

ASSURANCE CONTINUITY MAINTENANCE REPORT FOR Tenix Interactive Link Data Diode Device, Gigabit Variant

Maintenance Report Number: CCEVS-VR-06-0051b

Date of Activity:	07/21/2008	
References:	Common Criteria document CCIMB-2004-02-009 "Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements", version 1.0, February 2004;	
	Impact / Interactiv	Analysis Report,"Impact Analysis Report IAR-IL-DDD-002 Version 1.2" for the ve Link, Data Diode Device", dated 17 July 2008.
Documentation Updated:		Tenix Interactive Link Data Diode Device, Gigabit Variant Installation and Administration Guide
		Tenix Interactive Link Data Diode Device, Gigabit Variant developer evidence

Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report:

The vendor for the Tenix Interactive Link Data Diode Device, Gigabit Variant submitted an Impact Analysis Report (IAR) to CCEVS for approval on 17 July 2008. The IAR is intended to satisfy requirements outlined in Common Criteria document CCIMB-2004-02-009, "Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements", version 1.0, February 2004. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes the changes made to the certified TOE, the evidence updated as a result of the changes and the security impact of the changes.

Changes to TOE:

The Boeing P-8A Poseidon Program required a Ruggedized version of the Interactive Link Data Diode Device (IL-DDD) Gigabit Variant to be installed in the Boeing P-8A Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA). The P-8A Ruggedized Data Diode allows information to flow from a lower security classified network (low side source) to a higher security classified network (high side destination), without compromising the confidentiality of the information on the high side.

The P-8A Ruggedized Data Diode is based on the IL-DDD which has been upgraded in order to obtain extended environmental performance and enhance reliability required for the aircraft operational environment. This includes modification of the power supply design and implementation.

It should be noted that the tamper evident seal on the Ruggedized Data Diode Device is significantly smaller than the previously-evaluation Gigabit variant as depicted in paragraph 2.3 of the Tenix Interactive Link Data Diode Device, Gigabit Variant Installation and Administration Guide. As such, emphasis on regular inspection is the sole safeguard against tampering and should be actively enforced when the product is fielded.

Conclusion:

The changes to the TOE environment were analyzed and found to have no effect on the security of the evaluated TOE. The non-security relevance of the changes leads to the conclusion that the updates can be classified as a **minor change** and that certificate maintenance is the correct path for continuity of assurance.