

Certification Report

Beveiligingsprofiel Boordcomputer Taxi (PP-BCT), versie 1.8, 6 februari 2015

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Certificate

Standard Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1 Revision 4 (ISO/IEC 15408)

Certificate number **C08-10381-CR3**

TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. certifies:

Certificate holder
and developer

Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu
P.O. Box 20901, 2500 EX Den Haag, Netherlands

Product and
assurance level

Beveiligingsprofiel Boordcomputer Taxi (PP-BCT), versie
1.8, 6 februari 2015,

Assurance Package:

- EAL3

Project number

NSCIB-CC-08-10381-CR3

Evaluation facility

Brightsight BV located in Delft, the Netherlands



Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement for
components up to
EAL4

Applying the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 Revision 4 (ISO/IEC 18045)

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Validity

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Foreword

The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security products as well as for protection profiles and sites.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025, General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and testing laboratories.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.

The consumer should review the security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the security requirements stated in the (site) security target.

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Recognition of the certificate

The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate indicate that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.

International recognition

The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC. Starting 8 September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be found on: <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

Product certificates issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of the previous CCRA (i.e. recognition based on assurance components up to and including EAL4+ALC_FLR). Also certification procedures started before 8 September 2014 and Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old certificates remain recognised according to the rules of the previous CCRA.

This protection profile certificate falls under the recognition rules of both previous and current CCRA.

European recognition

The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April 2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on: <http://www.sogis.eu>.

1 Executive Summary

1.1 Introduction

This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Beveiligingsprofiel Boordcomputer Taxi (PP-BCT), versie 1.8, 6 februari 2015 [PP]. This Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the Protection Profile for their particular requirements.

1.2 Evaluation and Certification details

The Beveiligingsprofiel Boordcomputer Taxi (PP-BCT), versie 1.8, 6 februari 2015 [PP] is developed by Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu located in Den Haag, Netherlands and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification.

This version 1.8 of the PP-BCT is an update of the previously certified version 1.3 from 1 February 2010, which in turn was an update to the original certified version 1.0 from 13 October 2008¹. The change to the previously certified protection profile is at the level of changes/additions to the scope and functionality of the defined TOE. The identification of the updated protection profile is indicated by a new version number compared to the original protection profile as Configuration Management procedures required a change in the version number from v1.3 into v1.8.

The original protection profile has been evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was completed on 17 October 2008. The re-assessment of the updated protection profile was completed on 11 March 2015 with the approval of the evaluation technical report [ETR]¹. The certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].

The results documented in the ETR for this protection profile provide sufficient evidence that it meets the requirements for protection profile (PP) evaluations specified in the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4 [CEM], for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 4 [CC].

TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that evaluation of the Beveiligingsprofiel Boordcomputer Taxi (PP-BCT), versie 1.8, 6 februari 2015 meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the protection profile will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply to the specific version of the protection profile as evaluated.

1.3 Protection Profile Identification

Title:	Beveiligingsprofiel Boordcomputer Taxi (PP-BCT)
PP Version:	versie 1.8, 6 februari 2015
CC Version:	3.1 Revision 4 (September 2012)
CC Conformance Claim:	Part 2 conformant, Part 3 conformant, EAL 3
Required conformance:	Conformance claims to this protection profile require strict conformance

¹ The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.

2 Certification Results

2.1 Protection Profile Overview

This Protection Profile “Beveiligingsprofiel Boordcomputer Taxi (PP-BCT), versie 1.8, 6 februari 2015” [PP] is developed by the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment (Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu) as a basis for the development of Security Targets in order to perform a certification of an IT-product (TOE).

The “Boordcomputer Taxi” (BCT) is a control device intended for installation in cars that are used for taxi transportation. Its purpose is to aid enforcement processes by electronic registration of the ride administration and the working, drive and rest times and to make this information available on request to authorized persons for verification.

