



# Certification Report

**EAL 2 Evaluation of**

**EnPOS Biliřim Sanayi ve Ticaret A.ř.  
N-PosCore v1.1**

issued by

**Turkish Standards Institution  
Common Criteria Certification Scheme**

*Certificate Number: 21.0.01/TSE-CCCS-28*

	<b>YAZILIM TEST VE BELGELENDİRME DAİRESİ BAŞKANLIĞI</b>	<b>Doküman No</b>	YTBD-01-01-FR-01	
	<b>CCCS CERTIFICATION REPORT</b>	<b>Yayın Tarihi</b>	23/01/2015	
		<b>Revizyon Tarihi</b>		<b>No</b>

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<b>Pages</b>	20

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### **DISCLAIMER**

*This certification report and the IT product defined in the associated Common Criteria document has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facility conformance to Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 4, using Common Methodology for IT Products Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 4. This certification report and the associated Common Criteria document apply only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. Evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the CCCS, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report and its associated Common Criteria document are not an endorsement of the product by the Turkish Standardization Institution, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report and its associated Common Criteria document, and no warranty is given for the product by the Turkish Standardization Institution, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report and its associated Common Criteria document.*

### **FOREWORD**

*The Certification Report is drawn up to submit the Certification Commission the results and evaluation information upon the completion of a Common Criteria evaluation service performed under the Common*

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*Criteria Certification Scheme. Certification Report covers all non-confidential security and technical information related with a Common Criteria evaluation which is made under the STCD Common Criteria Certification Scheme. This report is issued publicly to and made available to all relevant parties for reference and use.*

*The Common Criteria Certification Scheme (CCSS) provides an evaluation and certification service to ensure the reliability of Information Security (IS) products. Evaluation and tests are conducted by a public or commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCTL) under CCCS' supervision.*

*CCEF is a facility, licensed as a result of inspections carried out by CCCS for performing tests and evaluations which will be the basis for Common Criteria certification. As a prerequisite for such certification, the CCEF has to fulfill the requirements of the standard ISO/IEC 17025 and should be accredited by accreditation bodies.*

*The evaluation and tests related with the concerned product have been performed by TÜBİTAK BİLGEM OKTEM which is a public CCTL.*

*A Common Criteria Certificate given to a product means that such product meets the security requirements defined in its security target document that has been approved by the CCCS. The Security Target document is where requirements defining the scope of evaluation and test activities are set forth. Along with this certification report, the user of the IT product should also review the security target document in order to understand any assumptions made in the course of evaluations, the environment where the IT product will run, security requirements of the IT product and the level of assurance provided by the product.*

*This certification report is associated with the Common Criteria Certificate issued by the CCCS for N-PosCore v1.1. whose evaluation was completed on 10.04.2015 and whose evaluation technical report was drawn up by TÜBİTAK BİLGEM OKTEM (as CCTL), and with the Security Target document with version no 1.3 of the relevant product.*

*The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target document are posted on the STCD Certified Products List at [bilisim.tse.org.tr](http://bilisim.tse.org.tr) portal and the Common Criteria Portal (the official web site of the Common Criteria Project).*

## **RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE**

*The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo is printed on the certificate to indicate that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA.*

*The CCRA has been signed by the Turkey in 2003 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL4. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be found on:*

<http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/>

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## 1 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report constitutes the certification results by the certification body on the evaluation results applied with requirements of the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation.

**Evaluated IT product name:** N-PosCore v1.1

**IT Product version:** v1.1

**Developer's Name:** EnPOS Bilişim Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

**Name of CCTL:** TÜBİTAK BİLGEM OKTEM

**Assurance Package:** EAL 2

**Completion date of evaluation:** 10.04.2015

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### 1.1 Brief Description

The TOE is an application which is the main items of a Fiscal Cash Register (FCR). TOE is used to process the transaction amount of purchases which can be viewed by both seller and buyer. Since transaction amount is used to determine tax revenues; secure processing, storing and transmission of this data is very important.

Figure 1 shows the general overview of the TOE and its related components as regarded in this Certification Report. The orange part of Figure 1 marked as Fiscal Application Software is the TOE. The figure also shows the input/output interface, fiscal memory, daily memory, database, ERU, fiscal certificate memory; that are TOE's environmental components and crucial for functionality and security. Connections between the TOE and its environment are also subject to evaluation since these connections are made over the interfaces of the TOE.




