
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Note 4, Galaxy Note Edge, Galaxy Alpha, & Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE & 10.5 LTE (MDFPP11) Security Target

Version 1.0
10/03/14

Prepared for:

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

416 Maetan-3dong, Yeongtong-gu, Suwon-si, Gyeonggi-do, 443-742 Korea

Prepared By:



www.gossamersec.com

| | |
|---|-----------|
| 1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION | 3 |
| 1.1 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE | 3 |
| 1.2 TOE REFERENCE | 4 |
| 1.3 TOE OVERVIEW | 4 |
| 1.4 TOE DESCRIPTION | 4 |
| 1.4.1 TOE Architecture | 5 |
| 1.4.2 TOE Documentation | 7 |
| 2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS | 8 |
| 2.1 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE | 8 |
| 3. SECURITY OBJECTIVES | 9 |
| 3.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT | 9 |
| 4. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION | 10 |
| 5. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS | 12 |
| 5.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS | 12 |
| 5.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS) | 13 |
| 5.1.2 User data protection (FDP) | 18 |
| 5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA) | 19 |
| 5.1.4 Security management (FMT) | 21 |
| 5.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT) | 23 |
| 5.1.6 TOE access (FTA) | 25 |
| 5.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP) | 25 |
| 5.2 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS | 25 |
| 5.2.1 Development (ADV) | 26 |
| 5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD) | 26 |
| 5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC) | 27 |
| 5.2.4 Tests (ATE) | 28 |
| 5.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA) | 28 |
| 6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION | 29 |
| 6.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT | 29 |
| 6.2 USER DATA PROTECTION | 33 |
| 6.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | 34 |
| 6.4 SECURITY MANAGEMENT | 35 |
| 6.5 PROTECTION OF THE TSF | 36 |
| 6.6 TOE ACCESS | 38 |
| 6.7 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS | 39 |
| 7. TSF INVENTORY | 40 |

LIST OF TABLES

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Table 1 TOE Security Functional Components | 13 |
| Table 2 EAL 1 augmented with ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Assurance Components | 26 |
| Table 3 OpenSSL Cryptographic Algorithms | 31 |
| Table 4 Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Algorithms | 31 |
| Table 5 Power-up Cryptographic Algorithm Known Answer Tests | 37 |

1. Security Target Introduction

This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE consists of the Samsung Galaxy Note 4, Galaxy Note Edge, Galaxy Alpha, & Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE & 10.5 LTE provided by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.. The TOE is being evaluated as a Mobile Device.

The Security Target contains the following additional sections:

- Conformance Claims (Section 2)
- Security Objectives (Section 3)
- Extended Components Definition (Section 4)
- Security Requirements (Section 5)
- TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)

Conventions

The following conventions have been applied in this document:

- Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
 - Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST, iteration is indicated by a letter placed at the end of the component. For example FDP_ACC.1a and FDP_ACC.1b indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the FDP_ACC.1 requirement, a and b.
 - Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [**assignment**]). Note that an assignment within a selection would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [*[**selected-assignment**]]*).
 - Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [***selection***]).
 - Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., "... **all** objects ..." or "... ~~some~~ **big** things ...").
- The MDFPP uses an additional convention – the ‘case’ – which defines parts of an SFR that apply only when corresponding selections are made or some other identified conditions exist. Only the applicable cases are identified in this ST and they are identified using **bold** text.
- Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as captions.

1.1 Security Target Reference

ST Title – Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Note 4, Galaxy Note Edge, Galaxy Alpha, & Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE & 10.5 LTE (MDFPP11) Security Target

ST Version – Version 1.0

ST Date – 10/03/14

1.2 TOE Reference

TOE Identification – Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Note 4, Galaxy Note Edge, Galaxy Alpha, & Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE & 10.5 LTE.

TOE Developer – Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

Evaluation Sponsor – Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

1.3 TOE Overview

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) are the Samsung Galaxy Note 4, Galaxy Note Edge, Galaxy Alpha, & Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE & 10.5 LTE.

1.4 TOE Description

The TOE is a mobile operating system based on Android 4.4 with modifications made to increase the level of security provided to end users and enterprises. The TOE is intended to be used as part of an enterprise messaging solution providing mobile staff with enterprise connectivity.

The TOE includes a Common Criteria mode (or “CC mode”) that an administrator can invoke through the use of an MDM or through a dedicated administrative application (see the Guidance for instructions to obtain the application). The TOE must be configured as follows in order for an administrator to transition the TOE to CC mode.

- Require a screen lock password (swipe, PIN, pattern, or facial recognition screen locks are not allowed).
- The maximum password failure retry policy should be less than or equal to ten.
- Device encryption must be enabled.
- SDCard encryption must be enabled.
- Revocation checking must be enabled.

When CC mode has been enabled, the TOE behaves as follows.

- The TOE sets the system wide Android CC mode property to “Enabled”.
- The TOE performs FIPS 140-2 power-on self-tests.
- The TOE performs self-tests for the key management.
- The TOE performs secure boot integrity checking of the kernel and key system executables.
- The TOE prevents loading of custom firmware/kernels and requires all updates occur through FOTA (Samsung’s Firmware Over The Air firmware update method)
- The TOE uses CAVP approved cryptographic ciphers when joining and communicating with wireless networks.
- The TOE utilizes CAVP approved cryptographic ciphers for TLS.
- The TOE ensures FOTA updates utilize 2048-bit PKCS #1 RSA-PSS formatted signatures (with SHA-512 hashing).

There are four different models of the TOE, the Samsung Galaxy Note 4, Galaxy Note Edge, Galaxy Alpha, & Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE & 10.5 LTE. These models differ in physical form factor and in addition, Samsung offers each model in differing hardware variants:

1. Samsung manufactures the Galaxy Note 4 hardware in an LTE and 3G cellular radio variant and offers each variant with 16GB or 32GB of internal Flash storage.
 2. Samsung manufactures the Galaxy Note Edge hardware in an LTE cellular radio variant and offers each variant with 16GB or 32GB of internal Flash storage.
 3. Samsung manufactures the Galaxy Alpha hardware in an LTE and 3G cellular radio variant and offers each variant with 16GB, 32GB, or 64GB of internal Flash storage.
 4. Samsung manufactures the Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE hardware in an LTE cellular radio variant and offers it with 16GB, 32GB, or 64GB of internal Flash storage.
-

5. Samsung manufactures the Galaxy Tab S 10.5 LTE hardware in an LTE cellular radio variant and offers it with 16GB, 32GB, or 64GB of internal Flash storage.

Finally, the Galaxy Tab 8.4 LTE and 10.5 LTE do not have a phone or SMS/MMS messaging applications nor do they include an NFC radio, thus it does not provide such functionality.

The model numbers of the mobile devices used during the evaluation are as follows:

| Device Name | Model Number | Android Version | Kernel Version | Build Number |
|------------------------------|--------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|
| Galaxy Note 4 (Qualcomm) | SM-N910C | 4.4.4 | 3.10.0 | KYU84Q |
| Galaxy Note 4 (System LSI) | SM-N910F | 4.4.4 | 3.10.9 | KYU84Q |
| Galaxy Note Edge (Qualcomm) | SM-N915A | 4.4.4 | 3.10.0 | KYU84Q |
| Galaxy Alpha (Qualcomm) | SM-G850A | 4.4.4 | 3.4.0 | KYU84Q |
| Galaxy Alpha (System LSI) | SM-G850F | 4.4.4 | 3.10.9 | KYU84Q |
| Galaxy Tab S 8.4 (Qualcomm) | SM-T707V | 4.4.2 | 3.4.0 | KOT49H |
| Galaxy Tab S 10.5 (Qualcomm) | SM-T807V | 4.4.2 | 3.4.0 | KOT49H |

1.4.1 TOE Architecture

The TOE combines with a Mobile Device Management solution that enables the enterprise to watch, control and administer all deployed mobile devices, across multiple mobile service providers as well as facilitate secure communications through a VPN. This partnership provides a secure mobile environment that can be managed and controlled by the environment and reduce the risks that can be introduced through a Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) model.

Data on the TOE is protected through the implementation of Samsung On-Device Encryption (ODE) which utilizes CAVP certified cryptographic algorithms to encrypt device and SD card storage. This functionality is combined with a number of on-device policies including local wipe, remote wipe, password complexity, automatic lock and privileged access to security configurations to prevent unauthorized access to the device and stored data.

The Samsung Enterprise Software Development Kit (SDK) builds on top of the existing Android security model by expanding the current set of security configuration of options to more than 390 configurable policies and including additional security functionality such as application whitelisting and blacklisting.

1.4.1.1 Physical Boundaries

The TOE is a multi-user operating system based on Android (4.4) that incorporates the Samsung Enterprise SDK. The TOE does not include the user applications that run on top of the operating system, but does include controls that limit application behavior. The TOE is used as a mobile device within an enterprise environment where the configuration of the device is managed through a compliant device management solution.

The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data networks to establish network connectivity, and the through that connectivity interacts with MDM servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.

1.4.1.2 Logical Boundaries

This section summarizes the security functions provided by the Samsung Galaxy Note 4, Galaxy Note Edge, Galaxy Alpha, & Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE & 10.5 LTE:

- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE access
- Trusted path/channels

1.4.1.2.1 Cryptographic support

The TOE includes a cryptographic module with FIPS 140-2 certified algorithms for a wide range of cryptographic functions including: asymmetric key generation and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to implement security protocols such as TLS, IPsec, and HTTPS and also to encrypt the media (including the generation and protection of data, right, and key encryption keys) used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications running on the TOE.

1.4.1.2.2 User data protection

The TOE is designed to control access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE is design to protect user and other sensitive data using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected.

