



Certification Report

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Certification Identification	JISEC-C0761
Product Name	Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6870i/6870/ 6860i/6860/6855i with Fax & PDL
Version and Release Numbers	1822
Product Manufacturer	Canon Inc.
Conformance of Functionality	PP conformant functionality, CC Part 2 Extended
Protection Profile Conformance	Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015 (Certification Identification: JISEC-C0553)
Name of IT Security Evaluation Facility	ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center

IT Product (TOE)

This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE has been certified as follows. 2022-09-15

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Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following standards prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document."

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Release 5

- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Release 5

Evaluation Result: Pass

"Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6870i/6870/6860i/6860/6855i with Fax & PDL, Version 1822" has been evaluated based on the standards required, in accordance with the provisions of the "Requirements for IT Security Certification" by Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements. Notice:

This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme.

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1 Executive Summary

This Certification Report describes the content of the certification result in relation to IT Security Evaluation of "Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6870i/6870/6860i/6860/ 6855i with Fax & PDL, Version 1822" (hereinafter referred to as the "TOE") developed by Canon Inc., and the evaluation of the TOE was completed on 2022-08-10 by ECSEC Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center (hereinafter referred to as the "Evaluation Facility"). It is intended to report to the sponsor, Canon Inc., and provide security information to procurement entities and consumers who are interested in the TOE.

Readers of the Certification Report are advised to read the Security Target (hereinafter referred to as the "ST") described in Chapter 10. Especially, details of security functional requirements, assurance requirements and rationale for sufficiency of these requirements of the TOE are described in the ST.

This Certification Report assumes "procurement entities who purchase this TOE" to be readers. Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on assurance requirements to which the TOE conforms, and does not guarantee an individual IT product itself.

1.1 Product Overview

An overview of the TOE functions and operational conditions is described as follows. Refer to Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.

1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package

The TOE conforms to the following Protection Profile [14][15] (referred to as the "Conformance PP").

Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015 (Certification Identification: JISEC-C0553)

1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality

The TOE is a multifunction product (hereinafter referred to as "MFP"), which has functions such as print, scan, copy, fax, and document storage and retrieval.

The TOE provides security functions required by the Conformance PP to prevent the document data processed by the MFP and the setting data etc. affecting security from unauthorized disclosure and alteration.

For these security functions, the validity of the design policy and the accuracy of the implementation were evaluated within the scope of the assurance requirements of the Conformance PP.

Threats and assumptions assumed for the TOE are described in the following sections.

1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives

The following threats are assumed for the TOE.

There are threats that user document data and data affecting security functions, which are assets to be protected by the TOE, may be disclosed or altered by unauthorized operation of the TOE or unauthorized access to the network to which the TOE is connected.

There are also threats that security functions of the TOE may be compromised by the failure of the TOE itself or installation of unauthorized software.

The TOE provides security functions required by the Conformance PP such as identification and authentication, access control, encryption, and digital signature to counter these threats.

1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions

The TOE is assumed to be operated under the following configuration and assumptions.

It is assumed that the TOE is operated in the environment where unauthorized physical access is restricted and it is connected to a LAN separated from the Internet.

The setting, administration and maintenance of the TOE must be performed in accordance with the guidance documents by a trusted administrator. Users of the TOE must have been trained in order to use the TOE securely.

1.1.3 Disclaimers

The following operation is not ensured by this evaluation:

- An environment different from that described in "4.2 Environmental Assumptions"

- TOE with settings different from those described in "7.5 Evaluated Configuration"

1.2 Conduct of Evaluation

Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed in 2022-08, based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of the TOE according to the publicised documents "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document"[1], "Requirements for IT Security Certification"[2], and "Requirements for Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility"[3] provided by the Certification Body.

1.3 Certification

The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [13] prepared by the Evaluation Facility as well as evaluation documentation, and confirmed that the TOE evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

The certification oversight reviews were also prepared for those concerns found in the certification process.

The Certification Body confirmed that all the concerns were fully resolved, and that the TOE evaluation had been appropriately conducted in accordance with the CC ([4][5][6] or [7][8][9]) and the CEM (either of [10][11]).