Figure 1 TOE and Related Components

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### 1.2 TOE Security Functions

The TOE provides following security features;

- i. TOE supports access control.
- ii. TOE supports secure communication between main processor and fiscal memory.  
However, for the cases where the main processor and the fiscal memory are included within the same electronic seal secure communication is not mandatory. TOE is able to detect disconnection between main processor and fiscal memory and enter into the maintenance mode.
- iii. TOE supports usage of ITU X509 v3 formatted certificate and its protected private key for authentication and secure communication with PRA- IS and TSM.
- iv. TOE supports secure communication between FCR-PRA-IS and FCR-TSM.
- v. TOE ensures the integrity of event data, sales data, authentication data, characterization data and FCR parameters.
- vi. TOE records important events defined in PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6] and send urgent event data immediately to PRA-IS in a secure way.
- vii. TOE detects physical attacks to FCR and enters into the maintenance mode in such cases.

### 1.3 Threats

- **T.AccessControl**

Adverse action: Authenticated users could try to use functions which are not allowed.

Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to FCR.

Asset: Event data, sales data, time information.

- **T.Authentication**

Adverse action: Unauthorized users could try to use FCR functions.

Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has logical and physical access to the FCR

Asset: Sales data, event data, time information

- **T.MDData**

Adverse action: This threat deals with four types of data: event data, sales data, characterization data and FCR parameters.

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An attacker could try to manipulate the event data to hide its actions and unauthorised access to the FCR, failure reports, and deletion of logs. An attacker also could try to disclose important events while transmitted between PRA-IS and FCR.

An attacker could try to manipulate or delete the sales data generated by TOE which may result in tax fraud. In addition, an attacker also could try to disclose sales data while transmitted between PRA-IS and FCR. Manipulation and deletion of sales data may be caused by magnetic and electronic reasons.

An attacker could try to manipulate the characterization data to cover information about tax fraud; to masquerade the user identity.

An attacker could try to manipulate the FCR parameters to use FCR in undesired condition.

Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to the FCR.

Asset: Event data, sales data, characterization data, FCR parameters.

- **T.Eavesdrop**

Adverse action: An attacker could try to eavesdrop event data, sales data and characterization data transmitted between the TOE and the PRA-IS and also between the TOE and the distributed memory units (Fiscal memory, Database, Daily memory, ERU).

Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, physical and logical access to the FCR communication channel.

Asset: Characterization data, sales data, and event data.

- **T.Skimming**

Adverse action: An attacker could try to imitate PRA-IS to receive information from FCR and to imitate TSM to set parameters to FCR via the communication channel.

Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential and logical access to the FCR.

Asset : Sales data, and event data, FCR parameters.

- **T.Counterfeit**

Adverse action: An attacker could try to imitate FCR by using sensitive(session keys) data while communicating with PRA-IS and TSM to cover information about tax fraud.

Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to the FCR.

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Asset: Sensitive data (session keys).

- **T.Malfunction**

Adverse action: An attacker may try to use FCR out of its normal operational conditions to cause malfunction without the knowledge of TOE.

Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical access to the FCR.

Asset: Sales data, event data.

- **T.ChangingTime**

Adverse action: An attacker may try to change time to invalidate the information about logged events and reports in FCR.

Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to the FCR.

Asset: Time Information

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## 2 – CERTIFICATION RESULTS

### 2.1 Identification of TOE

<b>Certificate Number</b>	21.0.01/TSE-CCCS-28
<b>TOE Name and Version</b>	<b>N-PosCore v1.1</b>
<b>Security Target Title</b>	N-PosCore v.1.1 ST v1.3
<b>Security Target Version</b>	1.3
<b>Security Target Date</b>	23.03.2015
<b>Assurance Level</b>	EAL 2
<b>Criteria</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012</li> <li>• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012</li> <li>• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012</li> </ul>
<b>Methodology</b>	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
<b>Protection Profile Conformance</b>	New Generation Fiscal Application Software Protection Profile TSE-CCCS/PP-006, version 1.8, 18 December 2014
<b>Common Criteria Conformance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012, conformant</li> <li>• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components;</li> </ul>

