CubeOne Manager) is supported in the operating environment through OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN to satisfy FAU_STG.1.



- FIA_AFL.1 and FIA_UAU.7 have the dependency on FIA_UAU.1. However FIA_UAU.2 satisfies in hierarchical relationships with FIA_UAU.1
- FIA_UAU.2, FMT_SMR.1 and FTA_MCS.2 have the dependency on FIA_UID.1. However FIA_UID.2 satisfies in hierarchical relationships with FIA_UID.1

5.3.2. Dependency rationale of security assurance requirements

The dependency of EAL1 assurance package provided in the CC is already satisfied, the rationale is omitted.

The augmented SAR ATE_FUN.1 has dependency on ATE_COV.1. But ATE_FUN.1 is augmented to require developer testing in order to check if the developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation, ATE_COV.1 is not included in this ST since it is not necessarily required to show the correspondence between the tests and the TSFIs.



6. TOE summary specification

This chapter represents the overview of security function required by TOE.

6.1. Security audit (FAU)

TOE uses the reliable timestamp provided by the TOE operating environment at the time of the event to ensure that audit data are generated sequentially during the generation of audit data. TOE sends all logs that occur during operation to the CubeOne Security Server for storing audit data. CubeOne Security Server stores the received logs in the DBMS (MySQL) and can review audit data through CubeOne Security Server.

6.1.1. Potential security violation and security alert

Security function component	Event of potential security violations					
FAU_UAU.2	Authentication failure audit event					
FPT_TST.1	Integrity violation audit event and self-tests failure event of validated cryptographic module among auditable events					
FAU_STG.3	Audit event of actions taken due to exceeding of a threshold					
FAU_STG.4(1) FAU_STG.4(2)	Audit event of actions taken due to the audit storage failure					

The TOE can detect potential security violations like Table 17.

Table 17. Potential security violations audit event

TOE generates audit data on such potential violation events, exposes the warning screen to the CubeOne Security Server, and notifies the user with a pop-up of the CubeOne Manager.

Satisfied security function component				
FAU_SAA.1, FAU_ARP.1				

6.1.2. Audit data generation

The TOE component generates an audit data of the events to be audited as defined in "Events to be audited" below. The policy manager can check the audit data generated in CubeOne Manager by



accessing CubeOne Manager, or the log manager can check the audit data generated in CubeOne Manager by accessing the web browser of CubeOne Security Server.

All audit data generated by the TOE are stored in the storage of CubeOne Security Server. The audit data can be checked through the log administrator.

Security functional component	Auditable event	Additional audit record			
FAU_ARP.1	Actions taken due to potential security violations				
FAU_SAA.1	Enabling and disabling of any of the analysis				
FAU_STG.3	Actions taken due to exceeding of a threshold				
FAU_STG.4(1) FAU_STG.4(2)	Actions taken due to the audit storage failure				
FCS_CKM.1(1) FCS_CKM.1(2)	Success and failure of the activity				
FCS_CKM.2	Success and failure of the activity (only applying to distribution of key related to user data encryption/decryption)				
FCS_CKM.4	Success and failure of the activity (only applying to destruction of key related to user data encryption/decryption)				
FCS_COP.1(1) FCS_COP.1(2) Success and failure of the activity					
FDP_UDE.1(Extended)	Success and failure of user data encryption/decryption				
FIA_AFL.1	The reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts and the actions taken, and the subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal state				
FIA_IMA.1(Extended)	Success and failure of mutual authentication Modify of authentication protocol				
FIA_UAU.2	All use of the authentication mechanism				
FIA_UAU.4	Attempts to reuse authentication data				
FIA_UID.2	All use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided				



Security functional component	Auditable event	Additional audit record
FMT_MOF.1	All modifications in the Behaviour of the functions in the TSF	
FMT_MTD.1	All modifications to the values of TSF data	Modified values of TSF data
FMT_PWD.1(Extended)	All changes of the password	
FMT_SMF.1	Use of the management functions	
FMT_SMR.1	Modifications to the user group of rules divided	
FPT_TST.1	Execution of the TSF self-tests and the results of the tests	Modified TSF data or execution code in case of integrity violation
FTA_MCS.2	Denial of a new session based on the limitation of multiple concurrent sessions	
FTA_SSL.5(1) FTA_SSL.5(2)	Locking or termination of interactive session	
FTA_TSE.1	Denial of a session establishment due to the session establishment mechanism All attempts at establishment of a user session	

The audit data generated by TOE shall be recorded as follows.

