


**National Information Assurance Partnership**  
**Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme**



**Validation Report**  
**for the**  
**Varonis Data Security Platform 8.6**

**Report Number:** CCEVS-VR-11100-2020

**Dated:** 12/9/2020

**Version:** 1.0

**National Institute of Standards and Technology**  
**Information Technology Laboratory**  
**100 Bureau Drive**  
**Gaithersburg, MD 20899**

**National Security Agency**  
**Information Assurance Directorate**  
**9800 Savage Road STE 6940**  
**Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940**

# **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

## **Validation Team**

Paul Bicknell  
Anne Gugel  
Peter Kruus  
Lisa Mitchell  
Linda Morrison

## **Common Criteria Testing Laboratory**

Kenneth Lasoski  
Rodrigo Tapia  
*Acumen Security, LLC*

# Table of Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Identification</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Architectural Information</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Security Policy</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Assumptions &amp; Clarification of Scope</b> .....	<b>9</b>
5.1	Assumptions .....	9
5.2	Clarification of Scope .....	9
<b>6</b>	<b>Documentation</b> .....	<b>10</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>TOE Evaluated Configuration</b> .....	<b>11</b>
7.1	Evaluated Configuration.....	11
<b>8</b>	<b>IT Product Testing</b> .....	<b>12</b>
8.1	Developer Testing .....	12
8.2	Evaluation Team Independent Testing .....	12
<b>9</b>	<b>Results of the Evaluation</b> .....	<b>13</b>
9.1	Evaluation of Security Target .....	13
9.2	Evaluation of Development Documentation .....	13
9.3	Evaluation of Guidance Documents .....	13
9.4	Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities .....	14
9.5	Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .....	14
9.6	Vulnerability Assessment Activity .....	14
9.7	Summary of Evaluation Results .....	15
<b>10</b>	<b>Validator Comments &amp; Recommendations</b> .....	<b>16</b>
<b>11</b>	<b>Annexes</b> .....	<b>17</b>
<b>12</b>	<b>Security Target</b> .....	<b>18</b>
<b>13</b>	<b>Glossary</b> .....	<b>19</b>
<b>14</b>	<b>Bibliography</b> .....	<b>20</b>

# 1 Executive Summary

This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration. Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.

This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the evaluation of the Varonis Data Security Platform Series Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.

The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in December 2020. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined in the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security Requirements for the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP].

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP]. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.

The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report (AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.

## 2 Identification

The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.

The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliance List.

Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:

- The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
- The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
- The conformance result of the evaluation.
- The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
- The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.

**Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers**

Item	Identifier
<b>Evaluation Scheme</b>	United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
<b>TOE</b>	Varonis Data Security Platform 8.6
<b>Protection Profile</b>	Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3 [SWAPP]
<b>Security Target</b>	Varonis Data Security Platform v8.6 Security Target Version 1.1
<b>Evaluation Technical Report</b>	Evaluation Technical Report for Varonis Data Security Platform 8.6 Version 1.1
<b>CC Version</b>	Version 3.1, Revision 5
<b>Conformance Result</b>	CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
<b>Sponsor</b>	Varonis Systems Inc
<b>Developer</b>	Varonis Systems Inc
<b>Common Criteria Testing Lab (CCTL)</b>	Acumen Security Rockville, MD 20850
<b>CCEVS Validators</b>	Paul Bicknell Anne Gugel Peter Kruus Lisa Mitchell Linda Morrison

### 3 Architectural Information

The TOE is a Microsoft Windows-based software application that works with file systems across a network to audit, analyze, and remediate improper or insecure access permissions. The TOE works with a variety of different objects, including files, folders, Exchange mailboxes, Active Directory domains, and SharePoint sites. The primary components and features of the TOE included in the evaluation are as follows:

- DatAdvantage (DA)
- Data Classification Engine (DCE)
- DatAlert
- Data Privilege (DP)
- Remediation Engine and Data Transfer Engine (DTE)

DA is the underlying framework that is common across all application components.

DCE provides the facilities to classify sensitive data stored in a number of repositories, tagging of sensitive data, identifying data owners and sensitive data patterns. In conjunction with DatAdvantage the DCE engine provides full identification cycle for sensitive data owners.

DatAlert provides real-time alerting for events such as privilege escalations, access on or deletion of sensitive data, permissions or other anomalous behavior related to object access.

Data Privilege is an interface to the application that provides a web-based form providing request and approval workflows for data consumers and owners.

DTE facilitates the secure migration of data between heterogeneous file systems by comparing source and target file system access control information and allowing administrators to ensure that the resultant migrated data contains the appropriate permissions in its new location. An additional, complementing part of the suite is the Remediation engine which allows the TOE to identify and correct permissions on data located within the monitored assets.

The TOE is managed remotely via two primary web-based interfaces: DatAdvantage Web and Data Privilege Web. In addition, two locally accessible interfaces are available: DatAdvantage UI and DatAdvantage Management Console. DatAdvantage UI provides the same functionality as DatAdvantage Web, while DatAdvantage Management Console provides initial configuration and maintenance tasks. DatAdvantage UI provides the same functionality as DatAdvantage Web, while DatAdvantage Management Console provides initial configuration and maintenance tasks.

## **4 Security Policy**

The TOE provides the security functionality required by [SWAPP].

### **Cryptographic Support**

The Microsoft Windows Server 2019 platform provides TLS/HTTPS functionality for users communicating with the TOE via its remote web interfaces, as well as TLS/HTTPS connections from the TOE to third party devices including Microsoft Active Directory, Microsoft Exchange Server, Microsoft SharePoint, and NetApp filers.

