



**MX-FR30**

## **Security Target**

Version 0.04

This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target written in Japanese.

SHARP CORPORATION

Revision history

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# 1 ST Introduction

In accordance with the Common Criteria (CC) identified in Section 2.1, this chapter identifies this Security Target (ST) and the Target of Evaluation (TOE) claiming conformance to this ST. For that, this chapter presents ST reference, TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE description. See Sections 8.1 and 8.2 for terminology used in this ST.

## 1.1 ST Reference

This section provides information needed to identify this Security Target (ST).

Title: MX-FR30 Security Target

Version: 0.04

Publication Date: April 16, 2012

Author: Sharp Corporation

## 1.2 TOE Reference

This section provides information needed to identify the Target of Evaluation (TOE) claiming conformance to this ST.

Name: MX-FR30

Version: C.10

Developer: Sharp Corporation

## 1.3 TOE Overview

### 1.3.1 TOE Type

The TOE is an IT product to protect data in a Multi Function Device (MFD).

The main part of the TOE is the firmware in a ROM and a Flash memory for the MFD. By replacing the MFD standard firmware, it offers the security functions and controls the entire MFD.

The HDC, part of the hardware in the MFD, is also a part of the TOE and is controlled by the firmware.

MFDs, Multi Function Devices, are office machines mainly with copier, printer, scanner and fax functions.

### 1.3.2 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware

The TOE operates on the MFD (hardware) made by Sharp Corporation, namely, MX-2610FN, MX-2610N, MX-2610NJ, MX-3110FN, MX-3110N, MX-3110NJ, MX-3610FN, MX-3610N and MX-3610NJ.

### 1.3.3 Main Security Functions

The TOE security feature mainly provides the following functions aiming to counter unauthorized attempts to steal image data in the MFD where the TOE is installed.

- a) Cryptographic operation function: encrypts image data and other data that the MFD handles before it is written to the HDD or Flash memory in the MFD.
- b) Data clear function: overwrites an area where encrypted data is stored into the HDD or Flash memory in the MFD with a random or fixed value.
- c) Confidential file function: provides password protection for image data on the HDD stored by the user to protect them from being reused by others without permission.
- d) Network protection function: prevents unauthorized access over the network, wiretapping of communication data and unauthorized modification of the network settings.
- e) Fax flow control function: prevents accesses from the telephone line connected to the MFD's fax I/F to the internal network through the MFD's network I/F.

### 1.3.4 TOE Usage

The TOE provides MFD functions such as copier, printer, scanner, fax transmission and reception, and PC-Fax in the same way as the standard firmware. This section describes an overview of how to invoke the security functions described in the previous section. Descriptions on MFD functions are discussed later.

- a) Users' operation of MFD functions such as copier triggers an automatic operation of the cryptographic operation function and the data clear function of the TOE. The MFD temporality spools image data into the MSD (the HDD or the Flash memory) in the MFD while a job such as copying is in the process. The MFD reads out the image data to process the job and deletes the image data when the job is completed. The TOE encrypts image data to be spooled using the cryptographic operation function and decrypts when it reads it out. The TOE overwrites image data to be deleted using the data clear function.
- b) Using the confidential file function of the TOE, users can save image data as a "confidential file" (with password protection) into the HDD in the MFD. Later they can reuse the confidential file (for printing, fax transmission, transferring the image file to a client and other proposes) and prevent the confidential file from being reused by others with the password.
  - When users give a job such as copy into the MFD, they select to save the image data and specify a password. This allows the TOE to save the image data of the job into the HDD along with the password after job completion.
  - Users set an original on the MFD, specify a password and perform "Scan to HDD". This allows the TOE to scan the original and obtain its image data from the MFD scanner unit, and save the image data into the HDD along with the password.
  - Users select a confidential file saved into the HDD, enter the password and specify a file manipulation (including print, send, preview and delete). The TOE checks the password entered and, when the password is verified, performs the file manipulation. The TOE disables the file manipulation if an incorrect password is entered three times in a row.
- c) When users save a confidential file using the confidential file function of the TOE and when they reuse it, the cryptographic operation function automatically operates. The TOE encrypts the image data and the password to be saved into the HDD using the cryptographic operation function. When the TOE checks a password entered to reuse a confidential file, the TOE reads out the password from the HDD and decrypts it. When a print job, a send job or a preview is executed after verification of the password, the TOE reads out the image data and decrypts it.
- d) When users delete a confidential file using the confidential file function of the TOE, the data clear function of the TOE automatically operates.
- e) When users communicate with the MFD from a client over the network, the SSL function of the TOE can be used. When a print job is sent from a client, the print image data is protected using the IPP-SSL protocol from being wiretapped during transmission. When users access the Web page provided by the MFD for remote operation such as reusing a confidential file, the SSL (HTTPS) protocol can be used to protect information including the password from being wiretapped during transmission.
- f) The administrator operates as necessary (including when the MFD is disposed) to execute "Clear All Memory". Then, the TOE overwrites all image data in the MFD using the data clear function.
- g) The administrator configures the filter settings. The administrator can specify IP address ranges to accept or reject communication with the MFD, and specify MAC addresses to accept communication with the MFD. When the filter settings are configured, the TOE does not respond to communication from IP addresses other than those specified to accept, IP addresses specified to reject and MAC addresses other than those specified to accept.

### 1.3.5 Overview of the MFD Functions and Applications

The usage environment of the MFD that the TOE is installed to is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Usage environment of the MFD

Each MFD function of the TOE is explained below. Most functions are invoked by the operation from the operation panel of the MFD. Some functions are invoked when receiving data. Moreover, some functions are invoked by the operation of MFD Web site, that is, a Web site that the MFD offers for remote operation.

### 1.3.5.1 Job function

The job function receives image data from the MFD's scanner unit or from outside of the MFD, spools the image data into the MSD in the MFD, and sends the image data to the MFD's engine unit (printing) or to the outside of the MFD (transmission). The job control function and the MFD control function implement the job function.

- a) Copier: reads the original and prints that image by the operation from the operation panel. If Tandem Copy mode is selected, it sends the image data to the MFD that the administrator specified beforehand.
- b) Printer: prints data received from the outside of the MFD.
  - Printer driver: generates print data at a client and sends it to the MFD via network or USB. If Tandem Print mode is selected, the printer driver sends the image data to two MFDs.
  - Push print: is to send print data from a client to the MFD via E-mail, FTP or Web. Received data by the internet fax and tandem print requests from another MFD are printed in the same manner.
  - Pull print: acquires print data from an FTP server, a network folder or a USB memory device by operations on the operation panel.
- c) Network scanner: scans an original to obtain its image data through operations on the operation panel, and transmits the image data in either of the following ways:
  - E-mail: transmits it as an attachment to an E-mail.
  - File server: transmits it to an FTP server.
  - Desktop: transmits it via FTP to a client running software tool delivered together with the MFD or provided separately.
  - Network folder: transmits it into a shared folder of Microsoft Windows over the network.
  - USB memory: puts it into a USB memory device plugged into the MFD.
  - PC scan: transmits it via TWAIN to a client running the software tool delivered together with the MFD.
  - Internet Fax: transmits it as an attachment to an E-mail according to the Internet Fax standard specification.
- d) Fax transmission: scans an original to obtain its image data through operations on the operation panel, and transmits the image data as a facsimile.
- e) Fax reception: receives a facsimile from another fax machine and prints it.
- f) PC-Fax: transmits image data from a client as a facsimile or an internet fax.



### 1.3.5.2 Document filing function

The document filing function provides the following functions that allow users to save image data into the HDD in the MFD and operate it from the operation panel or the client via Web later. This function is implemented by the job control function.

- File a job: when a user gives a job such as copy into the MFD, the image data of the job can optionally be saved.
- Scan to HDD: scans the original and does only store it, while neither prints nor transmits it.
- Operation on saved files: calls up saved image data for operations including the following.
  - Print: prints saved image data to the paper. If Tandem Print mode is selected, this function sends image data to the MFD that the administrator specified beforehand.
  - Send: transmits saved image data either by any medium available for the network scanner function or by facsimile.
  - Preview: displays the rough outline of saved image data.
  - Password change: changes confidential file passwords.
  - Delete: removes saved image data that the user no longer needs, and overwrites it.
  - Backup (export): transfers saved image data to the client as binary data, from which the user can restore (import) the image data later.

The printer driver allows its job to be saved without being printed. Similarly, Scan to HDD can be considered as a network scanner job saved without being transmitted.

### 1.3.5.3 Address book function

The Address book function stores destination fax numbers and E-mail addresses. This simplifies the operation for transmission. The data is stored into the HDD and storing, modifying and deleting it are available by the operation from the operation panel or Web. This function is realized by the job control function.

## 1.4 TOE Description

### 1.4.1 Physical Configuration of the TOE

The physical scope of the TOE is shaded in Figure 2. The main part of the TOE is in the MFD's controller firmware and provided as "Data Security Kit MX-FR30 (DSK)", an optional product for Sharp MFDs to enhance security coming with a ROM board and a USB memory device. Part of the security functions is included in the MFD's HDC, which is also within the scope of the TOE.

- ROM: contains part of the controller firmware and is mounted on the controller board.
- MAIN: is part of the controller firmware and installed from the USB memory device of the DSK to the Flash memory in the MFD.
- HDC: is part of an integrated circuit part that is mounted on the controller board in the MFD beforehand.




Figure 2: TOE and physical configuration of the MFD

### 1.4.2 Logical Configuration of the TOE

Figure 3 shows the logical configuration of the TOE. The thick-lined frame indicates the logical scope of the TOE. Rounded boxes indicate hardware devices outside of the TOE. Rectangles indicate functions of the TOE; and ones shaded indicate security functions. Among the data in the volatile memory, HDD, Flash

memory and EEPROM, the data that security functions handle (i.e. user data and TSF data) are also shaded.

Arrows in the figure indicate data flows. Functions of the TOE usually put data in the volatile memory temporarily to pass the data to each other. However, the figure omits every such detail except security significance.

