
Trend Micro

TippingPoint Threat Protection System (TPS) v5.2 Security Target

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1. Security Target Introduction

This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is the Trend Micro TippingPoint Threat Protection System (TPS) v5.2 provided by Trend Micro. The Trend Micro product is a network security solution for advanced threat detection.

The focus of this evaluation is on the TOE functionality supporting the claims in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices [NDcPP] (See section 1.2 for specific version information). The security functionality specified in [NDcPP] includes protection of communications between TOE components and trusted IT entities, identification and authentication of administrators, auditing of security-relevant events, ability to verify the source and integrity of updates to the TOE, and specifies and NIST-recommended cryptographic algorithms.

The Security Target contains the following additional sections:

- TOE Description (Section 2)
- Security Problem Definition (Section 3)
- Security Objectives (Section 4)
- IT Security Requirements (Section 5)
- TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
- Protection Profile Claims (Section 7)
- Rationale (Section 8).

1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification

ST Title – Trend Micro TippingPoint Threat Protection System v5.2 Security Target

ST Version – Version 1.0

ST Date – 15 October 2019

TOE Identification – Trend Micro TippingPoint Threat Protection System (TPS) v5.2

The TOE consists of the following appliances:

Appliance Model
TPS 440T
TPS 2200T (1 Gbps)
TPS 2200T (2 Gbps)
vTPS
TPS 8200TX
TPS 8400TX
TPS 1100TX
TPS 5500TX

The 1100TX includes one I/O module slot, the 5500TX and the 8200TX include two I/O module slots, and the 8400TX includes four I/O module slots. The following standard I/O modules are supported for the 1100TX, 5500TX, 8200TX, and 8400TX security devices.

Standard I/O module	Trend Micro part number
TippingPoint 6-Segment Gig-T	TPNN0059
TippingPoint 6-Segment GbE SFP	TPNN0068
TippingPoint 4-Segment 10 GbE SFP+	TPNN0060
TippingPoint 1-Segment 40 GbE QSFP+	TPNN0069

- The vTPS virtual appliance was tested in a virtual environment consistent with the requirements described in Section 2.2.1.1 of this document, including 2 Intel Xeon E5 with AES-NI @ 16GB CPUs, and 8GB memory in the host hardware system. Testing was performed using both ESXi Hypervisor version 6.5 and RHEL version 7.1 KVM. More generally, the virtual appliances are supported on host hardware that includes Intel Xeon processors.

1.2 Conformance Claims

This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:

- collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0+ Errata 20180314, 14 March 2018, [NDcPP] and including the following optional and selection-based SFRs: FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.3/LocSpace, FCS_SSHC_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1, and FMT_MOF.1/Functions. The following NIAP Technical Decisions apply to this PP and have been accounted for in the ST development and the conduct of the evaluation:
 - TD0259: NIT Technical Decision for Support for X509 ssh rsa authentication IAW RFC 6187
 - TD0260: NIT Technical Decision for Typo in FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4
 - TD0290: NIT technical decision for physical interruption of trusted path/channel
 - TD0291: NIT technical decision for DH14 and FCS_CKM.1
 - TD0334: NIT Technical Decision for Testing SSH when password-based authentication is not supported.
 - TD0336: NIT Technical Decision for Audit requirements for FCS_SSH*_EXT.1.8
 - TD0337: NIT Technical Decision for Selections in FCS_SSH*_EXT.1.6
 - TD0338: NIT Technical Decision for Access Banner Verification
 - TD0339: NIT Technical Decision for Making password-based authentication optional in FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
 - Part 2 Extended
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
 - Part 3 Conformant

1.3 Conventions

The following conventions have been applied in this document:

- Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.

- Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST, iteration is indicated by adding a string starting with “/” (e.g. “FCS_COP.1/Hash”).
- Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [**assignment**]). Note that an assignment within a selection would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [*[**selected-assignment**]]*).
- Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [***selection***]).
- Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “... **all** objects ...” or “... ~~some~~ **big** things ...”). Note that ‘cases’ that are not applicable in a given SFR have simply been removed without any explicit identification.
- Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as captions.

1.3.1 Terminology

This section identifies TOE-specific terminology.

DV	Digital Vaccine
HA	High Availability
IPM	Trend Micro’s proprietary IP Protection Module
ISO	An ISO image (or .ISO file) is a computer file that is an exact copy of an existing file system
LSM	Local Security Manager
TPS	TippingPoint Threat Protection System (the TOE)
TSE	Threat Suppression Engine

1.3.2 Abbreviations

This section identifies abbreviations and acronyms used in this ST.

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
API	Application Programming Interface
CBC	Cipher-Block Chaining
CA	Certificate Authority
CIFS	Common Internet File System
CLI	Command Line Interface
CM	Configuration Management
DH	Diffie-Hellman
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
GUI	Graphical User Interface
HMAC	Hashed Message Authentication Code
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ICMP	Internet Control Message Protocol
ICAP	Internet Content Adaptation Protocol
NDPP	Protection Profile for Network Devices
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS	Operating System
RSA	Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (algorithm for public-key cryptography)
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SMB	Server Message Block
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol
SSD	Solid State Drive

SSH	Secure Shell
SSL	Secure Socket Layer
ST	Security Target
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functions
UAU	User Authentication
UDP	User Datagram Protocol
VM	Virtual Machine

2. TOE Description

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the TippingPoint Threat Protection System (TPS), a network security platform that offers threat protection, shielding network vulnerabilities, blocking exploits, and defending against known and zero-day attacks. The TippingPoint Threat Protection System may also be referred to as TPS or the TOE in the remaining sections of this document. TPS provides coverage across various threat vectors, including advanced threats, malware, and phishing attempts. It employs a combination of technologies, such as deep packet inspection, threat reputation, and malware analysis, on a flow-by-flow basis, in order to detect and prevent attacks on the network. The product consists of the Threat Suppression Engine (TSE), Traffic Management filters, and Digital Vaccine (DV) filters that provide threat protection, shielding network vulnerabilities, blocking exploits, and defending against known and zero-day attacks. These threat protection functions may be enabled and used without affecting the claimed security functionality; however these features have not been evaluated. The TOE was evaluated as a network device only.

The TPS version 5.2 appliances included in the evaluation are TPS 440T, TPS 2200T (1 and 2 Gbps models), TPS 1100TX, TPS 5500TX, TPS 8200TX, TPS 8400TX, and vTPS. Each standalone appliance includes an RJ-45 console port and a 1 GbE copper management port. The 440T appliance is a small form-factor device designed for smaller network environments requiring up to 1 Gbps of inspection throughput. The TPS 2200T device is a mid-range system that has a larger form factor than the TPS 440T device and is designed for network environments requiring up to 2 Gbps of inspection throughput with up to 500 Mbps available for Secure Socket Layer (SSL) inspection. The 8200TX and 8400TX devices are high-end systems that are designed for network environments requiring up to 40 Gbps of inspection throughput with up to 2 Gbps available for Secure Socket Layer (SSL) inspection. The 1100TX and 5500TX devices support the same I/O modules as the 8200TX and 8400TX so these models can support the same capacity on a per-module basis, but they have fewer module slots for a reduced overall performance capacity. The vTPS model is a virtual appliance. All models provide the same security protections and all of the functionality specified in the [NDcPP].

The TOE must be configured to operate in FIPS mode in order to use the NIST validated cryptographic algorithms.

2.1 TOE Overview

The TippingPoint Threat Protection System v5.2 is a network device provided as a standalone hardware or virtual appliance. The appliances include the TPS 5.2 software; and each hardware appliance also includes the hardened Linux-4.4.85-yocto-standard operating system. All models include external user disk memory (CFast or SSD) that is used to store all traffic logs, snapshots, ThreatDV URL Reputation Feed, User-defined URL Entries database, and packet capture data. The external memory can also be used for troubleshooting purposes. The TX models include standard I/O modules used to receive and transmit packets for the threat detection functions. The 1100TX includes one I/O module slot, the 5500TX and the 8200TX include two I/O module slots, and the 8400TX includes four I/O module slots. The supported standard I/O modules are identified in Section 1.1.

