FUJIFILM Apeos C8180 / C7580 / C6580 models with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan and Overwrite Storage Security Target

Version 1.04

This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target written in Japanese.

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1.ST INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes Security Target (ST) Reference, TOE Reference, TOE Overview, and TOE Description.

1.1.ST Reference

This section provides information needed to identify this ST.

ST Title:	FUJIFILM Apeos C8180 / C7580 / C6580 models with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan and Overwrite Storage
	Security Target
ST Version:	V 1.04
Publication Date:	June 24, 2021
Author:	FUJIFILM Business Innovation Corp.

1.2.TOE Reference

This section provides information needed to identify the TOE.

	FUJIFILM Apeos
TOE Identification:	C8180 / C7580 / C6580
	models with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan and Overwrite Storage
Version:	Controller ROM Ver. 1.0.20, FAX ROM Ver. 2.2.1

The TOE is one of the following products.

Japanese market

Product	Version
FUJIFILM Apeos C8180 models with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan and	Controller ROM Ver.
Overwrite Storage	1.0.20,
FUJIFILM Apeos C7580 models with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan and	Fax ROM Ver.2.2.1
Overwrite Storage	
FUJIFILM Apeos C6580 models with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan and	
Overwrite Storage	

Other markets

Product	Version
FUJIFILM Apeos C8180 models with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan and	
Overwrite Storage	

FUJIFILM Apeos C7580 models with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan and	Controller ROM Ver.
Overwrite Storage	1.0.20,
FUJIFILM Apeos C6580 models with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan and	Fax ROM Ver.2.2.1
Overwrite Storage	

1.3.TOE Overview

1.3.1. TOE Type

The TOE is an MFD that is connected to a wired Local Area Network (LAN) and supports the copy, scan, print, fax, and document storage and retrieval functions.

1.3.2. Usage and Major Security Features of TOE




Figure 1 Operational Environment Assumed by TOE

The MFD is used in an environment that is connected to a wired Local Area Network (LAN) isolated from the external network by the firewall.

The MFD can connect to the public telephone line to send and receive fax data.

Users use each basic function of the MFD from the control panel of the MFD or web browser or printer driver of the general user and system administrator clients.

The MFD has the functions to copy, scan, print, fax (send and receive), store and retrieve the documents handled by users.

To prevent alteration and leakage of these documents, the MFD has the functions to identify and authenticate users, control access to documents and functions based on user roles, encrypt the setting data and document data stored in MFD storage, protect the communication data on the LAN, manage security settings (available only to system administrators), store the usage history of the MFD in the MFD internally and send the usage history to an external audit server (security audit function), verify the integrity of the TSF executable code and TSF data, verify the authenticity of the TSF executable code when the code is updated, and separate the fax line and the LAN, and overwrite residual image data stored in the storage.

To use overwrite residual image data function, it is necessary to purchase the data overwrite kit and enable the overwrite storage function.

The products that are included in the TOE support local authentication and remote authentication, when the remote authentication option is installed. However, only local authentication is used in the settings of the TOE.

Note:

• There are two types of Folders: The Personal Folder, which SAs and general users can create, and the Shared Folder, which the Key Operator can create. The guidance of the TOE prohibits the use of the Shared Folder. In this ST, "Folder" means "Personal Folder."

• The interfaces for users to connect personal storage devices (portable flash memory devices, etc.) to the MFD are disabled.

1.3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware and Software

In the operational environment shown in Figure 1, the TOE is an MFD, and there are the following non-TOE hardware and software.

(1) General user client

The hardware is a general-purpose computer.

When the computer is used as a printer client, the user needs to install a printer driver on the computer so that a request to print document data can be sent to the MFD. In order to use the web server function of the MFD, the user needs to use a web browser installed on the computer.

(2) System administrator client

The hardware is a general-purpose computer.

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A web browser is necessary for a system administrator to refer to and change the TOE settings and update the TOE firmware.

(3) Mail server

A mail server is necessary for the MFD to send scanned documents via email. The hardware/OS of the server is a general-purpose computer/server, and an email service that supports the SMTP protocol protected by TLS needs to be installed.

(4) Audit server

An audit server is necessary to collect audit events occurred on the MFD. The hardware/OS is a general-purpose computer/server, and the MFD sends audit logs to the audit server that support TLS using Syslog.

In the TOE evaluation, the following shall be used as the hardware and software listed above.

The OS and web browser for (1) general user client and (2) system administrator client shall be Windows 10 and Microsoft Edge respectively.

(3) mail server shall be Postfix version 2.10.1.

(4) audit server shall be Linux OS and rsyslog 8.24.0.

The printer driver used in (1) general user client shall be either of the following printer drivers, which FUJIFILM Business Innovation Corp. offers for the target MFD models.

For the Japanese market: "ART EX Print Driver Version 7.0.1"

For other markets: "PCL6 Print Driver Version 7.0.1"

1.4.TOE Description

This section describes user roles and the logical and physical boundaries of the TOE.

1.4.1. Users Assumptions

Table 1 specifies the TOE user roles assumed in this ST.

Table 1 User Roles

Name	User data type	Definition
U.NORMAL	General user	An identified and authorized
		User who is not granted the
		administrative role.
U.ADMIN	System administrator	An identified and authorized
		User who is granted the
		administrative role.
		(In the TOE, the Key
		Operator and SAs are
		U.ADMIN. They are
		collectively referred to as
		U.ADMIN in this ST.)

1.4.2. Logical Boundary of the TOE

Figure 2 shows the logical architecture of the TOE.

Among the functions within the logical boundary, the ones without underlines are basic functions and the ones with underlines are security functions.




Figure 2 TOE Logical Boundary

1.4.2.1. Basic Functions

- (1) Print: The MFD receives a digital document sent from the printer driver of the general user client. The received document is converted into a hard copy in accordance with the request from the control panel.
- (2) Scan: The MFD scans the document on the scanner in accordance with the request from the control panel and converts the document into a digital document. The TOE has the function to send digital documents converted from paper documents by the

scan function to the mail server and the function to store these documents in Folders using the document storage and retrieval function.

- (3) Copy: The MFD copies the document on the scanner in accordance with the request from the control panel.
- (4) PSTN fax send: The MFD scans the document on the scanner in accordance with the request from the control panel and sends the document data to the PSTN fax destination through PSTN using the standard PSTN fax protocol.
- (5) PSTN fax receive: The MFD receives fax document data sent from the machine on the other end of line through PSTN and stores the data in a specific Folder using the document storage and retrieval function.
- (6) Document storage and retrieval: The MFD stores digital documents in Folders and enables the following functions for stored documents in response to requests sent from the control panel or general user clients. In the TOE, digital documents that can be stored in a Folder are scanned documents with the scan function, or fax documents received with the PSTN fax receive.

Print: Print a digital document stored in Folder in accordance with the request from the control panel.

Retrieve: Send documents to general user clients in response to requests sent from general user clients.

Delete: Delete stored digital documents in accordance with the request from the control panel or general user clients.

1.4.2.2. Security Functions

The TOE provides the following security functions to support the basic functions described in 1.4.2.1.

(1) Identification and Authentication

Identifying/authenticating users and granting roles to the users ensure that functions of the MFD are accessible only to users who have been granted roles by a system administrator. The user identification and authentication function are also used as the basis for access control and administrative roles and helps associate specific users with security-relevant events and records of MFD use. The MFD carries out the identification and authentication of users.

When a user attempts to be authenticated and fails consecutively multiple times, another request to authenticate the user is no longer accepted.

When the remote authentication option is additionally installed, the products that are included in the TOE support local authentication and remote authentication. However, only local authentication is selected in the TOE settings.

(2) Access Control

Access control ensures that documents, information related to document processing, and security-relevant data are accessible only to users who have appropriate access permissions.

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(3) Data Encryption

Data encryption ensures that the data and communications data stored in the TOE cannot be accessed by an attacker through an unauthorized interface.

• Depending on the policy, data encryption is also used to protect documents and confidential system information on field-replaceable nonvolatile storage devices and to protect such data when these devices are removed from the MFD.

- The effectiveness of data encryption is assured through the use of internationally accepted cryptographic algorithms.
- (4) Trusted Communications

Trusted communications protect communication data on an internal network, such as document data, job information, audit log, and TOE setting data. The TOE supports general encrypted communication protocols (TLS/HTTPS and TLS).

(5) Security Management

The security management function ensures that only users who have been identified and authenticated as system administrators can refer to or change the settings of security functions of the TOE from the control panel or system administrator client.

(6) Security Audit

The events of when, who, and which actions all TOE users carried out (user operation, device failure, configuration change etc.) are sent to the audit server and stored as audit log. The audit log is encrypted by the TLS protocol when being sent. The audit log is stored in the TOE internally, only authorized users as a system administrator can also download it from a web browser of a system administrator client.

(7) Trusted Operation

Firmware updates for the MFD are verified before being applied to ensure the authenticity of the software. The MFD performs self-tests to ensure that its operation is not disrupted by some detectable malfunctions.

(8) PSTN Fax-Network Separation

With regards to PSTN fax-network separation, the MFD ensures that the PSTN fax modem is not used to create a data bridge between the PSTN and the LAN.

(9) Overwrite Storage

Used document data stored in the internal storage is overwritten after any of functions, such as copy, print, and scan, is completed.

1.4.3. Physical Boundary of the TOE

The physical boundary of the TOE is the whole MFD. The TOE does not include options and add-ons that are not relevant to security, such as finishers. Physical components that constitute the TOE are listed in Tables 2 to 4.

MFD unit is identified by the vendor name, the model name and function buttons displayed in the control panel after start-up.

Market	Unit	Version	Format	Delivery method
Japan/	FUJIFILM Apeos	Controller ROM	Hardware on	On-site
Other	C8180 models with	Ver. 1.0.20,	which firmware in	
	Copy, Print, Fax,	Fax ROM Ver.	binary format is	
	Scan and Overwrite	2.2.1	installed	
	Storage			
Japan/	FUJIFILM Apeos	Controller ROM	Hardware on	On-site
Other	C7580 models with	Ver. 1.0.20,	which firmware in	
	Copy, Print, Fax,	Fax ROM Ver.	binary format is	
	Scan and Overwrite	2.2.1	installed	
	Storage			
Japan/	FUJIFILM Apeos	Controller ROM	Hardware on	On-site
Other	C6580 models with	Ver. 1.0.20,	which firmware in	
	Copy, Print, Fax,	Fax ROM Ver.	binary format is	
	Scan and Overwrite	2.2.1	installed	
	Storage			

Table 2 Physical Components Constituting the TOE (MFD Main Unit)

As shown in Table 3 and Table 4, the guidance of this TOE is available in Japanese and English. The Japanese version for the Japanese market and the English version for other markets are distributed to users.

Table 3 Physical Components Constituting the TOE (Japanese version guidance)
--

	F	Della service ettere et		
Form number	Format	Delivery method	Guidance name	Hash value
GM1039J1-2	PDF file	Web	Apeos C8180	e774557d531ca49
Edition 1			Apeos C7580	92ccd67c9c718a3
			Apeos C6580	c154201d0995835
			Reference Guide	ec58cdc870940d3
			Operations	8e8e
GM1041J1-2	PDF file	Web	Apeos C8180	b778a816041787
Ver. 1			Apeos C7580	d49578dd8bdbea
			Apeos C6580	3839e753cddc83d
			Reference Guide	c3303a787edfbfd9
			Main Unit	9f7dd
FD1023J1-2	Paper	On-site	Apeos User's	-
Edition 1			Manual	
			C8180/C7580/C65	
			80	
GM1043J1-	PDF file	Web	Apeos C8180	7ac99472789a508
1_20210623			Apeos C7580	75f1cd82b526210
Edition 1			Apeos C6580	95c1a6918d6e780

Security Function	228bd3a0ed8f886
Supplementary	21af
Guide	

Table 4 Physical Components Constituting the TOE (English version guidance)

			[
Form number	Format	Delivery method	Guidance name	Hash value
GM1039E2-1	PDF file	Web	Apeos C8180	46089185097d0d7
Edition 1			Apeos C7580	446c719b9eb2abf2
			Apeos C6580	e339e9fd6218e3a
			Reference Guide	9cb0b4a384e2387
			Operations	de7
GM1041E2-2	PDF file	Web	Apeos C8180	b4ca353895028ab
Ver. 1			Apeos C7580	aa42470392f185d
			Apeos C6580	022aab006be1edc
			Reference Guide	a97c72fc51e7ad0
			Main Unit	3f3c
FD1023E2-2	Paper	On-site	Apeos User's	-
Edition 1			Manual	
			C8180/C7580/C65	
			80	
GM1043E2-	PDF file	Web	Apeos C8180	0aa39296febab85
1_20210623			Apeos C7580	dd698a18513fd09
(Edition 1)			Apeos C6580	36c802eb469eea7
			Security Function	95cd0aa2e920ac0
			Supplementary	e163
			Guide	

2. CONFORMANCE CLAIM

2.1.CC Conformance Claim

This ST and TOE claim conformance to the following versions of CC:

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and general model (April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5) Part 2: Security functional components (April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5) Part 3: Security assurance components (April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5)

CC Part2 extended CC Part3 conformant

2.2.PP claim, Package Claim

2.2.1. PP Claim

This ST claims exact conformance to the following HCD-PP.

Title: Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version: 1.0 dated September 10, 2015 Errata: Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices – v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017

2.2.2. Package Claim

This Security Target and TOE do not claim package conformance.