The large part of the TOE is the firmware for the MFD, providing security functions as well as control of the entire MFD. Part of the TOE security functions (TSFs) is implemented in the HDC and invoked by the TSFs in the firmware. The logical scope of the TOE includes the following functions:

- a) Cryptographic operation function (TSF\_FDE): encrypts user data and TSF data to be stored into the MSD and decrypts user data and TSF data retrieved from the MSD. This function is invoked by job control function (each job, address book and document filing functions). A part of this function is implemented in the HDC and invoked by the main part of this function in the firmware.
- b) Cryptographic key generation function (TSF\_FKG): generates the cryptographic key for the cryptographic operation function and stores the key into the volatile memory.
- c) Data clear function (TSF\_FDC): overwrites the MSD to prevent information leakage from the MSD. A part of this function is implemented in HDC and invoked by the main part of this function in the firmware. This function consists of Auto Clear at Job End, Clear All Memory, Clear Document Filing Data and Clear Address Book Data and Registered Data. Auto Clear at Job End is invoked automatically by job control function (each job and document filing functions). The others are invoked by the administrator.
- d) Authentication function (TSF\_AUT): identifies and authenticates an administrator by means of the administrator password. This function includes a management function that changes the administrator password.
- e) Confidential file function (TSF\_FCF): provides password protection when a user saves image data into the MFD using the document filing function (Section 1.3.5.2) and requires authentication by means of that confidential file password to reuse the data. If an incorrect password for a confidential file is entered three times in a row, this function locks that file. Only the administrator can release the locked file.
- f) Network protection function (TSF\_FNP): consists of the following three functions:
  - Filter function: restricts the other party to communicate by the terms of IP address or MAC address.
  - Communication data protection function: protects the communication data by SSL. This function is not available when the user uses a client and/or a protocol not supporting SSL.
  - Network settings protection function: provides the network management functions (see below) only to the administrator and do not allow other users to use it.
- g) Fax flow control function (TSF\_FFL): prevents accesses through the telephone line connected to the MFD's fax I/F from accessing the internal network through the MFD's network I/F.
- h) Job control function: provides the UI and control the action for each MFD function; in other words each job, address book function and document filing function.
- i) MFD control function: controls MFD hardware. This also converts the data format between the data to receive or transmit and the image data in the MFD for the jobs that require the communication.
- j) Network management functions: are for the administrator to query and modify the IP address to be




Figure 3: Logical configuration of the TOE

allocated for the MFD, the IP address of DNS servers that the TOE shall refer, port control (modifying the port number or disabling for each network service) and other network settings for using the network function. This function is invoked by the network protection function (TSF\_FNP).

### 1.4.3 Guidance Documents

Guidance documents shown in the Table 1.1 accompany the firmware as part of the TOE. Versions of the guidance documents are shown in brackets.

Table 1.1: Guidance Documents

For Japan	MX-FR30 Data Security Kit Operation Manual (in Japanese) [1.0]	MX-FR30 Data Security Kit Notice (in Japanese) [1.0]
For outside Japan	MX-FR30 Data Security Kit Operation Manual (in English) [1.0]	MX-FR30 Data Security Kit Notice (in English) [1.0]

### 1.4.4 Assets Protected by the TOE

The following user data are assets that are protected by the TOE.

- a) Image data that the MFD functions spool to process jobs
- b) Image data that users save as confidential files
- c) Address book data
- d) Network settings data
- e) Data transmission over the internal network

Specifics of each clause above is described in the following each section.

#### 1.4.4.1 Image data that the MFD functions spool to process jobs

The assets protected by the TOE include the image data that the TOE itself temporarily spools into the HDD or the Flash memory in the MFD for processing the jobs (mentioned in this chapter) without intent of the user to save when the user uses the MFD functions of the TOE. These data possibly contain the users' sensitive information, such as the user's own information and the information of the customers of the user.

MFDs "delete" these image data to deallocate resources when the jobs are finished or cancelled. To "delete" here means just to make the storage area "unused" by marking it "deleted" in the allocation table. This is to "delete" the image data that occupied the storage area, in the same way as data files on the hard disk connected to a general personal computer are deleted; the deleted image data can remain in the cleared area until the area is reused by other jobs. Thus, this ST includes into the assets the deleted image data remaining on the HDD or the Flash memory in the MFD.

#### 1.4.4.2 Image data that users save as confidential files

The assets protected by the TOE include the image data that the user saves into the HDD as a confidential file. As well as in the previous section, these data possibly contain the users' sensitive information.

The user can delete these data. But, in the same way as the previous section, the image data can remain on the HDD after this deletion. Thus, the deleted image data remaining on the HDD is also included in the assets.

#### 1.4.4.3 Address book data

The assets protected by the TOE include the address book data that the users store by the address book function and is stored into the HDD. This data is the personal data (destination name, mail address, fax number and others) that proper users share and possibly contain the organisation's sensitive information.

There is not necessarily a threat to counter if there is no method for the improper user to read or modify the address book data except standing in front of the operation panel and accessing every record in this data one by one by seeing and operating manually. However, this data shall be protected from the possibility that the improper user reads and modifies this data all at one time from the HDD directly or through the internal network.

#### **1.4.4.4 Network Settings data**

The assets protected by the TOE include the following network settings data that the administrator stored into the EEPROM using the network management function. This data contains the organisation's sensitive information and may lead to the threat to the internal network. Moreover it may lead to the threat to other assets if tampered improperly.

- a) TCP/IP Settings: Enable TCP/IP, Enable DHCP, IP Address Settings
- b) DNS Settings: Primary/Secondary DNS Server, Domain Name
- c) WINS Settings: Enable WINS, Primary/Secondary WINS Server, WINS Scope ID
- d) SMTP Settings: SMTP Server
- e) LDAP Settings: Enable LDAP, LDAP Server
- f) Tandem Connection Settings: IP Address of Slave Machine, Disabling of Master Machine Mode
- g) Port Control: Enabling or the port number for each network service

#### **1.4.4.5 Data transmission over the internal network**

In this ST, the communication data being transmitted over the internal network to and from the MFD is assumed to be the assets in consideration of threats of wiretapping.

#### **1.4.5 Related parties of the TOE**

This chapter describes those related to the TOE and the TOE-equipped MFD.

- Owner: an organisation which possesses the TOE and MFD and is in control of them.
- Those in charge of the organisation: belongs to the owner and is in charge of management of the MFD.
- Administrator: is assigned operation and management of the TOE and MFD by those in charge of the organisation.
- User: uses the MFD functions (Section 1.3.5) of the TOE and MFD.
- User that stored a confidential file: The user that saved the image data as a confidential file.

## 2 Conformance Claims

This ST satisfies the followings.

### 2.1 CC Conformance Claim

The versions of the CC to which this ST and the TOE claim conformance are as follows:

- Part 1: Introduction and general model  
July 2009 Version 3.1 Revision 3; Japanese Translation 1.0
- Part 2: Security functional components  
July 2009 Version 3.1 Revision 3; Japanese Translation 1.0
- Part 3: Security assurance components  
July 2009 Version 3.1 Revision 3; Japanese Translation 1.0

The conformance of this ST to CC Part 2 is CC Part 2 conformant.

The conformance of this ST to CC Part 3 is CC Part 3 conformant.

### 2.2 PP Claim

This ST does not claim conformance to any PP.

### 2.3 Package Claim

This ST claims conformance to EAL3.

### 3 Security Problem Definition

This chapter defines security problems of the TOE.

#### 3.1 Threats

Threats to the TOE are described in Table 3.1. Each of them assumes attackers who possess the basic attack potential.

Table 3.1: Threats

Identifier	Definition
T.RECOVER	An attacker removes the MSD from the MFD and installs it in other devices (than the MFD where the MSD is originally installed) to read and leak the user data in the MSD.
T.REMOTE	An attacker who is not allowed to access to the MFD reads or modifies the address book data in the MFD all at one time through the internal network.
T.SPOOF	An attacker who impersonates other user reads and leaks the image data that the user has saved as confidential file from the operation panel or through the internal network.
T.TAMPER	An attacker who impersonates an administrator reads or modifies the network settings data from the operation panel or through the internal network.
T.TAP	An attacker wiretaps communication data on the internal network when a proper user communicates with the MFD.

#### 3.2 Organisational Security Policies

Organisational security policies are described in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Organisational Security Policies

Identifier	Definition
P.RESIDUAL	Upon completion or cancellation of a job, the area in the MSD where the user data has been spooled shall be overwritten one or more times. When a user deletes a job or file, the area in the MSD which stores the user data shall be overwritten one or more times. When the MFD is disposed of or its ownership changes, all the user areas in the MSD shall be overwritten one or more times.
P.FAXTONET	Accesses through the telephone line connected to the MFD's fax I/F shall be prevented from accessing the internal network through the MFD's network I/F.

#### 3.3 Assumptions

Use and operation of the TOE requires the environment described in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Assumptions

Identifier	Definition
A.NETWORK	The TOE-installed MFD is connected to a subnetwork in the internal network protected against attacks from any external networks, where the subnetwork for the MFD connects nothing other than devices allowed to communicate with the MFD.
A.OPERATOR	The administrator is a trustworthy person who does not take improper action with respect to the TOE.

## 4 Security Objectives

This chapter describes the measures to implement the security objective policies.

### 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

The security objectives for the TOE are shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Security Objectives for the TOE

Identifier	Definition
O.FILTER	The TOE shall provide means to refuse attempts to access via the network to the MFD from any devices that unauthorized users use.
O.MANAGE	The TOE shall provide the function that identifies and authenticates the proper administrator.
O.REMOVE	The TOE shall encrypt the user data using a cryptographic key unique to the MFD when the TOE writes them into the MSD.
O.RESIDUAL	The TOE shall overwrite the user data area spooled into the MSD one or more times when a job is finished or cancelled. The TOE shall overwrite a specific user data area in the MSD one or more times when the user deletes a file. The TOE shall provide the function to overwrite all the user data areas in the MSD one or more times when the administrator operates to overwrite.
O.TRP	The TOE shall provide the function that protects communication data on the internal network from being wiretapped.
O.USER	The TOE shall provide the function that identifies and authenticates the proper user that stored the confidential files.
O.FAXTONET	The TOE shall prevent accesses through the telephone line connected to the MFD's fax I/F from accessing the internal network through the MFD's network I/F.