The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can access any of the TOE functions. For each session, the user is required to log in prior to successfully establishing a session through which TOE functions can be exercised. The only capabilities allowed prior to users authenticating are the display of the warning banner before authentication, and the TOE may send Echo Reply in response to Echo Request ICMP messages received at the Management interface. The banner is displayed on every login attempt.

The authorized administrators interact locally with the TOE via console or remotely using SSH where the Open Secure Sockets Layer (OpenSSL) is used to implement SSH and its underlying core cryptographic algorithms to secure the underlying communications. The TOE also uses SSH for communications with trusted external syslog servers. The TOE is operated in FIPS mode and includes NIST validated cryptographic algorithms.

The TOE local and remote administration is provided through the Command Line Interface (CLI). The TOE supports Super User, Admin, and Operator roles that map to the Security Administrator role in the protection profile. Each user must be assigned a role in order to perform any management action.

The TOE can communicate with the Trend Micro website to download TOE updates. The management CLI provided by the TOE can be used by Super User or Admin administrators to update the TOE, and to query the currently executing software version of the TOE. Software updates are available as package files. The update package is

published on Trend Micro support website and protected with a SHA-256 hash, and signed using 2048-bit RSA public/private key pair.

The TOE Audit log provides an internal log implementation that can be used to store and review audit records locally. Access is available to the Super User. The TOE can also be configured to send generated audit records to an external Syslog server using SSH. When configured to send audit records to a syslog server, audit records are written to the external syslog as they are written locally to the TOE Audit log.

A sample deployment scenario is as follows.




Figure 1 – Sample TPS Network Deployment Scenario

Figure 1 Sample TPS Network Deployment Scenario depicts an example of a corporate network with the TPS deployed to a variety of locations. A single TPS can be installed at the perimeter of the network, at the network core, on your intranet, or in all three locations. Though not depicted in the figure, the evaluated deployment includes a syslog server. Note that the TOE is evaluated as a single appliance, not a distributed solution, and the SMS appliance is excluded from the evaluated configuration.

2.2 TOE Architecture

This section describes the TOE physical and logical boundaries.

2.2.1 Physical Boundaries

The TOE is a self-contained hardware appliance or VM with TPS 5.2 software.

The following table identifies the hardware appliance models included in the TOE.

Device	Main Processor	Storage	Network Ports	Operating System / Software
TPS 440T	CPU = Intel Core i3 (without AES-NI)	Storage = 8GB CFAST (Internal)	Network Ports = 8x 1GbE Copper RJ45 Ports (4 Segments)	Linux-4.4.85-yocto-standard

Device	Main Processor	Storage	Network Ports	Operating System / Software
	(2Cores/4Threads, 3.3GHz, 55W TDP)	/ 8GB CFAST (External)		OpenSSL 1.0.2l-fips
TPS2200T (1 or 2 Gbps models)	CPU = Intel Xeon E5 (with AES-NI) (6Cores/12Threads, 2.0GHz, 95W TDP)	Storage = 8GB CFAST (Internal) / 8GB CFAST (External)	Network Ports = 4 Ports (2 Segments) 10GbE SFP+, 8 Ports (4 Segments) 1GbE SFP, 8 Ports (4 Segments) 1GbE Copper RJ45	Linux-4.4.85-yocto-standard OpenSSL 1.0.2l-fips
TPS1100TX	Intel Pentium D-1517 (with AES-NI) CPU / 4 Cores, 8 Threads, 1.6GHz, 25W TDP	Storage = 8GB CFAST (Internal) / 8GB (External)	One IOM Slot Hot-Swappable Up to 6 1GE Segments, Up to 4 10GE Segments, 1 40GE Segment	Linux-4.4.85-yocto-standard OpenSSL 1.0.2l-fips
TPS5500TX	Intel Xeon D-1559 (with AES-NI) CPU / 12 Cores, 24 Threads, 1.5GHz, 45W TDP	Storage = 32GB CFAST (Internal) / 32GB (External)	Two IOM Slots, Hot-Swappable Up to 12 1GE Segments, Up to 8 10GE Segments, Up to 2 40GE Segments	Linux-4.4.85-yocto-standard OpenSSL 1.0.2l-fips
TPS8200TX	2x Intel Xeon E5 (with AES-NI) CPUs / 12 Cores, 24 Threads, 1.8GHz, 75W TDP	Storage = 32GB CFAST (Internal) / 32GB (External)	Two IOM Slots, Hot-Swappable Up to 12 1GE Segments, Up to 8 10GE Segments, Up to 2 40GE Segments	Linux-4.4.85-yocto-standard OpenSSL 1.0.2l-fips
TPS 8400TX	2x Intel Xeon E5 (with AES-NI) CPUs / 12 Cores, 24 Threads, 1.8GHz, 75W TDP	128 GB DDR4-2133 DRAM (four 16 GB DDR4-2133 SDRAM per CPU) Also contains: 1 32 GB SSD	Four IOM Slots, Hot-Swappable Up to 24 1GE Segments, Up to 16 10GE Segments, Up to 4 40GE Segments	Linux-4.4.85-yocto-standard OpenSSL 1.0.2l-fips

Table 1 TOE Hardware Appliances

The TippingPoint vTPS can be deployed using a Normal image or a Performance image. Performance image offers an increased capacity for vCPUs and threading.

Virtual Machine appliance TOEs require the following:

Device	Image	Number of vCPUs	Memory	Disk	Operating System / Software
vTPS	Normal image: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> VMware: vTPS_vmw_5.2.0_xxxx.zip 	2 – 3	8GB	16.2GB	Linux-4.4.85-yocto-standard OpenSSL 1.0.21-fips <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ESXi Hypervisor version: Version 5.5 (Patch 3116895), Version 6.0 (Patch 5572656); Version 6.5 or RHEL version 7.1 KVM
	Performance image: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> VMware: vTPS_vmw_performance_v5.2.0_xxxx.zip 	6	16GB	16.2GB	Linux-4.4.85-yocto-standard OpenSSL 1.0.21-fips <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ESXi Hypervisor version: Version 5.5 (Patch 3116895), Version 6.0 (Patch 5572656); Version 6.5 or RHEL version 7.1 KVM

Table 2 TOE Virtual Machine Appliances

vTPS virtual appliances in the evaluated configuration are supported on Intel Xeon E5 with AES-NI.

For Performance image deployments, Intel Xeon CPUs based on Ivy Bridge or newer (for example, E5-2697v2 and E5-2683v3) are recommended.

2.2.1.1 Software Requirements

The TOE virtual (VM) appliances are delivered as an installation disk (or ISO image). They require that the following are installed on the host hardware system:

- VMWare ESXi 5.5, or 6.0 or 6.5
- RHEL version 7.1 KVM

2.2.1.2 Additional Hardware Requirements

- External audit storage requires the use of syslog servers.
- An administrative workstation or terminal emulator equipped with SSH client software.

2.2.1.3 Exclusions

The TippingPoint Threat Protection System product includes a Local Security Management (LSM) component that provides remote administrative management. The LSM is a GUI over HTTPS. In the evaluated configuration, all management must be performed using the CLI.

The TPS devices can be configured to use sFlow record emission to sample a random flow of traffic and send the data to a collector server for analysis. SFlow and collector services are not in the evaluated configuration.

Two TippingPoint Threat Protection appliances can be installed in a redundant network configuration. This system configuration provides High Availability (HA), ensuring that the network traffic always flows at wire speeds in the event of any internal hardware or software failure on the device. HA is not included in the evaluated configuration.

TippingPoint Threat Protection appliances can be installed in a stacking configuration. Stacking enables you to increase the overall inspection capacity of your TPS by grouping multiple TX Series devices and pooling their resources. Stacking configurations are not included in the evaluated configuration.