The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation Technical Report and fully concluded certification activities.

2 Identification

The TOE is identified as follows:

TOE Name:	Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6870i/6870/	
	6860i/6860/6855i with Fax & PDL	
TOE Version:	1822	

The TOE is one of the following:

• Sales area: Americas

Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6870i with Fax & PDL 1822

Canon image RUNNER ADVANCE DX 6860i with Fax & PDL 1822

Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6855i with Fax & PDL 1822

• Sales area: Europe, Asia, Oceania

Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6855i with Fax & PDL 1822

• Sales area: Japan, Korea

Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6870 with Fax & PDL 1822

Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6860 with Fax & PDL 1822

Users can verify that a product is the evaluated and certified TOE by the following means.

Users confirm the following information displayed on the main unit and the control panel of the TOE in accordance with the guidance documents:

- Vendor name : "Canon"

- Model name : One of the following:

"iR-ADV 6870" "iR-ADV 6860" "iR-ADV 6855" (Note) Regardless of the difference in model name for each sales area, either of the above is displayed.

- Fax : One of the following:

(For Japan)

JISEC-CC-CRP-C0761-01-2022

"スーパーG3FAX ボード・AX"

(For other countries)

"Super G3 FAX Board-AX"

- Controller Version : "1822"

- PDL : "PCL" and "PS"

3 Security Policy

The TOE provides the basic functions of the MFP such as print, scan, copy, fax, and document storage and retrieval. It has the functionality to store the user document data in the TOE and to communicate with user terminals and various servers via a network.

The TOE provides security functions that satisfy the requirements of the Conformance PP, to protect the document data processed by the MFP and setting data etc. affecting security.

As the background of the security functions provided by the TOE, user roles, assets, threats, and organizational security policies assumed for the TOE are described in following Section 3.1 to 3.4.

Details of the security functions of the TOE are described in Chapter 5.

3.1 Users

The user roles assumed for the TOE are shown in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1 User Roles

Designation	Definition		
Normal User	A User who has been identified and authenticated and does not		
	have an administrative role		
Administrator	A User who has been identified and authenticated and has an		
	administrative role		

3.2 Assets

The assets assumed to be protected by the TOE are shown in Table 3-2, Table 3-3 and Table 3-4. There are two categories of the assets, User Data and TSF Data, as shown in Table 3-2. Furthermore, User Data is classified as shown in Table 3-3 and TSF Data is as shown in Table 3-4.

Table 3-2 Assets

Designation	Asset category	Definition
D.USER	User Data	Data created by and for Users that do not
		affect the operation of the TSF
D.TSF	TSF Data	Data created by and for the TOE that might
		affect the operation of the TSF

Designation	User Data Type	Definition
D.USER.DOC	User Document	Information contained in a User's Document,
	Data	in electronic or hardcopy form
D.USER.JOB	User Job Data	Information related to a User's Document or
		Document Processing Job

Table 3-3 Assets (User Data)

Table 3-4 Assets (TSF Data)

Designation	TSF Data Type	Definition
D.TSF.PROT	Protected TSF	TSF Data for which alteration by a User who
	Data	is neither the data owner nor in an
		Administrator role might affect the security of
		the TOE, but for which disclosure is
		acceptable
D.TSF.CONF	Confidential	TSF Data for which either disclosure or
	TSF Data	alteration by a User who is neither the data
		owner nor in an Administrator role might
		affect the security of the TOE

3.3 Threats

The threats assumed for the TOE are shown in Table 3-5.

Table 3-5 Threats

Designation	Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS	An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete)
	User Document Data or change (modify or delete)
	User Job Data in the TOE through one of the TOE's interfaces.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE	An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF
	Data in the TOE through one of the TOE's
	interfaces.
T.TSF_FAILURE	A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of security
	if the TOE is permitted to operate.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE	An attacker may cause the installation of
	unauthorized software on the TOE.
T.NET_COMPROMISE	An attacker may access data in transit or otherwise
	compromise the security of the TOE by monitoring
	or manipulating network communication.

3.4 Organisational Security Policy

The organizational security policies required for the TOE are shown in Table 3-6.