1.4.1.2.3 Identification and authentication

The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a user perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display and the frequency of entering passwords is limited and when a configured number of failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using upper and lower cases characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords between 4 and 16 characters are supported.

The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can use X509v3 and validate certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec exchanges.

1.4.1.2.4 Security management

The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while many are restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it removes all MDM policies and disables CC mode.

1.4.1.2.5 Protection of the TSF

The TOE implements a number of features designed to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or exportable. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address space layout

randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. It is also designed to protect itself from modification by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one another to protect those applications.

The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation.

1.4.1.2.6 TOE access

The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an advisory message (banner) when users unlock the TOE for use.

The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.

1.4.1.2.7 Trusted path/channels

The TOE supports the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec to secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.

1.4.2 TOE Documentation

Samsung Android 4.4 on Galaxy Devices Guidance documentation, Version 1.11, October 02, 2014.

Samsung Android 4.4 on Galaxy Devices User Guidance documentation, Version 1.5, October 02, 2014.

2. Conformance Claims

This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
 - Part 2 Extended
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
 - Part 3 Extended
- Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 1.1, 12 February 2014 (MDFPP11)
- Package Claims:
 - Assurance Level: EAL 1 augmented with ALC_TSU_EXT.1

2.1 Conformance Rationale

The ST conforms to the MDFPP11. As explained previously, the security problem definition, security objectives, and security requirements are defined the PP.

3. Security Objectives

The Security Problem Definition may be found in the MDFPP11 and this section reproduces only the corresponding Security Objectives for operational environment for reader convenience. The MDFPP11 offers additional information about the identified security objectives, but that has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP11 should be consulted if there is interest in that material.

In general, the MDFPP11 has defined Security Objectives appropriate for Mobile Device and as such are applicable to the Samsung Galaxy Note 4, Galaxy Note Edge, Galaxy Alpha, & Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE & 10.5 LTE TOE.

3.1 Security Objectives for the Environment

- **OE.CONFIG** TOE administrators will configure the Mobile Device security functions correctly to create the intended security policy.
- **OE.NOTIFY** The Mobile User will immediately notify the administrator if the Mobile Device is lost or stolen.
- **OE.PRECAUTION** The Mobile User exercises precautions to reduce the risk of loss or theft of the Mobile Device.

4. Extended Components Definition

All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the MDFPP11. The MDFPP11 defines the following extended SFRs and SARs and since they are not redefined in this ST the MDFPP11 should be consulted for more information in regard to those CC extensions.

- FCS_CKM_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Support
- FCS_CKM_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Key Random Generation
- FCS_CKM_EXT.3: Extended: Cryptographic Key Generation
- FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Extended: Key Destruction
- FCS_CKM_EXT.5: Extended: TSF Wipe
- FCS_CKM_EXT.6: Extended: Salt Generation
- FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: HTTPS Protocol
- FCS_IV_EXT.1: Extended: Initialization Vector Generation
- FCS_RBG_EXT.1(*): Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
- FCS_SRV_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services
- FCS_STG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Storage
- FCS_STG_EXT.2: Extended: Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage
- FCS_STG_EXT.3: Extended: Integrity of encrypted key storage
- FCS_TLS_EXT.1: Extended: EAP TLS Protocol
- FCS_TLS_EXT.2: TLS Protocol
- FDP_ACF_EXT.1: Extended: Security access control
- FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Extended: Data-At-Rest Protection
- FDP_IFC_EXT.1: Extended: Subset information flow control
- FDP_STG_EXT.1(1): Extended: User Data Storage
- FIA_AFL_EXT.1: Authorization failure handling
- FIA_PAE_EXT.1: Extended: PAE Authentication
- FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Extended: Password Management
- FIA_TRT_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication Throttling
- FIA_UAU_EXT.1 : Extended: Authentication for Cryptographic Operation
- FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Timing of Authentication
- FIA_UAU_EXT.3: Extended: Re-Authentication
- FIA_X509_EXT.1: Extended: Validation of certificates
- FIA_X509_EXT.2: Extended: X509 certificate authentication
- FIA_X509_EXT.3: Extended: Request Validation of certificates
- FMT_SMF_EXT.1: Extended: Specification of Remediation Actions

-
- FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)
 - FPT_AEX_EXT.2: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page Permissions)
 - FPT_AEX_EXT.3: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Stack Overflow Protection)
 - FPT_AEX_EXT.4: Extended: Domain Isolation
 - FPT_BBD_EXT.1: Application Processor Mediation
 - FPT_KST_EXT.1: Extended: Key Storage
 - FPT_KST_EXT.2: Extended: No Key Transmission
 - FPT_KST_EXT.3: Extended: No Plaintext Key Export
 - FPT_NOT_EXT.1: Extended: Event Notification
 - FPT_TST_EXT.1: Extended: TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing
 - FPT_TST_EXT.2: Extended: TSF Integrity Testing
 - FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update: TSF version query
 - FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Extended: Trusted Update Verification
 - FTA_SSL_EXT.1: Extended: TSF- and User-initiated locked state
 - FTA_WSE_EXT.1: Extended: Wireless Network Access
 - FTP_ITC_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted channel Communication
 - ALC_TSU_EXT.1: Timely Security Updates

5. Security Requirements

This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.

The SFRs have all been drawn from the MDFPP11. The refinements and operations already performed in the MDFPP11 are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements have been copied from the MDFPP11 and any residual operations have been completed herein. Of particular note, the MDFPP11 made a number of refinements and completed some of the SFR operations defined in the Common Criteria (CC) and that PP should be consulted to identify those changes if necessary.

The SARs are also drawn from the MDFPP11 which includes all the SARs for EAL 1 augmented with ALC_TSU_EXT.1. However, the SARs are effectively refined since requirement-specific 'Assurance Activities' are defined in the MDFPP11 that serve to ensure corresponding evaluations will yield more practical and consistent assurance than the assurance requirements alone. The MDFPP11 should be consulted for the assurance activity definitions.

5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the Samsung Galaxy Note 4, Galaxy Note Edge, Galaxy Alpha, & Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE & 10.5 LTE TOE.

| Requirement Class | Requirement Component | |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| FCS: Cryptographic support | FCS_CKM.1(1): Refinement: Cryptographic key generation | |
| | FCS_CKM.1(2): Cryptographic key generation | |
| | FCS_CKM.1(3): Cryptographic key generation | |
| | FCS_CKM.2: Cryptographic key distribution | |
| | FCS_CKM_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Support | |
| | FCS_CKM_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Key Random Generation | |
| | FCS_CKM_EXT.3: Extended: Cryptographic Key Generation | |
| | FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Extended: Key Destruction | |
| | FCS_CKM_EXT.5: Extended: TSF Wipe | |
| | FCS_CKM_EXT.6: Extended: Salt Generation | |
| | FCS_COP.1(1): Cryptographic operation | |
| | FCS_COP.1(2): Cryptographic operation | |
| | FCS_COP.1(3): Refinement: Cryptographic operation | |
| | FCS_COP.1(4): Refinement: Cryptographic operation | |
| | FCS_COP.1(5): Refinement: Cryptographic operation | |
| | FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: HTTPS Protocol | |
| | FCS_IV_EXT.1: Extended: Initialization Vector Generation | |
| | FCS_RBG_EXT.1(*): Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) | |
| | FCS_SRV_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services | |
| | FCS_STG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Storage | |
| | FCS_STG_EXT.2: Extended: Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage | |
| | FCS_STG_EXT.3: Extended: Integrity of encrypted key storage | |
| | FCS_TLS_EXT.1: Extended: EAP TLS Protocol | |
| | FCS_TLS_EXT.2: TLS Protocol | |
| | FDP: User data protection | FDP_ACF_EXT.1: Extended: Security access control |
| | | FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Extended: Data-At-Rest Protection |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | FDP_IFC_EXT.1: Extended: Subset information flow control | |
| | FDP_STG_EXT.1(1): Extended: User Data Storage | |
| FIA: Identification and authentication | FIA_AFL_EXT.1: Authorization failure handling | |
| | FIA_PAE_EXT.1: Extended: PAE Authentication | |
| | FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Extended: Password Management | |
| | FIA_TRT_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication Throttling | |
| | FIA_UAU.7: Protected authentication feedback | |
| | FIA_UAU_EXT.1 : Extended: Authentication for Cryptographic Operation | |
| | FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Timing of Authentication | |
| | FIA_UAU_EXT.3: Extended: Re-Authentication | |
| | FIA_X509_EXT.1: Extended: Validation of certificates | |
| | FIA_X509_EXT.2: Extended: X509 certificate authentication | |
| | FIA_X509_EXT.3: Extended: Request Validation of certificates | |
| | FMT: Security management | FMT_MOF.1(1): Management of security functions behavior |
| FMT_MOF.1(2): Management of security functions behavior | | |
| FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions | | |
| FMT_SMF_EXT.1: Extended: Specification of Remediation Actions | | |
| FPT: Protection of the TSF | FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR) | |
| | FPT_AEX_EXT.2: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page Permissions) | |
| | FPT_AEX_EXT.3: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Stack Overflow Protection) | |
| | FPT_AEX_EXT.4: Extended: Domain Isolation | |
| | FPT_BBD_EXT.1: Application Processor Mediation | |
| | FPT_KST_EXT.1: Extended: Key Storage | |
| | FPT_KST_EXT.2: Extended: No Key Transmission | |
| | FPT_KST_EXT.3: Extended: No Plaintext Key Export | |
| | FPT_NOT_EXT.1: Extended: Event Notification | |
| | FPT_STM.1: Reliable time stamps | |
| | FPT_TST_EXT.1: Extended: TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing | |
| | FPT_TST_EXT.2: Extended: TSF Integrity Testing | |
| | FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update: TSF version query | |
| | FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Extended: Trusted Update Verification | |
| | FTA: TOE access | FTA_SSL_EXT.1: Extended: TSF- and User-initiated locked state |
| | | FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners |
| FTA_WSE_EXT.1: Extended: Wireless Network Access | | |
| FTP: Trusted path/channels | FTP_ITC_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted channel Communication | |

Table 1 TOE Security Functional Components

5.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)

5.1.1.1 Refinement: Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1(1))

FCS_CKM.1(1).1

The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys used for key establishment in accordance with:

- NIST Special Publication 800-56B, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography' for RSA-based key establishment schemes and
- *NIST Special Publication 800-56A, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment*

Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography' for elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes and implementing 'NIST curves' P-256, P-384 and [P-521] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard')]
and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112 bits.