Optional bypass I/O modules are available for the 1100TX, 5500TX, 8200TX, and 8400TX security devices that provide high availability for copper and fiber segments. These modules are not included in the evaluated configuration.

2.2.2 Logical Boundaries

This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:

- Security audit
- Cryptographic support
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE access
- Trusted path/channels

2.2.2.1 Security audit

The TOE is able to generate audit records for security relevant events specified in [NDCPP]. The TOE can be configured to store the audit records locally on the TOE and can also be configured to send the logs to a designated external log server. The audit records in local audit storage cannot be modified or deleted. In the event the space available for storing audit records locally is exhausted, the TOE deletes the oldest historical log file, renames the current log file to be a historical file, and creates a new current log file. The TOE will write a warning to the audit trail when the space available for storage of audit records exceeds 75% space remaining threshold.

2.2.2.2 Cryptographic support

The TOE is operated in FIPS mode and includes FIPS-approved and NIST-recommended cryptographic algorithms. The TOE provides cryptographic mechanisms for symmetric encryption and decryption, cryptographic signature services, cryptographic hashing services, keyed-hash message authentication services, deterministic random bit generation seeded from a suitable entropy source, and key zeroization. The cryptographic mechanisms support SSH used for secure communication, both as client and server.

2.2.2.3 Identification and authentication

The TOE requires users (i.e., administrators) to be successfully identified and authenticated before they can access any security management functions available in the TOE. The TOE offers both a locally connected console and a network accessible interface over SSH to support administration of the TOE.

The TOE supports the local (i.e., on device) definition of administrators with usernames and passwords. When a user is authenticated at the local console, no information about the authentication data (i.e., password) is echoed to the user. Passwords can be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: !; @; #; \$; %; ^; &; *; (;) ; , ; . ; ? ; < ; > ; and /.

The TOE provides authentication failure handling for remote administrator access. When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been reached, the remote administrator accessing the TOE via SSH is locked out for an administrator configurable period of time. Authentication failures by remote Administrators cannot lead to a situation where no Administrator access is available to the TOE since administrator access is still available via local console.

2.2.2.4 Security management

The TOE provides administrator roles and supports local and remote administration. The TOE supports Super User, Admin, and Operator roles that map to the Security Administrator role in the protection profile. Each user must be assigned a role in order to perform any management action.

2.2.2.5 Protection of the TSF

The TOE protects sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism that ensures reliable time information is available.

The TOE provides mechanisms to view the current version of the TOE and to install updates of the TOE software. TOE updates are initiated manually by the Super User or Admin, who can verify the integrity of the update prior to installation using a digital signature.

The TOE performs tests for software module integrity and cryptographic known-answer tests.

2.2.2.6 TOE access

The TOE implements administrator-configurable session inactivity limits for local interactive sessions at the console and for SSH sessions. The TOE will terminate such sessions when the inactivity period expires. In addition, administrators can terminate their own interactive sessions by logging out at the console and SSH.

The TOE supports an administrator-configurable TOE access banner that is displayed prior to a user completing the login process at the CLI. This is implemented for both local and remote management connections (console, SSH).

2.2.2.7 Trusted path/channels

The TOE protects interactive communication with remote administrators using SSH. SSH ensures confidentiality of transmitted information and detects any loss of integrity.

The TOE also uses SSH to protect the transmission of audit records to an external audit server.

2.3 TOE Documentation

Trend Micro TPS offers a series of documents that describe the installation process for the TOE, as well as guidance for subsequent use and administration of the system security features.

- Trend Micro TippingPoint Threat Protection System Hardware Specification and Installation Guide 5.2.0, June 2019
- Trend Micro TippingPoint Threat Protection System Command Line Interface Reference 5.2.0, April 2019
- Trend Micro TippingPoint Threat Protection System Install Your 440T and 2200T Security Devices, July 2018
- Trend Micro TippingPoint Threat Protection System Install Your 8200TX and 8400TX Security Devices, July 2018
- Trend Micro TippingPoint Virtual Threat Protection System (vTPS) User Guide v5.2.0, June 2019
- Trend Micro Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide (CCECG) for TPS v5.2, September 2019

3. Security Problem Definition

This security target includes by reference the Security Problem Definition (composed of organizational policies, threat statements, and assumptions) from the [NDcPP] excluding A.COMPONENTS_RUNNING.

In general, the [NDcPP] has presented a Security Problem Definition appropriate for network infrastructure devices, and as such is applicable to the TPS TOE.

4. Security Objectives

Like the Security Problem Definition, this security target includes by reference the Security Objectives from the [NDcPP] excluding OE.COMPONENTS_RUNNING. The [NDcPP] security objectives for the operational environment are reproduced below, since these objectives characterize technical and procedural measures each consumer must implement in their operational environment.

In general, the [NDcPP] has presented a Security Objectives statement appropriate for network infrastructure devices, and as such is applicable to the Trend Micro TOE.

4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

OE.PHYSICAL	Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the environment.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE	There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE.
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION	The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by other security and assurance measures in the operational environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN	Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance documentation in a trusted manner.
OE.UPDATE	The TOE firmware and software is updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE	The administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the TOE must be protected on any other platform on which they reside.
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION	The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.

5. IT Security Requirements

This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.

The SFRs have all been drawn from the Protection Profile (PP): collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314, 14 March 2018, [NDcPP] and including the following optional SFRs: FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.3/LocSpace, FCS_SSHC_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1, and FMT_MOF.1/Functions.

As a result, refinements and operations already performed in that PP are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements have been copied from that PP and any residual operations have been completed herein. Of particular note, the [NDcPP] made a number of refinements and completed some of the SFR operations defined in the CC and that PP should be consulted to identify those changes if necessary. Text deleted from SFRs by a refinement in [NDcPP] is not reproduced in ST.

The SARs are the set of SARs specified in [NDcPP].

5.1 Extended Requirements

All extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the [NDcPP]. The [NDcPP] defines the following extended SFRs and since they are not redefined in this ST, the [NDcPP] should be consulted for more information regarding those CC extensions.

- FAU_STG_EXT.1: External Audit Event Storage
- FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
- FCS_SSHC_EXT.1: SSH Client Protocol
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1: SSH Server Protocol
- FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management
- FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication
- FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
- FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords
- FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Protection of TSF Data (for Reading of all Pre-shared, Symmetric and Private Keys)
- FPT_STM_EXT.1: Reliable Time Stamps
- FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
- FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update
- FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking

5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the Trend Micro TPS TOE.

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
FAU: Security audit	FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation
	FAU_GEN.2: User Identity Association
	FAU_STG.1: Protected Audit Trail Storage
	FAU_STG_EXT.1: Protected Audit Event Storage
	FAU_STG.3/LocSpace: Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss
FCS: Cryptographic support	FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
	FCS_CKM.2: Cryptographic Key Establishment
	FCS_CKM.4: Cryptographic Key Destruction
	FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption: Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
	FCS_COP.1/SigGen: Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
	FCS_COP.1/Hash : Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash: Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
	FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
	FCS_SSHC_EXT.1: SSH Client Protocol
	FCS_SSHS_EXT.1: SSH Server Protocol
FIA: Identification and authentication	FIA_AFL.1: Authentication Failure Management
	FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management
	FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication
	FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
	FIA_UAU.7: Protected Authentication Feedback
FMT: Security management	FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate : Management of Security Functions Behaviour
	FMT_MOF.1/Functions: Management of Security Functions Behaviour
	FMT_MTD.1/CoreData : Management of TSF Data
	FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
	FMT_SMR.2: Restrictions on Security Roles
FPT: Protection of the TSF	FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords
	FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)
	FPT_STM_EXT.1: Reliable Time Stamps
	FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
	FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update
FTA: TOE access	FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking
	FTA_SSL.3: TSF-initiated Termination
	FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination
	FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners
FTP: Trusted path/channels	FTP_ITC.1: Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
	FTP_TRP.1/Admin: Trusted Path

Table 3 TOE Security Functional Components

5.2.1 Security audit (FAU)

5.2.1.1 Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1)

FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
- b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and

- c) All administrative actions comprising:
- Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user accounts are required for Administrators).
 - Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
 - Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).
 - Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
 - **[no other actions]**;
- d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 4.

FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the cPP/ST, information specified in column three of Table 4.

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1	None.	None.
FAU_GEN.2	None.	None.
FAU_STG.1	None.	None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FAU_STG.3/LocSpace	Low storage space for audit events.	None
FCS_CKM.1	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.2	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.4	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/Hash	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	None.	None.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH Session	Reason for failure
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH Session	Reason for failure
FIA_AFL.1	Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or exceeded.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	All use of identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	All use of identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU.7	None.	None.
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	Any attempt to initiate a manual update	None.
FMT_MOF.1/Functions	Modification of the behaviour of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity.	None.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	All management activities of TSF data.	None.

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FMT_SMF.1	None.	None.
FMT_SMR.2	None.	None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_TST_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Initiation of update; result of the update attempt (success or failure)	None.
FPT_STM_EXT.1	Discontinuous changes to time - either Administrator actuated or changed via an automated process. (Note that no continuous changes to time need to be logged. See also application note on FPT_STM_EXT.1)	For discontinuous changes to time: The old and new values for the time. Origin of the attempt to change time for success and failure (e.g., IP address).
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 (if “terminate the session” is selected)	The termination of a local session by the session locking mechanism.	None.
FTA_SSL.3	The termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism.	None.
FTA_SSL.4	The termination of an interactive session.	None.
FTA_TAB.1	None.	None.
FTP_ITC.1	Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination of the trusted channel. Failure of the trusted channel functions	Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin	Initiation of the trusted path. Termination of the trusted path. Failure of the trusted path functions	None.

Table 4 Auditable Events

5.2.1.2 User Identity Association (FAU_GEN.2)

FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

5.2.1.3 Protected Audit Trail Storage (FAU_STG.1)

FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.

FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

5.2.1.4 Protected Audit Event Storage (FAU_STG_EXT.1)

FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.

FAU_STG_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself.

FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [*overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: [the oldest historical audit file is deleted, the current audit file is renamed as a historical audit file, and a new current audit file is created]*] when the local storage space for audit data is full.

5.2.1.5 Action in case of possible audit data loss (FAU_STG.3/LocSpace)

FAU_STG.3.1/LocSpace The TSF shall generate a warning to inform the Administrator if the audit trail exceeds the local audit trail storage capacity.

5.2.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)

5.2.2.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (FCS_CKM.1)

FCS_CKM.1.1¹ The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [

- *RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3;*
- *ECC schemes using “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4;*
- *FFC Schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meet the following: RFC 3526, Section 3*

].

5.2.2.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (FCS_CKM.2)

FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [

- *Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”;*
- *Key establishment scheme using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meets the following: RFC 3526, Section 3;*

].

5.2.2.3 Cryptographic Key Destruction (FCS_CKM.4)

FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [

- *For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [single overwrite consisting of [zeroes]];*

] that meets the following: No Standard.

5.2.2.4 Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) (FCS_COP.1/Data Encryption)

FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES used in [CBC, GCM]] mode and cryptographic key sizes [128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: [AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772]].

5.2.2.5 Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification) FCS_COP.1/SigGen

FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

- *RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048 bits]*

]

¹ This SFR was modified by TD0291

that meet the following: [

- *For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3*].

5.2.2.6 Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) (FCS_COP.1/Hash)

FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512*] and message digest sizes [*160, 256, 512*] bits that meet the following: [ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004].

5.2.2.7 Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) (FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash)

FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512*] and cryptographic key sizes [*160, 256, 512 bits*] and message digest sizes [*160, 256, 512*] bits that meet the following: [ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”].

5.2.2.8 Random Bit Generation (FCS_RBG_EXT.1)

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [*CTR_DRBG (AES)*].

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [*two hardware-based noise sources*] with a minimum of [*256 bits*] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

5.2.2.9 SSH Client Protocol (FCS_SSHC_EXT.1)

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.1² The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFC(s) [*4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 5656, 6668*].

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [*no other method*].

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [*256K*] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.4³ The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [*aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes256-gcm@openssh.com*].

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.5⁴ The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [*ssh-rsa, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521*] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.6⁵ The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [*hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM*] as its data integrity MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [*diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256*] and [*ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521*] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

² This SFR was modified for TD0337.

³ This SFR was modified by TD0337.

⁴ This SFR was modified by TD0259.

⁵ This SFR was modified by TD0337.

- FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.8** The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and no more than one gigabyte of transmitted data. After either of the thresholds are reached a rekey needs to be performed.
- FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.9** The TSF shall ensure that the SSH client authenticates the identity of the SSH server using a local database associating each host name with its corresponding public key or [*no other methods*] as described in RFC 4251 section 4.1.

5.2.2.10 SSH Server Protocol (FCS_SSHS_EXT.1)

- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1**⁶ The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFC(s) [*4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 5656, 6668*].
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2**⁷ The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [*password-based*].
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [*256K*] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4**⁸ The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [*aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes256-gcm@openssh.com*].⁹
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5**¹⁰ The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [*ssh-rsa, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521*] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6**¹¹ The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [*hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM*] as its data integrity MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7** The TSF shall ensure that [*diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256*] and [*ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521*] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8** The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and no more than one gigabyte of transmitted data. After either of the thresholds are reached a rekey needs to be performed.

5.2.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)

5.2.3.1 Authentication Failure Management (FIA_AFL.1)

- FIA_AFL.1.1** The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [*1 to 10*] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely.
- FIA_AFL.1.2** When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall [*prevent the offending remote Administrator from successfully authenticating until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed*].

5.2.3.2 Password Management (FIA_PMG_EXT.1)

- FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:
- a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [*“!””, “@”, “#”, “\$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(”, “)”, [“”, “.””, “/”, “<”, “>”, “?”*]

⁶ This SFR was modified by TD0337.

⁷ This SFR was modified by TD0339.

⁸ This SFR was modified by TD0337.

⁹ This SFR was modified by TD0260.

¹⁰ This SFR was modified by TD0259.

¹¹ This SFR was modified by TD0337.

- b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to [1] and [15].

Application Note: The minimum password length can be configured to “1”, “8”, or “15” only.

5.2.3.3 Protected Authentication Feedback (FIA_UAU.7)

FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the authentication is in progress at the local console.

5.2.3.4 Password-based Authentication Mechanism (FIA_UAU_EXT.2)

FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local password-based authentication mechanism, and *[[local public key-based authentication for SSH]]* to perform local administrative user authentication.

5.2.3.5 User Identification and Authentication (FIA_UIA_EXT.1)

FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and authentication process:

- Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
- *[[send Echo Reply in response to Echo Request ICMP messages received at the Management interface]].*

FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.

5.2.4 Security management (FMT)

5.2.4.1 Management of Security Functions Behaviour (FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate)

FMT_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual update to Security Administrators.

5.2.4.2 Management of Security Functions Behaviour (FMT_MOF.1/Functions)

FMT_MOF.1.1/Functions The TSF shall restrict the ability to *[[determine the behaviour of; modify the behaviour of]]* the functions *[[transmission of audit data to an external IT entity]]* to Security Administrators.

5.2.4.3 Management of TSF Data (FMT_MTD.1/CoreData)

FMT_MTD.1.1/CoreData The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.

5.2.4.4 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
- Ability to configure the access banner;
- Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
- Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using *[[digital signature]]* capability prior to installing those updates;
- Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;

[

- *Ability to configure audit behavior;*
- *Ability to configure the list of TOE-provided services available before an entity is identified and authenticated, as specified in FIA_UIA_EXT.1;*
- *Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;*
- *Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps.*

].