Information
Date and time, type, identity and the outcome (success or failure) of the event

Satisfied security function component

FAU_GEN.1

6.1.3. Audit review

The audit data can be reviewed through CubeOne Manager and CubeOne Security Server, and only authorized administrators can be interrogated.

It provides the functions of security alert, review, and analysis of security audit generated in TOE.



An authorized policy administrator can review audit data generated in CubeOne Manager through CubeOne Manager.

An authorized log administrator can review all audit data of TOE stored in the audit storage (DBMS) through CubeOne Security Server.



The auditable records which administrator can review are as follows.

Item	Selection/ordering		Logical relation				
Managor	1		AND of the entire period with one of the items below				
Manager	que	ry	Total, Server, Database Name, Workgroup, In Workgroup, Item				
			AND of the entered value among the items below				
	Service	query	- server name, date(start~end), level (inform, warning, critical,				
	0011100		fatal)				
	error	ordering	ascending/ descending order based on one of the items below				
		ordening	- no., date, server name, server type, detail description, level				
		query	AND of the entered value among the items below				
Cocurity	Detection		- server name, date(start~end), level (warning, critical, fatal)				
Security Server	of massive		ascending/ descending order based on one of the items below				
Server	decryption	ordering	- no., date, server name CubeOne type, username, table,				
			decryption/encryption count, IP, program name, level				
		query	AND of the entered value among the items below				
	Audit log		- server name, date(start~end), level (success, fail)				
		ordering	ascending/ descending order based on one of the items below				
			- no., date, server name CubeOne type, username, table, column				
			sql statement, item, IP, program name, detail of audit				

Satisfied security function component

FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3

6.1.4. Action in case of possible audit data loss and Prevention of audit data loss

If the audit trail exceeds 80% of the audit repository capacity, CubeOne Manager sends alert to policy administrator through pop-up window. If the audit trail is saturated, the policy administrator is notified in a pop-up and the audited events are ignored.

When the CubeOne Security Server is reached at 80% of the audit repository capacity, it exposes a real-time warning screen to the CubeOne Security Server. If the audit trail is saturated, a warning screen is displayed in real time and the oldest audit data is overwritten.

Satisfied security function component					
FAU_STG.3, FAU_STG.4(1), FAU_STG.4(2)					



6.2. Cryptographic support (FCS)

The contents of validated cryptographic module used in TOE are as follows.

Item		Content		
Module	e Name	COLib V1.2.0		
Certificatio	on Number	CM-231-2028.6		
Deve	loper	Eglobal system		
Issue Date		2023-06-19		
Expiration Date		2028-06-19		
	Windows	colib.dll		
	AIX	libcolib.so		
Library name	Linux	libcolib.so		
	HP-UX	libcolib.sl		
	Sun	libcolib.so		

6.2.1. Cryptographic key generation (User data encryption)

The Cryptographic key used for user data encryption at TOE is generated through CubeOne Manager, the administration tool of TOE, according to user key length. In TOE, encryption keys that are used for user data encryption/decryption created during ITEM creation and are used for cryptographic operation. Block cipher algorithm, encryption key length, and operation mode supported by TOE are as follows.

ltem	Standard	Approved function	Key length	Operation mode
	KS X 1213-1	ARIA	128/192/256 bit	CBC, CFB-128, OFB
Block cipher	KS X 1213-2			
algorithm	TTAS.KO-12.0004/R1	SEED	128 bit	CBC, CFB-128, OFB
	TTAS.KO-12.0025	JLLD		

The encryption key generation is generated through the random number generator (HASH_DRBG) of validated cryptographic module used by TOE.

Item	Approved function	Remark	
Random number generator	HASH_DRBG	Hash: SHA-256	



Satisfied security function component

FCS_CKM.1(1), FCS_RBG.1

6.2.2. Cryptographic key generation (TSF data encryption)

The cryptographic keys used for TSF data encryption stored in TOE create KEK and DEK through random number generator of validated cryptographic module. DEK is used for TSF data encryption and KEK is used for DEK encryption.