### 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The security objectives for the operational environment are shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

Identifier	Definition
OE.CIPHER	When the user of the MFD communicates with the TOE, the administrator shall take necessary steps (examples are as follows.) to protect the communication data between the MFD user and the TOE from wiretapping on the internal network where the TOE is installed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The SSL functions of the TOE shall be used; the administrator shall make sure that the users of the TOE and MFD use software supporting the function. The administrator shall also configure the TOE to perform the functions defined in O.TRP.</li> <li>• Communication devices (such as routers and switches) with cryptographic functions shall be used.</li> <li>• The administrator shall provide physical protection (such as restricted areas) to the network.</li> <li>• The administrator shall make the MFD users use USB memory device to input/output the data.</li> </ul>
OE.ERASEALL	When the MFD is disposed of or its ownership changes, the administrator shall overwrite all the user data areas in the MSD one or more times using the TOE's function.
OE.FIREWALL	The administrator shall use the communication device having the function to protect the internal network against the attack from external networks when the internal network where the TOE is installed is connected to the external network.
OE.OPERATE	Those in charge of the organisation shall understand the role of the administrator and select a suitable person with the utmost care.

Identifier	Definition
OE.PC-USER	On the devices allowed to connect to the MFD on the internal network, the administrator shall run the identification and authentication function (such as logging in the OS) so that only the proper MFD users be able to use such devices.
OE.SUBNET	The administrator shall connect only the devices that are allowed to communicate to the MFD in the subnetwork where the TOE is installed, and keep and maintain that state.
OE.USER	The administrator shall make the users of the TOE and the MFD maintain their confidential file password securely so that it will not leak.

### 4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

Table 4.3 demonstrates that the policies indicated in the security objectives are effective for the threats, organisational security policies and assumptions indicated in the security problem definition. Table 4.3 shows the sections of this document that provide the rationale for the correspondences of threats, organisational security policies and the assumptions.

Table 4.3: Security Objectives Rationale

Security problem	T.RECOVER	T.REMOTE	T.SPOOF	T.TAMPER	T.TAP	P.RESIDUAL	P.FAXTONET	A.NETWORK	A.OPERATOR
O.FILTER		4.3.1.2							
O.MANAGE		4.3.1.2	4.3.1.3	4.3.1.4	4.3.1.5	4.3.2.1			
O.REMOVE	4.3.1.1								
O.RESIDUAL						4.3.2.1			
O.TRP					4.3.1.5				
O.USER			4.3.1.3						
O.FAXTONET							4.3.2.2		
OE.CIPHER					4.3.1.5				
OE.ERASEALL						4.3.2.1			
OE.FIREWALL								4.3.3.1	
OE.OPERATE									4.3.3.2
OE.PC-USER		4.3.1.2							
OE.SUBNET								4.3.3.1	
OE.USER			4.3.1.3						

#### 4.3.1 Rationale Explaining Why Threats Are Countered

The following is the rationale explaining why all threats are countered when the security objectives are achieved.

##### 4.3.1.1 T.RECOVER

To counter T.RECOVER, the TOE encrypts user data using a unique cryptographic key for MFD before the data is written to the MSD, as defined in O.REMOVE. Therefore, the attacker possessing the basic attack potential cannot make out the data that is stored or remained after deleting in the MSD even if the attacker could read it out.

When the volatile memory is removed from the MFD, all the storage data in volatile memory is lost by intercepting the power distribution. There are no interfaces to read the data directly on the memory during the run of MFD, and it requires a high level of technology like specifying the data area and under



transferring the data to read the data by attaching probes directly to the terminals or harness of MFD. Therefore, it is impossible for attacker possessing the basic attack potential to read the data by attaching probes directly to the terminals or harness of MFD. For this reason the cryptographic key that is stored into the volatile memory cannot be read.

Therefore, it is possible to protect the information on HDD and Flash memory from the leak by following each objective above.

#### 4.3.1.2 T.REMOTE

The followings counter T.REMOTE.

- According to O.FILTER, the TOE provides the method to deny accesses to the MFD from any devices that unauthorized users use via the network. This denies accesses to the MFD from unauthorized devices connected to the internal network while accepts accesses to the MFD from devices (including clients and servers) connected to the internal network with the intention to be used by authorized users of the MFD (including the administrator).
- In support of the previous paragraph, as defined in O.MANAGE, the TOE provides the function to identify and authenticate the administrator who configures settings required for the operation of the TOE.
- Accesses to the MFD from the devices (including clients and servers) connected to the internal network with the intention to be used by authorized users of the MFD (including the administrator) shall be permitted and are not subjected to the denial by O.FILTER. According to OE.PC-USER, an identification and authentication function (including logging in the OS) shall be required to devices allowed connections to the MFD and only the authorized users shall use the devices. This prevents attackers from abusing the devices allowed connections to the MFD (those for authorized users of the MFD) to access the address book data in the MFD (by impersonating authorised users).

Thus, O.FILTER and OE.PC-USER affect mutually and supplementary, and O.MANAGE supports O.FILTER. These objectives above can prevent the attacker who is not allowed to access to the MFD from accessing through the internal network and protect the address book data in the MFD.

#### 4.3.1.3 T.SPOOF

The followings counter T.SPOOF.

- The TOE provides the function that identifies and authenticates the proper user who has stored the confidential file according to O.USER.
- In support of the previous paragraph, as defined in O.MANAGE, the TOE provides the function to identify and authenticate the administrator who configures settings required for the operation of the TOE.
- The confidential file password that is required for identification and authentication of the proper user that stored the confidential file shall be maintained safely not to be leaked. The administrator makes the users of the TOE and the MFD to follow OE.USER.

These objectives above can counter the threat that caused by an attacker's impersonating other user.

#### 4.3.1.4 T.TAMPER

To counter T.TAMPER, the TOE provides the function to identify and authenticate the proper administrator according to O.MANAGE. Therefore, it is possible to protect the network settings data against reading or modifying via the operation panel or an internal network by the attacker who impersonates the administrator.

#### 4.3.1.5 T.TAP

The followings counter T.TAP.

- The TOE provides the function that protects communication data on the internal network from being wiretapped according to O.TRP.
- In support of the previous paragraph, as defined in O.MANAGE, the TOE provides the function to identify and authenticate the administrator who configures settings required for the operation of the TOE.

- In the internal network where the TOE is installed, the administrator shall exercise due care (using the TSF according to O.TRP, or other protective means when the MFD is in an environment where the use of the TSF is not suitable) of the communication data between the MFD user and the TOE not to be wiretapped, according to OE.CIPHER.

These objectives above can prevent the attacker from leaking communication data in the internal network when an authorized user communicates with the MFD.

### **4.3.2 Rationale for Implementation of Organisational Security Policies**

The following shows the rationale for all the organisational security policies to be implemented by achieving all the security objectives.

#### **4.3.2.1 P.RESIDUAL**

P.RESIDUAL can be achieved by the following objectives.

- Upon completion or cancellation of a job, the TOE overwrites the area in the MSD where the user data spooled one or more times according to O.RESIDUAL.
- According to O.RESIDUAL, the TOE overwrites a specific user data area in the MSD one or more times when the user deletes a file.
- When the MFD is disposed of or its ownership changes, the administrator overwrites all the user data areas in the MSD one or more times by using the function of the TOE according to OE.ERASEALL. This requires the support of the TOE and the function described in next paragraph is available.
- The TOE provides the function to overwrite all the user areas in the MSD one or more times by the administrator's operation according to O.RESIDUAL.
- In support of the previous paragraph, as defined in O.MANAGE, the TOE provides the function to identify and authenticate the administrator who configures settings required for the operation of the TOE.

These objectives above can achieve P.RESIDUAL.

#### **4.3.2.2 P.FAXTONET**

To implement P.FAXTONET, as defined in O.FAXTONET, the TOE shall prevent accesses through the telephone line connected to the MFD's fax I/F from accessing the internal network through the MFD's network I/F. Thus, P.FAXTONET can be achieved.

### **4.3.3 Rationale for Satisfaction of Assumptions**

The following is the rationale explaining why all assumptions are satisfied when the security objectives are achieved.

#### **4.3.3.1 A.NETWORK**

The assumption A.NETWORK requires that the MFD that the TOE is installed to is connected to an internal network, the internal network is protected against attacking from any external networks and only the devices that are allowed to communicate to the MFD are connected to at least the same subnetwork as MFD in the internal network. This is realized by the combination of OE.FIREWALL and OE.SUBNET.

#### **4.3.3.2 A.OPERATOR**

The assumption A.OPERATOR requires that the administrator is a trustworthy person. OE.OPERATE satisfies it by enforcing strict selection of the person to be the administrator based on an understanding of the role of administrator on the part of those in charge of the organisation that owns the TOE-equipped MFD. Therefore, A.OPERATOR can be achieved.

## 5 Extended Components Definition

This ST does not define any extended components.

## 6 Security Requirements

This chapter describes the security requirements.

### 6.1 Requirement Operations

This section defines the operations of CC functional and assurance components.

- Iteration operation: used to cover different aspects of the same requirements.
  - Component names, component labels and element labels are used as unique identifiers, with each followed by a lowercase character such as a, b, c,...
- Assignment operation: used to assign specified values to undetermined parameters such as the length of a password in the components.
  - A value assigned to a parameter is shown in brackets. Values, even if they are a part of a list of all, are comma-delimited or itemized.
  - Information in parentheses identifying each value such as its parameter name is added to the value as necessary.
- Selection operation: used to select one or more items from those given in the components.
  - Selected items are shown in *italic brackets, with being underlined and in italics*.
- Refinement operation: used to further refine the TOE by adding details to the components.
  - Additional text is shown in **bold**.
  - If a part of the original text is deleted, the part is shown in parentheses.
  - If a part of the original text is replaced with new text, the new text in **bold** is shown immediately before the original text in parentheses.
- *Simple Italics* do not indicate requirement operations. They are only used to emphasize text throughout the ST.

### 6.2 Security Functional Requirements

This section describes the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) that the TOE shall satisfy, based on the classes of CC Part 2.

#### 6.2.1 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support

##### FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or  
FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_CKM.1.1. The TSF shall generate the cryptographic key **that is unique to the MFD** in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [MSN-R3 expansion algorithm] and specified cryptographic key size [256 bits] that meet the following: [Data Security Kit Encryption Standard]

##### FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [

- Encrypting spool image data that will be written to the Flash memory
- Decrypting spool image data that was read from the Flash memory
- Encrypting spool image data that will be written to the HDD
- Encrypting filing image data that will be written to the HDD

- Encrypting the address book data that will be written to the HDD
  - Encrypting the administrator password that will be written to the HDD
  - Encrypting confidential file passwords that will be written to the HDD
  - Decrypting spool image data that was read from the HDD
  - Decrypting filing image data that was read from the HDD
  - Decrypting the address book data that was read from the HDD
  - Decrypting the administrator password that was read from the HDD
  - Decrypting confidential file passwords that was read from the HDD
- ] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Rijndael Algorithm] and cryptographic key size [256 bits] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 197].