5.2.4.5 Restrictions on Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2)

FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:

- Security Administrator.

FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions

- The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
 - The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely
- are satisfied.

5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

5.2.5.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords (FPT_APW_EXT.1)

FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form.

FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords.

5.2.5.2 Protection of TSF Data (for Reading of all Pre-shared, Symmetric and Private Keys) (FPT_SKP_EXT.1)

FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric key, and private keys.

5.2.5.3 Reliable Time Stamps (FPT_STM_EXT.1)

FPT_STM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.

FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall [*allow the Security Administrator to set the time*].

5.2.5.4 TSF Testing (FPT_TST_EXT.1)

FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [*during initial start-up (on power on)*] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [

- **software module integrity tests**
- **cryptographic known answer tests**

].

5.2.5.5 Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [*no other TOE firmware/software version*].

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and [*no other update mechanism*].

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a [*digital signature mechanism*] prior to installing those updates.

5.2.6 TOE access (FTA)

5.2.6.1 TSF-initiated Termination (FTA_SSL.3)

FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity.

5.2.6.2 User-initiated Termination (FTA_SSL.4)

FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator's own interactive session.

5.2.6.3 TSF-initiated Session Locking (FTA_SSL_EXT.1)

FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [
• *terminate the session*
]
after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.

5.2.6.4 Default TOE Access Banners (FTA_TAB.1)

FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE.

5.2.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

5.2.7.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (FTP_ITC.1)

FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of using [*SSH*] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [*no other capabilities*] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.

FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [**transmitting audit records to an audit server**].

5.2.7.2 Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1/Admin)

FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin The TSF shall be capable of using [*SSH*] to provide a communication path between itself and authorized remote Administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data.

FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path.

FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator authentication and all remote administrative actions.

5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirements for the TOE are included by reference from the [NDcPP].

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
ADV: Development	ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ATE: Tests	ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey

Table 5 Assurance Components

Consequently, the assurance activities specified in [NDcPP] apply to the TOE evaluation.

6. TOE Summary Specification

This chapter describes the security functions:

- Security audit
- Cryptographic support
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE access
- Trusted path/channels

6.1 Security audit

The TOE generates security relevant audit records including administrative activity. The audit records are stored locally on the TOE, protected from unauthorized modification and deletion and can be sent to a remote syslog server for storage. The connection for transmission of audit records uses SSH.

6.1.1 FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation

The TOE is able to generate audit records for security relevant and other events as they occur. The events that can cause an audit record to be logged include: starting and stopping the audit function; all attempts to initiate a secure communication channel; and any use of an administrator action via the CLI comprising:

- Administrative login and logout (including the name of the user account).
- Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
- Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action itself, when a key is changed, it is uniquely identified in the audit log by being referenced as an SSH key and by identifying the username that the key is associated with).
- Resetting passwords (name of related user account is logged).
- Attempts to initiate a TOE update.
- Modification of the behaviour of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity.

Additionally, the TOE generates an audit record warning that is written to the audit trail when the space allocated for storage of audit records exceeds 75% of capacity.

The audit records include the following fields:

- Log ID - Displays the system-assigned log ID number.
- Log Entry Time - Displays the time the log was entered in the format YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS.
- Device Name - The device name on which the session was logged.
- User - Displays the login name of the user who performed the audited action. The user listed for an event can include SMS, SYS, and CLI.
- Access - Displays the access level of the user performing the action. This field is only present in Audit Log type.
- IP Address - Displays the IP address from which the user performed the action.
- Interface - Displays the interface with which the user logged in: CLI for the command line interface. For system-initiated actions, SYS displays in this field.
- Access - Displays the access level of the user performing the action (from 0 (no administrative permissions to 8 (super user)). In particular, the following values relevant to the TOE's evaluated configuration are defined for this field as follows:
 - 0 NORMAL_ACCESS (no administrative permissions)
 - 1 OPERATOR_ACCESS
 - 4 ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS
 - 8 SUPER_USER_ACCESS
- Result - Displays the action performed or the result of a LOGIN or LOGOUT attempt.
- Action/Message – Text of the log entry identifying the action performed as a result. For example, Log Files Reset.

Table 4 corresponds to the audit events specified in Table 1 of the [NDcPP] and includes the audit events specified in the [NDcPP] for optional and selected SFRs as selected in this ST.

6.1.2 FAU_GEN.2: User Identity Association

The logged audit records identify the date and time, the nature or type of the triggering event, an indication of whether the event succeeded or failed, and the identity of the user responsible for the event. The logged audit records also include event-specific content that includes at least all of the content required in **Table 4**.

6.1.3 FAU_STG.1: Protected Audit Trail Storage

The TOE includes an internal log implementation that can be used to store audit records locally on the TOE. The local audit logs are stored on the TOE hard drive in either the 'audit' log or the 'system' log. The System Log records information about the software processes that control the device, including startup and shutdown of the TOE events. All other required audit events as identified in **Table 4** are stored in the Audit log.

The enforced limits on the size of the Audit and System logs are specified as a percentage of internal log disk space using the `log-file-size` CLI setting. The maximum amount of audit data that are stored locally in each log cannot exceed this percentage and the combined percentage configured for the logs must equal 100%. The TOE's log rotation function allows administrators to further control the amount of audit records that are stored. The current log is polled at a configurable interval to see if it has reached the maximum size. The administrator can specify the maximum size of a log file using the `maxFileSize` parameter. They can specify the number of files kept in the log rotation using the `NUMFILES` parameter. Within each log file, they can also specify the maximum number of records contained in each file using the `NUMRECORDS` parameter. A `maxFileSize` of 500MB with a maximum of 20 `NUMFILES` configured yields a maximum audit log size of 10,000 MB (roughly speaking). Each file can contain a maximum of approximately 65,535 records. When each of the 20 audit files are configured with the maximum approximate 65,535 records, the local audit log could accommodate a maximum of approximately 1,310,700 records. This is assuming that the allocated disk space has not been exceeded.

Only Super Users can configure the log sizes and the log rotation function. The audit records on the TOE are protected by database access control and there are no interfaces to modify or delete individual audit records.

6.1.4 FAU_STG_EXT.1: Protected Audit Event Storage

The TOE is capable of locally storing audit records and can be configured to send audit records to an external syslog server using SSH. When configured to send audit records to a syslog server, audit records are also written to the external syslog as they are written locally to the TOE audit log (in real-time).

The enforced limit on the size of the audit table is specified as a percentage of internal log disk space using the `log-file-size` CLI setting. System disk space is monitored and once the available storage for audit trail exceeds 75% full an alert is generated. Further restrictions on the amount of audit data that can be stored is controlled by the log rotation function. The local audit log is estimated to accommodate an approximated maximum of 1,310,700 records. See Section 6.1.3 above. When audit storage space is exhausted, the TOE overwrites previous audit records by deleting the oldest historical log file, renaming the current log file to be a historical file, and creating a new current log file. There are 5 files by default for log rollover functionality (ex: `audit.log` -- current, `audit.log.1..audit.log.4` -- rotated ones). Each file is allocated 20% of the total space allocated for that log. For example when the `audit.log` reaches its capacity (20% of audit log space) it gets renamed to `audit.log.1` and the new audit entries get written to `audit.log`. When `audit.log` reaches its capacity again, `audit.log.1-->audit.log.2`, `audit.log-->audit.log.1` and new entries go to `audit.log`. If all the 5 files get filled up (100% audit log space used) then the oldest file gets deleted. The maximum amount of audit data that are stored locally in each log cannot exceed this percentage (20% per file for 5 files) and the combined percentage configured for the logs must equal 100%.

6.1.5 FAU_STG.3/LocSpace

When the available storage for audit trail exceeds 75% full the TOE generates an alert and writes it to the system log.

