# *Solaris 10 11/06* **Security Target**

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Abstract

This document is the Security Target for the EAL4+ Common Criteria v2.3 evaluation of Solaris10 11/06 developed by Sun Microsystems, Inc.



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[CCP2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Requirements, Version 2.3, CCMB-2005-08-002, August 2005

[CAPP] Controlled Access Protection Profile, Issue 1.d, 8 October 1999

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[NIST2] Letter from R. Chandramouli, re: FPT\_TST.1 in RBAC PP, Computer Security Division, NIST, dated 16 July 2001

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# Introduction

# **1.1 ST Identification**

Title: Solaris 10 11/06 Security Target, v 1.3. FINAL

Keywords: Solaris 10 11/06, general-purpose operating system, POSIX, UNIX.

This document is the Security Target for the CC evaluation of the Solaris 10 11/06 operating system product, and is conformant to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation [CC].

### **1.2 ST Overview**

This Security Target documents the security characteristics of the Solaris 10 11/06 operating system.

The Solaris Operating Environment is a computer operating system, based on the opensource UNIX SunOS developed by Sun Microsystems, Inc.

Solaris is a highly-configurable UNIX-based operating system. Originally developed to meet the requirements of the C2 class of the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), it now meets specific equivalent Protection Profiles developed within the Common Criteria Project. These broad requirements are described for the Common Criteria scheme in [CAPP], the Controlled Access Protection Profile and in [RBAC], the Role Based Access Control Protection Profile.

A Solaris 10 11/06 system consists of a number of workstations and/or servers linked together to form a single distributed system. Users share the resources of multiple workstations and/or servers connected together in a single, distributed Trusted Computing Base (TCB).

This Solaris 10 11/06 ST, version 1.3. FINAL is based on the previous Solaris 10 3/05 Security Target with the appropriate changes and addition of new material.

# **1.3 CC Conformance**

This ST is conformant with the following:

- Controlled Access Protection Profile version 1.d [CAPP].
- Role Based Access Control Protection Profile version 1 [RBAC]

This ST is CC Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant, augmented by ALC\_FLR.3, with a claimed Evaluation Assurance Level of EAL4+ (see section 7.3.3).

## 1.4 Structure

The structure of this document is as defined by [CC] Part 1 Annex C.

- Section 2 is the TOE Description.
- Section 3 provides the statement of TOE security environment.
- Section 4 provides the statement of security objectives.
- Section 5 provides the statement of IT security requirements.
- Section 6 provides the TOE summary specification, which includes the detailed specification of the IT Security Functions.
- Section 7 provides the rationale for the security objectives, security requirements, TOE summary specification and PP claims against [CAPP] and [RBAC].
- · Appendix A contains information about TOE supported hardware platforms

# 1.5 Terminology

This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning specific to this document. Terms defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise.

Action: An action is an execution of a command or system call.

Administrative User: This term refers to an administrator of a Solaris 10 system. Administrators are granted a rights profile and may also be granted roles.

*Audit Class:* This is the name given to the definition of a collective grouping of events representing particular types of activity to be monitored; e.g. file read, network, administrative, application, process, file attribute modify, etc.

Authentication data: This includes a user identifier, password and authorizations for each user of the product.

*CCATS*: Commodity Classification Automated Tracking System. U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security code number for products classified against the Commerce Control List.

*CB:* Certification Body, a part of CSE (Communications Security Establishment) overseeing and monitoring evaluations in Canada.

*CCS*: Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. The CC program run by the Government of Canada

*CDE*: Common Desktop Environment. The legacy user desktop provided with the Solaris Operating System. It is an integrated graphical user interface built on top of the Motif toolkit (a graphical widget toolkit for building graphical user interfaces under the X Window System on UNIX and other POSIX-compliant systems).

*Common Components*: These relate to components of the mid-frame family that share the same or functionally similar hardware such as CPU, memory, Compact PCI Card, SC, I/O assemblies, etc.

*Dynamic Reconfiguration (DR):* This is the process of dynamically reconfiguring system boards, removing them or installing them onto a system while the Solaris operating environment is running. DR software is part of the Solaris Operating Environment and supports Multiple Domaining or Dynamic System Domains feature.

Dynamic System Domains: see Multiple Domain

FCS: First Customer Shipment.

*JDS*: Sun Java Desktop System. Sun's version of the opensource GNOME 2.0 Desktop Operating Environment. GNOME is a Unix and Linux desktop suite and development platform that provides a desktop for end-users, users. JDS is provided with Solaris 10 as a selectable option (an alternative to the Solaris CDE – Common Desktop Environment).

*High End Server platforms:* For the purposes of this ST this means the Sunfire 12K, 15K, 20K and 25K servers.

*IARR:* Impact Analysis and Rationale Report, the document which shows platform equivalency across the SunFire mid-frame range of servers.

*Low-end/Entry-Level platforms:* For the purposes of this ST this means the following product models: Servers E3500, E4500, E420R, E450, E250 and E220R; Workstation; Ultrasparcs 25, 30, 45, 60, 80 and 450; SunBlades 100, 150, 1000, 1500, 2000 and 2500; Netra X1, 20, 120, 240, CT410, CT810 and CT820; SunFire B100s, V100, V120, V125, V215, V245, V280R, V445, V480, V880, V880z, V210, V240, V250, V440; Netra 440 Server; UltraSparc 5 & 10; and the Ultra 3 Mobile. Entry level platforms also include all of Sun's Opteron- and Intel-based machines: the Sunfire v20z, v40z, x2100, x2100 M2, x2200 M2, x4100, x4100 M2, x4200, x4200 M2, x4500, x4600, x4600 M2 and servers; the Dell Poweredge 6000 workstation; the Ultra 20 and Ultra 20 M2 workstations; and the Javastations W1100 and W2100.

*Mid-frame/Mid-range platforms:* For the purposes of this ST this means the E10K Server; the Netra 1280; the Sunfire 1280, 3800, 4800, 4810, E5500, E6500, and 6800 servers; the SunFire V490, V890, 2900, 4900, 6900, T1000, T2000 Servers; and the Netra T2000 Server and CP3060 Blade.

*Multiple Domain (MD):* This is a hardware configuration feature whereby a system may be logically partitioned into one or more domains. Each domain is a self-contained server of one or multiple system boards, contains CPU, memory, I/O, boot-disk. network resources and runs a single instance of the Solaris Operating Environment.

*Object*: In Solaris 10, objects belong to one of four categories: file system objects, other kernel objects (such as processes, programs and interprocess communication), window system objects and miscellaneous objects.

*Peripherals:* This term should be taken to mean (optional) storage, communications or printing devices that can be used with the TOE platforms.

Platform: Refers to servers, workstations or both when contextually appropriate.

PP: Protection Profile.

*Product*: The term product is used to define all hardware and software components that comprise the distributed Solaris 10 system.

*Public object*: A type of object for which all subjects have read access, but only the TCB has write access.

SB: Sun Blade, a name given to a family of workstation products.

*SC*: System Controller, the component in the mid-frame platforms that boots up the ToE, and performs similar functions to that of an Open BootPROM

*Security Attributes*: As defined by functional requirement FIA\_ATD.1, the term 'security attributes' includes the following as a minimum: user identifier; group memberships; user authentication data.

*Server*: A computer/device which provides/manages information or services to computers on a network.

*SF*: Security Function OR (alternatively) SunFire, a name given to a family of servers, dependent upon context.

SFR: Security Functional Requirement

*SMC*: Sun Management Console, a secure system management GUI for SPARC administration

SoF: Strength of Function

*SPARC*: The name given to the processor family that is incorporated into the platforms identified in this ST.

SRN: Security Release Notes, see references.

Subject: There are two classes of subjects in Solaris 10:

- *untrusted subject* this is a Solaris 10 process running on behalf of some user, running outside of the TCB (for example, with no privileges).
- *trusted subject* this is a Solaris 10 process running as part of the TCB. Examples are service daemons and the processes implementing the windowing system.

*System*: Includes the hardware, software and firmware components of the Solaris 10 product which are connected/networked together and configured to form a usable system.

*System Controller*: This is an embedded system consisting of the system controller board and the system controller software (own processor, memory, etc.) which provides communication pathways between the platform system components and additionally performs functions replicating those of an 'Open Boot PROM'.

*Target of Evaluation (TOE)*: The TOE is defined as the Solaris 10 11/06 Operating system, running and tested on the hardware and firmware specified in this ST. The BootPROM firmware forms part of the TOE Environment (see section 5.4).

*Trusted Computing Base (TCB)*: A TCB is the totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system (which may include a combination of hardware, firmware, and software) that is responsible for enforcing a security policy

TSF: TOE Security Function.

TSP: TOE Security Policy.

User: Any individual/person who has a unique user identifier and who interacts with the Solaris 10 product.

*Workstation*: A workstation is a computer intended for individual use that is more capable, powerful and faster than a personal computer.

# **1.6 Document Layout**

IT security functions are assigned a unique reference identifier of the form Name.1 to enable ease of reference. For example, DAC.1, Audit.1.

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# **TOE Description**

## 2.1 Introduction

The TOE description aims to aid the understanding of the TOE's security requirements and provides a context for the evaluation. It defines the scope and boundaries of the TOE, both physically and logically, and describes the environment into which the TOE will fit.

For the purposes of this ST, the TOE is the Sun Microsytems Solaris 10 11/06 Operating System, referred to throughout this document as "Solaris 10" or "the TOE".

# 2.2 Intended Use

Solaris 10 is a highly-configurable UNIX-based operating system which has been developed to be compliant with the Controlled Access and Role Based Protection Profiles. Originally developed to meet the requirements of the C2 class of the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), it now meets specific equivalent Protection Profiles developed within the Common Criteria Project.

The TOE consists of a number of workstations and/or servers linked together to form a single distributed system. Users share the resources of multiple workstations and/or servers connected together in a single, distributed Trusted Computing Base (TCB). After successful login, the users have access to a general computing environment, allowing the start-up of user applications, issuing user commands at shell level, creating and accessing files. The TOE provides adequate mechanisms to separate the users and protect their data. Privileged commands are restricted to the system administrator role.

The TOE permits one or more processors and attached peripheral and storage devices to be used by multiple users to perform a variety of functions requiring controlled shared access to the data stored on the system. Such installations are typical of personal, workgroup, or enterprise computing systems accessed by users local to, or with otherwise protected access to, the computer systems.

The TOE provides facilities for on-line interaction with users. Networking is covered only to the extent to which the TOE can be considered to be part of a centrallymanaged system that meets a common set of security requirements. It is assumed that responsibility for the safeguarding of the data protected by the TOE can be delegated to the TOE users (other than the management of TOE security critical parameters,

which is performed by administrative users). All data is under the control of the TOE. The data is stored in named objects, and the TOE can associate with each controlled object a description of the access rights to that object.

All individual users of the TOE are assigned a unique user identifier; this unique identifier type supports individual accountability. The TOE authenticates the claimed identity of each user before allowing a user to perform any further actions. The TOE enforces controls such that access to data objects can only take place in accordance with the access restrictions.

# 2.3 Evaluated Configurations

#### 2.3.1 Target of Evaluation

This section defines the software that comprise the TOE and the Servers/Workstations that the software runs on.

#### 2.3.1.1 TOE Certification Platforms:

Note that the UltraSPARC IIi, IIIi and III Low-End platforms use an OpenBoot PROM. SunFire MidFrame and High-End platforms make use of the System Controller component to perform similar tasks to the OpenBOOT PROM. Both the OpenBoot PROM and System Controller are outside of the scope of this evaluation. The OpenBootPROM and System Controller are protected by a password commensurate with the appropriate SoF requirement for the environment. The Administrator is responsible for selecting passwords of appropriate strength to meet the ST requirements.

#### Workstations and Servers:

The target of evaluation is a (distributed) operating system product running on:

- Platform 1: Entry Level workstations and servers utilizing an UltraSPARC II, UltraSPARC IIe, UltraSPARC IIi, UltraSPARCIII, UltraSPARCIIIi, or UltraSPARC T1 processor in a single or multiple configuration. Various configurations of these platforms are possible and the evaluation scope includes all possible combinations/permutations through the testing of CB appropriate configurations.
- Platform 2: The Netra 1280 and SunFire mid-frame and high-end family offering Dynamic Reconfiguration and Multiple Domaining as defined in Section 1.5 and utilizing an UltraSPARC III Cu (copper based) or UltraSPARC IV processor. Various configurations of these platforms are possible and the evaluation scope includes all possible combinations/permutations through the testing of CB appropriate configurations. An [IARR], Impact Analysis and Rationale Report, will show platform equivalency across the SunFire midframe family.
- Platform 3: AMD based processor systems: AMD Opteron 800, 1200, and 8000 series; AMD-64 100, 200, and 2000 series; AMD dual-core 1200 and 2000 series; AMD Opteron 285; and, Intel Xeon.

Please refer to Appendix A for tables illustrating the hardware configurations available for use. Note that within each platform group, the processor speed associated with each model is dependent upon what was or is offered by the vendor.

#### 2.3.1.2 Software

The Target of Evaluation is based on the following system software:

- Solaris 10 11/06
- Solaris Management Console 2.1 (SMC)

The TOE documentation is supplied on CD-ROM and on SUN's website: http://www.sun.com/software/security

#### 2.3.2 File systems

The following filesystem types are supported:

- the standard Solaris UNIX filesystem, ufs, without the Trusted Solaris attributes;
- the standard remote filesystem access protocol, nfs (V2 and V3);
- the MS-DOS formatted filesystem pcfs;
- the High Sierra filesystem for CD-ROM drives, hsfs;
- the Network File System, Version 4 (NFS V4). This feature provides authentication, integrity, and privacy as well as enabling servers to offer different security flavors for different file systems via it's integration with the Kerberos authentication protocol.
- the Solaris Zettabyte File System (Solaris ZFS). This feature provides enhanced file system capabilities by automating common administrative tasks, protecting data from corruption and providing an extremely high degree of scalability. Solaris ZFS utilizes virtual storage pools to simplify expanding or contracting of file systems via additional drives.

In addition to the above file systems a number of "internal" filesystems are supported: The file descriptor file system, fd, allows programs to access their own file descriptors through the file name space, such as /dev/stdin corresponding to /dev/fd0.

- The names file system, namefs (or namfs) allows the arbitrary mounting of any file descriptor on top of another file name.
- The doors file system, doorfs allows fast control transfer between processes on the same machine.
- The process file system, procfs (/proc), provides access to the process image of each process on the machine as if the process were a "file". Process access decisions are enforced by DAC attributes inferred from the underlying process' DAC attributes.

## 2.3.3 Configurations

The evaluated configurations are defined as follows.

- When installing the product, the entire distribution should be selected;
- The evaluated version (or "package set") must be selected at time of installation in accordance with the description provided in the documentation and installed accordingly.
- No additional SMC add-ons should be installed;
- Minimum physical memory and disk configurations provided for the hardware in the tables in Appendix A are provided with the Solaris 10 11/06 documentation and may not be sufficient for all applications. For components which must be installed separately from the Solaris Installation, please consult that component's installation guide to determine requirements;
- The default setting for the Global Zone (Solaris Container) should be used. In addition, when configuring non-global Zones, the non-global Zone root file system models should be followed (sparse root Zone model and the whole root Zone model);
- The evaluated configuration includes both the Common Desktop Environment (CDE) windowing environment and Sun Java Desktop System (JDS) Operating Environment. Users may select either of these during login via the "User Preference" screen.

**Application note:** for the CC evaluated version of Solaris 10, the JDS/GNOME accessibility features are not available.

- Solaris 10 supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6, (no additional security claims are made for IPv6)
- Solaris 10 supports the use of DHCP, (no additional security claims are made for DHCP);
- 64 bit architectures are included;
- Web Based Enterprise Management Services (WBEM) are included (no additional security claims are made for WBEM);
- Network, Web Start, Jumpstart, Flash, DVD and CD installations are all supported;
- The standard Service Management Framework (SMF) profiles, generic.xml and generic\_limited\_net.xml, must be used;
- The Solaris Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) using the default configuration for identification and authentication. Alternately, the Kerberos authentication protocol can be configured for TOE identification and authentication.
- If the system console is used, it must be connected directly to the server/workstation and afforded the same physical protection as the server/workstation.

The product comprises one or more of the listed servers and/or workstations (and optional peripherals) running the above listed system software (a platform running the above listed software is referred to as a "TOE platform" below).

If the product is configured with more than one TOE platform, they are linked by Ethernet LANs, which may be joined by bridges/routers or by TOE platforms which act as routers/gateways.

If other systems are connected to the network they need to be configured and managed by the same authority using an appropriate security policy not conflicting with the security policy of the TOE. All links from this network to untrusted networks (e.g. the Internet) need to be protected by appropriate measures like carefully configured firewall systems that prohibit attacks from the untrusted networks. Those protections are not part of the TOE environment.

No other processors may be connected to the Ethernet network, except as noted below.

If the product is configured with more than one TOE platform, then the Sun Java System Directory Server 5.2 version of the LDAP naming service must be used and the Sun Java System Directory Server 5.2 version of the LDAP naming server(s) must be TOE platforms.




Figure 2-1 Typical Evaluation Configuration

## 2.4 Summary of Security Features

The primary security features of the product are:

- Discretionary Access Control;
- Object Reuse;
- Identification and Authentication (Including PAM and Kerberos);
- Roles and Profiles (Including Service Management Framework);
- Security Management
- Auditing;
- Enforcement;
- Secure Communication;
- TSF Protection; and
- Privileges and Authorizations.

These primary security features are supported by kernel and process domain separation and reference mediation, which ensure that the features are always invoked and cannot be bypassed.

## 2.4.1 DAC

Discretionary Access Control (DAC) restricts access to objects, such as files, based on Access Control Lists (ACLs) that include the standard UNIX permissions for user, group and other users. Access control mechanisms also protect System V IPC (interprocess communication) objects from unauthorized access.

The Solaris ACL model allows administrators to grant access rights, to a user or group, specific rights that govern who can access a specific object, a group of properties, or an individual property of an object.

#### 2.4.2 Object Reuse

Object Reuse functionality ensures that memory and other storage and file system objects are cleared of data (i.e. Contain no data) when they are re-allocated or re-used.

#### 2.4.3 Identification and Authentication

Sun Solaris provides identification and authentication as a built-in feature using the Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) based on usernames and passwords.

The PAM modules that are included in the default installation are included in the evaluated configuration. The list of PAM modules includes:

pam\_authtok\_check.so.1 pam\_authtok\_get.so.1 pam\_authtok\_store.so.1 pam\_dhkeys.so.1

1.3 FINAL

pam\_dial\_auth.so.1 pam\_krb5.so.1 pam\_passwd\_auth.so.1 pam\_rhosts\_auth.so.1 pam\_roles.so.1 pam\_unix\_account.so.1 pam\_unix\_auth.so.1 pam\_unix\_cred.so.1 pam\_unix\_session.so.1

In cooperation with the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) and the Generic Security Service (GSS); Kerberos and PAM are the mechanisms available for both distributed and non-distributed authentication. Note: LDAP is used with both SASL and Kerberos.