The using cryptographic algorithm and targets are as follows.

ltem		Standard	Key generation algorithm	Key length	Key Description
Mutual authentication	private key, public key	ISO/IEC 18033-2	RSAES(SHA-256)	2048bit	Asymmetric key to encrypt mutual authentication data
among TOE's components	private key, public key	ISO/IEC 14888-2	RSA-PSS(SHA- 256)	2048bit	Asymmetric key pair for digital signature
Basic protection of internally transmitted TSF data	session Key	TTAK.KO- 12.0331	HASH_DRBG(SHA- 256)	128bit	Session key using session information as a key to encrypt internal transmission data
Basic protection of stored TSF	Drived Key(DK)	TTAK.KO- 12.0334	Password Based Key Derivation Functions, HMAC- SHA-2	256bit	Generating a derivation key to be used as the key of KEK through user input
data	Master Key(KEK)	TTAK.KO- 12.0331	HASH_DRBG(SHA- 256)	256bit	Generating a KEK to encrypt DEK
	Secondary Key(DEK)	TTAK.KO- 12.0331	HASH_DRBG(SHA- 256)	256bit	Generating a DEK to encrypt TSF data

The key used for mutual authentication among the TOE components is created using the public key cipher of validated cryptographic module. The encryption key generated for basic protection of the internally transmitted TSF data is generated by the random number generator of validated cryptographic module.



To encrypt stored TSF data, create a DEK, use the DEK as a key to encrypt the TSF data, and create a KEK to encrypt the DEK. Here, the DK used to encrypt KEK uses the PBKDF2 method. The method used and the pseudorandom function are as follows.

function	Algorithm			Remark
	PBKDF2			- PCKS#5
Derivation function	(Password-Based	Key	Key Derivation	- reference to NIST SP
	Function 2)			800-132
Pseudo random number function	HMAC(SHA-256)	of	validated	ISO/IEC 9797-2
using in PBKDB2	cryptographic modu	ule		130/1EC 9/9/-2

	Satisfied security function component
FCS_CKM.1(2), FCS_RBG.1	

6.2.3. Cryptographic key distribution

The cryptographic key and policy generated in CubeOne Manager is distributed to CubeOne Server by using the block cipher and hash function of validated cryptographic module.

Distribution of encryption keys for encryption communication to protect TSF data transmitted between TOE components uses block ciphers, hash functions, and public key encryption algorithms provided by verified encryption modules.

The algorithms used are as follows.

ltem	Standard	Approved algorithm	Remark
	KS X 1213-1	ARIA-256(CBC)	block algorithm(ARIA) and
Key distribution for the	KS X 1213-2	ARIA-230(CDC)	hash-function(SHA256) of
user data encryption	ISO/IEC 10118-3	SHA256	validated cryptographic
	130/1EC 10118-3	31 A2 30	module
	KS X 1213-1	ARIA-128(CBC)	block algorithm(ARIA),
Key distribution for the	KS X 1213-2	ARIA-120(CDC)	hash-function(SHA256) and
basic protection of	ISO/IEC 10118-3	SHA256	public key
internally transmitted	130/1EC 10118-3	31 A2 30	encryption(RSAES) of
TSF data	ISO/IEC 18033-2	RSAES(2048)	validated cryptographic
	130/1EC 10033-2	NJAEJ(2040)	module

Satisfied security function component



Satisfied security function component

FCS_CKM.2

6.2.4. Cryptographic key destruction

The kind of cryptographic keys generated by TOE and destruction time are as follows.

Item	Destruction method	Destruction time
key destruction related to user data encryption	Free memory after overwrite the memory area to '0' 3 times through initialization function of memory provided by validated cryptographic module.	Destruction after cryptographic operation of user data. (encryption/decryption)
	Free memory after overwrite the memory area to '0' 3 times when CubeOne Server is terminated	Destroyed upon termination of CubeOne Server
key destruction related to TSF data encryption	Free memory after overwrite the memory area to '0' 3 times through initialization function of memory provided by validated cryptographic module.	Destruction after cryptographic operation of user data
key destruction related to transmitted TSF data	Free memory after overwrite the memory area to '0' 3 times through initialization function of memory provided by validated cryptographic module.	Destruction after cryptographic operation of user data

Satisfied security function component

FCS_CKM.4

6.2.5. Cryptographic operation (User data encryption)

The cipher algorithm, key length and operation mode of cryptographic operation are determined by creation of ITEM in CubeOne Manager. For the block cipher algorithm in TOE, the same cryptogram is not generated for the same statement because it uses IV.



The algorithms and key length used for ITEM and key length are as follows.