5.1.1.2 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1(2))

FCS_CKM.1(2).1

The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys used for authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm
[- *FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Appendix B.4 for ECDSA schemes and implementing 'NIST curves' P-256, P-384 and [P-521];*
- *ANSI X9.31-1998, Appendix A.2.4 Using AES for RSA schemes;*]
and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112 bits.

5.1.1.3 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1(3))

FCS_CKM.1(3).1

The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm PRF-384 and specified cryptographic key sizes 128 bits using a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1(1) that meet the following: IEEE 802.11-2012.

5.1.1.4 Cryptographic key distribution (FCS_CKM.2)

FCS_CKM.2.1

The TSF shall decrypt Group Temporal Key (GTK) in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method AES Key Wrap in an EAPOL-Key frame that meets the following: NIST SP 800-38F, IEEE 802.11-2012 for the packet format and timing considerations and does not expose the cryptographic keys.

5.1.1.5 Extended: Cryptographic Key Support (FCS_CKM_EXT.1)

FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall support a hardware-protected REK with an AES key of size [256 bits].

FCS_CKM_EXT.1.2

A REK shall not be able to be read from or exported from the hardware.

FCS_CKM_EXT.1.3

System software on the TSF shall be able only to request encryption/decryption by the key and shall not be able to read, import, or export a REK.

FCS_CKM_EXT.1.4

A REK shall be generated by a RBG in accordance with FCS_RBG_EXT.1(1).

5.1.1.6 Extended: Cryptographic Key Random Generation (FCS_CKM_EXT.2)

FCS_CKM_EXT.2.1

All DEKs shall be randomly generated with entropy corresponding to the security strength of AES key sizes of [128, 256] bits.

5.1.1.7 Extended: Cryptographic Key Generation (FCS_CKM_EXT.3)

FCS_CKM_EXT.3.1

All KEKs shall be [256-bit] keys corresponding to at least the security strength of the keys encrypted by the KEK.

FCS_CKM_EXT.3.2

The TSF shall generate KEKs by deriving the KEK from a Password Authentication Factor using PBKDF and *[a) an RBG that meets this profile (as specified FCS_RBG_EXT.1(*)), b) combined from other KEKs in a way that preserves the effective entropy of each factor by [encrypting one key with another]]*

5.1.1.8 Extended: Key Destruction (FCS_CKM_EXT.4)

FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1

The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with the specified cryptographic key destruction method *[in accordance with the following rules: [- For volatile flash memory the destruction shall be executed by [a single direct overwrite consisting of zeros followed by a read-verify]]]*.

FCS_CKM_EXT.4.2

The TSF shall destroy all plaintext keying material and cryptographic security parameters when no longer needed.

5.1.1.9 Extended: TSF Wipe (FCS_CKM_EXT.5)

FCS_CKM_EXT.5.1

The TSF shall wipe all protected data by *[Cryptographically erasing the encrypted DEKs and/or the KEKs in non-volatile memory by following the requirements in FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1;]*

FCS_CKM_EXT.5.2

The TSF shall perform a power cycle on conclusion of the wipe procedure.

5.1.1.10 Extended: Salt Generation (FCS_CKM_EXT.6)

FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1

The TSF shall generate all salts using a RBG that meets FCS_RBG_EXT.1(*).

5.1.1.11 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1(1))

FCS_COP.1(1).1

The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm

- AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A) mode,
- AES-CCMP (as defined in FIPS PUB 197, NIST SP 800-38C and IEEE 802.11-2012), and
- *[AES Key Wrap (KW) (as defined in NIST SP 800-38F), AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D)]*

and cryptographic key sizes 128-bit key sizes and *[256-bit key sizes]*.

5.1.1.12 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1(2))

FCS_COP.1(2).1

The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and *[SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512]* and message digest sizes 160 and *[256, 384, 512 bits]* that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4.

5.1.1.13 Refinement: Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1(3))

FCS_COP.1(3).1

The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm

- FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 4 for RSA schemes
- [- FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 5 for ECDSA schemes and*

implementing 'NIST curves' P-256, P-384 and [P-521]]
and cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112 bits.

5.1.1.14 Refinement: Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1(4))

FCS_COP.1(4).1

The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-SHA-1 and [*HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512*] and cryptographic key sizes [**any key sizes**] and message digest sizes 160 and [*256, 384, 512*] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 198-1, 'The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, and FIPS Pub 180-4, 'Secure Hash Standard'.

5.1.1.15 Refinement: Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1(5))

FCS_COP.1(5).1

The TSF shall perform Password-based Key Derivation Functions in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-*[SHA-512]*] and output cryptographic key sizes [*256*] that meet the following: NIST SP 800-132.

5.1.1.16 HTTPS Protocol (FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1)

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS (FCS_TLS_EXT.2).

5.1.1.17 Extended: Initialization Vector Generation (FCS_IV_EXT.1)

FCS_IV_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall generate IVs in accordance with MDFPP11 Table 11: References and IV Requirements for NIST-approved Cipher Modes.

5.1.1.18 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) (FCS_RBG_EXT.1(1))

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1(1)

The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with [*NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)]*].

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2(1)

The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from [*TSF-hardware-based noise source*] with a minimum of [*256 bits*] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.3(1)

The TSF shall be capable of providing output of the RBG to applications running on the TSF that request random bits.

5.1.1.19 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) (FCS_RBG_EXT.1(2))

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1(2)

The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with [*FIPS Pub 140-2 Annex C: X9.31 Appendix 2.4 using AES*].

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2(2)

The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from [*TSF-hardware-based noise source*] with a minimum of [*128 bits*] of entropy at least equal to the

greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.3(2)

The TSF shall be capable of providing output of the RBG to applications running on the TSF that request random bits.

5.1.1.20 Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services (FCS_SRV_EXT.1)

FCS_SRV_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide a mechanism for applications to request the TSF to perform the following cryptographic operations:

- FCS_COP.1(1)
- FCS_COP.1(2)
- FCS_COP.1(3)
- FCS_COP.1(4)
- FCS_COP.1(5)
- FCS_CKM.1(1)
- [FCS_CKM.1(2)].

5.1.1.21 Extended: Cryptographic Key Storage (FCS_STG_EXT.1)

FCS_STG_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide secure key storage for asymmetric private keys and [*no other keys*].

FCS_STG_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall be capable of importing keys/secrets into the secure key storage upon request of [*the user, the administrator*] and [*applications running on the TSF*].

FCS_STG_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall be capable of destroying keys/secrets in the secure key storage upon request of [*the user*].

FCS_STG_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall have the capability to allow only the application that imported the key/secret the use of the key/secret. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [*a common application developer*].

FCS_STG_EXT.1.5

The TSF shall allow only the application that imported the key/secret to request that the key/secret be destroyed. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [*a common application developer*].

5.1.1.22 Extended: Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage (FCS_STG_EXT.2)

FCS_STG_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall encrypt all DEKs and KEKs and [*all software-based key storage*] by KEKs that are
1) Protected by the REK with [a. encryption by a REK, b. encryption by a KEK chaining to a REK],
2) Protected by the REK and the password with [a. encryption by a REK and the password-derived KEK, b. encryption by a KEK chaining to a REK and the password-derived KEK].

FCS_STG_EXT.2.2

All keys shall be encrypted using AES in the [*GCM, CBC mode*].

5.1.1.23 Extended: Integrity of encrypted key storage (FCS_STG_EXT.3)

FCS_STG_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall protect the integrity of any encrypted KEK by [- [*GCM*] cipher mode for encryption according to FCS_STG_EXT.2;].

FCS_STG_EXT.3.2

The TSF shall verify the integrity of the [hash] of the stored key prior to use of the key.

5.1.1.24 Extended: EAP TLS Protocol (FCS_TLS_EXT.1)

FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement the EAP-TLS protocol as specified in RFC 5216 implementing TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246) and [no other TLS versions] supporting the following ciphersuites:

- Mandatory Ciphersuites in accordance with RFC 3268:

o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA

- Optional Ciphersuites:

[o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA

o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA

o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA]

FCS_TLS_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall verify that the server certificate presented for EAP-TLS [chains to one of the specified CAs].

5.1.1.25 TLS Protocol (FCS_TLS_EXT.2)

FCS_TLS_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall implement one or more of the following protocols TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [selection: TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)] supporting the following ciphersuites:

- Mandatory Ciphersuites:

o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA

- Optional Ciphersuites:

[o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,

o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,

o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,

o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,

o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,

o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,

o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,

o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,

o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,

o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 6460,

o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 6460]

FCS_TLS_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the distinguished name (DN) contained in a certificate does not match the expected DN for the peer.

5.1.2 User data protection (FDP)

5.1.2.1 Extended: Security access control (FDP_ACF_EXT.1)

FDP_ACF_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide a mechanism to restrict the system services that are accessible to an application.

5.1.2.2 Extended: Data-At-Rest Protection (FDP_DAR_EXT.1)

FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1

Encryption shall cover all protected data.