Kerberos provides an integrated client/server architecture that offers strong user authentication, as well as data integrity and privacy, for providing secure transactions over networks. Discussion of Kerberos data integrity and privacy services are discussed in Section "2.4.8 Secure Communications".

Solaris provides the mechanisms for password policy enforcement and the use of containers and zones, profiles, and privileges to limit the use of superuser level commands.

#### 2.4.4 Roles and Profiles

Solaris 10 supports the concept of Roles, allowing administrative powers to be broken into many discrete Roles. This removes the requirement of one superuser (root or only one system-administrator) to administer the TOE. A Role consists of a set of profiles. Profiles can be populated with the required authorizations appropriate to the defined role, thus allowing the administrative functionality to be distributed and hence diluted amongst the Roles, to reduce the impact of any misuse of a Role.

New to Solaris 10 is the Service Management Framework (SMF) which provides RBAC authorization that is required to administrate services. SMF allows administrators to install, configure and enable system applications and provides dependency based service startup/recovery. SMF can be used to assign uid/gid/default and limit privileges for services.

SMF also provides for distinction between services and applications that are configured/enabled e.g. services can be fully configured but disabled or enabled/disabled temporarily or permanently.

There are 2 types of SMF profiles:

- generic.xml: most services enabled (similar to Solaris 9;) and
- **generic\_limited\_net.xml:** fewer remotely available network services enabled, only ssh available for remote login, most other services off.

#### 2.4.5 Security Management

The management of the security critical parameters of the TOE is performed by administrative users. A set of commands that require root privileges are used for system management. Security parameters are stored in specific files that are protected by the access control mechanisms of the TOE against unauthorized access by non-administrative users.

Solaris 10 introduces Solaris Zones (formerly N1 grid containers). Solaris Zones provide an advanced resource management feature which ensures that applications can be run in separate Zones, with logical isolation ensuring true encapsulation. Zones provide multiple virtualized application environments from a single Solaris kernel to provide (in addition to process containment) resource usage & security isolation but blocks direct access to hardware (each Zone appears as a separate host from "outside").

The virtual server in the Zone hides the system details. The hardware on which the Zone is running is not exposed to the applications or users. Solaris Zones allows for a separate uid /gid namespace per Zone, and each Zone has their own root user and separate file system space.

The upper limit for the number of zones on a system is 8192. The number of Zones that can be effectively hosted on a single system is determined by the total resource requirements of the application software running in all of the zones.

There are 2 standard types of Solaris Zones, Global and non-Global. A Global Zone has a dual function as it is both the default Zone for the system and the Zone used for system-wide administrative control. All processes run in the global Zone if no non-Global Zones (referred to simply as "Zones") are created by the global administrator.

The global Zone is the only Zone from which a non-global Zone can be configured, installed, managed, or uninstalled. Only the global Zone is bootable from the system hardware. Administration of the system infrastructure, such as physical devices, routing tables, or dynamic reconfiguration (DR), is only possible in the global Zone. Appropriately privileged processes running in the global Zone can access objects associated with other zones.

A non-Global Zone provides isolation at almost any level of granularity required. A Zone does not need a dedicated CPU, a physical device, or a portion of physical memory. These resources can either be multiplexed across a number of Zones running within a single domain or system, or allocated on a per-Zone basis using the resource management features available in the operating system.

Each Zone can provide a customized set of services. To enforce basic process isolation, a process can see or signal only those processes that exist in the same Zone. Basic communication between Zones is accomplished by giving each Zone at least one logical network interface. An application running in one Zone cannot observe the network traffic of another Zone. This isolation is maintained even though the respective streams of packets travel through the same physical interface.

Each Zone is given a portion of the file system hierarchy. Because each Zone is confined to its subtree of the file system hierarchy, a workload running in a particular Zone cannot access the on-disk data of another workload running in a different Zone.

Files used by naming services reside within a Zone's own root file system view. Thus, naming services in different zones are isolated from one other and the services can be configured differently.

There are two types of non-global Zone root file system models: sparse and whole root. The sparse root Zone model optimizes the sharing of objects. The whole root Zone model provides the maximum configurability.

Zone Security Properties:

- Services can be isolated from each other;
- Potentially risky software can be quarantined;
- Processes in Zones can't send signals to other Zones (even if they have proc\_session or proc\_owner);
- System memory cannot be shared between Zones;
- Untrusted parties can be isolated to contain potential damage by a breach; and
- Each Zone can only see those processes running within it (except Global Zone)

In addition, each "Global Zone" can:

- Observe all activities inside each Zone;
- Not be seen by software in a non global Zone (note: non-global Zones run with less privileges, which will be a subset of the available privileges); and
- Change the contents or processes in each Zone (note: if proper privileges are assigned).

#### 2.4.6 Auditing

Solaris 10 can collect extensive auditing information about security related actions taken or attempted by users, ensuring that users are accountable for their actions. For each such action or event an audit record is generated containing: date and time of the event, user, security attributes and success or failure. This audit trail can be analyzed to identify attempts to compromise security and determine the extent of the compromise.

#### 2.4.7 Enforcement

The Solaris 10 security policy is enforced in a manner which ensures that the organizational policies are upheld in the target environment i.e. the integrity of the TSF is protected, kernel and process domain separation is enforced and bypass of the security functions is prevented.

### 2.4.8 Secure Communication

In its evaluated configuration, Solaris 10 supports trusted communication channels for TCP and IP layer connections between different physical TOEs through different protocols/services.

The Kerberos V5 network authentication protocol provides an integrated client/server architecture that offers strong user authentication, as well as data integrity and privacy, for providing secure transactions over networks. **Authentication** guarantees that the identities of both the sender and recipient of a network transaction are true. Kerberos can also verify the validity of data being passed back and forth (**integrity**) and encrypt it during transmission (**privacy/confidentiality**).

Using Kerberos, a user can log on to other machines, execute commands, exchange data, and transfer files securely. Additionally, Kerberos provides **authorization** services, allowing administrators to restrict access to services and machines; moreover, as a Kerberos user you can regulate other people's access to your account.

#### 2.4.9 TSF Protection

While in operation, the kernel software and data are protected by the hardware memory protection mechanisms. The memory and process management components of the kernel ensure a user process cannot access kernel storage or storage belonging to other processes.

Access to system services is controlled by the system, which requires that subjects wanting to perform security-relevant tasks be authorized appropriately.

Non-kernel TSF software and data are protected by DAC and process isolation mechanisms. In the evaluated configuration, the reserved user ID root owns the directories and files that define the TSF configuration. In general, files and directories containing internal TSF data (e.g., configuration files, batch job queues) are also protected from reading by DAC permissions.

The TOE and the hardware and firmware components are required to be physically protected from unauthorized access. The system kernel mediates all access to the hardware mechanisms themselves, other than program visible CPU instruction functions.

The TOE provides a tool that allows an administrative user to check the correct operation of the underlying hardware. This tool performs tests to check the system memory, the memory protection features of the underlying processor and the correct separation between user and supervisor state.

#### 2.4.10 Privileges and Authorizations

Privileges and Authorizations are two separate mechanisms that confer security rights to processes and users respectively. Authorizations apply to users. In order for a user to perform an action that would otherwise be prohibited by the Solaris 10 11/06 security policy, the user must have an authorization.

# **TOE Security Environment**

### 3.1 Introduction

The statement of TOE security environment describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is intended to be used and the manner in which it is expected to be employed.

To this end, the statement of TOE security environment identifies the lists the assumptions made on the operational environment (including physical and procedural measures), the intended method of use of the product, defines the threats that the product is designed to counter, and the organizational security policies with which the product is designed to comply.

Throughout this section, items that have been included which satisfy the specific requirements of the PP's are indicated with either [RBAC] or [CAPP] at the end of the item entry, where applicable.

## 3.2 Threats

The assumed security threats are listed below.

The **IT** assets to be protected comprise the information stored, processed or transmitted by the TOE. The term "information" is used here to refer to all data held within a workstation/server, including data in transit between workstations/servers.

The TOE counters the general threat of unauthorized access to information, where "access" includes disclosure, modification and destruction.

The threat agents can be categorized as either:

- unauthorized users of the TOE, i.e. individuals who have not been granted the right to access the system; or
- authorized users of the TOE, i.e. individuals who have been granted the right to access the system.

The threat agents are assumed to originate from a well managed user community in a non-hostile working environment, and hence the product protects against threats of inadvertent or casual attempts to breach the system security. The TOE is not intended to be applicable to circumstances in which protection is required against determined attempts by hostile and well funded attackers to breach system security.

The threats listed below are grouped according to whether or not they are countered by the TOE. Those that are not countered by the TOE are countered by environmental or external mechanisms.

#### **3.2.1** Threats countered by the TOE

**[T.ACCESS\_INFO]** An authorized user of the TOE accesses information without having permission from the person who owns, or is responsible for, the information. In this context "access" is to be interpreted as observing information for which the user has no "need to know", even though that user may have sufficient clearance to see the information. [RBAC]

**[T.ACCESS\_TOE]** An unauthorized user of the TOE gains access to the system, thereby gaining unauthorized access to information. An unauthorized user of the TOE could gain access to the system by impersonating an authorized user, or by gaining access to an unattended platform at which an authorized user is logged on. Failure to detect the fact that an attack is taking place, or that many attempts have taken place over a period of time, may result in the attack eventually succeeding, resulting in the attacker gaining unauthorized access to information. [RBAC]

Note: T.ACCESS\_TOE is meant to satisfy the T.ENTRY threat requirement from [RBAC].

**[T.MODIFY]** Unauthorized modification or destruction of information by an authorized user of the TOE.In this context "unauthorized" means not having the explicit or implicit permission of the designated owner of the information.

**[T.ADMIN\_RIGHTS]** Unauthorized use of facilities which require administration rights by an authorized user of the TOE. Unauthorized use of such facilities by a user who cannot be trusted not to misuse them (whether intentionally or accidentally) could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to information.

**[T.COMPROMISE]** Data may be compromised in terms of confidentiality and integrity if an unauthorized User intercepts a communication link between the TOE and another trusted IT product (which may be another instantiation of the TOE) and attempts to modify information in a way that can not be detected by the TOE or the other trusted IT product.

#### **3.2.2** Threats to be countered by measures within the TOE environment

The following threats apply in environments where specific threats to distributed systems need to be countered.

**[T.TRANSIT]** Data transferred between platforms is disclosed to or modified by unauthorized users or processes either directly or indirectly (e.g. through spoofing of workstation/server identity).

**[T.OPERATE]** Compromise of the IT assets may occur because of improper administration and operation of the TOE. Users or external threat agents may, through accidental discovery or directed search, discover inadequacies in the security administration of the TOE which permit them to gain logical access to and perform operations on its resources in breach of any permissions they may have. Potential attackers may seek to develop methods whereby the improperly administered security functions of the TOE may be circumvented during normal operation.[RBAC]

**[T.ROLEDEV]** The development and assignment of user roles may be done in a manner that undermines security. In general, roles could be developed which have an incorrect or improper combination of authorizations to perform operations on objects. In addition, users could be assigned to roles that are incommensurate with their duties, giving them either too much or too little scope of authorization. A particular concern arises in that users could be assigned conflicting roles with respect to 'separation of duties'. An individual user could be authorized to perform multiple operations on data objects that represent the parts of a transaction that should be separated among different individuals. [RBAC]

# 3.3 Organizational Security Policies

The TOE complies with the following organizational security policies:

**[P.AUTH]** Only those users who have been authorized to access the information within the system may access the system.[CAPP]

[P.DAC] The right to access specific data objects is determined on the basis of:

- a. the owner of the object; and
- b. the identity of the subject attempting the access; and
- c. the implicit and explicit access rights to the object granted to the subject by the object owner.

Note: P.DAC is meant to satisfy the P.ACCESS policy requirement from [RBAC].

**[P.ACCOUNTABLE]** The users of the system shall be held accountable for their actions within the system.[CAPP]

**[P.NEED\_TO\_KNOW]** The system must limit the access to, modification of, and destruction of the information in protected resources to those authorized users which have a "need to know" for that information. [CAPP]

#### **3.4** Assumptions

This section indicates the minimum physical and procedural measures required to maintain security of the TOE.

#### **3.4.1 Physical Aspects**

**[A.PROTECT]** The TOE hardware and software critical to security policy enforcement will be physically protected from unauthorized modification by potentially hostile outsiders.

It is assumed that all software and hardware, including network and peripheral cabling is approved for the transmittal of the most sensitive data held by the system. Such items are assumed to be physically protected against threats to the confidentiality and integrity of the data transmitted. [RBAC] [CAPP]

**[A.LOCATE]** The processing resources of the TOE will be located within controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorized physical access. [RBAC] [CAPP]

**[A.ASSET]** It is also assumed that the value of the stored assets merits moderately intensive penetration or masquerading attacks. It is also assumed that physical controls in place would alert the system authorities to the physical presence of attackers within the controlled space. [RBAC]

#### **3.4.2** Personnel Aspects

**[A.ACCESS]** Rights for users to gain access and perform operations on information are based on their membership in one or more roles (and the profiles that accompany these roles). These roles are granted to the users by the TOE Administrator. These roles accurately reflect the users job function, responsibilities, qualifications, and/or competencies within the enterprise. [RBAC]

**[A.MANAGE]** There will be one or more competent and trustworthy individuals assigned to manage TOE security. These individuals will have sole responsibility for the following functions: [CAPP]

a.Create and maintain roles;

b.Establish and maintain relationships among roles; and

c.Assignment and Revocation of users to roles.

In addition these individuals (as 'owners of the entire corporate data'), along with object owners will have the ability to assign and revoke object access rights to roles. [RBAC]

**[A.OWNER]** A limited set of users is given the rights to "create new data objects" and they become owners for those data objects. The organization is the owner of the rest of the information under the control of TOE. [RBAC]

**[A.NO\_EVIL\_ADM]** The system administrative personnel are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the administrator documentation. [CAPP]

**[A.COOP]** Authorized users possess the necessary authorization to access at least some of the information managed by the TOE and are expected to act in a cooperating manner in a benign environment. [CAPP]

#### **3.4.3 Procedural Aspects**

[A.USER] Each individual user is assumed to have a unique user ID.

**[A.PASSWORD]** Those responsible for the TOE must configure minimum password length for normal users to be at least six but no more than eight characters.

#### **3.4.4 Connectivity Aspects**

**[A.LDAP\_DOMAINS]** It is assumed that, if the product comprises more than one platform, all platforms are administered from a central point within each LDAP directory domain.

LDAP allows the creation of multiple administrative domains, thus allowing administrators to control local resources and user accounts, yet making it possible for users and resources to operate seamlessly over the entire organization.

[A.BRIDGES&ROUTERS] All bridges and routers are assumed to correctly pass data without modification.

**[A.CONNECT]** All connections to peripheral devices reside within the controlled access facilities. RBAC only addresses security concerns related to the manipulation of the TOE through its legitimate interfaces. Internal communication paths to interfaces points such as terminals are assumed to be adequately protected. [RBAC] [CAPP]

**[A.PEER]** Any other systems with which the TOE communicates are assumed to be under the same management control and operate under the same security policy constraints. CAPP-conferment TOEs are applicable to networked or distributed environments only if the entire network operates under the same constraints and resides within a single management domain. There are no security requirements which address the need to trust external systems or the communications links to such systems. [CAPP]

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# **Security Objectives**

#### 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

Throughout this section, items that have been included which satisfy the specific requirements of the PP's are indicated with either [RBAC] or [CAPP] at the end of the item entry, where applicable.

**[O.AUTHORISATION]** The TOE must ensure that only authorized users gain access to the TOE and its resources. [CAPP]

**[O.ENTRY]** The TOE must prevent logical entry to it by persons or processes with no rights to access it. [RBAC]

**[O.DISCRETIONARY\_ACCESS]** The TOE must control access to resources based on the identity of users. The TSF must allow authorized users to specify which resources may be accessed by which users.

The TOE must provide its users with the means of controlling and limiting access to the objects and resources they own or are responsible for, on the basis of individual users or identified groups of users, and in accordance with the set of rules defined by the P.DAC security policy. [CAPP]

**[O.KNOWN]** Legitimate users of the system must be identified before rights of access can be granted. RBAC assumes that there is a finite community of known users who will be granted rights of access and that system management has authority over that user community. **[RBAC]** 

**[O.AUDITING]** The TSF must record the security relevant actions of users of the TOE. The TSF must present this information to authorized administrators. The TOE must provide the means of recording security relevant events in sufficient detail to help an administrator of the TOE detect attempted security violations or potential misconfiguration of the TOE security features that would leave the IT assets open to compromise. [CAPP]

**[O.ACCOUNT]** The TOE must ensure that all users can be held accountable for their security relevant actions. [RBAC]

**[O.TRUSTPATH]** The TSF must be designed and implemented in a manner that allows for establishing a trusted channel or communication path between the TOE and another trusted IT product that protects the user data transferred over this channel from disclosure and undetected modification.

**[O.RESIDUAL\_INFO]** The TOE must ensure that any information contained in a protected resource is not released when the resource is recycled. [CAPP]

**[O.MANAGE]** The TOE must allow administrators to effectively manage the TOE and its security functions, and must ensure that only authorized administrators are able to access such functionality. [CAPP] [RBAC]

Note: O.MANAGE is meant to satisfy the O.ADMIN objective from [RBAC].

**[O.ENFORCEMENT]** The TOE security policy is enforced in a manner which ensures that the organizational policies are enforced in the target environment i.e. the integrity of the TSF is protected. [CAPP]

**[O.DUTY]** The TOE must provide the capability of enforcing the separation of duties, so that no single user is required to perform all administrative functions. [RBAC].

**[O.HIERARCHICAL]** The TOE must allow hierarchical definitions of profile rights. The hierarchical definition of rights gives the ability to define profile rights in terms of other profile rights. [RBAC].

**[O.ROLE]** The TOE must prevent users from gaining access to and performing operations on its resources/objects unless they have been granted access by the resource/object owner or they have been assigned to a role (by an authorized administrator) which permits those operations. **[RBAC]** 

### 4.2 Security Objectives for the TOE Environment

**[O.E\_ADMIN]** Those responsible for the TOE are competent and trustworthy individuals, capable of managing the TOE and the security of the information it contains.

[O.E\_ACCOUNTABLE] Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that:

a. The product is configured such that only the approved group of users for which the system was accredited may access the system.

b.Each individual user is assigned a unique user ID.

**[O.E\_AUDITDATA]** Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the audit functionality is used and managed effectively. In particular:

a.Procedures must exist to ensure that the audit trail for the product (i.e., all networked components containing an audit trail) is regularly analyzed and archived, to allow retrospective inspection.

b. The auditing system must be configured such that the loss of audit data is minimized upon:

-planned or unplanned shutdown; or

-lack of available audit storage (in particular administrators should ensure that the AUDIT\_CNT flag is correctly set as identified in the Administration documentation supplied with the TOE, and that remote partitions are mounted with the appropriate option [noac] so that audit information is not lost when the partition fills).

c. The auditing system is designed such that bad authentication data will not be stored in the audit trail.

d.The media on which audit data is stored must not be physically removable from the platform by unauthorized users.