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	CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012, conformant
<b>Sponsor</b>	EnPOS Bilişim Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.
<b>Developer</b>	EnPOS Bilişim Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.
<b>Evaluation Facility</b>	TÜBİTAK BİLGEM OKTEM
<b>Certification Scheme</b>	TSE-CCCS

## 2.2 Security Policy

The Security Target for the TOE claims conformance to the New Generation Fiscal Application Software Protection Profile TSE-CCCS/PP-006, version 1.8, 18 December 2014

Organizational Security Policies are;

- **P.Certificate**

It has to be assured that certificate which is installed at initialization step is compatible with ITU X.509 v3 format. FCR contains FCR certificate, Certification Authority root certificate, Certification Authority sub-root (subordinate) certificate and UpdateControl certificate is used to verify the signature of the TOE.

- **P.Comm\_EXT**

It has to be assured that communication between TOE and external devices is used to encrypted using AES algorithm with 256 bits according to External Device Communication Protocol Document

- **P.InformationLeakage**

It has to be assured that TOE's environment provides a secure mechanism which prevents attacker to obtain sensitive information (secret key) when FCR performs encryption operation; i.e by side channel attacks like SPA (Simple Power Analysis), SEMA (Simple Electromagnetic Analysis), DPA (Differential Power Analysis), DEMA (Differential Electromagnetic Analysis)

- **P.SecureEnvironment**

It has to be assured that environment of TOE senses disconnection between fiscal memory and main processor. Then TOE enters into the maintenance mode and logs urgent event. Moreover, it has to be assured that fiscal memory doesn't accept transactions with negative amounts which

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results in a decrease of total tax value. Also it has to be assured that environment of TOE provides a mechanism that sales data in daily memory which is not reflected to the fiscal memory cannot be deleted and modified in an uncontrolled way. In addition to this, it has to be assured that sales data in ERU cannot be deleted and modified

- **P.PhysicalTamper**

It has to be assured that TOE environment and TOE provide a tamper respondent system which is formed by electromechanical seals. It has to be assured that physical tampering protection system protects the keys (asymmetric key, symmetric key), the certificates, event data, characterization data, FCR parameters and sales data. It has to be assured that TOE logs this type of events and enters into the maintenance mode when physical tampering protection system detect unauthorised access. On the other hand it has to be assured that authorised access such as maintenance work or service works are logged. It has to be assured that physical tampering protection system (mesh cover) protects fiscal memory.

- **P.PKI**

It has to be assured that IT environment of the TOE provides public key infrastructure for encryption, signing and key agreement

- **P.UpdateControl**

TOE is allowed to be updated by only TSM or Authorised Manufacturer User to avoid possible threats during this operation, FCR shall verify the signature of the new version of TOE to ensure that the TOE to be updated is signed by the correct organisation. Thus, the TOE to be updated is ensured to be the correct certified version because only the certified versions will be signed. In addition, FCR shall check version of TOE to ensure that it is the latest version

### ***2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope***

Assumptions for the operational environment of the composite TOE are;

- **A.TrustedManufacturer**

It is assumed that manufacturing is done by trusted manufacturers. They process manufacturing step in a manner which maintains IT security

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- **A.Control**

It is assumed that PRA-IS personnel performs random controls on FCR. During these controls PRA-IS personnel should check that if tax amount and total amount printed values on receipt and sent to PRA-IS are the same. In addition to this, a similar check should be made for events as well

- **A.Initialisation**

It is assumed that environment of TOE provides secure initialization steps. Initialization step is consist of secure boot of operating system, and integrity check for TSF data. Moreover, it is assumed that environment of TOE provides secure installation of certificate to the FCR in initialization phase. Before certificate installation it is assumed that asymmetric key pair generated in a manner which maintains security posture

- **A.TrustedUser**

User is assumed to be trusted. It is assumed that for each sale a sales receipt is provided to the buyer

- **A.Activation**

It is assumed that environment of TOE provides secure activation steps at the beginning of the TOE operation phase and after each maintenance process