The TOE invokes the platform cryptography for secure credential storage including database connection strings, credentials for third party applications, and X.509 certificates and keypairs.

There are no cryptographic algorithms implemented within the TOE.

According to NIAP Policy #5 FAQ #8, the TOE relies on the platform which has been evaluated and is listed on the NIAP PCL as described in section 1.3 above.

### **User Data Protection**

Access to TOE platform resources is restricted to network communications and application logs. The TOE initiates communications to third party applications and allows initiation to the TOE from remote users for management.

The TOE leverages the Windows platform to securely store sensitive data.

### **Security Management**

The TOE stores configuration data using the recommended platform configuration storage mechanisms.

The TOE provides no access to any TSF functionality by default. No credentials are provided with the application on a default install and must be configured during the TOE installation process.

The TOE's binary and data files are protected with file permissions that prevent modification from unprivileged users.

The TOE is managed by the DatAdvantage Management Console, DatAdvantage UI, DatAdvantage Web, and DataPrivilege Web.

### **Privacy**

The TOE does not transmit PII.

### **Protection of the TSF**

The TOE uses only documented platform APIs and third-party libraries as specified in Appendix A of the ST.

The TOE does not request memory mapping at any explicit addresses, does not allocate any memory regions with both write and execute permissions, and does not write user-modifiable

files to directories containing executable files. The TOE is built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled and is compatible with the platform security features.

Updates to the TOE are performed manually by the TOE administrator. The TOE provides the ability to check for updates and verify the currently installed version. All TOE installation and update files are distributed in an executable format supported by Windows and binaries are signed to provide integrity of the update file.

SWID tags are used to uniquely identify the TOE binaries.

### **Trusted Path/Channels**

The TOE invokes the Windows platform to encrypt transmitted data between itself and third-party systems using TLS/HTTPS.

## 5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope

### 5.1 Assumptions

The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE's environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.

The following assumptions are drawn directly from the SWAPP.

ID	Assumption
A.PLATFORM	The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock for its execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER	The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN	The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

### 5.2 Clarification of Scope

All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:

- As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this evaluation is defined within the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP].
- Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
- The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.

## **6 Documentation**

The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:


- Varonis Data Security Platform 8.6 Security Target v1.1 [ST]
- Varonis Data Security Platform 8.6 Common Criteria Configuration Guide v1.1 [AGD]

# 7 TOE Evaluated Configuration

## 7.1 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is an application running on a general-purpose operating system. The TOE consists of a set of application binaries (executable runtimes, DLLs, etc.), web-based UIs, configuration files, and data that correspond with the application components discussed in section 1.2 of the ST. The TOE leverages the Windows platform to secure connectivity with third party products using TLS/HTTPS. In addition, the Windows platform provides the secure TLS/HTTPS functionality as necessary to protect the trusted path to TOE administrators. TOE environment components are described in section 1.3.3 of the ST.

The TOE is evaluated on the Microsoft Windows Server 2019 build 1809 platform, which has been evaluated against the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.2.1, and the Extended Package for Wireless LAN Client, Version 1.0.



## **8 IT Product Testing**

This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived from information contained in Evaluation Test Report for Varonis Data Security Platform, which is not publicly available. The Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.

### **8.1 Developer Testing**

No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.

### **8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing**

The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation and ran the tests specified in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP]. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.

## **9 Results of the Evaluation**

The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and work units received a passing verdict.

A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Varonis Data Security Platform to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the NDPP.

### **9.1 Evaluation of Security Target**

The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the Varonis Data Security Platform that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements. Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP].

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

### **9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation**

The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP] related to the examination of the information contained in the TOE Summary Specification.

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

### **9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents**

The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the

evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP] related to the examination of the information contained in the operational guidance documents.

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

#### **9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities**

The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE was identified.

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

#### **9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity**

The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP] and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP], and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

#### **9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity**

The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and found that any vulnerabilities have been mitigated or did not result in the TOE being able to be exploited in its evaluated configuration. The search terms, dates, and public databases used are documented in the AAR.

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP], and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

## **9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results**

The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.

The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP], and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.

## **10 Validator Comments & Recommendations**

The validation team suggests that the consumer pay particular attention to the installation guidance to ensure the product is placed into the evaluated configuration. It is particularly important that the guidance documentation be followed to enable BitLocker on the TOE platform.

The consumer should note the software in the operational environment, as listed in the ST, that is required for the operation of the TOE.

## **11 Annexes**

Not applicable.

## **12 Security Target**

Please see the Varonis Data Security Platform v8.6 Security Target Version 1.1 [ST].

## 13 Glossary

The following definitions are used throughout this document:

- **Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL).** An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
- **Conformance.** The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
- **Evaluation.** The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
- **Evaluation Evidence.** Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
- **Feature.** Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
- **Target of Evaluation (TOE).** A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
- **Validation.** The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
- **Validation Body.** A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.

## 14 Bibliography

The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:

1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
5. Protection Profile for Application Software, version 1.3, dated, 01 March 2019 [SWAPP].
6. Varonis Data Security Platform 8.6 Security Target Version 1.1 [ST]
7. Varonis Data Security Platform 8.6 Common Criteria Configuration Guide Version 1.1 [AGD]
8. Varonis Data Security Platform 8.6 Evaluation Technical Report Version 1.1 [ETR]
9. Varonis Data Security Platform 8.6 Assurance Activities Report Version 1.2 [AAR]
10. Test Plan for Varonis Data Security Platform 8.6 Version 1.2 [DTR]