

# National Information Assurance Partnership



## Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report

### Xceedium Gatekeeper Version 3.6

**Report Number:** CCEVS-VR-06-0048  
**Dated:** 31 October 2006  
**Version:** 1.0

National Institute of Standards and Technology  
Information Technology Laboratory  
100 Bureau Drive  
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

National Security Agency  
Information Assurance Directorate  
9800 Savage Road STE 6740  
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6740

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**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

**Validation Team**

**Franklin Haskell  
The MITRE Corporation  
Bedford, Massachusetts**

**Common Criteria Testing Laboratory**

**SAIC, Inc.  
Columbia, Maryland**

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## 1 Executive Summary

The evaluation of **Xceedium GateKeeper Version 3.6.0** was performed by SAIC, in the United States and was completed in August 2006. The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the Xceedium TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 and International Interpretations effective on 05, May 2005. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3.

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) determined that the evaluation assurance level (EAL) for the product is EAL 2 family of assurance requirements. The product, when configured as specified in the installation guides and user guides, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Xceedium GateKeeper Version 3.6 Security Target.

This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the GateKeeper product by any agency of the US Government and no warranty of the product is either expressed or implied.

The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, examined evaluation testing procedures, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.

The validation team notes that the claims made and successfully evaluated for the product represent a more limited set of requirements than what might be used for a "normal" product deployment. Specifically, no claims are made for protection of data transmission between parts of the TOE in spite of the fact that it will mostly likely be configured and setup in a distributed fashion over a network whose traffic could well be less than benign. It then becomes quite necessary for the administrators to fulfill the requirements levied on the environment. Nor were any claims made for the access control provided by the product between users and devices.

The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Evaluation Technical Report for Xceedium GateKeeper Version 3.6.0 (ETR) Parts 1 and 2 produced by SAIC.

### 1.1 Evaluation Details

**Evaluated Product:** GateKeeper Version 3.6.0

**Sponsor & Developer:** Xceedium, Inc.  
30 Montgomery St., Suite 1020  
Jersey City, NJ 07302

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**CCTL:** Science Applications International Corporation  
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory  
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive, Suite 300  
Columbia, MD 21046

**Completion Date:** August 2006

**CC:** **Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3**

**Interpretations:** There were no applicable interpretations used for this evaluation.

**CEM:** Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3

**Evaluation Class:** EAL 2

**Description**

The TOE is a rack mounted network appliance. The TOE provides remote IT support and monitoring to remote sites or local office locations via a Java enabled web browser. Common environments for use are hosting/co-location facilities where network access methods, monitoring, and security are essential.

Users and administrators access the TOE, but only administrators can access and set TOE security functions. Administrators may perform the following TOE tasks: view logins, user sessions, and reporting; set configuration parameters and conduct maintenance tasks; create custom access; utilize management features; and set associations between users and devices. All administrative actions are mediated by an access control policy.

**Disclaimer**

The information contained in this Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Gatekeeper product by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the Gatekeeper product is either expressed or implied.

**PP:** none

**Evaluation Personnel**

Shukrat Abbas  
John Boone

**Validation Team:** Franklin Haskell  
The MITRE Corporation  
202 Burlington Road  
Bedford, MA 01730-1420

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## 1.2 Interpretations

The Evaluation Team determined that there were no NIAP Interpretations applicable to this evaluation:

## 1.3 Threats to Security

The following are the threats that the evaluated product addresses:

**Table 1 - Threats**

T.PRIVIL	Unauthorized user	Illegal access through the administrator interface
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## 2 Identification

The product being evaluated is GateKeeper Version 3.6.0. Note that the actual target of evaluation is defined to be only certain parts of the whole product.

## 3 Security Policy

There are no Security Policies for the evaluated product.

**Table 2 - Policies**

P.MANAGE	The system must provide authorized administrators with utilities to effectively manage the security functions of the TOE
P.PROTECT	The TOE shall be protected from unauthorized accesses and disruptions of TOE data and functions.
P.AUDIT	Users of the system shall be held accountable for their security relevant actions within the system.

## 4 Assumptions

### 4.1 Personnel Assumptions

The following personnel assumptions are identified in the Security Target:

**Table 3 – Personnel Assumptions**

A.MANAGE	There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it contains.
A.NOEVIL	The authorized administrators are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the TOE documentation.

## 4.2 Physical Assumptions

The following physical assumptions are identified in the Security Target:

**Table 4 – Physical Assumptions**

A.LOCATE	The processing resources of the TOE will be located within controlled access facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical access.
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## 4.3 Clarification of Scope

All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:

1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made; and meets them with only a certain level of assurance (EAL 2 in this case).
2. As with all EAL 2 evaluations, this evaluation did not specifically search for vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” (as this term is defined in the CC and CEM); seriously attempt to find counters to them; nor find vulnerabilities related to objectives not claimed in the ST.
3. Encryption of communications using SSL between the web browser and the TOE is mentioned in some of the evaluation documents yet no requirements for it are included in the ST. Furthermore there are no requirements for any protection of data sent between the appliance and the web browser at all.
4. There are no requirements addressing access to the various network accessible devices by users. This means that those protections will have to be provided by the IT environment.
5. Note also that certain features of the product are not evaluated:
  - a. Fail Over Capability
  - b. Use of a Radius Server
  - c. Whole Security Scan
  - d. Use of a Modem
  - e. SNMP

## 5 Architectural Information

The TOE is a rack mounted network appliance. The TOE provides remote IT support and monitoring to remote sites or local office locations via a Java enabled web browser. Common environments for use are hosting/co-location facilities where network access methods, monitoring, and security are essential. All communication between the web-browser and TOE is protected with SSL (encrypted).