**[O.E\_CREDEN]** Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that all access credentials, such as passwords or other authentication information, are protected by the users in a manner which maintains IT security objectives. Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that user authentication data is stored securely and not disclosed to unauthorized individuals. In particular:

a.Procedures must be established to ensure that user passwords generated by an administrator during user account creation or modification are distributed in a secure manner, as appropriate for the clearance of the system.

b.The media on which authentication data is stored must not be physically removable from the platform by unauthorized users.

c.Users must not disclose their passwords to other individuals. [CAPP]

**[O.E\_BOOT]** Hardware and firmware within the IT environment shall ensure that the correct copy of the Solaris 10 11/06 Operating system is "booted" during system start-up.

Note: The above applies to both workstations and server. Administrators should also take precautions to prevent booting from the floppy drive, CD device or over the network where this is considered a threat.

**[O.E\_CONNECT]** Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that no connections to outside systems or users undermine the security of IT assets. [RBAC]

**[O.E\_CONSISTENCY]** Administrators of the TOE must establish and implement procedures to ensure the consistency of the security-related data across all distributed components that are networked to form a single system (e.g. authentication data). In particular, if the product comprises more than one platform, all such platforms are administered from a central point within each LDAP domain.

**[O.E\_INSTALL]** Those responsible for the TOE must establish and implement procedures to ensure that the hardware, software and firmware components that comprise the networked product are distributed, installed and configured in a secure manner. [CAPP] [RBAC]

**[O.E\_INFO\_PROTECT]**Those responsible for the TOE must establish and implement procedures to ensure that information is protected in an appropriate manner. In particular:

a.DAC protections on security critical files (such as audit trails and authentication databases) shall always be set up correctly.

b.All network and peripheral cabling must be approved for the transmittal of the most sensitive data held by the system. Such physical links are assumed to be adequately protected against threats to the confidentiality and integrity of the data transmitted.

c.If a system console is used, it must be connected directly to the machine, and must be afforded the same physical protections as the server or workstation. Access onto the system console is protected by user identification and authentication mechanisms. Access to the eeprom is protected by an eeprom password.

d. For the MidFrame and E15K platforms, the system controller must be connected directly to the server, and must be afforded the same physical protections as the server. The system controller will not be accessible via a network connection. Access onto the system controller is protected by an SC password.

**[O.E\_MAINTENANCE]** Administrators of the TOE must ensure that the comprehensive diagnostics facilities provided by the product are invoked at every scheduled preventative maintenance period.

**[O.E\_RECOVER]** Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that procedures and/or mechanisms are provided to assure that, after system failure or other discontinuity, recovery without a protection (i.e., security) compromise is obtained.

**[O.E\_PHYSICAL]** Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected from physical attack which might compromise IT security objectives. [CAPP] [RBAC]

**[O.E\_SOFTWARE\_IN]** Those responsible for the TOE shall ensure that the system shall be configured so that only an administrator can introduce new software into the system.

**[O.E\_SERIAL\_LOGIN]** Those responsible for the TOE shall implement procedures to ensure that users clear the screen before logging off where serial login devices(e.g. VT100) are used.

The following security objective applies in environments where specific threats to distributed systems need to be countered, as described in section 3. Typically this objective is met by cryptographic protection of network connections.

**[O.E\_PROTECT]** Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that procedures and/or mechanisms exist to ensure that data transferred between platforms is secured from disclosure, interruption or tampering.

# **Security Requirements**

# 5

# 5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) for the TOE are listed below in table 3 (classes, families, components and elements), with cross-references to [CAPP] and [RBAC] where these are derived from either PP.

The elements that are tailored for this security target are indicated by a \* after the element's name in the table. These tailored elements are detailed in sub-section 5.1 below, with the new material <u>underlined</u>. SFRs **in addition** to those taken from the [CAPP] and [RBAC] PP's for this security target are indicated in Table 5-1 with *italics*. These additional elements are conformant with Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Requirements, Version 2.3, CCIMB-2005-08-002, August 2005[CCP2], and are detailed in Section 5.2, below. The remaining SFRs in the table are to be used for this ST exactly as they appear in [CAPP] and [RBAC].

CLASS	FAMILY	COMPONENT	ELEMENT	[CAPP] PARAGRAPH	[RBAC] PARAGRAPH
FAU	FAU_GEN	FAU_GEN.1	FAU_GEN.1.1 FAU_GEN.1.2	5.1.1.1 5.1.1.2	5.1.1 5.1.1
		FAU_GEN.2	FAU_GEN.2.1	5.1.2.1	5.1.1
	FAU_SAR	FAU_SAR.1	FAU_SAR.1.1 FAU_SAR.1.2	5.1.3.1 5.1.3.2	5.1.1 5.1.1
		FAU_SAR.2	FAU_SAR.2.1	5.1.4.1	5.1.1
		FAU_SAR.3	FAU_SAR.3.1*	5.1.5.1	5.1.1
	FAU_SEL	FAU_SEL.1	FAU_SEL.1.1*	5.1.6.1	5.1.1
	FAU_STG	FAU_STG.1	FAU_STG.1.1 FAU_STG.1.2	5.1.7.1 5.1.7.2	5.1.1 5.1.1
		FAU_STG.3	FAU_STG.3.1*	5.1.8.1	
		FAU_STG.4	FAU_STG.4.1*	5.1.9.1	

Table 5-1 Security Functional Requirem	ents
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CLASS	FAMILY	COMPONENT	ELEMENT	[CAPP] PARAGRAPH	[RBAC] PARAGRAPH
FDP	FDP_ACC	FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACC.1.1*	5.2.1.1	5.1.2
		FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1.1* FDP_ACF.1.2* FDP_ACF.1.3* FDP_ACF.1.4*	5.2.2.1 5.2.2.2 5.2.2.3 5.2.2.4	5.1.2
	FDP_RIP	FDP_RIP.2	FDP_RIP.2	5.2.3.1	
		FDP_RIP.2	FDP_RIP.2	5.2.4.1	
	FDP_UCT	FDP_UCT.1	FDP_UCT.1.1	N/A	N/A
	FDP_UIT	FDP_UIT.1	FDP_UIT.1.1 FDP_UIT.1.2	N/A	N/A
FIA	FIA_ATD	FIA_ATD.1	FIA_ATD.1.1*	5.3.1.1	5.1.3
	FIA_SOS	FIA_SOS.1	FIA_SOS.1.1	5.3.2.1	
	FIA_UAU	FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UAU.1.1* FIA_UAU.1.2	5.3.3.1 5.3.3.2	
		FIA_UAU.2	FIA_UAU2.1		5.1.3
		FIA_UAU.7	FIA_UAU.7.1	5.3.4.1	
	FIA_UID	FIA_UID.1	FIA_UID.1.1* FIA_UID.1.2	5.3.5.1 5.3.5.2	
		FIA_UID.2	FIA_UID.2.1		5.1.3
	FIA_USB	FIA_USB.1	FIA_USB.1.1*	5.3.6.1 5.3.6.2 5.3.6.3	5.1.3

 Table 5-1
 Security Functional Requirements

CLASS	FAMILY	COMPONENT	ELEMENT	[CAPP] PARAGRAPH	[RBAC] PARAGRAPH
FMT	FMT_MSA	FMT_MSA.1	FMT_MSA.1.1*	5.4.1.1	5.1.4
		FMT_MSA.2	FMT_MSA.2.1		5.1.4
		FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MSA.3.1* FMT_MSA.3.2*	5.4.2.1 5.4.2.2	5.1.4 5.1.4
	FMT_MTD	FMT_MTD.1	FMT_MTD.1.1	5.4.3 5.4.4 5.4.5 5.4.6	5.1.4
		FMT_MTD.3	FMT_MTD.3.1		5.1.4
	FMT_REV	FMT_REV.1	FMT_REV.1.1 FMT_REV.1.2* FMT_REV.1.1	5.4.7.1 5.4.7.2 5.4.8.1	5.1.4 5.1.4
	FMT_SMR	FMT_SMR.1	FMT_SMR.1.1* FMT_SMR.1.2	5.4.9.1 5.4.9.2	
		FMT_SMR.2	FMT_SMR.2.1* FMT_SMR.2.2* FMT_SMR.2.3*		5.1.4 5.1.4 5.1.4
	FMT_SMF	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1.1		
FPT	FPT_AMT	FPT_AMT.1	FPT_AMT.1.1*	5.5.1.1	5.1.5
	FPT_FLS	FPT_FLS.1	FPT_FLS.1.1		5.1.5
	FPT_RCV	FPT_RCV.1	FPT_RCV.1.1		5.1.5
		FPT_RCV.4	FPT_RCV.4.1*		5.1.5
	FPT_RVM	FPT_RVM.1	FPT_RVM.1.1	5.5.2.1	5.1.5
	FPT_SEP	FPT_SEP.1	FPT_SEP.1.1 FPT_SEP.1.2	5.5.3.1 5.5.3.2	5.1.5 5.1.5
	FPT_STM	FPT_STM.1	FPT_STM.1.1	5.5.4.1	5.1.5
	FPT_TST	FPT_TST.1	FPT_TST.1.1 FPT_TST.1.2 FPT_TST.1.3		5.1.5 5.1.5 5.1.5
FTA	FTA_LSA	FTA_LSA.1	FTA_LSA.1.1		5.1.6
	FTA_TSE	FTA_TSE.1	FTA_TSE.1.1		5.1.6
	FTA_SSL	FTA_SSL.1	FTA_SSL.1.1 FTA_SSL.1.2		
		FTA_SSL.2	FTA_SSL.2.1 FTA_SSL.2.2		

Table 5-1	Security Functional Requirement	s

CLASS	FAMILY	COMPONENT	ELEMENT	[CAPP] PARAGRAPH	[RBAC] PARAGRAPH
FTP	FTP_ITC	FTP_ITC.1	FTP_ITC.1.1		
			FTP_ITC.1.2		
			FTP_ITC.1.2		
	FTP_TRP	FTP_TRP.1	FTP_TRP.1.1		
			FTP_TRP.1.2		
			FTP_TRP.1.3		

### 5.1.1 Protection Profile SFRs Tailored for This ST

This sections contains the elements that correspond to the [RBAC] and [CAPP] Protection Profiles that are tailored for this security target (as indicated by a \* after the element's name in Table 5-1, above) with the new material underlined.

### 5.1.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)

[CAPP] 5.1.5.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to perform <u>searches</u> of audit data based on the following attributes: FAU\_SAR.3.1

a. User identity;

b. type of audit event and audit class.

[CAPP] 5.1.6.1 The TSF shall be able to include or exclude auditable events from the set of audited events based on the following attributes: FAU\_SEL.1.1

- a. User identity;
- b. audit class.

[*CAPP*] 5.1.8.1 The TSF shall generate an alarm to the authorized administrator if the audit trail exceeds or meets 100% occupancy. FAU\_STG.3.1

Note: An alarm is generated once 100% of the allocated audit space is reached. This disk space may be exceeded in certain circumstances e.g. by auditable actions taken by authorized administrators.

[CAPP] 5.1.9.1 The TSF shall be able to prevent auditable events, except those taken by the authorized administrator, if the audit trail is full. FAU\_STG4.1

#### 5.1.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP)

*[CAPP] 5.2.1.1* The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy on processes acting on the behalf of users, <u>filesystem objects</u> and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the DAC policy. FDP\_ACC.1.1

[CAPP] 5.2.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to

objects based on the following: FDP\_ACF.1.1

- a. The user identity and group membership(s) associated with a subject; and
- b. The access control attributes associated with an object: ACL, permission bits

[*CAPP*] 5.2.2.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: FDP\_ACF.1.2

IF the object has an explicit ACL, THEN:

- access granted to the object's owner is based on the user::rwx permissions
- access granted to individuals specified in the ACL is based on the bitwise AND
- operation of the user:[specified]:rwx and mask:rwx permissions
- access granted to subjects who belong to the object's group is based on the bitwise AND operation of the group::rwx and the mask:rwx entries
- access granted to subjects who belong to groups specified in the ACL is based on the bitwise AND operation of the group:[specified]:rwx and mask:rwx permissions
- access granted to all other subjects is based on the object's other permissions

ELSE

- access granted to the object's owner is based on the object user rwx permissions
- access granted to subjects who belong to the object's group is based on the object group rwx permissions
- access granted to all other subjects is based on the object other rwx permissions

[CAPP] 5.2.2.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rule: FDP\_ACF.1.3

a. .If a subject has an effective override privilege, the TSF shall authorize access of the subject to any given filesystem object, even if such access is disallowed by FDP ACF.1.2.

[CAPP] 5.2.2.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on no additional rules. FDP\_ACF.1.4

# 5.1.1.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

#### **User Attribute Definition**

[CAPP] 5.3.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: FIA\_ATD.1.1

- a. User Identifier;
- b. Group Memberships;
- c. Authentication Data;
- d. Security-relevant Roles; and

e. login shell.

#### **User Authentication**

[CAPP] 5.3.3.1 The TSF shall allow <u>the following TSF-mediated actions</u> on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated FIA\_UAU.1.1

- a. select language;
- b. select desktop or console login;
- c. select remote host for login;
- d. help for login function.

### **User Identification**

[*CAPP*] 5.3.5.1 The TSF shall allow <u>the following TSF-mediated actions</u> on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. FIA\_UID.1.1

- <u>a.</u> select language;
- b. select desktop or console login;
- c. select remote host for login;
- d. help for login function.

#### **User Subject Binding**

[CAPP] 5.3.6.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: FIA\_USB.1.1

- a. The audit user identity;
- b. The effective user identity;
- c. The effective group identities;
- d. The real user identity and real group identities.

[CAPP] 5.3.6.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of a user: FIA\_USB.1.1

- a. Upon successful identification and authentication, the real and effective and audit user identities shall be those specified via the User Identifier attribute held by the TSF for the user.
- b. Upon successful identification and authentication, the real and effective group identities shall be those specified via the Group Memberships attributes held by the TSF for the user.

[CAPP] 5.3.6.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of a user: FIA\_USB.1.1

- a. The effective user identity associated with a subject can be changed to another user's identity via a command, provided that the effective user carried override privilege or successful authentication as the new user identity has been achieved;
- b. When executing a file which has the set UID permission bit set, the effective user identity associated with the subject shall be changed to that of the owner of the file;
- c. When executing a file which has the set GID permission bit set, the effective group identity associated with the subject shall be changed to that of the group attribute of the file.

Application Note: The DAC policy is enforced based on the effective UID as described above. All auditable events are recorded with the audit ID, which contains the identity of the user at identification time. In this manner, all auditable events can be traced back to the person initially identified to the TOE and are not associated to another person who may at some time identify them self as the alternate identity.

### 5.1.1.4 Security Management (FMT)

[CAPP] 5.4.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to restrict the ability to modify the access control attributes associated with a named object to the subject that owns the object and a subject with an effective override privilege.<sup>FMT\_MSA.1.1</sup>

[RBAC] 5.1.4The TSF shall enforce the RBAC SFP to provide <u>restrictive</u> default values for object security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.<sup>FMT\_MSA.3.1</sup>

[CAPP] 5.4.2.2 The TSF shall allow the <u>authorized administrators and users</u> <u>authorized by the Discretionary Access Control Policy to modify object security</u> <u>attributes</u> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created. FMT-<sup>MSA.3.2</sup>

#### Revocation

[CAPP] 5.4.7.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke security attributes associated with objects within the TSC to users authorized to modify the security attributes by the Discretionary Access Control policy.  $FMT^{-REV.1.1}$ 

[CAPP] 5.4.7.2 The TSF shall enforce the rules: FMT\_REV.1.2

- a. The access rights associated with an object shall be enforced when an access check is made; and
- b. Administrative users shall be able to revoke security-relevant authorizations by completely deleting user security attributes, or by modifying the user identity, user name, primary group, secondary group and login shell, or by setting a new password. Such revocation is to take effect when the user next authenticates to the system.

Application Note: The DAC policy may include immediate revocation (e.g., Multics immediately revokes access to segments) or delayed revocation (e.g., most UNIX

systems do not revoke access to already opened files). The DAC access rights are considered to have been revoked when all subsequent access control decisions by the TSF use the new access control information. It is not required that every operation on an object make an explicit access control decision as long as a previous access control decision was made to permit that operation. It is sufficient that the developer clearly documents in guidance documentation how revocation is enforced.

Rationale: This component supports the <u>O.DISCRETIONARY ACCESS</u> objective by providing that specified access control attributes are enforced at some fixed point in time.

#### 5.1.1.5 Security Management Roles

The TSF shall maintain the roles:

- a. Set of RBAC administrative roles;
- b. users authorized by the Discretionary Access Control Policy to modify object security attributes;
- c. users authorized to modify their own authentication data:
- d. [CAPP] 5.4.9.1 Roles for the Object Owners. FMT\_SMR.1.1
- e. [RBAC] 5.1.4 Restrictions on Roles for the Object owner and administrator FMT\_SMR.2.1

[RBAC] 5.1.4 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.<sup>FMT\_SMR.2.2</sup>

The TSF shall ensure that the following conditions are satisfied:

- a. Object owners can modify security attributes for only the objects that they own;
- b. [*RBAC*] 5.1.4 The set of RBAC administrative roles can modify security attributes for all objects under the control of the TOE.<sup>FMT\_SMR.2.3</sup>

#### 5.1.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

*[CAPP]* 5.5.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of tests <u>at the request of an</u> <u>authorized administrator</u> to demonstrate the correct operation of the security assumptions provided by the abstract machine that underlies the TSF. <sup>FPT\_AMT.1.1</sup>

#### 5.1.1.7 Trusted Recovery

*[RBAC]* 5.1.5 After a failure or service discontinuity, the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to return the TOE to a secure state is provided. FPT\_RCV.1.1

The TSF shall ensure that the following SFs and failure scenarios have the property that the SF either completes successfully, or the indicated failure scenarios recovers to a consistent and secure state:

- a. The SF checks whether a specified privilege is assigned to any role but the database containing the privilege data is not on-line or the particular data table is inaccessible;
- b. [*RBAC*] 5.1.5 The SF checks whether a specified role has been assigned to a particular user but the database containing the role membership information is not on-line or the particular data table is inaccessible. FPT\_RCV.4.1

#### 5.1.1.8 Specification of Management Functions

*[CEM-2] Note below:* The TSF shall be capable of allowing the administrative user to perform the following management functions: <sup>FMT\_SMF.1</sup>

- a. Object security attributes management
- b. Management of user accounts and roles (create, delete, modify)
- c. Authentication data management
- d. Management of security settings
- e. Audit administration
- NOTE: This security functional requirement has been added as a result of AIS 32, Final Interpretation 065. The security functional requirement was added because a dependency from FMT\_MSA.1 and FMT\_MTD.1 to this new component has been defined in ASI 32, Final Interpretation 065.

#### 5.1.1.9 TOE Access

[*CEM-2*] 501 The TSF shall lock an interactive session after an <u>administrator-defined</u> time interval of user activity by;

- clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable
- disabling any activity of the user's data access/display devices other than unlocking the session. FTA\_SSL.1.1

The TSF shall require the following events to occur prior to unlocking the session: the user must be successfully re-authenticated. FTA\_SSL.1.2

[CEM-2] 501 The TSF shall allow user-initiated locking of the user's own interactive session by;

- clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable
- disabling any activity of the user's data access/display devices other than unlocking the session. FTA\_SSL.2.1

The TSF shall require the following events to occur prior to unlocking the session: the user must be successfully re-authenticated. FTA\_SSL.2.2

# 5.2 Additional SFRs for This ST

This section contains the SFR elements (as indicated in *italics* in Table 5-1, above) included in this ST that are **in addition** to the requirements defined by either the [CAPP] or [RBAC] PP's.

# 5.2.1 Security Management (FMT)

#### 5.2.1.1 Specification of Management Functions

*[CCP2] Note below:* The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: <sup>FMT\_SMF.1.1</sup>

- a. Object security attributes management
- b. Management of user accounts and roles (create, delete, modify)
- c. Authentication data management d. Management of security settings
- d. Audit administration

*Note:* See application note at beginning of Section 5, above.

#### 5.2.1.2 TOE Access (FTA)

#### Session Locking

*[CCP2]* The TSF shall lock an interactive session after an <u>administrator-defined time</u> <u>interval of user activity</u> by;

- a. clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable
- b. disabling any activity of the user's data access/display devices other than unlocking the session. FTA\_SSL.1.1

The TSF shall require the following events to occur prior to unlocking the session:

a. the user must be successfully re-authenticated. FTA\_SSL.1.2

[CCP2] The TSF shall allow user-initiated locking of the user's own interactive session by;

- a. clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable
- b. disabling any activity of the user's data access/display devices other than unlocking the session. FTA\_SSL2.1

The TSF shall require the following events to occur prior to unlocking the session:

a. the user must be successfully re-authenticated. FTA\_SSL.2.2

# 5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)

#### 5.2.2.1 Inter-TSF User Data Confidentiality Transfer Protection

[CCP2] The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to be able to transmit and receive objects in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure. FDP\_UCT.1.1

#### 5.2.2.2 Inter-TSF User Data Integrity Transfer Protection

[*CCP2*] The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification and insertion errors. FDP\_UIT.1.1

[CCP2] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification or insertion has occurred. FDP\_UIT.1.2

# 5.2.3 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

### 5.2.3.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

*[CCP2]* The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. <sup>FTP\_ITC.1.1</sup>

[CCP2] The TSF shall permit the TSF or the remote trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel. FTP\_ITC.1.2

*[CCP2]* The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for, nfs (standard remote filesystem access protocol), ftp (file transfer protocol), rcp (remote copy), rdist (remote file distribution), rlogin (remote login), rsh (remote shell), and telnet.

#### 5.2.3.2 Trusted Path

*[CCP2]* The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and remote users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from modification or disclosure. FTP\_TRP.1.1

[CCP2] The TSF shall permit local and remote users to initiate communication via the trusted path. FTP\_TRP.1.2

*[CCP2]* The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial user authentication; user identification; changing of roles; changing of current group; changing of password and changing of session level. <sup>FTP\_TRP.1.3</sup>

# 5.3 Strength of Function

The claimed minimum strength of function is SOF-medium.

# 5.4 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The target evaluation assurance level for the product is EAL4+ [CC]. Assurance is augmented by ALC\_FLR.3 Systematic Flaw Remediation.

# 5.5 Security Requirements for the IT Environment

The IT environment is required to meet the objectives described in Section 4.2. All but one of these objectives is met by procedural measures, however O.E\_BOOT is met by either the OpenBoot PROM or the System Controller. Refinements to the CC Part 2 functional component are identified by emboldened text. The functionality provided by this firmware/SC is specified as follows:

### 5.5.1 Sun Ultrasparc Workstations and Low End Servers

The **platforms with OpenBoot PROM** shall restrict the ability to <u>modify the behavior</u> of <u>the boot strapping process</u> to <u>users who know the valid PROM</u> <u>password</u>.<sup>FMT\_MOF.1.1:1</sup>

Application Note: In fully secure and command-secure modes, the valid (booting) password is required in order to configure the PROM operating modes, passwords or boot parameters as required by the [SRN].

# 5.5.2 SunFire MidFrames and High End Servers

The **System Controller on the SunFire MidFrame High End servers** shall restrict the ability to <u>modify the behavior of the boot strapping process</u> to <u>users who know the valid SC password</u>. FMT\_MOF.1.1:2

Application Note: A valid (booting) password is required in order to configure the SC operating modes, passwords or boot parameters as required by the [SRN].

### 5.5.3 x86/x64 Workstations and Servers

The **x86/x64 Workstations and Server platforms** shall restrict the ability to <u>modify</u> the behavior of the boot strapping process to <u>users who know the valid PROM</u> password. FMT\_MOF.1.1:2

Application Note: A valid (booting) password is required in order to configure the operating modes, passwords or boot parameters as required by the [SRN].

# **TOE Summary Specification**

# 6

# 6.1 IT Security Functions

The ITSFs to which the claimed Strength of Function (SoF) rating applies are as follows:

- IA.1
- IA.11

#### 6.1.1 Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

Policy

The security-related software shall define and control access between named users and named objects (e.g., files and programs) in the data processing system. All named users and named objects shall be uniquely identifiable over all the platforms in the system.

Within Solaris, DAC is applied in two different ways depending on the type of object. This ST therefore defines two object types:

- Objects that have permissions that can be changed by the owner;
- Objects that have permissions that are fixed or implicit given a process context.

The enforcement mechanisms for the former type of object shall allow users to specify and control sharing of those objects, initially generated by the user, by named users (group control is optional) using the specific designations of read, write, execute/search.

The discretionary access control mechanism shall, either by explicit user action or by default, provide that objects are protected from unauthorized access.

These access controls shall be capable of including or excluding access down to the level of a single user.

Access permission to these objects by users not already possessing access permission shall only be assigned by an authority responsible and authorized to grant access.

Subjects have a number of IDs associated with them:-

- effective user ID, real user ID, saved user ID;
- effective group ID, real group ID, saved group ID, supplemental groups; and
- audit user ID.

The Solaris 10 discretionary access controls use the effective user ID and effective group ID for policing a subject's access rights over objects that have fixed or implicit permissions to within a process context.

#### Self/Group/Public/ACL Permissions

The product shall implement a discretionary access control mechanism that controls the access of subjects to named owner controlled objects. The discretionary access control mechanism shall associate with each object, an owner identification, a group identification, a set of access permissions and/or an access control list (ACL).

**DAC.1** Subject to DAC.8, the access permissions on a filesystem object can be modified only by a subject that owns the object.

**DAC.2** No subject may change the owner or group of an owner controlled object unless it is the owner of the object or has the following privilege effective:

priv\_file\_chown - Allows a process to change a file's owner user ID. Also allows a process to change a file's group ID to one other than the process' effective group ID or one of the process' supplemental group IDs.

**DAC.3** Subject to DAC.1, a subject may assign any combination of the following access modes to an owner controlled object:-

• read, write, execute/search

to:-

- the owner of the object (self);
- any member of the owning group (group); and
- any user other than the owner or a member of the owning group (other).

**DAC.4** Subject to DAC.1, an Access Control List (ACL) can be created for a *ufs* or *nfs* filesystem object to specify a set of allowable access modes (as per DAC.3) for individually named users or groups. If an ACL entry for a user or group contains no access modes, the specified user or group is specifically excluded from accessing the object. Users not listed anywhere in an ACL (either through explicit user ACL entries or through any applicable group ACL entries) shall have their access to the object determined by the "Other" ACL entry.

Note that the scope of the above Security Function is limited to regular files held on ufs and nfs filesystems. This includes hard links but excludes device special files, pipes and symbolic links. However, the regular files referenced by symbolic links can still be controlled by ACLs.

**DAC.6** Whenever a subject requests access to an owner controlled object, the access permissions for that object shall be checked to determine whether the user who owns the subject can access the object in the requested mode. Where an ACL is defined for an object, it shall be used instead of the object's permission bits.

**DAC.7** When a subject creates a filesystem object, the user ID of the subject is assigned to the object, and the user's umask restricts the initial access permissions of the object. The TOE default is that a user's umask is set to prevent any user other than the owner having write access to the object.

**DAC.8** Subjects may only override discretionary access control if they have one or more of the following privileges effective;

- priv\_file\_dac\_execute
- priv\_file\_dac\_read
- priv\_file\_dac\_search
- priv\_file\_dac\_write
- priv\_file\_owner
- priv\_file\_setid
- priv\_ipc\_dac\_read
- priv\_ipc\_dac\_write
- priv\_ipc\_owner

**DAC.9** The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to be able to transmit objects in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.

**DAC.10** The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification and insertion errors.

#### 6.1.2 Object Reuse

**OR.1** When an object is initially assigned, allocated or reallocated to a subject from the system's pool of unused objects, the security-related software shall assure that the object contains no data for which the subject is not authorized.

**OR.2** When memory objects are allocated for use by a subject at run-time, the memory shall contain no data from a previous subject.

Any portion of a file object that has not been previously written to shall either:

- not be readable by any subject; or
- shall be cleared before it can be read.

**OR.3** The TOE shall revoke all access rights held by a subject to the information contained within a storage object, before reuse by other subjects.

# 6.1.3 Identification and Authentication

#### Password Authentication

**IA.1** The product shall require users to identify and successfully authenticate themselves, using a user name and a password, before performing any other actions.

**IA.2** Upon successful identification and authentication, the real and audit user ID and the real group ID of the user's subjects shall be those specified by the authentication data.

#### Password Protection

The authentication data shall not contain a clear text version of each user's password, but rather a one-way encrypted value based on the user's password. When a user enters his password, it is used to construct an encrypted value and is compared against the encrypted value in the authentication data.

IA.9 On entry, passwords shall not be displayed in cleartext.

IA.10 User passwords are always stored in encrypted form.

Note: This SF does not apply to BOOTPROM or System Controller passwords (which are not user passwords, and are beyond the scope of this ST).

**IA.11** The authentication data shall be protected so that it cannot be written other than as follows:

- by administrative users who may
  - create, delete user identities,
  - modify the name, primary group, secondary group, login shell;
  - set passwords if required; and
- by a user supplying a new password.

Note: In respect of [CAPP\_5.4.7.2] requirements; The administrator can use the Administration tools to revoke access rights, security relevant authorizations and forcibly log off users if required.

# 6.1.4 Audit

#### Audit Events

**Audit.1** The use of the identification and authentication mechanisms is auditable. The following information is recorded for each event audited:-

- date;
- time;
- user identity audit ID and effective user ID (if successful);
- security attributes of the user (if successful)
- · identification of the server/workstation or terminal used; and
- success or failure of the event.

Audit.2 Attempts to access to objects are auditable. The following information is recorded for each event audited:-

- date;
- time;
- user identity audit ID and effective user ID;
- name of the object;
- type of access attempted; and
- success or failure of the attempt.

**Audit.3** The creation of an object is auditable. The following information is recorded for each event audited:

- date;
- time;
- user identity audit ID and effective user ID;

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• name of the object.

**Audit.4** The creation of a subject to run on behalf of a user is auditable. The following information is recorded for each event audited:

- date;
- time;
- user identity audit ID and effective user ID;
- success or failure of the attempt;

**Audit.5** The creation, deletion, disabling or enabling of user accounts is auditable. The following information is recorded for each event audited:

- date;
- time;
- identity of the user implementing the change audit ID and effective user ID;
- name of the user account being modified; and
- type of action.

Audit.6 Attempts to assign or modify security attributes are auditable. The following information is recorded for each event audited:

- date;
- time;
- identity of the user implementing the change audit ID and effective user ID;
- name of the user account or object being modified;
- type of attribute; and
- success or failure of the attempt.

**Audit.7** The use of DAC override privileges are auditable. The following information is recorded for each event audited:

- date;
- time;
- user identity audit ID and effective user ID;
- name of the object involved (if any); and
- the privilege or role granted.

**Audit.8** Security relevant events affecting the operation of the auditing functions are auditable. The following information is recorded for each event audited:

- date;
- time;
- user identity (if relevant) audit ID and effective user ID; and
- type of event.
- the privilege or role granted

**Audit.9** The allocation or re-allocation of any reconfigurable hardware component on a platform via the dynamic reconfiguration capability is auditable. The following information is recorded for each event audited:

- date;
- time;
- user identity audit ID and effective user ID;
- name of the hardware component; and
- type of action.

• Note that this Security Function applies to the SunFire MidFrame and E15K platforms configured in multi-domain mode. If an attempt is made to execute the command which supports the dynamic reconfiguration feature, all other platforms and the SunFire MidFrames and E15K platforms configured in single-domain mode will generate audit records indicating that the command is not applicable to the machine.

**Audit.10** The creation or deletion of a logical device for storage media is auditable. The following information is recorded for each event audited:

- date;
- time;
- user identity (if relevant) audit ID and effective user ID;
- name of the object and device; and
- type of action.

Audit.11 Start-up and shutdown of the system is auditable. The following information is recorded for each event audited:

- date;
- time;
- user identity (mandatory for shutdown only) audit ID and effective user ID; and
- type of event.

Audit.12 The date and time information recorded in audit records shall be reliable.

#### Protection of Audit Information

Audit.14 Audit data shall be protected so that access to it is limited to administrative users.

Audit.15 Password data (in clear or encrypted form) is never recorded in the audit log.

#### Selective Audit Data Collection/Reduction

Audit.16 Only administrative users may define classes of audit event.

Audit.17 Only administrative users shall be able to define the default system auditmask that defines which audit classes are recorded by default.

Audit.18 Only administrative users shall be able to define a per-user audit-mask that defines which audit classes are recorded for that user. For a given user, the system shall audit those classes that are in the default system audit mask or the per-user audit mask.

**Audit.19** Audit reduction software shall be available to allow administrative users to selectively retrieve audit data based on, at a minimum, the identity of users, the type of audit event, and the audit class.

#### Audit Data Storage

**Audit.20** Each server/workstation of the (distributed) product may store audit data locally or on another server/workstation of the product that can act as an audit server.

Audit.21 If another server/workstation of the product is being used as an audit server, and this audit server becomes unavailable, the (local) server/workstation shall either:

• automatically switch over to storing audit data locally,

or

• suspend operation until the audit server is again available,

or

• suspend operation until an alternative server/workstation of the product takes over as an audit server;

or

• if no server/workstation is able to store audit data then no further auditable events shall occur (i.e., all auditable actions will be suspended).

Audit.22 Facilities are available to allow administrative users to archive and maintain the audit logs. Only such users may use these facilities to archive and maintain the audit logs.

Audit.23 The system shall notify an administrator of audit trail saturation.

# 6.1.5 Administration

Profiles **Profiles** 

Solaris 10 provides the ability for an administrator to define profiles and assign profiles to users. Profiles are a powerful mechanism that allow administrators to define the commands and CDE actions that users are allowed to perform, together with the authorizations that the user has. This mechanism provides fine-grain control over usercapabilities and allows the system to rigorously implement the principle of least privilege.

Admin.1 Only administrators may assign a user profile to a user. The profile shall include:

- A list of desktop actions that the user is allowed to perform, and for each action:
  - The privilege that the action shall be performed with;
  - The real and effective user ID and the real and effective group ID that the action shall be performed with.
- A list of commands that the user is allowed to perform, and for each command:
  - The privileges that the command shall be executed with;
  - The real and effective user ID and the real and effective group ID that the command shall be executed with.
- A list of authorizations that shall be granted to the users assigned this profile.

Admin.2 Users may perform only those desktop actions as specified in their profiles, and when executed they are executed with the security attributes as specified by Admin.1.

Admin.3 Users who are configured to use the profile shell may execute only those commands as specified in their profiles, and when executed they are executed with the security attributes as specified by Admin.1.

Roles

Roles are configurable with Solaris 10, allowing the system to be configured so that the principle of least-privilege can be optimally implemented for each installation and application

The following rules apply to the configuration of roles:

Admin.4 Only an authorized user can define and assign roles to users.

Admin.5 The TSF shall restrict the scope of a session based on the role assigned to the user.

### **6.1.6 Enforcement Functions**

**ENF.1**The TOE shall validate all actions between subjects and objects that require policy enforcement, before allowing the action to succeed.

**ENF.2** The TOE shall maintain a domain 'kernel space' for its own trusted execution. This shall be kept separate from untrusted subjects which operate in a separate domain 'user space'.

**ENF.3** The TOE shall allow an administrator to perform a self test to ensure that the underlying TSF is enforcing process separation.

ENF.4 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for user passwords.

### 6.1.7 Failure

**FAIL.1** After a failure or system discontinuity, the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to return the TOE to a secure state is provided.

**FAIL.2** The TSF shall preserve a secure state when failures occur in the databases containing user privileges information or the functions related to user roles and privileges.

#### 6.1.8 Session Locking

**SL.1** The TSF shall lock an interactive session after an administrator-defined time interval of user activity by clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable and disabling any activity of the user's data access/display devices other than unlocking the session.

**SL.2** The TSF shall require that prior to unlocking an interactive session the user must be successfully re-authenticated.

**SL.3** The TSF shall allow user-initiated locking of the user's own interactive session by clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable and disabling any activity of the user's data access/display devices other than unlocking the session.

**SL.4** The TSF shall require that prior to unlocking a user's interactive session, the user must be successfully re-authenticated.

# 6.1.9 Secure Communication

The TOE provides the ability to protect communication by cryptographic mechanism against disclosure and undetected unauthorized modification.

**SC.7** Communication channels provided by the TSF between itself and a remote trusted IT product must be logically distinct from other communications channels.

**SC.8** The TSF must provide assured identification of the end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure for communication channels provided by the TSF between itself and a remote trusted IT product.

**SC.9** Communication channels provided by the TSF between itself and remote or local users are kept logically distinct from other communications channels through the use of encryption services that use specific session keys for each user/session.

**SC.10** The TSF uses Kerberos authentication to provide assured identification of the end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure for communication channels provided by the TSF between itself and remote or local users for telnet, rcp, ftp, rsh commands.

# 6.2 Required Security Mechanisms

#### 6.2.1 Identification and Authentication

The TOE uses a username and password mechanism to provide authentication of users. The construction of passwords is sufficient to meet the requirements of a strength of function of Medium. This mechanism supports the IT SFs IA.1 and IA.11.

Passwords are encrypted using a proprietary one way hashing algorithm, however the assessment of algorithmic strength does not form part of the evaluation.