Item	Standard	Algorithm	Mode of operation	Key length
	KS X 1213-1	ARIA	CBC/CFB/OFB	128/192/256
Plack sinher	KS X 1213-2	ARIA		
Block cipher	TTAS.KO-12.0004/R1	SEED	CBC/CFB/OFB	128
	TTAS.KO-12.0025	SEED		
ПУСП		SHA256		
HASH function	ISO/IEC 10118-3	SHA384	-	-
Tunction		SHA512		

There is the function for plug-in and API according to operational environment supported in TOE. It uses the encryption/decryption function that cryptographic operation of validated cryptographic module provides.

Satisfied security function component

FCS_COP.1(1), FDP_UDE.1

6.2.6. Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption)

The lists of cryptographic operation used to encryption of TSF data are follows.

Cryptographic operation	Standard	Algorithm	Key length
Mutual authentication among the TOE	ISO/IEC 18033-2	RSAES(SHA-256)	2048bit
components	ISO/IEC 14888-2	RSA-PSS(SHA-256)	2048bit
	KS X 1213-1	ADIA CRC made	128bit
Basic protection of the internally	KS X 1213-2	ARIA, CBC mode	
transmitted TSF data	ISO/IEC 10118-3	SHA-256	-
	KS X 1213-1	ADIA CRC made	256bit
Basic protection of the stored TSF data	KS X 1213-2	ARIA, CBC mode	256bit
	ISO/IEC 10118-3	SHA-256	-

The approved functions of validated cryptographic module used in TOE are follows.

Approved function	Description	
COLibSetCipherInfo	Data encryption/decryption function	
COLibEncrypt COLibDecrypt		



Approved function	Description	
COLibGetRsaKey	Key pair generation function for RSA	
	(encryption/decryption/sign/verify)	
COLibRsaKeyInit		
COLibSetRsaInfo	Encryption function of Public key cipher	
COLibEncryptRsa		
COLibRsaKeyInit		
COLibSetRsaInfo	Decryption function of Public key cipher	
COLibDecryptRsa		
COLibRsaKeyInit		
COLibSetRsaInfo	Certification function of Digital signature	
COLibDecryptRsa		
COLibRsaKeyInit		
COLibSetRsaInfo	Significance function of Digital signature	
COLibEncryptRsa		
COLibGetKey	Key generation function	
COLibEncrypt	Hash function	
COLibSetCipherInfo		
COLibEncrypt	Pseudorandom number function used in the PBKDF2 function	
COLibDecrypt		
COLibSetCipherInfo	Constitution and accounting for the stick of VEV and DEV	
COLibEncrypt	Creation and reservation function of KEK and DEK	
COLibSetCipherInfo	Encryption function for TSF data	
COLibEncrypt		
COLibSetCipherInfo	Description from the for TCE date	
COLibDecrypt	Decryption function for TSF data	

Satisfied security function component

FCS_COP.1(2), FPT_PST.1

6.3. User data protection

It provides a column-specific encryption and decryption method for user data stored in the DBMS that the TOE wants to protect, and performs encryption and decryption in the application server or DBMS according to the API and plug-in method.



After encrypting and decrypting user data, it provides a mechanism to delete the original data, which is plain text, so that it cannot be recovered by overwriting it three times with '0'.

Satisfied security function component

FDP_UDE.1, FDP_RIP.1

6.4. Identification and authentication (FIA)

6.4.1. Authentication failure handling

The authentication method for CubeOne Manger and CubeOne Security Server is based on their ID and password. If five consecutive failed certifications occur, the authentication function is prevented for five minutes to avoid repeated attempts by the authentication process.

Item		em	Content
Count	of	Authentication	Default: 5 Times.
failure	* There is no method that change default value.		
Action taken			Identification/authentication function inactivation during 5 minutes

Satisfied security function component

FIA_AFL.1

6.4.2. Verification of secrets

The first time you run CubeOne Manager, the administrator tool of TOE, you must register a new administrator ID and password. The administrator password can be changed through the menu of the CubeOne Manager after initial registration. When registering the administrator, the following items must be entered, and the verification criteria and requirements are as follows.

ltem	Description	Verification criteria
CubeOne Username	CubeOne Manager ID	 Length: min. 9 ~ max. 30 Must include English letter, special, number char.
Password	Password of ID	- Length: min. 9 ~ max. 30
Authentication password	Authentication password to generate key encryption key through PBKDF2 derivation	- Must include English letter, special, number character



ltem	Description	Verification criteria
	function	

The log administrator must register password during installation of CubeOne Security Server. The password combination rule is 9 to 30 characters, including all English letters, special characters, and numbers. After initial registration, the administrator password can be changed After logging in to the web security management screen of CubeOne Security Server