2.2.3. Conformance Rationale

This ST and TOE satisfy the conditions required by the PP. The TOE type conforms to the PP because this ST and TOE satisfy the following conditions required by the PP and claim exact conformance to the PP.

Required Uses

Printing, scanning, copying, network communications, administration

- Conditionally Mandatory Uses
 - PSTN faxing, storage and retrieval, field-replaceable nonvolatile storage.
- Optional Uses

Internal audit log storage, Image Overwrite

3.SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION

This chapter describes the threats, organizational security policies, and the assumptions for the use of the TOE.

3.1.Threats

3.1.1. Assets Protected by TOE

The TOE protects the following assets.

Table 5 Assets for User Data

Designation	User Data type	Definition
D.USER.DOC	User Document Data	Information contained in a User's
		Document, in electronic or hardcopy
		form
D.USER.JOB	User Job Data	Information related to a User's
		Document or Document Processing
		Job

Table 6 Assets for TSF Data

Designation	TSF Data type	Definition
D.TSF.PROT	Protected TSF Data	TSF Data for which alteration by a
		User who is neither the data owner nor
		in an Administrator role might affect the
		security of the TOE, but for which
		disclosure is acceptable
D.TSF.CONF	Confidential TSF Data	TSF Data for which either disclosure or
		alteration by a User who is neither the
		data owner nor in an Administrator role
		might affect the security of the TOE

3.1.2. Threats

Table 7 identifies the threats addressed by the TOE.

Table 7 Threats

Designation	Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_A	An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete) User
CCESS	Document Data or change (modify or delete) User Job
	Data in the TOE through one of the TOE's interfaces.

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T.TSF_COMPROMISE	An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF Data in	
	the TOE through one of the TOE's interfaces.	
T.TSF_FAILURE	A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of security if the	
	TOE is permitted to operate.	
T.UNAUTHORIZED_U	An attacker may cause the installation of unauthorized	
PDATE	software on the TOE.	
T.NET_COMPROMISE	An attacker may access data in transit or otherwise	
	compromise the security of the TOE by monitoring or	
	manipulating network communication.	
T.NET_COMPROMISE	compromise the security of the TOE by monitoring or	

3.2. Organizational Security Policies

Table 8 describes the organizational security policies the TOE must comply with.

|--|

Designation	Definition
P.AUTHORIZATION	Users must be authorized before performing Document
	Processing and administrative functions.
P.AUDIT	Security-relevant activities must be audited, and the log of
	such actions must be protected and transmitted to an
	External IT Entity.
P.COMMS_PROTECTI	The TOE must be able to identify itself to other devices on
ON	the LAN.
P.STORAGE_ENCRYP	If the TOE stores User Document Data or Confidential
TION	TSF Data on Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage
(conditionally	Devices, it will encrypt such data on those devices.
mandatory)	
P.KEY_MATERIAL	Cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or any other
(conditionally	values that contribute to the creation of encryption keys for
mandatory)	Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage of User Document
	Data or Confidential TSF Data must be protected from
	unauthorized access and must not be stored on that
	storage device.
P.FAX_FLOW	If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it will ensure
(conditionally	separation between the PSTN fax line and the LAN.
mandatory)	
P.IMAGE_OVERWRIT	Upon completion or cancellation of a Document
E	Processing job, the TOE shall overwrite residual image
(optional)	data from its Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage
	Devices.

3.3.Assumptions

Table 9 describes the assumptions for the performance, operation, and use of the TOE.

Table 9 Assumptions

Designation	Definition
A.PHYSICAL	Physical security, commensurate with the value of the
	TOE and the data it stores or processes, is assumed to be
	provided by the environment.
A.NETWORK	The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the
	TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN	TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE
	according to site security policies.
A.TRAINED_USERS	Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according to
	site security policies.

4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES

This chapter describes the security objectives for the environment. Table 10 defines the security objectives for the TOE environment.

Designation	Definition
OE.PHYSICAL_PROTE	The Operational Environment shall provide physical
CTION	security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the
	data it stores or processes.
OE.NETWORK_PROT	The Operational Environment shall provide network
ECTION	security to protect the TOE from direct, public access to its
	LAN interface.
OE.ADMIN_TRUST	The TOE Owner shall establish trust that Administrators
	will not use their privileges for malicious purposes.
OE.USER_TRAINING	The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of site
	security policies and have the competence to follow them.
OE.ADMIN_TRAININ	The TOE Owner shall ensure that Administrators are
G	aware of site security policies and have the competence to
	use manufacturer's guidance to correctly configure the
	TOE and protect passwords and keys accordingly.

Table 10 Security Objectives for the TOE Environment

5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION

Extended components in this section are defined in HCD-PP.

5.1. Extended Functional Requirements Definition

5.1.1. Class FAU: Security Audit

FAU_STG_EXT Extended: External Audit Trail Storage

Family Behavior:

This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure that secure transmission of audit data from TOE to an External IT Entity.

Component leveling:

FAU STG EXT.1 Extended: External Audit Trail Storage interfaces

1

FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage requires the TSF to use a trusted channel implementing a secure protocol.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

• The TSF shall have the ability to configure the cryptographic functionality.

Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

• There are no auditable events foreseen.

FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation,
	FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an External IT Entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.

Rationale:

The TSF is required that the transmission of generated audit data to an External IT Entity which relies on a non-TOE audit server for storage and review of audit records. The storage of these audit records and the ability to allow the administrator to review these audit records is provided by the Operational Environment in that case. The Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the transmission of audit data to an External IT Entity.

This extended component protects the audit records, and it is therefore placed in the FAU class with a single component.

5.1.2. Class FCS: Cryptographic Support

FCS_CKM_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Key Management

Family Behavior:

This family addresses the management aspects of cryptographic keys. Especially, this extended component is intended for cryptographic key destruction.

Component leveling:

FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction interfaces

4

FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Material Destruction ensures not only keys but also key materials that are no longer needed are destroyed by using an approved method.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

• There are no management actions foreseen.

Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

• There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_CKM_EXT.4	Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for
	asymmetric keys), or
	FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation
	(Symmetric Keys)],
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall destroy all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and cryptographic critical security parameters when no longer needed.

Rationale:

Cryptographic Key Material Destruction is to ensure the keys and key materials that are no longer needed are destroyed by using an approved method, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Cryptographic Key Material Destruction.

This extended component protects the cryptographic key and key materials against exposure, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT Extended: HTTPS selected

Family Behavior:

Components in this family define requirements for protecting remote management sessions between the TOE and a Security Administrator. This family describes how HTTPS will be implemented. This is a new family defined for the FCS Class.

Component leveling:

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected Destruction interfaces 1

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS selected, requires that HTTPS be implemented according to RFC 2818 and supports TLS.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

• There are no management actions foreseen.

Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

• Failure of HTTPS session establishment

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	HTTPS selected	
Hierarchical to:		No other components.
Dependencies:		No dependencies.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS as specified in FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.

Rationale:

HTTPS is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms.

This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.

FCS_KYC_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Key Chaining)

Family Behavior:

This family provides the specification to be used for using multiple layers of encryption keys to ultimately secure the protected data encrypted on the storage.

Component leveling:

FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining

FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Key Chaining, requires the TSF to maintain a key chain and specifies the characteristics of that chain.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

• There are no management actions foreseen.

Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

• There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_KYC_EXT.1	Key Chaining	
Hierarchical to:		No other components.
Dependencies:		[FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic operation (Key
		Wrapping),
		FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining,
		FCS_COP.1(i) Cryptographic operation (Key
		Transport),
		FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Key
		Derivation), and/or
		FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key
		Encryption)].

FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [selection: one, using a submask as the BEV or DEK; intermediate keys originating from one or more submask(s) to the BEV or DEK using the following method(s): [selection: key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(e), key combining as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1, key encryption as specified in FCS_COP.1(f), key derivation as specified in FCS_KDF_EXT.1, key transport as specified in FCS_COP.1(i)]] while maintaining an effective strength of [selection: 128-bit and 256-bit].

Rationale:

1

Key Chaining ensures that the TSF maintains the key chain, and also specifies the characteristics of that chain. However, the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the management of multiple layers of encryption key to protect encrypted data.

This extended component protects the TSF data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.

FCS_RBG_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)

Family Behavior:

This family defines requirements for random bit generation to ensure that it is performed in accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.

Component leveling:

FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation		1	
---	--	---	--

FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation requires random bit generation to be performed in accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

• There are no management actions foreseen.

Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

• There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_RBG_EXT.1	Random Bit Generation
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with [selection: ISO/IEC 18031:2011, NIST SP 800-90A] using [selection: Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)].

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from [selection: [assignment: number of software-based sources] software-based noise source(s), [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source(s)] with a minimum of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 "Security strength table for hash functions", of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

Rationale:

Random bits/number will be used by the SFRs for key generation and destruction, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the random bit generation. This extended component ensures the strength of encryption keys, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.

FCS_TLS_EXT Extended: TLS selected

Family Behavior:

This family addresses the ability for a server and/or a client to use TLS to protect data between a client and the server using the TLS protocol.

Component leveling:

 FCS TLS EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected
 1

FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS selected, requires the TLS protocol implemented as specified.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

• There are no management actions foreseen.

Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

• Failure of TLS session establishment

FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
	FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric encryption/decryption)
	FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for
	signature generation/verification)
	FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic Operation (Hash
	Algorithm)
	FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-
	hash message authentication)
	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic
	Operation (Random Bit Generation)

FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement one or more of the following protocols [selection: *TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)*] supporting the following cipher suites:

Mandatory cipher suites: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA

Optional cipher suites: [selection: None TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS DHE RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256 TLS DHE RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA256 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS ECDHE ECDSA WITH AES 128 GCM SHA256 TLS ECDHE ECDSA WITH AES 256 GCM SHA384 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 1.

Rationale:

TLS is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms.

This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.

5.1.3. Class FDP: User Data Protection

FDP_DSK_EXT Extended: Protection of Data on Disk

Family Behavior:

This family is to mandate the encryption of all protected data written to the storage.

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Component leveling:

 FDP DSK EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
 1

FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk, requires the TSF to encrypt all the Confidential TSF and User Data stored on the Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Devices in order to avoid storing these data in plaintext on the devices.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

• There are no management actions foreseen.

Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

• There are no auditable events foreseen.

FDP_DSK_EXT.1	Protection of Data on Disk	
Hierarchical to:	No other components.	
Dependencies:	FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data	
	Encryption/Decryption)	

FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [selection: *perform encryption in accordance with FCS_COP.1(d), use a self-encrypting Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device that is separately CC certified to conform to the FDE EE cPP*] such that any Field- Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device contains no plaintext User Document Data and no plaintext confidential TSF Data.

FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.

Rationale:

Extended: Protection of Data on Disk is to specify that encryption of any confidential data without user intervention, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Protection of Data on Disk.

This extended component protects the Data on Disk, and it is therefore placed in the FDP class with a single component.

FDP_FXS_EXT Extended: Fax Separation

Family Behavior:

This family addresses the requirements for separation between PSTN fax line and the LAN to which TOE is connected.

Component leveling:

FDP FXS EXT.1 Extended: Fax Separation 1

FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Fax Separation, requires the fax interface cannot be used to create a network bridge between a PSTN and the LAN to which TOE is connected.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

• There are no management actions foreseen.

Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

• There are no auditable events foreseen.

FDP_FXS_EXT.1	Fax separation	
Hierarchical to:		No other components.
Dependencies:		No dependencies.

FDP_FXS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prohibit communication via the fax interface, except transmitting or receiving User Data using fax protocols.

Rationale:

Fax Separation is to protect a LAN against attack from PSTN line, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Protection of TSF or User Data.

This extended component protects the TSF Data or User Data, and it is therefore placed in the FDP class with a single component.

5.1.4. Class FIA: Identification and Authentication

FIA_PMG_EXT Extended: Password Management

Family Behavior:

This family defines requirements for the attributes of passwords used by administrative users to ensure that strong passwords and passphrases can be chosen and maintained.

Component leveling:

FIA PMG EXT.1 Extended: Password Management	 1	

FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password management requires the TSF to support passwords with varying composition requirements, minimum lengths, maximum lifetime, and similarity constraints.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

• There are no management actions foreseen.

Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

• There are no auditable events foreseen.

FIA_PMG_EXT.1	Password management
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.

FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for User passwords:

Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [selection: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "\", "&", "*", "(", ")", [assignment: other characters]];

Minimum password length shall be settable by an Administrator, and have the capability to require passwords of 15 characters or greater.

Rationale:

Password Management is to ensure the strong authentication between the endpoints of communication, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Password Management.

This extended component protects the TOE by means of password management, and it is therefore placed in the FIA class with a single component.

5.1.5. Class FPT: Protection of the TSF

FPT_KYP_EXT Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material

Family Behavior:

This family addresses the requirements for keys and key materials to be protected if and when written to nonvolatile storage.

Component leveling:

FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of key and key material

FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of key and key material, requires the TSF to ensure that no plaintext key or key materials are written to nonvolatile storage.

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Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

• There are no management actions foreseen.

Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

• There are no auditable events foreseen.

FPT_KYP_EXT.1	Protection of Key and Key Material
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.

FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall not store plaintext keys that are part of the keychain specified by FCS_KYC_EXT.1 in any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device, and not store any such plaintext key on a device that uses the key for its encryption.

Rationale:

Protection of Key and Key Material is to ensure that no plaintext key or key material are written to nonvolatile storage, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the protection of key and key material.

This extended component protects the TSF data, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single component.

FPT_SKP_EXT Extended: Protection of TSF Data

Family Behavior:

This family addresses the requirements for managing and protecting the TSF data, such as cryptographic keys. This is a new family modelled as the FPT Class.