The TOE has four modes of operation: operational mode, control mode, activation/inspection mode and working mode. The operational mode has three operating levels: basic, working time and taxi transport. When taxi transport is being offered or working time takes place the driver manually selects the corresponding operating level. In the operational mode, operating level working time or taxi transport, data is registered on the performed taxi rides and the working, drive and rest times of the driver. The start and end of a ride is made known to the TOE by an active operating action by the driver. In addition the loading condition (loaded/unloaded) shall be indicated.

Furthermore the TOE takes care of providing the basic data time and travelled distance, and the position of the vehicle in all modes. In the operating level basic the registration of events is also maintained. The operating level basic is a distinct operating level in the operational mode. In the other modes the TOE integrates the basic functionality with the other functionality of the concerned mode.

The assets to be protected by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP are defined in the Protection Profile [PP], article 3.3.3. Based on these assets the security problem is defined in terms of Security Policies and Assumptions. This is outlined in the Protection Profile [PP], article 4.

These Security Policies and Assumptions are split into Security Objectives to be fulfilled by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP and Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the Environment of a TOE claiming conformance to this PP.

2.2 Security Functional Requirements

Based on the Security Objectives to be fulfilled by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP the security policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements to be implemented by a TOE. The security functional requirements are divided in a number of functional groups. Every group contains one or more mutually coherent requirements. These groups are:

- ∅ Security roles: These define the different roles and modes of the TOE, and how these roles are adopted.
- ∅ Identification and Authentication: These define how BCT-cards and other peripherals are identified and where necessary authenticated.
- ∅ BCT-access policy: Here it is defined what needs to be recorded, and who is allowed to do what with it.
- ∅ Signatures: Here it is defined how signatures are being requested from the System card and BCT-card.
- ∅ Security audit: Here it is defined which system events are recorded and how these are protected.
- ∅ Protection of the BCT: Here it is defined how the physical protection of the BCT functions and how the integrity is guaranteed.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) are outlined in the [PP], article 6. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus the SFR claim is called: **Common Criteria Part 2 conformant**.

2.3 Assurance Requirements

The TOE security assurance requirements claimed in the Protection Profile are based entirely on the assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance Level 3 package. Thus the SAR claim is called: **Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL 3 conformant.**

(for the definition and scope of assurance packages according to CC see [CC], part 3 for details).

2.4 Results of the PP Evaluation

The evaluation lab determined that the claims as made in the Protection Profile “Beveiligingsprofiel Boordcomputer Taxi (PP-BCT), versie 1.8, 6 februari 2015” are in conformance with the requirements for Protection Profiles as specified in class APE of the CC.

The evaluation was performed as a delta evaluation in which only the changes to the PP were assessed to verify that the evaluation results of the previously certified PP can be reused. The certifier concluded that the evaluation lab has performed all APE work units in accordance with the APE section of the CEM. The findings are recorded in an Evaluation Technical Report [ETR].

2.5 Comments/Recommendations

There are no specific Evaluator Comments or Recommendations.

3 Protection Profile

The Protection Profile “Beveiligingsprofiel Boordcomputer Taxi (PP-BCT), versie 1.8, 6 februari 2015” [PP] is included here by reference.

4 Definitions

This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:

BCT	Boordcomputer Taxi
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	IT Security Evaluation Facility
NSCIB	Nederlands Schema voor Certificatie op het gebied van IT-Beveiliging
PP	Protection Profile
TOE	Target of Evaluation

5 Bibliography

This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this report:

[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I version 3.1 revision 1, and Part II and III, version 3.1, revision 4, September 2012.
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[ETR] ²	Brightight, Evaluation Technical Report Boordcomputer Taxi Platform Protection Profile version 2.0, 6 March 2015.
[NSCIB]	Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.1, August 1 st , 2011.
[PP]	Beveiligingsprofiel Boordcomputer Taxi (PP-BCT), versie 1.8, 6 februari 2015.

(This is the end of this report).

² The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.