6.2 Cryptographic support

The TOE includes OpenSSL1.0.2i-fips wrapped with TippingPoint Crypto Core OpenSSL 2.0.13 library which provides cryptographic algorithms and services. The following functions have been certified in accordance with the identified standards. Note that two sets of algorithms certificates were awarded because the 1100TX and 5500TX were tested separately after their release.

Functions	Standards	Certificates
Asymmetric key generation		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RSA (2048 bits) 	FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.3	RSA #2945 Combined #C1262
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ECDSA (P-256, P-384, P-521 curves) 	FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.4	ECDSA #1470 Combined #C1262
Key Establishment		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ECDSA (P-256, P-384, P-521 curves) 	NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography";	CVL #1937 Combined #C1262
Encryption/Decryption		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AES CBC (128 and 256 bits) 	ISO 18033-3, CBC as specified in ISO 10116	AES #5484 Combined #C1262
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AES GCM (128 and 256 bits) 	ISO 18033-3, GCM as specified in ISO 19772	AES #5484 Combined #C1262
Cryptographic signature services (Signature Generation and Verification)		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) (modulus 2048) 	FIPS PUB 186-4 "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)"	RSA #2945 Combined #C1262
Cryptographic hashing		

Functions	Standards	Certificates
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SHA-1 (digest size 160 bits) SHA-256 (digest size 256 bits) SHA-384 (digest size 384 bits) SHA-512 (digest size 512 bits) 	ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004	SHS #4401 Combined #C1262
Keyed-hash message authentication		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HMAC-SHA-1 (key size 160 bits and digest size 160 bits) HMAC-SHA-256 (key size 256 bits and digest size 256 bits) HMAC-SHA-512 (key size 512 bits and digest size 512 bits) 	ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”	HMAC #3640 Combined #C1262
Random bit generation		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CTR-DRBG(AES) with one independent hardware-based noise source of 256 bits of non-determinism 	ISO/IEC 18031:2011	DRBG #2159 Combined #C1262

Table 6 Cryptographic Functions

6.2.1 FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation

The TOE generates RSA asymmetric keys using cryptographic key sizes of 2048 bits according to FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3. The RSA asymmetric keys are used in support of SSH public key authentication. See table above for Asymmetric key generation: RSA (2048-bit). The TOE also generates ECC asymmetric keys using Diffie-Hellman group 14 and NIST curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 in support of SSH public key authentication and SSH session establishment.

6.2.2 FCS_CKM.2: Cryptographic Key Establishment

The TOE performs key establishment using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that implements 2048-bit MODP Group according to RFC 3526, Section 3; and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement using the P-256, P-384, or P-521 curve when an SSH ciphersuite is negotiated.

The TOE acts as both a sender and recipient. It acts as a client for communication with an external audit server, and as a server for the SSH management interface.

See **Table 6 Cryptographic Functions** above for detail.

6.2.3 FCS_CKM.4: Cryptographic Key Destruction

The TOE uses the following secret keys, private keys and CSPs.

Key/CSP Name	Algorithm/Key Size	Description
RSA SGK	RSA 2048 bits	RSA signature generation key
RSA KDK	RSA 2048 bits	RSA key decryption key
ECC Keys	ECC key pair (P-256, P-384, P-521)	SSH session keys
SSH-RSA	RSA 2048 bits	SSH-RSA client keys
AES EDK	AES 128, 256 bits	AES encrypt/decrypt key
HMAC Key	HMAC-SHA-1 (160 bits) HMAC-SHA-256 (256 bits) HMAC-SHA-512 (512 bits)	HMAC keyed hash key
CTR_DRBG Key	AES 256 bits	Internal CTR_DRBG key variable

Table 7 Secret keys, Private keys and CSPs

The TOE incorporates OpenSSL, which provides implementation of the cryptographic algorithms specified in **Table 6**. The TOE operates in FIPS mode and invokes the OpenSSL crypto module APIs to set up and maintain the full SSH session, using the underlying cryptographic algorithms as identified in **Table 6**. Therefore, all key generation, negotiation of session keys, and packet authentication is performed and managed by the crypto module.

User passwords and SSH-RSA client keys are stored encrypted using AES256 in internal flash. When deleted SSH_RSA client keys are overwritten with zeros. The key encryption key is stored encrypted on Compact Flash (CF) using AES. The key used to encrypt the KEK exists in hardware circuitry within the TOE.

All remaining keys (see **Table 7** above) are plaintext stored in RAM, only during the lifetime of an API call. They are destroyed automatically by overwriting once with zeroes upon power-off. Plain text keys in memory are freed immediately after use, and the memory is overwritten with zeroes.

6.2.4 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)

The TOE performs 128/256-bit AES encryption/decryption as specified in ISO 18033-3, CBC mode as specified in ISO 10116 and GCM mode as specified in ISO 19772.

6.2.5 FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)

The TOE will provide cryptographic signature services using RSA Digital Signature Algorithm with key size of 2048 bits that meets the FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard.

6.2.6 FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)

The TOE performs SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 cryptographic hashing services in accordance with ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004. The SHA hash algorithm is used as part of HMAC, but is also used as part of RSA digital signature creation and verification.

6.2.7 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)

The TOE performs keyed-hash message authentication that meets the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2. The key length, hash function used, block size, and output MAC lengths are identified in the table below.

Algorithm	Key Size	Block Size	Message Digest Size
SHA-1	160	512	160

SHA-256	256	512	256
SHA-512	512	1024	512

Table 8 HMAC Properties

Keyed-hashing message authentication services HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, and HMAC-SHA-512 are supported for SSH.

6.2.8 FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation

The TOE uses a software-based deterministic random bit generator that complies with ISO/IEC 18031:2011, using CTR_DRBG (AES). The TOE seeds the DRBG with 256 bits of entropy. All platforms use entropy provided by the Linux kernel, including device, input, interrupt, and disk randomness.

On the 1100TX/5500TX/8400TX/8200TX and vTPS with a processor that supports the RDRAND instruction, RDRAND is used as an additional hardware based entropy input.

On the 2200T, 440T, and vTPS with a processor that does not support the RDRAND instruction, CPU time jitters are used as an additional non-physical based entropy input.

6.2.9 FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 – SSH Client Protocol / FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 – SSH Server Protocol

The TOE acts as an SSH client for secure communications with an external audit server. The TOE acts as an SSH Server for secure communications with remote administrators. The TOE implements the SSHv2 protocol and complies with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 5656 and 6668.

The TOE's SSH client protocol implementation supports the public-key-based authentication method as described in RFC 4252. The TOE drops packets greater than 256K bytes in an SSH transport connection as described in RFC 4253.

The TOE's SSH server protocol implementation supports public-key-based and password authentication methods as described in RFC 4252. The TOE drops packets greater than 256K bytes in an SSH transport connection as described in RFC 4253.

As SSH packets are being received, the TOE uses a buffer to build all packet information. Once complete, the packet is checked to ensure it can be appropriately decrypted. However, if it is not complete when the buffer becomes full (256K bytes) the packet will be dropped.

The TOE's SSH transport implementation uses:

- aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes256-gcm@openssh.com encryption algorithms
- ssh-rsa, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 as its public key algorithms; and
- hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, AEAD_AES_128_GCM, and AEAD_AES_256_GCM (implicit for aes*-gcm@openssh.com) as its MAC algorithms.

The SSH algorithms are enabled by default. The TOE rejects any encryption, public key and MAC algorithms not listed above. SSH ciphers can be toggled using the command: debug ssh ciphers CIPHER enable/disable. PK and MAC algorithms can be changed by modifying the sshd config file as root.

The TSF uses diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, and ecdh-sha2-nistp521 as its key exchange methods for the SSH protocol. The TOE ensures that the SSH connection is rekeyed when a threshold of either one hour has been reached, or when one gigabyte of data has been transmitted. Both thresholds are checked by the TOE and rekeying is performed upon reaching the threshold that is hit first.