FDP_DAR_EXT.1.2

Encryption shall be performed using DEKs with AES in the [*CBC, GCM*] mode with key size [*128, 256*] bits.

5.1.2.3 Extended: Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC_EXT.1)

FDP_IFC_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall [*enable all IP traffic (other than IP traffic required to establish the VPN connection) to flow through the IPsec VPN client*].

5.1.2.4 Extended: User Data Storage (FDP_STG_EXT.1(1))

FDP_STG_EXT.1.1(1)

The TSF shall provide protected storage for the Trust Anchor Database.

5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)

5.1.3.1 Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL_EXT.1)

FIA_AFL_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall detect when a configurable positive integer within [**1-100**] of unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to last successful authentication by that user.

FIA_AFL_EXT.1.2

When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [*met*], the TSF shall perform [*full wipe of all protected data*].

5.1.3.2 Extended: PAE Authentication (FIA_PAE_EXT.1)

FIA_PAE_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall conform to IEEE Standard 802.1X for a Port Access Entity (PAE) in the 'Supplicant' role.

5.1.3.3 Extended: Password Management (FIA_PMG_EXT.1)

FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall support the following for the Password Authentication Factor:

1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of [*upper and lower case letters*], numbers, and special characters: [*!@#\$%^&*()+=_/'":; , ? ` ~ | < > { } []*];
2. Password length up to [**16**] characters shall be supported.

5.1.3.4 Extended: Authentication Throttling (FIA_TRT_EXT.1)

FIA_TRT_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall limit automated user authentication attempts by [*preventing authentication via an external port, enforcing a delay between incorrect authentication attempts*]. The minimum delay shall be such that no more than 10 attempts can be attempted per 500 milliseconds.

5.1.3.5 Protected authentication feedback (FIA_UAU.7)

FIA_UAU.7.1

The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the device's display to the user while the authentication is in progress.

5.1.3.6 Extended: Authentication for Cryptographic Operation (FIA_UAU_EXT.1)

FIA_UAU_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall require the user to present the Password Authentication Factor prior to decryption of protected data and keys at startup.

5.1.3.7 Timing of Authentication (FIA_UAU_EXT.2)

FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall allow [*make emergency phone calls¹, take screen shots (stored internally), receive calls, turn TOE off, restart TOE, enable/disable airplane mode, configure sound, vibrate, or mute, set volume for sound categories*] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA_UAU_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

5.1.3.8 Extended: Re-Authentication (FIA_UAU_EXT.3)

FIA_UAU_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall require the user to enter the correct Password Authentication Factor when the user changes the Password Authentication Factor, and following TSF- and user-initiated locking in order to transition to the unlocked state, and [*no other conditions*].

5.1.3.9 Extended: Validation of certificates (FIA_X509_EXT.1)

FIA_X509_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
- The certificate path must terminate with a certificate in the Trust Anchor Database.
- The TSF shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension and that the cA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates.
- The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [*a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759*].
- The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
 - o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3).
 - o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.

FIA_X509_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

5.1.3.10 Extended: X509 certificate authentication (FIA_X509_EXT.2)

FIA_X509_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for EAP-TLS exchanges, and [*TLS, IPsec*], and [*no additional uses*].

FIA_X509_EXT.2.2

When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [*not accept the certificate*].

¹ The Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE and 10.5 LTE do not support phone capabilities.

FIA_X509_EXT.2.3

The TSF shall not establish a trusted communication channel if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.

5.1.3.11 Extended: Request Validation of certificates (FIA_X509_EXT.3)

FIA_X509_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall provide a certificate validation service to applications.

FIA_X509_EXT.3.2

The TSF shall respond to the requesting application with the success or failure of the validation.

5.1.4 Security management (FMT)

5.1.4.1 Management of security functions behavior (FMT_MOF.1(1))

FMT_MOF.1(1).1

The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions

1. enroll the TOE in management

[5. enable/disable [personal Hotspot connections and tethered connections]]

to the user.

5.1.4.2 Management of security functions behavior (FMT_MOF.1(2))

FMT_MOF.1(2).1

The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions

1. configure password policy:

- a. minimum password length
- b. minimum password complexity
- c. maximum password lifetime

2. configure session locking policy:

- a. screen-lock enabled/disabled
- b. screen lock timeout

- c. number of authentication failures

3. enable/disable[**camera and microphone devices**]

4. configure application installation policy by [**c. denying installation of applications**]

[5. enable/disable the VPN protection,

6. enable/disable [nfc, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and cellular radios],²

8. enable/disable [personal Hotspot connections, tethered connections],

9. specify wireless networks (SSIDs) to which the TSF may connect,

10. configure security policy for each wireless network:

a. [specify the CA(s) from which the TSF will accept WLAN authentication server certificate(s)]

b. ability to specify security type

c. ability to specify authentication protocol

d. specify the client credentials to be used for authentication

e. [no additional WLAN functions]

11. enable/disable developer modes,

12. enable data-at rest protection,

13. enable removable media's data-at-rest protection,

22. enable/disable messaging capabilities³,

24. enable/disable voice command control of device functions,

² The Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE and 10.5 LTE do not include NFC capabilities.

³ The Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE and 10.5 LTE do not include SMS/MMS capabilities.

31. enable/disable Location services]

to the administrator when the device is enrolled and according to the administrator-configured policy.

5.1.4.3 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)

FMT_SMF.1.1

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

1. configure password policy:
 - a. minimum password length
 - b. minimum password complexity
 - c. maximum password lifetime
2. configure session locking policy:
 - a. screen-lock enabled/disabled
 - b. screen lock timeout
 - c. number of authentication failures
3. enable/disable the VPN protection
4. enable/disable **[nfc, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and cellular radios]**⁴
5. enable/disable **[camera and microphone devices]**
6. specify wireless networks (SSIDs) to which the TSF may connect
7. configure security policy for each wireless network:
 - a. **[specify the CA(s) from which the TSF will accept WLAN authentication server certificate(s)]**
 - b. ability to specify security type
 - c. ability to specify authentication protocol
 - d. specify the client credentials to be used for authentication
 - e. **[no additional WLAN management functions]**
8. transition to the locked state
9. full wipe of protected data
10. configure application installation policy by **[c. denying installation of applications]**,
11. import keys/secrets into the secure key storage,
12. destroy imported keys/secrets and **[no other keys/secrets]** in the secure key storage,
13. import X.509v3 certificates into the Trust Anchor Database,
14. remove imported X.509v3 certificates and **[no other X.509v3 certificates]** in the Trust Anchor Database,
15. enroll the TOE in management
16. remove applications
17. update system software
18. install applications
- [20. enable/disable [tethering over WiFi, USB, and Bluetooth],**
- 21. enable/disable developer modes,**
- 22. enable data-at rest protection,**
- 23. enable removable media's data-at-rest protection,**
- 25. configure the Access Point Name and proxy used for communications between the cellular network and other networks**
- 30. remove Enterprise applications,**
- 34. enable/disable device messaging capabilities**⁵,
- 36. enable/disable voice command control of device functions,**
- 41. configure the unlock banner**

⁴ The Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE and 10.5 LTE do not include NFC capabilities.

⁵ The Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE and 10.5 LTE do not include SMS/MMS capabilities.

42. enable/disable Location services, enable/disable USB mass storage, authenticate personal Hotspot connections to the device via [pre-shared key]].

5.1.4.4 Extended: Specification of Remediation Actions (FMT_SMF_EXT.1)

FMT_SMF_EXT.1

The TSF shall offer [**full wipe of protected data, remove Enterprise applications, [remove MDM policies and disable CC mode]**] upon unenrollment and [*no other triggers*].

5.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

5.1.5.1 Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR) (FPT_AEX_EXT.1)

FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide address space layout randomization (ASLR) to applications.

FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2

The base address of any user-space memory mapping will consist of at least 8 unpredictable bits.

5.1.5.2 Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page Permissions) (FPT_AEX_EXT.2)

FPT_AEX_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall be able to enforce read, write, and execute permissions on every page of physical memory.

5.1.5.3 Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Stack Overflow Protection) (FPT_AEX_EXT.3)

FPT_AEX_EXT.3.1

TSF processes that execute in a non-privileged execution domain on the application processor shall implement stack-based buffer overflow protection.

5.1.5.4 Extended: Domain Isolation (FPT_AEX_EXT.4)

FPT_AEX_EXT.4.1

The TSF shall protect itself from modification by untrusted subjects.

FPT_AEX_EXT.4.2

The TSF shall enforce isolation of address space between applications.

5.1.5.5 Application Processor Mediation (FPT_BBD_EXT.1)

FPT_BBD_EXT.1.1

Code executing on any baseband processor (BP) shall not be able to access application processor (AP) resources except when mediated by the AP.

5.1.5.6 Extended: Key Storage (FPT_KST_EXT.1)

FPT_KST_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall not store any plaintext key material in readable non-volatile memory.

5.1.5.7 Extended: No Key Transmission (FPT_KST_EXT.2)

FPT_KST_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall not transmit any plaintext key material from the cryptographic module.

5.1.5.8 Extended: No Plaintext Key Export (FPT_KST_EXT.3)

FPT_KST_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall ensure it is not possible for the TOE user(s) to export plaintext keys.

5.1.5.9 Extended: Event Notification (FPT_NOT_EXT.1)

FPT_NOT_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall transition to non-operational mode and [*no other actions*] when the following types of failures occur:

- failures of the self tests
- TSF software integrity verification failures
- [*no other failures*].

5.1.5.10 Reliable time stamps (FPT_STM.1)

FPT_STM.1.1

The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.

5.1.5.11 Extended: TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing (FPT_TST_EXT.1)

FPT_TST_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of all cryptographic functionality.