# 6.3 Assurance Measures

Assurance measures will be adopted to address each of the EAL4+ assurance requirements, as summarized in Table B.1 in [CC, Part 3] and as summarized below.

Assurance components	Assurance Measure
ACM_AUT.1 Partial CM automation	Information on the automated CM tools will be provided in the Software Development Framework document.
ACM_CAP.4 Generation support and acceptance procedures	Configuration Management procedures will be provided for Solaris 10.
ACM_SCP.2 Problem tracking CM coverage	As for ACM_CAP.4.
ADO_DEL.2 Detection of modification	Delivery procedures will be provided for Solaris 10.
ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures	Installation, generation and start-up procedures will be provided for Solaris 10.
ADV_FSP.2 Fully defined external interfaces	The Solaris 10 MAN pages, which are relevant to the implementation of the security functions, will be provided to the evaluation and assessed against this assurance requirement.
ADV_HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design	High-level Design will be provided for Solaris 10.
ADV_IMP.1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF	The source code for Solaris 10 will be provided to the evaluation.
ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design	Low-level Design will be provided for Solaris 10.
ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration	This correspondence information will be contained in the functional specification and design documents. The functional specification will map SFs to MAN pages. The HLD will map ITSFs to the HLD, and the LLD will map ITSFs and source code modules to the LLD basic components.
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model	A separate Informal Security Policy Model (ISPM) will be provided to the evaluation.
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance	The Solaris 10 operational documentation relevant to an administrator will be provided.
AGD_USR.1 User guidance	The Solaris 10 operational documentation relevant to an end user will be provided.
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures	Development security documentation will be provided for Solaris 10.
ALC_FLR.3 Life Cycle Support	Flaw remediation procedures are in place for Solaris, documents and other evidence will be provided.

# Table 6-1: How Assurance Requirements Will Be Met

Assurance components	Assurance Measure
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model	The Life Cycle definition for Solaris 10 11/06 is documented in the Software Development Framework document.
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools	The tools used in the development of Solaris 10 11/06 are the same as for Solaris 10 3/05.
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage	The analysis of test coverage for Solaris 10 11/06 will be presented to the evaluation in a form similar to that provided to the Solaris 10 03/05 evaluation. The existing coverage is against both High and Low level designs and should therefore be to a sufficient depth.
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: high-level design	The analysis of test depth for Solaris 10 11/06 will be presented to the evaluation in a form similar to that provided to the Solaris 10 03/05 evaluation. The existing coverage is against both High and Low level designs and should therefore be to a sufficient depth.
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing	The test documentation for Solaris 10 11/06 provided to the evaluation will be in a format similar to that provided to the Solaris 10 03/05 evaluation. The tests will be run on a range of platforms as specified in section 2.3.1.1
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample	Access will be provided to the TOE in its evaluated configuration on an appropriate set of platforms, together with all resources needed to repeat the developer's tests.
AVA_MSU.2 Validation of analysis	The Misuse Analysis previously submitted for the EAL4 evaluation of Solaris 10 03/05 will be updated for Solaris 10 11/06.
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation	The Strength of Function analysis, previously submitted for the EAL4 evaluation of Solaris 10 03/05, will be updated for Solaris 10 11/06.
AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis	The Developer Vulnerability Analysis, previously submitted for the EAL4 evaluation of Solaris 10 03/05, will be updated for Solaris 10 11/06 and submitted to fulfill this requirement. In addition, evidence of Sun's continuing search for vulnerabilities and the resolution of them in the Solaris product, will be provided.

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# Rationale

7

This chapter presents the evidence used in the ST evaluation. This evidence supports the claims that the ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements, that a conformant TOE would provide an effective set if IT security countermeasures within the security environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements. The rationale also demonstrates that any PP conformance claims are valid.

# 7.1 Correlation of Threats, Policies, Assumptions and Objectives.

The correlation between threats, organizational policies, assumptions and objectives is detailed in the following sections, and is summarized below

Objective	Threat and Policies
O.AUTHORISATION	T.ACCESS_INFO, T.ACCESS_TOE, T.MODIFY, T.ADMIN_RIGHTS P.AUTH, P.ACCOUNTABLE
O.ENTRY	T.ACCESS_INFO, T.ACCESS_TOE
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS	T.ACCESS_INFO, T.MODIFY, P.DAC, P.NEED_TO_KNOW
O.KNOWN	T.ACCESS_INFO, T.ACCESS_TOE, T.MODIFY, T.ADMIN_RIGHTS
O.AUDITING	T.ACCESS_INFO, T.ACCESS_TOE, T.MODIFY, P.ACCOUNTABLE, T.ADMIN_RIGHTS
O.ACCOUNT	T.ACCESS_INFO, T.ACCESS_TOE, T.MODIFY, T.ADMIN_RIGHTS, P.ACCOUNTABLE
O.TRUSTPATH	T.COMPROMISE, P.NEED_TO_KNOW
O.RESIDUAL-INFO	T.ACCESS_INFO, P.DAC, P.NEED_TO_KNOW
O.MANAGE	T.ACCESS_INFO, T.ACCESS_TOE, T.MODIFY, T.ADMIN_RIGHTS, P.AUTH, P.DAC, P.ACCOUNTABLE, P.NEED_TO_KNOW

Table 7-1         Mapping of Objectives to Threa	ats and Organizational Polices
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Objective	Threat and Policies
O.ENFORCEMENT	T.ACCESS_INFO, T.ACCESS_TOE, T.MODIFY, T.ADMIN_RIGHTS, P.AUTH, P.DAC, P.ACCOUNTABLE, P.NEED_TO_KNOW
O.DUTY	T.MODIFY, T.ADMIN_RIGHTS
O.HIERARCHIAL	T.ADMIN_RIGHTS
O.ROLE	T.ACCESS_INFO, T.MODIFY, T.ADMIN_RIGHTS

# Table 7-1 Mapping of Objectives to Threats and Organizational Polices

# Table 7-2Mapping of Threats to Objectives

Threat	Objective
T.ACCESS_INFO	O.AUTHORIZATION, O.ENTRY, O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS, O.KNOWN, O.ROLE, O.AUDITING, O.ACCOUNT, O.RESIDUAL_INFO, O.MANAGE, O.ENFORCEMENT
T.ACCESS_TOE	O.AUTHORIZATION, O.ENTRY, O.KNOWN, O.AUDITING, O.ACCOUNT, O.MANAGE, O.ENFORCEMENT
T.MODIFY	O.AUTHORIZATION, O.DISCRETIONRY_ACCESS, O.KNOWN, O.ROLE, O.AUDITING, O.ACCOUNT, O.MANAGE, O.ENFORCEMENT, O.DUTY
T.ADMIN_RIGHTS	O.AUTHORIZATION, O.KNOWN, O.ROLE, O.ACCOUNT, O.MANAGE, O.ENFORCEMENT, O.DUTY, O.HIERARCHICAL
T.COMPROMISE	O.TRUSTPATH
T.TRANSIT	O.E_INSTALL, O.E_INFO_PROTECT, O.E_PROTECT
T.OPERATE	O.E_ADMIN, O.E_ACCOUNTABLE, O.E_CREDEN, O.E_CONNECT, O.E_CONSISTENCY, O.E_PHYSICAL,
T.ROLEDEV	O.E_ACCOUNTABLE, O.E_CONNECT, O.E_CONSISTENCY, O.E_CREDEN

Policy	Objective
P.AUTH	O.AUTHORIZATION, O.MANAGE, O.ENFORCEMENT
P.DAC	O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS, O.RESIDUAL_INFO, O.ENFORCEMENT, O.MANAGE
P.ACCOUNTABLE	O.AUDITING, O.AUTHORIZATION, O.MANAGE, O.ACCOUNT, O.ENFORCEMENT,
P.NEED_TO_KNOW	O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS, O.RESIDUAL_INFO, O.ENFORCEMENT, O.MANAGE O.TRUSTPATH

# Table 7-3Mapping of Policies to Objectives

Table 7-4	Mapping of Objectives for the Environment to Threats,
	Assumptions and Policies

Objective	Threats and Assumptions		
O.E_ADMIN	T.OPERATE A.MANAGE, A.PASSWORD		
O.E_ACCOUNTABLE	T.OPERATE, T.ROLEDEV A.USER, A.MANAGE		
O.E_AUDITDATA	A.MANAGE		
O.E_CREDEN	T.OPERATE, T.ROLEDEV A.USER, A.MANAGE, A.COOP		
O.E_BOOT	A.MANAGE		
O.E_CONNECT	T.OPERATE, T.ROLEDEV, A.PROTECT, A.ASSET, A.MANAGE		
O.E_CONSISTENCY	T.OPERATE, T.ROLEDEV, A.LDAP_DOMAINS, A.MANAGE		
O.E_INSTALL	T.TRANSIT, A.PASSWORD, A.MANAGE, A.PEER		
O.E_INFO_PROTECT	T.TRANSIT A.PROTECT, A.ASSET, A.BRIDGES&ROUTERS, A.MANAGE		
O.E_MAINTENANCE	A.MANAGE		
O.E_RECOVER	A.MANAGE		
O.E_PHYSICAL	T.OPERATE A.LOCATE, A.MANAGE, A.CONNECT		

Objective	Threats and Assumptions
O.E_SOFTWARE_IN	A.MANAGE
O.E_SERIAL_LOGIN	A.MANAGE, A.CONNECT
O.E_PROTECT	T.TRANSIT, A.PROTECT, A.ASSET, A.BRIDGES&ROUTERS A.MANAGE, A.CONNECT

# Table 7-4Mapping of Objectives for the Environment to Threats,<br/>Assumptions and Policies

The OSPs are derived from the [CAPP] and [RBAC] and are included to indicate how the OSPs relate to the TOE security objectives and the primary non-IT security objectives. The OSPs are generally more abstract than the threats and so the correlation between similar threats and OSPs to objectives is not necessarily the same.

The environmental objectives O.E\_ADMIN, O.E\_BOOT, O.E\_INSTALL and O.E\_CONSISTENCY are general objectives which help counter all the threats (with the exception of T.TRANSIT in some cases) as follows:

-[O.E\_ADMIN] Those responsible for administering the TOE must be competent and trustworthy in order to manage the security functions effectively. Effective management is necessary in order that the threats are not inadvertently or deliberately realized;

-[O.E\_BOOT] and [O.E\_INSTALL] ensure that the correct copy of the operating system is installed and subsequently booted in a secure manner, and is hence relevant to help counter all the threats;

-[O.E\_CONSISTENCY] is required to ensure that data is set up and maintained in a consistent manner across all platforms in the distributed system. Erroneous or duplicate entries in the authentication information may allow any of the threats to be realized.

# 7.2 Security Objectives Rationale

This section demonstrates that the security objectives stated in Section 4 above are traceable to all of the aspects identified in the TOE security environment and are suitable to cover them.

# 7.2.1 Complete Coverage - Threats

This section provides evidence demonstrating coverage of the threats by both the IT and Non-IT security objectives.

**[T.ACCESS\_INFO]** An authorized user of the TOE accesses information without having permission from the person who owns, or is responsible for, the information.

Security objectives O.DISCRETIONARY\_ACCESS and O.ROLE counter this threat directly by ensuring the means are provided by which users can securely implement compartmentalization of information in order to counter this threat. O.RESIDUAL\_INFO helps counter the threat by ensuring that once an object has passed outside the control of DAC, that residual information contained in it is not passed to other users.

Security objectives O.AUTHORISATION and O.KNOWN support O.DISCRETIONARY\_ACCESS and O.ROLE in countering this threat by ensuring that an authorized user cannot impersonate another authorized user, thereby undermining the intent of O.DISCRETIONARY\_ACCESS.

O.AUDITING helps counter this threat by ensuring that repeated [unsuccessful] attempts to access information to which the user is not granted permission, can be detected, thereby allowing the administrator to take action before the attack is successful. O.ACCOUNT states that the TOE must ensure that all users can be held accountable for their security relevant actions.

O.ENTRY which states that the TOE must prevent logical entry to it by persons or processes with no rights to access it.

O.MANAGE and O.ENFORCEMENT counter this threat by ensuring:

-privileged actions are controlled; and

-the access controls cannot be bypassed.

Support is also provided by the following security objectives for the environment:

a.O.E\_ADMIN - to administer the controls over access to information;

b.O.E\_BOOT - to ensure that information cannot be accessed by booting an alternative operating system;

c.O.E\_CREDEN is required to protect the information which would otherwise enable attackers to gain access to the TOE;

d.O.E\_.PROTECT - to ensure that data transmitted over network cabling is appropriately protected;

e.O.E\_RECOVER - to ensure that information cannot be accessed by terminating the operation of a server/workstation (whether intentional or not); and

f.O.E\_SERIAL\_LOGIN - to ensure that information is not seen by users who do not have a need to know when serial devices are being used.

g.O.E\_PHYSICAL which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected from physical attack which might compromise IT security objectives.

**[T.ACCESS\_TOE]** An unauthorized user of the TOE gains access to the system, thereby gaining unauthorized access to information.

O.AUTHORISATION ensures that all users identify themselves to the system, and that their claimed identity is authenticated before being granted access to the system. This therefore prevents unauthorized users gaining access to the system. O.KNOWN also states that legitimate users of the system must be identified before rights of access can be granted. O.AUDITING provides support in the form of auditing attempts to access the TOE. The auditing of unsuccessful attempts to login help to detect and hence counter the threat of repeated attacks on the access functions. O.ACCOUNT states that the TOE must ensure that all users can be held accountable for their security relevant actions.

O.ENTRY which states that the TOE must prevent logical entry to it by persons or processes with no rights to access it.

O.MANAGE and O.ENFORCEMENT support this threat by ensuring:

-the database of authorized users is properly managed and maintained;

-the authorization functions are always invoked and cannot be bypassed;

-the auditing functions are set up appropriately to detect repeated attempts to login.

Support is also provided by the following security objectives for the environment:

a.O.E\_ADMIN - to ensure that the introduction of new user identities is a restricted operation and performed only by the users responsible.

b.O.E\_ACCOUNTABLE - to ensure that unauthorized users are not provided with accounts enabling them to access the TOE;

c.O.E\_CREDEN - which ensures that bad passwords, which might be used to determine valid passwords, are not stored in the audit trail, and hence not known to any users. It also ensures that valid authentication data is not disclosed to unauthorized individuals;

d.O.E\_CONSISTENCY - which ensures that access is granted to individuals on a basis consistent across all platforms. This avoids possible duplication of authentication data.

e.O.E\_BOOT – to ensure that information cannot be accessed by booting an alternative operating system

f.O.E\_CONNECT- which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that no connections to outside systems or users undermine the security of IT assets.

g.O.E\_PHYSICAL which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected from physical attack which might compromise IT security object

**[T.MODIFY]** Unauthorized modification or destruction of information by an authorized user of the TOE.

The security objective O.DISCRETIONARY\_ACCESS provides the means to ensure that users can protect the integrity of the information they own or are responsible for.

Security objective O.AUTHORISATION and O.KNOWN support O.DISCRETIONARY\_ACCESS in countering this threat by ensuring that an authorized user cannot impersonate another authorized user, thereby undermining the intent of O.DISRETIONARY\_ACCESS. O.MANAGE ensures that the administrative users can control access to the information.

O.AUDITING helps counter this threat by ensuring that repeated [unsuccessful] attempts to modify information to which the user is not granted permission, can be detected, thereby allowing the administrator to take action before the attack is successful. O.ACCOUNT states that the TOE must ensure that all users can be held accountable for their security relevant actions.

O.ENFORCEMENT supports this threat by ensuring the access control functions are always invoked and cannot be bypassed.

Role based access to the information is covered by the objectives O.DUTY and O.ROLE which ensure that only those users are assigned roles and only those uses that have been assigned the correct role can access the information.

Support is also provided by the following security objectives for the environment:

a.O.E\_INFO\_PROTECT and O.E\_PROTECT - ensures that information transmitted over the network is not accessible to other authorized users of the TOE and hence the data cannot be modified or destroyed;

b.O.E\_ADMIN ensures that the default access permissions are set appropriately so that access is granted, by default, to a restricted set of users.

c.O.E\_BOOT - to ensure that information cannot be accessed by booting an alternative operating system

d.O.E\_PHYSICAL which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected from physical attack which might compromise IT security objectives.

**[T.ADMIN\_RIGHTS]** Unauthorized use of facilities which require administration rights by an authorized user of the TOE.

Administration of the TOE has been divided into user roles. The objective for this functionality is divided between O.DUTY, O.HIERACHICAL and O.ROLE, which ensures that roles are properly defined.

O.DUTY provides the capability of enforcing separation of files and O.HIERARCHIAL allows for the hierarchal definition of these roles. O.ROLE ensures that a user cannot access or perform operations on its resources or objects unless they have been assigned the appropriate role.

O.AUTHORISATION and O.KNOWN ensures that only authorized users can access the TOE, and provides for identification of users to determine the administration right assigned to the user.

O.AUDITING discourages the unauthorized use of administrator facilities by ensuring that any such breach of security policy can be detected. O.ACCOUNT states that the TOE must ensure that all users can be held accountable for their security relevant actions.

O.MANAGE and O.ENFORCEMENT support this threat by ensuring:

-the database of authorized administrators is properly managed and maintained;

-the administration functions are always checked when invoked and cannot be bypassed;

-the auditing functions are set up appropriately to detect repeated attempts to use the administration functions by non-administrative users.

Support is also provided by the following security objectives for the environment:

O.E\_CREDEN ensures user's authentication data is kept secure. This prevents an authorized user impersonating an administrator to gain unauthorized access to administrator facilities.

O.E\_CONSISTENCY ensures that a single set of administration rights exist across the TOE, thereby avoiding errors caused by duplication or erroneous entries in the authorization data.

O.E\_CONNECT- which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that no connections to outside systems or users undermine the security of IT assets.

O.E\_BOOT - o ensure that information cannot be accessed by booting an alternative operating system

O.E\_ACCOUNTABLE ensures that users are uniquely identified and the use of privileged facilities can be controlled amongst the user community.

O.E\_SOFTWARE\_INSTALL ensures that only administrators can introduce software into the TOE and hence counters the threat of malicious software being introduced. The introduction of some software e.g. Compilers, may provide enhanced facilities to an attacker which could be used to mount a successful attack on the TOE and hence make unauthorized use of administration facilities.

O.E\_PHYSICAL which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected from physical attack which might compromise IT security objectives.

**[T.COMPROMISE]** Data may be compromised in terms of confidentiality and integrity if an unauthorized User intercepts a communication link between the TOE and another trusted IT product (which may be another instantiation of the TOE) and attempts to modify information in a way that can not be detected by the TOE or the other trusted IT product.

This threat is countered by the O.TRUSTPATH objective which states that the TSF must be designed and implemented in a manner that allows for establishing a trusted channel or communication path between the TOE and another trusted IT product that protects the user data transferred over this channel from disclosure and undetected modification.

**[T.TRANSIT]** Data transferred between platforms is disclosed or modified to unauthorized users or processes either directly or indirectly (e.g. through spoofing of server/workstation identity).

Administrators must ensure that data transferred between platforms i.e. along network cabling, is suitably protected against physical or other (e.g. tempest) attacks which may result in the disclose, modification or delay of information transmitted between platforms. Environmental objective O.E\_PROTECT ensures this is achieved. Because such issues need to be considered at installation time, environmental objectives O.E\_INSTALL and O.E\_INFO\_PROTECT are also applicable.

**[T.OPERATE]** Compromise of IT assets may occur because of improper administration and operation of the TOE.

This threat is countered by O.ENTRY which states that the TOE must prevent logical entry to it by persons or processes with no rights to access it.

O.MANAGE and O.ENFORCEMENT support this threat by ensuring:

-the database of authorized administrators is properly managed and maintained;

-the administration functions are always checked when invoked and cannot be bypassed;

-the auditing functions are set up appropriately to detect repeated attempts to use the administration functions by non-administrative users.

Support is also provided by the following security objectives for the environment:

O.E\_CREDEN ensures user's authentication data is kept secure. This prevents an authorized user impersonating an administrator to gain unauthorized access to administrator facilities.

O.E\_CONSISTENCY ensures that a single set of administration rights exist across the TOE, thereby avoiding errors caused by duplication or erroneous entries in the authorization data.

O.E\_CONNECT- which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that no connections to outside systems or users undermine the security of IT assets.

O.E\_ACCOUNTABLE ensures that users are uniquely identified and the use of privileged facilities can be controlled amongst the user community.

O.E\_ADMIN which states that those responsible for administering the TOE must be competent and trustworthy in order to manage the security functions effectively. Effective management is necessary in order that the threats are not inadvertently or deliberately realized;

O.E\_PHYSICAL which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected from physical attack which might compromise IT security objectives.

**[T.ROLEDEV]** The development and assignment of user roles may be done in a manner that undermines security.

Administration of the TOE has been divided into user roles. The objective for this functionality is divided between O.DUTY, O.HIERACHICAL and O.ROLE, which ensures that roles are properly defined.

O.DUTY provides the capability of enforcing separation of files and O.HIERARCHIAL allows for the hierarchal definition of these roles. O.ROLE ensures that a user cannot access or perform operations on its resources or objects unless they have been assigned the appropriate role.

O.AUTHORISATION and O.KNOWN ensures that only authorized users can access the TOE, and provides for identification of users to determine the administration right assigned to the user.

O.AUDITING discourages the unauthorized use of administrator facilities by ensuring that any such breach of security policy can be detected. O.ACCOUNT states that the TOE must ensure that all users can be held accountable for their security relevant actions.

O.MANAGE and O.ENFORCEMENT support this threat by ensuring:

-the database of authorized administrators is properly managed and maintained;

-the administration functions are always checked when invoked and cannot be bypassed;

-the auditing functions are set up appropriately to detect repeated attempts to use the administration functions by non-administrative users.

Support is also provided by the following security objectives for the environment:

O.E\_CREDEN ensures user's authentication data is kept secure. This prevents an authorized user impersonating an administrator to gain unauthorized access to administrator facilities.

O.E\_CONSISTENCY ensures that a single set of administration rights exist across the TOE, thereby avoiding errors caused by duplication or erroneous entries in the authorization data.

O.E\_CONNECT- which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that no connections to outside systems or users undermine the security of IT assets.

O.E\_ACCOUNTABLE ensures that users are uniquely identified and the use of privileged facilities can be controlled amongst the user community

### 7.2.2 Complete Coverage - Policy

This section provides evidence demonstrating coverage of the Organizational Security Policy by the IT security objectives.

**[P.AUTH]** Only those users who have been authorized to access the information within the system may access the system.

This policy is implemented through the objective O.AUTHORISATION which ensures that only authorized users are allowed access to the system. O.MANAGE and O.ENFORCEMENT support this policy by ensuring that the set of authorized users is effectively managed and that the authorization functions are always invoked and cannot be bypassed.

The environmental objective O.E\_CREDEN supports this policy by ensuring that authorization data is constructed in a manner commensurate with the protection required for the information on the TOE and that passwords are not disclosed since doing so would compromise the policy.

[P.DAC] The right to access specific data objects is determined on the basis of:

a.the owner of the object; and

b.the identity of the subject attempting the access; and

c.the implicit and explicit access rights to the object granted to the subject by the object owner.

P.DAC is implemented through the objective O.DISCRETIONARY\_ACCESS which provides the means of controlling access between objects and subjects on the attributes defined by the policy, and is supported by O.RESIDUAL\_INFO objective which ensures that information will not given to users which do not have a need to know, when resources are reused. O.ENFORCEMENT supports this policy by ensuring that the access control functions are always invoked and cannot be bypassed. O.MANAGE supports this policy by requiring authorized administrator be able to manage the functions.

**[P.ACCOUNTABLE]** The users of the system shall be held accountable for their actions within the system.

Accountability is implemented primarily through the objective O.AUDITING which ensures user's security relevant events can be recorded so as to be able to hold users accountable for their actions. O.ACCOUNT ensures that all users can be held accountable for their security relevant actions. An unauthorized user can not be held accountable for their actions and O.AUTHORISATION therefore supports this policy by ensuring that only authorized users are allowed access. **O.MANAGE** and O.ENFORCEMENT support this policy by ensuring that an effective set of actions are audited in order to detect attempted breaches of the security policy and that the auditing functions are always invoked and cannot be bypassed.

Environmental objectives O.E\_ADMIN, O.E\_ACCOUNTABLE and O.E\_AUDITDATA ensure that the administrator manages the auditing security functions effectively.

**[P.NEED\_TO\_KNOW]** The system must limit the access to, modification of, and destruction of the information in protected resources to those authorized users which have a "need to know" for that information.

P.NEED\_TO\_KNOW is implemented primarily through the objective O.DISCRETIONARY\_ACCESS which provides the means of controlling access between objects and subjects on the attributes defined by the policy, and is supported by O.RESIDUAL\_INFO objective which ensures that information will not given to users which do not have a need to know, when resources are reused. O.ENFORCEMENT supports this policy by ensuring that the access control functions are always invoked and cannot be bypassed. O.MANAGE supports this policy by requiring authorized administrator be able to manage the functions. O.TRUSTPATH supports this policy by requiring that the TSF be designed and implemented in a manner that allows for establishing a trusted channel or communication path between the TOE and another trusted IT product.

# 7.2.3 Complete Coverage - Environmental Assumptions

This section provides evidence demonstrating coverage of the environmental assumptions by security objectives.

**[A.PROTECT]** It is assumed that all network and peripheral cabling is approved for the transmittal of the most sensitive data held by the system. Such physical links are assumed to be adequately protected against threats to the confidentiality and integrity of the data transmitted.

The environmental objective O.E\_PROTECT ensures that network cabling is suitably protected against threats of modification, tampering or interruption of the data transmitted via this medium. O.E\_INFO\_PROTECT ensures that, where the cabling is carrying classified information, that the infrastructure has been approved. O.E\_CONNECT ensures that no connections to outside systems or users undermine the security of IT assets.

**[A.LOCATE]** It is assumed that the processing resources of the TOE will be located within controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorized physical access.

The environmental objective O.E\_PHYSICAL states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected from physical attack which might compromise IT security objectives.

**[A.ASSET]** It is assumed that the value of the stored assets merits moderately intensive penetration or masquerading attacks.

The environmental objective O.E\_PROTECT ensures that network cabling is suitably protected against threats of modification, tampering or interruption of the data transmitted via this medium. O.E\_INFO\_PROTECT ensures that, where the cabling is carrying classified information, that the infrastructure has been approved. O.E\_CONNECT ensures that no connections to outside systems or users undermine the security of IT assets.

# 7.2.4 Complete Coverage - Personnel Assumptions

**[A.ACESS]** It is assumed that rights for users to gain access and perform operations on information are based on their membership in one or more roles. These roles are granted to the users by the TOE administrator. These roles adequately reflect the users job function, responsibilities, qualifications, and/or competencies within the enterprise.

The environmental objective O.E\_ACCOUNTABLE ensures that only approved groups of users for which the product was accredited may access the system and that each user is assigned a unique user ID.

**[A.MANAGE]** There will be one or more competent and trustworthy individuals assigned to manage TOE security. These individuals will have sole responsibility for the following functions:

a. create and maintain roles;

b.establish and maintain relationships among roles

c.Assignment and revocation of users to roles

In addition, these individuals, as owners of the entire corporate data, along with object owners, will have the ability to assign and revoke object access rights to roles.

The assumption	A.MANAGE	is covered b	y all environmental	objectives, specifically
O.E_ADMIN,	O.E_ACCO	UNTABLE,	O.E_AUDITDAT	A, O.E_CREDEN,
O.E_BOOT,	O.E_CONN	ECT, C	.E_CONSISTENCY	, O.E_INSTALL,

1.3 FINAL

O.E\_INFO\_PROTECT, O.E\_MAINTENANCE, O.E\_RECOVER, O.E\_PHYSICAL, O.E\_SOFTWARE\_IN, O.E\_SERIAL\_LOGIN and O.E\_PROTECT. All of these objectives require that those responsible for the TOE are competent and trustworthy individuals, capable of managing the TOE and the security of the information it contains.

**[A.OWNER]** Assumes a limited set of users is given the rights to "create new data objects" and they become owners for those data objects. The organization is the owner of the rest of information under the control of the TOE.

**[A.NO\_EVIL\_ADM]** Assumes that system administrative personnel are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the administrator documentation.

This assumption is covered by the environmental objective O.E\_ADMIN which states that those responsible for the TOE are competent and trustworthy individuals, capable of managing the TOE and the security of the information it contains. It is also covered by O.E\_INSTALL which requires procedures for secure distribution, installation and configuration of systems.

**[A.COOP]** Assumes that authorized users possess the necessary authorization to access at least some of the information managed by the TOE and are expected to act in a cooperating manner in a benign environment.

This assumption is met by the environmental objective O.E\_CREDEN which requires the safe storage of authentication data and ensures that users will not disclose their passwords

### 7.2.5 Complete Coverage - Procedural Assumptions

[A.USER] Each individual user must have a unique user ID.

This is primarily met by O.E\_ACCOUNTABLE which states that each individual user is assigned a unique user ID. This is supported by O.E\_ADMIN and O.E\_CREDEN which ensure that those responsible for the TOE are competent and that the user IDs are not disclosed to unauthorized individuals.

**[A.PASSWORD]** It is assumed that the length of password for normal users will be at least six but no more than eight characters.

This is primarily met by O.E\_INSTALL which states that '*Those responsible for the TOE must establish and implement procedures to ensure that the software components are configured in a secure manner*'. It is also supported by O.E\_ADMIN which ensures that the administrator is competent enough to ensure this setting within the TOE remains set.

**[A.LDAP\_DOMAINS]** It is assumed that, if the product comprises more than one platform, all platforms are administered from a central point within each LDAP domain.

LDAP is installed and configured at installation time, and therefore objective O.E\_CONSISTENCY ensures this assumption is upheld.

**[A.BRIDGES&ROUTERS]** All bridges and routers are assumed to correctly pass data without modification.

As for A.Protect, this assumption is met by O.E\_PROTECT and O.E\_INFO\_PROTECT; bridges and routers are part of the cabling infrastructure.

**[A.CONNECT]** It is assumed that all connections to peripheral devices reside within controlled access facilities. Internal communication paths to interface points such as terminals are assumed to be adequately protected.

This assumption is met by the following environmental objectives:

O.E\_SERIAL\_LOGIN which ensures the protection of attached serial login devices.

O.E\_PROTECT which ensures that data transferred between servers and workstations is protected

O.E\_PHYSICAL which ensures that those parts of the TOE critical to security policy are protected from physical attack which might compromise IT security objectives.

**[A.PEER]** It is assumed that any other systems with which the TOE communicates are assumed to be under the same management control and operate under the same security policy constraints.

The assumption A.PEER is met by the environmental objective O.E\_INSTALL which states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the TOE hardware, software and firmware components that comprise the networked product are distributed, installed and configured in a secure manner.

# 7.3 Security Requirements Rationale

This section demonstrates that the set of security requirements is suitable to meet and is traceable to the set of security objectives.

### 7.3.1 Complete Coverage - Objectives

This section demonstrates that the functional components selected for the TOE provide complete coverage of the defined security objectives. The mapping of components to security objectives is depicted in the following table.

Policy	Objective						
O.AUTHORISATION	User Attribute Definition (FIA_ATD.1)						
	Strength of Authentication Data (FIA_SOS.1)						
	Authentication (FIA_UAU.1)						
	User Authentication Before Any Action (FIA_UAU.2)						
	Protected Authentication Feedback (FIA_UAU.7)						
	User Identification Before Any Action (FIA_UID.2)						
	User Identification (FIA_UID.1)						
	TSF Initiated Screen Locking (FTA_SSL.1)						
	User initiated locking (FTA_SSL.2)						
	Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1)						
O.ENTRY	Management of User Attributes (FMT_MTD.1)						
	Management of Authentication Data (FMT_MTD.1)						
	Revocation of User and/or Object Attributes (FMT_REV.1)						
	Security Management Roles (FMT_SMR.1)						
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS	Discretionary Access Control Policy (FDP_ACC.1)						
	Discretionary Access Control Functions (FDP_ACF.1)						
	User Attribute Definition (FIA_ATD.1)						
	User-subject Binding (FIA_USB.1)						
	Management of Object Security Attributes (FMT_MSA.1)						
	Secure Security Attributes (FMT_MSA.2)						
	Static Attribute Initialization (FMT_MSA.3)						
	Revocation of Object Attributes (FMT_REV.1)						
O.KNOWN	Authentication (FIA_UAU.1)						
	User Authentication Before Any Action (FIA_UAU.2)						
	User Identification (FIA_UID.1)						

 Table 7-5
 Security Objectives to Functional Component Mapping

Policy	Objective						
O.AUDITING	Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1)						
	User Identity Generation (FAU_GEN.2)						
	Audit Review (FAU_SAR.1)						
	Restricted Audit Review (FAU_SAR.2)						
	Selectable Audit Review (FAU_SAR.3)						
	Selective Audit (FAU_SEL.1)						
	Guarantees of Audit Data Availability (FAU_STG1)						
	Action in case of Possible Audit Loss (FAU_STG3)						
	Prevention of Audit Data Loss (FAU_STG4)						
	User Subject Binding (FIA_USB.1)						
	Management of the Audit Trail (FMT_MTD.1)						
	Management of the Audited Events (FMT_MTD.1)						
	Reliable Time Stamps (FPT_STM.1)						
O.ACCOUNT	Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1)						
	User Identity Generation (FAU_GEN.2)						
	User Subject Binding (FIA_USB.1)						
	Restricted Audit Review (FAU_SAR.2)						
	Selectable Audit Review (FAU_SAR.3)						
	Selective Audit (FAU_SEL.1)						
	Guarantees of Audit Data Availability (FAU_STG1)						
	Prevention of Audit Data Loss (FAU_STG4)						
	Management of User Attributes (FMT_MTD.1)						
	Reliable Time Stamps (FPT_STM.1)						
	Audit Review (FAU_SAR.1)						
O.TRUSTPATH	Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (FTP_ITC.1)						
	Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1)						
	Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)						
	Data Exchange Integrity (FDP_UIT.1)						
O.RESIDUAL_INFO	Subject Residual Information Protection (FDP_RIP.2)						

 Table 7-5
 Security Objectives to Functional Component Mapping

Policy	Objective					
O.MANAGE	Audit Review (FAU_SAR.1)					
	Restricted Audit Review (FAU_SAR.2)					
	Selectable Audit review (FAU_SAR.3)					
	Selectable Audit (FAU_SEL.1)					
	Action in case of Possible Audit Data Loss (FAU_STG.3)					
	Prevention of Audit Data loss (FAU_STG.4)					
	Management of Audit Trail (FMT_MTD.1)					
	Management of Audit Events (FMT_MTD.1)					
	Management of User Attributes (FMT_MTD.1)					
	Management of Authentication Data (FMT_MTD.1)					
	Revocation of User Attributes (FMT_REV.1)					
	Security Management Roles (FMT_SMR.1)					
	Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)					
	Management of Security Attributes (FMT_MSA.1)					
	Secure Security Attributes (FMT_MSA.2)					
	Static Attribute Initialization (FMT_MSA.3)					
	Secure TSF Data (FMT_MTD.3)					
	Failure with Preservation of State (FPT_FLS.1)					
	Manual Recovery (FPT_RCV.1)					
	Function Recovery (FPT_RCV.4)					
O.ENFORCEMENT	Abstract Machine Testing (FPT_AMT.1)					
	Reference Mediation (FPT_RVM.1)					
	Domain Separation (FPT_SEP.1)					
	TSF Self test (FPT_TST.1)					
	Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1)					
O.DUTY	Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2)					
O.HIERACHICAL	Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2)					

Table 7-5         Security Objectives to Functional Component	Mapping
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Policy	Objective
O.ROLE	RBAC Policy (FDP_ACC.1)
	RBAC Functions (FDP_ACF.1)
	Management of Object Security Attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
	Static Attribute Initialization (FMT_MSA.3)
	Management of User Attributes (FMT_MTD.1)
	Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2)
	Limitation on the Scope of Selectable Attributes (FTA_LSA.1)
	TOE Session Establishment (FTA_TSE.1)
O.E_BOOT	Management of the Security Functions Behavior (FMT_MOF.1)

#### Table 7-5 Security Objectives to Functional Component Mapping

#### **O.AUTHORISATION**

The TSF must ensure that only authorized users gain access to the TOE and its resources.

Users authorized to access the TOE are defined using an identification and authentication process [FIA\_UID.1, FIA\_UID.2 and FIA\_UAU.2]. To ensure authorized access to the TOE, authentication data is protected [FIA\_ATD.1, FIA\_UAU.7, FMT\_MTD.1 and FTP\_TRP.1]. The strength of the authentication mechanism must be sufficient to ensure unauthorized users cannot pose as authorized users with reasonable time, effort and other constraints [FIA\_SOS.1]. Lock screen can be initiated to ensure that only authorized uses can gain access [FTA\_SSL.1].

#### **O.ENTRY**

The TOE must prevent logical entry to it by persons or processes with no rights to access it.

The TSF shall restrict the ability to create, modify and initialize the user security attributes, other than authentication data, to authorized administrators (FMT\_MTD.1). The TSF shall restrict the ability to create, modify and initialize the authentication data to authorized administrators or users authorized to modify their own authentication data (FMT\_MTD.1). The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke user or object attributes within the TSC to authorized administrators (FMT\_REV.1). The TSF shall maintain all roles and be able to associate users with roles (FMT\_SMR.1).

#### **O.DISCRETIONARY\_ACCESS**

The TSF must provide its users with the means of controlling and limiting access to the objects and resources they own or are responsible for, on the basis of individual users or identified groups of users, and in accordance with the set of rules defined by the P.DAC security policy.

Discretionary access control must have a defined scope of control [FDP\_ACC.1]. The rules of the DAC policy must be defined [FDP\_ACF.1]. The security attributes of objects used to enforce the DAC policy must be defined [FDP\_ACF.1]. The security attributes of subjects used to enforce the DAC policy must be defined [FIA\_ATD.1 and FIA\_USB.1]. Authorized users must be able to control who has access to objects[FMT\_MSA.1], that only secure values are set for security attributes [FMT\_MSA.2] and be able to revoke that access [FMT\_REV.1]. Protection of named objects must be continuous, starting from object creation [FMT\_MSA.3].

#### **O.KNOWN**

Legitimate users of the system must be identified before rights of access can be granted.

The TSF shall allow TSF mediated actions on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated (FIA\_UAU.1). The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on the behalf of the user (FIA\_UAU.1). The TSF shall allow TSF mediated actions on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified (FIA\_UID.1). The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on the behalf of the user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on the behalf of the user (FIA\_UID.1). The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on the behalf of the user (FIA\_UID.1 and FIA\_UAU.2).

### **O.AUDITING**

The TOE must provide the means of recording any security relevant events, so as to (a) assist an administrator in the detection of potential attacks or misconfiguration of the TOE security features that would leave the TOE susceptible to attack; and (b) hold users accountable for any actions they perform that are relevant to security.

Security-relevant actions must be defined, auditable [FAU\_GEN.1], and capable of being associated with individual users [FAU\_GEN.2 and FIA\_USB.1]. The audit trail must be protected so that only authorized users may access it [FAU\_SAR.2]. The TSF must provide the capability to audit the actions of an individual user [FAU\_SAR.3, FAU\_SEL.1 and FIA\_USB.1]. The audit trail must be complete [FAU\_STG.1 and FAU\_STG.4]. The time stamp associated must be reliable [FPT\_STM.1]. An authorized administrator must be able to review [FAU\_SAR.1] and manage[FAU\_STG.3.1 and FMT\_MTD.1] the audit trail.

### **O.ACCOUNT**

The TOE must ensure that all users can be held accountable for their security relevant actions.

Security-relevant actions must be defined, auditable [FAU\_GEN.1], and capable of being associated with individual users [FAU\_GEN.2 and FIA\_USB.1]. The audit trail must be protected so that only authorized users may access it [FAU\_SAR.2]. The TSF must provide the capability to audit the actions of an individual user [FAU\_SAR.3, FAU\_SEL.1 and FIA\_USB.1]. The audit trail must be complete [FAU\_STG.1 and FAU\_STG.4]. The time stamp associated must be reliable [FPT\_STM.1]. An authorized administrator must be able to review [FAU\_SAR.1] and manage[FAU\_SAR.3.1 and FMT\_MTD.1] the audit trail.

#### **O.TRUSTPATH**

The TSF must be designed and implemented in a manner that allows for establishing a trusted channel or communication path between the TOE and another trusted IT product that protects the user data transferred over this channel from disclosure and undetected modification.

The TSF must be able to establish (a) an Inter-TSF trusted channel between itself and another trusted IT product and/r (b) a communication path between itself and remote or local users or that is logically distinct from other communication paths [FTP\_ITC.1] [FTP\_TRP.1] protecting the user data transferred from disclosure [FDP\_UCT.1] and undetected modification [FDP\_UIT.1].

#### **O.RESIDUAL\_INFO**

The TSF must ensure that any information contained in a protected resource is not released when the resource is recycled.

Residual information associated with defined objects in the TOE must be purged prior to the reuse of the object containing the residual information [FDP\_RIP.2].

#### **O.MANAGE**

The TSF must allow administrators to effectively manage the TOE and its security functions, and must ensure that only authorized administrators are able to access such functionality.

Aspects that need to be managed must be defined [FMT\_SMF.1]. The TSF must provide for an authorized administrator to manage the TOE [FMT\_SMR.1]. The administrator mustbe ableto administer user accounts[FMT\_MTD.1 and FMT\_REV.1]. The administrator must be able to review manage the audit trail [FAU\_SAR.1, FAU\_SAR.3, FAU\_SEL.1, FAU\_STG.3, FAU\_STG.4, FMT\_MTD.1]. Only secure values must be accepted for RBAC-related attributes and TSF data [FMT\_MSA.2, FMT\_MTD.3] The administrator must be able to ensure that only authorized users are able to control who has access to objects [FMT\_MSA.1], and that only secure values are set for security attributes [FMT\_MSA.2]

The TSF shall provide a secure state following failure and allow manual and function recovery [FPT\_FLS.1, FPT\_RCV.1, FPT\_RCV.4].

#### **O.ENFORCEMENT**

The TOE security policy is enforced in a manner which ensures that the organizational policies are enforced in the target environment i.e. the integrity of the TSF is protected. The TSF must make and enforce the decisions of the TSP [FPT\_RVM.1]. It must be protected from interference that would prevent it from performing its functions [FPT\_SEP.1]. Additionally, the TOE must provide the capability to demonstrate correct operation of the TSF's underlying abstract machine [FMT\_AMT.1]. The correctness of this objective is further met through the assurance requirements defined in the PP.

The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the TOE [FPT\_TST.1]. The integrity of the TOE is enforced via the trusted path [FTP\_TRP.1]

#### **O.DUTY**

The TOE must provide the capability of enforcing separation of duties, so that no single user is required to perform all administrative functions.

The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles [FMT\_SMR.2].

#### **O.HIERARCHICAL**

The TOE must allow hierarchical definitions of roles. Hierarchical definition of roles means that they are constructed hierarchically using rights profiles.

The TSF shall ensure that the set of administrative roles can modify security attributes for all objects under the control of the TOE [FMT\_SMR.2].

#### **O.ROLE**

The TOE must prevent users from gaining access to and performing operations on its resources and objects unless they have been granted access by the resource or objects owner or have been assigned a role which permits those operations.

The TSF shall enforce an RBAC policy [FDP\_ACC.1 and FDP\_ACF.1]. User and object security attributes required to enforce the RBAC policy must be securely managed [FMT\_MTD.1, FMT\_MSA.1 and FMT\_MSA.3]. The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles [FMT\_SMR.2]. The TSF shall deny and restrict the scope of a session [FTA\_LSA.1 and FTA\_TSE.1].

### O.E\_BOOT

The IT environment is required to meet the objectives described in Section 4.2. All but one of these objectives is met by procedural measures, however O.E\_BOOT is met by either the OpenBoot PROM or the System Controller.

The platforms with OpenBoot PROM shall restrict the ability to modify the behavior of the boot strapping process to users who know the valid PROM password. [FMT\_MOF.1.1]. The System Controller on the SunFire MidFrame High End servers shall restrict the ability to modify the behavior of the boot strapping process to users who know the valid SC password.[FMT\_MOF.1.1]. The x86/x64 Workstations and Server platforms shall restrict the ability to modify the behavior of the boot strapping process to users who know the valid PROM password. [FMT\_MOF.1.1].

	FAU_GEN.1	FAU_SAR.1	FAU_STG.1	FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACF.1	FIA_ATD.1	FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UID.1	FMT_MSA.1	FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MTD.1	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.1	FPT_AMT.1	FPT_STM.1	FPT_TST.1	FTP_ITC.1	FTP_TRP.1	FMT_MSA.2
FAU_GEN.1															$\checkmark$				
FAU_GEN.2	$\checkmark$							$\checkmark$											
FAU_SAR.1	~																		
FAU_SAR.2		$\checkmark$																	
FAU_SAR.3		$\checkmark$																	
FAU_SEL.1	~										$\checkmark$								
FAU_STG.1	~																		
FAU_STG.3			$\checkmark$																
FAU_STG.4			~																
FDP_ACC.1					$\checkmark$														
FDP_ACF.1										$\checkmark$									
FDP_RIP.2																			
FIA_ATD.1																			
FIA_SOS.1																			
FIA_UAU.2								$\checkmark$											
FIA_UAU.7							$\checkmark$												
FIA_UID.2																			
FIA_USB.1						$\checkmark$													
FMT_MSA.1										$\checkmark$									
FMT_MSA.2				$\checkmark$					$\checkmark$				$\checkmark$						
FMT_MSA.3									$\checkmark$				$\checkmark$						
FMT_MTD.1												~	~						
FMT_MTD.3											$\checkmark$								
FMT_REV.1													$\checkmark$						
FMT_SMF.1																			
FMT_SMR.1							$\checkmark$												
FMT_SMR.2							$\checkmark$												
FPT_AMT.1																			

 Table 7-6
 Dependencies between Functional Components

	FAU_GEN.1	FAU_SAR.1	FAU_STG.1	FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACF.1	FIA_ATD.1	FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UID.1	FMT_MSA.1	FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MTD.1	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.1	FPT_AMT.1	FPT_STM.1	FPT_TST.1	FTP_ITC.1	FTP_TRP.1	FMT_MSA.2
FPT_FLS.1																			
FPT_RCV.1																			
FPT_RCV.4																			
FPT_RVM.1																			
FPT_SEP.1																			
FPT_STM.1																			
FPT_TST.1														$\checkmark$					
FTA_LSA.1																			
FTA_SSL.1							$\checkmark$												
FTA_SSL.2							$\checkmark$												
FTA_TSE.1																			
FDP_UCT.1				$\checkmark$													$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
FDP_UIT.1				$\checkmark$													$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
FMT_SMF.1																			
FTP_ITC.1																			
FTP_TRP.1																			

 Table 7-6
 Dependencies between Functional Components

## 7.3.2 Requirements are Mutually Supportive and Internally Consistent

The above table, Table 7-6, identifies the dependencies of all functional components included in the ST. Required dependencies are indicated by the use if the checkmark:  $\checkmark$ 

All dependencies between functional components are satisfied within this ST, with the following exceptions.

• Dependencies on FIA\_UAU.1 and FIA\_UID.1 are satisfied, respectively, by the inclusion of FIA\_UAU.2 and FIA\_UID.2 which are hierarchic to these components.

ALC\_FLR.3 introduces no additional dependencies.

#### 7.3.3 Justification for Choice of Assurance Requirements

This ST claims an assurance rating of EAL4+. The ST has been based largely on [CAPP] and [RBAC] which specific security requirements for a product which is to be used in a non-hostile environment with a moderate risk to the assets. In such environments, an assurance level of EAL3 is recommended as stated in [CAPP].

This ST also contains the assurance requirements from the CC EAL4 assurance package augmented with ALC\_FLR.3. The CC allows assurance packages to be augmented, which allows the addition of assurance components from the CC not already included in the EAL. Augmentation was chosen to provide the added assurance that is provided by defining flaw remediation procedures and correcting security flaws. This ST is based on solid rigorous commercial software development practices and has been developed for a generalized environment for a TOE that is generally available and does not need modification to meet the security needs specified in the ST.

The EAL chosen is based on the statement of the security environment and objectives defined in this ST. The sufficiency of the EAL chosen is justified based on the enhancements made to [CAPP] and [RBAC] which are detailed in Section 5.1. and the flaw remediation procedures defined in supplement ALC\_FLR.3.

[CAPP] requires an EAL3 assurance rating. EAL4+ is a super-set of those requirements.

[RBAC] requires EAL2 assurance augmented with ADV\_SPM.1.1 EAL4+ is a superset of these requirements.

#### 7.3.4 Strength of Function Claim is Consistent with Security Objectives

The claimed strength of function rating is SOF-medium. This exceeds the [RBAC] requirement of SOF-basic and is consistent with [CAPP] which states that a 'one off' probability of guessing the password shall be 1,000,000. This is specified in SFR FIA\_SOS.1 which is in turn consistent with the security objectives described in section 7.3.

### 7.4 TOE Summary Specification Rationale

This section demonstrates that the TOE security functions and assurance measures are suitable to meet the TOE security requirements.

# 7.4.1 IT Security Functions Satisfy Functional Requirements

This section demonstrates that the combination of the specified TOE IT security functions work together so as to satisfy the TOE security functional requirements. The table below shows the TOE security functions which together satisfy each security functional requirement. They are grouped under the relevant TOE security objective.

Security Functional Requirement	TOE Security Function(s) Rational to support the SFR
Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1.1)	Audit.1 to Audit.11, Audit.15 <sup>a</sup> Auditing procedures provide a record of auditable events.
Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1.2)	Audit.1,2,3,4,5,6,8,11,21 Event records include date and time of the event, subject identity and the outcome (success or failure) of the event.
User Identity Generation (FAU_GEN.2.1)	Audit.1 to Audit.11 Auditing procedures identify each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
Audit Review (FAU_SAR.1.1)	Audit.19 Authorized administrators of the TOE have the capability to read all audit record information.
Audit Review (FAU_SAR.1.2)	Audit.19 Audit records are suitable for user interpretation.
Restricted Audit Review (FAU_SAR.2.1)	Audit.14 Audit data is protected so that access is limited to administrative users.
Selectable Audit Review (FAU_SAR.3.1)	Audit.19 Administrative users are able to selectively retrieve audit data based on, at a minimum, the identity of users, the type of audit event, and the audit class.
Selective Audit (FAU_SEL.1.1)	Audit.17, Audit.18 Administrative users are able to define the default system audit-mask that defines which audit classes are recorded by default. Only administrative users are able to define a per-user audit-mask that defines which audit classes are recorded for that user. For a given user, the system shall audit those classes that are in the default system audit mask or the per-user audit mask.
Protected Audit Trail Storage (FAU_STG.1.1)	Audit.14 Audit data is protected against unauthorized deletion because access to it is limited to administrative users.
Protected Audit Trail Storage (FAU_STG.1.2)	Audit.14 Audit data is protected against modification.
Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss (FAU_STG.3.1)	Audit.23 The system shall notify an administrator of audit trail saturation.
Prevention of Audit Data Loss (FAU_STG.4.1)	Audit.20, Audit.21 In the event of an audit storage failure the system will prevent auditable events, except those taken by the administrator.

Table 7-7SFR - IT SF Mapping

Security Functional Requirement	TOE Security Function(s) Rational to support the SFR
Discretionary Access Control Policy (FDP_ACC.1.1)	DAC.6, Admin.2, Admin.3 The access permissions on an owner controlled object can be modified only by a subject that owns the object or by a user with override file access permissions.
Discretionary Access Control Functions (FDP_ACF.1.1)	DAC.3, DAC.4 Solaris file permissions ensure that no subject can change the owner or group of an owner controlled object unless it has override file access permissions, or optionally is the owner of the object
Discretionary Access Control Functions (FDP_ACF.1.2)	DAC.6 Solaris file permissions ensure that whenever a subject requests access to an owner controlled object, the access permissions for that object shall be checked to determine whether the user who owns the subject can access the object in the requested mode.
Discretionary Access Control Functions (FDP_ACF.1.3)	DAC.8, Admin.2, Admin.3 Solaris file permissions ensure that a subject cannot override discretionary access control unless they have override file access permissions
Discretionary Access Control Functions (FDP_ACF.1.4)	DAC.3, DAC.4, DAC.6. Whenever a subject requests access to an owner controlled object, the access permissions for that object will be checked to determine whether the user who owns the subject can access the object in the requested mode. Where an ACL is defined for an object, it will be used instead of the object's permission bits. Unix file permissions ensure that the changes to the object are allowable unless overridden by ACL.
Object Residual Information Protection (FDP_RIP.2.1)	OR.1, OR.2, OR.3 Solaris ensures that any previous content of a resource is made unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to all objects.
Subject Residual Information Protection	OR.1, OR.2, OR.3 Solaris ensures that any previous content of a resource is made unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to all subjects.
Basic Data Exchange Confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)	DAC.9 The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to be able to transmit objects in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure
Data Exchange Integrity (FDP_UIT.1.1)	DAC.10 The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification and insertion errors
Data Exchange Integrity (FDP_UIT.1.2)	DAC.10 The TSF shall enforce the Discretionary Access Control Policy to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification and insertion errors
User Attribute Definition (FIA_ATD.1.1)	IA.1, IA.11 Solaris assures that users are assigned unique individual security attributes that are enforced throughout each session.

Security Functional Requirement	TOE Security Function(s) Rational to support the SFR
Strength of Authentication Data (FIA_SOS.1.1)	IA.1, IA.11 <sup>b</sup> Solaris mechanisms exists which enforces standards of password management.
Authentication (FIA_UAU.1.1)	IA.1 User must authenticate identity at the beginning of each user session.
Authentication (FIA_UAU.1.2)	IA.1 No user actions are allowed until authentication has completed successfully.
User Authentication (FIA_UAU.2)	IA.1 No user actions are allowed until authentication has completed successful
Protected Authentication Feedback (FIA_UAU.7.1)	IA.9 Passwords are not displayed upon entry.
Identification (FIA_UID.1.1)	IA.1 Solaris makes an allowance for actions to be taken on behalf of the user prior to identification.
Identification (FIA_UID.1.2)	IA.1 Solaris requires each user be successfully identified before allowing any other actions on the behalf of that user.
Identification (FIA_UID.2)	IA.1 Solaris requires each user be successfully identified before allowing any other actions on the behalf of that user.
User-Subject Binding (FIA_USB.1.1)	IA.2 Audit ID data assigned to a user upon entry does not change as the user switches user ID's and roles.
Management of Object Security Attributes (FMT_MSA.1.1)	DAC.1, DAC.2 Discretionary Access Control rules ensure restricted ability to modify the access control attributes associated with a named object.
Secure Security Attributes (FMT_MSA.2.1)	ENF.4 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for user passwords.
Static Attribute Initialization (FMT_MSA.3.1)	DAC.7 When a subject creates a filesystem object, the user ID of the subject is assigned to the object, and the user's umask restricts the initial access permissions of the object.
Static Attribute Initialization (FMT_MSA.3.2)	DAC.7 The TOE default is that a user's umask is set to prevent any user other than the owner having write access to the object.
Management of the Audit Trail (FMT_MTD.1.1)	Audit.14 Access to audit trail is limited to the administrator and therefore protected from unauthorized observation or modification.

Table 7-7SFR - IT SF Mapping

Security Functional Requirement	TOE Security Function(s) Rational to support the SFR
Management of Audited Events (FMT_MTD.1.1)	Audit.16, 17, 18 Only the administrative user may initialize or change auditable events.
Management of User Attributes (FMT_MTD.1.1)	IA.11, Admin.1 Only the administrator can initialize user accounts and assign user profiles
Management of Authentication Data (FMT_MTD.1.1)	IA.10 Only the administrator can change user authentication data.
Management of Authentication Data (FMT_MTD.1.1)	IA.11 A user may change their own password.
Management of Authentication Data (FMT_MTD.3)	ENF.4 The TSF ensures that only secure values are accepted for user passwords
Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1.1)	IA.1, IA.11, DAC.1, DAC.8 TSF allows for the administrator to manage the system security attributes
Revocation of User Attributes (FMT_REV.1.1)	IA.11, DAC.1, DAC.2, Admin.1 Only the administrator can remove or delete user accounts
Revocation of Object Attributes (FMT_REV.1.2)	IA.11 Once a user has been removed from the system there is no way to authenticate.
Revocation of Object Attributes (FMT_REV.1.2)	DAC.6 Solaris file permissions ensure that only authorized users are able to revoke object attributes.
Security Management Roles (FMT_SMR.1.1)	DAC.1, DAC.2, IA.11, Admin.1 Solaris assigns a unique id to each user which enables the assignment of management roles. Only the administrator can assign roles to a user.
Security Management Roles (FMT_SMR.1.2)	DAC.2, DAC.8, IA.11, Audit.14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, Admin.1 Solaris supports this requirement through the use of uid assignment and audit tracking
Restriction on Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2.1)	Admin.1, Admin.4, Admin.5 The TSF shall maintain the list of roles.
Restriction on Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2.2)	Admin.1, Admin.4, Admin.5 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Restriction on Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2.3)	Admin.4, Admin.5 Defined ability of users and administrators to modify security attributes and objects.
Abstract Machine Testing (FPT_AMT.1.1)	ENF.3 SUN provides a suite of Abstract machine tests for TOE users
Failure with Preservation of Secure State (FPT_FLS.1)	Fail.2 The TSF maintains the ability to preserve RBAC database information when the system experiences a failure

Table 7-7SFR - IT SF Mapping

Security Functional Requirement	TOE Security Function(s) Rational to support the SFR
Manual Recovery (FPT_RCV.1)	Fail.1 The TSF will enter maintenance mode following a system failure, allowing the administrator to bring the system to a secure state before resuming operation.
Functional Recovery (FPT_RCV.4)	Fail.2 The TSF maintains the ability to preserve RBAC database information when the system experiences a failure
Reference Mediation (FPT_RVM.1.1)	ENF.1 Solaris validates all actions between subjects and objects before allowing the action to succeed
Domain Separation (FPT_SEP.1.1)	ENF.2 Solaris maintains a secure domain within the system kernel for trusted execution and the storage of trusted objects. This are is separate from untrusted activities within the TOE.
Domain Separation (FPT_SEP.1.2)	ENF.2 Solaris maintains a secure domain within the system kernel for trusted execution and the storage of trusted objects. This are is separate from untrusted activities within the TOE
Reliable Time Stamps (FPT_STM.1.1)	Audit.12 Solaris provides a reliable time stamp through it's audit mechanism.
TSF Self Test (FPT_TST.1)	ENF.3 The TOE shall allow an administrator to perform a self test to ensure that the underlying TSF is enforcing process separation
TSF-Limitation on scope of selectable attributes (FTA_LSA.1.1)	Admin.5 The TSF shall restrict the scope of a session based on the role assigned to the user.
TSF-initiated Session Locking (FTA_SSL.1.1)	SL.1 The TSF shall lock an interactive session after an administrator-defined time interval of user activity by clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable and disabling any activity of the user's data access/display devices other than unlocking the session.
TSF-initiated Session Unlocking (FTA_SSL.1.2)	SL.2 The TSF shall require that prior to unlocking an interactive session the user must be successfully re-authenticated.
User Initiated Session Locking (FTA_SSL.2.1)	SL.3 The TSF shall allow user-initiated locking of the user's own interactive session by clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable and disabling any activity of the user's data access/display devices other than unlocking the session.
User Initiated Session Unlocking (FTA_SSL.2.2)	SL.4 The TSF shall require that prior to unlocking a user's interactive session, the user must be successfully re-authenticated.

Table 7-7SFR - IT SF Mapping

Security Functional Requirement	TOE Security Function(s) Rational to support the SFR
TOE Session Establishment (FTA_TSE.1)	IA.1 The product shall require users to identify and successfully authenticate themselves, using a user name and a password, before performing any other actions
Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (FTP_ITC.1)	SC.7, SC.8 Communication channels provided by the TSF between itself and a remote trusted IT product must be logically distinct from other communications channels and must provide assured identification of the end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1)	SC.9, SC10 Communication channels provided by the TSF between itself and remote or local users must be logically distinct from other communications channels and must provide assured identification of the end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

Table 7-7SFR - IT SF Mapping

a. FAU\_GEN.1.1 implicitly includes the requirement not to store password information in the audit trail as required by IT SF Audit.15.

b. Supplying a new password is stated in ITSF IA.11, and it is the process through which a user enters a new password that enforces the construction of the password and hence the probability of guessing the correct password.

## 7.4.2 Justification for Compliance of Assurance Measures

Section 6.3 shows that all assurance requirements are met by an appropriate assurance measure.

The Security Functional Requirements outlined in section 7.4.1 are all met within the design of the Solaris Operating Environment. Tests have been developed and will be conducted which confirm that all of the TOE security functional requirements are met.

# 7.5 PP Claims and Rationale

## 7.5.1 PP Reference

The TOE meets all of the requirements of the Controlled Access Protection Profile, which is defined in [CAPP] and the Role Based Access Control Protection Profile which is defined in [RBAC].

## 7.5.2 PP Tailoring

The security functional requirements for the TOE are as defined in [CAPP] and [RBAC] with refinements as necessary and appropriate for a ST. These refinements are detailed in section 5.1.1.

### 7.5.3 PP Additions

There are a total of seven (7) additional security functional requirements for the TOE beyond those defined in [RBAC] and [CAPP], as follows: FDP\_UCT.1; FDP\_UIT.1; FMT\_SMF.1; FTA\_SSL.1; FTA\_SSL.2; FTP\_ITC.1 and FTP\_TRP.1. These additional requirements are detailed in section 5.2.

There is one additional security requirement for the IT environment which is detailed in **section 5.4**. This relates to the requirements placed on the SC or OpenBoot PROM in support of protecting the server/workstation in the environment.

There are no additional TOE security objectives to those contained in [CAPP] and [RBAC]. The security objectives for the TOE environment in this ST may be regarded as additional to those contained in [CAPP] and [RBAC], although they are deemed to be broadly equivalent, and refined due to the specific environment assumed for the Solaris 10 product.

# 7.5.4 PP Rationale

The objectives used in this ST are derived from [CAPP] and [RBAC]. The differences are minor and result from refinements appropriate to a Security Target where a specific product and the assumed environment are being described. The SFRs used in this ST are derived from [CAPP] and [RBAC], and have been refined as required for inclusion in a ST.

The rationale presented in this document describing why the SFRs are appropriate to meet the security objectives has been taken from [CAPP] and [RBAC] also. Because of the similarities between the objectives and SFRs contained in this ST and in [CAPP] and [RBAC], the justification provided in [CAPP] and [RBAC] is also appropriate for this ST.

# Appendix A

# A 1.1 Platform 1 Configurations

Platform Specification	Server E3500	Server E4500	Server E5500	Server E6500	Server E10K	Server E450	Server E420R	Server E250	Server E220R
<b>Operating Environment</b>			Sola	ris 10 11/06	Operating	Environme	nt		
CPUs	1-8	1-14	1-14	1-30	4-64	1-4	1-4	1-2	1-2
Processor		τ	UltraSPARC II with onboard e-cache						
Clock speeds	16	7; 250, 336,	400, 464, 50	0 or 650 M	Hz	250, 300, 400, 450 or 480 Mhz			
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI)	2 SBus	3 SBus	3 SBus	2 SBus 2 PCI	4 SBus 6 PCI	10 PCI	4 PCI	4 PCI	4 PCI
Maximum Memory	2 GB	2 GB 2 GB 2 GB 56 GB 64 GB 4 GB 2 GB 2					2 GB	2 GB	
Max Storage	n/a	144 GB	144 GB	72.8 GB	2 TB	730 GB	72.8 GB	216 GB	72.8 GB

Platform Specification	Ultrasparc 30	Ultrasparc 60	Ultrasparc 80	Ultrasparc 450	SunFire V100 <sup>1</sup>	Sunblade 100	Netra X1		
<b>Operating Environment</b>		Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment							
CPUs	1	1-2	1-4	1-4	1	1	1		
Processor		UltraSPARC-IIe							
Clock speeds			250, 30	00, 450 or 500 N	/IHz				
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI)	4 PCI	4 PCI	4 PCI	10 PCI	2 USB	2 PCI	2 USB		
Maximum Memory	2 GB	2 GB	4 GB	4 GB	2 GB	2 GB	2 GB		
Max Storage	18 GB	72 GB	72 GB	730 GB	40 GB	30GB	80 GB		

# A.1.1 Platform 1 Configurations - Continued

Platform Specification	SunBlade 1000	SunBlade 2000	Netra 20	SunFire V280R	SunFire V480	SunFire V880	SunFire V880z			
<b>Operating Environment</b>		Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment								
CPUs	1-2	1-2	1-2	1-2	2 or 4	2 - 8	1-6			
Processor		UltraSPARC III Cu 8MHz Cache								
Clock speeds		600Mh	z, 750Mhz, 900	)MHz, 1015MF	Hz, 1050MHz &	1200MHz				
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI)	4 PCI	4 PCI	4 PCI	4 PCI	6 PCI	9 PCI	9 PCI			
Maximum Memory	8 GB	8 GB	8 GB	8 GB	32 GB	64 GB	48 GB			
Max Storage	146 Gb	146 GB	146 GB	146 GB	3 TB	3 TB	73 TB			

Platform Specification	SunFire V210	SunFire V240	Netra 240	SunFire V250	SunFire V440	Netra 440 Server	SunBlade 1500	SunBlade 2500	
<b>Operating Environment</b>			Sola	ris 10 11/06	Operating E	nvironment			
CPUs	1-2	1-2	1-2	1-2	1-2	1-2	1	1-2	
Processor		UltraSPARC IIIi 8MHz Cache							
Clock speeds			900MHz, 10	15MHz, 105	0MHz, 1200	MHz & 1.503	GHz		
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI)	1 PCI	3 PCI	2 PCI 1 SCSI	6 PCI	6 PCI	6 PCI	4 PCI	6 PCI	
Maximum Memory	4 GB	8 GB	8 GB	8 GB	16 GB	16 GB	8 GB	16 GB	
Max Storage	146 GB	292 GB	292 GB	292 GB	292 GB	292 GB	120 GB	146 GB	

Platform Specification	SunFire V125	SunFire V215	SunFire V245	SunFire V445	Ultra 25 Workstation	Ultra 45 Workstation				
Operating Environment		Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment								
CPUs	1	1-2	1-2	1-4	1	1-2				
Processor		τ	IltraSparc IIIi Pr	ocessor, 1MB Le	evel 2 Cache					
Clock speeds			1.0,	1.34, 1.6 GHz						
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI)	1 PCI	2 PCI	4 PCI	8 PCI	6 PCI	6				
Maximum Memory	8 GB	16 GB	16 GB	32 GB	8 GB	16 GB				
Max Storage	146 GB	146 GB	292 GB	2.9 TB	1 TB	1 TB				

1.3 FINAL

# A.1.1 Platform 1 Configurations - Continued

Platform Specification	Netra CT810	Netra CT820	Ultra Sparc 5	Ultra Sparc 10	Ultra 3 Mobile				
Operating Environment	Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment								
CPUs	1 (single processor only)								
Processor	UltraSparc IIi 512Kb L2 on-die cache								
Clock speeds		270, 300, 3	33, 360, 440, 550,	or 650 Mhz					
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI)	6 PCI	18 cPSB	3 PCI	4PCI	0				
Maximum Memory	4 GB	2 GB	512 MB	1 GB	2 GB				
Max Storage	144 GB	80 GB	20 GB	40 GB	80 GB				

Platform Specification	Sun Blade 150	Sun Fire B100s	SunFire V100 <sup>1</sup>	Sun Fire V120	Netra 120	Netra CT410	
Operating Environment	Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment						
CPUs	1 (single processor only)						
Processor		UltraS	parc IIi 512Kł	DL2 on-die cac	che		
Clock speeds		270, 300	), 333, 360, 44	0, 550, or 650	Mhz		
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI)	3 PCI	0	0	1 PCI	1 PCI	2 PCI	
Maximum Memory	2 GB	2 GB	2 GB	4 GB	4 GB	4 GB	
Max Storage	40 GB	40 GB	80 GB	108 GB	72 GB	72 GB	

Platform Specification	Sun Fire T1000 Server	Sun Fire T2000 Server	Netra T2000 Server	Netra CP3060 Blade						
Operating Environment	Solaris 10 11/06 Operating Environment									
CPUs	1	1	1	1						
Processor		UltraSPARC T1 Chip Multithreaded (CMT)								
Clock speeds		1.2 GHz is 8 core, 1.0 GH 3 MB unified level 2	,							
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI)	1 PCI	5 PCI	5 PCI	8 PCIe						
Maximum Memory	32 GB	64 GB	32 GB	64 GB						
Max Storage	160 GB	292 GB	146 GB	292 GB						

1. SunFire V100 was available with the Sparc IIe and IIi processors

# A 1.2 Platform 2 Configurations

Platform Specification	Netra 1280	Sun Fire V1280	Sun Fire 3800	Sun Fire 4800	Sun Fire 4810	Sun Fire 6800	Sun Fire 12K	Sun Fire 15K	
Operating Environment			Sola	ris 10 11/06	Operating En	vironment			
CPUs	4-12	4-12	2-8	2-	12	2-24	4-52	16-106	
Processor		UltraSPARC III Cu							
Clock speeds	900	900 Mhz 900MHz, 1050MHz & 1200MHz							
System Board (CPU) Slots	N/A	N/A	2	3		6	9	18	
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI)	6 PCI	6 PCI	12 cPCI	16 PCI or 8 cPCI		32 PCI or 16 cPCI	36 PCI	72 PCI	
I/O Channel Bandwidth		I	24 G	B per second	per PCI/cPC	I assembly	l		
Maximum Memory per domain	96GB	96GB	64 GB	96	GB	192 GB	288 GB	576 GB	
Max Storage (all SunFire data center servers sup- port external storage)	17.5 TB	17.5 TB	35 TB 77 TB			77 TB	120 TB	250 TB	
Sustained System Band- width		1	9.6 GB/sec					43.2 GB/sec	

Platform Specification	SunFire V490	SunFire V890	SunFire 2900	SunFire 4900	SunFire 6900	SunFire E20K	SunFire E25K
<b>Operating Environment</b>		, L	Solaris 10 11/00	6 Operating E			
CPUs	2-4	1-8	4, 8 or 12	4-12	2-24	4-36	8-72
Processor		1	Ultra	SPARC III C	u	1	L
Clock speeds	1200MHz o	ItraSPARC IV: 1050MHz,UltraSPARC[tm] III Cu: 900MHz, 1050MHz or 1200MF1200MHz or 1350 MHzUltraSPARC IV: 1050MHz, 1200MHz or 1350MHzSPARC V9superscalar SPARC V9, ECC protected					
System Board (CPU) Slots	3	3	3	3	6	9	18
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI)	6 PCI	9 PCI, 2 USB	6 PCI	16 PCI	32 PCI	32 PCI	72 PCI
I/O Channel Bandwidth	N	/A	31.2 GB/sec aggregate bandwidth			150 MHz Sun[tm] Fire- plane redundant 18X18 interconnect	
Maximum Memory per domain	32 GB	64 GB	96 GB	96 GB	192 GB	288 GB	576 GB
Max Storage (all SunFire data center servers support external storage)	292 GB	1.72 TB	146 GB	146 GB	146 GB	120 TB	250 TB
Sustained System Bandwidth	Ν	/A	9.6 GB/sec			21.6 GB/sec	43.2 GB/sec

# A 1.3 Platform 3 Configurations

Platform Specification	SunFire V20z	SunFire V40z	Sun Java Workstation W1100	Sun Java Workstation W2100	Dell Precision 650 Workstation		
<b>Operating Environment</b>	Solaris 10 11/06 x86 Operating Environment						
CPUs	1-2	2-4	1	2	1-2		
Processor	AMD-64 200 Series	AMD Opteron 800	AMD-64 100	AMD-64 200 Series	Intel(r) Xeon(tm)		
Clock speeds	1.6GHz, 1.8GHz 2.2GHz 2.4GHz, 2.6GHz	1.8GHz, 2.2GHz, 2.4GHz, 2.6GHz	1.44Ghz, 1.46Ghz, 1.48Ghz, 1.50Ghz	2.44Ghz, 2.46Ghz, 2.48Ghz, 2.50Ghz	1.8Ghz, 2.6Ghz 3.0Ghz		
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI)	2 PCI	7 PCI	5 PCI, 1 AGP	5 PCI, 1 AGP	N/A		
Maximum Memory	16 GB	32 GB	8 GB	16 GB	6 GB		
Max Storage (all SunFire data center servers support exter- nal storage)	73 GB	1.8 TB	80 GB	146 GB	N/A		

Platform Specification	SunFire x2100	SunFire x2100 M2	SunFire x2200 M2	SunFire x4100 / 4100 M2	SunFire x4200 / x4200 M2			
<b>Operating Environment</b>		Solaris 10 x86 Operating Environment						
CPUs	1	1	1-2	1-2	1-2			
Processor	AMD-64 100 Series	AMD dual core model 1200	AMD dual core 2000 series	AMD-64 200 / 2000 Series	AMD-64 200 / 2000 Series			
Clock speeds	2.0, 2.4, 2.6, 2.8, 3.0 Ghz	1.8, 2.2, 2.6 GHz	1.8, 2.2, 2.6, 2.8 GHz	2.0GHz, 2.2GHz, 2.4GHz, 2.6GHz, 2.8GHz	2.0GHz, 2.2GHz, 2.4GHz, 2.6GHz, 2.8GHz			
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI)	1 PCIe	1 PCIe	2 PCIe	2 PCI	5 PCI			
Maximum Memory	8 GB	8 GB	32 GB	32 GB	32 GB			
Max Storage (all SunFire data center servers support external storage)	1 TB	1 TB	1 TB	1 TB	500 GB			

# A.1.3 Platform 3 Configurations - Continued

Platform Specification	SunFire x4500	SunFire x4600	SunFire x4600 M2	Ultra 20 Wkstn	Ultra 20 M2 Wkstn	Ultra 40 Wkstn	Ultra 40 M2 Wkstn
<b>Operating Environment</b>	Solaris 10 x86 Operating Environment						
CPUs	1-2	4 or 8	4 or 8	1	1		1-2
Processor	AMD Opteron, Model 285	AMD Opteron 800 Series	AMD Opteron 8000 Series	AMD-64 100 Series	AMD Opteron 1200 Series		
Clock speeds	2.6 GHz (95Watt)	2.6, 2.8 GHz	2.6, 2.8 GHz	1.8, 2.2 and 2.6GHz	1.8, 2.2, 2.6, and 2.8GHz		
I/O Slots (SBus/PCI)	2 PCI	6 PCIe, 2 PCIx		6 PCI			
Maximum Memory	16 GB	64 GB 128 GB		8 GB			32 Gb
Max Storage (all SunFire data center servers support external storage)	24 TB	2 TB	2TB	500 GB	1 TB		

1.3 FINAL