Component leveling:

FP1_SKP_EX1.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data 1	FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data		1	
--	--	--	---	--

FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading all symmetric keys), requires preventing symmetric keys from being read by any user or subject. It is the only component of this family.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

• There are no management actions foreseen.

Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

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• There are no auditable events foreseen.

FPT_SKP_EXT.1	Protection of TSF Data	
Hierarchical to:	No other components.	
Dependencies:	No dependencies.	

FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.

Rationale:

Protection of TSF Data is to ensure the pre-shared keys, symmetric keys and private keys are protected securely, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the protection of such TSF data.

This extended component protects the TOE by means of strong authentication using Pre- shared Key, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single component.

FPT_TST_EXT Extended: TSF testing

Family Behavior:

This family addresses the requirements for self-testing the TSF for selected correct operation.

Component leveling:

FPT TST EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing

FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF testing requires a suite of self-testing to be run during initial start-up in order to demonstrate correct operation of the TSF.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

• There are no management actions foreseen.

Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

• There are no auditable events foreseen.

FPT_TST_EXT.1	TSF testing	
Hierarchical to:		No other components.
Dependencies:		No dependencies.

FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (and power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.

1

Rationale:

TSF testing is to ensure the TSF can be operated correctly, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the TSF testing. There is no SFR defined for TSF testing. This extended component protects the TOE, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single component.

FPT_TUD_EXT Extended: Trusted Update

Family Behavior:

This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure that only administrators can update the TOE firmware/software, and that such firmware/software is authentic.

Component leveling:

 FPT TUD EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update
 1

FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update, ensures authenticity and access control for updates.

Management:

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

• There are no management actions foreseen.

Audit:

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST:

• There are no auditable events foreseen.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Trusted Update	
Hierarchical to:		No other components.
Dependencies:		[FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for
		signature generation/verification), or
		FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash
		Algorithm)].

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to query the current version of the TOE firmware/software.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to initiate updates to TOE firmware/software.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE using a digital signature mechanism and [selection: *published hash, no other functions*] prior to installing those updates.

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Rationale:

Firmware/software is a form of TSF Data, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the management of firmware/software. In particular, there is no SFR defined for importing TSF Data.

This extended component protects the TOE, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single component.

6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

This chapter describes the security functional requirements, security assurance requirements, and security requirement rational.

The definitions of terms used in this chapter are as follows.

6.1.Notation

Bold typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that has been completed or refined in HCD-PP, relative to the original SFR definition in Common Criteria Part 2 or to its Extended Component Definition.

Bold italic typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that has been partially completed or refined in HCD-PP. It also must be selected and/or completed in this ST.

<u>Underlined bold italic</u> typeface in parentheses that follows <u>underlined bold</u> typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that has been partially completed in HCD-PP and refined in this ST. *Italic* typeface indicates the text within an SFR that must be selected and/or completed in this ST. *Gray italic* typeface indicates the text within an SFR that has not been selected in this ST. <u>Underlined italic</u> typeface indicates the text within an SFR that has been assigned in this ST.

The definition of SFR components followed by (a), (b)... is as described in the PP. SFR components followed by (a1), (a2)... represent required iterations of iterations.

6.2. Security Functional Requirements

Security functional requirements provided by the TOE are described below.

6.2.1. Class FAU: Security Audit

FAU_GEN.1	Audit data genera (for O.AUDIT)	ation
Hierarchical to:	No other components.	
Dependencies:	FPT_STM.1	Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1	 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit and c) All auditable events specified in Table 11, [assignment: <u>no other auditable events</u>]. 	
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FAU_GEN.1.2

The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and

b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, **additional information specified in Table 11**, [assignment: <u>no other relevant information</u>].

	Table [·]	11 Audit	table E	vents
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Auditable Events	Relevant SFR	Additional Information
Job completion	FDP_ACF.1	Type of job
Unsuccessful User authentication	FIA_UAU.1	None
Unsuccessful User identification	FIA_UID.1	None
Use of management functions	FMT_SMF.1	None
Modification to the group of Users that are part of a role	FMT_SMR.1	None
Changes to the time	FPT_STM.1	None
Failure to establish session	FTP_ITC.1,	Reason for
	FTP_TRP.1(a),	failure
	FTP_TRP.1(b)	

FAU_GEN.2	User identity association		
	(for O.AUDIT)		
Hierarchical to:	No other components.		
Dependencies:	FAU_GEN.1	Audit data generation	
	FIA_UID.1 Timing	of identification	
FAU_GEN.2.1	For audit events resulting from actions of identified users,		
	the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event		
	with the identity of	the user that caused the event.	
FAU_SAR.1	Audit review		
-	(for O.AUDIT)		
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		
Hierarchical to:	No other components.		
Dependencies:	FAU_GEN.1	Audit data generation	

FAU_SAR.1.1	The TSF shall provide [assignment: <i>U.ADMIN</i>] with the capability to read all records from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2	The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.
FAU_SAR.2	Restricted audit review (for O.AUDIT)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2.1	The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access.
FAU_STG.1	Protected audit trail storage (for O.AUDIT)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1	The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2	The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.
FAU_STG.4	Prevention of audit data loss (for O.AUDIT)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1	Refinement: The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: <i>"ignore audited events</i> ", "prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights", <i>"overwrite the oldest stored audit records"</i>] and [assignment: <u>no other actions to be taken</u>] if the audit trail is full.
FAU_STG_EXT.1	Extended: External Audit Trail Storage (for O.AUDIT) - 33 -

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Hierarchical to:	No other components.			
Dependencies:	FAU_GEN.1	Audit data generation,		
	FTP_ITC.1 Inter-7	ΓSF trusted channel.		
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1	The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audi data to an External IT Entity using a trusted channel			
	according to FTP_ITC.1.			

6.2.2. Class FCS: Cryptographic Support

FCS_CKM.1(a)	Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys) (for O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. [FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification), or FCS_COP.1(i) Cryptographic operation (Key Transport)] FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1(a)	Refinement: The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys used for key establishment in accordance with [selection: • <i>NIST Special Publication 800-56A,</i> <i>"Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography"</i> <i>for finite field-based key establishment schemes;</i> • <i>NIST Special Publication 800-56A,</i> <i>"Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography"</i> <i>for elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes and implementing "NIST curves" P-256, P-384 and</i> <i>[selection: P-521, no other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard")</i> • <i>NIST Special Publication 800-56B,</i> <i>"Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography"</i> <i>for RSA-based key establishment schemes</i>

] and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112 bits.

FCS_CKM.1(b)	Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys) (for O.COMMS_PROTECTION, O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. [FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric encryption/decryption), or FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption), or FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping), or FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption), or FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication), or FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)] FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_CKM.1.1(b)	Refinement: The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys using a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and specified cryptographic key sizes [selection: <i>128-bit, 256-bit</i>] that meet the following: No Standard.
FCS_CKM.4	Cryptographic key destruction (for O.COMMS_PROTECTION, O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION, O.PURGE_DATA)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. [FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys), or FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)]
FCS_CKM.4.1	Refinement: The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [selection:

For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by [selection: powering off a device, [assignment: other mechanism that ensures keys are destroyed]].

For nonvolatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection: single, three or more times] overwrite of key data storage location consisting of [selection: a pseudo random pattern using the TSF's RBG (as specified in FCS RBG EXT.1), a static pattern], followed by a [selection: read-verify, none]. If read-verification of the overwritten data fails, the process shall be repeated again;] that meets the following: [selection: NIST SP800-88, no standard]. FCS_CKM_EXT.4 **Cryptographic Key Material Destruction** (for O.COMMS PROTECTION, O.STORAGE ENCRYPTION, O.PURGE DATA) Hierarchical to: No other components. **Dependencies:** [FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys), or FCS CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)], FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS CKM EXT.4.1 The TSF shall destroy all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and cryptographic critical security parameters when no longer needed. FCS_COP.1(a) **Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric** encryption/decryption) (for O.COMMS PROTECTION) Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FCS CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys) FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction

FCS_COP.1.1(a)	 Refinement: The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES operating in [assignment: <u>CBC, GCM</u>] and cryptographic key sizes 128-bits and 256-bits that meets the following: FIPS PUB 197, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)" [Selection: NIST SP 800-38A, NIST SP 800-38B, NIST SP 800-38C, NIST SP 800-38D]
FCS_COP.1(b1)	Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification) (for O.UPDATE VERIFICATION)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys) FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(b1)	Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services in accordance with a [selection: -Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment: 2048 bits or greater], RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment: 2048 bits or greater], or -Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with key sizes of [assignment: 256 bits or greater]] that meets the following [selection: Case: Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard" Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard" Case: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard" The TSF shall implement "NIST curves" P-256, P384 and [selection: P521, no other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard").].
FCS_COP.1(b2)	Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification) (for O.COMMS_PROTECTION)

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Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys) FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(b2)	Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services in accordance with a [selection: -Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment: 2048 bits or greater], RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment: 2048 bits, 3072 bits], or -Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with key sizes of [assignment: 256 bits, 384bits, 521bits]] that meets the following [selection: Case: Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard" Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard" Case: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard" The TSF shall implement "NIST curves" P-256, P384 and [selection: P521, no other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard").].
FCS_COP.1(c1)	Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm) (selected in FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3, or with FCS_SNI_EXT.1.1)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. No dependencies.
FCS_COP.1.1(c1)	Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with [selection: <i>SHA-1,</i> <i>SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512</i>] that meet the following: [ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004].
FCS_COP.1(c2)	Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm) (for O.COMMS_PROTECTION)

Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. No dependencies.
FCS_COP.1.1(c2)	Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with [selection: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] that meet the following: [ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004].
FCS_COP.1(d)	Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) (for O. STORAGE_ENCRYPTION)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)] FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(d)	The TSF shall perform data encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [selection: <i>CBC, GCM, XTS</i>] mode and cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3, [selection: <i>CBC as specified in ISO/IEC</i> 10116, GCM as specified in ISO/IEC 19772, and XTS as specified in IEEE1619].
FCS_COP.1(f)	Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption) (selected from FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys) FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(f)	Refinement: The TSF shall perform key encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [[selection: <i>CBC, GCM</i>] mode] and cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: [AES as specified in ISO /IEC 18033-3, [selection: CBC as specified in ISO/IEC 10116, GCM as specified in ISO/IEC 19772].

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FCS_COP.1(g)	Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication) (selected with FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys) FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(g)	Refinement: The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[selection: <i>SHA-1, SHA-</i> <i>224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512</i>], key size [assignment: <u>160, 256, 384</u>], and message digest sizes [selection: 160, 224, 256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following: FIPS PUB 198-1, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, and FIPS PUB 180-3, "Secure Hash Standard."
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	HTTPS selected (selected in FTP_ITC.1.1, FTP_TRP.1.1)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1	The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2	The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS as specified in FCS_TLS_EXT.1.
FCS_KYC_EXT.1	Key Chaining (for O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. [FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic operation (Key Wrapping), or FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining, or FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption), or

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FCS KDF EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Key Derivation), and/or FCS COP.1(i) Cryptographic operation (Key Transport)] FCS KYC EXT.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [selection: one, using a submask as the BEV or DEK; intermediate keys originating from one or more submask(s) to the BEV or DEK using the following method(s): [selection: key wrapping as specified in FCS COP.1(e), key combining as specified in FCS SMC EXT.1, key encryption as specified in FCS_COP.1(f), key derivation as specified in FCS KDF EXT.1, key transport as specified in FCS_COP.1(i)]] while maintaining an effective strength of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]. FCS_RBG_EXT.1 **Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)** (for O.STORAGE ENCRYPTION and O.COMMS PROTECTION) Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. FCS RBG EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with [selection: ISO/IEC 18031:2011, NIST SP 800-90A] using [selection: Hash DRBG (any), HMAC DRBG (any), CTR DRBG (AES)]. FCS RBG EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [selection: [assignment: 1] software-based noise source(s), [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source(s)] with a minimum of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC18031:2011 Table C.1 "Security Strength Table for Hash Functions", of the keys and hashes that it will generate. FCS_TLS_EXT.1 **TLS** selected (selected in FTP ITC.1.1, FTP TRP.1.1) Hierarchical to: No other components.

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Dependencies:	FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
	FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric encryption/decryption)
	FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification)
	FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)
	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1	The TSF shall implement one or more of the following protocols [selection: <i>TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)</i>] supporting the following cipher suites:
	Mandatory Ciphersuites:
	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
	Optional Ciphersuites:
	[selection:
	None
	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
].

6.2.3. Class FDP: User Data Protection

FDP_ACC.1	Subset access control (for O.ACCESS_CONTROL and O.USER_AUTHORIZATION)		
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other compone FDP_ACF.1 control	ents. Security attribute-based access	
FDP_ACC.1.1	Access Control S	SF shall enforce the User Data FP on subjects, objects, and subjects and objects specified in Table	
FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute (for O.ACCESS_C O.USER_AUTHOP		
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other compone FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3	ents. Subset access control Static attribute initialization	
FDP_ACF.1.1		The TSF shall enforce the User Data SFP to objects based on the following: and attributes specified in Table 12 and	
FDP_ACF.1.2	determine if an ope controlled objects i <i>among controlled</i>	SF shall enforce the following rules to eration among controlled subjects and is allowed: <i>rules governing access</i> <i>d subjects and controlled objects</i> <i>operations on controlled objects</i> <i>e 12 and Table 13</i> .	
FDP_ACF.1.3		SF shall explicitly authorize access of based on the following additional rules:].	
FDP_ACF.1.4	subjects to objects [assignment: <u>none</u>]	SF shall explicitly deny access of based on the following additional rules:	
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Table 12 D.USER.DOC Access Control SFP

		"Create"	"Read"	"Modify"	"Delete"
	Operation:	Submit a	View image	Modify	Delete
		document to	or Release	stored	stored
Print		be printed	printed	document	document
			output		
	Job owner	(note 1)		denied	
	U.ADMIN			denied	
	U.NORMAL		denied	denied	denied
	Unauthenticate	denied	denied	denied	denied
	d				
Scan	Operation:	Submit a	View	Modify	Delete
		document for	scanned	stored	stored
		scanning	image	image	image
	Job owner	(note 2)			
	U.ADMIN				
	U.NORMAL		denied	denied	denied
	Unauthenticate	denied	denied	denied	denied
	d				
Сору	Operation:	Submit a	View	Modify	Delete
		document for	scanned	stored	stored
		copying	image or	image	image
			Release		
			printed copy		
			output		
	Job owner	(note 2)			
	U.ADMIN				
	U.NORMAL		denied	denied	denied
	Unauthenticate	denied	denied	denied	denied
	d				
Fax send	Operation:	Submit a	View	Modify	Delete
		document to	scanned	stored	stored
		send as a fax	image	image	image
	Job owner	(note 2)			
	U.ADMIN				
	U.NORMAL		denied	denied	denied
	Unauthenticate	denied	denied	denied	denied
	d				
Fax	Operation:	Receive a fax	View fax	Modify	Delete
receive		and store it	image or	image of	image of
			Release	received	received
				fax	fax

	Fax owner U.ADMIN U.NORMAL Unauthenticate d	(note 3) (note 4) (note 4) (note 4)	printed fax output denied denied	denied denied denied denied	denied denied
Storage/R etrieval	Operation:	Store document	Retrieve stored document	Modify stored document	Delete stored document
	Job owner U.ADMIN U.NORMAL Unauthenticate d	(note 1) denied	(note 5) denied denied	denied denied denied denied	<i>(note 5)</i> denied denied

Table 13 D.USER.JOB Access Control SFP

		"Create" *	"Read"	"Modify"	"Delete"
	Operation:	Create print job	View print	Modify	Cancel
			queue/log	print job	print job
Print	Job owner	(note 1)			
	U.ADMIN				
	U.NORMAL			denied	denied
	Unauthenticate d	denied	denied	denied	denied
Scan	Operation:	Create scan job	View scan	Modify	Cancel
			status/log	scan job	scan job
	Job owner	(note 2)		denied	
	U.ADMIN			denied	
	U.NORMAL			denied	denied
	Unauthenticate	denied	denied	denied	denied
	d				
Сору	Operation:	Create copy job	View copy	Modify	Cancel
			status/log	copy job	copy job
	Job owner	(note 2)			
	U.ADMIN			denied	
	U.NORMAL			denied	denied
	Unauthenticate d	denied	denied	denied	denied

Fax send	Operation:	Create fax send	View fax	Modify fax	Cancel
	-	job	job	send job	fax send
		-	status/log	-	job
	Job owner	(note 2)		denied	
	U.ADMIN			denied	
	U.NORMAL			denied	denied
	Unauthenticate d	denied	denied	denied	denied
Fax	Operation:	Create fax	View fax	Modify fax	Cancel
receive		receive job	receive	receive job	fax
			status/log		receive
					job
	Fax owner	(note 3)		denied	
	U.ADMIN	(note 4)		denied	
	U.NORMAL	(note 4)		denied	denied
	Unauthenticate d	(note 4)	denied	denied	denied
Storage/R	Operation:	Create storage /	View	Modify	Cancel
etrieval		retrieval job	storage /	storage /	storage /
			retrieval log	retrieval	retrieval
				job	job
	Job owner	(note 1)		denied	
	U.ADMIN			denied	
	U.NORMAL			denied	denied
	Unauthenticate d	denied	denied	denied	denied

Note 1: Job Owner is identified by a credential or assigned to an authorized User as part of the process of submitting a print or storage Job.

Note 2: Job Owner is assigned to an authorized User as part of the process of initiating a scan, copy, fax send, or retrieval Job.

Note 3: Job Owner of received faxes is assigned by configuration. Ownership of received faxes is assigned to a specific user.

Note 4: PSTN faxes are received from outside of the TOE, they are not initiated by Users of the TOE.

Note 5: Key Operator can operate the DOC/JOB of all users, while SA can operate the DOC/JOB of his/her own only.

FDP_DSK_EXT.1	Protection of Data on Disk (for O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION)
Hierarchical to:	No other components. - 46 -

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Dependencies:	FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption).
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1	The TSF shall [selection: perform encryption in accordance with FCS_COP.1(d), use a self-encrypting Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device that is separately CC certified to conform to the FDE EE cPP], such that any Field- Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device contains no plaintext User Document Data and no plaintext Confidential TSF Data.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2	The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1	Fax separation (for O.FAX_NET_SEPARATION)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. No dependencies.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1.1	The TSF shall prohibit communication via the fax interface, except transmitting or receiving User Data using fax protocols.
FDP_RIP.1(a)	Subset residual information protection (for O.IMAGE_OVERWRITE)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1(a)	Refinement: The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable by overwriting data upon the deallocation of the resource from the following objects: D.USER.DOC .

6.2.4. Class FIA: Identification and Authentication

FIA_AFL.1	Authentication fa	•
Hierarchical to:	No other compone	ents.
Dependencies:	FIA_UAU.1	Timing of authentication

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FIA_AFL.1.1	The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: <i>1 - 10</i>]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: <u>User authentication (with local authentication)</u>].
FIA_AFL.1.2	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: <i>Identification and authentication of relevant user is inhibited until TOE is cycled.</i>].
FIA_ATD.1	User attribute definition (for O.USER_AUTHORIZATION)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1	The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [assignment: <u>User</u>].
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	Password Management (for O.USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. No dependencies.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1	The TSF shall provide the following password
	 management capabilities for user passwords: Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [selection: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^*, "&", "*", "(", ")", [assignment: "(space)", "#", "\$", "%", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", "
FIA_UAU.1	 Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [selection: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^*, ", "&", "*", "(", ")", [assignment: <u>" (space)", "#", "\$", "%", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", "</u>

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Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1	Refinement: The TSF shall allow [assignment: <u>storing the</u> <u>fax data received from public telephone line</u>] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.7	Protected authentication feedback (for O.USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1	The TSF shall provide only [assignment: •] to the user while the authentication is in progress.
FIA_UID.1	Timing of identification (for O.USER_I&A and O.ADMIN_ROLES)
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1	Refinement: The TSF shall allow [assignment: <i>storing the fax data received from public telephone line</i>] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_USB.1	User-subject binding (for O.USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1	The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [assignment: <u>User Identifier, User Role</u>].

FIA_USB.1.2	The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: <u>none]</u> .
FIA_USB.1.3	The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: <u>none]</u> .
6.2.5. Class FMT:	Security Management
FMT_MOF.1	Management of security functions behavior (for O.ADMIN_ROLES)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MOF.1.1	Refinement: The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: <i>determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of</i>] the functions [assignment: <u>List of</u>

Table 14 List of Security Functions

Function	Operation
User Authentication	<u>enable, disable</u>
Auditing	<u>enable, disable,</u>
	modify the behavior
Trusted communications	<u>enable, disable,</u>
	modify the behavior
Storage Data Encryption	<u>enable, disable</u>
Overwrite Storage	<u>enable, disable,</u>
	modify the behavior
Firmware update	<u>enable, disable</u>
<u>Self Test</u>	<u>enable, disable</u>

FMT_MSA.1

Management of security attributes

(for O.ACCESS_CONTROL and O.USER_AUTHORIZATION)

Hierarchical to:	No other components.	
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1	Subset access control
	FMT_SMR.1	Security roles

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FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MSA.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP to restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: creation] the security attributes [assignment: attributes listed in Table 15] to [assignment: listed in Table 15] to [assignment:

Table 15 Security Attributes and Authorized Roles

Security attributes	Operation	Role
User identifier (Key Operator case)	<u>modify</u>	<u>Key Operator</u>
<u>User identifier (General case)</u>	<u>modify,</u>	<u>U.ADMIN</u>
	delete, creation	
User Role (Key Operator case)	query	Key Operator
User Role (General case)	<u>query, modify</u>	<u>U.ADMIN</u>

FMT_MSA.3	Static attribute initialization (for O.ACCESS_CONTROL and O.USER_AUTHORIZATION)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1	Refinement:The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP to provide [selection, choose one of: <i>restrictive, permissive, [assignment: none]</i>] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2	Refinement: The TSF shall allow the [selection: <i>U.ADMIN</i> , no role] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_MTD.1	Management of TSF data (for O.ACCESS CONTROL)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MTD.1.1

Refinement: The TSF shall restrict the ability to **perform** the specified operations on the specified TSF Data to the roles specified in Table 16.

Table 16 Management of TSF Data

Data	Operation	Authorized Role(s)
TSF Data owned by U.NORMAL or owned by U.NORMAL.	associated with do	
U.NORMAL <u>password</u>	<u>modify</u>	U.ADMIN, the owning U.NORMAL.
TSF Data not owned by a U.NORM	AL	
Key Operator password	<u>modify</u>	U.Admin (<u>Key</u> <u>Operator</u>)
SA password	modify	U.ADMIN
Data on use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication	<u>query, modify</u>	U.ADMIN
<u>Data on minimum user password</u> length	<u>query, modify</u>	U.ADMIN
Data on Private Charge Print	query, modify	U.ADMIN
Data on access denial due to authentication failure	<u>query, modify</u>	U.ADMIN
Data on Customer Engineer <u>operation restriction</u>	query, modify	U.ADMIN
Data on date and time	query, modify	U.ADMIN
<u>Data on Auto Clear</u>	query, modify	U.ADMIN
Data on Report Print	<u>query, modify</u>	U.ADMIN
Software, firmware, and related co	onfiguration data	
<u>Controller ROM,</u> <u>Fax ROM</u>	<u>modify</u>	U.ADMIN

FMT_SMF.1

Specification of Management Functions

(for O.USER_AUTHORIZATION, O.ACCESS_CONTROL, and O.ADMIN_ROLES)

Hierarchical to:No other components.Dependencies:No dependencies.

FMT_SMF.1.1

management functions: [assignment: <u>Security</u> <u>Management Functions listed in Table 17</u>].

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The TSF shall be capable of performing the following

Management Functions	Operation
Registration of U.NORMAL/SA	query, modify, delete
	<u>creation</u>
Data on user authentication	<u>query, modify</u>
Key Operator identifier	<u>modify</u>
Key Operator password	<u>modify</u>
Data on use of password entered from	<u>query, modify</u>
MFD control panel in user authentication	
<u>Data on Private Charge Print</u>	<u>query, modify</u>
<u>Data on t</u> rusted communications	<u>query, modify</u>
Data on date and time	<u>query, modify</u>
<u>Data on a</u> uditing	<u>query, modify</u>
Data on storage data encryption	<u>query, modify</u>
Data on Overwrite Storage	<u>query, modify</u>
Data on Customer Engineer operation	<u>query, modify</u>
<u>restriction</u>	
Data on Self Test	query, modify
Data on access denial due to	<u>query, modify</u>
authentication failure	
Data on minimum user password length	<u>query, modify</u>
Data on Auto Clear	<u>query, modify</u>
Data on firmware update	<u>query, modify</u>
Data on Report Print	<u>query, modify</u>
Controller ROM, Fax ROM	<u>modify</u>

Table 17 Security Management Functions

FMT_SMR.1	Security roles (for O.ACCESS_CONTROL, O.USER_AUTHORIZATION, and O.ADMIN_ROLES)
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

Refinement: The TSF shall maintain the roles <u>U.ADMIN</u> (*U.ADMIN, SA, Key Operator*), U.NORMAL.

FMT SMR.1.2	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
—	

FMT_SMR.1.1

6.2.6. Class FPT:	Protection of the TSF
FPT_KYP_EXT.1	Protection of Key and Key Material (for O.KEY_MATERIAL)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. No dependencies.
FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1	Refinement: The TSF shall not store plaintext keys that are part of the keychain specified by FCS_KYC_EXT.1 in any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device .
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	Protection of TSF Data (for O.COMMS PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. No dependencies.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1	The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.
FPT_STM.1	Reliable time stamps (for O.AUDIT)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1	The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
FPT_TST_EXT.1	TSF testing (for O.TSF_SELF_TEST)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. No dependencies.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1	The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start- up (and power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Trusted Update (for O.UPDATE_VERIFICATION)
Hierarchical to:	No other components.

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Dependencies:	FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification), FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm).
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1	The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to query the current version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2	The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to initiate updates to TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3	The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE using a digital signature mechanism and [selection: <i>published hash, no</i> <i>other functions</i>] prior to installing those updates.

6.2.7. Class FTA: TOE Access

FTA_SSL.3	TSF-initiated termination (for O.USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1	The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: <u>Auto Clear time for the control panel: 10 to 900 seconds</u> <u>Login timeout for the Web UI: one to 240 minutes</u> <u>There is no inactive time with printer driver</u>].

6.2.8. Class FTP: Trusted Paths/Channels

FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF trusted channel (for O.COMMS_PROTECTION, O.AUDIT)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected, or FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected, or FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected, or FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected].

FTP_ITC.1.1	Refinement: The TSF shall use [selection: <i>IPsec, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS</i>] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: [selection: <i>authentication server, [assignment: <u>Audit Log Server, Mail</u> <u>Server]</u>] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.</i>
FTP_ITC.1.2	Refinement: The TSF shall permit the TSF, or the authorized IT entities , to initiate communication via the trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.3	Refinement: The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [assignment: <i>mail service, and audit_transmission service</i>].
FTP_TRP.1(a)	Trusted path (for Administrators) (for O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected, or FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected, or FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected, or FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected].
FTP_TRP.1.1(a)	Refinement: The TSF shall use [selection, choose at least one of: <i>IPsec, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS</i>] to provide a trusted communication path between itself and remote administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and detection of modification of the communicated data.
FTP_TRP.1.2(a)	Refinement: The TSF shall permit remote administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path
FTP_TRP.1.3(a)	Refinement: The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial administrator authentication and all remote administration actions .

FTP_TRP.1(b)	Trusted path (for Non-administrators) (for O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	No other components. [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected, or FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected, or FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected, or FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected].
FTP_TRP.1.1(b)	Refinement : The TSF shall use [selection, choose at least one of: <i>IPsec, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS</i>] to provide a trusted communication path between itself and remote users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and detection of modification of the communicated data.
FTP_TRP.1.2(b)	Refinement: The TSF shall permit [selection: <i>the TSF, remote users</i>] to initiate communication via the trusted path
FTP_TRP.1.3(b)	Refinement: The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial user authentication and all remote user actions .

6.3. Security Assurance Requirements

The requirements for the TOE security assurance are described in Table 18.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components	Assurance Components Description
	ASE_CCL.1 ASE_ECD.1 ASE_INT.1	Conformance claims Extended components definition ST introduction
Security Target Evaluation	ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_REQ.1	Security objectives for the operational environment Stated security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1 ASE_TSS.1	Security Problem Definition TOE Summary Specification
Development	ADV_FSP.1	Basic functional specification
Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE.1 AGD_PRE.1	Operational user guidance Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMS.1	Labelling of the TOE TOE CM coverage
Tests	ATE_IND.1	Independent testing – Conformance
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1	Vulnerability survey

Table 18 Security	Assurance Requirements

The rationale for choosing these security assurance requirements is that they define a minimum security baseline that is based on the anticipated threat level of the attacker, the security of the Operational Environment in which the TOE is deployed, and the relative value of the TOE itself.

6.4. Security Requirement Rationale

6.4.1. Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements

Table 19 describes the functional requirements that security functional requirements depend on and those that do not and the reason why it is not problematic even if dependencies are not satisfied.

Functional Requirements	Dependencies of Fu	nctional Requirem	ents
Requirement and its name	Requirement specified in PP	Un-fulfilled requirement and its rationale	Fulfil ment
FAU_GEN.1	FPT_STM.1	-	ОК
Audit data generation			
FAU_GEN.2	FAU_GEN.1	-	OK
User identity association	FIA_UID.1		
FAU_STG_EXT.1	FAU_GEN.1	-	OK
Extended: External audit trail	FTP_ITC.1		
storage			
FCS_CKM.1(a)	[FCS_COP.1(b), or	-	OK
Cryptographic key generation	FCS_COP.1(i)]		
(asymmetric keys)	FCS_CKM_EXT.4		
FAU_SAR.1	FAU_GEN.1	-	OK
Audit review			
FAU_SAR.2	FAU_SAR.1	-	OK
Restricted audit review			
FAU_STG.1	FAU_GEN.1	-	OK
Protected audit trail storage			
FAU_STG.4	FAU_STG.1	-	OK
Prevention of audit data loss			
FCS_CKM.1(b)	[FCS_COP.1(a), or	-	OK
Cryptographic key generation	FCS_COP.1(d), or		
(symmetric keys)	FCS_COP.1(e), or		
	FCS_COP.1(f), or		
	FCS_COP.1(g), or		
	FCS_COP.1(h)]		
	FCS_CKM_EXT.4		
	FCS_RBG_EXT.1		
FCS_CKM.4	[FCS_CKM.1(a), or	-	OK
	FCS_CKM.1(b)]		

Table 19 Dependencies of Functional Security Requirements

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Functional Requirements	Dependencies of Functional Requiremen					
Requirement and its name	Requirement specified in PP	Un-fulfilled requirement and its rationale	Fulfil ment			
Cryptographic key destruction						
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic key material destruction	[FCS_CKM.1(a), or FCS_CKM.1(b)] FCS_CKM.4	-	ОК			
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic operation (symmetric encryption/decryption)	FCS_CKM.1(b) FCS_CKM_EXT.4	-	ОК			
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic operation (signature generation/verification)	FCS_CKM.1(a) FCS_CKM_EXT.4	-	ОК			
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (hash algorithm)	None	-	ОК			
FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES data encryption/decryption)	CS_CKM.1(b) FCS_CKM_EXT.4	-	ОК			
FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (key encryption)	CS_CKM.1(b) FCS_CKM_EXT.4	-	ОК			
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)	CS_CKM.1(b) FCS_CKM_EXT.4	-	ОК			
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected	FCS_TLS_EXT.1	-	ОК			
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Extended: Key chaining	[FCS_COP.1(e), or FCS_SMC_EXT.1, or FCS_COP.1(i), or FCS_KDF_EXT.1, and/or FCS_COP.1(f)]	-	ОК			
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	None		-			

Functional Requirements	Dependencies of Functional Requiremen						
Requirement and its name	Requirement specified in PP	Fulfil ment					
Extended: Cryptographic operation (random bit generation)							
FCS_TLS_EXT.1	FCS CKM.1(a)		ОК				
Extended: TLS selected	FCS_COP.1(a)	-	UK				
Extended. TES selected	FCS_COP.1(a)						
	FCS_COP.1(c)						
	FCS_COP.1(g)						
	FCS_COF.1(g) FCS_RBG_EXT.1						
FDP ACC.1	FDP ACF.1		ОК				
Subset access control		-	OK				
FDP ACF.1	FDP ACC.1		ОК				
Security attribute-based	FMT MSA.3		OR				
access control							
FDP DSK EXT.1	FCS COP.1(d)		ОК				
Extended: Protection of data							
on disk							
FDP FXS EXT.1	None		_				
Extended: Fax separation							
FDP RIP.1(a)	None		_				
Subset residual information							
protection							
FIA AFL.1	FIA UAU.1	-	ОК				
Authentication failure							
handling							
FIA ATD.1	None		-				
User attribute definition							
FIA PMG EXT.1	None		-				
Extended: Password							
management							
FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UID.1	-	ОК				
Timing of authentication							
FIA_UAU.7	FIA_UAU.1	-	OK				
Protected authentication							
feedback							
FIA_UID.1	None		-				
Timing of authentication							

Functional Requirements	Dependencies of Functional Requireme					
Requirement and its name	Requirement specified in PP	Un-fulfilled requirement and its rationale	Fulfil ment			
FIA_USB.1	FIA_ATD.1	-	ОК			
User-subject binding						
FMT_MOF.1	FMT_SMF.1	-	OK			
Management of security	FMT_SMR.1					
functions behavior						
FMT_MSA.1	FDP_ACC.1	-	OK			
Management of security	FMT_SMF.1					
attributes	FMT_SMR.1					
FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MSA.1	-	OK			
Static attribute initialization	FMT_SMR.1					
FMT_MTD.1	FMT_SMF.1	-	OK			
Management of TSF data	FMT_SMR.1					
FMT_SMF.1	None		-			
Specification of management						
functions						
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1	-	OK			
Security roles						
FPT_KYP_EXT.1	None		-			
Extended: Protection of key						
and key material						
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	None		-			
Extended: Protection of TSF						
data						
FPT_STM.1	None		-			
Reliable time stamps						
FPT_TST_EXT.1	None		-			
Extended: TSF testing						
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	FCS_COP.1(b)	-	ОК			
Extended: Trusted update	FCS_COP.1(c)					
FTA SSL.3	None	1	_			
TSF-initiated termination						
FTP ITC.1	[FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, or	-	ОК			
Inter-TSF trusted channel	FCS TLS EXT.1, or					
	FCS_SSH_EXT.1, or					
	FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1]					

Functional Requirements	Dependencies of Functional Requirements					
Requirement and its name	Requirement specified in PP	Un-fulfilled requirement and its rationale	Fulfil ment			
FTP_TRP.1(a)	[FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, or	-	OK			
Trusted path (for	FCS_TLS_EXT.1, or					
administrators)	FCS_SSH_EXT.1, or					
	FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1]					
FTP_TRP.1(b)	[FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, or	-	OK			
Trusted path (for non-	FCS_TLS_EXT.1, or					
administrators)	FCS_SSH_EXT.1, or					
	FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1]					

6.4.2. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

The rationale for choosing these security assurance requirements is that they define a minimum security baseline that is based on the anticipated threat level of the attacker, the security of the Operational Environment in which the TOE is deployed, and the relative value of the TOE itself. The assurance activities throughout the ST are used to provide tailored guidance on the specific expectations for completing the security assurance requirements.

7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION

This chapter describes the summary specifications of the security functions provided by the TOE.

7.1.Security Functions

Table 20 shows security functional requirements and the corresponding TOE security functions. The security functions described in this section satisfy the TOE security functional requirements specified in section 6.1 of this ST.

Table 20 Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding TOE Security Functions

				Secu	r <mark>ity fu</mark> n	ctions			
	Identification and authentication	Security audit	Access control	Security management	Trusted operation	Data encryption	Trusted communications	PSTN Fax-Network Separation	Overwrite Storage
SFRs	lder	Sec	Aco	Sec	Tru:	Dat	Tru	PS	٥٧e
FAU_GEN.1		✓							
FAU_GEN.2		~							
FAU_STG_EXT.1		~							
FAU_SAR.1		✓							
FAU_SAR.2		~							
FAU_STG.1		✓							
FAU_STG.4		~							
FCS_CKM.1(a)						✓			
FCS_CKM.1(b)						~			
FCS_CKM.4						✓			
FCS_CKM_EXT.4						✓			
FCS_COP.1(a)						✓			
FCS_COP.1(b1)						✓			
FCS_COP.1(b2)						✓			
FCS_COP.1(c1)						✓			
FCS_COP.1(c2)						✓			
FCS_COP.1(d)						✓			

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				Secu	rity fun	ctions			
SFRs	Identification and authentication	Security audit	Access control	Security management	Trusted operation	Data encryption	Trusted communications	PSTN Fax-Network Separation	Overwrite Storage
	¥	0)	4	0)		 ✓	н		0
FCS_COP.1(f)						✓ ✓			
FCS_COP.1(g) FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1						v	✓		
FCS_KYC_EXT.1						✓	•		
FCS_RBG_EXT.1						· ✓	✓		
FCS_TLS_EXT.1							· •		
FDP_ACC.1			√				•		
FDP_ACF.1			√						
FDP_DSK_EXT.1						✓			
FDP FXS EXT.1								✓	
 FDP_RIP.1(a)									✓
FIA AFL.1	✓								
 FIA_ATD.1	✓								
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	\checkmark								
FIA_UAU.1	✓								
FIA_UAU.7	✓								
FIA_UID.1	✓								
FIA_USB.1	✓								
FMT_MOF.1				✓					
FMT_MSA.1				✓					
FMT_MSA.3				✓					
FMT_MTD.1				✓	✓				
FMT_SMF.1				✓	✓				
FMT_SMR.1				\checkmark					
FPT_KYP_EXT.1						✓			
FPT_SKP_EXT.1				\checkmark					
FPT_STM.1		✓							
FPT_TST_EXT.1					✓				

FUJIFILM Apeos C8180/C7580/C6580 Security Target

				Secur	rity fun	ctions			
SFRs	Identification and authentication	Security audit	Access control	Security management	Trusted operation	Data encryption	Trusted communications	PSTN Fax-Network Separation	Overwrite Storage
FPT_TUD_EXT.1					~				
FTA_SSL.3	✓								
FTP_ITC.1							\checkmark		
FTP_TRP.1(a)							\checkmark		
FTP_TRP.1(b)							\checkmark		

7.1.1. Identification and Authentication

The identification and authentication function is the function to identify and authenticate a user by having the user enter a user ID and password from the control panel, Web UI(*) and printer driver of the user client so that only certain authorized users are granted permissions to use the functions of the MFD.

User information registered in the MFD is used for identification and authentication. (*): MFD server function via Web browser of the general user and system administrator clients. Although it is provided as the name of "Internet Service" on the product, it will be referred to as Web UI in this document from this section onward.

(1) FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

The TOE authenticates users before they access the TOE. The TOE has the function to handle authentication failures when a user attempts to be authenticated. This function detects failed local authentication attempts made by the user. When the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts of the user reaches the number (1- 10), which is set as the maximum allowable number of failures, the TOE does not accept an identification and authentication request of the user until the TOE is turned off and on again.

[Related TSFI] Identification and authentication of control panel Identification and authentication of Web UI

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Printer driver

(2) FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
 FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
 The TOE defines a user ID and a role as attributes for each user and assign the attributes to an identified and authenticated user.

[TSFI related to FIA_ATD.1] Management functions of control panel Management functions of Web UI

[TSFI related to FIA_USB.1] Identification and authentication of control panel Identification and authentication of Web UI

(3) FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management

In the TOE, when a Key Operator's password is changed and when the password of a user authenticated by local authentication is newly created or changed, it is possible to create a password by combining the following characters.

Characters that can be used for a password:

Upper- and lower-case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "*", "(", ")", "(space)", """, "+", ",", "-", "/", ":", ";", "<", "=", ">", "?", "[", "¥", "]", "_", "`", "{", "}", "<", "~"

A system administrator can set the required minimum length of the password to a number between 0 to 63. Based on this setting, the TOE can set a lower limit of the password length to 15.

[Related TSFI] Management functions of control panel Management functions of Web UI

(4) FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

The TOE supports local authentication as the user identification and authentication method.

There are three types of interfaces that require user identification and authentication: the control panel, web browser of the user client and printer driver.

The TOE prompts a user to enter his/her ID and password via a web browser of the user client or the control panel before permitting him/her to operate the MFD function. The entered user ID and password are verified against the user data registered in the TOE.

When Private Print is performed, identification and authentication are performed based on the ID and password assigned to the print data sent from the client computer.

The identification (FIA_UID.1) and authentication (FIA_UAU.1) are simultaneously performed, and the operation on the TOE is allowed only when both identification and authentication succeed.

When receiving fax data via the public telephone line, the TOE receives the fax data without user identification and authentication.

[Related TSFI] Identification and authentication of control panel Identification and authentication of Web UI Printer driver Public phone line

(5) FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback

The TOE provides the function to display the same number of bullets (\bullet) as the password characters entered on the control panel or web browser in order to hide the password at the time of user authentication.

[Related TSFI] Identification and authentication of control panel Identification and authentication of Web UI

(6) FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination

The TOE clears the login information (authentication session) and prompts a user to re-authenticate if Web UI has not been accessed from a web browser for a specified period of time (settable from one to 240 mins).

In addition, when there is no operation from the control panel for a specified period of time (the settable time ranges from 10 to 900 seconds), the setting on the control panel is cleared and the screen returns to the authentication screen.

The session with the printer driver is not retained. The session ends immediately after a print request is processed.

[Related TSFI] Identification and authentication of control panel Identification and authentication of Web UI

7.1.2. Security Audit

The security audit function offers a means to track and record the events of when, who, and which actions all TOE users carried out (user operation, device failure, configuration change etc.) according to the Security Audit Log setting configured by a system administrator.

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(1) FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

FAU_GEN.2 User identity association

The TOE records auditable events shown in Table 21, such as job completion, failed user identification and authentication attempts, and use of security management functions by identified and authenticated users, in the audit log. The date and time when the event occurred, the type of the event, the user who caused the event (if known), and the result of the event are recorded in the audit data of each event. When the TOE records a defined auditable event in the audit log, the TOE associates the event with the identification information of the user who caused the event.

[Related TSFI]

Identification and authentication of control panel Identification and authentication of Web UI Printer driver Management functions of control panel Management functions of Web UI Power button Copy, print, scan, fax, scanned document storage to Folder, and document retrieval functions of control panel Job status and log display functions of control panel Function of Web UI to display the JOB status and log Function of Web UI to retrieve document data from Folder Firmware update function of Web UI Public phone line

Auditable Events	Names of auditable events to	Description
	be logged	
Start-up and	System Status/ Started normally	
shutdown of the	(cold boot),	
audit functions	System Status/ Started normally	
	(warm boot),	
	Shutdown requested	
Job completion	Job Status/ Completed,	Print
	Job Status/ Canceled by User	Сору
		Scan
		Fax
		Mailbox
		["Mailbox" means a
		storage and retrieval job.]

Table 21 Details of Security Audit Log

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		,
Unsuccessful User	Login/ Failed	
authentication	(Invalid UserID),	
Unsuccessful User	Login/ Failed	
identification	(Invalid Password)	
(control panel and		
Web UI)		
Unsuccessful User	Job Status/ Print /Aborted	
authentication		
Unsuccessful User		
identification		
(printer driver)		
Use of	Device Settings/ View Security	
management	Setting	
functions	Device Settings/ Change	
	Security Setting	
	Device Settings/ Switch	
	Authentication Mode	
	Device Settings/ Edit User	
	["ID", "Password", and "Name"	
	are recorded as modified	
	attributes.]	
	Device Settings/ Add User	
	Device Settings/ Delete User	
	Device Config/ Software	
	Audit Policy/ Audit Log/ Enable,	
	Audit Policy/ Audit Log/ Disable	
Modification to the	Device Settings/ Edit User	
group of Users that	-	
are part of a role	[When "Role" attribute is	
	modified, the modification is	
	recorded.]	
Changes to the	Device Settings / Adjust Time	
time		
Failure to establish	Communication / Trusted	Failed [Protocol,
session (TLS)	Communication	destination and the
		reason of failure are
		recorded]

(2) FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

After logging in to the Web UI, the system administrator can read all audit logs stored inside the TOE by using the Web UI.

Audit log is downloaded as a tab-delimited text file. When downloading audit logs, TLS communication must be enabled.

[Related TSFI] Management functions of Web UI

(3) FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review

The function to read audit logs stored inside the TOE are restricted to the authenticated system administrator. Also, audit logs can be accessed only from the web browser and can not be accessed from the control panel.

[Related TSFI] Management functions of Web UI

(4) FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage Access to audit logs stored inside the TOE is for reading only, there is no delete or modify function. This protects audit logs from unauthenticated deletion and modification.

[Related TSFI] Management functions of Web UI

(5) FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss

Audit logs stored inside the TOE are stored up to 15,000 logs. When audit logs become full, the oldest recorded audit log is overwritten and new audit log is recorded without loss.

[Related TSFI]
Identification and authentication of control panel
Identification and authentication of Web UI
Printer driver
Management functions of control panel
Management functions of Web UI
Power button
Copy, print, scan, scanned document storage to Folder, fax, and document retrieval
functions of control panel
Job status and log display functions of control panel
Function of Web UI to display the JOB status and log
Function of Web UI to retrieve document data from Folder
Firmware update function of Web UI

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Public phone line

(6) FAU_STG_EXT.1 Extended: External Audit Trail Storage

The audit logs are sent to the audit server using syslog protocol. The behavior to protect audit logs in transit is described in 7.1.7 (3) FTP_ITC.1. Since audit logs to be sent are stored inside the TOE, the behavior to read audit logs is described in (3) FAU_SAR.2, the behavior to protect from unauthenticated deletion and modification is described in (4) FAU_STG.1, the behavior when audit logs become full is described in (5) FAU_STG.4. Audit logs remain inside the TOE even after they are sent to the audit server. If the transmission fails, the transmission will be retried until it succeeds. When the number of unsent audit logs that failed to be sent reaches 13,500, the error is displayed on the control panel and MFD stops. In this case, make the connection between the MFD and the syslog server normal, and restart the MFD to resolve the error.

[Related TSFI] Follow the related TSFI of FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2

(7) FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

The TOE provides the function to issue the time stamp using TOE's clock function when the defined auditable event is recorded in the audit log. As specified in FMT_MTD.1, only system administrators can change the clock setting.

[Related TSFI] Follow the related TSFI of FAU GEN.1, FAU GEN.2

7.1.3. Access Control

Only the authenticated and identified user can use the following functions. Available functions depend on the interface that accesses the TSF.

- a) Functions controlled by the MFD control panel
 Copy, fax (send), scan, document storage and retrieval, print (This print function requires the Accounting System preset on printer driver. A user must be authenticated on the control panel.), device condition display, job status and log display, and referring to / changing the TOE setting data (system administrators only)
- b) Functions controlled by Web UI
 Device condition display, job status and log display, function to retrieve document data from Folder, and referring to / changing the TOE setting data (system administrators only), and firmware update function (only system administrator)
- c) Functions that use the printer driver of the user client
 When a user sends a print request from the printer driver of the user's client in
 which the Accounting System is preset, the MFD decomposes the received data into

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bitmap data and stores the data in the internal repository as private print according to the user ID if the identification and authentication are successful.

(1) FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

The TOE controls access to the jobs and document data of each basic function in accordance with Tables 12 and 13. For the notes in brackets at the ends of the following sentences, refer to the notes of Tables 12 and 13.

The user who started each function is assigned as the owner of the job and document data of the function and only the owner or system administrators can access the job and document data. However, only system administrators can access the data of a fax that is being received and the data that is being transmitted from the client computer.

Regarding the print function, a user ID, which will be used to identify the user of the function, is included in the print data sent by the client computer. The owner of the print job is identified with the user ID (note 1).

Regarding scan, copy, and fax send functions' jobs, the user associated with the user ID that is used to log in on the control panel is assigned as the job owner (note 2). Regarding fax jobs that are in progress, system administrators are assigned as the job owners because the user who started the fax send feature cannot be identified. (note 3)

Regarding the stored data of a received fax, the user ID associated with the Folder that stores the data is assigned as the owner (note 3).

Because Jobs and data of received faxes are sent from outside of the TOE, no TOE user can create jobs or data of received faxes. (note 4)

The document storage and retrieval function enable the function to store/retrieve scanned documents or fax received documents to/from the Folder. Regarding the scan function, the user must be logged in beforehand. When a user stores scanned documents in a Folder, the Key Operator can select a Folder from all Folders, while a general user and SA can only select the user's own Folder. After selecting the Folder to store scanned documents, the user scans the documents. The user who owns the selected Folder becomes the owner of the scanned documents (note 1). Only the owner of the data stored in the Folder or the Key Operator can retrieve, print (and select the number of copies and the paper size) and delete the stored data. Although SAs are included in system administrators, they cannot access the data in the Folderes of other users (note 5). The print, fax receive, and the document storage and retrieval functions do not provide the function of editing document data.

[Related TSFI]

Printer driver

Copy, print, scan, scanned document storage to Folder, fax and document retrieval functions of control panel

Function of control panel to display the job status and log Function of Web UI to display the job status and log Function of Web UI to retrieve document data from Folder Public phone line

7.1.4. Security management

(1) FMT MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior FMT MTD.1 Management of TSF data FMT SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT MSA.3 Static attribute initialization FMT SMR.1 Security roles The TOE provides identified and authenticated system administrators with user interfaces to refer to and change settings of security management functions shown in Table 22 that are related to the TOE security functions and to customize detailed settings of each function. Identified and authenticated general users can only change their own passwords. As shown above, the required security management functions are satisfied. As in Table 12 and Table 13, the TOE sets the ID of the user who started each basic function as the default value of the ID of the owner of the job and document data of each function. For details, refer to "7.1.3. Access Control (1) FDP ACC.1 Subset access control FDP ACF.1 Security attribute based access control." The TOE associates the roles of the Key Operator, SA, system administrator, and general user to the legitimate users and maintains the association. In the TOE, the default value of the user role, which is a security attribute, is the general user.

[TSFI related to FMT_MOF.1,FMT_MSA.1, andFMT_SMR.1] Management functions of control panel Management functions of Web UI [TSFI related to FMT_MTD.1 andFMT_SMF.1] Management functions of control panel Management functions of Web UI Firmware update function of Web UI [TSFI related to FMT_MSA.3] Printer driver Management functions of control panel Management functions of Web UI Copy, scan, and scanned document storage to Folder, and fax functions of control panel Public phone line

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Security management item	Control	Web UI
	panel	
Refer to the setting of Overwrite Storage, enable/disable it,	~	✓
and set the number of passes (overwrite procedure)		
Refer to the setting of Storage Data Encryption and	~	-
enable/disable it		
Refer to the setting of the use of password entered from	\checkmark	-
MFD control panel in user authentication and		
enable/disable it		
Refer to the setting of access denial due to authentication	\checkmark	\checkmark
failure of the user, enable/disable it, and set the allowable		
number of failures		
Set the ID and the password of the Key Operator (Only the	\checkmark	\checkmark
Key Operator is privileged.)		
Refer to the setting of the ID of a user and change the ID	\checkmark	\checkmark
and password		
Refer to the assigned role of the user and set SA or general		
user as the role		
Refer to and set the minimum password length	✓	✓
Refer to the setting of communication data encryption,	\checkmark	\checkmark
enable/disable it, and configured the detailed settings.		
Refer to the setting of TLS certificate and create/update the	-	\checkmark
certificate		
Refer to the setting of User Authentication and	\checkmark	\checkmark
enable/disable Local Authentication		
Refer to the setting of PrivatePrint and configure the	\checkmark	-
settings of store/print		
Refer to and set date and time	✓	-
Refer to the setting of Self Test and enable/disable it	✓	✓
Refer to the setting of firmware update and enable/disable it	✓	✓
Refer to and set Auto Clear of Control Panel and Web UI	\checkmark	\checkmark
Refer to the setting of Report Print and select whether to	\checkmark	-
allow only the system administrators / all users to use the		
function		
Refer to and configure the setting of Customer Engineer	\checkmark	✓
Operation Restriction (enable/disable the function and set		
password for maintenance)		
Refer to and configure the setting of the security audit	\checkmark	-
function (enable/disable the function and set syslog)		

Table 22 Security management functions and their operationable UIs

(2) FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data

The TOE stores a KEK (Key Encryption Key) in plaintext in NVRAM2, but the TOE does not provide an interface to read the KEK to any users. The circuit board which NVRAM2 is soldered to is not for storage.

A DEK (Data Encryption Key) is encrypted with KEK in AES-CBC and is stored in NVRAM1 and HDD. The one in HDD is a backup.

When the TOE is turned on, the encrypted DEK stored in NVRAM1 is decrypted with a KEK stored in NVRAM2. While the TOE is in operation, the DEK is stored in DRAM in plaintext.

The TOE does not provide an interface to read the plaintext DEK stored in DRAM to any users. The plaintext DEK stored in DRAM is destroyed when the TOE is turned off.

Certificates with secret keys used for TLS communications, etc. are encrypted with the mechanism described in 7.1.6 (15) and stored in the NVRAM1. The interface to read the secret keys is not provided to any users.

The TLS session key and TLS EC Diffie-Hellman secret key used for communication are stored in the DRAM in plaintext, but the interface to read the plaintext session keys stored in the DRAM is not provided to any users. The plaintext session key is destroyed when the TOE is turned off.

【Related TSFI】 None

7.1.5. Trusted Operation

(1) FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF testing

The TSF consists of two firmware: Controller ROM and Fax ROM. Verification of the integrity of these two firmware guarantees the proper operation of the TSF. When the TOE is turned on, Controller ROM and Fax ROM respectively calculate 4 bytes and 2 bytes checksums to verify whether the checksums match the specified value. When an error occurs, an error message is displayed on the control panel, and the TOE cancels the startup. The TOE operates health tests described in [1]11.3 on the DRBG. When the test is failed, the TOE displays an error message on the control panel and cancels the startup. The specifications of the DRBG is described in 7.1.6.

[Related TSFI] Power button

(2) FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update

FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

The system administrators can see the current version of the firmware that configures the TOE on the control panel by operating it or on paper by printing the configuration report.

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Only identified and authenticated system administrators can update the firmware by sending a binary file that contains Controller ROM and Fax ROM to the TOE from the Web UI of a system administrator's client computer.

When the TOE receives a binary file that contains firmware sent from the Web UI of a system administrator's client computer, the TOE verifies the digital signature attached to the binary file. When the verification fails, the update is cancelled, an error message is displayed ont the control panel, and the TOE stops. The digital signature attached to the binary file is a RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 digital signature that is made by hashing the binary file with SHA-256 and encrypting the hash value with a 2048-bit secret key. Therefore, in order to verify the digital signature, 1) decrypt the digital signature attached to the binary file with SHA-256, and 3) compare the decrypted value and the hash value. When the two values are the same, verification is successful and if not, verification is failed.

[TSFI related to FPT_TUD_EXT.1] Function of control panel to confirm the firmware version Firmware update function of Web UI [TSFI related to FMT_MTD.1 and FMT_SMF.1] Management functions of control panel Management functions of Web UI Firmware update function of Web UI

7.1.6. Data Encryption

(1) FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys) An elliptic curve key described in [2] is used as the asymmetric key for the key establishment (EC Diffie-Hellman) in TLS encrypted communication. Methods to generate an elliptic curve key shall follow [3] 5.6.1.2.2 and [2] Appendix B.4.2. TLS EC Diffie-Hellman secret key is a random number generated by AES-256 CTR DRBG described in (14) seeded with values generated by Linux /dev/random. Supported elliptic curves are P-256, P-384, and P-521 as described in [2] Appendix D, and the elliptic curve to be used is decided in TLS negotiation.

The TOE uses an elliptic curve key described in [2] or an RSA key described in [4] as the asymmetric key for the TLS server certificate. These asymmetric keys are generated on the user request from Web UI. Methods to generate an elliptic curve key shall follow [3] 5.6.1.2.2 and [2] Appendix B.4.2. Methods to generate an RSA key shall follow [4] 6.3.1.3. The prime number used in the procedure shall be generated following [2] B.3.3. Supported elliptic curves are P-256, P-384, and P-521 as described in [2] Appendix D, and supported RSA key sizes are 2048-bit and 3072-bit. The user selects one and requests to generate a key on Web UI. AES-256 CTR DRBG described in (14) is used to generate random probable primes.

The TOE does not make any changes to the above key generation methods and does not use any other methods.

[Related TSFI]
Identification and authentication of Web UI
Printer driver
Management functions of Web UI
Scan function of control panel
Function of Web UI to display the JOB status and log
Function of Web UI to retrieve document data from Folder
External audit server
Firmware update function of Web UI
* In addition, the related TSFI of FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2 are also included.
(This is because that it is sent to audit server via TLS communication when the audit log is generated.)

(2) FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic Key Generation (symmetric keys)

The TOE uses random numbers that consist of arbitrary number of bits for the DEK and the session keys for trusted communications. Specifically, a 256-bit number for the DEK, a 256-bit number for the KEK to encrypt the DEK, a 128 to 256-bit number (depends on the encryption method decided in the negotiation) for the master key of TLS session keys are generated. For random number generation, AES-256 CTR DRBG described in (14) is used. The DRBG is called when the key chain described in (12) is generated and when the TLS communication session starts.

[Related TSFI] Identification and authentication of Web UI Printer driver Management functions of Web UI Power button Scan function of control panel Function of Web UI to display the JOB status and log Function of Web UI to retrieve document data from Folder External audit server Firmware update function of Web UI * In addition, the related TSFI of FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2 are also included. (This is because that it is sent to audit server via TLS communication when the audit log is generated.)

(3) FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Material Destruction The TOE destroys plaintext keys and key materials when they are no longer needed (*). Table 23 shows keys and key materials that are stored in the TOE in plaintext and how they are destroyed. The values of these keys and materials are copied to the working memory of RAM and used when an encryption is performed. The copied data on RAM is deleted when the TOE is turned off because it is no longer needed.

(*) The DEK is stored in NVRAM1 and HDD, but it is not destroyed because it is encrypted as described in (10). The asymmetric key for TLS server certificate described in (1) is stored in the NVRAM1, but it is not destroyed because it is encrypted with the mechanism described in (15). The public key used for the verification of firmware signature is not destroyed because it is not classified as any of the following: secret key, private cryptographic key, or cryptographic critical security parameter.

[Related TSFI] Management functions of control panel Power button

Key type	Storage	Destruction method and reason
KEK (Key Encryption Key)	NVRAM2	Overwritten once with the random value generated using DRBG described in (14) when restore to factory settings is requested from the administrator menu on the control panel.
		Restore to factory settings means destroying all data on the disk and since it is not necessary to decrypt the target partition with the same encryption key after destroying the data, DEK and KEK are not required.
TLS session key TLS EC Diffie-	RAM (volatile)	Destroyed when the TOE is turned off.
Hellman secret key		Since the TOE closes a valid TLS session
		when it is powered off, TLS session key and
		TLS EC Diffie-Hellman secret key are not
		needed.

Table 23 Methods to destroy keys and key material stored in plaintext

(4) FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric encryption/decryption)
 The TOE supports AES-CBC described in [5] and AES-GCM (128-bit and 256-bit)
 described in [6] for the symmetric encryption/decryption of TLS. AES follows [7].

[Related TSFI]
Identification and authentication of Web UI
Printer driver
Management functions of Web UI
Scan function of control panel
Function of Web UI to display the JOB status and log
Function of Web UI to retrieve document data from Folder
External audit server
Firmware update function of Web UI
* In addition, the related TSFI of FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2 are also included.
(This is because that it is sent to audit server via TLS communication when the audit log is generated.)

(5) FCS_COP.1(b1) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification) The TOE supports RSA digital signature described in [2] for the verification of the authenticity of the firmware update. The key size is 2048-bit. The format of the signature follows RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 described in [2] 5.5 (f).

[Related TSFI] Firmware update function of Web UI

(6) FCS_COP.1(b2) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification) When verifying the target of TLS communication and digital signature generation/verification, the TOE generates RSA digital signatures and elliptic curve digital signatures described in [2] and verifies with them. Supported RSA key sizes are 2048-bit and 3072-bit. Supported NIST elliptic curves are P256, P384, and P521. The format of the RSA digital signature follows RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 described in [2] 5.5 (f). The methods of generation and verification of the elliptic curve digital signature follows [2] 6.4. For these, the signature methods to be used are determined respectively by negotiation with the communication partner during TLS communication, and by the user's specification at the time of digital signature generation.

[Related TSFI]

Management functions of Web UI Scan function of control panel

* In addition, the related TSFI of FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2 are also included. (This is because that it is sent to audit server via TLS communication when the audit log is generated.)

(7) FCS_COP.1(c1) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)

The TOE uses SHA-256 for the hash calculation of firmware update image data when verifying the authenticity of the firmware update. The TOE compares the SHA-256

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hash value and the value of the signature decrypted with RSA to verify the signature. The hash algorithm follows [8].

[Related TSFI] Firmware update function of Web UI

(8) FCS_COP.1(c2) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)

The TOE supports SHA1/SHA256/SHA384 for the hash calculation of keyed-hash message authentication method described in (11). The hash algorithm used for communication is determined by negotiation with the communication partner. In addition, the TOE supports SHA256/SHA384/SHA512 for hash calculation for digital signature generation/verification, and the hash algorithm to be used determined by user's specification at the time of signature generation.

The hash calculation of keyed-hash message authentication method in TLS and the hash calculation of digital signature generation/verification are independent and can be freely combined.

[Related TSFI]
Identification and authentication of Web UI
Printer driver
Management functions of Web UI
Scan function of control panel
Function of Web UI to display the JOB status and log
Function of Web UI to retrieve document data from Folder
External audit server
Firmware update function of Web UI
* In addition, the related TSFI of FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2 are also included.
(This is because that it is sent to audit server via TLS communication when the audit log is generated.)

(9) FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) The TOE supports AES described in [9] as the encryption method of the storage encryption and supports CBC described in [10] as the block cipher mode. The key size is 256-bit. The sector number of the storage and the DEK are used to calculate the IV.

[Related TSFI]
Printer Driver
Copy, print, scan, scanned document storage to Folder, fax, and document retrieval functions of control panel
Job status and log display of control panel
Function of Web UI to retrieve document data from Folder
Public phone line

(10) FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption)

As described in (12), the TOE encrypts DEK (256-bit) using AES described in [9]. The key size is 256-bit. Supported block cipher mode is CBC described in [10]. IV is a random number generated by AES-256 CTR DRBG described in (14). As described in (12), the TOE encrypts DEK (256 bit) when the TOE is turned on for the first time without DEK chain.

【Related TSFI】 Power button

(11) FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)

The TOE supports the following for the keyed-hash message authentication of TLS.

- Key size (bit): 160, 256, and 384
- Hash: SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-384
- Message digest size (bit): 160, 256, and 384

The hash algorithm follows [11], and the keyed-hash message authentication algorithm (HMAC) follows [12].

[Related TSFI]
Identification and authentication of Web UI
Printer driver
Management functions of Web UI
Scan function of control panel
Function of Web UI to display the JOB status and log
Function of Web UI to retrieve document data from Folder
External audit server
Firmware update function of Web UI
* In addition, the related TSFI of FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2 are also included.
(This is because that it is sent to audit server via TLS communication when the audit log is generated.)

(12) FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Key Chaining

In the TOE, the DEK and the KEK, which encrypts the DEK, are in a key chain. When the TOE is turned on without DEK chain (more specifically, when the TOE is turned on for the first time in the factory, or when the TOE is turned on for the first time after the operation to restore factory settings is performed from the system administrator menu on the control panel), the TOE generates the DEK and KEK using DRBG described in (14). The DEK is encrypted with KEK as described in (10) and stored in NVRAM1 and HDD, and the KEK is stored in NVRAM2 in plaintext. When the TOE is turned on subsequently, the TOE decrypts the encrypted DEK stored in NVRAM1 with the KEK retrieved from NVRAM2 as described in (10). The key size of both DEK and KEK is 256-bit. As described in (14), DRBG supplies sufficient entropy, so the strength of

both DEK and KEK is 256-bit, which means that the 256-bit strength is maintained in the key chain.

【Related TSFI】 Power button

(13) FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Protection of Key and Key Material

As described in (12), when the TOE is turned on for the first time without DEK chain, the TOE generates a DEK and a KEK using DRBG described later, stores the DEK encrypted with KEK in NVRAM1 and HDD, and stores the KEK in NVRAM2 in plaintext. The DEK and KEK are not stored in other storage. NVRAM2 is not a Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device, so plaintext keys that are part of the keychain specified by (12) is not stored in any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device.

【Related TSFI】 Power button

(14) FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)

For random number generation, the TOE uses AES-256 CTR DRBG that follows [1]10.2.1. This DRBG has derivation function and reseed function, but does not have prediction resistance function. It uses a random number generated by Linux kernel /dev/random as the seed. Linux Random Number Generator (LRNG), which provides /dev/random, and the read noise of the clock counter, which is input in LRNG, are included in the entropy pool of DRBG. The noise is created by a software so that the clock counter reads at random timings. DRBG uses the seed provided by /dev/random as the entropy input and nonce, but the amount of entropy is more than 256-bit × 1.5, which is sufficient according to [1] 8.6.7.

The TOE generates the DEK and the master key of TLS session keys using the DRBG.

As described in (12), the DRGB is activated in order to generate the DEK when TOE is turned on for the first time without DEK chain.

[Related TSFI]
Identification and authentication of Web UI
Printer driver
Management functions of Web UI
Power button
Scan function of control panel
Function of Web UI to display the JOB status and log
Function of Web UI to retrieve document data from Folder
External audit server
Firmware update function of Web UI

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* In addition, the related TSFI of FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2 are also included. (This is because that it is sent to audit server via TLS communication when the audit log is generated.)

(15) FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Protection of Data on Disk

The TOE encrypts/decrypts each data block in the storage device. More precisely, for the storage device partition that is to be encrypted, the TOE applies data decryption/encryption through the read/write operation of a file or metadata, and reads/writes data blocks from/to that partition. Encryption method follows FCS_COP.1(d). The storage devices containing the encryption target partition are NVRAM1 and HDD, both of which are field-replaceable. There are no field-replaceable devices except for the NVRAM1 and HDD. After Storage Data Encryption is enabled by the administrator, the encryption/decryption described above starts to be performed when the TOE is turned on for the first time. As described in (12), the DEK to be used for encryption/decryption is generated when the TOE is turned on without an cryptographic key chain.