5.1.5.12 Extended: TSF Integrity Testing (FPT_TST_EXT.2)

FPT_TST_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall verify the integrity of the Application Processor bootloader software, Application Processor OS kernel, and [*no other executable code*], stored in mutable media prior to its execution through the use of [*a digital signature using a hardware-protected asymmetric key*].

5.1.5.13 Extended: Trusted Update: TSF version query (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the TOE firmware/software.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the hardware model of device.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of installed mobile applications.

5.1.5.14 Extended: Trusted Update Verification (FPT_TUD_EXT.2)

FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall verify software updates to the TSF using a digital signature by the manufacturer prior to installing those updates.

FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2

The boot integrity [*key, hash*] shall only be updated by verified software.

FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3

The digital signature verification key shall [*match a hardware-protected public key*].

FPT_TUD_EXT.2.4

The TSF shall verify mobile application software using a digital signature mechanism prior to installation.

5.1.6 TOE access (FTA)

5.1.6.1 Extended: TSF- and User-initiated locked state (FTA_SSL_EXT.1)

FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall transition to a locked state after a time interval of inactivity and a user initiated lock, and upon transitioning to the locked state, the TSF shall perform the following operations:

- a) clearing or overwriting display devices, obscuring the previous contents;
- b) [no other actions].

5.1.6.2 Default TOE Access Banners (FTA_TAB.1)

FTA_TAB.1.1

Before establishing a user session, the TSF shall display an Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE.

5.1.6.3 Extended: Wireless Network Access (FTA_WSE_EXT.1)

FTA_WSE_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be able to attempt connections to wireless networks specified as acceptable networks as configured by the administrator in FMT_SMF.1.

5.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

5.1.7.1 Extended: Trusted channel Communication (FTP_ITC_EXT.1)

FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS and [TLS and IPsec] to provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.

FTP_ITC_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall permit the TSF and applications to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for connection to a wireless access point and [no other communications].

5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The SARs for the TOE are the EAL 1 augmented with ALC_TSU_EXT.1 components as specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. Note that the SARs have effectively been refined with the assurance activities explicitly defined in association with both the SFRs and SARs.

| Requirement Class | Requirement Component |
|--------------------------------|---|
| ADV: Development | ADV_FSP.1: Basic functional specification |
| AGD: Guidance documents | AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance |
| | AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures |
| ALC: Life-cycle support | ALC_CMC.1: Labelling of the TOE |
| | ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM coverage |
| | ALC_TSU_EXT.1: Timely Security Updates |

| | |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| ATE: Tests | ATE_IND.1: Independent testing - conformance |
| AVA: Vulnerability assessment | AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability survey |

Table 2 EAL 1 augmented with ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Assurance Components

5.2.1 Development (ADV)

5.2.1.1 Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)

ADV_FSP.1.1d

The developer shall provide a functional specification.

ADV_FSP.1.2d

The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.

ADV_FSP.1.1c

The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

ADV_FSP.1.2c

The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

ADV_FSP.1.3c

The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorisation of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.

ADV_FSP.1.4c

The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.

ADV_FSP.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ADV_FSP.1.2e

The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.

5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)

5.2.2.1 Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)

AGD_OPE.1.1d

The developer shall provide operational user guidance.

AGD_OPE.1.1c

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.

AGD_OPE.1.2c

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.

AGD_OPE.1.3c

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.

AGD_OPE.1.4c

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.

AGD_OPE.1.5c

The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences and implications for maintaining secure operation.

AGD_OPE.1.6c

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

AGD_OPE.1.7c

The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.

AGD_OPE.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

5.2.2.2 Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)

AGD_PRE.1.1d

The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.

AGD_PRE.1.1c

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.

AGD_PRE.1.2c

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

AGD_PRE.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AGD_PRE.1.2e

The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared securely for operation.

5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC)

5.2.3.1 Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)

ALC_CMC.1.1d

The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.

ALC_CMC.1.1c

The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.

ALC_CMC.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

5.2.3.2 TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)

ALC_CMS.2.1d

The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.

ALC_CMS.2.1c

The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs.

ALC_CMS.2.2c

The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.

ALC_CMS.2.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

5.2.3.3 Timely Security Updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)

ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1d

The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security updates are made to the TOE.

ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1c

The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security updates for the TOE software/firmware.

ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2c

The description shall express the time window as the length of time, in days, between public disclosure of a vulnerability and the public availability of security updates to the TOE.

ALC_TSU_EXT.1.3c

The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting security issues pertaining to the TOE.

ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

5.2.4 Tests (ATE)

5.2.4.1 Independent testing - conformance (ATE_IND.1)

ATE_IND.1.1d

The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.

ATE_IND.1.1c

The TOE shall be suitable for testing.

ATE_IND.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ATE_IND.1.2e

The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.

5.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)

5.2.5.1 Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)

AVA_VAN.1.1d

The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.

AVA_VAN.1.1c

The TOE shall be suitable for testing.

AVA_VAN.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AVA_VAN.1.2e

The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.

AVA_VAN.1.3e

The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.

6. TOE Summary Specification

This chapter describes the security functions:

- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE access
- Trusted path/channels

6.1 Cryptographic support

FCS_CKM.1(1): The TOE has CVL algorithm certificate #10 and ECDSA algorithm certificate #264 for Elliptic Curve key establishment and key generation respectively. The TOE has RSA algorithm certificate #960 for RSA key generation and for RSA key establishment, the TOE generally fulfills all of the NIST SP 800-56A and 800-56B requirements without extensions.

FCS_CKM.1(2): The TOE supports asymmetric key generation of RSA and ECDSA (for curves P-256, P-384, and P-521) key pairs for signature generation and verification, which the TOE generates as per the ANSI X9.31 and FIPS 186-2, respectively. The TOE has RSA certificate #960 and ECDSA certificate # 264 for its RSA and ECDSA key generation implementations. While the TOE itself does not currently utilize its key generation implementation to generate any signature key pairs, the TOE provides key generation as a service to mobile applications executing on the TOE. The TOE allows applications to generate key pairs with any security strength, including those equal to or greater than 112-bits (the PP requires that an application only generate and use asymmetric keys with a security strength of 112-bits).

FCS_CKM.1(3): The TOE adheres to 802.11-2012 with regards to 802.11i key generation. The TOE provides the PRF384 for WPA2, generates AES 128-bit keys using the OpenSSL module. The TOE has been designed for compliance, and the Devices have successfully completed certification (including WPA2 Enterprise) and received a WiFi CERTIFIED Interoperability Certificate from the WiFi Alliance. The WiFi Alliance maintains a website providing further information about the testing program: <http://www.wi-fi.org/certification>

FCS_CKM.2: The TOE adheres to the RFC 3394, SP 800-38F, and 802.11-2012 standards and unwraps the GTK (sent wrapped using AES Key Wrap in an EAPOL-Key frame), thus ensuring that it does not expose the Group Temporal Key (GTK).

FCS_CKM_EXT.1: The TOE supports a Root Encryption Key (REK) within the main (application) processor. Requests for encryption or decryption chaining to the REK are only accessible through the Trusted Execution Environment, or TEE (TrustZone). The REK lies in a series of 256-bit fuses, which either the TOE programs during manufacturing or the processor vendor programs during fabrication. The TEE does not allow direct access to the REK but provides access to a derived HEK (Hardware Encryption Key) which is derived from the REK through a KDF function for encryption and decryption.

The REK value is generated during manufacturing either by the TOE (if it detects that the REK fuses have not been set) using its hardware DRBG or is generated during fabrication using an external RBG that meets the requirements of this PP in that the process utilizes a SHA-256 Hash_DRBG seeded by a hardware entropy source identical in architecture to that within the TOE. This fabrication process includes strict controls to ensure that fabricator cannot access any REK values between generation and programming.

FCS_CKM_EXT.2: The TOE supports Data Encryption Key (DEK) generation using its approved RBGs. The TOE generates AES 256-bit DEKs using its OpenSSL CTR_DRBG in response to an application through either the Android Java API or through the native C API. This is used, for example, by the ODE (Onboard Device Encryption, which refers to the TOE's encryption of the user data partition) system using the native C API as well as by the media encryption system application to generate a master key for protection of File Encryption Keys (FEKs) for individual files.

The TOE also generates DEKs by using its ANSI X9.31 A.2.4 AES-128 RNG (contained in the kernel crypto module). The removable media encryption system of the TOE utilizes this function to generate FEKs to encrypt individual files on the removable media.

FCS_CKM_EXT.3: The TOE generates KEKs (which are always AES 256-bit keys generated by the CTR_DRBG) through a combination of methods. First, the module generates a KEK (denoted as a Domain KEK, or DKEK) for each user of the phone, for each Domain (where a Domain provides separation of application data, e.g., "Corporate" or "Home"). Note that the current TOE only supports a single Domain for each user; however future versions of the TOE may support multiple Domains.

To protect the user's DKEK, the TOE first combines a key derived from the user's password with PBKDF2 with a random SALT as well as a unique Domain string. The resulting ephemeral PKEK (password key encryption key) is then used to protect the randomly generated DKEK, the second factor being the REK-derived HEK. The DKEK is encrypted with AES256 GCM inside the TEE, to provide both security and integrity for storage. This process is reversed to access the DKEK.

The TOE generates a number of different KEKs. In addition to the DKEK, applications may request key generation (either through the Java or native C API), and the TOE utilizes the same RBG to satisfy those requests. The requesting application ultimately chooses whether to use that key as a DEK or a KEK (and can choose whether it wishes that key to be 128 or 256-bits), but it is worth mentioning here, as an application can utilize such a key as a KEK, should it choose.