An administrator configures TOE user access to network devices. The administrator configures custom module permissions per user to the specific network devices. User entity includes both account and contact information. Both an administrator and a user can update the user’s account information for username, password, first name, last name, phone number, beeper number, email address, and other description such as department, location, etc.



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Users and administrators access the TOE, but only administrators can access and set TOE security functions. Administrators may view logins, user sessions, and reporting; set TOE configuration parameters; and conduct maintenance tasks; create custom access; utilize management features; and set associations between users and devices. All administrative actions are mediated by an access control policy.

The TOE implements the following evaluated features:

1. External appliance LCD display for entering initial host connection information or checking on system configuration.
2. Authentication via TOE web server
3. Single Access Port to network devices
4. Web interface GUI for administrators and users
5. Monitoring, logging, and alert emails for monitored events

This product is meant to be used in an environment where the support personnel are not local to the back-end devices and access is restricted via other means such as firewalls. In that scenario, only legitimate users with valid authentication credentials will be able to access services that were defined for them.

## **6 Documentation**

Following is a list of useful documents supplied by the developer on a CD shipped with the product.

- Xceedium GateKeeper v3.6.0 Administration Guide v3.6.4, August 2006
- Xceedium GateKeeper v3.6.0 Installation Guide, v3.6.3, August 2006
- Xceedium GateKeeper v3.6.0 User's Guide, v3.6.2, August 2006
- README file – contains an overall description of CD contents and basic system requirements

The security target used is:

- Xceedium GateKeeper Version 3.6 Security Target, version 1.0, October 11, 2006.

## **7 IT Product Testing**

The evaluation team applied each EAL 2 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured that the TOE performed as described in the functional specification and as stated in the TOE security functional requirements. The evaluation team performed a sample of the vendor test suite, and devised an independent set of team test and penetration tests. The vendor tests, team tests, and penetration tests substantiated the security functional requirements in the ST. The tests were conducted using:

- TOE Server Platform: GateKeeper v3.6 appliance
- TOE Client Platform: Windows XP SP2 and Java-enabled web browser
- Network Devices: Sun OS, Windows 2003 server, Windows NT, Mac OS, Cisco router, net KVM, Power cycle devices

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The basic test configuration is an administrator or user running a Java-enabled Web browser on a client machine performing functions on the TOE server appliance. The following tasks were performed by the evaluation team:

- The developer test suite was examined and found to provide adequate coverage of the security functions.
- A selection of the developer tests were run and the results found to be consistent with the results generated by the developer.
- No vulnerabilities in the TOE were found during a search of vulnerability databases.
- A few vulnerabilities were found in the Open SSL and Apache software being used but upon further examination were found not to be applicable because the version used has been patched, and the exploit was not possible in the TOE configuration.
- Tests devised from postulated vulnerabilities in the I&A mechanism revealed no problems.

## **8 Evaluated Configuration**

The evaluated configuration is a single Gatekeeper being accessed over a network from a single Web browser.

## **9 Results of the Evaluation**

The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's performance of a subset of the vendor tests suite, the independent tests, and the penetration test also demonstrates the accuracy of the claims in the ST.

## **10 Validator Comments/Recommendations**

The product is touted as a great aid to administrators allowing them to control access to and manage many devices scattered across a network through a single browser interface. It is meant to be used in an environment where the support personnel are not local to the back-end devices and access is restricted via other means such as firewalls. In that scenario, only legitimate users with valid authentication credentials will be able to access services that were defined for them. There are security considerations for at least three aspects of this product in its normal operating environment:

1. control of user access to the devices
2. protection of communications between the browser and the devices
3. management of user access and attributes.

Of these three only the last is addressed by the selection of requirements in the Security Target. This means that only the dynamic provisioning of non-local, remote user access to back-end devices based on defined privileges is evaluated. Not mentioned are any requirements for controlling user access to devices, nor any for the network links. Fortunately lack of any access control requirements merely means that the users may not be able to control the devices. There are requirements to control access of users to the controlling interface. The threat of "non-users" gaining access to the devices is not mentioned anywhere in the evaluation documents.

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It is more serious that no requirements are present regarding the protection of device commands transmitted over the network. E.g. the evaluated configuration does not protect against spoofing of such commands. Given that the device only has one network port that is used for both access to the device and for transmission of commands to the controlled devices; i.e. there is no alternate and protected pathway; it would seem that the SSL protection of this pathway should have been evaluated.

The validator recommends that any party considering purchase of this product make sure they understand the unevaluated capabilities they intend to use and the concomitant vulnerabilities.

## **11 Annexes**

Not applicable.

## **12 Security Target**

The security target for this product's evaluation is **Xceedium GateKeeper Version 3.6 Security Target**, Version 1.0, October 11, 2006.

## **13 Glossary**

There were no definitions used other than those used in the CC or CEM.

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## **Bibliography**

The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated August 2005, Version 2.3.
- [2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security functional requirements, dated August 2005, Version 2.3.
- [3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Annexes, dated August 1999, Version 2.1.
- [4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security assurance requirements, dated August 2005, Version 2.3.
- [5] Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security – Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated 1 November 1998, version 0.6.
- [6] Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security – Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, dated August 2005, version 2.3.
- [7] Evaluation Technical Report for Xceedium GateKeeper Version 3.6 Part II, version 2.0, October 19, 2006
- [8] Xceedium GateKeeper Version 3.6 Security Target, Version 1.0, October 11, 2006.
- [9] NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme for IT Security, Guidance to Common Criteria Testing Laboratories, Version 1.0, March 20, 2001