Designation	Definition	
P.AUTHORIZATION	Users must be authorized before performing Document Processing and administrative functions.	
P.AUDIT	Security-relevant activities must be audited and the log of such actions must be protected and transmitted to an External IT Entity.	
P.COMMS_PROTECTION	The TOE must be able to identify itself to other devices on the LAN.	
P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION	If the TOE stores User Document Data or Confidential TSF Data on Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Devices, it will encrypt such data on those devices.	
P.KEY_MATERIAL	Cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or any other values that contribute to the creation of encryption keys for Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage of User Document Data or Confidential TSF Data must be protected from unauthorized access and must not be stored on that storage device.	
P.FAX_FLOW	If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it will ensure separation between the PSTN fax line and the LAN.	

Table 3-6 Organisational Security Policies

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment to operate the TOE as useful information for the assumed readers to determine whether to use the TOE.

4.1 Usage Assumptions

Table 4-1 shows assumptions to operate the TOE.

The effective performances of the TOE security functions are not assured unless these assumptions are satisfied.

Designation	Definition	
A.PHYSICAL	Physical security, commensurate with the value of the	
	TOE and the data it stores or processes, is assumed to be	
	provided by the environment.	
A.NETWORK	The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the	
	TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.	
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN	TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE	
	according to site security policies.	
A.TRAINED_USERS	Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according	
	to site security policies.	

Table 4-1 Assumptions

4.2 Environmental Assumptions

Figure 4-1 shows the operational environment assumed for the TOE. The TOE is installed in a general office and used in an environment connected to the internal network of the organization and the public telephone line.

Users operate the control panel of the TOE or a client PC connected to the internal network to use the TOE.




Figure 4-1 Operational Environment of the TOE

The operational environment of the TOE consists of the following components.

(1) Client PC

It is a general PC used by users.

The following software is required. Only system administrators can operate the TOE from Web browser.

- OS: Windows 10
- Printer Driver:

(For Japan)

Generic Plus LIPSLX Printer Driver V2.50

Generic Plus PS3 Printer Driver V2.50

Generic Plus PCL6 Printer Driver V2.50

(For other countries)

Generic Plus UFRII Printer Driver V2.50

Generic Plus PS3 Printer Driver V2.50

Generic Plus PCL6 Printer Driver V2.50

· Web Browser: Microsoft Edge (for administrators only)

(2) Audit Log Server

An audit log server is a server to store audit logs generated by the TOE. SMB supporting software is required. The following software was used in this evaluation.

- · OS: Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard Edition
- $\boldsymbol{\cdot}$ SMB software: Included in OS

(3) Time Server

A time server is a server for the TOE to obtain accurate time. SNTP supporting software is required. The following software was used in this evaluation.

- OS: Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard Edition
- SNTP software: Included in OS
- (4) File Server

A file server is used to send user document data scanned by the TOE. SMB supporting software is required. The following software was used in this evaluation.

- · OS: Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard Edition
- SMB software: Included in OS

It should be noted that the reliability of the hardware and the software other than the TOE shown in this configuration is outside the scope of this evaluation. Those are assumed to be trustworthy.

4.3 Clarification of Scope

There are the following restrictions on the functions provided by the TOE or ensured by this evaluation.

1) Servers and client PCs

Various servers and client PCs that operate in cooperation with the TOE must be connected via IPsec.

Furthermore, the TOE does not provide the function to select to apply or not apply IPsec for each device communicated over network.

Therefore, it is not possible to apply IPsec to various servers and not apply IPsec to client PCs.

Administrators are responsible for operating servers and client PCs cooperating with the TOE securely.

5 Architectural Information

This chapter explains the scope and the main components of the TOE.

5.1 TOE Boundary and Components

Figure 5-1 shows the composition of the TOE.

In Figure 5-1, the TOE is the part described as "TOE" in the center of the figure and is the entire MFP with the necessary option.




Figure 5-1 TOE boundary

The functions provided by the TOE consist of basic functions of the MFP and security functions.

In Figure 5-1, the colored parts in the TOE are security functions, and the other functions in the TOE are basic functions.

The security functions of the TOE are described below.

For details on the basic MFP functions, see Chapter 11.

(1) User Authentication Function

This function is a function to identify and authenticate users with their names and passwords when users use the TOE from the control panel of MFP, Web browser of client PC, or Printer driver of client PC.

This function has the following functionality to reinforce the identification and authentication.

- Restriction on the minimum password length.
- Account lockout after successive authentication failures.
- Termination of the session if there is no operation for a certain time after

the successful authentication.

(2) Access Control Function

This function is a function to control the access to the user data when users operate the basic functions of the MFP on them. The access control is performed based on the owner information of the user data and on the user's identification information and role.

(3) SSD Encryption Function

This function is a function to encrypt the data stored in the TOE. The encryption of the stored data uses AES XTS mode with a 256-bit key.

Encryption keys are generated using a random bit generator with enough entropy that is difficult to guess.

(4) LAN Data Protection Function

This function is a function to protect communication data between the TOE and IT devices using encryption communication protocol, IPsec. Furthermore, HTTPS is also available between the TOE and Web browser of client PC.

Encryption keys are generated using a random bit generator with enough entropy that is difficult to guess.

(5) Signature Verification and Generation Function

This function is a function to verify and generate a digital signature used in "LAN Data Protection function".

(6) Management Function

This function is a function to restrict the setting, etc. of the security functions to administrators. However, normal users can change their passwords.

(7) Audit Log Function

This function is a function to generate audit logs on audit events relevant to the security functions and send them to an audit log server.

Generated audit logs are also stored in the TOE. When the stored logs exceed the storage capacity, the oldest one is deleted to store a new audit log. Only administrators can browse the stored audit logs from the web browser of client PC.

(8) Trusted Update Function

This function is a function to verify the digital signature of new firmware when the firmware is updated.

(9) Self-Testing Function

This function is a function to verify the digital signature of the firmware at start-up of the TOE.

(10) PSTN Fax-Network Separation

This function is a function to separate the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and the LAN. The use of the PSTN is limited to fax and no other communication is possible.

5.2 IT Environment

The TOE communicates with servers and client PCs via LAN.

The function of the TOE described in " (4) LAN Data Protection Function" works in cooperation with those IT devices and uses the following protocols:

- Servers: IPsec
- Client PC (Printer driver): IPsec
- Client PC (Web browser): IPsec or IPsec and HTTPS

6 Documentation

The identification of documents attached to the TOE is listed in Table 6-1 to Table 6-3. There are three sets of the guidance documents depending on the sales area. TOE users are required to fully understand and comply with the following documents in order to satisfy the assumptions.

Name	Version
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6800 シリーズ用 Protection	USRMA-6814-01
Profile for Hardcopy Devices 対応 セキュリティー設定 アドミニス	20220610
トレーターガイド	
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6870 / 6860ユーザーズガイド(CC認	USRMA-6815-01
証参照用)	
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6800 シリーズ用 ACCESS	USRMA-6816-01
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM アドミニストレーターガイド(CC認証参	
照用)	

Table 6-1	Guidance	(Japanese)
	•	(•

Table 6-2 Guidance (English: USE Version)

Name	Version
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6800 series Protection Profile for	USRMA-6817-01
Hardcopy Devices adaptive Security Settings Administrator Guide	20220610
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6870i / 6860i / 6855i User's Guide	USRMA-6819-01
(for CC certification reference)	
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6800 series ACCESS	USRMA-6821-01
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Administrator Guide (for CC	
certification reference)	

Table 6-3 Guidance (English: APE Version)

Name	Version
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6800 series Protection Profile for	USRMA-6817-01
Hardcopy Devices adaptive Security Settings Administrator Guide	20220610
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6870i / 6860i / 6855i User's Guide	USRMA-6823-01
(for CC certification reference)	
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX C6800 series ACCESS	USRMA-6824-01
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Administrator Guide (for CO	
certification reference)	

7 Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results

7.1 Evaluation Facility

ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center that conducted the evaluation as the Evaluation Facility is approved under JISEC and is accredited by NITE (National Institute of Technology and Evaluation), the Accreditation Body, which joins Mutual Recognition Arrangement of ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation). It is periodically confirmed that the above Evaluation Facility meets the requirements on the appropriateness of the management and evaluators for maintaining the quality of evaluation.