In addition to those KEKs, the TOE also derives several other ephemeral KEKs. The HEK is derived directly from the REK using an AES_CMAC based KDF to derive the 256-bit HEK. The PKEK2 is derived from the user's password combined with Salt (again, taken from the AES-256 CTR_DRBG) forming PKEK1, which is then put through an SP 800-108 KDF using a specific Domain value to derive PKEK2. Finally, the TOE can derive a KEK for an application by using an SP 800-108 KDF to combine the DKEK with a string provided by the application to form KEK1. In each of these operations, the key management scheme ensures preservation of effective entropy.

FCS_CKM_EXT.4: The TOE destroys cryptographic keys when they are no longer in use by the system. The exceptions to this are public keys (that protect the boot chain and software updates) and the REK, which are never cleared. Keys stored in RAM for immediate use are destroyed by a zero overwrite. Keys stored in Flash (i.e. eMMC) are destroyed by cryptographic erasure upon invocation of a wipe of all data through a Secure Trim command (as defined in the JEDEC eMMC 5.0 specification, JESD84-B50) to the flash controller for the location where the ODE and removable media keys are stored. Once these are erased, the keys stored within the encrypted data partition of the TOE are considered cryptographically erased.

FCS_CKM_EXT.5: The TOE provides a TOE Wipe function that first erases the ODE DEK used to encrypt the entire data partition using a Secure Trim command to ensure that TOE writes zeros to the eMMC blocks containing the ODE DEK (the data partition footer contains the ODE DKEK and ODE DEK as well as the SDCard DKEK and SDCard MK). After overwriting that, the TOE will reformat the partition (though that does not matter as one can no longer retrieve the data at that point). Upon completion of reformatting the Flash partition holding user data, the TOE will perform a power-cycle.

FCS_CKM_EXT.6: The TOE creates salt and nonces (which are just salt values used in WPA2) using its AES-256 CTR_DRBG.

FCS_COP.1: The TOE performs cryptographic algorithms in accordance with the following NIST standards and has received the following CAVP algorithm certificates.

The OpenSSL FIPS Object Module provides the following algorithms

| Algorithm | NIST Standard | SFR Reference | Cert# |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|--|-------|
| AES 128/256 CBC, CCM, GCM, KW | FIPS 197, SP 800-38A/C/D/F | FCS_COP.1(1) | 1884 |
| CVL ECC CDH P-224/256/384/521 | SP 800-56A | FCS_CKM.1(1) | 10 |
| DRBG Hash/HMAC/CTR/Dual_EC | SP 800-90A | FCS_RBG_EXT.1(1) | 157 |
| ECDSA PKG/PKV/SigGen/SigVer | FIPS 186-4 | FCS_CKM.1(1) FCS_CKM.1(2) FCS_COP.1(3) | 264 |
| HMAC SHA-1/256/384/512 | FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 | FCS_COP.1(4) | 1126 |
| RSA SIG(gen)/SIG(ver)/Key(gen) | FIPS 186-2 | FCS_CKM.1(1) FCS_CKM.1(2) FCS_COP.1(3) | 960 |
| SHS SHA-1/256/384/512 | FIPS 180-4 | FCS_COP.1(2) | 1655 |

Table 3 OpenSSL Cryptographic Algorithms

The Samsung Kernel Cryptographic (“Kernel Crypto”) Module provides the following algorithms

| Algorithm | NIST Standard | SFR Reference | Cert# |
|------------------------|----------------------------|------------------|-------------|
| AES 128/256 CBC | FIPS 197, SP 800-38A | FCS_COP.1(1) | 2810 & 2809 |
| HMAC SHA-1/256/384/512 | FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 | FCS_COP.1(4) | 1761 & 1760 |
| RNG ANSI X9.31 AES-128 | ANSI X9.31 & 931rngext.pdf | FCS_RBG_EXT.1(2) | 1276 & 1275 |
| SHS SHA-1/256/384/512 | FIPS 180-4 | FCS_COP.1(2) | 2358 & 2357 |

Table 4 Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Algorithms

The TOE’s application processors include hardware entropy implementations that supply random data within the TEE and to the Linux kernel RNG (/dev/random).

Note that kernel-space system applications utilize the cryptographic algorithm implementations in the Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Module (Kernel Crypto), while user-space system applications and mobile applications utilize the OpenSSL module (either through a Java API or through the native C API). In the case of each cryptographic module, the module itself includes any algorithms required (for example, OpenSSL provides hash functions for use by HMAC and digital signature algorithms).

For its HMAC implementations, the TOE accepts all key sizes of 160, 256, 384, & 512; supports all SHA sizes save 224 (e.g., SHA-1, 256, 384, & 512), utilizes the specified block size (512 for SHA-1 and 256, and 1024 for SHA-384 & 512), and output MAC lengths of 160, 256, 384, and 512.

The TOE conditions the user’s password exactly as per SP 800-132 (and thus as per SP 800-197-1) with no deviations by using PBKDF2 with 16,384 HMAC-SHA-512 iterations to combine a 128-bit salt with the user’s password.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: The TOE includes the ability to support the HTTPS protocol (compliant with RFC 2818) so that (mobile and system client) applications executing on the TOE can securely connect to external servers using HTTPS. Administrators have no credentials and cannot use HTTPS or TLS to establish administrative sessions with the TOE as the TOE does not provide any such capabilities.

FCS_IV_EXT.1: The TOE generates IVs for data storage encryption and for key storage encryption. The TOE uses AES-CBC mode for data encryption and AES-GCM for key storage.

FCS_RBG_EXT.1(*): The TOE provides a number of different RBGs including

1. A SHA-256 Hash_DRBG provided in the hardware of the Qualcomm Application Processor.
2. RBGs provided by OpenSSL: Hash_DRBG (using any size SHA), HMAC_DRBG (again using size SHA), and CTR_DRBG (using AES). Note that while the TOE includes implementations of three DRBG variants (and supports all options within each variant), the TOE (and its current system level applications) make use of only an AES-256 CTR_DRBG. Furthermore The TOE provides mobile applications access (through an

Android Java API) to random data drawn from its AES-256 CTR_DRBG. However, future (system-level) applications could utilize other DRBG variants supported by the TOE's OpenSSL module.

3. And an ANSI X9.31 AES-128 RBG provided by Kernel Crypto

The TOE ensures that it initializes each RBG with sufficient entropy ultimately accumulated from a TOE-hardware-based noise source (please see the Entropy Assessment Report for more details). The TOE uses its hardware-based noise source to continuously fill /dev/random with random data with full entropy, and in turn, the TOE draws from /dev/random to seed both its AES-256 CTR_DRBG and ANSI X9.31 AES-128 RBG. The TOE seeds its AES-256 CTR_DRBG using 384-bits of data from /dev/random, thus ensuring at least 256-bits of entropy. Finally the TOE seeds its X9.31 AES-128 with 256-bits of data from /dev/random, also ensuring that it contains at least 128-bits of entropy.

FCS_SRV_EXT.1: The TOE provides applications access to the cryptographic operations including encryption (AES), hashing (SHA), signing and verification (RSA & ECDSA), key hashing (HMAC), password-based key-derivation functions (PKBDFv2 HMAC-SHA-512), generate asymmetric keys for key establishment (RSA, DH, and ECDH), and generate asymmetric keys for signature generation and verification (RSA, ECDSA). The TOE provides access through the Android operating system's Java API, through the native OpenSSL API, and through the kernel. The vendor also developed testing applications to enable execution of the NIST algorithm testing suite in order to verify the correctness of the algorithm implementations.

FCS_STG_EXT.1: The TOE provides for secure key storage for asymmetric keys. For these asymmetric keys, the TOE secures a series of public keys used for Secure Boot through a chain of trust that operates as follows. The Application Processor (AP) contains the SHA-256 hash of the Secure Boot Public Key (an RSA 2048-bit key embedded in end of the signed bootloader image), and upon verifying the SBPK attached to the bootloader produces the expected hash, the AP uses this public key to verify the PKCS 1.5 RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 signature of the bootloader image, to ensure its integrity and authenticity before transitioning execution to the bootloader. The bootloader, in turn, contains the Image Signing Public Key (ISPK), which the bootloader will use to verify the PKCS 1.5 RSA 2048 w/ SHA-1 signature on either kernel image (primary kernel image or recovery kernel image). Note that when configured for Common Criteria mode, the TOE only accepts updates to the TOE firmware Over The Air; however, when not configured for CC mode, the TOE allows updates through the bootloader's ODIN mode. The primary kernel includes an embedded FOTA Public Key, which the TOE uses to verify the authenticity and integrity of Firmware Over-The-Air update signatures (which contain a PKCS 2.1 PSS RSA 2048 w/ SHA-512 signature).

In addition to the internal public keys protected by the chain-of-trust with a hardware root/anchor, the TOE also provides users, administrators, and applications running on the TOE the ability to import keys. The TOE allows a user to import a certificate (in PKCS#12 [PFX] format) and provides applications running on the TOE an API to import a certificate. In either case, the TOE will place the certificate into the user's key store, where the TOE will remove the PKCS#12 password-based protection from the certificate and then encrypt the certificate with a DEK, which in turn is encrypted with the a KEK derived from the user's DKEK. All user and application items placed into the user's keystore are secured in this fashion. Note that while operating in CC mode, the TOE also encrypts (using ODE) the Flash filesystem in which keystore items reside, providing a second layer of encryption protection to keystore objects.

The user of the TOE can elect to remove values from the keystore, as well as to securely wipe the entire device.

The TOE affords applications control (control over use and destruction) of keys that they create or import, and only a common application developer can explicitly authorize access, use, or destruction of one application's key by any other application.