6.4.3. Identification and authentication

The administrator enters the administrator ID and password when installing the CubeOne Manager that performs the security management function of the TOE. For CubeOne Security Server, the installer password must be registered. Password combination rules can be created with not less than 9 to 30 characters including letters, special characters, and numbers. Passwords entered during authentication are masked so that they cannot be seen on the screen (" \bullet ") and do not provide a reason for their failure. If the identification of CubeOne Manager is failed, only the version information of TOE can be confirmed. In case of failure of CubeOne Security Server's identification, all the functions are disabled.

When the policy administrator attempts CubeOne Manager authentication, uniqueness is guaranteed using a random number generated by a verified random number generator to prevent reuse of authentication attempts.

When the log administrator attempts to authenticate with the CubeOne Security Server, uniqueness is guaranteed through a session ID for each session, preventing reuse of authentication attempts.

Satisfied security function component
FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.2, FIA_UID.2

6.4.4. Mutual authentication between components

TOE components perform mutual authentication with each other. The timing of mutual authentication and the encryption algorithm used are as follows.

Item	Mutual authentication time	Algorithm



Item Mutual authentication time		Algorithm	
CubeOne Manager ↔ CubeOne Security Server	 When logging in/logging out of Manager When distributing policies 	RSAES(SHA-256) RSA-PSS(SHA-256)	
CubeOne Server ↔ CubeOne Sercurity Server	- When running the server	RSAES(SHA-256) RSA-PSS(SHA-256)	
CubeOne Manager ↔ CubeOne Server	- When distributing policies	RSAES(SHA-256) RSA-PSS(SHA-256)	

The mutual authentication method is as follows. Assume that the element requesting mutual authentication is A, and the element receiving the request is B.

- 1. Both A and B generate an RSA key pair and exchange public keys with each other.
- 2. B generates a random number key with a verified random number generator and then performs public key encryption (RSAES) on the random number key with A's public key.
- 3. B attaches the public key encrypted value and the digital signature sign value created with B's private key and then sends it to A.
- A decrypts the received encryption value with B's public key and authenticates the sign value. A decrypts the public key encryption value with the private key and verifies the random number key.
- 5. A performs public key encryption (RSAES) by attaching AuthID and the decrypted random number key to B's public key.
- 6. A attaches the public key encrypted value and the digital signature sign value created with A's private key and then sends it to B.
- B decrypts the received encryption value with A's public key and authenticates the sign value.
 B decrypts the public key encryption value with the private key and verifies the random number key.
- 8. B separates the AuthID and the random number key and checks whether the AuthID and the random number key are the same.
- 9. B combines the session ID and the session key value generated by a random number generator. B generates a session value by using ARIA encryption with random number key and sends it to A.
- 10. A decrypts(ARIA) the encrypted session value received from B using random number key.
- 11. A encrypts data including the session ID with the session key and transmits it to B.
- 12. B decrypts the encryption value received from A using the session key and compares the session ID to confirm whether it is an authenticated session.



The AuthID used for mutual authentication is created based on the MAC address in the case of CubeOne Manager, and in the case of CubeOne Server and CubeOne Security Server, AuthID is transmitted from the Manager when distributing policies.

Satisfied security function component

FIA_IMA.1

6.5. Security management (FMT)

6.5.1. Security functions and Protection of stored TSF data

After identification with CubeOne Manger, the policy adminiatrator can manage the keys and policies used to encrypt user data, manage CubeOne Server, review audit data, and change the administrator password. The administrator password has a rule of not less than 9 to 30 characters, including letters, special characters, and numbers.

In case of CubeOne Security Server, the authorized log administrator can perform following security functions: query audit data, control the approved IP to connect as log administrator, change the administrator's password. And the rule of changing password is the same as the CubeOne Manager.

The list of security functions and security function management capabilities that the authorized policy/log administrator can perform are as shown in the table below.

Authorized	Coquity function	Action			
Administrator	Security function	decision	stop	start	change
	Identification and Authentication	0	Х	Х	Х
	Integrity verification	0	Х	Х	Х
Authorized policy	User encryption policy	0	0	0	Х
administrator	Item distribution	0	Х	0	Х
	Audit data review	0	Х	Х	Х
	Password policy	0	Х	Х	Х
Authorized log administrator	Audit data review	0	Х	Х	Х
	Administrator connection IP	0	Х	Х	Х
	Password policy	0	Х	Х	Х



Table 18. List and Action of security functions

The list of TSF data and management capabilities that the authorized policy/log administrator can perform are listed in the table below.

Authorized	TSF data	Ability			
Administrator	ISF data	Query	Change	*Reg.	Delete
	Audit Data	0	Х	Х	Х
	Administrator password	Х	0	0	Х
Authorized policy	CubeOne Server information	0	0	0	0
administrator	CubeOne operation type	0	Х	0	0
	Group information of cryptographic policy	0	0	0	0
	ITEM information for encryption	0	Х	0	0
	Audit Data	0	Х	Х	Х
Authorized log administrator	Administrator connection IP	0	0	0	Х
	Administrator password	Х	0	0	Х

Table 19. TSF Data list and management ability

	Satisfied security function component
F	FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1

6.5.2. Management of ID and password

You can register the administrator ID and password on the first connection after installing CubeOne Manager, which is responsible for managing the security functions of TOE. CubeOne Manager can only register one administrator. The rules for registering IDs and passwords are as follows.

Item Content		Description
New CubeOne Username	User ID of CubeOne Manager	- Length: min. 9 ~ max. 30
		- English letter, special , number char.
New Password	Password of user ID	
Confirm Password	Confirm password of user ID	- Length: min. 9 ~ max. 30
Authentication New Authentication password of		- Must include English letter, special,
password	CubeOne Manager	number character
Authentication Confirm	Confirm authentication	



|--|

The administrator password of CubeOne Security Server provides the ability to set passwords during installation, and the combination rules are the same as the CubeOne Manager.

	Satisfied security function component
FMT_PWD.1, FMT_SMF.1	

6.5.3. Security roles

The user provided by TOE is an authorized administrator. TOE's policy administrator can register only one administrator and manage all management functions provided by CubeOne Manager. The log administrator can only access CubeOne Security Server, and as a single administrator, there is only one account and manages all management functions provided by CubeOne Security Server.

Satisfied security function component

FMT_SMR.1



6.6. Protection of the TSF (FPT)

6.6.1. Basic internal TSF data transfer protection

TOE performs mutual authentication and secure communication of each component and performs encryption through validated cryptographic module to protect TSF data transmitted between TOE components from exposure and change.

ltem	TOE components		Cryptographic algorithm
	CubeOne Manager	CubeOne Security Server	1) public key algorithm
mutual authentication	CubeOne Manager	CubeOne Server	- RSAES(2048) 2) Digital signature algorithm
	CubeOne Security Server	CubeOne Server	- RSA-PSS(2048)
secure communication	CubeOne Manager	CubeOne Security Server	1) symmetric key algorithm
	CubeOne Manager	CubeOne Server	- ARIA-128(CBC) 2) hash algorithm
	CubeOne Security Server	CubeOne Server	- SHA-256

Satisfied security function component

FIA_IMA.1, FPT_ITT.1

6.6.2. Basic protection of stored TSF data

TSF data stored in TOE is encrypted using ARIA-256 (CBC) and SHA-256 of validated cryptographic module. The data stored in TOE is as follows.

TOE components	TSF data	encryption algorithm
	User data encryption key	ARIA-256(CBC)
CubeOne Manager	TSF Data Encryption Key (KEK, DEK)	ARIA-256(CBC)
	User data encryption policy	ARIA-256(CBC)
	Audit data	ARIA-256(CBC)
CubeOne Server TSF Data Encryption Key (KEK, DEK)		ARIA-256(CBC)



TOE components	TSF data	encryption algorithm
	TOE set value	ARIA-256(CBC)
CubeOne Security Server	TSF Data Encryption Key (KEK, DEK)	ARIA-256(CBC)
	TOE set value	ARIA-256(CBC)
	Policy administrator Password	SHA-256
	Log administrator Password	SHA-256

Satisfied	security	function	component
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FTP_PST.1

6.6.3. TSF self-test

TSF performs its own test periodically during normal operation and at startup. It also provides integrity verification of the TSF data and the TSF.

6.6.3.1. Self-test

The self-test for correct operation of the TOE is as follows.