## 6.2.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection

- FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control  
Hierarchical to: No other components.  
Dependencies: FDP\_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
- FDP\_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [fax information flow control SFP] on [
  - Reception at the fax I/F from the fax line and transmission from the network I/F to the internal network (subject)
  - Data received at the fax I/F from the fax line (information)
  - Relay from the fax I/F to the network I/F (operation)].
- FDP\_IFF.1 Simple security attributes  
Hierarchical to: No other components.  
Dependencies: FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control  
FMT\_MSA.3 Static attributes initialization
- FDP\_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [fax information flow control SFP] based on the following types of subjects and information security attributes: [
  - Reception at the fax I/F from the fax line (subject): No security attributes
  - Transmission from the network I/F to the internal network (subject): No security attributes
  - Data received at the fax I/F from the fax line (information): No security attributes].
- FDP\_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [Never permits].
- FDP\_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [None (additional information flow control SFP rules)].
- FDP\_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [None (rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise information flows)].
- FDP\_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [None (rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows)].
- FDP\_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection  
Hierarchical to: No other components.  
Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FDP\_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable **by overwriting one or more times** upon the [*deallocation of the resource from*] the following objects: [
  - The spool image data file on the HDD
  - The filing image data file on the HDD
  - The address book data file on the HDD
  - The spool image data file in the Flash memory].

].

### 6.2.3 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication

- FIA\_AFL.1a Authentication failure handling a  
Hierarchical to: No other components.  
Dependencies: FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
- FIA\_AFL.1.1a The TSF shall detect when [ [3 (*positive integer number*)] ] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [the unsuccessful administrator authentication attempts following the last successful authentication].
- FIA\_AFL.1.2a When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [*met*], the TSF shall [  
• Unsuccessful authentication reached three times: Reception of authentication trials stops for five minutes  
• Five minutes later after stopping: the number of times authentication was unsuccessful is cleared, and the reception of authentication trials is recovered  
].
- FIA\_AFL.1b Authentication failure handling b  
Hierarchical to: No other components.  
Dependencies: FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
- FIA\_AFL.1.1b The TSF shall detect when [ [3 (*positive integer number*)] ] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [the unsuccessful authentication attempts for a confidential file following the last successful authentication for that confidential file].
- FIA\_AFL.1.2b When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [*met*], the TSF shall [  
• Unsuccessful authentication reached three times: Reception of authentication trials stops and the confidential file is locked  
• Release operation of the confidential file by the administrator: the number of times authentication was unsuccessful is cleared, and the reception of authentication trials is recovered  
].
- FIA\_SOS.1a Verification of secrets a  
Hierarchical to: No other components.  
Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FIA\_SOS.1.1a The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that **the administrator password** (secrets) **meets** (meet) [5 or more characters].
- FIA\_SOS.1b Verification of secrets b  
Hierarchical to: No other components.  
Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FIA\_SOS.1.1b The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that **the confidential file password** (secrets) **meets** (meet) [5 or more characters].
- FIA\_UAU.2a User authentication before any action a  
Hierarchical to: FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication  
Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification
- FIA\_UAU.2.1a The TSF shall require each **administrator** (user) to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that **administrator** (user).
- FIA\_UAU.2b User authentication before any action b  
Hierarchical to: FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

- Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification
- FIA\_UAU.2.1b The TSF shall require each **user that stored a confidential file** to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
- FIA\_UAU.7a Protected authentication feedback a  
Hierarchical to: No other components.  
Dependencies: FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
- FIA\_UAU.7.1a The TSF shall provide only [substitute characters as many as ones that are provided] to the **administrator** (user) while the authentication **of the administrator** is in progress.
- FIA\_UAU.7b Protected authentication feedback b  
Hierarchical to: No other components.  
Dependencies: FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
- FIA\_UAU.7.1b The TSF shall provide only [substitute characters as many as ones that are provided] to **the user that stored a confidential file** while the authentication **of the user** is in progress.
- FIA\_UID.2a User identification before any action a  
Hierarchical to: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification  
Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FIA\_UID.2.1a The TSF shall require each **administrator** (user) to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that **administrator** (user).
- FIA\_UID.2b User identification before any action b  
Hierarchical to: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification  
Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FIA\_UID.2.1b The TSF shall require each user **that stored a confidential file** to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

#### 6.2.4 Class FMT: Security Management

- FMT\_MOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour a  
Hierarchical to: No other components.  
Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
- FMT\_MOF.1.1a The TSF shall restrict the ability to *[enable]* the functions [Clear All Memory, Clear Document Filing Data and Clear Address Book Data and Registered Data] to [administrator].
- FMT\_MOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour b  
Hierarchical to: No other components  
Dependencies: FMT\_SMF.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMR.1 Specification of Management Functions
- FMT\_MOF.1.1b The TSF shall restrict the ability to *[disable]* the functions [Clear All Memory and Clear Document Filing Data] to [administrator].
- FMT\_MOF.1c Management of security functions behaviour c  
Hierarchical to: No other components  
Dependencies: FMT\_SMF.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMR.1 Specification of Management Functions
- FMT\_MOF.1.1c The TSF shall restrict the ability to *[modify the behaviour of]* the functions [Document Filing and Network Protection] to [administrator].

FMT\_MTD.1a Management of TSF data a

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MTD.1.1a The TSF shall restrict the ability to [*modify*] the [administrator password] to [administrator].

FMT\_MTD.1b Management of TSF data b

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MTD.1.1b The TSF shall restrict the ability to [*modify*] the [confidential file password] to [the user that stored the confidential file].

FMT\_MTD.1c Management of TSF data c

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MTD.1.1c The TSF shall restrict the ability to [*query, modify*] the [

- Values of the IP address filter settings
  - Values of the MAC address filter settings
  - Values of the SSL Settings
  - Values of Disabling of Document Filing
  - Values of Disabling of Print Jobs Other Than Print Hold Job
- ] to [administrator].

FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FMT\_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [

- Enable and Disable “Clear All Memory”
- Enable and Disable “Clear Document Filing Data”
- Enable “Clear Address Book Data and Registered Data”
- Lock releasing “confidential files”
- Modify “the administrator password”
- Modify “confidential file passwords”
- Query and Modify “Disabling of Document Filing”
- Query and Modify “Disabling of Print Jobs Other Than Print Hold Job”
- Query and Modify “IP address filter settings” and “MAC address filter settings”
- Manage SSL-protected services

].

*Note: Consideration for management requirement is described in Section 6.4.1.9.*

FMT\_SMR.1a Security roles a

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

FMT\_SMR.1.1a The TSF shall maintain the roles [administrator].

FMT\_SMR.1.2a The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FMT\_SMR.1b Security roles b

Hierarchical to: No other components.



Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

FMT\_SMR.1.1b The TSF shall maintain the roles [each user that stored a confidential file].

FMT\_SMR.1.2b The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

## 6.2.5 Class FTA: TOE Access

FTA\_TSE.1 TOE session establishment

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FTA\_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on [IP address and MAC address].

## 6.2.6 Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channels

FTP\_TRP.1 Trusted path

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FTP\_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [*remote*] users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from [*disclosure*].

FTP\_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [*remote users*] to initiate communication via **HTTPS or IPP-SSL** (the trusted path).

FTP\_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [

- Administrator authentication, manipulation of confidential files, reading out the address book data, modification of the address book, filter settings and network settings via the TOE Web
- Image data reception from the printer driver in the print function

(*other services for which trusted path is required*)]].

## 6.3 Security Assurance Requirements

The EAL3 security assurance requirements (SAR) to which this ST claims conformance are shown by assurance class of CC Part 3. This ST uses the security assurance components defined in CC Part 3 without changes as the SAR.

- Class ADV: Development
  - Security architecture: ADV\_ARC.1 — Security architecture description
  - Functional specification: ADV\_FSP.3 — Functional specification with complete summary
  - TOE design: ADV\_TDS.2 — Architectural design
- Class AGD: Guidance documents
  - Operational user guidance: AGD\_OPE.1 — Operational user guidance
  - Preparative procedures: AGD\_PRE.1 — Preparative procedures
- Class ALC: Life-cycle support
  - CM capability: ALC\_CMC.3 — Authorisation controls
  - CM scope: ALC\_CMS.3 — Implementation representation CM coverage
  - Delivery: ALC\_DEL.1 — Delivery procedures
  - Development security: ALC\_DVS.1 — Identification of security measures
  - Life-cycle definition: ALC\_LCD.1 — Developer defined life-cycle model
- Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
  - Conformance claims: ASE\_CCL.1 — Conformance claims
  - Extended components definition: ASE\_ECD.1 — Extended components definition
  - ST introduction: ASE\_INT.1 — ST introduction

- Security objectives: ASE\_OBJ.2 — Security objectives
- Security requirements: ASE\_REQ.2 — Derived Security requirements
- Security problem definition: ASE\_SPD.1 — Security problem definition
- TOE summary specification: ASE\_TSS.1 — TOE summary specification
- Class ATE: Tests
  - Coverage: ATE\_COV.2 — Analysis of coverage
  - Depth: ATE\_DPT.1 — Testing: basic design
  - Functional tests: ATE\_FUN.1 — Functional testing
  - Independent testing: ATE\_IND.2 — Independent testing - sample
- Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment
  - Vulnerability analysis: AVA\_VAN.2 — Vulnerability analysis

## 6.4 Security Requirements Rationale

This section demonstrates that the security requirements are effective to meet the security objectives.

### 6.4.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale

The correspondences between security functional requirements (SFRs) and security objectives are shown in Table 6.1. Table 6.1 shows the sections that provide the rationale for the correspondences between the security functional requirements and the security objectives.