FCS_STG_EXT.2: The TOE provides protection for all stored keys (i.e. those written to storage media for persistent storage) chained to both the user's password and the REK. FEKs (which are DEKs for individual encrypted files on removable media), which are 128-bit, and stored as part of the metadata for each encrypted file, are encrypted with AES-CBC. The FEK is protected by the SDCard MK, a 256-bit key. All other keys (including the SDCard MK) are encrypted with AES-GCM. All KEKs are 256-bit, ensuring that that the TOE encrypts every key with another key of equal or greater strength/size.

In the case of WiFi, the TOE utilizes the 802.11-2012 KCK and KEK keys to unwrap (decrypt) the WPA2 Group Temporal Key received from the access point. Additionally, the TOE protects persistent Wifi keys (user certificates and Pre-Shared Key values) in the same way as other DEKs, namely by encrypting them with a KEK chained to both the user's password and the REK.

FCS_STG_EXT.3: The key hierarchy shows AES-256 GCM is used to encrypt all KEKs and the GCM encryption mode itself ensures integrity as authenticated decryption operations fail if the encrypted KEK becomes corrupted.

FCS_TLS_EXT.1: The TOE supports EAP-TLS using TLS version 1.0 and supports the following ciphersuites:

1. TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
2. TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
3. TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
4. TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA

The user or administrator need not configure (nor is it possible to configure) the TOE in any special way to ensure that the TOE only uses (when configured for CC mode) the above set of TLS ciphersuites as part of EAP-TLS.

When configuring the TOE to utilize EAP-TLS as part of a WPA2 protected WiFi-network, the user must explicitly select the CA certificate to which the server's certificate must chain. Moreover, the user (or administrator, using an MDM), must load such a CA certificate as the TOE does not come with any built-in CA certificates suitable for use with 802.1X.

FCS_TLS_EXT.2: The TOE provides mobile applications API service for TLS versions 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2 including support for following twelve ciphersuites.

1. TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
2. TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
3. TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
4. TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
5. TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
6. TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
7. TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
8. TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
9. TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
10. TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
11. TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 6460
12. TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 6460

When an application uses the provided APIs to attempt to establish a trusted channel, if the application detects that the distinguished name (DN) contained within the peer certificate does not match the expected DN for the peer, then the application cannot establish the connection.

6.2 User data protection

FDP_ACF_EXT.1: The TOE provides the following categories of system services to applications.

1. System or Signature – these are privileged services which require the accessing application to either be signed by a Samsung Signing Key or to be included as part of the read-only TOE System image
 2. Normal – these are services which are available to any application regardless of permissions
-

authentication attempts through the UI to no more than five attempts within 30 seconds (thus if the current [the nth] and prior four authentication attempts have failed, and the n-4th attempt was less than 30 second ago, the TOE will prevent any further authentication attempts until thirty seconds have elapsed since that n-4th attempt).

FIA_UAU.7: The TOE allows the user to enter the user's password from the lock screen. The TOE will, by default, display the most recently entered character of the password briefly or until the user enters the next character in the password, at which point the TOE obscures the character by replacing the character with a dot symbol.

FIA_UAU_EXT.1: As described before, the TOE's Key Hierarchy requires the user's password in order to derive the PKEK1 & PKEK2 keys in order to decrypt other KEKs and DEKs. Thus, until it has the user's password, the TOE cannot decrypt the DEK utilized by ODE to decrypt protected data.

FIA_UAU_EXT.2: The TOE, when configured to require a user password (as is the case in CC mode), allows a user to make an emergency call, take screen shots (stored internally), turn the TOE off, restart the TOE, enable or disable airplane mode, configure sound/vibrate/mute, set volume for sound categories, or to receive an incoming phone call without first successfully authenticating. Beyond those actions, a user cannot perform any other actions other than observing notifications displayed on the lock screen until after successfully authenticating.

FIA_UAU_EXT.3: The TOE requires the user to enter their password in order to unlock the TOE. Additionally the TOE requires the user to confirm their current password when accessing the "Settings->Screen Security" menu in the TOE's user interface. Only after entering their current user password can the user then elect to change their password.

FIA_X509_EXT.1: The TOE checks the validity of all imported CA certificates by checking for the presence of the basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE as the TOE imports the certificate. Additionally the TOE verifies the extendedKeyUsage Server Authentication purpose during WPA2/EAP-TLS negotiation.

FIA_X509_EXT.2: The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as part of EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec authentication. The TOE comes with a built-in set of default of Trusted Credentials (Android's set of trusted CA certificates). And while the user cannot remove any of the built-in default CA certificates, the user can disable any of those certificates through the user interface so that certificates issued by disabled CA's cannot validate successfully. In addition, a user can import a new trusted CA certificate into the Key Store or an administrator can install a new certificate through an MDM.

The TOE does not establish TLS connections itself (beyond EAP-TLS used for WPA2 Wifi connections), but provides a series of APIs that mobile applications can use to check the validity of a peer certificate. The mobile application, after correctly using the specified APIs can be assured as to the validity of the peer certificate and will not establish the trusted connection if the peer certificate cannot be verified (including validity, certification path, and revocation [through CRL or OSCP]).

FIA_X509_EXT.3: The TOE's Android operating system provides applications the CertPathValidator Java API Class of methods validating certification paths (certificate chains) establishing a trust chain from a certificate to a trust anchor.

6.4 Security management

FMT_MOF.1(1): The TOE grants the user the exclusive functions to enroll the TOE in a management and to enable and disable tethering (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth⁶, and USB).

FMT_MOF.1(2): The TOE grants the administrator (through MDM APIs) the ability to restrict the ability to perform the functions specified in the SFR selections (see section 5.1.4.2).

FMT_SMF.1: The TOE provides the capability to perform the management functions specified in the SFR selections (see section 5.1.4.3)

⁶ The Galaxy Alpha (Qualcomm) and Note Edge devices do not support Bluetooth tethering.

FMT_SMF_EXT.1: The TOE when unenrolled from an MDM removes all MDM policies and disables CC mode. The TOE also provides the capability to the MDM Agent to wipe all protected data and to remove any installed Enterprise applications.

6.5 Protection of the TSF

FPT_AEX_EXT.1: The Linux kernel of the TOE's Android operating system provides address space layout randomization utilizing a non-cryptographic kernel random function to provide 8 unpredictable bits to the base address of any user-space memory mapping. The random function, `get_random_int(void)`, is similar to `urandom`, seeks to minimize entropy pool depletion, and ensures that one cannot predict the value of the bits.

FPT_AEX_EXT.2: The TOE's Android 4.4 operating system utilizes a 3.4 or 3.10 Linux kernel, whose memory management unit (MMU) enforces read, write, and execute permissions on all pages of virtual memory and ensures that write and execute permissions are not simultaneously granted on any memory (exceptions are only made for Dalvik JIT compilation). The Android operating system (as of Android 2.3) sets the ARM No eXecute (XN) bit on memory pages and the TOE's ARMv7 Application Processor's MMU circuitry enforces the XN bits. From Android's documentation (<https://source.android.com/devices/tech/security/index.html>), Android 2.3 forward supports "Hardware-based No eXecute (NX) to prevent code execution on the stack and heap".

FPT_AEX_EXT.3: The TOE's Android operating system provides explicit mechanisms to prevent stack buffer overruns (enabling `-fstack-protector`) in addition to taking advantage of hardware-based No eXecute to prevent code execution on the stack and heap. Samsung requires and applies these protections to all TSF executable binaries and libraries.

FPT_AEX_EXT.4: The TOE protects itself from modification by untrusted subjects using a variety of methods. The first protection employed by the TOE is a Secure Boot process that uses cryptographic signatures to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the bootloader and kernels using data fused into the device processor.

The TOE protects access to the REK and derived HEK to only trusted applications within the TEE (TrustZone). The TOE key manager includes a TEE module which utilizes the HEK to protect all other keys in the key hierarchy. All TEE applications are cryptographically signed, and when invoked at runtime (at the behest of an untrusted application), the TEE will only load the trusted application after successfully verifying its cryptographic signature. Furthermore, `SKMM_TA` checks the integrity of the system by checking the result from both Secure Boot/SecurityManager and from the Integrity Check Daemon before servicing any requests. Without this TEE application, no keys within the TOE (including keys for ScreenLock, the key store, and user data) can be successfully decrypted, and thus are useless.

The third protection is the TOE SecurityManager watchdog service. The SecurityManager manages the CC mode of the TOE by looking for unsigned kernels or failures from other, non-cryptographic checks on system integrity, and upon detecting of a failure in either, disables the CC mode and notifies the TEE application. The TEE application then locks itself, again rendering all TOE keys useless.

Finally, the TOE's Android OS provides "sandboxing" that ensures that each non-system mobile application executes with the file permissions of a unique Linux user ID, in a different virtual memory space. This ensures that applications cannot access each other's memory space (it is possible for two processes to utilize shared memory, but not directly access the memory of another application) or files and cannot access the memory space or files of system-level applications.

FPT_BBD_EXT.1: The TOE's hardware and software architecture ensures separation the application processor (AP) from the baseband or communications processor (CP). From a software perspective, the AP and CP communicate logically through the Android Radio Interface Layer (RIL) daemon. This daemon, which executes on the AP, coordinates all communication between the AP and CP. It makes requests of the CP and accepts the response from the CP; however, the RIL daemon does not provide any reciprocal mechanism for the CP to make requests of the AP. Because the mobile architecture provides only the RIL daemon interface, the CP has no method to access the resources of the software executing on the AP.