- **A.AuthorisedService**

It is assumed that repairing is done by trusted authorised services. The repairing step is processed in a manner which maintains legal limits

- **A.Ext\_Key**

It is assumed that External Device (EFT-POS, Main Unit) generates strong key for communicating with TOE



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## 2.5 Documentation

During the evaluation; the configuration of evaluation evidences which are composed of Software source code, Common Criteria related documents, sustenance documents and guides are shown below;

<b>Name of Document</b>	<b>Version Number</b>	<b>Publication Date</b>
Common Criteria - CC	3.1 r4	September 2012
Common Evaluation Methodology - CEM	3.1 r4	September 2012
NPC-ARC-Security Architecture Document	1.9	31.03.2015
NPC-DP-v.0.4 - Delivery Procedure	0.4	31.03.2015
NPC-FSP-v 1.0 – Functional Specification	1.0	31.03.2015
NPC-KYP-v.1.0 – Configuration Management	1.0	31.03.2015
NPC-PRE-v.0.3 – Preparative Procedures	0.3	31.03.2015
NPC-ST-v.1.3 – Security Target	1.3	23.03.2015
NPC-TDS-v1.1 – TOE Design	1.1	20.03.2015
NPC-TD-v0.5 Test Documentation	0.5	26.03.2015
YN200 Kullanım Kılavuzu_27_03_2015	1.1	27.03.2015

**Table 2 – Evaluation Evidences**

## 2.6 IT Product Testing

During the evaluation, all evaluation evidences of TOE were delivered and transferred completely to CCTL by the developers. All the delivered evaluation evidences which include software, documents, etc. are mapped to the assurance families Common Criteria and Common Methodology; so the connections between the assurance families and the evaluation evidences has been established. The evaluation results are available in the final Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) of N-PosCore v1.1 Değerlendirme Teknik

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Raporu v2.0

It is concluded that the TOE supports EAL 2. There are 19 assurance families which are all evaluated with the methods detailed in the ETR.

IT Product Testing is mainly described in two parts:

### ***2.6.1 Developer Testing:***

- TOE Test Coverage: Developer has prepared TOE System Test Document according to the TOE Functional Specification documentation.
- TOE Test Depth: Developer has prepared TOE System Test Document according to the TOE Design documentation which include TSF subsystems and its interactions.
- TOE Functional Testing: Developer has made functional tests according to the test documentation. Test plans, test scenarios, expected test results and actual test results are in the test documentation.

### ***2.6.2 Evaluator Testing:***

- Independent Testing: Evaluator has done a total of 67 sample independent tests. 10 of them are selected from developer`s test plans. The other 17 tests are penetration tests. All of them are related to TOE security functions.
- Penetration Testing: Evaluator has done 17 penetration tests to find out if TOE`s vulnerabilities can be used for malicious purposes. The potential vulnerabilities and the penetration tests are in “TOE Security Functions Penetration Tests Scope”

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## 2.7 Evaluated Configuration

During the evaluation; the configuration of evaluation evidences which are composed of Common Criteria documents, sustenance documents and guides are shown below;

<b>Name of Document</b>	<b>Version Number</b>	<b>Publication Date</b>
Common Criteria - CC	3.1 r4	September 2012
Common Evaluation Methodology - CEM	3.1 r4	September 2012
NPC-ARC-Security Architecture Document	1.9	31.03.2015
NPC-DP-v.0.4 - Delivery Procedure	0.4	31.03.2015
NPC-FSP-v 1.0 – Functional Specification	1.0	31.03.2015
NPC-KYP-v.1.0 – Configuration Management	1.0	31.03.2015
NPC-PRE-v.0.3 – Preparative Procedures	0.3	31.03.2015
NPC-ST-v.1.3 – Security Target	1.3	23.03.2015
NPC-TDS-v1.1 – TOE Design	1.1	20.03.2015
NPC-TD-v0.5 Test Documentation	0.5	26.03.2015
YN200 Kullanım Kılavuzu_27_03_2015	1.1	27.03.2015

**Table 3 – Documentation**

## 2.8 Results of the Evaluation

Table 4 below provides a complete listing of the Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE. These requirements consists of the Evaluation Assurance Level 2 (EAL 2) components as specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria;

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Assurance Class	Component	Component Title	Verdict
Development	ADV_ARC.1	Security Architecture Description	PASS
	ADV_FSP.4	Security-enforcing functional specification	PASS
	ADV_TDS.1	Basic Design	PASS
Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE.1	Operational User Guidance	PASS
	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative Procedures	PASS
Life-Cycle Support	ALC_CMC.2	Use of a CM system	PASS
	ALC_CMS.2	Parts of the TOE CM coverage	PASS
	ALC_DEL.1	Delivery Procedures	PASS
Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL.1	Conformance Claims	PASS
	ASE_ECD.1	Extended Components Definition	PASS
	ASE_INT.1	ST Introduction	PASS
	ASE_OBJ.2	Security Objectives	PASS
	ASE_REQ.2	Derived Security Requirements	PASS
	ASE_SPD.1	Security Problem Definition	PASS
	ASE_TSS.1	TOE Summary Specification	PASS
Tests	ATE_COV.1	Evidence of coverage	PASS
	ATE_FUN.1	Functional Testing	PASS
	ATE_IND.2	Independent Testing	PASS
Vulnerability Analysis	AVA_VAN.2	Vulnerability analysis	PASS

**Table 4 – Security Assurance Requirements of TOE**

The Evaluation Team assigned a Pass, Fail, or Inconclusive verdict to each work unit of each EAL 2 assurance component. For Fail or Inconclusive work unit verdicts, the Evaluation Team advised the developer about the issues requiring resolution or clarification within the evaluation evidence. In this way, the Evaluation Team assigned an overall Pass verdict to the assurance component only when all of the work units for that component had been assigned a Pass verdict. So for TOE “N-PosCore v.1.1” the results of the assessment of all evaluation tasks are “**Pass**”.

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		<b>Revizyon Tarihi</b>		<b>No</b>

The result of AVA\_VAN.2 evaluation is given below:

It is determined that TOE, in its operational environment, is resistant to an attacker possessing “**Basic**” attack potential.

### **2.9 Evaluator Comments / Recommendations**

No recommendations or comments have been communicated to CCCS by the evaluators related to the evaluation process of “N-PosCore v.1.1” product, result of the evaluation, or the ETR.

## **3 SECURITY TARGET**

The Security Target associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following terminology:

Title: N-PosCore v.1.1 Security Target

Version: v1.3

Date of Document: 23.03.2015

## **4 GLOSSARY**

ADV : Assurance of Development

AGD : Assurance of Guidance Documents

ALC : Assurance of Life Cycle

ASE : Assurance of Security Target Evaluation

ATE : Assurance of Tests Evaluation

AVA : Assurance of Vulnerability Analysis

BİLGEM : Bilişim ve Bilgi Güvenliği İleri Teknolojiler Araştırma Merkezi

CC : Common Criteria (Ortak Kriterler)

CCCS : Common Criteria Certification Scheme (TSE)

CCRA : Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement

CCTL : Common Criteria Test Laboratory (OKTEM)

CEM :Common Evaluation Methodology

CMC : Configuration Management Capability

CMS : Configuration Management Scope

DEL : Delivery

EAL : Evaluation Assurance Level

FCR: Fiscal Cash Register

	<b>YAZILIM TEST VE BELGELENDİRME DAİRESİ BAŞKANLIĞI</b>	<b>Doküman No</b>	YTBD-01-01-FR-01	
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		<b>Revizyon Tarihi</b>		<b>No</b>

GR : Observation Report

OKTEM : Ortak Kriterler Test Merkezi

OPE : Opretaional User Guidance

OSP : Organisational Security Policy

PP : Protection Profile

PRA: Presidency of Revenue Administration

PRE : Preperative Procedures

SAR : Security Assurance Requirements

SFR : Security Functional Requirements

ST : Security Target

STCD :Software Test and Certification Department

TOE : Target of Evaluation

TSF : TOE Secirity Functionality

TSFI : TSF Interface

## 5 BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012

[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012

[3] YTBD-01-01-TL-01 Certification Report Preparation Instructions, Rel.Date: July,30,2013

[4] PRA Messaging Protocol, v2.02

## 6 ANNEXES

There is no additional information which is inappropriate for reference in other sections