TOE components	Program Function		Period		
CubeOne Manager	CubeOne.exe Cubeone Manager executable file		Start-up and 1 hour cycle at CubeOne Manager		
CubeOne Server	~/bin/cubeone_guard64	Manage the daemon processes on the CubeOne Server - cubebeacon - cubeone_auditor - cubeoned	Start-up and 1 hour cycle at CubeOne Server		
	~/bin/cubebeacon64	 encryption/decryption statistics system usage statistics send audit log data to CubeOne Security Server 	Start-up and Restart by cubeone_guard at end of process		
	~/bin/cubeone_auditor64	Send success and failure audit log to CubeOne Security Server	Start-up and Restart by cubeone_guard at		



TOE components	Program	Function	Period
			end of process
	~/bin/cubeoned64	 perform the user data encryption/decryption perform the mutual authentication among TOE components 	Start-up and Restart by cubeone_guard at end of process
CubeOne Security Server	~/bin/sserver.sh	 start CubeOne Security Server Secruity Server daemon process management 	Start-up and 1 hour cycle at CubeOne Security Server
	~/bin/sserverd64	 store audit log data perform the mutual authentication among TOE components 	Start-upandRestartbysserver.sh at end ofprocess

6.6.3.2. Integrity verification of TSF and TSF data

TOE components	Program	Function	Period
CubeOne Manager	CubeOne.exe	Execution file of CubeOne Manager	When driven
	CoNet.dll	Communication module among TOE components	and requested by an
	cubecmc.dll	Wrap library of validated cryptographic module	authorized administrator
	colib.dll	Validated cryptographic module	
CubeOne Server	~/bin/coinit64	Initialize CubeOne Server	- When driven
	~/bin/cubebeacon64	 encryption/decryption statistics check Daemon service for CubeOne Server daemon to send audit log to CubeOne Security Server 	and requested by an authorized administrator

The TOE's TSF and TSF data integrity verification function and cycle are as follows.



TOE components	Program	Function	Period
	~/bin/cubeone_auditor64	Daemon to send success and failure audit log to CubeOne Security Server	
	~/bin/cubeoned64	Daemon Process to communicate with CubeOne Manager	
	~/bin/cubonesql64	Perform initial encryption job as child process of cubeoned	
	~/bin/cubeone_guard64	Daemon to monitor cubebeacon, cubeone_auditor, cubeoned	
	~/bin/co_check_integrity	Perform integrity verification on files when running	
	~/lib/libCOtbenc.so (Tibero) ~/lib/libCOdb2enc (DB2) ~/lib/libCubeOnej.so (ORACLE) ~/lib/libCOmysqlenc.so (MySQL) ~₩Wlib₩Wextcube.dll (MSSQL)	C library for plug-in type	
	~/lib/libCOencapi.so	C library for API type	
	~/lib/libcolib.so	Validated cryptographic module	
	~/var/conf/cubeone.conf	Cubeone Server configuration file	
CubeOne	~/bin/sserverd	Daemon Process to communicate among TOE components	- When driven and requested by an authorized administrator
	~/bin/ssagent	Perform specified job as child process of sserverd	
	~/bin/co_check_integrity	Perform integrity verification on files when running	
Security Server	~/lib/libcolib.so	Validated cryptographic module	
261761	~/var/conf/sserver.conf	Cubeone Security Server configuration file	
	~/data/BACKUP/param.comm ~/data/BACKUP/param.dat ~/data/BACKUP/param_pw.dat	Communicate with CubeOne Manager and perform encryption and decryption	



Satisfied security function component

FPT_TST.1



6.7. TOE access (FTA)

6.7.1. TOE session control

When the policy manager attempts to access CubeOne Manager, the connection is controlled based on the manager's IP entered when installing CubeOne Security Server.

When the log manager attempts to connect to the CubeOne Security Server, the administrator's access is controlled based on the connection IP, and the session is rejected when an unauthorized IP connection is attempted.

CubeOne Manager's access rights limit the number of concurrent sessions to 1, and CubeOne Security Server limits the number of concurrent sessions to 1.

After a period of CubeOne Manager inactivity (10 minutes), the session is locked and administrator re-authentication is required. CubeOne Security Server terminates the session after a period of inactivity (10 minutes).

There is only one IP that can connect to CubeOne Manager, so simultaneous access is not possible. CubeOne Security Server limits the number of IPs that can be connected to one, and also limits the number of simultaneous connection sessions to one, so existing connections are blocked when simultaneous connections are attempted.

Satisfied security function component

FTA_MCS.2, FTA_SSL.5, FTA_TSE.1