FPT_KST_EXT.1: The TOE does not store any plaintext key material in its internal Flash or on external SDCards; instead, the TOE encrypts all keys before storing them. This ensures that irrespective of how the TOE powers down (e.g., a user commands the TOE to power down, the TOE reboots itself, or battery is removed), all keys in internal Flash or on an external SDCard are wrapped with a KEK. Please refer to section 6.1 of the TSS for further information (including the KEK used) regarding the encryption of keys stored in the internal Flash and on external SDCards. As the TOE encrypts all keys stored in Flash, upon boot-up, the TOE must first decrypt and utilize keys.

FPT_KST_EXT.2: The TOE utilizes a cryptographic module consisting of an implementation of OpenSSL, the kernel crypto module, the key management module, and the following system-level executables that utilize KEKs: dm-crypt, eCryptfs, wpa_supplicant, and the keystore.

The TOE ensures that plaintext key material does not leave this cryptographic module. Please see the above section (FPT_KST_EXT.1) and the FCS_STG_EXT sections of the TSS for more details regarding key handling at boot and lock screen password entry.

FPT_KST_EXT.3: The TOE does not provide any way to export plaintext DEKs or KEKs (including all keys stored in the keystore) as the TOE chains all KEKs to the HEK/REK.

FPT_NOT_EXT.1: When the TOE encounters a self-test failure or when the TOE software integrity verification fails, the TOE transitions to a non-operational mode. The user may attempt to power-cycle the TOE to see if the failure condition persists, and if it does persist, the user may attempt to boot to the recovery mode/kernel to wipe data and perform a factory reset in order to recover the device.

FPT_STM.1: The TOE requires time for the Package Manager, FOTA image verifier, wpa_supplicant, and key store applications. The TOE components obtain time from the TOE using system API calls [e.g., time() or gettimeofday()]. An application cannot modify the system time as mobile applications need the android "SET_TIME" permission to do so. Likewise, only a process possessing root privileges can directly modify the system time using system-level APIs. TOE uses the Cellular Carrier time as a trusted source; however, the user can also manually set the time through the TOE's user interface.

FPT_TST_EXT.1: The TOE automatically (without requiring any user involvement) performs known answer power on self-tests (POST) on its cryptographic algorithms to ensure that they are functioning correctly. The kernel itself performs known answer tests on its cryptographic algorithms to ensure they are working correctly and the SecurityManager service invokes the self-tests of OpenSSL at start-up to ensure that those cryptographic algorithms are working correctly. Should any tests fail, the user cannot successfully unlock the device (as attempts to decrypt keys will fail).

| Algorithm | Implemented in | Description |
|-----------------------------|----------------|---|
| AES encryption/decryption | OpenSSL | Comparison of known answer to calculated valued |
| ECDH key agreement | OpenSSL | Comparison of known answer to calculated valued |
| DRBG random bit generation | OpenSSL | Comparison of known answer to calculated valued |
| ECDSA sign/verify | OpenSSL | Comparison of known answer to calculated valued |
| HMAC-SHA | OpenSSL | Comparison of known answer to calculated valued |
| RSA sign/verify | OpenSSL | Comparison of known answer to calculated valued |
| SHA hashing | OpenSSL | Comparison of known answer to calculated valued |
| AES encryption/decryption | Kernel Crypto | Comparison of known answer to calculated valued |
| HMAC-SHA | Kernel Crypto | Comparison of known answer to calculated valued |
| SHRNG random bit generation | Kernel Crypto | Comparison of known answer to calculated valued |
| SHA hashing | Kernel Crypto | Comparison of known answer to calculated valued |

Table 5 Power-up Cryptographic Algorithm Known Answer Tests

FPT_TST_EXT.2: The TOE ensures a secure boot process in which the TOE verifies the digital signature of the bootloader software for the Application Processor (using a public key whose hash resides in the processor's internal fuses) before transferring control. The bootloader, in turn, verifies the signature of the Linux kernel (either the primary or the recovery kernel) that it loads. This device secures this boot process by ensuring that the digital signature of the bootloader software has been signed by a public key that matches a SHA-256 hash store in fuses

residing within the application processor, and then the device extends the chain by verifying the signature of each subsequent stage using the fuse key or by using a key embedded within an already verified image.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1: The TOE's user interface provides a method to query the current version of the TOE software/firmware (Android version, baseband version, kernel version, and build number) and hardware (model and version). Additionally, the TOE provides users the ability to review the currently installed apps (including 3rd party "built-in" applications) and their version.

FPT_TUD_EXT.2: When in CC mode, the TOE verifies all updates to the TOE software using a public key (FOTA public key) chaining ultimately to the Secure Boot Public Key (SBPK), a hardware protected key whose SHA-256 hash resides inside the application processor (note that when not in CC mode, the TOE allows updates to the TOE software through ODIN mode of the bootloader). After verifying an update's FOTA signature, the TOE will then install those updates to the TOE.

The application processing verifies the bootloader's authenticity and integrity (thus tying the bootloader and subsequent stages to a hardware root of trust: the SHA-256 hash of the SBPK, which cannot be reprogrammed after the "write-enable" fuse has been blown).

The Android OS on the TOE requires that all applications bear a valid signature before Android will install the application.

ALC_TSU_EXT: Samsung utilizes industry best practices to ensure their devices are patched to mitigate security flaws. Samsung provides customers with a developer web portal (<http://developer.samsung.com/notice/How-to-Use-the-Forum>) in which one can ask questions as well as inform Samsung of potential issues with their software (as Samsung moderators monitor the forums), and as an Android OEM, also works with Google on reported Android issues (<http://source.android.com/source/report-bugs.html>) to ensure customer devices are secure.

Samsung will create updates and patches to resolve reported issues as quickly as possible, at which point the update is provided to the wireless carriers. The delivery time for resolving an issue depends on the severity, and can be as rapid as a few days before the carrier handoff for high priority cases. The wireless carriers perform additional tests to ensure the updates will not adversely impact their networks and then plan device rollouts once that testing is complete. Carrier updates usually take at least two weeks to as much as two months (depending on the type and severity of the update) to be rolled out to customers.

Samsung communicates with the reporting party to inform them of the status of the reported issue. Further information about updates is handled through the carrier release notes. Issues reported to Google directly are handled through Google's notification processes.

6.6 TOE access

FTA_SSL_EXT.1: The TOE transitions to its locked state either immediately after a User initiates a lock by pressing the power button or after a configurable period of inactivity, and as part of that transition, the TOE will display a lock screen to obscure the previous contents; however, the TOE's lock screen still displays email notifications, calendar appointments, text message notifications, the time, date, call notifications, battery life, signal strength, and carrier network. But without authenticating first, a user cannot perform any related actions based upon these notifications (they cannot respond to emails, calendar appointments, or text messages) other than responding to an incoming phone call.

Note that during power up, the TOE presents the user with an initial power-up ODE screen, where the user can only make an emergency call⁷ or enter the ODE password in order to allow the TOE to decrypt the OBE key so as to be able to access the data partition. After successfully authenticating at the power-up login screen, the TOE presents the user with the lock screen.

⁷ The Galaxy Tab S 8.4 LTE and 10.5 LTE do not support phone capabilities.

FTA_TAB.1: The TOE can be configured to display a user-specified message (maximum of 23 characters) on the Lock screen, and additionally an administrator can also set a Lock screen message (up to 256 characters) using an MDM.

FTA_WSE_EXT.1: The TOE allows an administrator to specify (through the use of an MDM) a list of wireless networks (SSIDs) to which the user may direct the TOE to connect to. When not enrolled with an MDM, the TOE allows the user to control to which wireless networks the TOE should connect, but does not provide an explicit list of such networks, rather the user may scan for available wireless network (or directly enter a specific wireless network), and then connect. Once a user has connected to a wireless network, the TOE will automatically reconnect to that network when in range and the user has enabled the TOE's WiFi radio.

6.7 Trusted path/channels

FTP_ITC_EXT.1: The TOE provides secured (encrypted and mutually authenticated) communication channels between itself and other trusted IT products through the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec. The TOE permits itself and applications to initiate communicate via the trusted channel, and the TOE initiates communicate via the trusted channel for connection to a wireless access point. The TOE provides access to TLS via published APIs which are accessible to any application that needs an encrypted end-to-end trusted channel. The TOE has also been validated against the Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients.

7. TSF Inventory

Below is a list of user-mode TSF binaries and libraries. All are built with the `-fstack-protector` option set. For each binary/library, the name, path and security function is provided.

| Name | Path | Security Function |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------------|
| charon | /system/bin | VPN |
| dalvikvm | /system/bin | VM |
| icd | /system/bin | Integrity Check |
| keystore | /system/bin | Key Store |
| odekeymgr | /system/bin | DAR |
| qrngd | /system/bin | RNG |
| qseecomd | /system/bin | Trustzone Daemon |
| sfothelper | /system/bin | FOTA |
| time_daemon | /system/bin | Time |
| vold | /system/bin | DAR |
| wpa_supplicant | /system/bin | DAR |
| libSecurityManagerNative.so | /system/lib | Self-test |
| libcharon.so | /system/lib | VPN |
| libcrypto.so | /system/lib | Crypto |
| libdirencryption.so | /system/lib | DAR |
| libhydra.so | /system/lib | VPN |
| libjavacrypto.so | /system/lib | Crypto JNI |
| libkeystore_binder.so | /system/lib | KeyStore |
| libkeyutils.so | /system/lib | DAR |
| libsec_devenc.so | /system/lib | DAR |
| libsec_ecryptfs.so | /system/lib | DAR |
| libsec_ode_km.so | /system/lib | DAR |
| libskmm.so | /system/lib | Key Mgmt |
| libskmm_helper.so | /system/lib | Key Mgmt |
| libsoftkeymaster.so | /system/lib | Key Store |
| libssl.so | /system/lib | SSL/TLS |
| libstrongswan.so | /system/lib | VPN |
| libvstr.so | /system/lib | VPN |