7.2 Evaluation Approach

The evaluation was conducted on the assurance requirements in the CC Part 3 required by the Conformance PP using the evaluation methods prescribed in the CEM and the assurance activities of the Conformance PP.

Details for evaluation activities were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report.

The Evaluation Technical Report explains the summary of the TOE as well as the content of the evaluation and the verdict for each work unit in the CEM and assurance activity of the Conformance PP.

7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity

The history of the evaluation conducted is described in the Evaluation Technical Report as follows.

The evaluation started in 2022-04 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation Technical Report dated 2022-08.

The Evaluation Facility received a full set of evaluation deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by the developer, and examined the evidence in relation to a series of evaluation conducted.

Furthermore, the evaluators conducted the evaluator testing at the developer site in 2022-05, 06 and 08.

Concerns in the evaluation process that the Certification Body found were described as the certification oversight reviews, and they were sent to the Evaluation Facility. The Evaluation Facility and the developer examined them, which was reflected in the Evaluation Technical Report.

7.4 IT Product Testing

As the verification results of the evidence presented in the evaluation process, the evaluators performed the evaluator independent testing to ensure that the security functions of the product are accurately implemented and the evaluator penetration testing based on the vulnerability assessment.

7.4.1 Developer Testing

The developer testing is not included in the assurance requirements of this evaluation.

7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing

The evaluators conducted evaluator independent testing (hereinafter referred to as "independent testing") based on the evidence presented during the evaluation to ensure that the security functions of the product are accurately implemented.

The independent testing performed by the evaluators is explained as follows.

(1) Independent Testing Environment

The environment for the independent testing is based on the operational environment of the TOE shown in Figure 4-1. The components used in the independent testing environment are listed in Table 7-1.

Components	Description
TOE	- For Japan
	Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6870 with Fax & PDL
	1822
	- For other countries
	Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6860i with Fax & PDL
	1822
Client PC	• OS : Windows 10
	• Web Browser : Microsoft Edge
	Printer Driver:
	Generic Plus PS3 Printer Driver V2.50
	Generic Plus PCL6 Printer Driver V2.50
	Generic Plus UFRII Printer Driver V2.50
	Generic Plus LIPSLX Printer Driver V2.50
Audit Log Server	• OS: Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard Edition
Time Server	• OS: Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard Edition
File Server	• OS: Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard Edition

Table 7-1	Components	of Independ	dent Testing

There are following differences between the configuration of the independent testing and the TOE configuration identified in the ST. The evaluator determined that there are no problems with those differences and that the security functions of the TOE configuration identified in the ST can be considered properly tested.

(1) Tested models

In the models of the TOE described in Chapter 2 "TOE identification," there are multiple models due to the following differences:

- Difference in the model name by sales area
- Differences in PDL Configurations (Standard or Optional)
- Difference in printing speed
- Difference in display language

The evaluator determined that the security functions of all the models of the TOE can be considered to have been tested by testing the representative two models considering the above differences, because the security functions of each models are the same.

It should be noted that models with different names by sales area are the same model, only the names in terms of product sales are different.

(2) Using a modified firmware for testing

In the independent testing, a firmware modified for testing was used to confirm the encryption functions and input-output data of SSD instead of the firmware of the TOE. The evaluator determined that the testing on the modified firmware is valid because the modification for testing does not affect the functions of the test target.

(3) Using additional testing tools

In the independent testing, some testing tools were used to confirm and alter the communication data and to confirm the encryption functions.

The validity of those testing tools was confirmed by the evaluator.

(2) Summary of the Independent Testing

A summary of the independent testing is as follows.

a. Viewpoints of the Independent Testing

The viewpoints of the independent testing devised by the evaluator based on the requirements of the Conformance PP and on the evaluation documentation submitted for evaluation are shown below.

<Independent Testing Viewpoints>

(1) Confirm security functions for each Security Functional Requirement (SFR).

(2) Confirm that the implementation of the cryptographic algorithms is correct.

b. Independent Testing Outline

An outline of the independent testing that the evaluators performed is as follows.