Table 6.1: Security Functional Requirements Rationale

Objective Requirement	O.FILTER	O.MANAGE	O.REMOV	O.RESIDUAL	O.TRP	O.USER	O.FAXTONE1
FCS_CKM.1		6.4.1.2	6.4.1.3			6.4.1.6	
FCS_COP.1		6.4.1.2	6.4.1.3			6.4.1.6	
FDP_IFC.1							6.4.1.7
FDP_IFF.1							6.4.1.7
FDP_RIP.1				6.4.1.4			
FIA_AFL.1a		6.4.1.2					
FIA_AFL.1b						6.4.1.6	
FIA_SOS.1a		6.4.1.2					
FIA_SOS.1b						6.4.1.6	
FIA_UAU.2a		6.4.1.2					
FIA_UAU.2b						6.4.1.6	
FIA_UAU.7a		6.4.1.2					
FIA_UAU.7b						6.4.1.6	
FIA_UID.2a		6.4.1.2					
FIA_UID.2b						6.4.1.6	
FMT_MOF.1a				6.4.1.4			
FMT_MOF.1b				6.4.1.4			
FMT_MOF.1c		6.4.1.2			6.4.1.5	6.4.1.6	
FMT_MTD.1a		6.4.1.2					
FMT_MTD.1b						6.4.1.6	
FMT_MTD.1c	6.4.1.1	6.4.1.2			6.4.1.5	6.4.1.6	
FMT_SMF.1	6.4.1.1	6.4.1.2		6.4.1.4	6.4.1.5	6.4.1.6	
FMT_SMR.1a		6.4.1.2					
FMT_SMR.1b						6.4.1.6	
FTA_TSE.1	6.4.1.1						
FTP_TRP.1		6.4.1.2			6.4.1.5	6.4.1.6	

#### 6.4.1.1 O.FILTER

O.FILTER can be met by the combination of SFRs as follows.

- The TOE is able to deny session establishment based on IP address or MAC address according to FTA\_TSE.1.
- The TOE provides the capability of performing the management of the IP address filter and MAC address filter settings that is required for operating the previous paragraph according to FMT\_SMF.1.
- The ability to query or modify the values of the IP address filter settings and MAC address filter settings described in the previous paragraph is restricted to the administrator by FMT\_MTD.1c.

FMT\_SMF.1 and FMT\_MTD.1c provide the management of FTA\_TSE.1 consistently and do not conflict among them.

As explained above, SFRs do not conflict to meet O.FILTER.

#### 6.4.1.2 O.MANAGE

O.MANAGE can be met by the combination of SFRs as follows.

- a) The administrator is identified and authenticated by FIA\_AFL.1a, FIA\_UAU.2a, FIA\_UAU.7a and FIA\_UID.2a.
- b) The TOE provides the capability to modify the administrator password that is required for authentication of the administrator described above according to FMT\_SMF.1.
- c) It is ensured that the administrator password meets 5 or more characters when the administrator password is modified according to FIA\_SOS.1a.
- d) The capability to modify the administrator password that is the TSF data to achieve O.MANAGE is restricted to the administrator by FMT\_MTD.1a.
- e) The role of the administrator is maintained and the administrator is associated with the roles by FMT\_SMR.1a.
- f) According to FCS\_COP.1, the administrator password to be written to the HDD is encrypted. Therefore, even if the HDD is connected to a device which is not the MFD having originally stored the administrator password into the HDD, the encryption protects the administrator password from being regenerated. Thus, a secondary threat can be prevented of the disabling of O.MANAGE caused by regenerating the administration password.
- g) FCS\_CKM.1 generates a unique cryptographic key for each MFD to achieve FCS\_COP.1.
- h) FTP\_TRP.1 provides the function to protect the administrator password over the internal network from being wiretapped. Thus, a secondary threat can be prevented of the disabling of O.MANAGE caused by wiretapping the administration password.
- i) The capability to modify the behaviour of the TSF defined by FTP\_TRP.1, that is, Network Protection function is restricted to the administrator by FMT\_MOF.1c.
- j) The capability to query or modify the TSF data relating to FTP\_TRP.1, that is, the values of the SSL settings is restricted to the administrator by FMT\_MTD.1c.
- k) Operation and management can be implemented as FMT\_SMF.1 requires.

a) is related to the event about the identification and authentication of the administrator. b), c) and d) are related to the event about the modification of the administrator password. f) and g) are related to the event about the encryption operation of the administrator password. h), i), j) and k) are related to the event about the transmission of the administrator password over the internal network

These four events occur independently of each other, and do not conflict mutually.

Conflict does not occur in a) because the four SFRs in a) affect mutually and supplementary to achieve the identification and authentication of the administrator.

Conflict does not occur in b), c) and d) because the three SFRs in b), c) and d) affect mutually and supplementary to achieve the modification of the administrator password.

Conflict does not occur in e) because e) is a requirement for the dependency of d), and it is supported to a).

Conflict does not occur in f) and g) because f) and g) depend on each other to achieve the encryption operation of the administrator password to be written to the HDD.

Conflict does not occur in i), j) and k) because i), j) and k) defines mutually and supplementary the management of h).

Thus, these SFRs do not conflict to meet O.MANAGE.

### 6.4.1.3 O.REMOVE

The intent of O.REMOVE is to counter T.RECOVER; to prevent the user data stored into the MSD from being regenerated even if the MSD is removed from the MFD. This can be met by the combination of SFRs as follows.

- According to FCS\_COP.1, the user data to be written to the MSD is encrypted. Therefore, even if the MSD is connected to a device which is not the MFD having originally stored the data into the HDD, the encryption protects the data from being regenerated.
- FCS\_CKM.1 generates a unique cryptographic key for each MFD that satisfies FCS\_COP.1.

FCS\_COP.1 and FCS\_CKM.1 depend mutually and do not conflict mutually. Thus, these SFRs do not conflict to meet O.REMOVE as above.

### 6.4.1.4 O.RESIDUAL

O.RESIDUAL can be met by the combination of SFRs as follows:

- a) FDP\_RIP.1 requires to overwrite the following objects' area one or more times upon the deallocation of the resource from the following objects.
  - The target objects are the spool image data file on the HDD, filing image data file on the HDD, address book data file on the HDD and the spool image data file in the Flash memory.
  - The resource from these objects is deallocated when the jobs are completed or cancelled, the user deletes the confidential file and the specific data clear function is invoked by the operation made by the administrator.
  - Specific data clear functions described in the previous paragraph include Clear All Memory, Clear Document Filing Data and Clear Address Book Data and Registered Data.
- b) According to FMT\_SMF.1, the management capability defined in FDP\_RIP.1 is provided.
- c) In each of the following SFRs, the management capability defined in FDP\_RIP.1 is restricted to the administrator.
  - According to FMT\_MOF.1a, the capability is restricted to the administrator to enable each of the functions of Clear All Memory, Clear Document Filing Data and Clear Address Book Data and Registered Data included in the TSF relating to FDP\_RIP.1.
  - According to FMT\_MOF.1b, the capability is restricted to the administrator to disable each of the functions of Clear All Memory and Clear Document Filing Data included in the TSF relating to FDP\_RIP.1.

Conflict does not occur in c) because each SFR in c) is independent. Conflict does not occur in b) and c) because b) and c) defines the management of a) mutually and supplementarily.

Thus, these SFRs do not conflict to meet O.RESIDUAL.

### 6.4.1.5 O.TRP

O.TRP can be met by the combination of SFR as follows.

- FTP\_TRP.1 provides the function to protect communication data over the internal network.
- The capability to modify the behaviour of the TSF defined by FTP\_TRP.1, that is, Network Protection function is restricted to the administrator by FMT\_MOF.1c.
- The capability to query or modify the TSF data relating to FTP\_TRP.1, that is, the values of the SSL Settings is restricted to the administrator by FMT\_MTD.1c.
- Operation and management can be implemented as FMT\_SMF.1 requires.

Conflict does not occur between FMT\_MOF.1c, FMT\_MTD.1c and FMT\_SMF.1 because they define the management of FTP\_TRP.1 mutually and complementary. Thus, these SFRs do not conflict to meet O.TRP.

#### 6.4.1.6 O.USER

O.USER can be met by the combination of SFRs as follows.

- a) The user that stored a confidential file is identified and authenticated by FIA\_AFL.1b, FIA\_UAU.2b, FIA\_UAU.7b and FIA\_UID.2b. Thus, only the user that stored the confidential file can access the confidential file (including the management of the confidential file password).
- b) It is ensured that a confidential file password meets 5 or more characters according to FIA\_SOS.1b.
- c) The capability to modify the TSF defined by FIA\_AFL.1b, FIA\_UAU.2b, FIA\_UAU.7b and FIA\_UID.2b, that is Document Filing function, is restricted to the administrator by FMT\_MOF.1c.
- d) The capability to modify a confidential file password is restricted to the user that stored the confidential file by FMT\_MTD.1b.
- e) The capability to query or modify the TSF data relating to the effectiveness of protection obtained by using the confidential file function, that is, the values of Disabling of Document Filing and Disabling of Print Jobs Other Than Print Hold Job is restricted to the administrator by FMT\_MTD.1c.
- f) The role of the user that stored a confidential file is maintained and the user that stored a confidential file is associated with the role by FMT\_SMR.1b.
- g) Management and operation of confidential passwords are implemented as FMT\_SMF.1 requires.
- h) According to FCS\_COP.1, confidential file passwords to be written to the HDD is encrypted. Therefore, even if the HDD is connected to a device which is not the MFD having originally stored the confidential file password into the HDD, the encryption protects the confidential file password from being regenerated. Thus, a secondary threat can be prevented of the disabling of O.USER caused by regenerating the confidential file password.
- i) FCS\_CKM.1 generates a unique cryptographic key for each MFD to achieve FCS\_COP.1.
- j) FTP\_TRP.1 provides the function to protect confidential file passwords over the internal network from being wiretapped. Thus, a secondary threat can be prevented of the disabling of O.USER caused by wiretapping confidential file passwords.
- k) The capability to modify the behaviour of the TSF defined by FTP\_TRP.1, that is, Network Protection function is restricted to the administrator by FMT\_MOF.1c.
- l) The capability to query or modify the TSF data relating to FTP\_TRP.1, that is, the values of the SSL Settings is restricted to the administrator by FMT\_MTD.1c.
- m) Operation and management can be implemented as FMT\_SMF.1 requires.

a) is related to the event about the identification and authentication of the user that stored a confidential file. b), d) and g) are related to the event about the modification of confidential file passwords. c) and e) are related to the event about the management by the administrator. h) and i) are related to the event of the encryption of confidential file passwords. j), k), l) and m) are related to the event of transmitting a confidential file password over the internal network.

These five events occur independently of each other, and do not conflict mutually.

Conflict does not occur in a) because the four SFRs affect mutually and supplementary to identify and authenticate the user that stored a confidential file.

Conflict does not occur in b), d) and g) because the three SFRs affect mutually and supplementary to modify confidential file passwords.