All plaintext user data and plaintext secret TSF data are encrypted because they are written in the partitions to be encrypted on the NVRAM1 and HDD. The partitions not to be encrypted on the NVRAM1 and HDD store only program images, control parameters, and the DEK encrypted with KEK in the method specified in (10). Plaintext user document data and plaintext secret TSF data is not stored in those partitions. As described in (12), the DEK is encrypted when the TOE is turned on without a cryptographic key chain. NVRAM2, which stores the plaintext KEK, is not a field-replaceable storage device.

[Related TSFI]
Printer driver
Management functions of Web UI
Power button
Copy, print, scan, scanned document storage to Folder, fax, and document retrieval
functions of control panel
Job status and log display of control panel
Function of Web UI to retrieve document data from Folder
Public phone line

7.1.7. Trusted Communications

(1) FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS selected

There is a setting that forces a secure channel using HTTPS for all communication traffic of the TOE with the web browser. Only system administrators can change this setting, and it is performed on Web UI. The specifications of HTTPS follow [13]. When the TOE receives a request to connect to Web UI from the web browser of a

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client computer, the TOE and the client computer establish the TLS negotiation and start HTTPS communication. Identification, authentication, and all remote operation on the TOE through Web UI of the client computer are performed via HTTPS communication. The system administrator reads the audit logs stored inside the TOE by using the Web UI via HTTPS communication.

[Related TSFI]

Identification and authentication of Web UI Management functions of Web UI Function of Web UI to display the JOB status and log Function to retrieve document data from Folder of Web UI External audit server Firmware update function of Web UI

(2) FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS selected

The supported TLS communication is TLS 1.2 described in [14]. The cipher suite to be used in the TLS communication is negotiated while the client and server are connected with TLS. In TLS communication, the TOE can be a client or a server depending on the function in operation. For example, the TOE acts as a server when accessing Web UI. The TOE acts as a client when sending scanned documents via email.

The TOE selects an appropriate cipher suite that the TOE supports from the cipher suites suggested by the client. Cipher suites supported by the TOE are as follows:

- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384

[Related TSFI] Identification and authentication of Web UI Printer driver Management functions of Web UI Scan function of control panel Function of Web UI to display the JOB status and log Function of Web UI to retrieve document data from Folder Firmware update function of Web UI * In addition, the related TSFI of FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2 are also included. (This is because that it is sent to audit server via TLS communication when the audit log is generated.)

(3) FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

The TOE supports the following trusted communication protocols for the communication of the TOE with the audit server and the mail server. This ensures identification of the end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and modification.

Audit server: TLS Mail server: TLS

【Related TSFI】 Audit server: Follow the related TSFI of FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2 Mail server: Scan function of control panel

(4) FTP_TRP.1(a) Trusted path (for Administrators)

The TOE supports the following trusted communication protocols for each interface to access the TOE from the remote computers of system administrators. This ensures identification of the TOE's end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and modification. Web UI: TLS/HTTPS

[Related TSFI]

Identification and authentication of Web UI Management functions of Web UI Function of Web UI to display the JOB status and log Function of Web UI to retrieve document data from Folder Firmware update function of Web UI

(5) FTP_TRP.1(b) Trusted path (for Non-administrators)

The TOE supports the following trusted communication protocols for each interface to access the TOE from the remote computers of non-administrators. This ensures identification of the TOE's end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and modification.

- Web UI: TLS/HTTPS
- Printing with the printer driver: TLS

[Related TSFI]
Identification and authentication of Web UI
Printer driver
Function of Web UI to display the JOB status and log
Function of Web UI to retrieve document data from Folder

7.1.8. PSTN Fax-Network Separation

(1) FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Fax separation

The TOE is equipped with a fax modem function, which enables the TOE to send/receive fax data through the public phone line.

The only supported protocol is ITU-T G3 mode.

Only the fax documents of the user are allowed to be sent/received with the fax interface.

The TOE is not equipped with a data modem function, so external data communication commands cannot be received, which means the TOE cannot be accessed by unauthorized means from the fax line. Also, the TOE does not offer the function to deliver data between the public phone line and the internal network, so the data received through the public phone line is not sent to the internal network.

[Related TSFI] Public phone line

7.1.9. Overwrite Storage

(1) FDP_RIP.1(a) Subset residual information protection

When the Overwrite Storage is enabled to be conducted after each job by a system administrator, the TOE overwrites the used document data stored in the internal HDD after each job of copy, print, scan, and fax is finished.

The document data used by the document storage function is deleted when an operation to print, retrieve or delete the data from Folder is carried out. After that, the TOE overwrites the data.

Overwrite Storage has two options: one pass overwrite procedure (overwrite with zero) and three pass overwrite procedure (overwrite with zero / one / random number and verification). However, when the data encryption function is enabled, the data for overwrite (zero / one / random number) to be physically written to the storage is encrypted. A list of used document data to be overwritten and deleted is on the internal HDD, and the TOE checks the list when it is turned on. If used document data that has not been deleted is found on the list, Overwrite Storage is performed.

【Related TSFI】
Printer driver
Power button
Copy, Print, Scan, fax, and document data retrieval functions of control panel

Job status and log display of control panel Function of Web UI to display the JOB status and log Function of Web UI to retrieve document data from Folder

8. ACRONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY

8.1.Acronyms

The following acronyms are used in this ST:

Acronym	Definition
CC	Common Criteria
DRAM	Dynamic Random Access Memory
FIPS PUB	Federal Information Processing Standard publication
IIT	Image Input Terminal
MFD	Multi Function Device
NVRAM	Non Volatile Random Access Memory
PDL	Page Description Language
PP	Protection Profile
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SMTP	Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function

8.2.Terminology

The following terms are used in this ST:

Term	Definition
Destruction	Destruction is to delete the target so that the location of the target cannot
	be traced from the file system and volatile memory.
KEK	Abbreviation of Key Encryption Key. In this ST, KEK is a cryptographic key
	to encrypt the DEK.
DEK	Abbreviation of Data Encryption Key. In this ST, DEK is a cryptographic key
	for storage.
Flash memory	SD or eMMC.
Web UI	A interface that allows users to control the TOE through the web browser of
	the user client.
Folder	A location to store scanned documents, received fax documents.
	Computers on the network can retrieve the stored documents from the
	Folder.

Private Print	A print function that temporarily stores bitmap data (decomposed print data)
(Private Charge	in the storage of the MFD and then print out in accordance with the
Print)	authenticated user's instruction from the control panel.
	The remaining data in the storage of the MFD after deletion. After a
Used document	
data	document stored in the storage is used, only its file is deleted, and the data inside remains.
Decument data	
Document data	A collective term for all the data, including image data, transmitted across
	the MFD when any of copy, print, scan, fax, or document storage functions
Scanned	is used by a general user (U.NORMAL) or an SA.
	The document data converted into digital format by "Scan" function.
document	This TOE has the function to send a scanned document to a mailserver and
-	to store it in the Folder by "Document storage and retrieval" function.
Fax received	The digital document data received by fax function and handled in this TOE.
document	With this TOE, the received fax data can be stored in a preset Folder by the
	setting at the time of installation.
Audit log	The tracked and recorded data of auditable events, when, and who, and
	carried out which actions (such as user operation, device failure and
	configuration change)
User role	A role assigned to an identified and authenticated user. The TOE defines
	the Key Operator role, SA role, and general user role.
Key Operator	The authority required for the Key Operator to use the TOE.
role	
SA role	The authority required for an SA to use the TOE.
U.NORMAL role	The authority required for a general user (U.NORMAL) to use the TOE.
User identifier	Information to identify users. User ID.
Key Operator	A user ID with the Key Operator role.
identifier	
Key Operator	An authorized user who maintains the MFD and performs settings of the
	security functions of the TOE.
SA	An authorized user who maintains the MFD and performs settings of the
	security functions of the TOE. An SA account is created by the Key
	Operator or an SA who is already registered.
U.ADMIN	A collective term for Key Operator and SA.
	A function to identify the user before he/she uses each TOE function so that
User	the TOE can limit the access to the TOE functions.
authentication	When the remote authentication option is installed, user authentication
	supports two modes (local authentication and remote authentication). The
	TOE uses local authentication.
Local	A mode to perform user authentication of the TOE using the user
Authentication	information registered in the MFD.
Remote	A mode to perform user authentication of the TOE using the user
Authentication	information registered in the external authentication server.

Storage data	A function to encrypt the storage that stores some of the assets under	
encryption	protection.	
Decompose	A function to analyze the data written in PDL and convert the data into	
function	bitmap data.	
Decompose	The action of analyzing the data written in PDL and converting the data into	
	bitmap data by using the decompose function.	
	An operation mode that enables a system administrator to refer to and	
System	rewrite TOE device operation settings and security function settings in order	
administrator	to adjust those settings in accordance with the operational environment.	
mode	System administrator mode is distinguished from the operation mode that	
	enables a general user to use the MFD functions.	
Auto Olean	A function to automatically log out after a specified period of time passes	
Auto Clear	without any operations performed on the control panel or Web UI.	
Customer	Customer service engineer, an engineer who maintains and repairs the	
Engineer	MFD.	
	A person who accesses the TOE or protected property by unauthorized	
Attacker	means. Includes users who attempt access by disguising themselves as	
	authenticated users.	
	A panel on which buttons, lamps, and a touch-screen display, which are	
Control panel	necessary for MFD operations, are arranged.	
General user	A client for a general user.	
client		
System		
administrator	A client for a system administrator. A system administrator can refer to and	
client	change the TOE setting data of the MFD via web browser.	
	A software to convert the data on a general user client into print data written	
Printer driver	in page description language (PDL), a readable format for MFD. Used on	
	the user client.	
	The data written in PDL, a readable format for MFD. Print data is converted	
Print data	into bitmap data by the decompose function of the TOE.	
	The decomposed data of the data read by the copy function and the print	
Bitmap data	data transmitted sent by the print function from a user client to MFD. Bitmap	
Diffiap data	data is stored to the storage after being compressed in a unique process.	
Original		
document	Texts, images and photos to be read on IIT by the copy function.	
	The data created by the TOE or for the TOE and may affect the TOE	
TOE setting data	security functions. Included in the TSF data.	
Cryptographic	256-bit data which is automatically generated. When document data is	
	stored to the storage device, it is encrypted with the cryptographic key.	
key Network		
NELWOIK	A general term to indicate both external and internal networks.	
External network	The network which cannot be managed by the organization that manages	
	the TOE. This does not include the internal network.	

Internal network	Channels between the MFD and the trusted remote servers and client computers. The channels are located in the network of the organization that owns the TOE. The network is protected from the security risks coming from the external network.
Public telephone	Line/network for sending/receiving fax data.
line/network	
Fax data	Sent/received data in the public telephone line for faxes.
Certificate	Defined in ITU-T recommendation X.509. A certificate includes the data for
	user authentication (name, distinguished name, organization which the user
	belongs to, etc.), public key, expiry date, serial number, signature, etc.
Data on	Minimum user password length to set the user password on the MFD
minimum user	control panel.
password length	Included in the TOE setting data.
Key Operator	Password data for Key Operator authentication. Included in the TOE setting
password	data.
SA password	Password data for SA authentication. Included in the TOE setting data.
U.Normal	Password data for general user (U.NORMAL) authentication. Included in
password	the TOE setting data.
Data on access	The data on whether to enable/disable access denial due to authentication
denial due to	failure. They also incorporate the data on the allowable number of the
authentication	failures before access denial. Included in the TOE setting data.
failures	
Data on auditing	The data on whether to enable/disable the function to trace/record auditable
	events, when, and who, and carried out which actions (such as user
	operation, device failure and configuration change,). Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on user	The data on whether to enable/disable the authentication function. The
authentication	authentication function is performed using the user authentication
	information when copy, scan, fax, and print functions of MFD are
	performed. It also incorporates the data on the authentication method.
	Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on use of	The data on whether to enable/disable the use of password when the user
password	authentication is performed on the control panel. Included in the TOE
entered from	setting data.
MFD	
control panel in	
user	
authentication	
Data on Private	The setting data on whether to store the received print data to Private Print
Charge Print	area or print it out. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on trusted	Data on whether the general encrypted communication protocols
communications	(TLS/HTTPS and TLS) are enabled/disabled and their detailed settings and
	certificate, authentication passwords, encryption keys, and shared keys to

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	protect communication data in the internal network such as document data,
	job information, audit log, and TOE setting data. Included in the TOE setting
	data.
Data on	The data on whether to enable/disable the Customer Engineer Operation
Customer	Restriction function and the data on the maintenance password. Included in
Engineer	the TOE setting data.
operation	
restriction	
Data on	The data on whether to enable/disable the functions related to Overwrite
Overwrite	Storage. Included in the TOE setting data.
Storage	
Data on storage	The data on whether to enable/disable the functions related to storage data
data encryption	encryption. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on date and	The time zone / summer time information and the present time data.
time	Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on Auto	The data on whether to enable/disable the functions of Auto Clear and the
Clear	timing to clear on the control panel and Web UI. Included in the TOE setting
	data.
Data on Self Test	The data on whether to enable/disable the Self Test function. Included in
	the TOE setting data.
Data on Report	The data on whether to enable/disable the Report Print function. Included in
Print	the TOE setting data.
Data on	The setting data on firmware update functions. Setting data of Firmware
Firmware update	Update. Included in the TOE setting data.

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