The TOE ensures that the SSH client authenticates the identity of the SSH server using its local database associating each host name with its corresponding public key as described in RFC 4251 section 4.1.

6.3 Identification and authentication

The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can access any of the TOE functions.

6.3.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management

The TOE can detect when an Administrator (Super User and Admin) configurable number (from 1 to 10) of failed remote authentication attempts has been reached. When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been reached, the remote administrator accessing the TOE via SSH is locked out for an administrator (Super User and Admin) configurable period of time (1-1440 minutes). Authentication failures by remote Administrators cannot lead to a situation where no Administrator access is available to the TOE. If remote administrators are locked out, administrator access is still available via local console, and this prevents any condition where no administrator access is available.

6.3.2 FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management

The TOE can be composed of passwords from any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: “!”, “@”, “#”, “\$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(”, “)”, “;”, “:”, “/”, “<”, “>”, “?” Single and double quotes, spaces or back slashes are not allowed. The minimum password length is administrator configurable to 1, 8 or 15 characters, depending on Password security Level.

The TOE offers configurable global authentication settings that apply to all users. The TOE offers pre-defined Password Security Levels of None, Low, Medium and High. The default value is Medium. Each level adopts the requirements of the preceding level and adds additional requirements for the user name and password.

A Password Security Level of None does not contain any restrictions other than User names cannot contain spaces. The Password Security Level of Low requires User names to be at least six characters in length; a new password must be different than the current password, and passwords must be at least eight characters in length. A Password Security Level of Medium specifies the following additional password complexity requirements:

- Contains at least two alphabetic characters,
- Contains at least one numeric character, and
- Contains at least one non-alphanumeric character.

A Password Security Level of High requires the passwords to be at least 15 characters and meet the following additional password complexity requirements:

- Contains at least one uppercase character,
- Contains at least one lowercase character, and
- At least half the characters cannot occupy the same positions as the current password.

Based on the configured password security level, the only security-relevant condition is the enforced length configured by level.

6.3.3 FIA_UAU.7: Protected Authentication Feedback

When logging in, the TOE does not echo passwords so that passwords are not inadvertently displayed to the user and any other users that might be able to view the login display.

6.3.4 FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication, FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Password-based Authentication Mechanism

Administrators manage the TOE remotely using an SSH connection to the Ethernet Management port on the TOE appliance or locally through the console interface or locally through a direct connection to the Ethernet Management port. Each method provides access to the CLI after an administrator successfully logs in. Prior to administrative login, the Management interface will respond to ICMP requests to confirm connectivity (for remote administrative connections) and displays a warning banner for both local and remote connections. No other TSF-mediated actions are permitted on behalf of an administrative user until the user is successfully authenticated.

In order to log in, the user must provide an identity and also authentication data that matches an identity configured on the TOE. Users are defined locally within the TOE with a user identity, password, and user role. Administrators accessing the Ethernet Management port can be defined with an SSH public key for public key-based authentication for SSH connections rather than a password. Users are authenticated directly by the TOE. Any resulting session is

dependent upon successful authentication and established sessions are associated with the role(s) (see Section 6.4) assigned to the user.

6.4 Security management

The TOE provides a CLI to access the security management functions. Security management commands are limited to administrators and are available only after they have provided acceptable user identification and authentication data to the TOE. The TOE controls user access to the TOE and resources based on user role. Users are given permission to access a set of commands and resources based on their user role.

6.4.1 FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate: Management of Security Functions Behaviour Requests

The initiation of manual TOE updates is restricted to the Admin and Super User roles.

6.4.2 FMT_MOF.1/Functions: Management of Security Functions Behaviour Requests

Users with the Super User or Operator roles can configure the audit data to be transmitted to a remote syslog server.

6.4.3 FMT_MTD.1/CoreData: Management of TSF Data

The ability to manage the TSF data is restricted to the Administrators. No administrative functions are accessible prior to administrator log-in. The authorized administrator must have the appropriate permissions as defined by the role to access the TSF data.

6.4.4 FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions

All administrative functionality is available from the CLI (locally or remote).

The TOE provides the following management functions:

- Configure the access banner;
- Configure the cryptographic functionality (cryptographic ciphers used in SSH sessions);
- Set the time which is used for time-stamps;
- Update the TOE, and to verify the updates using the digital signature capability prior to installing those updates;
- Configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
- Configure the session inactivity time before session termination;
- Configure the list of TOE-provided services available before an entity is identified and authenticated, as specified in FIA_UIA_EXT.1; and
- Configure audit behaviour (send audit records to a remote syslog server).

6.4.5 FMT_SMR.2: Restrictions on Security Roles

The TOE includes pre-defined administrator roles and supports local and remote administration. The pre-defined roles Super User, Admin, and Operator map to the Security Administrator role in the [NDcPP]. The Operator role only has the ability to view TSF data as specified by FMT_MTD.1/CoreData; and determine the behavior of the function to transmit of audit data to an external IT entity.

The TPS appliance has a serial console interface as well as an Ethernet interface dedicated to management. An administrator can manage the TOE locally via the CLI through the console interface. In addition, the CLI can be accessed remotely via SSH.

6.5 Protection of the TSF

The TOE ensures that sensitive information such as passwords and cryptographic keys are stored such that they are not accessible even to an administrator. The TOE provides its own internal clock which it uses to provide a reliable time source for audit records.

The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and mechanisms for the update of the TOE software/firmware and verification of the cryptographic functions.

6.5.1 FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords

The TOE stores passwords using 256-bit AES and prevents reading of plaintext passwords. The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any users a plaintext password. See Section 6.2 for more information about stored passwords.

6.5.2 FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Protection of TSF Data (for Reading of all Pre-shared, Symmetric and Private Keys)

The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any users a stored cryptographic key. See Section 6.2 for more information about stored keys.

6.5.3 FPT_STM_EXT.1: Reliable Time Stamps

The TOE is a hardware appliance or a virtual appliance image installed on a hardware appliance that includes a hardware-based real-time clock to ensure that reliable time information is available. The TOE's real-time clock is a Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor that stores the system time and date information. The TOE's embedded OS manages the clock and exposes administrator clock-related functions. The clock is used for audit record time stamps, measuring session activity for termination, and for cryptographic operations based on time/date.

6.5.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing

The TOE performs all self-tests (software module integrity tests and cryptographic known answer tests) on start-up. The TOE process manager service is responsible for bringing up all relevant TOE processes. All binaries include an embedded integrity checksum (md5sum) that the process manager verifies before starting the process. If a module fails a software integrity test, the TOE reports status indicating which failure occurred and transitions to an error state, in which the module ceases to continue processing.

The TOE includes CAVP certified OpenSSL binaries which are included in the self-testing to ensure the correct operation of cryptographic functions. OpenSSL performs the following cryptographic self-tests during start-up:

- Cryptographic known answer tests: for symmetric and one-way cryptographic operations, the TSF will process known input data and compare it to the pre-computed output for each algorithm to ensure results are consistent with known answers.
- Pairwise consistency tests: for public key cryptographic operations, the TSF will perform a cryptographic operation followed by its reverse (e.g. encrypt/decrypt; sign/verify) to ensure that the result of the calculation is the same as the initially-supplied value.

6.5.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update

The administrator uses the CLI to update the TOE, and to query the currently executing software version of the TOE. The command `version` displays the current software version.

The administrator uses a Debug command (`debug upgrade`) to download a TOE update package directly from a specified URL. The update package is published on Trend Micro support website. The TOE protects package files by first calculating a SHA-256 hash, then signing the hash using 2048-bit RSA public/private key pair. The digital signature is verified by the TOE prior to the package being installed. The TOE starts the update process once it verifies the signature/hash. A package with an invalid signature will not be installed by the TOE.

