



# Certification Report

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## Target of Evaluation (TOE)

Application date/ID	2012-01-16 (ITC-2395)
Certification No.	C0370
Sponsor	Sharp Corporation
Name of the TOE	MX-FR33
Version of the TOE	C.10
PP Conformance	None
Assurance Package	EAL3
Developer	Sharp Corporation
Evaluation Facility	Information Technology Security Center Evaluation Department

This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE is certified as follows.

2012-09-06

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**Evaluation Criteria, etc.:** This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following standards prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme".

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation  
Version 3.1 Release 3
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation  
Version 3.1 Release 3

## Evaluation Result: Pass

"MX-FR33 C.10" has been evaluated based on the standards required, in accordance with the provisions of the "IT Security Certification Procedure" by Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.

Notice:

This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme.

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## 1. Executive Summary

This Certification Report describes the content of the certification result in relation to IT Security Evaluation of "MX-FR33 C.10" (hereinafter referred to as the "TOE") developed by Sharp Corporation, and the evaluation of the TOE was finished on 2012-08 by Information Technology Security Center Evaluation Department (hereinafter referred to as the "Evaluation Facility"). It is intended to report to the sponsor, Sharp Corporation, and provide security information to consumers and procurement personnel who are interested in this TOE.

Readers of the Certification Report are advised to read the Security Target (hereinafter referred to as the "ST") that is the appendix of this report together. Especially, details of security functional requirements, assurance requirements and rationale for sufficiency of these requirements of the TOE are described in the ST.

This Certification Report assumes "the general consumers who purchase this TOE" to be readers. Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on assurance requirements to which the TOE conforms, and does not guarantee an individual IT product itself.

### 1.1 Product Overview

An overview of the TOE functions and operational conditions is described as follows. Refer to Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.

#### 1.1.1 Assurance Package

Assurance Package of the TOE is EAL3.

#### 1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality

The TOE is an IT Product to protect data in a Multi Function Device (hereinafter referred to as "MFD").

The main part of the TOE is the firmware in a ROM and a Flash memory for the MFD. By replacing the MFD standard firmware, it offers the security functions and controls the entire MFD. The HDC, part of the hardware in the MFD, is also a part of the TOE and is controlled by the firmware.

The main security functions of the TOE are cryptographic operation function, data clear function, confidential files function, network protection function and fax flow control function, which are aiming to counter unauthorised attempts to steal image data in the MFD where the TOE is installed.

About these security functionalities, the validity of the design policy and the accuracy of the implementation were evaluated within the scope of the assurance package. The threats and the assumptions that the TOE assumes are described in the next section.

##### 1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives

The TOE assumes the following threats and provides the security functions to counter them.

User data, such as image data stored into the MFD, address book and others, which are assets to be protected by the TOE, are assumed to be disclosed or altered illegally by the following threats: unauthorised operation of the TOE, direct data read-out from storage device, access to the communication data on the network or others.

To counter these threats, the encryption of the data when it is stored into the HDD or the Flash memory in the MFD (hereinafter collectively referred to as "MSD") prevents it from being read directly. The TOE also provides protection function using password when storing image data to prevent unauthorised users from accessing to it. In addition, the TOE provides protection function using encryption of network communication to prevent communication data from being wiretapped.

Regarding settings for security functions, identification and authentication function of the administrator prevents the settings from being altered and the security functions from being disabled.

### 1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions

The evaluated product is assumed to be operated under the following configuration and assumptions.

The TOE runs on MFDs that Sharp Corporation provides.

The MFD that the TOE is installed assumes to be connected to and used in the internal network, together with clients and the various servers.

When the internal network is connected to the external network, firewall is connected to deny access to the MFD from the external network.

### 1.1.3 Disclaimers

In the operational environment that the security functions for protecting communication between the TOE and a client do not work, an operator shall be responsible for performing an objective for protecting communication. For details, see Chapter 4.3.

## 1.2 Conduct of Evaluation

Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed on 2012-08 based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of this TOE according to the publicized documents "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme"[1], "Requirements for IT Security Certification"[2], and "Requirements for Approval of Evaluation Facility"[3] provided by the Certification Body.

## 1.3 Certification

The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [13] and the Observation Reports prepared by the Evaluation Facility as well as evaluation evidential materials, and confirmed that the TOE evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The Certification Body confirmed that the TOE evaluation had been appropriately

conducted in accordance with the CC ([4][5][6] or [7][8][9]) and the CEM (either of [10][11]). The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation Technical Report submitted by the Evaluation Facility and fully concluded certification activities.

## 2. Identification

The TOE is identified as follows:

Name of the TOE	MX-FR33
Version of the TOE	C.10
Developer	Sharp Corporation

The above TOE name indicates an optional product to enhance the security functions of MFDs made by Sharp Corporation.

Users can confirm whether a TOE product has been evaluated and certified by taking the following steps.

By following the instructions described in the guidance documents attached to the TOE, users can confirm that the installed product is the certified TOE by comparing the name and version of the TOE displayed on the MFD with those described in the guidance documents.



### 3. Security Policy

This chapter describes security function policies and organisational security policies.

The TOE provides the security functions to counter the unauthorised access to the image data in the MFD and to protect the communication data on the network.

To meet the organisational security policies, the TOE provides the functions to overwrite data stored into the MFD and to prevent the unauthorised access through telephone lines via fax interface.

In addition, for each setting that is relevant to the above-mentioned security functions, only administrators are permitted to set configurations in order to prevent the deactivation and unauthorised use of the security functions.

#### 3.1 Security Function Policies

The TOE possesses the security functions to counter the threats shown in Chapter 3.1.1 and to meet the organisational security policies shown in Chapter 3.1.2.

##### 3.1.1 Threats and Security Function Policies

###### 3.1.1.1 Threats

The TOE assumes the threats shown in Table 3-1 and provides the security functions to counter them.

**Table 3-1 Assumed Threats**

Identifier	Threat
T.RECOVER	An attacker removes the MSD from the MFD and installs it in other devices (than the MFD where the MSD is originally installed) to read and leak the user data in the MSD.
T.REMOTE	An attacker who is not allowed to access to the MFD reads or modifies the address book data in the MFD all at one time through the internal network.
T.SPOOF	An attacker who impersonates other user reads and leaks the image data that the user has saved as confidential file from the operation panel or through the internal network.
T.TAMPER	An attacker who impersonates an administrator reads or modifies the network settings data from the operation panel or through the internal network.

T.TAP	An attacker wiretaps communication data on the internal network when a proper user communicates with the MFD.
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### 3.1.1.2 Security Function Policies against Threats

The TOE counters the threats shown in Table 3-1 in accordance with the following security functional policies:

(1) Countermeasure against the threat of "T.RECOVER"

This threat assumes that the residual data in the MSD might be leaked when the MSD is removed from the MFD. The following security functions counter this threat.

1. Cryptographic key generation function (TSF\_FKG):

This is a function to generate a cryptographic key (common key) to support the cryptographic operation function (TSF\_FDE). The TOE generates a 256-bit secure key every time the MFD is turned on and stores it into the volatile memory.

2. Cryptographic operation function (TSF\_FDE):

This TSF always encrypts user data and TSF data before writing them to the MSD. When necessary, this TSF reads the data from the MSD and decrypts them for further use. For encryption and decryption, the AES algorithm based on FIPS PUB 197 and the cryptographic key that is generated by the cryptographic key generation function (TSF\_FKG) are used.

The target user data is spool image data in the HDD and Flash memory, filing image data on the HDD, and the address book data on the HDD. The target TSF data is confidential file passwords and the administrator password in the HDD.

(2) Countermeasure against the threats of "T.REMOTE" and "T.TAP"

These threats assume that the address book data that the TOE manages might be accessed without authorisation via the internal network and that the data transmitted to and from the client might be wiretapped and leaked. The following security functions counter these threats.

1. Network protection function (TSF\_FNP):

This TSF provides the following three functions for the network protection.

a) Filter function:

This function cancels attempts to communicate from parties who are not expected to do so according to the settings that the administrator configured beforehand based on the conditions of IP addresses and MAC addresses. The TSF always cancels network packets from parties that do not meet the conditions, and does not respond to or process them.

Up to 4 ranges of IP addresses can be specified, and it can be set whether to allow or deny the ranges. Up to 10 MAC addresses to allow communication can be specified.

b) Communication data protection function:

This TSF provides the following communication data protection function.

- The HTTPS communication function to prevent wiretapping of communication data

- between the client and the TOE Web
- The IPP-SSL communication function to prevent wiretapping of print data that is sent from the printer driver of the client

The TSF allows only the administrator who has been identified and authenticated by the authentication function (TSF\_AUT) to query and modify the settings above. By enabling or disabling each of the above communications, the behaviour of the network protection function can be changed.

c) Network settings protection function:

This function provides the interfaces to manage the network settings data on the operation panel and the TOE Web. These interfaces are provided only to the administrator to prevent other users from accessing.

(3) Countermeasure against the threat of “T.TAMPER”

This threat assumes that the network settings data that the TOE manages might be accessed without authorisation from the operation panel or via the internal network. The following security function counters the threat. Data transmitted from the client is protected by the communication data protection function of the network protection function (TSF\_FNP).

1. Authentication function (TSF\_AUT):

This TSF enforces the identification and authentication of the administrator by the administrator password. The administrator password shall be 5 or more characters. This function provides the interfaces of the function for the administrator when the authentication of the administrator is successful by the correct administrator password. When the administrator password is entered from the operation panel, the TSF shows as many asterisks as characters entered, however does not show the characters entered. When the administrator password is entered via the TOE Web, the TSF requires the client to hide the character that the user entered such as a substitute character.

If an incorrect password is entered three times in a row in an authentication process of the administrator password, the reception of further authentication attempts stops; the administrator password is locked. In five minutes after the locking, the function unlocks the administrator password automatically; the number of times authentication was unsuccessful is cleared, and the reception of authentication trials is recovered.

By providing only the administrator with the management function to change (modify) the administrator password, the secure maintenance of the role is achieved.

(4) Countermeasure against the threat of “T.SPOOF”

This threat assumes that image data stored as confidential files in the TOE might be accessed without authorisation from the operation panel or via the internal network. The following security function (confidential file function) counters the threat by identifying and authenticating the authorised user that stored the confidential file. Confidential file passwords required for identification and authentication are protected by the communication data protection function of the network protection function (TSF\_FNP) and the cryptographic operation function (TSF\_FDE).

1. Confidential files function (TSF\_FCF):

This TSF provides password protection to image data that a user stored as a confidential file in the MFD and allows operations (such as printing) after password authentication on the operation panel or via the Web.

During the authentication before reusing a confidential file, the TSF hides the typed

characters. If an incorrect confidential file password is entered three times in a row, the TSF locks the file. The number of authentication failures is counted for each file. When authentication is successful, the authentication failure count of the file is reset to zero. The lock can be released by only the administrator who has been identified and authenticated by Authentication (TSF\_AUT).

The TSF allows only the user that stored a confidential file who has been identified and authenticated by the TSF to change the confidential file password, as one of the operations on a saved confidential file. The TSF verifies the new confidential password meets the quality metric of 5 or more characters.

This TSF provides the following management functions for the document filing function. Only the administrator who has been identified and authenticated by Authentication (TSF\_AUT) is allowed to execute these functions.

a) Management functions for improving the effectiveness of protection obtained by using the confidential file:

- Disabling of Document Filing:

It disables each mode of saving for each job type. The default and recommended value is that non-confidential mode (where files are saved without password protection) is disabled for all job types.

- Disabling of Print Jobs Other Than Print Hold Job:

It disables the job to print out on the spot from the printer driver. This function denies the job without Holding and holds the Hold job by ignoring that the job is printed out or not. This function is recommended to use in the environment where there is a high risk that the third person takes away the output paper.

b) Management function for locking confidential files

- Release the lock of confidential files:

It releases the lock of confidential files which have been locked by the failure of the authentication for the confidential file password.

### 3.1.2 Organisational Security Policies and Security Function Policies

#### 3.1.2.1 Organisational Security Policies

Organisational security policies required in use of the TOE are shown in Table 3-2.

**Table 3-2 Organisational Security Policies**

Identifier	Organisational Security Policy
P.RESIDUAL	<p>Upon completion or cancellation of a job, the area in the MSD where the user data has been spooled shall be overwritten one or more times.</p> <p>When a user deletes a job or file, the area in the MSD which stores the user data shall be overwritten one or more times.</p>

	When the MFD is disposed of or its ownership changes, all the user areas in the MSD shall be overwritten one or more times.
P.FAXTONET	Accesses through the telephone line connected to the MFD's fax I/F shall be prevented from accessing the internal network through the MFD's network I/F.

### 3.1.2.2 Security Function Policies to Organisational Security Policies

The TOE meets the organisational security policies shown in Table 3-2 by implementing the following security functions.

- (1) Implementation of the organisational security policy of "P.RESIDUAL"  
 "P.RESIDUAL" requires that the data stored in the MFD's HDD and Flash memory should be overwritten. This organisational security policy is enforced by the following security functions.

#### 1. Data clear function (TSF\_FDC)

The TOE provides data clear functions that clear image data files that are spooled or stored and the address book data file. These functions consist of the following functions. Each function disables regeneration of the image data by overwriting the HDD with a random value and the Flash memory with a fixed value.

##### a) Auto Clear at Job End:

This TSF consists of the following functions of:

- When the job is completed or cancelled, overwriting image data that has been spooled into the HDD or the Flash memory in order to process a job.
- When the user deletes the data, overwriting image data stored into the HDD using the document filing function (including the confidential file function).

##### b) Clear All Memory:

This function is invoked from the operation panel by the administrator who has been identified and authenticated by the authentication function (TSF\_AUT). The function overwrites all image data files that have been spooled or stored in the HDD and the Flash memory.

This function can be cancelled. When the administrator selects a cancellation, the TSF requires the administrator to be identified and authenticated. Only when the authentication is successful, the function is cancelled. During an authentication, the TOE shows as many asterisks as characters entered instead of the entered characters itself. If an incorrect password is entered three times in a row, the reception of further authentication attempts stops; the administrator password is locked. In five minutes after the locking, the function unlocks the administrator password automatically; the number of times authentication was unsuccessful is cleared, and the reception of authentication trials is recovered.

##### c) Clear Address Book Data and Registered Data:

This function is invoked by the administrator who has been identified and authenticated by TSF\_AUT and overwrites the address book data on the HDD.

## d) Clear Document Filing Data:

This function is invoked by the administrator who has been identified and authenticated by TSF\_AUT and overwrites image data on the HDD. The data to be cleared by this function is specified one or more from the following choices by the administrator when this function is invoked.