<Independent Testing Approach>

The behavior of the TOE for inputs using the control panel of the TOE, the client PC and the testing tools was confirmed by following means:

- If the behavior can be confirmed from the external interfaces of the TOE, the external interfaces of the TOE including audit logs are used.
- If the behavior cannot be confirmed from the external interfaces of the TOE, the developer interface of the TOE is used.

<Content of the Performed Independent Testing>

The independent testing was performed on 18 items by the evaluators.

Table 7-2 shows contents of the independent testing corresponding to the viewpoints.

Viewpoint	Outline of the Independent Testing
1	Confirmation of security functions
	\cdot Confirm that all security functions work as the specification with the test
	items created based on the assurance activities of the Conformance PP
	for each SFR or the requirements of the SFR.
2	Confirmation of implementation of cryptographic algorithms
	\cdot Confirm the following cryptographic algorithms are implemented as the
	specification using the test program installed in the TOE.
	- RSA (key generation, signature generation/verification)
	- ECDSA (key generation, signature generation/verification)
	- AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256
	- XTS-AES-256

Table 7-2 Content of the Performed Independent Testing

	- SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
	- HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384
	- CTR_DRBG (AES), Hash_DRBG (SHA-256)

c. Result

All the independent testing performed by the evaluator was correctly completed, and the evaluator confirmed the behavior of the TOE. The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the expected behavior and all the testing results.

7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing

The evaluators devised and performed the evaluator penetration testing (hereinafter referred to as the "penetration testing") on the potentially exploitable vulnerabilities of concern under the assumed environment of use and attack level from the evidence presented in the process of the evaluation.

The penetration testing performed by the evaluators is explained as follows.

(1) Summary of the Penetration Testing

A summary of the penetration testing performed by the evaluators is as follows.

a. Vulnerability of Concern

The evaluators searched into the provided documentation and the publicly available information for the potential vulnerabilities, and then identified the following vulnerabilities which require the penetration testing.

- 1. There is a concern that unintended network ports of the TOE may be open.
- 2. There is a concern that known vulnerabilities may exist in the Web interface of the TOE.
- 3. There is a concern that known vulnerabilities may exist in the print processing of the TOE.
- 4. There is a concern that unintended programs may be executed by the malicious input from the control panel of the TOE or printer driver.
- b. Penetration Testing Outline

The evaluators performed the following penetration testing to identify potentially exploitable vulnerabilities.

<Penetration Testing Environment>

The penetration testing was performed in the same environment as that of the evaluator independent testing, except for the additional tools for penetration testing. Table 7-3 shows the tools used in the penetration testing.

Name	Outline and Purpose of Use
nmap 7.92	A tool to detect available network service ports.
Burp Suite Pro 1.7.37	The tool is used to refer and alter the communication data between Web browser and Web server (TOE).
PRET 0.40	A tool to inspect various vulnerabilities in a printing processing.

Table 7-3 Penetration	Testing	Tools
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<Content of the Performed Penetration Testing>

Table 7-4 shows vulnerabilities of concern and the content of the penetration testing corresponding to them.

Vulnerability	Penetration Testing Outline
1	- Confirm that unexpected network ports of the TOE are not open using Nmap.
2	- Confirm that there are no known vulnerabilities in the Web interface of the TOE using Burp Suite Pro.
3	- Confirm that there are no known vulnerabilities in print processing of the TOE using PRET.
4	- Confirm that unexpected behaviour is not observed even if the character strings that may cause unauthrised processing are input in the control panel and printer driver of the TOE.

c. Result

In the penetration testing performed by the evaluators, the evaluators did not find any exploitable vulnerabilities that attackers who have the assumed attack potential could exploit.

7.5 Evaluated Configuration

The conditions of the TOE configuration, that are prerequisites for this evaluation, are as described in the guidance documents listed in Chapter 6. In order to use the TOE securely as ensured by the evaluation, the TOE must be set as described in the guidance documents. Different settings are not subject to assurance by this evaluation.

7.6 Evaluation Results

The evaluators had concluded that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in the CEM and all assurance activities in the Conformance PP as per the Evaluation Technical Report.

In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.

- PP Conformance:

Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015 Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017 Guideline for Certification Application with HCD-PP Conformance [16]

- Treatment regarding FCS_RBG_ EXT.1 Test
- Treatment regarding FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1
- Treatment regarding FCS_TLS_ EXT.1.1 Test
- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
- Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant

As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following assurance components required by the Conformance PP:

ASE_INT.1, ASE_CCL.1, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_OBJ.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_REQ.1, ASE_TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1, ATE_IND.1, AVA_VAN.1

The result of the evaluation is only applied to those which are composed by the TOE corresponding to the identification described in the Chapter 2.

7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations

There is no evaluator recommendation to be addressed to procurement entities.

8 Certification

Based on the evidence submitted by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation process, the Certification Body has performed certification by checking that the following requirements are satisfied:

- The submitted documentation was sampled, the content was examined, and the related work units in the CEM and assurance activities of the Conformance PP shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
- 2. Rationale of the evaluation verdict by the evaluators presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall be adequate.
- 3. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report shall conform to the CEM and the assurance activities of the Conformance PP.

Concerns found in the certification process were prepared as the certification oversight reviews, and they were sent to the Evaluation Facility.

The Certification Body confirmed such concerns pointed out in the certification oversight reviews were solved in the ST and the Evaluation Technical Report and issued this Certification Report.

8.1 Certification Result

As a result of verification of the Evaluation Technical Report, and related evaluation documentation submitted by the Evaluation Facility, the Certification Body determined that the TOE evaluation satisfies the assurance requirements required by the Conformance PP.

8.2 Recommendations

Procurement entities who are interested in the TOE are advised to refer "4.3 Clarification of Scope" and "7.5 Evaluated Configuration" to make sure the scope of the evaluation and the operational requirements of the TOE meet the operational conditions assumed by each user.

9 Annexes

There is no annex.

10 Security Target

The Security Target [12] of the TOE is provided as a separate document from this Certification Report.

Title:	Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6870i/6870/	
	6860i/6860/6855i with Fax & PDL Security Target	
Version:	2.06	
Publication Date:	2022-07-27	
Author:	Canon Inc.	

11 Glossary

CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
PP	Protection Profile
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality

The abbreviations relating to the CC used in this report are listed below.

The abbreviations relating to the TOE used in this report are listed below.

MFP	Multifunction Product
PDL	Page Description Language
PSTN	Public Switched Telephone Network

The abbreviations relating to the IT Technology used in this report are listed below.

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
GCM	Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
RSA	Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SMB	Server Message Block
SNTP	Simple Network Time Protocol
XTS	XEX encryption mode with tweak and ciphertext stealing

The definitions of terms used in this report are listed below.

Copy function	A function to scan paper documents by operating the control panel and print them.
Scan function	A function to scan paper documents by operating the control panel and send the scanned user document data to a file server.
Fax function	A function to send and receive fax data via Public Switched Telephone Network. Fax send functionality is to scan paper

	documents by operating the control panel and send the scanned user document data using the standard fax protocol. Fax receive functionality is to receive user document data using the standard fax protocol and store them.
Print function	A function to receive user document data from the printer driver of a client PC, and then print out them by operating the control panel of the MFP.
Document Storage and Retrieval function	A function to store user document data in the MFP and retrieve them. Document storage functionality is to scan paper documents by operating the control panel of the MFP and store the scanned user document data. Document retrieval functionality is to print out stored user document data by operating control panel of the MFP. In addition, the user document data stored in "Fax receive" can be printed out, sent to a file server, and sent by fax.
Assurance Activities	Evaluation work to be performed by an evaluator in order to conform to a PP. It is a supplement of the CEM. In the case of the Conformance PP [14], it is described in the Conformance PP.

12 Bibliography

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- [13] Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 6870i/6870/6860i/6860/6855i with Fax & PDL Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3, August 10, 2022, ECSEC Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center
- [14] Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015 (Certification Identification: JISEC-C0553)

- [15] Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017
- [16] Guideline for Certification Application with HCD-PP Conformance, Version 1.8, November 11, 2020, Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, JISEC-CERT-2020-A18