Conflict does not occur in c) and e) because the two SFRs affect mutually and supplementary to achieve management by the administrator.

f) does not conflict because it is depended on by d) and supported by a).

h) and i) are mutually dependent in encrypting confidential file passwords to be written to the HDD.

Conflict does not occur in k), l) and m) because they defines the management of j) mutually and supplementary.

Thus, these SFRs do not conflict to meet O.USER.

#### 6.4.1.7 O.FAXTONET

O.FAXTONET can be met by the combination of the SFRs of FDP\_IFC.1 and FDP\_IFF.1.

These two SFRs implements a data flow control that never allows the data received from the fax line to be relayed to the internal network. This prevents accesses from the telephone line connected to the MFD's fax I/F from being relayed to the internal network through the MFD's network I/F.

Conflict does not occur in the two SFRs which meet O.FAXTONET, because they depend on each other.

#### **6.4.1.8 Rationale for consistency of the entire security functional requirements**

As described in Sections 6.4.1.1 through 6.4.1.7, conflict does not occur between each of the SFRs which implement the TOE security objectives, eliminating any inconsistency.

Furthermore, as shown in Table 4.1, each of the TOE security objectives is independent and does not conflict against each other; no conflict occurs between the TOE security objectives and they are consistent.

Thus, no conflict occurs among the whole SFRs which meet the TOE security objectives and the entire SFRs are consistent.

#### **6.4.1.9 Rationale for consistency of TOE security management functions**

Some of the SFRs require the security management function. CC Part 2 suggests the management activities foreseen to each functional component as the management requirements of each component.

The management functions required for all the SFR components are shown in Table 6.2 with the consideration for management requirement. The management functions specified by FMT\_SMF.1 agree with the required management functions shown in the table.

Thus, the SFRs are internally consistent in terms of security management functions.

Table 6.2: Management Functions of the TOE

Management Function Origin	Management Function required	Consideration for management requirement
FCS_CKM.1	—	(no management requirements)
FCS_COP.1	—	(no management requirements)
FDP_IFC.1	—	(no management requirements)
FDP_IFF.1	—	No attributes.
FDP_RIP.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enable and Disable “Clear All Memory”</li> <li>• Enable and Disable “Clear Document Filing Data”</li> <li>• Enable “Clear Address Book Data and Registered Data”</li> </ul>	The timing to perform protection is fixed to the release of allocation.
FIA_AFL.1a	—	The threshold and action are fixed.
FIA_AFL.1b	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lock releasing “confidential files”</li> </ul>	The threshold and action are fixed.
FIA_SOS.1a	—	The quality metric is fixed.
FIA_SOS.1b	—	The quality metric is fixed.
FIA_UAU.2a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Modify “the administrator password”</li> </ul>	Management Function required agrees with management requirement.
FIA_UAU.2b	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Modify “confidential file passwords”</li> <li>• Query and Modify “Disabling of Document Filing”</li> <li>• Query and Modify “Disabling of Print Jobs Other Than Print Hold Job”</li> </ul>	Management Function required agrees with management requirement.
FIA_UAU.7a	—	(no management requirements)
FIA_UAU.7b	—	(no management requirements)
FIA_UID.2a	—	Identification of the administrator is fixed.
FIA_UID.2b	—	Identification of each user that stored a confidential file is fixed.
FMT_MOF.1a	—	No role groups
FMT_MOF.1b	—	No role groups
FMT_MOF.1c	—	No role groups
FMT_MTD.1a	—	No role groups
FMT_MTD.1b	—	No role groups
FMT_MTD.1c	—	No role groups
FMT_SMF.1	—	(no management requirements)
FMT_SMR.1a	—	No user groups
FMT_SMR.1b	—	No user groups
FTA_TSE.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Query and Modify “IP address filter settings” and “MAC address filter settings”</li> </ul>	Management Function required agrees with management requirement.
FTP_TRP.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Manage SSL-protected services</li> </ul>	Management Function required agrees with management requirement.

#### 6.4.1.10 Rationale for security functional requirement dependencies

Table 6.3 shows the dependencies that the SFRs must satisfy according to the CC, the ones that the TOE satisfies and the ones that the TOE does not satisfy. The dependency that is marked with “\*” in the table is satisfied by the hierarchically upper component. Table 6.4 shows the justification for the TOE not satisfying certain dependencies. Correspondences between the following two tables are indicated by common identifiers (such as J1).

Table 6.3: Security Functional Requirement Dependencies

Dependencies Requirement	Stipulated	Satisfied	Unsatisfied	Justification
FCS_CKM.1	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1], FCS_CKM.4	FCS_COP.1	FCS_CKM.4	J1
FCS_COP.1	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1], FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1	FCS_CKM.4	J1
FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFF.1	FDP_IFF.1	—	—
FDP_IFF.1	FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3	FDP_IFC.1	FMT_MSA.3	J2
FDP_RIP.1	—	—	—	—
FIA_AFL.1a	FIA_UAU.1 *	FIA_UAU.2a	—	—
FIA_AFL.1b	FIA_UAU.1 *	FIA_UAU.2b	—	—
FIA_SOS.1a	—	—	—	—
FIA_SOS.1b	—	—	—	—
FIA_UAU.2a	FIA_UID.1 *	FIA_UID.2a	—	—
FIA_UAU.2b	FIA_UID.1 *	FIA_UID.2b	—	—
FIA_UAU.7a	FIA_UAU.1 *	FIA_UAU.2a	—	—
FIA_UAU.7b	FIA_UAU.1 *	FIA_UAU.2b	—	—
FIA_UID.2a	—	—	—	—
FIA_UID.2b	—	—	—	—
FMT_MOF.1a	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1a	—	—
FMT_MOF.1b	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1a	—	—
FMT_MOF.1c	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1a	—	—
FMT_MTD.1a	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1a	—	—
FMT_MTD.1b	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1b	—	—
FMT_MTD.1c	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1a	—	—
FMT_SMF.1	—	—	—	—
FMT_SMR.1a	FIA_UID.1 *	FIA_UID.2a	—	—
FMT_SMR.1b	FIA_UID.1 *	FIA_UID.2b	—	—
FTA_TSE.1	—	—	—	—
FTP_TRP.1	—	—	—	—

Table 6.4: Justification of Unsatisfied Security Functional Requirement Dependencies

	Unsatisfied	Justification Rationale
J1	FCS_CKM.4	The cryptographic key is unique for each MFD; the same cryptographic key is generated and stored into the volatile memory every time each MFD is turned on. The cryptographic key is destroyed by discharging the electrical charge in the volatile memory which occurs every time the MFD is turned off. Therefore, there is no need to implement the TSF that performs the standard key destruction method, and FCS_CKM.4 is not required to specify standards.
J2	FMT_MSA.3	Fax information flow control SFP never permits the target information flow. Therefore, security attributes need not to be dealt with in implementing SFP; FMT_MSA.3 is not required which defines the default values of the security attributes.

### 6.4.2 TOE security Assurance Requirements Rationale

The TOE is a part of the MFD and an optional product for the MFD that is sold separately, which is a commercial product. The major threat is that an attacker uses physical means to remove the MSD from the MFD and installs it in other devices to read and leak the user data in the MSD. Therefore, the Evaluation Assurance Level of the TOE is EAL 3 which is sufficient for commercial products.

Since the SARs conform to EAL3, all SARs meet the dependencies.



## 7 TOE Summary Specification

By describing a summary specification of the TOE security functions (TSFs), this chapter shows that the security functional requirements (SFRs) are satisfied. Table 7.1 shows correspondences between the SFRs and the TSFs. The section numbers in the table show where each description is.

Table 7.1: Security Functional Requirements and TOE Security Functionalities

Function Requirement	TSF_FKG	TSF_FDE	TSF_FDC	TSF_AUT	TSF_FCFT	TSF_FNP	TSF_FFL
FCS_CKM.1	7.1						
FCS_COP.1		7.2					
FDP_IFC.1							7.7
FDP_IFF.1							7.7
FDP_RIP.1			7.3				
FIA_AFL.1a			7.3	7.4		7.6	
FIA_AFL.1b					7.5		
FIA_SOS.1a				7.4			
FIA_SOS.1b					7.5		
FIA_UAU.2a			7.3	7.4		7.6	
FIA_UAU.2b					7.5		
FIA_UAU.7a			7.3	7.4		7.6	
FIA_UAU.7b					7.5		
FIA_UID.2a			7.3	7.4		7.6	
FIA_UID.2b					7.5		
FMT_MOF.1a			7.3				
FMT_MOF.1b			7.3				
FMT_MOF.1c					7.5	7.6	
FMT_MTD.1a				7.4			
FMT_MTD.1b					7.5		
FMT_MTD.1c					7.5	7.6	
FMT_SMF.1			7.3	7.4	7.5	7.6	
FMT_SMR.1a				7.4			
FMT_SMR.1b					7.5		
FTA_TSE.1						7.6	
FTP_TRP.1						7.6	

### 7.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (TSF\_FKG)

This TOE generates a cryptographic key (common key) to support the cryptographic operation function for user data and TSF data. The cryptographic key (common key) that is unique to the MFD is generated every time the MFD is powered on.

The TOE generates a 256-bit secure key using the MSN-R3 expansion algorithm and stores the key into the volatile memory to use it for the AES Rijndael, a cryptographic algorithm. The MSN-R3 expansion algorithm is an algorithm for generating a cryptographic key which conforms to the Data Security Kit Encryption Standard. Therefore, the TOE satisfies FCS\_CKM.1.

### 7.2 Cryptographic Operation (TSF\_FDE)

The TSF always encrypts user data and TSF data before writing them to the MSD. When necessary, the TSF reads the data from the MSD and decrypts them for further use.

The following user data are the targets of cryptographic operation:

- Spool image data on the HDD
- Spool image data in the Flash memory
- Filing image data on the HDD

- Address book data on the HDD

The following TSF data are the target of cryptographic operation:

- Confidential file passwords on the HDD
- Administrator password on the HDD

For the encryption and decryption of the user data and TSF data above, the AES Rijndael algorithm that is based on FIPS PUB 197 and the 256 bits cryptographic key that is generated by cryptographic key generation function (TSF\_FKG) are used. Therefore, the TOE satisfies FCS\_COP.1.

## 7.3 Data Clear (TSF\_FDC)

In the following, first the TSF overview and then each component are described.

### 7.3.1 Overview of the Data Clear Function

The whole picture of this TSF and its correspondences between SFRs are described.

The TOE provides data clear functions that clear image data files that are spooled or stored and the address book data file. Each of the following functions is contained in the TSF:

- a) Auto Clear at Job End
- b) Clear All Memory
- c) Clear Address Book Data and Registered Data
- d) Clear Document Filing Data

Each of the above functions makes up the TSF and corresponds to the SFRs as follows.

- Each function overwrites the HDD one or more times with a random value. The above a) and b) overwrites the Flash memory once with a fixed value. Each function disables regeneration of the information (such as image data) stored in objects (such as image data files) associated with the function by overwriting the objects to deallocate their areas. Thus, the TOE satisfies FDP\_RIP.1.
- This TSF allows the administrator who has been identified and authenticated according to TSF\_AUT to invoke the above b), c) and d) according to FMT\_SMF.1 and FMT\_MOF.1a.
- The above b) and d) have the cancel operation (Section 7.3.3) to stop in accordance with FMT\_SMF.1 and satisfy FIA\_AFL.1a, FIA\_UAU.2a, FIA\_UAU.7a and FIA\_UID.2a in cooperation with TSF\_AUT and TSF\_FNP which are later discussed. The cancel operation requires the administrator to be identified and authenticated according to FIA\_UID.2a and FIA\_UAU.2a. For authentication, the protected feedback by FIA\_UAU.7a and the failure handling by FIA\_AFL.1a are provided. This allows only the administrator to cancel ongoing data clear functions as defined in FMT\_MOF.1b.

The following sections elaborate upon each function:

### 7.3.2 Auto Clear at Job End

This function overwrites the image data that has been:

- Spooled into the HDD or the Flash memory in order to process a job, when the job is completed or cancelled, and
- Stored into the HDD using the document filing function (including the confidential file function), when the user deletes the data.

The TOE always invokes this function at the specified timing in both cases and does not provide any means to deactivate this function.

### 7.3.3 Clear All Memory

This function is invoked from the operation panel by the administrator who has been identified and authenticated by TSF\_AUT and overwrites the following data:

- All of the spool image data on the HDD
- All of the filing image data on the HDD
- All of the spool image data in the Flash memory

This function does not clear the address book data.

This function can be cancelled. To cancel this function, the administrator is required to select a cancellation and then the TSF requires the administrator who has invoked the function to enter the administrator password. The cancel operation serves as identification of the administrator defined in FIA\_UID.2a and entering the administrator password serves as authentication of the administrator defined in FIA\_UAU.2a. While entering the password for authentication, the TOE shows as many asterisks as characters entered according to FIA\_UAU.7a, however does not show the characters entered. The overwrite operation is only cancelled if entering the password for authentication is successful.

If an incorrect password is entered three times in a row in an authentication process required for cancelling the function, the reception of further authentication attempts stops as defined in FIA\_AFL.1a; the administrator password is locked. In five minutes after the locking, the function unlocks the administrator password automatically; the number of times authentication was unsuccessful is cleared, and the reception of authentication trials is recovered.

### 7.3.4 Clear Address Book Data and Registered Data

This function is invoked from the operation panel by the administrator who has been identified and authenticated by TSF\_AUT and overwrites the address book data on the HDD.

This function can not be cancelled because the function completes in a relatively short time.

### 7.3.5 Clear Document Filing Data

This function is invoked from the operation panel by the administrator who has been identified and authenticated by TSF\_AUT and overwrites image data on the HDD. The data to be cleared by this function is specified one or more from the following choices by the administrator when this function is invoked.

- All of the spool image data on the HDD
- All of the filing image data on the HDD

This function can be cancelled the same way the Clear All Memory function can.

## 7.4 Authentication (TSF\_AUT)

This TSF enforces the identification and authentication of the administrator by the administrator password. According to FMT\_SMF.1 and FMT\_MTD.1a, the TSF allows only the administrator who has been identified and authenticated by the TSF to modify the administrator password. According to FIA\_SOS.1a, the TSF only accepts a password which is 5 or more characters.

The functions not for the administrator are available without identification and authentication of the administrator.

In cooperation with TSF\_FDC and TSF\_FNP, this TSF satisfies FIA\_AFL.1a, FIA\_UAU.2a, FIA\_UAU.7a and FIA\_UID.2a.

This function provides the interfaces of the function for the administrator when the administrator is identified by the operations to run the management functions or the login operation of the administrator according to FIA\_UID.2a, and the authentication of the administrator is successful by the correct administrator password according to FIA\_UAU.2a. The login operation of the administrator includes both identification of administrator and authentication of the administrator password from the operation panel or via the TOE Web.

When the administrator password is entered from the operation panel, this TSF, according to FIA\_UAU.7a, shows as many asterisk characters as characters entered, however does not show the characters entered.

When the administrator password is entered via the TOE Web, this TSF specifies the input type as a password to the client. This requires the client to hide the character that the user entered such as a substitute character.

If an incorrect password is entered three times in a row in an authentication process of the administrator password, the reception of further authentication attempts stops as defined in FIA\_AFL.1a; the administrator password is locked. In five minutes after the locking, the function unlocks the administrator password automatically; the number of times authentication was unsuccessful is cleared, and the reception of authentication trials is recovered.

The TSF identifies the administrator by the authentication function and relates him/her to the role. By providing only the administrator with the management function to change (modify) the administrator password, the secure maintenance of the role is achieved. Thus, the TOE satisfies FMT\_SMR.1a.

## 7.5 Confidential files (TSF\_FCF)

When a user saves image data into the MFD as a confidential file, the data is protected by a password and authentication is required before calling it up and using it.

This TSF provides an interface for creating confidential files to each of the copier, printer driver, PC-fax and Scan to HDD and, according to FIA\_SOS.1b, verifies that confidential file passwords meet the quality metric of 5 or more characters.

This TSF provides functions to operate saved confidential files from the operation panel or via the TOE Web. According to FIA\_UID.2b, the TSF identifies the user that stored a confidential file when the user selects his/her confidential file and, according to FIA\_UAU.2b, provides the interface for file manipulation only when authentication is successful with the correct confidential file password. During the authentication, the TSF does not disclose any information other than the number of characters typed according to FIA\_UAU.7b.

Whenever a user attempts some operation on his/her saved confidential file from the operation panel, the TSF requests the user to enter the confidential file password. This TSF shows as many asterisks as the characters entered, however does not show the characters themselves.

When a user attempts some operation on his/her saved confidential file via the TOE Web, this TSF specifies the input type as a password to the client when the confidential file password is entered. This requires the browser of the client to hide the characters that the user entered by replacing them with substitute characters.

If an incorrect confidential file password is entered three times in a row during the authentication before reusing a saved confidential file, the TSF stops accepting further authentication attempts and locks the file to prohibit any operations according to FIA\_AFL.1b. The number of authentication failures is counted for each file. When authentication is successful, the authentication failure count of the file is reset to zero. The release operation of the confidential file by the administrator clears the number of times authentication was unsuccessful and recovers the reception of authentication trials.

According to FMT\_MTD.1b and FMT\_SMF.1, this TSF allows only the user that stored a confidential file who has been identified and authenticated by the TSF to change the password, as one of the operations on a saved confidential file. According to FIA\_SOS.1b, this TSF verifies the new confidential password meets the quality metric of 5 or more characters.

This TSF identifies the user that stored a confidential file prior to reusing the file by identification and authentication of the user and relates him/her to the role. In addition, by providing only the user that stored the confidential file with the function to change (modify) the confidential file password, the secure maintenance of the role is achieved. Thus, the TOE satisfies FMT\_SMR.1b.

This TSF exports the encrypted data to the Web browser of the client. This TSF also imports both encrypted and not encrypted data from the Web browser of the client.

According to FMT\_SMF.1, FMT\_MOF.1c and FMT\_MTD.1c, this TSF provides the following management functions for the document filing function and allows the administrator whom TFS\_AUT has identified and authenticated to execute them:

- Management functions for improving the effectiveness of protection obtained by using the confidential file:
  - Disabling of Document Filing: disables each mode of saving for each job type. The default and recommended value is that the non-confidential mode (where files are saved without password protection) is disabled for all job types.
  - Disabling of Print Jobs Other Than Print Hold Job: disables the job to print out on the spot from the printer driver. This function denies the job without Holding and holds the Hold job by ignoring that the job is printed out or not. This function is recommended to use in the environment where there is a high risk that the third person takes away the output paper.
- Management function for locking confidential files:

- Release the lock of confidential files: releases the lock of confidential files which have been locked by the failure of the authentication for the confidential file password. This management function is provided as “*Release the Lock on File/Folder Manipulation*”.

## 7.6 Network Protection (TSF\_FNP)

In the following, first the TSF overview and then each component are as follows.

### 7.6.1 Overview of Network Protection

Components of this TSF and their correspondences between SFRs are as follows.

This TSF consists of the following functions.

- a) Filter function
- b) Communication data protection function
- c) Network settings protection function

Each of the above components satisfies the SFRs as follows:

- The above a) satisfies FTA\_TSE.1
- The above b) satisfies FTP\_TRP.1
- In cooperation with TSF\_FDC and TFS\_AUT, the above c) satisfies FIA\_AFL.1a, FIA\_UAU.2a, FIA\_UAU.7a and FIA\_UID.2a
- In cooperation with TSF\_FCF, the above a) and b) satisfy FMT\_MTD.1c.
- In cooperation with TSF\_FDC and TSF\_FCF, the above a) and b) satisfy FMT\_SMF.1.
- In cooperation with TSF\_FCF, the above b) satisfies FMT\_MOF.1c.

The following sections elaborate upon each function.

### 7.6.2 Filter Function

This function rejects attempts to communicate from parties who are not expected to do so according to the settings that the administrator configured beforehand based on the condition of IP addresses and MAC addresses. The TSF always cancels network packets from parties that do not meet the conditions and does not respond to or process them.

Up to 4 ranges of IP addresses can be specified and it can be set whether to allow or deny the ranges (IP address filter).

Up to 10 MAC addresses to allow communication can be specified (MAC address filter).

The TSF satisfies FTA\_TSE.1 because it rejects communication to and from an unintended third party based on the IP address and the MAC address. According to FMT\_MTD.1c and FMT\_SMF.1, the TSF allows only the administrator who has been identified and authenticated by TSF\_AUT to query and modify TSF data i.e. the values of the IP address filter settings and the MAC address filter settings.

### 7.6.3 Communication Data Protection Function

This TSF provides the following communication data protection function.

- According to FTP\_TRP.1, this function provides the HTTPS communication function to prevent wiretapping of communication data between the client and the TOE Web. HTTPS communication starts when the remote user accesses the TOE Web from the client browser and the communication is kept until disconnected.
- According to FTP\_TRP.1, this function also provides the IPP-SSL communication function to prevent wiretapping of print data that is sent from the printer driver of the client. IPP-SSL communication starts when the remote user accesses the MFD by sending a print job by the printer driver from applications on the client and the communication is kept until disconnected.

The cryptographic algorithms used in HTTPS communication and IPP-SSL communication are RSA, DES, Triple-DES, AES and SHA-1. The server private key and public key are installed by configuring of the administrator.

According to FMT\_MTD.1c and FMT\_SMF.1, the TSF allows only the administrator who has been identified and authenticated by TSF\_AUT to query and modify the values of the SSL settings which are a collection of the values relating to HTTPS communication and IPP-SSL communication (TSF data).

By enabling or disabling each of HTTPS and IPP-SSL communications, the behaviour of the network protection function can be changed. When any of HTTPS or IPP-SSL communications is disabled, the network protection function behaves with those communications disabled. The TSF only allows the administrator who has been identified and authenticated by TSF\_AUT to change the behaviour according to FMT\_MOF.1c.

#### **7.6.4 Network Settings Protection Function**

This function provides the interfaces to manage the network settings data described in Section 1.4.4.4 at the operation panel and the TOE Web. These interfaces are provided only to the administrator to prevent other users from accessing. So this TSF enforces the identification and authentication same as TSF AUT before providing the interfaces to manage the network settings data. The identification and authentication is executed according to FIA\_UID.2a, FIA\_UAU.2a, FIA\_UAU.7a and FIA\_AFL.1a in the same way as TSF\_AUT.

#### **7.7 Fax Flow Control (TSF\_FFL)**

According to FDP\_IFC.1 and FDP\_IFF.1, this TSF performs a data flow control that never allows data received from the fax line to be relayed to the internal network. This prevents accesses from the telephone line connected to the MFD's fax I/F from being relayed to the internal network through the MFD's network I/F.

## 8 Appendix

This chapter describes the definitions of terms.

### 8.1 Terminology

Terminology used in this ST is defined in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1: Terminology

Term	Definition
Administrator password	A password to protect special functions for the administrator including the security management functions which are important in operation and management of the TOE and MFD from being used by those other than the administrator.
Auto Clear at Job End	The function to overwrite image data of each job stored into some MSD of the MFD, invoked when a job is finished or cancelled and when a user deletes a saved data file.
Board	A printed circuit board on which components are mounted by soldering.
Clear Address Book Data and Registered Data	The function to overwrite address book data stored into the HDD. This function is invoked by the operation of the administrator.
Clear All Memory	The function to overwrite all the image data stored into the MSD in the MFD. This function is invoked by the operation of the administrator.
Clear Document Filing Data	The function to overwrite the image data that are stored into the HDD. This function is invoked by the operation of the administrator. The main objective is to clear the image data that are stored, but it is also available to clear the image data that are spooled.
Confidential file	The data that the user saved with password protection (confidential file password) to prevent the others from manipulating.
Confidential file password	The password to prevent others from reusing the confidential file without permission.
Controller board	The board that controls the whole MFD. This contains the CPU to execute firmware of the TOE, volatile memory, HDC, HDD and others.
Controller firmware	The firmware that controls the controller board in the MFD.
Data file	In this document, objects consisting of allocated MSD resources to store information (including image data).
Data Security Kit Encryption Standard	Sharp Corporation's documentation intended for in-house use which defines the standards for an algorithm for cryptographic operation and generation of a cryptographic key used in the cryptographic operation for MFD's Data Security Kit.
Disabling of Document Filing	The management function to disable to save the image data for each job type and mode. This is used to disable to save the image data without Confidential Mode.
Disabling of Print Jobs Other Than Print Hold Job	The management function to disable to print out jobs sent from a printer driver on the spot. Print jobs are denied and only hold jobs and print hold jobs are accepted; print hold jobs are only held without being printed out.
Document filing	The function that stores image data that the MFD handles into the HDD for users' later operations. This is also called "Filing" in this document.
Engine	A device that forms print images on receiver papers, with mechanism of paper feeding/ejection. Also called as "print engine" or "engine unit".
External network	A network, not the internal network of an organisation, which the organisation does not manage.
Fax I/F	A physical I/F to be used for connecting the MFD to a fax line.
Fax line	A physical transmission channel to send and receive fax messages.
Filter settings	The management function to screen parties on the other end of communication. The filter settings contain IP address filter settings and MAC address filter settings.
File manipulation	An operation to manipulate image data saved as a file, such as printing, sending previewing and deleting as mentioned in Section 1.3.5.2.
Filing	Stands for "Document filing". This is also to store the image data by document filing function.
Firmware	The software that is embedded to the machines to control the machine's hardware. In this document, firmware especially indicates the controller firmware.

Term	Definition
Flash memory	A type of non-volatile memory that allows erasing electrically in large blocks and also allows rewriting to any part of memory.
Hold	To store a job sent from a printer driver using the document filing function.
Image data	Digital data, especially in this document, of two-dimensional image that each function of the MFD manages.
Internal network	The network that is inside the organisation and protected against the threat about security from any external networks.
IP address	A call sign, used for IP, to identify devices for communication.
IP address filter	A function to restrict devices for communication by determining to accept or not communication based on their IP addresses.
IP address filter settings	The management function for IP address filtering.
Job	The sequence from beginning to end of the use of an MFD function (copier, printer, scanner, fax reception, fax transmission, or PC-Fax). In addition, the instruction for a functional operation is sometimes called a job.
Lock	The function to stop accepting passwords if wrong passwords are entered in a row.
MAC address	A call sign to, used for MAC, identify devices of communication media.
MAC address filter	The function to restrict devices for communication by determining to accept or not communication based on their MAC addresses.
MAC address filter settings	The management function for MAC address filtering.
MFD Web site	The Web site offered by the Web server inside the MFD as the interface for remote MFD operation.
MSN-R3 expansion algorithm	Sharp Corporation's original algorithm for generating a cryptographic key which is defined in Data Security Kit Encryption Standard.
Memory	A memory device; in particular a semiconductor memory device.
Network I/F	A physical I/F used for connecting the MFD to a network.
Network settings	In this document, the management function to query or modify network settings data which is an asset protected by the TOE.
Non-volatile memory	The memory device that retains its contents even when the power is turned off.
Operation panel	The user interface unit in front of the MFD. This contains the function key and liquid crystal display with touch operation system.
Print function	The function to print data received from external devices.
Relay	To pass data input at an interface to another interface.
Rijndael	A cryptographic algorithm adopted by the AES. The developers are Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen from Belgium.
Scan to HDD	One of the filing functions. It scans the original to obtain image data, and does only save a file of the image data into the HDD, while neither prints nor transmits it.
Scanner unit	The device that scans the original and gets the image data. This is used for copier, scanner, fax transmission or scan to HDD.
Spool	Storing the job's image data into the MSD temporarily to increase the input and output efficiency.
SSL Settings	The management function to enable or disable the HTTPS communication or the IPP-SSL communication.
SSL-protected services	The following services are included: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The following services which are protected with the HTTPS: Administrator authentication, reuse of confidential files, reading out the address book data, modification of the address book, filter settings and network settings via the TOE Web</li> <li>• The following IPP-SSL protected service: Image data reception from a printer driver in the print function</li> </ul>
Standard firmware	The controller firmware that is installed to the MFD that TOE is not installed to. TOE contains the controller firmware, and standard firmware is replaced with the TOE's controller firmware when TOE is installed.
Subnetwork	A part of internal network divided by router.
Tandem copy	Tandem print in the MFD's copier function.



Term	Definition
Tandem print	The function to print a large job twice faster than usual by halving that job among two MFDs.
TOE Web	The MFD Web site is referred to as the TOE Web when the TOE is installed to the MFD.
TWAIN	A technical standard for PC to be input image data from devices such as scanners.
Unit	A substance provided standard that can be attached to or detached from a printed circuit board; or an option that is installed and is ready for operation. This can also be a system that includes a mechanism and is ready for operation.
Volatile memory	A memory device, the contents of which vanish when the power is turned off.

## 8.2 Acronyms

Acronyms used in this ST are indicated in Table 8.2 and Table 8.3.

Table 8.2: Acronyms in the CC

Acronym	Definition
CC	Common Criteria
CM	Configuration Management
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality

Table 8.3: Other Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard: established by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology, United States of America)
CPU	Central Processing Unit: the central processing unit of a computer.
DSK	Data Security Kit MX-FR30: an optional product sold separately for the MFD, including the firmware part of the TOE.
EEPROM	Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM: a type of non-volatile memory that allows low frequency of electrical rewriting at any address.
FIPS PUB 197	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197: the standard which defines the AES specifications.
HDC	Hard Disk Controller: the HDC in the MFD includes part of the TOE hardware.
HDD	Hard Disk Drive
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol: a communication protocol generally used for Web.
HTTPS	HTTP over SSL, HTTP with protection of SSL.
I/F	Interface
IP	Internet Protocol: a communication protocol to divide data in packets to deliver it to the destination.
IPP	Internet Printing Protocol: a communication protocol for printing.
IPP-SSL	IPP over SSL, IPP with protection of SSL.
IT	Information Technology
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol: a communication protocol for directory service.
MAC	Media Access Control: communication protocols to allow a number of communication devices to share a single communication medium by identifying devices and mediating communication to avoid collision.
MFD	Multi Function Device: a digital multifunctional device which is an office machine mainly equipped with copier, printer, scanner and fax functions. In this document, only models listed in Section 1.3.2.
MSD	Mass Storage Device: in this document, this especially indicates the HDD and Flash memory in MFD.
NIC	Network Interface Card or Network Interface Controller
OS	Operating System
PC	Personal Computer
ROM	Read Only Memory
SSL	Secure Socket Layer: a cryptographic communication protocol for computer network.
UI	User Interface
USB	Universal Serial Bus: a serial bus standard to connect between IT equipments.
SMTP	Simple Mail Transfer Protocol: a communication protocol to transfer E-mails.
WINS	Windows Internet Name Service: resolves a NetBIOS name into the IP address.