- All of the spool image data on the HDD
- All of the filing image data on the HDD

This function can be cancelled the same way the Clear All Memory function can.

## (2) Implementation of the organisational security policy of "P.FAXTONET"

"P.FAXTONET" requires that the TOE prevents accesses through the telephone line connected to the MFD's fax interface from accessing the internal network through the MFD's network interface. This organisational security policy is implemented by the following security function.

## 1. Fax Flow Control (TSF\_FFL)

This function implements a data flow control that never allows the data received from the fax line to be relayed to the internal network. This prevents accesses from the telephone line connected to the MFD's fax interface from being relayed to the internal network through the MFD's network interface.

## 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment to operate the TOE as useful information for the assumed readers to determine the use of the TOE.

### 4.1 Usage Assumptions

Table 4-1 shows assumptions to operate the TOE.

The effective performances of the TOE security functions are not assured unless these assumptions are satisfied.

**Table 4-1 Assumptions in Use of the TOE**


Identifier	Assumptions
A.NETWORK	The TOE-installed MFD is connected to a subnetwork in the internal network protected against attacks from any external networks, where the subnetwork for the MFP connects nothing other than devices allowed to communicate with the MFD.
A.OPERATOR	The administrator is a trustworthy person who does not take improper action with respect to the TOE.

### 4.2 Environmental Assumptions

The TOE operates on MFDs manufactured by Sharp Corporation, namely MX-4110FN, MX-4110N, MX-4110NJ, MX-4111FN, MX-4111N, MX-4111NJ, MX-5110FN, MX-5110N, MX-5110NJ, MX-5111FN, MX-5111N and MX-5111NJ.

The TOE-installed MFD shall be connected to an internal network where the clients and the servers are also connected and shall be connected to a telephone line required for fax.

Figure 4-1 shows the general operational environment as assumptions of the TOE.



**Figure 4-1 Usage Environment of the TOE**

As shown in Figure 4-1, the TOE-installed MFD is connected to an internal network and a telephone line. The internal network connects the client and servers such as the FTP server and mail server as appropriate, allowing them to communicate with the TOE including sending print data.

The internal network can be connected to external networks through a firewall; the necessary settings shall be made to screen accesses to the MFD from external networks.

#### 4.3 Clarification of Scope

The TOE provides the security function (communication data protection function) to protect data transmitted to and from the client. However, when the function is disabled by the administrator or when a client on the network does not support the function, the manager of MFD's operation shall be responsible for taking measures such as installing an encryption device to protect the data to and from the client.



## 5. Architectural Information

This chapter explains the TOE's physical scope and logical configuration in term of their objectives and association.

### 5.1 TOE Boundary and Components

The physical scope of the TOE is shaded in Figure 5-1. The main part of the TOE is in the MFD's controller firmware and provided as "Data Security Kit MX-FR33 (DSK)", an optional product for Sharp MFDs to enhance security coming with a ROM board and a USB memory device. Part of the security functions is included in the MFD's HDC, which is also within the scope of the TOE.

- ROM:


It contains part of the controller firmware. When the TOE is installed to the MFD, the ROM is mounted on the controller board.

- MAIN:

It is part of the controller firmware and installed from the USB memory device of DSK to the Flash memory in the MFD.


- HDC:

It is part of an integrated circuit that is mounted on the controller board in the MFD beforehand.



**Figure 5-1 TOE boundary**

Figure 5-2 shows the logical configuration of the TOE. The thick-lined frame indicates the logical scope of the TOE. Rounded boxes indicate hardware devices outside of the TOE. Rectangles indicate functions of the TOE and ones shaded indicate security functions. Among the data in the volatile memory, HDD, Flash memory and EEPROM, the data that security functions handle (i.e. user data and TSF data) are also shaded. Arrows in the figure indicate data flows.



**Figure 5-2 Logical configuration of the TOE**

The main part of the TOE is the firmware for the MFD, providing security functions as well as control of the entire MFD. Part of the TOE security functions (TSF) is implemented in the HDC and invoked by the TSF in the firmware. The security functions are as follows.

- a) Cryptographic operation function:  
This function encrypts user data and TSF data to be stored into the MSD and decrypts user data and TSF data retrieved from the MSD.
- b) Cryptographic key generation function:  
This function generates the cryptographic key for the cryptographic operation function.
- c) Data clear function:  
This function overwrites the MSD to prevent information leakage from the MSD.
- d) Authentication function:  
This function identifies and authenticates an administrator by means of the administrator password. It includes a management function that changes the administrator password.
- e) Confidential file function:  
This function provides password protection for image data in the MFD stored by the user to protect them from being reused by others without permission.
- f) Network protection function:  
This function prevents unauthorised accesses over the network, wiretapping of communication data and unauthorised of the network settings.
- g) Fax flow control function:  
This function prevents accesses from the telephone line connected to the MFD's fax I/F to the internal network through the MFD's network I/F.

## 5.2 IT Environment

The TOE is connected to the internal network and communicates with servers including the FTP server and the mail server and the client. It also communicates with clients connected through a USB port and fax machines connected through a fax line.

The clients on the internal network or connected through a USB port use the TOE via a printer driver or a Web browser. The clients can operate via a Web browser, including making settings for the security functions.

## 6. Documentation

The identification of documents attached to the TOE is listed below. TOE users are required to fully understand and comply with the following documents in order to satisfy the assumptions. The version of each document is shown with [].

- MX-FR33 Data Security Kit Operation Manual [1.0]  
(Japanese version and English version)

This is provided as an operational manual of the TOE, which describes necessary information of the TOE's administration and operations, including usage and configuration of security functions.

- MX-FR33 Data Security Kit Notice [1.0]  
(Japanese version and English version)

This notice describes requirements on secure operation and TOE installation guidance.

## 7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results

### 7.1 Evaluation Approach

Evaluation was conducted by using the evaluation methods prescribed in the CEM in accordance with the assurance components in the CC Part 3. Details for evaluation activities were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report. The Evaluation Technical Report explains the summary of the TOE as well as the content of the evaluation and the verdict of each work unit in the CEM.

### 7.2 Overview of Evaluation Activity

The history of the evaluation conducted is described in the Evaluation Technical Report as follows.

The evaluation has started on 2011-12 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation Technical Report dated 2012-08. The Evaluation Facility received a full set of evaluation deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by the developer, and examined the evidence in relation to a series of evaluation conducted.

Additionally, the evaluator directly visited the manufacturing and delivery sites on 2012-03 and the development site on 2012-06, and examined procedural status conducted in relation to each work unit for configuration management, delivery and development security by investigating records and interviewing staff. Further, the evaluator conducted the sampling check of the developer testing and the evaluator testing by using the developer testing environment at the developer site on 2012-06.

Concerns found in evaluation activities for each work unit were all issued as the Observation Report, and it was reported to the developer. These concerns were reviewed by the developer, and all concerns were solved eventually.

### 7.3 IT Product Testing


The evaluator confirmed the validity of the testing that the developer had performed. As a result of the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation and those confirmed validity, the evaluator performed the reproducibility testing, additional testing and penetration testing based on vulnerability assessments judged to be necessary.

#### 7.3.1 Developer Testing

The evaluator evaluated the integrity of the developer testing that the developer performed and the documentation of actual testing results. A summary of the evaluated developer testing is as follows:

##### (1) Developer Testing Environment

Test configuration of the testing performed by the developer is shown in Figure 7-1 and Table 7-1.



**Figure 7-1 Configuration of the Developer Testing**

**Table 7-1 Main Components**

Name of Component	Description (Purpose of Use)
MFD	An MFD where the TOE is installed.
Debug terminal PC	A computer where all the software used for the testing is installed.
Client PC	A computer used to test the filter function.
Pseudo exchange	A device to simulate a fax line (public line).

MFD(B)	An MFD used for tests that require two MFDs including fax and tandem printing.
Modem for telephone lines	A device that performs data communication via the public line.

The MFD used in the developer testing is one of the several MFDs identified in the ST, namely the MX-4111FN. While the MFDs on which the TOE runs have different processing capabilities, the same TOE is used. Thus, the configuration of the testing environment is considered equivalent to that identified in the ST.

(2) Summary of the Developer Testing

The summary of the developer testing is explained as follows.

(a) Developer Testing Outline

An outline of the developer testing is as follows.

<Developer Testing Approach>

Under the environment shown in Figure 7-1, either of the following two types of ROMs, the product ROM or the testing ROM, was used in compliance with the characteristics of each test. To confirm test results, the testing ROM was provided with the capability of outputting from a serial port, outputting the cryptographic seed and key, enabling and disabling the cryptographic operation, and specifying data to be overwritten. However, the security functions to be tested were not affected.

The testing was conducted by stimulating interfaces including turning on/off the MFD, manual operations from the operation panel and from the client as well as observing responses on the operation panel and on the debug terminal.

<Developer Testing Tools>

Tools used in the developer testing are shown in Table 7-2.

**Table 7-2 Developer Testing Tools**

	Type of Software	Description
(a)	Serial terminal software	Terminal emulator software to operate the MFD via serial communication.
(b)	Web browser	HTTP-based client software to access the MFD's Web server, enabling the user to operate the MFD and send print data to the MFD using the Web print function (print function) of the MFD.
(d)	Decryption tool	Software to decrypt data files encrypted by the MFD with any key.
(e)	TIFF file viewer	Image display software to display compressed images (JBIG and MMR) generated by the MFD on a computer screen.
(f)	JPEG file viewer	Image display software to display compressed images (JPEG) generated by the MFD on a computer screen.
(g)	File dump software	Software to display computer files in hex notation. It is also called binary editor.
(h)	FTP server software	FTP server software which performs the Scan-to-FTP function (scan and send function) of the MFD and transfers data for debugging from the MFD over a network.

	Type of Software	Description
(i)	FTP client software	FTP client software to receive data transferred to the FTP server using the Scan-to-FTP function (scan and send function) of the MFD and to send print data to the MFD using the FTP Push-print function (print function).
(j)	E-mail server software	E-mail server software which performs the Scan-to-Email function and the Internet Fax function (both are scan and send functions) of the MFD.
(k)	E-mail client software	E-mail client software to receive data transferred to the mail server using the Scan-to-Email function (scan and send function) of the MFD and to send print data to the MFD using the E-mail-print function (print function) of the MFD.
(l)	File server software	File server software which performs the Scan-to-SMB function (scan and send function) of the MFD.
(m)	Disk dump software	Software to read any given sectors of the HDD, enabling displaying and editing them.
(n)	ipconfig.exe	Software to query or modify IP addresses and MAC addresses of the network interfaces of the clients through the command prompt.
(o)	MD5 software	Software to obtain a MD5 value of files or character strings through the command prompt.
(p)	Printer driver	Printer driver software which enables the client to send print data from client's applications and print it on the MFD.
(q)	PC-Fax driver	PC-Fax driver software which performs PC-Fax, enabling the client to send fax data from client's applications and send it from the MFD.
(r)	PC-Internet Fax driver	PC-Internet Fax driver software which performs PC-Internet Fax, enabling the client to send fax data from client's applications and send it from the MFD.
(s)	Sharpdesk (network scanner tool)	Client software to receive data transferred to the client using the Scan-to-DeskTop function (scan and send function) of the MFD.
(t)	TWAIN driver	TWAIN driver software which performs the PC scan function (scan and send function) of the MFD.
(u)	Template of TIFF file header	A TIFF file header for image data conversion used for the testing.
(v)	JBIG decode tool	Image data conversion software to display compressed image files generated by the MFD on a debug tool.
(w)	Image file analysis software	Software to extract and display binary files generated by the MFD on the debug terminal PC.

#### <Conduct of the Developer Testing>

As ways to stimulate interfaces, the following approaches were taken: turning on/off the MFD, manual operations from the operation panel and from the client via a Web browser, data transmission via a network cable from another MFD, and dial-up connection using the pseudo exchange.

To confirm responses to the above, behaviour was observed in terms of the results displayed on the Web browser or operation screen of the client, those displayed on the MFD's operation panel, those on the debug terminal PC via a serial communication cable, and visual inspection of printout results of the MFD and behaviour when a fax message is received.

#### (b) Scope of the Performed Developer Testing

The developer testing was performed on 46 items by the developer.

By the coverage analysis, it was verified that all of the TSFIs described in the functional specification had been tested. By the depth analysis, it was verified that the behaviour of TSF subsystems described in the TOE design had been sufficiently tested.

(c) Result

The evaluator confirmed that the actual test results were consistent with the expected test results. The evaluator confirmed an approach of the performed developer testing and the legitimacy of tested items, and confirmed that both the approaches and the results matched the test plans.

### 7.3.2 Evaluator Independent Testing

The evaluator performed the sample testing to reconfirm the execution of the security functions by the test items extracted from the developer testing. In addition, the evaluator performed the evaluator independent testing to ensure that security functions are certainly implemented from the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation.

The independent testing performed by the evaluator is explained as follows.

(1) Independent Testing Environment

The configuration of the testing conducted by the evaluator is shown in Figure 7-2. It is the same as that of the developer testing except that an external telephone is connected to the MFD in the independent testing.




Figure 7-2 Configuration of the Evaluator Independent Testing



## (2) Summary of the Evaluator Independent Testing

The independent testing performed by the evaluator is explained as follows.

## (a) Viewpoints of the Independent Testing

The evaluator devised independent tests in the following viewpoints based on the developer testing and the evidential materials submitted for evaluation.

## &lt;Independent Testing Viewpoints&gt;

1. Each of the TSFs which do not seem to have been considered in the developer testing is tested. For these TSFs, different types of parameters and their combinations are added to cover all range of parameters.
2. Tests are conducted to confirm TSF's behaviour more rigorously with additional timings and combinations of user operation.
3. Tests are conducted to confirm TSF's behaviour using different interfaces to the client from those used in the developer testing.
4. Consideration is made to cover all types of interfaces and all security functions that the TOE provides.

## (b) Independent Testing Outline

An outline of the independent testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.

## &lt;Independent Testing Approach&gt;

Test approaches similar to those of the developer testing were taken.

## &lt;Independent Testing Tools&gt;

The tools used in the developer testing that are shown in Table 7-2 were used.

## &lt;Conduct of the Independent Testing &gt;

From the independent testing viewpoints, 11 independent tests and 16 sample tests were conducted. Main contents of the tests conducted and corresponding viewpoints of the independent testing are shown in Table 7-3.

**Table 7-3 Viewpoints for the Independent Testing**

Viewpoints	Outline of the Independent Testing
2. 4.	A test to confirm that the security functions operate well even if backup data has been restored.
3. 4.	A test concerning print job operations from the client connected through a USB port.
2. 4.	A test to confirm that the data clear function operates well even if several operations such as changing a confidential file password, cancellation of a file deletion or interruption of a copy job in progress are added in addition to those performed in the developer testing.
2. 4.	A test to confirm that the security functions operate well even if a confidential file's property is changed while the MFD operates or if several confidential files are locked.

1. 4.	A test to confirm that the network protection function (filter function) operates well when different combinations of IP addresses or MAC addresses are added.
1. 4.	A test on the fax flow control function with an external telephone connected.

## (c) Result

All the independent testing performed by the evaluator was correctly completed, and the evaluator confirmed the behaviour of the TOE. The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the expected behaviour and all the testing results.

## 7.3.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing

The evaluator devised and performed the necessary evaluator penetration testing the potentially exploitable vulnerabilities of concern under the assumed environment of use and attack level based on the evidence submitted during the evaluation process.

An outline of the penetration testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.

## (1) Summary of the Penetration Testing

A summary of the penetration testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.

## (a) Vulnerability of Concern

The evaluator investigated potential vulnerabilities based on the submitted evidential materials and publicly-available information, and identified vulnerabilities that needed penetration testing as follows.

1. The assets protected by the TOE and the OS may be accessed without authorisation via Telnet or FTP communications.
2. The TOE may be accessed from an unintended network port interface, or the assets protected by the TOE may be leaked by sending unauthorised data to an open port.
3. The security functions may be bypassed by using interfaces whose use is not usually assumed or by accessing interfaces in unexpected ways.
4. More information than necessary may be output from interfaces, ending up leaking confidential information.
5. The security functions may be bypassed by unexpected timings of user operations or exceptional cases.
6. The security functions may be bypassed if there is vulnerability in dealing with passwords in the identification and authentication function.
7. The security functions may be bypassed if there is vulnerability in SSL implementation.
8. The security functions may be bypassed by entering unexpected values such as those above or below the range, or invalid.
9. An MFD without a TOE may leak the assets protected by the TOE when several MFDs process a job in collaboration.
10. The security functions may be bypassed by physically tampering the memory or the boards inside.
11. The security functions may be bypassed if there is vulnerability in accesses from the client via the Web.

## (b) Penetration Testing Outline

The evaluator conducted the following penetration testing to determine whether there is a possibility that the potential vulnerabilities may be abused.

## &lt; Penetration Testing Environment &gt;

The penetration testing was conducted in the same configuration as that of the evaluator independent testing (except that a client was added in which a penetration testing tool had been installed).

In the penetration testing, the following tools listed in Table 7-4 were used in addition to those in the developer testing listed in Table 7-2.

**Table 7-4 Penetration Testing Tools**

Name of Tool/Software	Description (Purpose of Use)
FTP	FTP (File Transfer Protocol) client software.
netcat	A tool to read and write TCP or UDP packets.
nmap	A port scanner.
telnet	Telnet (remote login protocol) client software.
Wireshark	A tool to monitor and analyze communication on a LAN.

## &lt; Conduct of the Vulnerability Testing &gt;

Table 7-5 shows descriptions of the penetration testing which corresponds to vulnerabilities of concern, identified in the investigation of potential vulnerabilities. The evaluator conducted 22 penetration tests to determine the possibility of abuse of potential vulnerabilities.

**Table 7-5 Outline of Performed Penetration Testing**

Vulnerability of Concern	Outline of the Penetration Testing
1	Confirmed that the assets protected by the TOE and information on the system are not accessed directly even if the MFD is connected via FTP or Telnet communications.
2	Confirmed that unexpected network ports are not open (with the port scanner). Also confirmed vulnerabilities to unauthorised accesses do not exist in the ports being used.
3	Confirmed that unauthorised use does not exist of the interfaces to service technicians. Also confirmed that the

	security functions are not harmed by connecting devices through USB ports.
4	Confirmed that information leading to the leakage of confidential information is not output from TOE's interfaces.
5	Confirmed that the security functions are not bypassed even if the user operates in a way which is not specified in guidance documents, or the network is shutdown during data transmission.
6	Confirmed that the identification and authentication function is not bypassed even if invalid passwords or values above or below the range are entered.
7	Confirmed that vulnerable protocols are not selected due to the settings for the client in SSL communication.
8	Confirmed that the security functions are not bypassed even if invalid addresses are specified for the network protection function (filter function).
9	Confirmed that an MFD without a TOE does not leak the assets protected by the TOE when tandem copying is performed.
10	Confirmed that vulnerabilities do not exist which may lead to the bypassing of the security functions caused by replacing or removing the ROM or board inside.
11	Confirmed that the security functions are not bypassed by specifying the URL when the client is connected to the MFD via a browser.

(c) Result

In the penetration testing conducted by the evaluator, the evaluator did not find the vulnerabilities that attackers who have the assumed attack potential could exploit.

#### 7.4 Evaluated Configuration

This evaluation was conducted in the configuration shown in "7.3.2 Evaluator Independent Testing" and Figure 7-2. IPv4 was used in the network. The TOE will not be used in the configuration which is significantly different from the above configuration components. Therefore, the evaluator determined the configuration of the above evaluation is appropriate.

## 7.5 Evaluation Results

The evaluator had concluded that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in the CEM by submitting the Evaluation Technical Report.

In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.

- PP Conformance: None
- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 Conformant
- Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant

As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following assurance components.

- All assurance components of EAL3 package

The result of the evaluation is only applied to those which are composed by the TOE corresponding to the identification described in the Chapter 2.

## 7.6 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations

The evaluator recommendations for users are not mentioned.

## 8. Certification

The Certification Body conducted the following certification based on the materials submitted by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation process.

1. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall be adequate.
2. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall properly be reflected.
3. The submitted evidential materials were sampled, the contents were examined, and the related work units shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
4. Rationale of the evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall be adequate.
5. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall conform to the CEM.

### 8.1 Certification Result

As a result of verification of the submitted Evaluation Technical Report, Observation Reports and related evaluation deliverables, the Certification Body determined that the TOE satisfies all assurance requirements for EAL3 in the CC Part 3.

### 8.2 Recommendations

Users of the TOE are advised to refer to "4.2 Environment Assumptions" and "4.3 Clarification of Scope" to make sure that user's TOE operational environment satisfies the requirements for operation in a network environment.

## 9. Annexes

There is no annex.

## 10. Security Target

Security Target [12] of the TOE is provided as a separate document along with this Certification Report.

MX-FR33 Security Target Version 0.04 (April 16, 2012) Sharp Corporation

## 11. Glossary

The abbreviations relating to the CC used in this report are listed below.

CC:	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM:	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL:	Evaluation Assurance Level
PP:	Protection Profile
ST:	Security Target
TOE:	Target of Evaluation
TSF:	TOE Security Functionality

The abbreviations relating to the TOE used in this report are listed below.

DSK:	Data Security Kit MX-FR33, an optional product sold separately for the MFD, including the firmware part of the TOE.
EEPROM:	Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM, a type of non-volatile memory that allows low frequency of electrical rewriting at any address.
HDC:	Hard Disk Controller, the HDC in the MFD includes part of the TOE hardware.
HDD:	Hard Disk Drive
HTTPS:	HTTP over SSL, HTTP with protection of SSL.
IPP-SSL:	IPP over SSL, IPP with protection of SSL.
MAC:	Media Access Control, communication protocols to allow a number of communication devices to share a single communication medium by identifying devices and mediating communication to avoid collision.
MFD:	Multi Function Device, a digital multifunctional device which is an office machine mainly equipped with copier, printer, scanner and fax functions.
MSD:	Mass Storage Device, in this ST, this especially indicates the HDD and Flash memory in the MFD.
ROM:	Read Only Memory.
USB:	Universal Serial Bus, a serial bus standard to connect between IT equipments.



The definitions of terms used in this report are listed below.

Confidential file:	The data that the user saved with password protection (confidential file password) to prevent others from manipulating.
Controller board:	The board that controls the whole MFD. This contains the CPU to execute the firmware of the TOE, volatile memory, HDC, HDD and others.
Controller firmware:	The firmware that controls the controller board in the MFD.
Document filing:	The function that stores image data that the MFD handles into the HDD for users' later operations. This is also called "Filing" in this document.
Flash memory:	A type of non-volatile memory that allows the entire memory to be erased at once and also allows rewriting to any part of memory.
Hold:	To store a job sent from a printer driver using the document filing function.
Image data:	Digital data, especially in this document, of two-dimensional image data that each function of the MFD manages.
Internet fax:	A function to send and receive fax messages via the Internet. In conformance to the standard specifications, fax data can be sent and received as an attachment by email.
IP address:	A call sign, used for IP, to identify devices for communication.
Job:	The sequence from beginning to end of the use of an MFD function (copier, printer, scanner, fax reception, fax transmission, or PC-Fax). In addition, the instruction for a functional operation is sometimes called a job.
MAC address:	A call sign, used for MAC, to identify devices of communication media.
Non-volatile memory:	The memory device that retains its contents even when the power is turned off.
Operation panel:	The user interface unit in front of the MFD. This contains the function key and liquid crystal display with touch operation system.
Print function:	The function to print data received from external devices.
Spool:	Storing a job's image data into the MSD temporarily to increase the input and output efficiency.
Standard firmware:	The controller firmware that is installed to the MFD that the TOE is not installed to. The TOE contains the controller firmware, and standard firmware is replaced with the TOE's controller firmware when the TOE is installed.
Subnetwork:	A part of internal network divided by router.

Tandem copy:	Tandem print in the MFD's copier function.
Tandem print:	The function to print a large job twice faster than usual by halving that job among two MFDs.
Volatile memory:	A memory device, the contents of which vanish when the power is turned off.

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