6.6 TOE access

The TOE can be configured to display an informative banner when an administrator establishes an interactive session. The TOE can also enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be terminated. Finally, the TOE allows administrators to terminate their own session.

6.6.1 FTA_SSL.3: TSF-initiated Termination

The TOE can be configured by an administrator to set an interactive remote session timeout value (any integer value greater than zero in minutes) for user sessions. The default timeout is 15 minutes. Note also that should a user have their session terminated (e.g., due to inactivity), they are required to successfully authenticate, by reentering their identity and authentication data, in order to establish a new session.

The TOE can be configured by an administrator to set an interactive session timeout value for remote user sessions. The timeout value is in minutes and can be set to any integer value from one to 32000.

6.6.2 FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination

Administrators can terminate their own interactive sessions by logging out at the console and SSH.

6.6.3 FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking

The TOE can be configured by an administrator to set an interactive session timeout value for local user sessions. The timeout value is in minutes and can be set to any integer value from one to 32000.

The TOE implements the session inactivity limit for local interactive sessions at the console. Such sessions will be terminated when the inactivity period expires. Should a user have their session terminated (e.g., due to inactivity), they are required to successfully authenticate, by reentering their identity and authentication data, in order to establish a new session.

6.6.4 FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners

The TOE supports an administrator-configurable TOE access banner that is displayed prior to a user completing the login process at the CLI. This is implemented for both local and remote management connections (console, SSH).

6.7 Trusted path/channels

An authorized administrator can establish a secure remote connection with the TOE using SSH.

The TOE also uses SSH secure communications with an external log server, to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of audit records.

6.7.1 FTP_ITC.1: Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

The TOE can be configured to export audit records to an external audit server. The TOE uses SSH to protect communications between itself and the audit server. SSH provides assured identification of its end points via host name/public key association as per FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.9 and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data. The TOE initiates communication via the trusted channel for the audit server.

The TOEs secure protocols are supported by FIPS-approved cryptographic mechanisms included in the TOE implementation.

6.7.2 FTP_TRP.1/Admin: Trusted Path

The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators accessing the CLI using SSH, which provides confidentiality of transmitted information and detects any loss of integrity. Remote administrators initiate communication via the trusted path by using an SSH client to login.

To successfully establish an interactive administrative session, the administrator must be able to provide acceptable user credentials (e.g., user id and password), after which they will be able to access the CLI features. Remote administrators may also need to provide an SSH key for key-based authentication. The trusted path is used for initial Administrator authentication and all subsequent administrative actions.

The secure protocols are supported by FIPS-approved cryptographic mechanisms included in the TOE implementation.

7. Protection Profile Claims

The ST conforms to the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314, 14 March 2018, [NDcPP] and including the following optional SFRs: FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.3/LocSpace, FCS_SSHC_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1, and FMT_MOF.1/Functions.

As explained in Section 3, Security Problem Definition, the Security Problem Definition of the [NDcPP] has been included by reference into this ST.

As explained in Section 4, Security Objectives, the Security Objectives of the [NDcPP] have been included by reference into this ST.

The following table identifies all the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in this ST. Each SFR is reproduced from the [NDcPP] and operations completed as appropriate.

Requirement Class	Requirement Component	Source
FAU: Security audit	FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation	NDcPP
	FAU_GEN.2: User Identity Association	NDcPP
	FAU_STG.1: Protected Audit Trail Storage	NDcPP
	FAU_STG_EXT.1: Protected Audit Event Storage	NDcPP
	FAU_STG.3/LocSpace: Action in case of possible audit data loss	NDcPP
FCS: Cryptographic support	FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation	NDcPP
	FCS_CKM.2: Cryptographic Key Establishment	NDcPP
	FCS_CKM.4: Cryptographic Key Destruction	NDcPP
	FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption: Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)	NDcPP
	FCS_COP.1/SigGen: Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)	NDcPP
	FCS_COP.1/Hash: Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)	NDcPP
	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash: Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)	NDcPP
	FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation	NDcPP
	FCS_SHC_EXT.1: SSH Client Protocol	NDcPP
	FCS_SHS_EXT.1: SSH Server Protocol	NDcPP
FIA: Identification and authentication	FIA_AFL.1: Authentication Failure Management	NDcPP
	FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management	NDcPP
	FIA_UAU.7: Protected Authentication Feedback	NDcPP
	FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Password-based Authentication Mechanism	NDcPP
	FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication	NDcPP
FMT: Security management	FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate: Management of security functions behaviour	NDcPP
	FMT_MOF.1/Functions: Management of security functions behaviour	NDcPP
	FMT_MTD.1/CoreData: Management of TSF Data	NDcPP
	FMT_SMF.1:Specification of Management Functions	NDcPP
	FMT_SMR.2: Restrictions on Security Roles	NDcPP
FPT: Protection of the TSF	FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)	NDcPP
	FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords	NDcPP

Requirement Class	Requirement Component	Source
	FPT_STM_EXT.1: Reliable Time Stamps	NDcPP
	FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing	NDcPP
	FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update	NDcPP
FTA: TOE access	FTA_SSL.3: TSF-initiated Termination	NDcPP
	FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination	NDcPP
	FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking	NDcPP
	FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners	NDcPP
FTP: Trusted path/channels	FTP_ITC.1: Inter-TSF trusted channel	NDcPP
	FTP_TRP.1/Admin: Trusted Path	NDcPP

Table 9 SFR Protection Profile Sources

8. Rationale

This security target includes by reference the [NDcPP] Security Problem Definition, Security Objectives, and Security Assurance Requirements. The security target makes no additions to the [NDcPP] assumptions. [NDcPP] security functional requirements have been reproduced with the Protection Profile operations completed. Operations on the security requirements follow [NDcPP] application notes and assurance activities. Consequently, [NDcPP] rationale applies but is incomplete. The TOE Summary Specification rationale below serves to complete the rationale required for the security target.

8.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale

Each subsection in Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, describes a security function of the TOE. Each description is followed with rationale that indicates which requirements are satisfied by aspects of the corresponding security function. The security functions work together to satisfy all of the security functional requirements. Furthermore, all of the security functions are necessary in order for the TSF to provide the required security functionality.

This Section in conjunction with Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, provides evidence that the security functions are suitable to meet the TOE security requirements. The collection of security functions work together to provide all of the security requirements. The security functions described in the TOE summary specification are all necessary for the required security functionality in the TSF. **Table 10 Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping** demonstrates the relationship between security requirements and security functions.

	Security audit	Cryptographic support	Identification and authentication	Security management	Protection of the TSF	TOE access	Trusted path/channels
FAU_GEN.1	X						
FAU_GEN.2	X						
FAU_STG.1	X						
FAU_STG_EXT.1	X						
FAU_STG.3/LocSpace	X						
FCS_CKM.1		X					
FCS_CKM.2		X					
FCS_CKM.4		X					
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption		X					
FCS_COP.1/SigGen		X					
FCS_COP.1/Hash		X					
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash		X					
FCS_RBG_EXT.1		X					
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1		X					
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1		X					
FIA_AFL.1			X				
FIA_PMG_EXT.1			X				
FIA_UAU.7			X				
FIA_UAU_EXT.2			X				
FIA_UIA_EXT.1			X				
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate				X			
FMT_MOF.1/Functions				X			
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData				X			
FMT_SMF.1				X			
FMT_SMR.2				X			
FPT_APW_EXT.1					X		
FPT_SKP_EXT.1					X		
FPT_STM_EXT.1					X		
FPT_TST_EXT.1					X		
FPT_TUD_EXT.1					X		
FTA_SSL.3						X	
FTA_SSL.4						X	
FTA_SSL_EXT.1						X	

	Security audit	Cryptographic support	Identification and authentication	Security management	Protection of the TSF	TOE access	Trusted path/channels
FTA_TAB.1						X	
FTP_ITC.1							X
FTP_TRP.1/Admin							X

Table 10 Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping