

# collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Component

Version 1.0

September 10, 2020

## **Acknowledgments**

This collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) was developed by the Dedicated Security Components (DSC) international Technical Community with representatives from Industry, Information Technology Security Evaluation Facilities (ITSEFs), and International Common Criteria schemes. The organizations that directly contributed to the development of this cPP include:

### **Industry**

Apple Inc.

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

### **Common Criteria Test Laboratories**

atsec Information Security

Det Norske Veritas and Germanischer Lloyd (DNV GL)

### **International Common Criteria Schemes**

National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)

UK IT Security Evaluation and Certificate Scheme (NCSC)

# 1 Preface

## 1.1 Objectives of Document

This document presents the Common Criteria (CC) collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) to express the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) for a Dedicated Security Component (DSC). The Evaluation Activities that specify the actions an evaluator performs to determine if a product satisfies the SFRs and SARs captured within this cPP are described in the Evaluation Activities for Dedicated Security Component cPP Supporting Document [SD].

The DSC international Technical Community (iTC) designed the DSC cPP as a standalone PP so that vendors may evaluate a DSC once and re-use this evidence across multiple devices that contain identical DSCs. Vendors may also combine this cPP with a platform solution cPP for CC consumers.

## 1.2 Scope of Document

The scope of the cPP within the development and evaluation process is described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation [CC]. In particular, a cPP defines the IT security requirements of a generic type of Target of Evaluation (TOE) and specifies the functional and assurance security measures that the ITSEF must apply to the TOE to demonstrate that it meets the cPP's stated requirements [CC1, Section C.1].

## 1.3 Intended Readership

The target audiences of this cPP are developers, CC consumers, system integrators, evaluators, and schemes.

## 1.4 Related Documents

### Common Criteria<sup>1</sup>

[CC1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,  
Part 1: Introduction and General Model,  
CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.

[CC2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,  
Part 2: Security Functional Components,  
CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.

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<sup>1</sup> For details see <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/>

[CC3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,  
Part 3: Security Assurance Components,  
CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.

[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,  
Evaluation Methodology,  
CCMB-2017-04-004, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.

#### Other Documents

[SD] Evaluation Activities for Dedicated Security Component cPP, Version 1.0,  
September 10, 2020

### 1.5 Revision History

Version	Date	Description
1.0	9/10/20	Initial publication

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## 2 PP Introduction

### 2.1 PP Reference Identification

PP Reference: collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Component

PP Version: 1.0

PP Date: September 10, 2020

### 2.2 TOE Overview

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Dedicated Security Component (DSC). In the context of this cPP, a DSC is the combination of a hardware component and its controlling firmware. The firmware should be dedicated to providing the encompassing platform with services for the provisioning, protection, and use of Security Data Objects (SDOs), which include keys, identities, attributes, and other types of Security Data Elements (SDEs). See Figure 1 for an example of a TOE representation.




Figure 1: Representation of the Target of Evaluation (TOE)

The TOE should be one or more discrete and embedded hardware components that provide well-scoped security functions that are physically inaccessible directly from the rich operating system. The DSC TOE would consist of isolated firmware and circuitry capable of executing well-defined commands against SDEs/SDOs in memory and across restricted interfaces.

Examples of a DSC that could claim conformance to this cPP include Secure Elements (SE), Trusted Platform Modules (TPM), Hardware Security Modules (HSM), Trusted Execution Environments (TEE), and Secure Enclave Processors (SEP). In some cases, vendors have already integrated these dedicated hardware components into a System on Chip (SoC) and as such are isolated components of a larger physical package. Figure 2 below shows a block diagram of a typical example of a DSC TOE with all of its internal components.




Figure 2: Example of TOE Internal Components

### 2.2.1 Security Data Objects




Figure 3: Composition of an SDO

An SDO is created by combining SDEs with some attributes. Each SDE used to create the SDO reaches the DSC in one of the following ways:

- By parsing SDEs received via secure channels (see O.PARSE\_PROTECTION).
- By generating the SDEs locally on the DSC as part of the Provisioning service.

An SDO may include one or more SDEs from one or both of these sources. In the Provisioning step, the relevant SDEs are then bound together with a set of attributes resulting in an SDO. Explicit binding occurs when the DSC includes one or more SDEs along with their attributes in a formatted structure to form the SDO. An X.509 certificate is just one example of an SDO (where the signature in the certificate provides the binding of the attributes contained). A DSC protects the integrity of an SDO with one of the following methods:

- Hash or keyed hash (FCS\_COP.1/Hash, FCS\_COP.1/HMAC)
- Digital signature (FCS\_COP.1/SigGen, FCS\_COP.1/SigVer)

Explicit binding may also occur when the DSC wraps an SDO prior to storing it externally. Figure 3 shows an example SDO with binding data used to secure an arbitrary number of SDEs.

Implicit binding may occur by virtue of the location of SDEs within the DSC. An implicit binding may occur for pre-installed SDEs, in which case the DSC restricts the functionality it allows with the SDEs. It may also occur when the contents of certain protected storage locations carry with them implicit attributes simply by existing in these locations.

Vendors may pre-install keys and other material in the DSC during the manufacturing process, or the DSC may automatically generate keys or other material upon first boot. Since the user (an administrator or client application acting on behalf of a human user) provides no input to these items, the cPP calls these pre-installed SDEs. Pre-installed SDEs have two distinguishing characteristics:

- These keys may persist over a factory reset; and
- They may not be accessible to administrators.

If the SDOs have been erased (e.g. due to a tamper response), then a factory reset may not be possible. Following an initial boot (e.g. first boot by end-user, or following a factory reset), a DSC may generate SDEs unique to an instance of a DSC that are persisted across user sessions. These are considered to be pre-installed SDEs.

Pre-installed SDOs (i.e., SDEs with implicit binding installed by the vendor at manufacturing time) are typically not accessible by non-administrative users of the platform (i.e., client applications) and are reserved for use by the DSC itself to manage its sub-components, keys, and, indirectly, user content. Pre-installed SDOs typically have implicitly bound attributes. Since pre-installed SDOs rarely, if ever, leave the DSC, they may have no formal structure containing attributes. That does not mean these attributes do not exist; only that there exists no structure in which one would find them all in one place.

The DSC may allow the modification of attributes for pre-installed SDOs. One example would be the authorization value necessary to use the SDO. Obviously, the vendor may have a strong desire to keep the users of the DSC from changing the SDE itself, or deleting it. They could allow administrators to hide the SDO, but not delete it for the sake of factory resets.

Another case of implicit binding occurs when a DSC reserves a bank of user-accessible registers with common attributes. The bank contains one or more registers, usually all of the same size. Again, the functionality within the firmware determines the attributes especially when the function applies only to one or more members of the bank of reserved registers. Without the benefit of a structure with explicit attributes, the DSC relies on the firmware to enforce the policies inherent to the attributes associated with a bank of registers; for example, the DSC firmware implicitly binds the common attributes to the bank of registers.

An SDO held in the DSC may be exported (propagated) only if it is either in a wrapped form (i.e. with confidentiality and integrity of the SDO protected by a cryptographic key-based operation), or if it is transmitted over a secure channel (protecting confidentiality, integrity and optionally authenticity of the receiving endpoint).

2.2.2 Services




Figure 4: Services Provided by the TOE

The labels in Figure 4 refer to the following:

- SDE: Security Data Element
- SDO: Security Data Object (component from SDEs and attributes)
- SDO ID: Unique identifier for an SDO

- SDO1: SDO that is modified or is a reference to original SDO
- SDO2: SDO that is bound to the DSC but stored outside of it

DSCs provide seven core security services to a platform as illustrated in Table 1.

Service	Description
<b>Parse</b>	The DSC shall ingest pre-provisioned keys, credentials, tokens, attributes, etc. from trusted components or services external to its boundary either across a secured channel or in a manner that the objects are protected for use only by the DSC.
<b>Provision</b>	The DSC shall create SDOs from parsed or generated SDEs and attributes using binding mechanisms to apply integrity protection to the SDEs together with their attributes.
<b>Protect</b>	The DSC shall manage protected storage for all SDOs. Platform users (through client applications) can store SDOs either inside or outside the DSC boundary. A DSC shall maintain the integrity and confidentiality (if required) of SDOs both inside the boundary and stored outside the boundary.
<b>Process</b>	The DSC shall modify and use SDOs or their attributes on behalf of authorized entities. The Process service shall coordinate with the Protect service for storage of the SDOs while not in use and shall collaborate with the Prove service to authenticate the requesting entity and validate their authorization for access to the SDO in the requested mode. The Process service shall submit an SDO to the Purge service when it is no longer needed by the platform.
<b>Prove</b>	The DSC may attest to a remote entity that the DSC is currently in a specific state. During this process, the DSC shall use the appropriate attributes or authentication tokens (such as nonces, digital signatures, etc.) to enable the remote entity to verify the authenticity of the source of the evidence.
<b>Purge</b>	When the platform no longer needs an SDO, the DSC shall execute a mechanism for destroying the SDO by permanently removing it from the DSC to protect against unauthorized recovery.
<b>Propagate</b>	If an SDO is required by or allowed to be used by a remote peer, the DSC shall ensure that the SDO is exported only as a protected object or is transmitted over a trusted channel.

*Table 1: Core Security Services*

### 2.2.3 Roots of Trust

This collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) assumes a DSC will contain one Root of Trust (RoT) that is comprised of the compute engine, one set of firmware code, and pre-installed SDOs, including a unique identity bound to the hardware. The firmware code may be immutable, or it may be mutable but with controlled, authenticated, and authorized updates allowed. This code may provide one or more RoT services, such as a RoT for Measurement, Verification, or Reporting. The unique identity bound to the hardware should be immutable and third parties should be able to authenticate the manufacturer of the Root of Trust through its unique identity (e.g., the unique identity may be a credential signed by the manufacturer).

### 2.2.4 DSC Characteristics

The security functional requirements rely on the following characteristics of the DSC:

- Users
- Subjects
- Objects
- Security Attributes
- Operations

Users: The entities using the DSC will be client applications on the platform. They may be acting as proxies for users or may have identities of their own. The DSC will not be able to distinguish the difference; therefore, the cPP will recognize an entity known as the Client Application (CA), as the user presenting authentication tokens and authorization values (collectively known as authorization data) to the DSC for the purposes of identity verification and authorization to perform operations. Section 2.4.1 discusses the concept of users in more detail. This cPP also recognizes a special user called the administrator, which typically has access to DSC objects normally denied to CAs (see definition of objects below).

Subjects: The following list contains the fundamental actors in the expected operational use cases of the DSC. The first three are active actors, while the fourth is usually passive but could be active.

- S.DSC – DSC with security attribute DSC.ID, which is the identity of the DSC
- S.Admin – Admin (an authorized administrator with special privileges) security attribute Admin.ID – See section 2.4.1 for more discussion on Admin.
- S.CA – CA (i.e. an authorized user or an application with a verifiable identity) with security attribute CA.ID – See section 2.4.1 for more discussion on users.
- S.EPS – External Platform Storage (EPS) (e.g. transient SDE/SDO source and destination, in the case of data imported and exported for the sole use inside the DSC). In the case of a passive EPS, the DSC will properly protect the integrity and confidentiality of the objects it stores and retrieves from there. In the case of an active EPS with security attribute EPS.ID, the DSC and EPS may choose to create a secure channel through which they will pass objects back and forth.

Objects: The following list contains objects the DSC expects to use during the expected operational use cases.

- OB.P\_SDO – Pre-provisioned SDOs (e.g. DSC.ID) with security attributes listed in the next paragraph.
- OB.T\_SDO – Transient SDOs or just SDOs (i.e. SDOs in the DSC currently, but are either ephemeral or are normally stored external to DSC when not in use) with security attributes listed in the next paragraphs. See sections 2.4.2, 2.4.4, and 2.4.6 for more discussion on keys, which are the primary use cases for SDOs.
- OB.AuthData – Authorization Data (including authentication data, e.g. PINs, passwords, tokens)

- OB.Pstate – Platform State (e.g. measurements and assertions)
- OB.FAACntr – Failed Authorization Attempt Counters
- OB.AntiReplay – Anti-replay tokens (e.g. counters, nonces, etc.)
- OB.Context – Session Context (The DSC may maintain one or more sessions with a CA involving one or more of SDOs, Authorization Data, Platform State, Failed Authorization Counters, and Anti-Replay Tokens. The DSC may represent internally the state of these objects at any given time in a Session Context) – See section 2.4.3 for more discussion on sessions.

Security Attributes: The following list contains the minimum security attributes for a DSC. Individual DSCs may implement additional security attributes beyond this (whether they are additional standalone attributes or additional attributes that are associated with SDOs); the ST author is expected to identify these.

- DSC.ID – The DSC identifier. It may also serve as the identifier for the DSC RoT.
- CA.ID – The Client Application identifier.
- EPS.ID – The External Platform Storage (EPS) identifier. This attribute is optional for a passive EPS (i.e. plain memory that only stores information). If the DSC uses a Client Application to manage storage, then support for this attribute is required.
- SDO.\* – The SDO Security Attributes:
  - SDO.ID – SDO Identifier
  - SDO.Type – SDO Type
  - SDO.AuthData – SDO Reference authorization data
  - SDO.Reauth – SDO re-authorization conditions
  - SDO.Conf – SDO Confidential SDE list
  - SDO.Export – SDO export flag
  - SDO.Integrity – SDO integrity protection data
  - SDO.Bind – SDO binding data

Operations: The following list contains the expected operations of a DSC.

- OP.Import (See Parse) – The DSC may receive SDOs, SDEs, Authorization Data, Platform State, Anti-Replay Tokens or Session Contexts from the CA or the EPS. The Admin may also give the DSC Authorization Data.
- OP.Create (See Provision) – The DSC may create SDOs, SDEs, Authorization Data, Platform State, Anti-Replay Tokens, or Session Contexts with authorization from a CA or Admin.
- OP.Use (See Process) – The DSC may use or perform a cryptographic operation on Pre-Provisioned SDOs, Transient SDOs, SDEs, Authorization Data, Platform State, Anti-Replay Tokens, or Session Contexts with Create authorization from a CA or Admin.

Cryptographic operations may include encryption, decryption, hashing, signature generation, and signature verification.

- OP.Modify (See Process) – The DSC may modify SDOs, SDEs, Authorization Data, Platform State, Anti-Replay Tokens, or Session Contexts with authorization from a CA or Admin.
- OP.Attest (See Prove) – The DSC may create an attestation of Platform State using an SDO or Pre-Provisioned SDO and Anti-Replay Tokens as authorized by a CA or Admin respectively.
- OP.Store (See Protect) – The DSC may store SDOs, SDEs, Authorization Data, Platform State, Anti-Replay Tokens, or Session Contexts in protected storage of the DSC. See section 2.4.5 for more discussion on protected storage.
- OP.Export (See Propagate) – The DSC may export SDOs, SDEs, Authorization Data, Platform State, or Anti-Replay Tokens to a CA or EPS with the proper authorization from the owner of each object. In the case of EPS, the DSC will bind the objects to the DSC in such a way as to deny other DSCs or entities the ability to import, use, modify, attest, store, export, or destroy them. The DSC may export Session Contexts only to an EPS binding it in the same way as above.
- OP.Destroy (See Purge) – The DSC may purge SDOs, SDEs, Authorization Data, Platform State, Anti-Replay Tokens, or Session Contexts in protected storage with proper authorization from the owner of each object.

### 2.3 TOE Use Cases

DSCs are used in platforms to support mobile commerce, to manage platform credentials, manage user access to sensitive resources such as enterprise data centers or entertainment content servers, to manage and protect data-in-transit such as through secure channels or VPN tunnels, and to manage and protect keying, authentication, and authorization material for data-at-rest solutions such as self-encrypting drives.

For the mobile commerce use case, users, merchants, and financial institutions expect and require that financial transactions between them and their platforms be trusted and secure. For example,

- All peers to a transaction must be able to authenticate each other.
- The integrity of the transaction must be ensured.

To support such transactions, a DSC performs the following:

- Ingests data elements and attributes and exports the data objects associated with these transactions and the identities of the parties
- Generates data objects to use for these transactions.
- Securely stores data elements bound with their attributes within a protected hardware boundary.

- Authenticates and processes these data elements within a protected execution environment to ensure the authenticity of the parties and the transactions.
- Establishes secure communications channels between the parties to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the transactions.
- Securely erases data objects when no longer needed.
- Ensures its own integrity and authenticity prior to execution.

DSCs are implemented to satisfy the following use cases:

#### **[USE CASE 1] Protected Key Store**

A platform leveraging DSCs as a hardware-secured Private Key Store facilitates the use of secure and protected storage of secret symmetric keys and private asymmetric keys for access to data and services. These DSCs would provide safe use of the private and secret keys inside the protected hardware boundary.

#### **[USE CASE 2] User / Platform Authentication to Enterprise Managed Resources**

A platform leveraging DSCs for a hardware-secured ID facilitates the use of the platform as a secure and reliable form of authentication for authorized access to highly sensitive local or remote data and services.

#### **[USE CASE 3] Mobile Commerce**

A platform that uses DSCs facilitates secure storage and protected use of credentials for financial transactions between trusted and authorized users, platforms, merchants and financial institutions. These DSCs would provide safe use of the credentials inside the protected hardware boundary. The use of certified hardware-isolated credential stores on smart platforms and only unlocking their use with authenticated authorization provides confidence that the transaction was indeed authorized by the approved 'platform holder'.

## **2.4 Key Reference Model**

The Key Reference Model abstraction draws inspiration from several different DSC products. The products distinguish themselves from one another in the types of keys supported, how they are protected, the types of applications supported, the number of layers of key, and the number of keys at each layer.

The following paragraphs describe the relationships between elements of the DSC.

### **2.4.1 Roles**

There are two main roles that come into play with any platform, including the DSC. These are administrator and client applications. The DSC is often a component within a larger system or platform that is referred to as a platform from this point forward. Often the platform supports different roles as well. At times, these roles may coincide with the roles supported in the DSC, even on purpose.

The administrator may, among other things, accept responsibility for providing timely updates to the DSC, both feature updates and security updates. It may also be responsible for managing the pre-installed SDOs and the initial configuration of the DSC. Different administrators may have different authorities to manage the TSF; for example, one administrator may be responsible for controlling firmware updates while another may take an active part in managing the contents of the DSC installed post-manufacture.

An administrator may manage the contents of the DSC, including user content. A DSC administrator is not necessarily the owner of a given SDO. Although the DSC administrator may possibly own one or more SDOs, not all SDOs allow a DSC administrator direct control of it. In some cases, a DSC administrator may also be in a position to grant or deny another administrator access to what it perceives as their content, namely the DSC's firmware and possibly some keying material belonging to the manufacturer. A DSC manufacturer's choice of allowing an administrator of the DSC this kind of latitude is a feature of its product.

The CA role may also be further divided into multiple users. CAs can include:

- An application vendor acting on its own behalf to update software on the platform.
- A content provider controlling access to its content through an application.
- A human entity using the platform who has an identity that they use to authenticate themselves to the content provider through a CA.
- An original equipment manufacturer (OEM) that designed and manufactured a more complex system with the DSC as a component (assuming that the DSC manufacturer and the manufacturer of the more complex system using the DSC as a component are different entities).

In some cases, the DSC may allow the OEM to provision and manage its own content in the DSC for its own purpose, such as managing their firmware or software installed on the platform. In this case, the OEM is considered to be another CA under the control of the administrator. The role of administrator is not ascribed to the OEM since it likely does not control the manufacturer's firmware or key material and thus does not control the behavior of the DSC. Nor would the other CAs on the platform tolerate OEM control of their content stored in the DSC. Even so, there should be some separation between the administrator-owner and the other roles of the platform in terms of authorizing use of the contents assigned to each of the roles. For example, administrator-owners may deny access to contents, either temporarily or permanently (e.g., through cryptographic erase). However, they cannot themselves access their contents for their own use or to gain access to things they are not otherwise authorized to access.

## 2.4.2 Key Usage

One way to categorize keys is by the cryptographic functions they are allowed to participate in. When one creates a key, one often restricts its use to encryption and decryption, or to signature generation and verification. There are exceptions to this rule, especially in proof of possession protocols. However, certification regimes often require strict separation of usage in regards to encryption/decryption and signature generation/verification: one may use a key for one or the

other, but never both. As such, a DSC may have to enforce this separation of usage for keys; this may mean that an attribute must accompany a key to help the DSC in its enforcement.

### 2.4.3 Sessions

Users may use their keys multiple times while in the DSC. Because authorization using public key methods tends to be resource intensive (i.e. uses a fair amount of internal memory and takes a long time), the DSC can use sessions to enforce authorization and manage access to the key within it. As an alternative to requiring authorization for each access to a key, the DSC could allow the user or owner of the key to open a session and provide the authorization when being used for the first time, then maintain the session and authorization using a series of less resource-intensive challenges and responses. Alternatively, in some instances, the DSC may require additional authorization (such as an elevation of privileges) to access keys (or different, related keys). Such a protocol of challenges and responses may generate and use ephemeral authorization tokens, which would be one form of critical security parameter (CSP). The DSC may have to switch session contexts in and out of the DSC to external temporary storage, which necessitates the protection of these CSPs. Such a session context is one type of SDO, to be discussed later.

### 2.4.4 Key Hierarchies

Another way to categorize keys is the relationship they have with each other. A DSC may have a key hierarchy, or key chain, whereby data-at-rest is protected by one or more keys, which are protected in turn by one or more additional keys, and potentially so on. This model calls out three categories of keys generally found on typical DSCs. DSCs may contain Root Keys, Intermediate (or Branch) Keys, and Leaf Keys.

Most DSCs have a concept of Root Keys. These keys are typically provisioned by the DSC manufacturer and have some permanence in the DSC. Root Keys may be derived from seeds (which is discussed later), injected at manufacturing time, or provisioned by a user. Root keys installed by the manufacturers are considered administrator key material. Typically, normal client applications, including OEMs, should not alter or erase this material unless specifically authorized to do so. Root keys installed by the administrator should be similarly restricted. Client application-installed root keys, on the other hand, are not considered as permanent since the client application or the administrator can remove them at any time without authorization.

Root Keys may either be encryption/decryption keys, signature verification keys, or signature generation keys. Encryption/decryption keys, or simply Root Encryption Key (REK), usually anchor a hierarchy of keys stored external to the DSC necessitating both the encrypt key to protect the key outside the DSC, and the decrypt key to expose its operations within the protected and secure confines of the DSC. The Signature Verification Keys from public key schemes should always contain the public portion and never the private portion. Use of Signature Generation keys as Root Keys is rare.

Most DSCs have a concept of Intermediate Keys. These are sometimes known as Branch Keys, Key Encryption Keys, and Key Wrapping Keys. In the SFRs of this cPP, these will be referred to as Key Encryption Keys (KEKs), even if the target of encryption is not a key. Intermediate Keys must always be encryption keys. Intermediate keys cannot be signing keys.

Note that although chained certificates (see certificates below) are one form of a sequence of keys, each of which signs another key, the creation and verification of such a chain of certificates is out of scope for the core requirements of the cPP; however, it may be added as a package if one or both of these features (creating the chain and verifying the chain) is indeed present in the DSC. Nonetheless, the primitives of signing and verification are present due to other cryptographic operations in scope for this cPP.

Intermediate Keys should always be protected (i.e. wrapped) by either a Root Key or another Intermediate Key.

Leaf Objects consist of Authorization Data and Leaf Keys. Leaf Keys can be either signing or encryption keys. Leaf Objects collectively refers to data that should be wrapped by either a Root Key or a KEK and is not subsequently used as a KEK itself. Encryption Leaf Keys do not wrap other keys (at least in the context of the DSC; what happens outside the DSC with Leaf Keys is out of its control). In many contexts, an Encryption Leaf Key is known as a Data Encryption Key (DEK). In the context of the DSC, this cPP will not assume how the user of the DSC will use the Leaf Keys it creates, and will refrain from using the term DEK.

Certificates contain either signed public keys, signed encryption/decryption keys, or some sort of Authorization Data. Signature keys come in several varieties: asymmetric signing keys, which contain a private key for signing (and maybe also the public key for verification) and verification keys, which contains only the public verification key and does not contain the private key (and thus cannot perform a signing function). There are also symmetric signature keys. In this case these consist of only a single key for both signing and verifying.

Authorization Data may have an arbitrary length of bits or bytes and may contain arbitrary or non-arbitrary values of bits or bytes.

Seeds have a special place in this Key Reference Model. Manufacturers, owners, and users of the DSC can use permanent seeds to create root keys. Manufacturers have good reasons to use seeds to derive Root Keys and other items in the Key Reference Model. These include:

- Seeds take less space to store than certain asymmetric keys for given desired cryptographic strengths.
- Having seeds that are unique per DSC enhances the chance that the same key derivation function on different DSCs will yield unique keys.

Figure 5 contains an example of a hierarchy of keys where each lower-level key is wrapped by a higher-level key that is connected to it. The Firmware Signature Key and the Root Encryption Key are examples of Root Keys. The Intermediate Wrapping Key is an example of an Intermediate Key. The Software Signature Key, the File Encryption Key, and the Streaming Movie Authorization Token are examples of Leaf Objects. Figure 5 serves as an illustration of key hierarchies; other configurations are possible.




Figure 5: Example Key Hierarchy

Roles may play an important part in key hierarchies. One of the simplest models enforces a different hierarchy for each role at the root key level. Another way to put this is each hierarchy at the root key level supports a different role. However, for more complexity, once intermediate keys are allowed, then each intermediate key could serve as the root of a hierarchy of keys for a different role. Here is where the key functions and the roles come together. Roles may further divide into which role has the right to use a key, which role has the right to move the key from one parent to another, which role has the right to destroy a key, etc.

### 2.4.5 Protected Storage Locations

This cPP covers several different types of storage locations for keys and critical security parameters (CSPs) such as authentication tokens. Some DSCs may have a generous amount of protected storage internal to themselves, which allows it to accommodate all keys and CSPs in operational use, whether the DSC is performing operations to administer itself or operations on behalf of users. Other DSCs may have a minimal amount of protected storage locations with just enough to accommodate root keys along with a limited number of operational keys and CSPs for user authorized sessions.

For those cases in which the DSC relies on storage external to itself to accommodate all the keys and CSPs on which applications expect it to operate, it will either have to support secure channels to another DSC with a more generous allocation of protected storage locations, or use a series of wrapping keys to protect private keys and CSPs while outside of the DSC. Whether the DSC is powered on or powered off, the DSC is expected to provide support for protected storage locations for its root keys. If the DSC uses external storage without secure channels, then it should be ready to wrap both intermediate wrapping keys as well as the Leaf Objects. This implies that there will be some sort of structure on each of these items stored external to the DSC. The next section discusses that structure.

A conformant TOE may include “write-once” storage such as single-use eFuses. Since data is written to any such storage as part of the initial provisioning of the TOE, the data is considered immutable once the TOE has entered its evaluated configuration. The integrity of this data is maintained through the physical properties of its storage medium.

### 2.4.6 SDEs and SDOs

Although there is another section written about SDEs and SDOs, this section is used to map keys and authentication tokens to SDEs and SDOs. This cPP does not impose a strict structure on the items in the key hierarchy. An X.509 certificate is one example of a strict structure of a key with attributes. Collecting attributes of an SDE and composing an SDO structure with an SDE and attribute fields imposes temporal and storage penalties in all cases. In certain resource-constrained cases the attributes could be implicit. For example, the root keys are administrative keys, which requires administrator authentication for use while all other objects are user objects, which require user authentication. The raw unadorned key or object is the SDE and the SDO may be implied by virtue of its location within the hierarchy, i.e. it is understood that keys in the root position require administrator authentication while all other objects, which may or may not be keys, require user authentication.

In the previous section on protected storage locations, a DSC may have to use storage external to itself. In these cases, an SDO of a wrapped key may contain a number of important attributes, such as a pointer to its parent, authorization values, and other indications of the functions allowed (encrypt vs. sign). Alternatively, some or all attributes may be implied, which means that only the keys or CSPs themselves exist outside the DSC. In either case, the sensitive values, such as private keys, secret keys, and CSPs, should be encrypted when outside the DSC. The parent of these objects are either intermediate wrapping keys, or encrypting root keys.

Some DSCs may want to distinguish between SDEs created within itself from SDEs ingested from an external source. Additionally, some DSCs may output SDEs without additional context or attributes from the DSC. A DSC, in some contexts, will not distinguish an ingested SDO from raw keys.

### 3 CC Conformance Claims

As defined by the references [CC1], [CC2] and [CC3], this cPP:

- conforms to the requirements of Common Criteria v3.1, Release 5
- is Part 2 extended, Part 3 conformant
- does not claim conformance to any other PP or package.

The methodology applied for the cPP evaluation is defined in [CEM] and refined by the Evaluation Activities in [SD]. This cPP satisfies the following Assurance Families: APE\_CCL.1, APE\_ECD.1, APE\_INT.1, APE\_OBJ.2, APE\_REQ.2 and APE\_SPD.1.

In order to be conformant to this cPP, a TOE must demonstrate Exact Conformance. Exact Conformance is defined as the ST containing all of the requirements in section 5 of this cPP (these are the mandatory SFRs), and potentially requirements from Appendix A (these are optional SFRs) or Appendix B (these are selection-based SFRs, some of which will be mandatory according to the selections made in other SFRs) of this cPP. While iteration is allowed, no additional requirements (from CC Parts 2 or 3, or definitions of extended components not already included in this cPP) are allowed to be included in the ST. Further, no requirements in section 5 of this cPP are allowed to be omitted.

The PPs and PP-Modules that are allowed to be specified in a PP-Configuration with this cPP are specified in the 'Allowed-With' list at <https://ccusersforum.onlyoffice.com/Products/Files/doceditor.aspx?fileid=6746219>.

## 4 Security Problem Definition

### 4.1 Assets

(R.AUTHDATA) Authorization Data that the TOE manages in support of the authorization services that it offers, including both user-provided authentication tokens and authorization values and those created by the TOE. Authorization Data may be special cases of SDEs, or they may be attributes in an SDO. The TSF may use Authorization Data to manage the use and disposition of a single SDE, or a broad class of SDEs. The TOE protects the integrity of Authorization Data, and in some cases, may protect their confidentiality.

(R.CONFKEY) Confidential (or secret) keys used in symmetric cryptographic functions and private keys used in asymmetric cryptographic functions are managed and used by the TOE in support of the cryptographic services that it offers. This includes user keys that are owned and used by a specific user (which are a special case of an SDE), and support keys used in the implementation and operation of the TOE. The confidentiality and integrity of these keys must be protected.

(R.PUBKEY) Public keys are managed and used by the TOE in support of the cryptographic services that it offers (including user keys and support keys). This includes user keys that are owned and used by a specific user (which are a special case of an SDE), and support keys used in the implementation and operation of the TOE. The integrity of these keys must be protected.

(R.SDE) An SDE is an item of user data that is held in (and may be stored on) the TOE and that may be used only by an authorized subject (i.e. a user or process acting on behalf of that user). Typically the TOE will not know what an SDE represents in terms of the application or service that it is used for: it will characterize an SDE only in terms of the authorization requirements that are necessary to access it (i.e. the presentation and possibly processing of authorization data presented to the TOE), and the operations that can be performed on or with it after authorization has been achieved. An SDE may require protection of its confidentiality, its integrity, or both.

(R.SDO) An SDO comprises one or more SDEs that are collectively bound to one or more attributes (e.g. an identifier for the identity that a key or authorization data is associated with). These attributes may necessarily be used by the TSF to enforce authorization policies concerning the allowed use and disposition of the subject SDEs. The bindings can either be explicit (e.g. in a well-formatted standards-based data structure) or implicit (e.g. by virtue of their location within the TOE which implies privileges of use and disposition by certain users), or a combination of both.

### 4.2 Threats

(T.BRUTE\_FORCE\_AUTH) An unauthorized user may attempt to gain unauthorized access to the TOE by repeatedly and rapidly supplying a large number of permutations of authorization data, such as passwords, biometrics, etc. that protect the SDEs, in the hopes that valid authorization data can be obtained through brute force. A successful brute force attack puts the SDE/SDO data, user identity, and the TOE's underlying platform at risk.

The consequences of risks to SDEs include the loss of confidentiality of the SDE or SDO data, unauthorized access to and use of this data, destruction of this data, and the ability of the adversary to impersonate a user or that user's platform.

(T.HW\_ATTACK) An individual with physical access to the TOE may apply hardware attacks such as probing, physical manipulation, fault-injection, side-channel analysis, environmental stress, or reactivating blocked test-features or other pre-delivery services to manipulate the behavior of the TOE to disclose SDOs.

(T.SDE\_TRANSIT\_COMPROMISE) An attacker with the ability to observe data transmission into and out of the TOE may access or determine plaintext values of keys, authorization data, and other SDEs as the TSF transmits them into or out of the TOE. This puts the SDE/SDO data, user identity, and the TOE's underlying platform at risk.

The consequences of access to plaintext SDEs in this way include the loss of confidentiality of SDE/SDO data, unauthorized use of this data, unauthorized modification of this data, and the ability of the adversary to impersonate a user or their platform.

(T.UNAUTH\_UPDATE) An unauthorized user may force the platform to update the TOE with firmware that compromises its security features. Poorly chosen update protocols, cryptographic algorithms, and keys sizes may allow adversaries to install software or firmware that bypasses security features or rolls back to firmware versions with compromised security features and provides them with unauthorized access to SDEs.

The consequences of risks to firmware include the loss of confidentiality of the SDE/SDO data, unauthorized access to and use of this data, destruction of this data, and the ability of the adversary to impersonate a user or that user's platform.

(T.UNAUTHORIZED\_ACCESS) An unauthorized user may gain unauthorized access to one or more SDEs within the TOE. If an adversary gains access to SDEs/SDOs stored in the TSF, they may attempt to view, use, or destroy this data as well as impersonate a user or that user's platform.

The consequences of unauthorized access to SDEs/SDOs include the loss of confidentiality of their content, unauthorized use of that content, unauthorized modification or destruction of that content, and the ability of the adversary to impersonate a user or that user's platform.

(T.WEAK\_CRYPTO) An unauthorized user or attacker that observes network traffic transmitted to and from the TOE may cryptographically exploit poorly chosen cryptographic algorithms, random bit generators, ciphers or key sizes. Weak cryptography chosen by users or by TSF protection mechanisms puts the user's data, identity, and platform at risk of exploitation by adversaries.

The consequences of risks to SDEs include the loss of confidentiality of the SDE/SDO data, unauthorized access to and use of this data, destruction of this data, and the ability of the adversary to impersonate a user or that user's platform.

(T.WEAK\_ELEMENT\_BINDING) An unauthorized user may successfully break the association between SDEs, for example to replace one element with another element.

The consequences of manipulation of SDEs in this way include the loss of confidentiality of the data, unauthorized use of the data, destruction of the data, unauthorized modification of credentials, and the ability of the adversary to impersonate a user or that user's platform.

(T.WEAK\_OWNERSHIP\_BINDING) A user may successfully access or manipulate SDEs that they do not own.

The consequences of manipulation of SDEs in this way include the loss of confidentiality of SDE/SDO data, unauthorized use of that data, unauthorized modification of that data, and the ability of the adversary to impersonate a user or that user's platform.

### **4.3 Assumptions**

This section describes the assumptions made in identification of the threats and security requirements for dedicated security components. The dedicated security component is not expected to provide assurance in any of these areas, and as a result, requirements are not included to mitigate the threats associated.

(A.AUTH\_USERS) Authorized users follow all provided guidance regarding the safeguarding of SDEs held outside the TOE.

(A.CREDENTIAL\_REVOCATION) If a platform is lost, stolen, or compromised then there is a method of revocation of any credentials held (or equivalent method of mitigating the impact of potential access to the credentials). Credential revocation ensures that the loss of physical custody does not have significant negative impact on the security of the platform. This implies that an attacker has only limited access to the device to apply attacks. It further implies that the device owner is not seen as an attacker.

(A.ROT\_INTEGRITY) The vendor provides a RoT that is comprised of the TOE firmware, hardware, and pre-installed SDOs, free of intentionally malicious capabilities. The platform trusts the RoT since it cannot verify the integrity and authenticity of the RoT.

If the RoT is immutable, then the platform can have confidence that once delivered, malicious actors cannot modify the RoT to add malicious capabilities. If the RoT is mutable (e.g. the firmware and pre-installed SDOs), then it will verify the authenticity and integrity of the updates before applying them.

(A.TRUSTED\_PEER) The remote peer communicating over a secure channel is trustworthy, and will not abuse the secure channel in order to introduce malware or fraudulent SDEs into the TOE.

### **4.4 Organizational Security Policies**

There are no organizational security policies defined in this cPP.

## 5 Security Objectives

### 5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

(O.AUTH\_FAILURES) The TOE resists repeated attempts to guess authorization data by responding to consecutive failed attempts in a way that prevents an attacker from exploring a significant amount of the space of possible authorization data values.

(O.AUTHORIZATION) The TOE authorizes only authenticated subjects to access SDOs stored by authenticated users of the TOE, pre-installed SDOs stored in the RoT by the manufacturer of the TOE, and management functions that are used to manipulate the TSF and its stored data.

(O.DATA\_PROTECTION) The TOE provides authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity services for SDOs.

(O.FW\_INTEGRITY) The TOE ensures its own integrity has remained intact and attests its integrity to outside parties on request.

(O.PARSE\_PROTECTION) All SDEs are received by the TOE over a secure channel for parsing, protecting confidentiality and integrity of the SDEs while in transit. The TOE authenticates the source of all SDEs received, and authenticates itself to the remote peer.

(O.PURGE\_PROTECTION) The TOE provides secure destruction of SDEs when they are deleted, so that the previous value of the SDE can no longer be accessed (and cannot be restored).

(O.SECURE\_UPDATE) The TOE software/firmware either does not allow update, or else implements a mechanism that ensures only authorized updates are applied. If the TOE allows updating its firmware, it is required to implement a mechanism that ensures only authorized firmware can be loaded into the TOE. A secure update mechanism ensures the firmware is authorized through verification of its integrity and authenticity while also preventing rollback to a previous and potentially vulnerable firmware instance.

(O.STRONG\_BINDING) The TOE provides a mechanism for binding data to its attributes (including the identity of its owner) and prevents unauthorized changes to data attributes.

The protections for pre-installed SDEs/SDOs come through the firmware protections. For example, only authorized updates to the firmware contains the functionality that determines the attributes of the pre-installed SDOs. In the same vein, the authorized updates may also affect the SDEs as well, if the vendor so chooses. The authorized update binds the attributes present in the functionality of the firmware to the pre-installed SDEs.

(O.STRONG\_CRYPTO) The TOE implements strong cryptographic mechanisms and algorithms according to recognized standards, including support for random bit generation based on recognized standards and a source of sufficient entropy. The TOE uses key sizes that are recognized as providing sufficient resistance to current attack capabilities.

### 5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The Operational Environment of the TOE implements technical and procedural measures to assist the TOE in correctly providing its security functionality. This section defines security objectives

for the Operational Environment and consists of a set of statements describing the goals that the Operational Environment should achieve.

(OE.AUTH\_USERS) Authenticated users follow all provided guidance regarding the safeguarding of SDEs, especially authentication tokens such as passwords, pass-phrases, and biometrics.

(OE.PHYSICAL) The platform holder will ensure that an attacker has no prolonged, unsupervised physical access to the platform. If a platform is lost or stolen then the platform holder will promptly initiate revocation of any credentials held (or equivalent method of mitigating the impact of potential access to the credentials).

This security objective for the operating environment expects an entity to wipe the contents of the TOE in the event that an attacker has prolonged unsupervised physical access to the platform containing the TOE. There exists a variety of methods to wipe the contents or render the contents useless to the attacker. The platform may institute its own signal to wipe the TOE upon reaching or exceeding a threshold of unsuccessful user authentication or authorization attempts by an attacker. A remote entity may signal to the platform that it should issue a signal to the TOE to wipe its contents. The platform user (who has lost physical access to the platform) may contact service providers and inform them of the loss of credentials in the TOE, who may in turn issue revocation of those credentials.

(OE.TRUSTED\_PEER) Connections using secure channels are made only to trusted peers, in whom confidence has been established that they will not abuse the secure channel in order to introduce malware or fraudulent SDEs into the TOE.

### 5.3 Security Objectives Rationale

Table 2 shows the mapping of Security Objectives for the TOE and for its Operational Environment to Threats and Assumptions, along with rationale for these mappings.

Objective	Threat or Assumption	Rationale
O.AUTH_FAILURES	T.BRUTE_FORCE_AUTH	This objective ensures that the TSF has a method to thwart brute-force authorization attempts.
O.AUTHORIZATION	T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS	This objective defines and enforces policies that govern access to SDOs.
	T.HW_ATTACK	This objective ensures that the access control policy is not thwarted by physical attacks on the TOE.
O.DATA_PROTECTION	T.SDE_TRANSIT_COMPROMISE	This objective ensures that the confidentiality of SDEs is enforced.
	T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS	This objective ensures that SDOs have adequate protections.

collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Components

Objective	Threat or Assumption	Rationale
	T.WEAK_ELEMENT_BINDING	This objective assures the authenticity and integrity of SDEs.
	T.WEAK_OWNERSHIP_BINDING	This objective protects SDEs from unauthorized access.
O.FW_INTEGRITY	A.ROT_INTEGRITY	This objective ensures that the RoT's attestation of firmware integrity is sufficient assurance that the attestation is valid because the RoT is assumed to be trusted.
	T.WEAK_ELEMENT_BINDING	This objective ensures that the TOE's firmware cannot be corrupted in a way that allows the unauthorized substitution of SDEs.
	T.WEAK_OWNERSHIP_BINDING	This objective ensures that the TOE's firmware cannot be corrupted in a way that causes ownership bindings not to be enforced.
O.PARSE_PROTECTION	T.SDE_TRANSIT_COMPROMISE	This objective ensures that SDEs are not transmitted into the TOE over an insecure channel.
O.PURGE_PROTECTION	T.HW_ATTACK	This objective ensures that a hardware attack does not expose SDE remnants that could compromise the TOE or any of its stored data.
	T.SDE_TRANSIT_COMPROMISE	This objective ensures that residual data associated with SDEs do not remain when the SDEs themselves are deleted.
O.SECURE_UPDATE	T.UNAUTH_UPDATE	This objective prevents the application of untrusted firmware updates to the TOE.
O.STRONG_BINDING	T.WEAK_OWNERSHIP_BINDING	This objective establishes ownership of SDEs to determine the users that may interact with them.
O.STRONG_CRYPTO	T.WEAK_CRYPTO	This objective ensures that the TOE implements cryptographic algorithms that are not subject to compromise.

Objective	Threat or Assumption	Rationale
OE.AUTH_USERS	A.AUTH_USERS	This objective holds that sufficiently trained and trusted users will follow instructions as assumed.
OE.PHYSICAL	A.CREDENTIAL_REVOCATION	This objective ensures that an adversary will not have sufficient access to the TOE to exploit the login mechanism if the assumption holds that credential revocation is enforced upon a lost or stolen TOE.
	T.HW_ATTACK	This objective ensures that the adversary has only a limited window of opportunity to engage in a hardware attack on the physical TOE.
OE.TRUSTED_PEER	A.TRUSTED_PEER	This objective holds that if the TOE's Operational Environment is configured such that the TSF can only communicate with trusted peer, then this assumption will be satisfied.
	A.ROT_INTEGRITY	This objective holds that the vendor's RoT can be relied upon if the only entities that the TSF communicates with are trusted.

*Table 2: Security Problem Definition Mapping to Security Objectives*

The objectives can map to multiple assumptions or threats to fully define the objectives of the TOE and the operational environment.

## 6 Security Functional Requirements

The individual security functional requirements are specified in the sections below. Based on selections made in these SFRs it will also be necessary to include some of the selection-based SFRs in Appendix B. Additional optional SFRs may also be adopted from those listed in Appendix A for those functions that are provided by the TOE instead of its Operational Environment.

The Evaluation Activities defined in [SD] describe actions that the evaluator shall take in order to determine compliance of a particular TOE with the SFRs. The content of these Evaluation Activities will therefore provide more insight into deliverables required from TOE Developers.

### 6.1 SFR Architecture

A DSC implements all seven services in Table 3 as well as self-protection functionality that protects against a compromise or degradation of these services.

Service	Applicable Requirements
<b>Parse</b>	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
	FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
	FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)
	FCS_COP.1/HMAC Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash)
	FCS_COP.1/KAT Cryptographic Operation (Key Agreement/Transport)
	FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)
	FCS_COP.1/PBKDF Cryptographic Operation (Password-Based Key Derivation Functions)
	FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Key Cryptography)
	FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
	FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
	FDP_ITC_EXT.1 Parsing of SDEs
	FDP_ITC_EXT.2 Parsing of SDOs
	FTP_ITP_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel
	FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels
	FTP_CCMP_EXT.1 CCM Protocol
	FTP_GCMP_EXT.1 GCM Protocol
	FTP_ITE_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications

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<b>Provision</b>	FCS_CKM.1/AK FCS_CKM.1/KEK FCS_CKM_EXT.5 FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/HMAC FCS_COP.1/SKC FCS_RBG_EXT.1 FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FIA_SOS.2 FMT_MSA.3 FPT_STM.1 FCS_ENT_EXT.1 FCS_RBG_EXT.2 FCS_CKM.1/SK	Cryptographic Key Generation (Asymmetric Keys) Cryptographic Key Generation Key Encryption Key (KEK) Cryptographic Key Derivation Cryptographic Operation (Hashing) Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Key Cryptography) Random Bit Generation Subset Access Control Security Attribute Based Access Control TSF Generation of Secrets Static Attribute Initialization Reliable Time Stamps Entropy for External IT Entities Cryptographic Operation Random Bit Generation Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Key Encryption)
<b>Protect</b>	FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/HMAC FCS_COP.1/SKC FCS_STG_EXT.1 FCS_STG_EXT.2 FCS_STG_EXT.3 FDP_SDC_EXT.1 FDP_SDI.2 FMT_SMR.2 FPT_FLS.1/FI FPT_MOD_EXT.1 FPT_PHP.3 FPT_ROT_EXT.1 FPT_ROT_EXT.2 FPT_PRO_EXT.2 FDP_FRS_EXT.2 FIA_AFL_EXT.2 FPT_FLS.1/FW FPT_ITT.1	Cryptographic Operation (Hashing) Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Key Cryptography) Protected Storage Key Storage Encryption Key Integrity Protection Confidentiality of SDEs Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action Separation of Roles Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Fault Injection) Debug Modes Resistance to Physical Attack Root of Trust Services Root of Trust for Storage Data Integrity Measurements Factory Reset Behavior Authorization Failure Response Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Firmware) Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection

collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Components

<b>Process</b>	FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/HMAC FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc FCS_COP.1/SigGen FCS_COP.1/SigVer FCS_COP.1/SKC FCS_SLT_EXT.1 FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FIA_AFL_EXT.1 FIA_SOS.2 FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UAU.5 FIA_UAU.6 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.2 FPT_ROT_EXT.1 FPT_RPL_EXT.1 FPT_STM.1 FIA_AFL_EXT.2	Cryptographic Operation (Hashing) Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation) Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Key Cryptography) Cryptographic Salt Generation Subset Access Control Security Attribute Based Access Control Authorization Failure Handling TSF Generation of Secrets User Authentication before any Action Multiple Authentication Mechanisms Re-Authenticating Management of Security Functions Behavior Management of Security Attributes Specification of Management Functions Separation of Roles Root of Trust Services Replay Prevention Reliable Time Stamps Authorization Failure Response
<b>Prove</b>	FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/HMAC FCS_RBG_EXT.1 FCS_SLT_EXT.1 FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FPT_PRO_EXT.1 FPT_RPL_EXT.1 FPT_STM.1 FCS_RBG_EXT.2 FPT_ROT_EXT.3 FDP_DAU.1/Prove FDP_MFW_EXT.1 FDP_MFW_EXT.2 FDP_MFW_EXT.3	Cryptographic Operation (Hashing) Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash) Random Bit Generation Cryptographic Salt Generation Subset Access Control Security Attribute Based Access Control Root of Trust Replay Prevention Reliable Time Stamps Cryptographic Operation Random Bit Generation Root of Trust for Reporting Mechanisms Basic Data Authentication (for Use with the Prove Service) Mutable/Immutable Firmware Basic Firmware Integrity Firmware Authentication with Identity of Guarantor

<b>Propagate</b>	FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/HMAC FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc FCS_COP.1/SKC FCS_RBG_EXT.1 FCS_SLT_EXT.1 FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ETC_EXT.2 FCS_RBG_EXT.2 FPT_ITT.1 FTP_ITP_EXT.1 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 FTP_CCMP_EXT.1 FTP_GCMP_EXT.1 FTP_ITE_EXT.1	Cryptographic Operation (Hashing) Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Key Cryptography) Random Bit Generation Cryptographic Salt Generation Subset Access Control Security Attribute Based Access Control Propagation of SDOs Cryptographic Operation Random Bit Generation Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection Physically Protected Channel Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels CCM Protocol GCM Protocol Encrypted Data Communications
<b>Purge</b>	FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 FDP_RIP.1 FCS_RBG_EXT.2 FDP_FRS_EXT.2	Cryptographic Key Destruction Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction Timing Random Bit Generation Subset Residual Information Protection Cryptographic Operation Random Bit Generation Factory Reset Behavior
<b>TSF Security</b>	FDP_FRS_EXT.1 FDP_MFW_EXT.1 FMT_SMF.1 FPT_FLS.1/FI FPT_MOD_EXT.1 FPT_PHP.3 FPT_TST.1 FRU_FLT.1 FPT_PRO_EXT.2 FDP_MFW_EXT.2 FDP_MFW_EXT.3 FDP_FRS_EXT.2 FPT_FLS.1/FW FPT_RPL.1/Rollback	Factory Reset Mutable/Immutable Firmware Specification of Management Functions Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Fault Injection) Debug Modes Resistance to Physical Attack TSF Testing Degraded Fault Tolerance Data Integrity Measurements Basic Firmware Integrity Firmware Authentication with Identity of Guarantor Factory Reset Behavior Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Firmware) Replay Detection (Rollback)

Table 3: SFR Architecture

## 6.2 Conventions

The conventions used in descriptions of the SFRs are as follows:

- Unaltered SFRs are stated in the form used in [CC2] or their extended component definition (ECD);
- Refinement made in the PP: the added/removed text is indicated with bold text/~~strikethroughs~~. When text is substituted (i.e. some text is added in place of some other text, which is then deleted), only the added text is included;

Note that a refinement is also used to indicate cases where the PP replaces an assignment defined for an SFR in [CC2] and replaces it with a selection;

- Selections:
  - o Wholly or partially completed in the PP: the selection values (i.e. the selection values adopted in the PP or the remaining selection values available for the ST) are indicated with underlined text;  
 e.g. “[*selection: disclosure, modification, loss of use*]” in [CC2] or an ECD might become “disclosure” (completion) or “[selection: disclosure, modification]” (partial completion) in the PP;
  - o Some SFRs include selections that determine or constrain other assignments or selections. In these cases, a table follows the requirement in which each row of the table defines a permitted set of choices. Each row includes a unique identifier defined solely to provide a label for the selection set. Individual entries in these tables may also require further selections or assignments.

e.g. for FCS\_CKM.1/AK (see Table 4), the ST for a TOE that supports RSA keys must include the entries for ‘key type’, ‘key sizes’, and ‘list of standards’ as specified in row 1AK. For ‘key sizes’, the ST author must further select which of the required key sizes are supported. The row identifiers are merely intended as quick-reference handles—there is no expectation that the TSF actually refer internally to RSA keys using this identifier. Likewise, if the TOE supports ECC the ST must include the entries from row 2AK along with the appropriate selections.

Identifier	Key Type	Key Sizes	List of Standards
1AK	RSA	[ <u>selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit</u> ]	FIPS PUB 186-4 (Section B.3)
2AK	ECC	[ <u>selection: 256 (P-256), 384 (P-384), 512 (P-521)</u> ]	FIPS PUB 186-4 (Section B.4 & D.1.2)
3AK	BPC	[ <u>selection: 256 (brainpoolP256r1), 384 (brainpoolP384r1), 512 (brainpoolP512r1)</u> ]	RFC5639 (Section 3) [Brainpool Curves]

Table 4: Sample Cryptographic Table

- Assignment wholly or partially completed in the PP: indicated with *italicized text*;

- Assignment completed within a selection in the PP: the completed assignment text is indicated with *italicized and underlined text*  
e.g. “[selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]” in [CC2] or an ECD might become “[change default, [select tag]]” (completion of both selection and assignment) or “[selection: change default, select tag, [select value]]” (partial completion of selection, and completion of assignment) in the PP;
- Iteration: indicated by adding a string starting with “/” (e.g. “FCS\_COP.1/Hash”).

SFR text that is bold, italicized, and underlined indicates that the original SFR defined an assignment operation but the PP author completed that assignment by redefining it as a selection operation, which is also considered to be a refinement of the original SFR.

If the selection or assignment is to be completed by the ST author, it is preceded by ‘selection:’ or ‘assignment:’. If the selection or assignment has been completed by the PP author and the ST author does not have the ability to modify it, the proper formatting convention is applied but the preceding word is not included. The exception to this is if the SFR definition includes multiple options in a selection or assignment and the PP has excluded certain options but at least two remain. In this case, the selection or assignment operations that are not permitted by this PP are removed without applying additional formatting and the ‘selection:’ or ‘assignment:’ text is preserved to show that the ST author still has the ability to choose from the reduced set of options.

Extended SFRs (i.e. those SFRs that are not defined in [CC2]) are identified by having a label ‘\_EXT’ at the end of the SFR name.

## 6.3 Cryptographic Support

### 6.3.1 FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

<b>FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation</b>
-----------------------------------------------

**FCS\_CKM.1.1** The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys by [*parsing in accordance with FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 and FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2, [selection: asymmetric key generation in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/AK, symmetric key generation in accordance to FCS\_CKM.1/SK, no other methods]*] ~~in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].~~

#### ***Application Note 1.***

*Parsing of keys can refer to both the act of importing keys from outside the TOE boundary and to the act of issuing commands or parameters to the TOE that trigger the TSF to perform a key generation function.*

*If asymmetric key generation in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/AK is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_CKM.1/AK must be claimed by the TOE.*

*If symmetric key generation in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/SK is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_CKM.1/SK must be claimed by the TOE.*

### 6.3.2 FCS\_CKM.1/KEK Cryptographic Key Generation (Key Encryption Key)

#### FCS\_CKM.1/KEK Cryptographic Key Generation (Key Encryption Key)

**FCS\_CKM.1.1/KEK** The TSF shall generate **key encryption keys** in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm **corresponding to [selection:**

- **Asymmetric KEKs generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/AK identifier AK1,**
- **Symmetric KEKs generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/SK,**
- **Derived KEKs generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5**

~~]~~ and ~~specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]~~ that meet the following: ~~[assignment: list of standards]~~.

#### *Application Note 2.*

*KEKs protect KEKs and Symmetric Keys (SKs). DSCs should use key strengths commensurate with protecting the chosen symmetric encryption key strengths.*

*If Asymmetric KEKs generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/AK is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_CKM.1/AK must be claimed by the TOE.*

*If Symmetric KEKs generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/SK is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_CKM.1/SK must be claimed by the TOE.*

*If Derived KEKs generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5 is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5 must be claimed by the TOE.*

### 6.3.3 FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

#### FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

**FCS\_CKM.2.1** The TSF shall **establish** cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: **[selection:**

- **RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56B Revision 2, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography”;**
- **RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2”;**
- **Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: [selection:
  - **NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”;**
  - **RFC 7748, “Elliptic Curves for Security”]****
- **Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”;**

- **Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) that meets the following: [selection:**
  - **ANSI X9.63 - Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography;**
  - **IEEE 1363a - Standard Specification for Public-Key Cryptography - Amendment 1: Additional Techniques;**
  - **ISO/IEC 18033-2 - Information Technology - Security Techniques - Encryption Algorithms - Part 2: Asymmetric Ciphers;**
  - **SECG SEC1 - Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section 5.1 Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme]**

]that meets the following: [*assignment: list of standards*].

### *Application Note 3.*

*This is a refinement of the SFR FCS\_CKM.2 to deal with key establishment rather than key distribution.*

*The ST author selects all key establishment schemes used for the selected cryptographic protocols.*

*The RSA-based key establishment schemes are described in Section 8 of NIST SP 800-56B Revision 2 [NIST-RSA]; however, Section 8 relies on implementation of other sections in SP 800-56B Revision 2.*

*The elliptic curves used for the key establishment scheme correlate with the curves specified in FCS\_CKM.1/AK.*

*The selections in this SFR must be consistent with those for FCS\_COP.1/KAT.*

## **6.3.4 FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction**

### **FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction**

**FCS\_CKM.4.1** The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys **and keying material** in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction **method** **[selection:**

- **For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection:**
  - **single overwrite consisting of [selection:**
    - **a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF's RBG,**
    - **zeroes,**
    - **ones,**
    - **a new value of a key,**
    - **[assignment: some value that does not contain any CSP]],**
  - **removal of power to the memory,**

- removal of all references to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection];
- **For non-volatile memory [selection:**
  - **that employs a wear-leveling algorithm, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection:**
    - **single overwrite consisting of [selection: zeroes, ones, pseudo-random pattern, a new value of a key of the same size, [assignment: some value that does not contain any CSP]],**
    - **block erase];**
  - **that does not employ a wear-leveling algorithm, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection:**
    - **[selection: single, [assignment: ST author defined multi-pass]] overwrite consisting of [selection: zeros, ones, pseudo-random pattern, a new value of a key of the same size, [assignment: some value that does not contain any CSP]] followed by a read-verify. If the read-verification of the overwritten data fails, the process shall be repeated again up to [assignment: number of times to attempt overwrite] times, whereupon an error is returned.**
    - **block erase]**

]

] that meets the following: [no standard].

#### **Application Note 4.**

*A DSC must implement mechanisms to destroy cryptographic keys and key material contained in persistent storage when no longer needed. The term “cryptographic keys” in this SFR includes the authorization data that is the entry point to a key chain and all other cryptographic keys and keying material (whether in plaintext or encrypted form). This SFR does not apply to the public component of asymmetric key pairs, or to keys that are permitted to remain stored such as device identification keys.*

*In the case of volatile memory, the selection “removal of all references to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection” is used in a situation where the TSF cannot address the specific physical memory locations holding the data to be erased and therefore relies on addressing logical addresses (which frees the relevant physical addresses holding the old data) and then requesting the platform to ensure that the data in the physical addresses is no longer available for reading (i.e. the “garbage collection” referred to in the SFR text).*

*Guidance documentation for the TOE requires users not to allow the TOE to leave the user’s control while a session is active (and hence while the DEK is likely to be in plaintext in volatile memory).*

*The selection for destruction of data in non-volatile memory includes block erase as an option, and this option applies only to flash memory. A block erase does not require a read verify, since*

*the mappings of logical addresses to the erased memory locations are erased as well as the data itself.*

*Where different destruction methods are used for different data or different destruction situations then the different methods and the data/situations they apply to (e.g. different points in time, or power-loss situations) are described in the TSS (and the ST may use separate iterations of the SFR to aid clarity). The TSS includes a table describing all relevant keys and keying material (including authorization data) used in the implementation of the SFRs, stating the source of the data, all memory types in which the data is stored (covering storage both during and outside of a session, and both plaintext and non-plaintext forms of the data), and the applicable destruction method and time of destruction in each case.*

*Some selections allow assignment of “some value that does not contain any CSP.” This means that the TOE uses some specified data not drawn from an RBG meeting FCS\_RBG\_EXT requirements, and not being any of the particular values listed as other selection options. The point of the phrase “does not contain any sensitive data” is to ensure that the overwritten data is carefully selected, and not taken from a general pool that might contain current or residual data (e.g. SDOs or intermediate key chain values) that itself requires confidentiality protection.*

### **6.3.5 FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction Timing**

#### **FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction Timing**

**FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4.1** The TSF shall destroy all keys and keying material when no longer needed.

#### ***Application Note 5.***

*The DSC will have mechanisms to destroy keys, including intermediate keys and key material, by using an approved method, FCS\_CKM.4. Examples of keys include intermediate keys, leaf keys, encryption keys, signing keys, verification keys, authentication tokens, and submasks. The DSC will have mechanisms to destroy keys and key material contained in persistent storage when no longer needed. Based on their implementation, vendors will explain when certain keys are no longer needed. An example in which key is no longer necessary includes a wrapped key whose password has changed. However, there are instances when keys are allowed to remain in memory, for example, a device identification key.*

### **6.3.6 FCS\_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)**

#### **FCS\_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)**

**FCS\_COP.1.1/Hash** The TSF shall perform [*cryptographic hashing*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**selection: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512**] that meets the following: [**selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS 180-4**].

#### ***Application Note 6.***

*The hash selection should be consistent with the overall strength of the algorithm used for signature generation. For example, the DSC should choose SHA-256 for 2048-bit RSA or ECC*

with P-256, SHA-384 for 3072-bit RSA, 4096-bit RSA, or ECC with P-384, and SHA-512 for ECC with P-521. The ST author selects the standard based on the algorithms selected.

SHA-1 may be used for the following applications: generating and verifying hash-based message authentication codes (HMACs), key derivation functions (KDFs), and random bit/number generation<sup>2</sup>.

### 6.3.7 FCS\_COP.1/HMAC Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash)

#### FCS\_COP.1/HMAC Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash)

**FCS\_COP.1.1/HMAC** The TSF shall perform [*keyed hash message authentication*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**selection: HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, KMAC128, KMAC256**] and cryptographic key sizes [**assignment: key size (in bits)**] that meet the following: [**selection: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”; [NIST-KDV] section 4 “KMAC”**].

#### Application Note 7.

The HMAC key size falls into a range between L1 and L2 defined in ISO/IEC 10118 for the appropriate hash function (for example for SHA-256 L1 = 512, L2 = 256) where  $L2 \leq k \leq L1$ .

### 6.3.8 FCS\_COP.1/KAT Cryptographic Operation (Key Agreement/Transport)

#### FCS\_COP.1/KAT Cryptographic Operations (Key Agreement/Transport)

**FCS\_COP.1.1/KAT** The TSF shall perform [*cryptographic key agreement/transport*] using [**selection: identifier from Supported Methods for Key Agreement/Transport Operation table**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*cryptographic algorithms as chosen from Supported Methods for Key Agreement/Transport Operation table for corresponding identifiers*] and cryptographic key sizes [*key sizes as chosen from Supported Methods for Key Agreement/Transport Operation table for corresponding cryptographic algorithms*] that meet the following: [*standards as chosen from Supported Methods for Key Agreement/Transport Operation table for corresponding cryptographic algorithms*].

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
KAS1	RSA-single party	[ <b>selection: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192</b> ] bits	NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 8.2
KAS2	RSA-both party	[ <b>selection: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192</b> ] bits	NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 8.3

<sup>2</sup> In certain cases, SHA-1 may also be used for verifying old digital signatures and time stamps, provided that this is explicitly allowed by the application domain.

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
KTS-OAEP	RSA	[ <u>selection: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192</u> ] bits	NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 9
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5	RSA	[ <u>selection: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192</u> ] bits	RFC 8017 Section 7.2
ECDH-NIST	ECDH with NIST curves	[ <u>selection: 256 (P-256), 384 (P-384), 512 (P-521)</u> ]	NIST SP 800-56Ar3
ECDH-BPC	ECDH with Brainpool curves	[ <u>selection: 256 (brainpoolP256r1), 384 (brainpoolP384r1), 512 (brainpoolP512r1)</u> ]	RFC 5639 (Section 3)
DH	Diffie-Hellman	[ <u>selection: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192</u> ] bits	NIST SP 800-56A rev 3, [ <u>selection: RFC 3526 Section [selection: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7], RFC 7919 Appendices [selection: A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5]</u> ]
Curve25519	ECDH	256 bits	RFC 7748
ECIES	ECIES	[ <u>selection: 256, 384, 512</u> ] bits	[ <u>selection: ANSI X9.63, IEEE 1363a, ISO/IEC 18033-2 Part 2, SECG SEC1 sec 5.1</u> ]

Table 5: Supported Methods for Key Agreement/Transport Operation

**Application Note 8.**

The selections in this SFR should be consistent with the algorithms selected in FCS\_CKM.2.

**6.3.9 FCS\_COP.1/KeyEnc Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)**

<b>FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc</b>	<b>Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)</b>
-------------------------	-------------------------------------------------

**FCS\_COP.1.1/KeyEnc** The TSF shall perform [*key encryption and decryption*] **using [selection: identifier from Supported Methods for Key Encryption Operation table]** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*cryptographic algorithms as chosen from Supported Methods for Key Encryption Operation table for corresponding identifiers*] and cryptographic key size [*key sizes as chosen from Supported Methods for Key Encryption Operation table for corresponding identifiers*] that meet the following: [*standards as chosen from Supported Methods for Key Encryption Operation table for corresponding identifiers*].

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Size	List of Standards
SE1	Symmetric [ <u>selection: AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES-CTR, AES-KWP, AES-KW</u> ]	[ <u>selection: 128, 192, 256</u> ] bits	See FCS_COP.1/SKC
SE2	Symmetric [ <u>CAM-CBC, CAM-CCM, CAM-GCM</u> ]	[ <u>selection: 128, 256</u> ] bits	See FCS_COP.1/SKC
AE1	Asymmetric KTS-OAEP	[ <u>selection: 2048, 3072</u> ] bits	See FCS_COP.1/KAT
XOR	Exclusive OR operation	[ <u>selection: 128, 192, 256</u> ] bits	See FCS_CKM_EXT.5

Table 6: Supported Methods for Key Encryption Operation

**Application Note 9.**

A TOE will use this requirement to specify how the Key Encryption Key (KEK) wraps a symmetric encryption key. A TOE will always need this requirement in order to capture the last stage of the key chain in which the Key Encryption Key (KEK) wraps the symmetric encryption key.

If XOR is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5 must be claimed by the TOE.

**6.3.10 FCS\_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation)**

**FCS\_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation)**

**FCS\_COP.1.1/SigGen** The TSF shall perform [*digital signature generation*] using [selection: identifier from Supported Methods for Key Agreement/Transport Operation table] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*cryptographic algorithms as chosen from Supported Methods for Signature Generation Operation table for corresponding identifiers*] and cryptographic key sizes [*key sizes as chosen from Supported Methods for Signature Generation Operation table for corresponding identifiers*] that meet the following: [*standards as chosen from Supported Methods for Signature Generation Operation table for corresponding identifiers*].

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key sizes	List of Standards
SigGen1	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using [ <u>selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512</u> ]	[ <u>selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit</u> ]	[ <u>selection: RFC 8017, PKCS #1 v2.2 (Section 8.2); FIPS186-4, (Section 5.5)</u> ] (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)  [ <u>selection: ISO10118-3, (Clause 10, 11); FIPS180-</u>

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Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key sizes	List of Standards
			4, (Section 6)] (SHA)
SigGen2	Digital signature scheme 2 using [selection: <a href="#">SHA-256</a> , <a href="#">SHA-384</a> , <a href="#">SHA-512</a> , <a href="#">SHA3-256</a> , <a href="#">SHA3-384</a> , <a href="#">SHA3-512</a> ]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	ISO9796-2, (Clause 9) (Digital signature scheme 2)  [selection: <a href="#">ISO10118-3</a> , (Clause 10, 11); <a href="#">FIPS180-4</a> , (Section 6)] (SHA)
SigGen3	Digital signature scheme 3 using [selection: <a href="#">SHA-256</a> , <a href="#">SHA-384</a> , <a href="#">SHA-512</a> , <a href="#">SHA3-256</a> , <a href="#">SHA3-384</a> , <a href="#">SHA3-512</a> ]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	ISO9796-2, (Clause 10) (Digital signature scheme 3)  [selection: <a href="#">ISO10118-3</a> , (Clause 10, 11); <a href="#">FIPS180-4</a> , (Section 6)] (SHA)
SigGen4	RSASSA-PSS using [selection: <a href="#">SHA-256</a> , <a href="#">SHA-384</a> , <a href="#">SHA-512</a> , <a href="#">SHA3-256</a> , <a href="#">SHA3-384</a> , <a href="#">SHA3-512</a> ]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	[ <a href="#">RFC8017</a> , <a href="#">PKCS#1v2.2</a> (Section 8.1)] (RSASSA-PSS)  [selection: <a href="#">ISO10118-3</a> , (Clause 10, 11); <a href="#">FIPS180-4</a> , (Section 6)] (SHA)
SigGen5	ECDSA on [selection: <a href="#">brainpoolP256r1</a> , <a href="#">brainpoolP384r1</a> , <a href="#">brainpoolP512r1</a> , <a href="#">NIST P-256</a> , <a href="#">NIST P-384</a> , <a href="#">NIST P-521</a> ] using [selection: <a href="#">SHA-256</a> , <a href="#">SHA-384</a> , <a href="#">SHA-512</a> , <a href="#">SHA3-256</a> , <a href="#">SHA3-384</a> , <a href="#">SHA3-512</a> ]	[selection: 256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits, 521 bits]	[selection:  [selection: <a href="#">ISO14888-3</a> ; <a href="#">FIPS186-4</a> (Section 6)] (ECDSA);  <a href="#">RFC5639</a> (Section 3) (Brainpool Curves);  <a href="#">FIPS186-4</a> (Appendix D.1.2) (NIST Curves)]  [selection: <a href="#">ISO10118-3</a> , (Clause 10, 11); <a href="#">FIPS180-4</a> , (Section 6)] (SHA)

Table 7: Supported Methods for Signature Generation Operation

**6.3.11 FCS\_COP.1/SigVer Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)**

**FCS\_COP.1/SigVer Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)**

**FCS\_COP.1.1/SigVer** The TSF shall perform [*digital signature verification for authenticity*] using [**selection: identifier from Supported Methods for Signature Verification Operation table**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*cryptographic algorithms as chosen from Supported Methods for Signature Verification Operation table for corresponding identifiers*] and cryptographic key sizes [*key sizes as chosen from Supported Methods for Signature Verification Operation table for corresponding identifiers*] that meet the following: [*standards as chosen from Supported Methods for Signature Verification Operation table for corresponding identifiers*].

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
SigVer1	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using [ <b>selection: one or more hash algorithms selected in FCS_COP.1.1/Hash</b> ]	[ <b>selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit</b> ]	[ <b>selection: RFC 8017, PKCS #1 v2.2 (Section 8.2); FIPS186-4, (Section 5.5)</b> ] (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)  [ <b>selection: ISO10118-3, (Clause 10, 11); FIPS180-4, (Section 6)</b> ] (SHA)
SigVer2	Digital signature scheme 2 using [ <b>selection: one or more hash algorithms selected in FCS_COP.1.1/Hash</b> ]	[ <b>selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit</b> ]	ISO9796-2, (Clause 9) (Digital signature scheme 2)  [ <b>selection: ISO10118-3, (Clause 10, 11); FIPS180-4, (Section 6)</b> ] (SHA)
SigVer3	Digital signature scheme 3 using [ <b>selection: one or more hash algorithms selected in FCS_COP.1.1/Hash</b> ]	[ <b>selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit</b> ]	ISO9796-2, (Clause 10) (Digital signature scheme 3)  [ <b>selection: ISO10118-3, (Clause 10, 11); FIPS180-4, (Section 6)</b> ] (SHA)
SigVer4	RSASSA-PSS using [ <b>selection: one or more hash algorithms selected in FCS_COP.1.1/Hash</b> ]	[ <b>selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit</b> ]	[ <b>selection: RFC8017, PKCS#1v2.2 (Section 8.1)</b> ] (RSASSA-PSS)  [ <b>selection: ISO10118-3, (Clause 10, 11); FIPS180-4, (Section 6)</b> ] (SHA)

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
SigVer5	ECDSA on [selection: <a href="#">brainpoolP256r1</a> , <a href="#">brainpoolP384r1</a> , <a href="#">brainpoolP512r1</a> , NIST P-256, NIST P-384, NIST P-521] using [selection: one or more hash algorithms selected in FCS COP.1.1/Hash]	[selection: 256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits]	[selection: ISO14888-3; FIPS186-4 (Section 6)] (ECDSA);  RFC5639 (Section 3) (Brainpool Curves);  FIPS186-4 (Appendix D.1.2) (NIST Curves)]  [selection: ISO10118-3, (Clause 10, 11); FIPS180-4, (Section 6)] (SHA)

Table 8: Supported Methods for Signature Verification Operation

### 6.3.12 FCS\_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Key Cryptography)

#### **FCS\_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Key Cryptography)**

**FCS\_COP.1.1/SKC** The TSF shall perform [*data encryption/decryption*] using [selection: identifier from Supported Methods for Symmetric Key Cryptography Operation table] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*cryptographic algorithms as chosen from Supported Methods for Symmetric Key Cryptography Operation table for corresponding identifiers*] and cryptographic key sizes [*key sizes as chosen from Supported Methods for Symmetric Key Cryptography Operation table for corresponding identifiers*] that meet the following: [*standards as chosen from Supported Methods for Symmetric Key Cryptography Operation table for corresponding identifiers*].

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
AES-CCM	AES in CCM mode with unpredictable, non-repeating nonce, minimum size of 64 bits	[selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (AES)  ISO 19772, Clause 8 (CCM)  NIST SP800-38C (CCM)

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Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
AES-GCM	AES in GCM mode with non-repeating IVs; IV length must be equal to 96 bits; the deterministic IV construction method (SP800-38D, Section 8.2.1) must be used; the MAC length t must be one of the values <u>[selection: 96, 104, 112, 120, 128]</u> bits	<u>[selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]</u>	ISO 18033-3 (AES) ISO 19772, Clause.11 (GCM) NIST SP800-38D (GCM)
AES-CBC	AES in CBC mode with non-repeating and unpredictable IVs	<u>[selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]</u>	ISO 18033-3 (AES) ISO 10116 (CBC) NIST SP800-38A (CBC)
AES-CTR	AES in counter mode with a non-repeating initial counter and with no repeated use of counter values across multiple messages with the same secret key	<u>[selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]</u>	ISO 18033-3 (AES) ISO 10116 (CTR) NIST SP800-38A (CTR)
XTS-AES	AES in XTS mode with unique <u>[selection: consecutive non- negative integers starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer, data unit sequence numbers]</u> tweak values	<u>[selection: 256 bits, 512 bits]</u>	ISO 18033-3 (AES) <u>[selection: IEEE 1619, NIST SP800-38E]</u> (XTS)
AES-KWP	KWP based on AES	<u>[selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]</u>	ISO/IEC 18033-3 (AES), NIST SP 800-38F, sec. 6.3 (KWP)
AES-KW	KW based on AES	<u>[selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]</u>	ISO/IEC 18033-3 (AES), NIST SP 800-38F, sec. 6.2 (KW)  ISO/IEC 19772, clause 7 (key wrap)

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
CAM-CBC	Camellia in CBC mode with non-repeating and unpredictable IVs	[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (Camellia) ISO 10116 (CBC)
CAM-CCM	Camellia in CCM mode with unpredictable, non-repeating nonce, minimum size of 64 bits	[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (Camellia) ISO 19772, Clause 8 (CCM) SP800-38C
CAM-GCM	Camellia in GCM mode with non-repeating IVs; the IV length must be equal to 96 bits; the deterministic IV construction method (SP800-38D, Section 8.2.1) must be used; the MAC length t must be one of the values [selection: 96, 104, 112, 120, 128] bits.	[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (Camellia) ISO 19772, Clause 11 (GCM) NIST SP800-38D
XTS-CAM	Camellia in XTS mode with unique [selection: consecutive non-negative integers starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer, data unit sequence numbers] tweak values	[selection: 256 bits, 512 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (Camellia) [selection: IEEE 1619, SP800-38E] (XTS)

Table 9: Supported Methods for Symmetric Key Cryptography Operation

### 6.3.13 FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

#### FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [selection: Hash DRBG (any), HMAC DRBG (any), CTR DRBG (AES)].

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2** The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source in accordance with NIST SP 800-90B that accumulates entropy from [selection: [assignment: number of software-based sources] software-based noise source, [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source] with a minimum of [selection: 128, 192, 256] bits of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011, of the keys and CSPs that it will generate.

**Application Note 10.**

*ISO/IEC 18031:2011 contains three different methods of generating random numbers. Each of these in turn depends on underlying cryptographic primitives (hash functions/ciphers). This cPP allows SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 for Hash\_DRBG or HMAC\_DRBG and only AES-based implementations for CTR\_DRBG.*

**6.3.14 FCS\_SLT\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Salt Generation**

**FCS\_SLT\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Salt Generation**

**FCS\_SLT\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall use salts and nonces generated by an RBG as specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.

**6.3.15 FCS\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Storage**

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Storage**

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide [selection: mutable hardware-based, immutable hardware-based, software-based] protected storage for asymmetric private keys and [selection: symmetric keys, persistent secrets, no other keys].

**Application Note 11.**

*If the protected storage is implemented in software that is protected as required by FCS\_STG\_EXT.2, the ST author is expected to select software-based. If software-based is selected, the ST author is expected to select all software-based key storage in FCS\_STG\_EXT.2.*

*Support for protected storage for all symmetric keys and persistent secrets will be required in future revisions.*

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall support the capability of [selection: importing keys/secrets into the TOE, causing the TOE to generate keys/secrets] upon request of [selection: a client application, an administrator].

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall be capable of destroying keys/secrets in the protected storage upon request of [selection: a client application, an administrator].

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall have the capability to allow only the user that [selection: imported the key/secret, caused the key/secret to be generated] to use the key/secret. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [selection: the client application, the administrator].

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.5** The TSF shall allow only the user that [selection: imported the key/secret, caused the key/secret to be generated] to request that the key/secret be destroyed. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [selection: the client application, the administrator].

**Application Note 12.**

*Not all conformant TOEs will have the ability to import pre-generated keys into the TOE. In these cases, the TOE's ability to receive commands to perform key generation is considered to be its implementation of the Parse service. A subject that caused a key to be generated is considered to be the 'owner' of that key in the same manner as they would be if they had imported it directly.*

### 6.3.16 FCS\_STG\_EXT.2 Key Storage Encryption

#### FCS\_STG\_EXT.2 Key Storage Encryption

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall encrypt [AKs, SKs, KEKs, and [selection: long-term trusted channel key material, all software-based key storage, no other keys]] using one of the following methods: [assignment: key encryption methods as specified in FCS\_COP.1/KeyEnc].

### 6.3.17 FCS\_STG\_EXT.3 Key Integrity Protection

#### FCS\_STG\_EXT.3 Key Integrity Protection

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.3.1** The TSF shall protect the integrity of any encrypted [AKs, SKs, KEKs, and [selection: long-term trusted channel key material, all software-based key storage, no other keys]] by using [selection:

- Symmetric encryption in [selection: AES CCM, AES GCM, AES KW, AES KWP, CAM CCM, CAM GCM] mode in accordance with FCS\_COP.1/SKC;
- A hash of the stored key in accordance with FCS\_COP.1/Hash;
- A keyed hash of the stored key in accordance with FCS\_COP.1/HMAC;
- A digital signature of the stored key in accordance with FCS\_COP.1/SigGen using an asymmetric key that is protected in accordance with FCS\_STG\_EXT.2;
- An immediate application of the key for decrypting the protected data followed by a successful verification of the decrypted data with previously known information

].

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.3.2** The TSF shall verify the integrity of the [selection: hash, digital signature, MAC] of the stored key prior to use of the key.

#### **Application Note 13.**

*This requirement is not applicable to derived keys that are not stored. It is not expected that a single key will be protected from corruption by multiple of these methods; however, a product may use one integrity-protection method for one type of key and a different method for other types of keys.*

*The documentation of the product's encryption key management should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the product's key management and how it meets the requirements to ensure the keys are adequately protected. This documentation should include an essay and diagrams. This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS – it can be submitted as a separate document and marked as developer proprietary.*

## 6.4 User Data Protection

### 6.4.1 FDP\_ACC.1 Subset Access Control

#### FDP\_ACC.1 Subset Access Control

**FDP\_ACC.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] on [

- *Subjects: S.DSC, S.Admin, S.CA, S.EPS*
- *Objects: OB.P\_SDO, OB.T\_SDO, OB.AuthData, OB.Pstate, OB.FAACntr, OB.AntiReplay, OB.Context*
- *Operations: OP.Import, OP.Create, OP.Use, OP.Modify, OP.Attest, OP.Store, OP.Export, OP.Destroy].*

**Application Note 14.**

*The set of operations specified in the assignment can be collectively referred to as “access.” Any subsequent use of the term “access” should be interpreted to refer to one or more of these events.*

**6.4.2 FDP\_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control**

<b>FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control</b>
----------------------------------------------------------

**FDP\_ACF.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] to objects based on the following: [subjects (defined in FDP\_ACC.1.1) attempt to perform operations (defined in FDP\_ACC.1.1) against objects (defined in FDP\_ACC.1.1). Subject and object attributes may be used to determine whether the desired operations are permitted.

*The following are the SFP-relevant security attributes that are associated with the subjects and objects defined in FDP\_ACC.1.1, as well as any restrictions on the attribute values:*

- *S.DSC*
  - *DSC.ID*
- *S.Admin – none*
- *S.CA*
  - *CA.ID*
- *S.EPS*
  - *EPS.ID*
- *OB.P\_SDO*
  - *SDO.ID*
  - *SDO.Type*
  - *SDO.AuthData*
  - *SDO.Reauth*
  - *SDO.Conf*
  - *SDO.Export*
  - *SDO.Integrity*
  - *SDO.Bind*
- *OB.T\_SDO – same as OB.P\_SDO*

- *OB.AuthData – none*
- *OB.Pstate – none*
- *OB.FAACntr – none*
- *OB.AntiReplay – none*
- *OB.Context – none*

].

**FDP\_ACF.1.2** The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

- *[Any subject that has been authorized to perform any operation against any OB.P\_SDO or OB.T\_SDO object can continue to perform this operation if one of the following conditions is true:*
  - *The object's SDO.Reauth attribute has a value of 'none', indicating that re-authorization is not required for subsequent interactions with the SDO;*
  - *The object's SDO.Reauth attribute has a value of 'each use', indicating that re-authorization is required for each interaction with the SDO, and the subject has supplied valid authorization data to the TOE*
- *[assignment: rules automatically enforced by the TSF that always prohibit certain subject-object-operation actions]*
- *[assignment: rules automatically enforced by the TSF that always permit certain subject-object-operation actions]*
- *[assignment: rules automatically enforced by the TSF that conditionally permit certain subject-object-operation actions based on subject security attributes, object security attributes, or other conditions]*
- *[selection: [assignment: any configurable rules or parameters that can be modified to affect the behavior of the Access Control SFP], no configurable rules].*

**FDP\_ACF.1.3** The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: *[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].*

**FDP\_ACF.1.4** The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: *[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].*

***Application Note 15.***

*The expectation of this SFR is that the reader is given sufficient information to determine, for each object controlled by the TOE, the operations that can be performed on it based on the subject attempting to perform the operation, and whether this is conditional based on attribute values or any other circumstances.*

*It is expected that many of the subject-object-operation combinations will always be prohibited by the TSF, either because the target object is not externally modifiable or because the subject lacks the ability to perform the operation in question.*

*The ST author is not expected to create an exhaustive list of subject-object-operation combinations; it is sufficient to list those that are always permitted and those that are conditionally permitted with the expectation that all remaining combinations are prohibited.*

*FDP\_ACF.1.3 and FDP\_ACF.1.4 allow the ST author to optionally specify override conditions to resolve otherwise contradictory Access Control SFP rules. For example, the rule “S.Admin may always modify the SDO.Conf attribute of any OB.P\_SDO or OB.T\_SDO object” may be overridden by a statement in FDP\_ACF.1.4 that identifies any particular SDO objects as non-modifiable regardless of subject authorizations.*

*The DSC may contain pre-installed SDOs. The DSC will enforce access control for pre-installed SDOs like any other SDO it contains or manages.*

### **6.4.3 FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2 Propagation of SDOs**

#### **FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2 Propagation of SDOs**

**FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall propagate only SDO references, wrapped authorization data, and wrapped SDOs such that only [selection: the TSF, authorized users] can access them.

#### ***Application Note 16.***

*The “SDO reference” is a pointer to an object that resides in the TOE; this can be thought of as a token to the object. The “only the TSF can unwrap the data” selection refers to data that is stored outside the TOE boundary (i.e., data that has been propagated).*

### **6.4.4 FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1 Factory Reset**

#### **FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1 Factory Reset**

**FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall permit a factory reset of the TOE upon: [selection: activation by external interface, presentation of [assignment: types of authorization data required and reference to their specification], no actions or conditions].

#### ***Application Note 17.***

*If the DSC provides factory reset and requires an authorization to carry out the operation then the ST author selects either presentation of... and fills in the authorization data accepted (e.g. a PIN or a cryptographic token based on some specification referenced in the assigned value). If the DSC provides factory reset external to the DSC without requiring authorization then the ST author selects activation by external interface. This selection is intended for use when the device containing the DSC takes responsibility for obtaining and checking the authorization for factory reset.*

*If any selection other than no actions or conditions is made in FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1.1, the selection-based SFR FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 must be claimed.*

#### 6.4.5 FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Parsing of SDEs

<b>FDP_ITC_EXT.1 Parsing of SDEs</b>
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**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall support importing SDEs using [selection: physically protected channels as specified in FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1, encrypted data buffers as specified in FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1, cryptographically protected data channels as specified in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1].

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall verify the integrity of the SDE using [selection: cryptographic hash as specified in FCS\_COP.1/Hash, keyed hash as specified in FCS\_COP.1/HMAC, integrity-providing encryption algorithm as specified in FCS\_COP.1/KeyEnc [selection: SE1, SE2], digital signature as specified in FCS\_COP.1/SigVer, integrity verification supported by FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1].

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall bind SDEs to security attributes using [*assignment: list of ways the TSF generates security attributes and binds them to the SDEs*].

#### **Application Note 18.**

*The way the TSF checks the integrity of the SDE depends on the method of importation. For example, the encrypted data channel may provide data integrity as part of its service.*

*When a TSF parses an SDE, it should generate security attributes and create an SDO by binding the security attributes to the SDE.*

*If physically protected channels as specified in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 is selected, the selection-based SFR FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 must be claimed.*

*If encrypted data buffers as specified in FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 is selected, the selection-based SFR FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 must be claimed.*

*If cryptographically protected data channels as specified in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 is selected, the selection-based SFR FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 must be claimed.*

#### 6.4.6 FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2 Parsing of SDOs

<b>FDP_ITC_EXT.2 Parsing of SDOs</b>
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**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall support importing SDOs using [selection: physically protected channels as specified in FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1, encrypted data buffers as specified in FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1, cryptographically protected data channels as specified in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1].

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.2** The TSF shall verify the integrity of the SDO using [selection: cryptographic hash as specified in FCS\_COP.1/Hash, keyed hash as specified in FCS\_COP.1/HMAC, integrity-providing encryption algorithm as specified in FCS\_COP.1/KeyEnc [selection: SE1, SE2], digital signature as specified in FCS\_COP.1/SigVer, integrity verification supported by FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.1].

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.3** The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data.

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.4** The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user data received.

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.5** The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.

***Application Note 19.***

*The way the TSF checks the integrity of the SDO depends on the method of importation. For example, the encrypted data channel may provide data integrity as part of its service.*

*When a TSF parses an SDO, it should already have a set of security attributes. However, the TSF may modify these attributes, if authorized, to comply with security policies on the TOE.*

*If physically protected channels as specified in FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 is selected, the selection-based SFR FDP\_ITP\_EXT.1 must be claimed.*

*If encrypted data buffers as specified in FDP\_ITE\_EXT.1 is selected, the selection-based SFR FDP\_ITE\_EXT.1 must be claimed.*

*If cryptographically protected data channels as specified in FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 is selected, the selection-based SFR FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 must be claimed.*

#### **6.4.7 FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware**

<b>FDP_MFW_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware</b>
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**FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall be maintained as [selection: immutable, mutable] firmware.

***Application Note 20.***

*The ST author must include FDP\_MFW\_EXT.2, FDP\_MFW\_EXT.3, FPT\_FLS.1/FW, and FPT\_RPL.1/Rollback if mutable is selected.*

#### **6.4.8 FDP\_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection**

<b>FDP_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection</b>
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**FDP\_RIP.1.1** The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: [

- SDOs
- SDEs].

***Application Note 21.***

*When an SDE is a key then it is also subject to the key destruction requirements in FCS\_CKM.4, depending on where and how it is stored. This SFR applies to authorization data that are SDEs and security attributes in SDOs.*

#### 6.4.9 FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1 Confidentiality of SDEs

##### **FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1 Confidentiality of SDEs**

**FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall use [selection: protected storage, symmetric encryption using [selection: AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES-KWP, AES-KW, CAM-CBC, CAM-CCM, CAM-GCM] as specified in FCS COP.1/SKC, key wrapping using [selection: KAS1, KAS2, KTS-OAEP] as specified in FCS COP.1/KAT] to protect the confidentiality of authorization data and [assignment: list of internally and externally stored SDEs identified in the Confidential SDE List attribute of an SDO].

**FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall use FCS\_CKM.1/KEK to derive or generate the key to encrypt the SDEs.

##### *Application Note 22.*

*This SFR applies to confidential SDEs, especially secret and private keys, Allowed Random Number Generators' state data, and vendor verification reference data. This SFR also applies to all authorization data appearing in the attribute list under SDO.AuthData as well as any administrator authorization data which may be stored implicitly.*

*If the TOE stores these parameters outside of its boundary, it must encrypt them according to the cryptographic requirements for key encryption, as required by FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2.*

*Vendor pre-installed SDOs includes both objects installed during manufacturing, and those provisioned by the vendor before final release to customer. The administrator and no one else owns and controls these objects.*

*The confidential-SDE List attribute of the SDO indicates those SDEs that require confidentiality. If SDEs do not require confidentiality, then its omission from this list indicates that confidentiality is not required.*

#### 6.4.10 FDP\_SDI.2 Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action

##### **FDP\_SDI.2 Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action**

**FDP\_SDI.2.1** The TSF shall monitor SDOs and SDEs controlled by the TSF for [integrity errors] on all objects, based on the following attributes: [selection: [assignment: attribute associated with presence in protected storage], cryptographic hash, digital signature, integrity-providing encryption algorithm as specified in FCS COP.1/KeyEnc [selection: SE1, SE2]].

**FDP\_SDI.2.2** Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [

- *prohibit the use of the altered data*
- *send notification of the error where applicable].*

##### *Application Note 23.*

*This SFR deals with the mechanism that protects the integrity of the SDEs and security attributes within an SDO. This provides the binding data that ensures the prevention of unauthorized changes to the SDEs and attributes.*

*The cryptographic requirements for cryptographic hashes and digital signatures apply here.*

*No specific requirement is placed here on the nature of the integrity protection data, but the Security Target shall describe this protection measure, and shall identify the iteration of FCS\_COP.1/Hash or FCS\_COP.1/HMAC that covers any cryptographic algorithm used.*

*The integrity protection data in FDP\_SDI.2.1 is included in the list of attributes identified in FMT\_MSA.1, and protects the value of the SDEs and of the SDO security attributes.*

*When an SDO is parsed, its integrity is checked when it is imported into the TOE.*

## 6.5 Identification and Authentication

When a platform process requests the ability to create, use, modify, dispose of, etc., an SDE or SDO within the DSC, as a matter of policy, the DSC may expect or request authorization from the platform process, which may include authentication of the requester on whose behalf the platform process is acting. The DSC assumes the requester to be either a person, a process, or a device. The rules on how the requester formats the request will be outside the scope of this cPP. Upon request (or as a matter of an established protocol), the interface (on behalf of the user) presents to the DSC process those authorization values required to authorize execution of the event request. This may include one or more different types of authentication credentials. The DSC validates these items before acting upon the requested event. The validation may simply compare the authorization values to an expected value, or perform a more complex cryptographic protocol to verify the authenticity of the user. After validation, the DSC may then create and subsequently use an authorization value to represent the validation of these authorization values in anticipation of future requests.

Requirements related to the strength, quality, and performance of authorization values supplied to the DSC, such as X.509 certificates and biometric templates, are all outside the scope of the DSC and are expected to be met by the platform, where applicable. The DSC is only expected to enforce quality metrics on any authorization values it generates itself.

### 6.5.1 FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1 Authorization Failure Handling

<b>FIA_AFL_EXT.1 Authorization Failure Handling</b>
-----------------------------------------------------

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall maintain [selection: a unique counter for [selection, choose one of: each SDO, the following SDOs [assignment: list of SDOs]], one global counter covering [selection, choose one of: all SDOs, the following SDOs [assignment: list of SDOs]]]], called the failed authorization attempt counters, that counts of the number of unsuccessful authorization attempts that occur related to authorizing access to these **SDOs**.

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall maintain a [selection, choose one of: static, administrator configurable variable] threshold of the minimal acceptable number of unsuccessful authorization attempts that occur related to authorizing access to these **SDOs**.

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3** When the failed authorization attempt counters [selection, choose one of: meets, surpasses] the threshold for unsuccessful authorization attempts, the TSF shall [selection, choose one of:

- prevent future authorization attempts for a static prescribed amount of time;
- prevent future authorization attempts for an administrator configurable amount of time;

- prevent all future authorization attempts indefinitely (i.e., lock), as described by FIA AFL EXT.2;
- factory reset the TOE wiping out all non-persistent SDOs, as described by FDP FRS EXT.2

] for these SDOs.

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall increment the failed authorization attempt counter before it verifies the authorization.

***Application Note 24.***

*The product validates the authorization factors prior to determining whether user (administrator or client application) access to the SDE/SDO is permitted. In cases where validation of the authorization factors fails, the product will not allow access to SDE/SDO. The product validates the authorization factors in such a way that it does not allow an attacker to circumvent the other requirements to gain knowledge about the SDE/SDO or other keying material that protects them from inadvertent exposure.*

*It is possible for the TOE to have different rules for the treatment of different SDOs or groups of SDOs. For example, some SDOs may trigger a factory reset in the event of excessive authorization failures while others may only temporarily block future authorization attempts. The ST author should iterate this SFR for each distinct response the TSF can make (as defined by the selections in FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3) and the SDOs whose authorization failures will trigger these responses.*

*If prevent all future authorization attempts indefinitely (i.e., lock), as described by FIA AFL\_EXT.2 is selected in FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3, the selection-based SFR FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2 must be claimed.*

*If factory reset the TOE wiping out all non-persistent SDOs, as described by FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 is selected in FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3, the selection-based SFR FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 must be claimed.*

**6.5.2 FIA\_SOS.2 TSF Generation of Secrets**

<b>FIA_SOS.2 TSF Generation of Secrets</b>
--------------------------------------------

**FIA\_SOS.2.1** The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate **authorization data** that meet [the following quality metrics:

- *For each authentication attempt, the probability shall be less than one in 1,000,000 that a random attempt will be successful*
- *For multiple attempts to authenticate during a one-minute period, the probability shall be less than one in 100,000 that a series of random attempts will be successful].*

**FIA\_SOS.2.2** The TSF shall be able to enforce the use of TSF generated **authorization data** for [assignment: non-empty list of TSF functions].

**Application Note 25.**

*This SFR expects the TSF must generate authorization data from a sufficiently large key space to ensure that users cannot employ random guessing as a statistically plausible method of authorizing actions within the TOE, both for a single event and over a session.*

**6.5.3 FIA\_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action**

**FIA\_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action**

**FIA\_UAU.2.1** The TSF shall require each user **and SDO owner** to be successfully authenticated before **authorizing** any ~~other~~ TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user **or SDO owner**.

**Application Note 26.**

*This SFR goes with FDP\_ACF.1, which authorizes access to SDOs (i.e. authorizes operations with or on SDOs). The security policies in FDP\_ACF.1 may require authentication of the subjects and owners of the SDOs before the TSF authorizes access to them. An authentication token is critical data bound to a user. Such data, when presented to the TOE and successfully verified by it, authenticates the user. The TOE may use the successful authentication of a user as an authorization to execute an action on its behalf, or to perform a requested operation on or with an SDO.*

*This requirement specifies the TSF exercise an authentication mechanism from FIA\_UAU.5 by which the TOE authenticates the identity of the user requesting the operation and the owner of the SDO which is an object in the operation. Such authentication is necessary to authorize it to operate with the SDOs. A user could present a unique authentication token. The TSF may accept authentication tokens with no further conditioning. The TSF validates the authentication token prior to granting the authorization to perform the requested operation with the SDO. The SDO security attribute SDO.Reauth determines whether or not the TOE may authenticate the user and the SDO owner only once or each time each time it operates with the SDO.*

*The means of validation may vary based on the type of authentication token.*

**6.5.4 FIA\_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms**

**FIA\_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms**

**FIA\_UAU.5.1** The TSF shall provide **[selection: none, authentication token mechanism, cryptographic signature mechanism, [assignment: list of authentication mechanisms]]** to support user authentication.

**FIA\_UAU.5.2** The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the **[selection: all subject users and SDO owners shall successfully authenticate themselves using one of the mechanisms listed in FIA UAU.5.1, the Prove service shall not accept "none" as an authentication method, [assignment: rules describing how each authentication mechanism provides authentication]]**.

**Application Note 27.**

*This SFR describes the authentication mechanisms required for any user of any service as a precondition for providing authorization to execute the service. This includes the authentication of the owner of the SDOs of the service.*

**6.5.5 FIA\_UAU.6 Re-Authenticating**

**FIA\_UAU.6 Re-Authenticating**

**FIA\_UAU.6.1** The TSF shall re-authenticate the user **for access to an SDO** under the conditions:  
[

1. *Re-authentication and re-authorization by further successful completion of the authentication and authorization methods in FIA\_UAU.2, in accordance with the value of the SDO.Reauth attribute of the SDO as follows:*
  - a. *If SDO.Reauth has the value 'each access';*
  - b. *if SDO.Reauth has the value 'policy' and the TSF determines that the TOE satisfies the policy for re-authentication and reauthorization*

].

**Application Note 28.**

*The allowed values for the SDO.Reauth attribute of an SDO are defined in FMT\_MSA.3 and the SDO Attributes Initialization Table. The rules in FDP\_ACF.1.2 and also ensure that the need for re-authorization has been checked before access to an SDO.*

*An SDO.Reauth value of 'none' indicates that no authentication of the subject user nor of the SDO owners is necessary. It also indicates that no reauthorization for operations using the SDO is necessary.*

*An SDO.Reauth value of policy indicates that there may be a more complicated set of circumstances that trigger a re-auth (re-authentication of the users and owners as well as re-authorization of the operation). This could be a policy of a time limit for which a user can use an SDO before re-authentication (e.g. 10 minutes or 24 hours). The ST should indicate the policies allowed, and how the TOE evaluates the policies. The ST should also indicate the location of those policies, and how the TOE protects the integrity of those policies.*

*When the TSF binds a user to access an SDO, this means that the TSF has authenticated the user and that the TSF authorized the user to have the right to exercise one or more of the following actions: generate the SDO, modify the SDO, including its security attributes, use the SDO in a TOE operation, propagate or duplicate the SDO for use by a device external to the DSC, or destroy the SDO. The user may not have exclusive rights to exercise the operations listed.*

*Policy as represented by the attributes in the SDO dictates whether or not a user must authenticate itself in order to authorize access to the SDO.*

*It is possible that the attributes of some SDOs should remain unchanged, and that the attributes of other SDOs may be changed by authorized users. If this is the case, then the ST author should iterate this SFR and indicate in the TSS which SDOs apply to each iteration.*

## 6.6 Security Management

### 6.6.1 FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior

#### FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior

**FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions in FMT\_SMF.1 to authenticated administrators.

### 6.6.2 FMT\_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes

#### FMT\_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes

**FMT\_MSA.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the [*Access Control SFP*] to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [*assignment: list of security attributes, to include attributes as specified in the Supported Methods for SDO Attributes table*] to [*the authorized identified roles as specified in the Supported Methods for SDO Attributes table*].

SDO Attribute	Modification Constraints
SDO.ID	Cannot be modified
SDO.Type	Cannot be modified
SDO.AuthData	[ <i>assignment: list of roles that are authorized to modify SDO reference authorization data</i> ]
SDO.Reauth	[ <i>assignment: list of roles that are authorized to modify re-authorization conditions</i> ]
SDO.Conf	[ <i>assignment: list of roles that are authorized to modify confidential SDE-list</i> ]
SDO.Export	[ <i>assignment: list of roles that are authorized to modify export flag</i> ]
SDO.Integrity	Cannot be modified by users (maintained automatically by TSF)
SDO.Bind	Cannot be modified by users (maintained automatically by TSF)

Table 10: Supported Methods for SDO Attributes

#### **Application Note 29.**

The SDO Attributes Modification Table defines the required constraints on security attribute modification. The Security Target completes the other parts not specified here (along with any other information for other security attributes relevant to a particular TOE).

The assignments of authorized subjects in the SDO Attributes Modification Table may be defined by the ST author in terms of roles or in terms of an action such as presentation of a valid

*authentication token of a particular type (in this case the ST author identifies in an Application Note the other SFRs that govern the action).*

*The TSF vendor may pre-install SDOs with default attributes. The Security Target should make clear which attributes the administrators may change or are prohibited from changing. It should also make clear between authorization values required to use pre-installed SDOs and authorization values required to change the attributes of pre-installed SDOs.*

*The SDO Attributes Modification Table lists SDO ID as “cannot be modified”. In some cases, a change in the attributes may cause a change in the SDO ID. In these cases, a change in the SDO ID causes the creation of a new SDO and possibly the loss of the old SDO.*

*Only authorized subjects can change the attributes of an SDO, and only as permitted in the SDO Attributes Modification Table.*

### **6.6.3 FMT\_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization**

This SFR deals with the initialization of the attributes of an SDO when it is created by parsing or provisioning. The generation process includes SDOs created by the TSF (provisioned) and those imported via FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2 (parsed).

The TSF is expected to give an SDO a set of security attributes at the time of its creation. This set is expected to include at least the following attributes:

- SDO identifier
- SDO type
- SDO reference authorization data (i.e. the data that is used when determining whether to grant access to an SDO, for each relevant mode of access, on the basis of an authorization token presented to the DSC)
- Re-authorization conditions (i.e. event after which re-authorization is required)
- Confidential-SDE list (each SDE in this list is held encrypted when the SDO is stored)
- Export Flag (indicating whether the SDO is allowed to be propagated)
- Integrity protection data
- Binding Data (created by the TOE to strongly link or associate the SDO with other entities such as the TOE itself or with other SDOs in a hierarchy such as a child to a parent).

The TSF provides the capability to protect the contents of an SDO (i.e. the set of its SDEs together with the SDO attributes) from unauthorized modification. The DSC shall check for such modifications before using the SDO or any of its SDEs.

#### **FMT\_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization**

**FMT\_MSA.3.1** The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

**FMT\_MSA.3.2** The TSF shall allow the [*authorized identified roles, according to the Supported Methods for SDO Attributes Initialization table*] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

SDO Attribute	Property	Authorized Override Role	Initialization Method	Allowed Values
SDO.ID	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[ <i>assignment: range of allowed values</i> ]
SDO.Type	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[ <i>assignment: list of allowed types</i> ]
SDO.AuthData	Permissive	[ <u>selection: admin, client application</u> ]	Import process	[ <u>selection: none, assignment: list of types of authentication tokens allowed</u> ], [ <u>assignment: range of authorization values allowed</u> ]
	Restrictive	None	Generation process	
SDO.Reauth	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[ <u>selection: none, each access, policy</u> ]
SDO.Conf	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[ <i>assignment: list of SDEs of which the TOE must provide a confidentiality service</i> ]
SDO.Export	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[ <u>selection: exportable, non-exportable</u> ]
SDO.Integrity	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[ <i>assignment: range of allowed values</i> ]
SDO.Bind	Restrictive	None*	Import and generation process	[ <i>assignment: range of allowed values</i> ]

*Table 11: Supported Methods for SDO Attributes Initialization*

**Application Note 30.**

*Both admin and client application roles can initiate the import process. The imported object contains the default values for each attribute, where allowed. The TSF can override default values for the following attributes of imported objects: SDO.ID, SDO.Type, SDO.Reauth, SDO.Export, and SDO.Integrity. The TSF may override default values in these cases to force the objects to comport to established structures within the TOE, or to comply with TOE-wide security policies. In these cases, the defined roles (i.e. admin and client application) cannot override the default values. For SDO.AuthData, the TSF shall allow user roles (i.e. admin and client applications) to*

override authorization data that may arrive with the object. For *SDO.Conf* the TSF accepts the imported value for this attribute. *SDO.Bind* is explained below.

Unless otherwise noted, both admin and client application roles can initiate the generation process. The admin and client application will provide the default values for the attributes. This SFR assumes the TSF checks *SDO.Type*, *SDO.AuthData*, *SDO.Reauth*, *SDO.Conf*, and *SDO.Export* for compliance with established security policies and refuses to create objects which do not comply and thus will not override the value of any of these attributes. In the cases of the *SDO.ID* and *SDO.Integrity*, the TSF generates these values and therefore there is no need to override.

In the case of *SDO.Bind* for both import and generation processes, the TSF may override values that denote a binding to the TOE, but it should not override values that denote a binding to other keys. In the case of the import process, the defined roles cannot override the default values for any binding.

The *SDO Attributes Initialization Table* is referenced from *FMT\_MSA.3* and matches the attributes covered by *FMT\_MSA.1* (which defines controls on the modification of the attributes). The initialization of these security attributes occurs when an SDO is either parsed by the TOE or generated on the TOE. The required constraints on security attribute initialization specified in this PP are shown in Table 11; the Security Target completes the selection and assignments in the SFR and adds to the table any other information for other security attributes relevant to a particular TOE.

The *SDO.AuthData* attribute is data that is required in order to validate authorization of a subject to access the SDO (in each of the modes relevant to that SDO). The nature of this data will depend on the authorization mechanism used in the TOE, as described in *FIA\_UAU.2*.

The *SDO.Reauth* attribute for an individual SDO takes one of the values defined in the selection in the Allowed Values column of Table 11. Examples of TOE-specified events might be explicit revocation of authorization by a user, expiry of a time interval, or completion of a fixed number of uses since the last authorization. The re-authorization conditions are used in *FIA\_UAU.6* and *FDP\_ACF.1*. These determine whether a single authorization by the SDO owner will allow any number of uses of the SDO until the end of the user's session (value 'none'), or whether each use of the SDO must be individually authorized (value 'each access'), or whether re-authorization must happen each time one of the TOE-specified events occurs.

The *SDO.Conf* attribute indicates which SDEs, if any, the TOE should encrypt when not in operational use. The TOE should use the methods in *FCS\_COP.1/SKC*, *FCS\_STG\_EXT.1*, or *FCS\_STG\_EXT.2* to protect the SDEs in this list.

The *SDO.Export* attribute takes one of the values 'exportable' or 'non-exportable'.

The *SDO.Integrity* attribute includes evidence that the TSF can use to protect and verify the integrity of the SDO.

Attributes assigned by the TOE to any parsed SDOs must be described in the Security Target and in operational user guidance.

The TOE uses the Binding Data for an SDO to strongly link the SDO to the TOE, a parent SDO in a hierarchy, or to nothing at all. SDOs bound to nothing may freely travel from one TOE to another

*without restrictions. If bound to another SDO as a child to a parent in a hierarchy, it may travel only where the parent SDO travels. If bound to the TOE, it may travel to any other TOE for any reason, even if the TOE moves its parent to another TOE. Note that vendors will initialize attributes of pre-installed SDOs with default values. However, authorization values to change the attributes of pre-installed SDOs may differ from the authorization value required to use the pre-installed SDO.*

*The vendor should document the implicit attributes for pre-installed SDOs and SDOs stored in special locations.*

*In cases in which the SDO ID is a cryptographic hash of the attributes and SDEs, that value represents both the ID and projects the integrity of the SDO, including the SDEs. As the TOE unwraps an incoming SDO, it may automatically check the integrity. For pre-installed SDOs in protected storage, the hardware plus the TSF projects the integrity of them.*

*When a remote peer sends an SDO to the TOE, it properly indicates through the SDE-confidentiality list of any authorization values and authentication tokens present in the SDO, whether they are present in the SDE or as attributes, which control access to the SDE.*

*When a TOE generates an SDO internally for the first time, it properly indicates through the SDE-confidentiality list any SDEs that are authorization values or authentication tokens. Similarly, if any of the attributes are authorization values or authentication tokens, the TOE will properly indicate through the SDE-confidentiality list that it will encrypt them prior to storing them.*

*The TOE may contain pre-installed SDOs or SDOs either provisioned the first time the user turns on the TOE or provisioned as the result of a “factory reset” event. TSFs may refer to such persistent SDOs as root keys or trusted anchors. Pre-installed SDOs may reside in immutable hardware and persist across factory resets. Other persistent SDOs may persist until a user issues a “factory reset” which either cryptographically erases the SDOs or overwrites them by provisioning new ones. These SDOs may not contain a confidential SDE list since either these persistent values serve as a root encryption key for a hierarchy of SDOs, or they serve as a KDF seed for generating root encryption keys for a hierarchy of SDOs.*

*It is possible that the default attributes of some SDOs should be restrictive, and that the default attributes of other SDOs may be permissive. If this is the case, then the ST author should iterate this SFR and indicate in the TSS what the default attribute properties are for each SDO.*

#### **6.6.4 FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions**

<b>FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions</b>
--------------------------------------------------------

**FMT\_SMF.1.1** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [

- *Set authorization failure parameters for FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1*
- *Reset TOE to factory state for FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1*
- *Configure authorization policies for TOE resources*

*[selection:*

- *update TOE firmware and pre-installed SDOs,*

- o unlock access to SDO following excessive failed authorization attempts,
- o no other functions].

**Application Note 31.**

If *FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1* selects mutable firmware, then *FMT\_SMF.1* must select Update TOE firmware and pre-installed SDOs.

Recall that resetting a TOE to factory state also wipes all user data, but may not wipe out pre-installed SDOs. Configuring authorization policies includes setting policies for allowed access to SDOs.

Protections for pre-installed SDEs/SDOs come through the firmware, and by extension, through firmware updates. In the same vein, the authorized updates may also affect the SDEs as well, if the vendor so chooses. One could say that the authorized update binds the attributes present in the functionality of the firmware to the pre-installed SDEs.

**6.6.5 FMT\_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles**

<b>FMT_SMR.2</b>	<b>Restrictions on Security Roles</b>
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**FMT\_SMR.2.1** The TSF shall maintain the roles: [*administrator, client application*].

**FMT\_SMR.2.2** The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

**FMT\_SMR.2.3** The TSF shall ensure that the conditions [

- *Only client applications can access their own encrypted data,*
- *Only administrators can perform privileged functions*]

are satisfied.

**Application Note 32.**

This cPP uses the term “user” throughout to reference both the administrator and client application roles simultaneously.

**6.7 Protection of the TSF**

**6.7.1 FPT\_FLS.1/FI Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Fault Injection)**

<b>FPT_FLS.1/FI</b>	<b>Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Fault Injection)</b>
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**FPT\_FLS.1.1/FI** The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [*fault injections*].

**Application Note 33.**

Note that a secure state does not imply the uninterrupted enforcement of all claimed security functionality it is appropriate for the TSF to “fail closed” and block the execution of security-relevant behavior if a fault injection attempt or other significant glitch occurs.

### 6.7.2 FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1 Debug Modes

<b>FPT_MOD_EXT.1 Debug Modes</b>
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**FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide no access to debug modes.

**Application Note 34.**

*'Debug modes' may include, but are not limited to, any alternate mode of operation, such as developer mode, test mode, manufacturer mode, or altered boot mode.*

### 6.7.3 FPT\_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack

<b>FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack</b>
------------------------------------------------

**FPT\_PHP.3.1** The TSF shall resist [*data extraction via fault injection, extreme temperatures, abnormal voltage*] to the [*TSF storage elements that contain [selection: SDEs, SDOs, firmware]*] by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

**Application Note 35.**

*Physical protection mechanisms as envisioned by this requirement are mechanisms that protect communications to the extent that encryption or other logical protections are not required to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and assured identification of endpoints. Such mechanisms may include, for example, physically isolated traces, or mechanisms that take advantage of physical properties of signals to ensure that communications are receivable only by the intended endpoint.*

*Any physical external casing or potting material of the TOE is considered an 'external interface', not just those interfaces over which data is transmitted. This ensures that the TSF will respond appropriately if, for example, an attacker penetrates the physical surface of the DSC in an attempt to access its stored data.*

*The TOE's protection against abnormal temperature and voltage can be considered equivalent to what is required by assertion AS07.77 of [ISO-TR].*

### 6.7.4 FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1 Root of Trust

<b>FPT_PRO_EXT.1 Root of Trust</b>
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**FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall contain an SDO that contains the identity of the Root of Trust.

**Application Note 36.**

*Every DSC is expected to have a single RoT that comprises the DSC hardware and pre-installed SDOs, from which services (e.g. Storage, Authorization, etc.) can be offered.*

*Depending on the use case and the way status registers are used, unique identity keys may be bound to the TOE, the TOE platform, or both.*

*The sole presence of unique identity keys linking to the RoT does not prove authenticity without the use of digital signatures.*

**FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall maintain Root of Trust data as [selection: immutable, mutable if and only if its mutability is controlled by a unique identifiable owner].

**Application Note 37.**

*One expects that only authorized sources can modify the single RoT, such as through a secure update. A pre-installed SDO may contain the identity of the manufacturer of the RoT.*

*The process of authenticating the source of a secure update may involve querying the identity of the manufacturer, contained on a pre-installed SDO. If this identity is in the form of an X.509 certificate containing a signature verification key signed by the manufacturer, then the authentication process is sufficient.*

*A unique identifiable owner is assumed to be one with an administrative role; however, there may be circumstances where the owner does not take on an administrative role, which should be documented.*

### 6.7.5 FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1 Root of Trust Services

<b>FPT_ROT_EXT.1</b>	<b>Root of Trust Services</b>
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**FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide a Root of Trust for Storage, a Root of Trust for Authorization, and [selection: Root of Trust for Measurement, Root of Trust for Reporting, no others].

**Application Note 38.**

*This document uses the [GP\_ROT] definitions for RoT for Storage (denoted as the combination of RoT for Confidentiality and RoT for Integrity), Authorization, Measurement, and Reporting. DSCs use Roots of Trust for Storage to protect SDOs. Section 6.5 has a number of requirements for ensuring the TSF has functionality to authorize a user in order to access an SDO, including FIA\_UAU.6.*

*If both Root of Trust for Measurement and Root of Trust for Reporting are selected in FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1.1, the selection-based SFR FDP\_DAU.1/Prove must also be claimed.*

### 6.7.6 FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2 Root of Trust for Storage

<b>FPT_ROT_EXT.2</b>	<b>Root of Trust for Storage</b>
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**FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall prevent unauthorized access to SDOs associated with the Root of Trust for Storage.

**Application Note 39.**

*TOEs may use shielded locations or cryptographic protections to prevent unauthorized access to SDOs. Use FDP\_SDI.2 to protect the integrity of SDOs stored in the RoT for Storage.*

### 6.7.7 FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1 Replay Prevention

#### FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1 Replay Prevention

**FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall have a mechanism for preventing replay of user authorization of operations on SDOs using the following methods [selection: monotonic counters, random nonces, [assignment: other methods as specified]].

**FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall detect replay for the following actions: [*authorization of operations on SDOs*].

**FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall deny the requested operation on the SDO when it detects a replay.

#### *Application Note 40.*

*The TSF receives authorization from an external source to the DSC to perform an operation on an SDO. If the operation on the SDO is restricted to authorized users, then anyone observing the communication to the DSC can copy the authorization and replay it. Random nonces and monotonic counters are but two mechanisms the TSF can use to mitigate replay. In this requirement, operations on SDOs include generating, using, modifying, propagating, and destroying. Besides monotonic counters and random nonces, the TSF could employ other methods to prevent replay of user authorizations, which the Security Target should describe.*

*This requirement does not specify how TSF detects replays.*

### 6.7.8 FPT\_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps

#### FPT\_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps

**FPT\_STM.1.1** The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

#### *Application Note 41.*

*It is acceptable for the TSF to provide timestamp data either through an internal clock or a counter. It is also permissible for the TSF to obtain time data from a clock contained within the same physical enclosure as the TOE.*

### 6.7.9 FPT\_TST.1 TSF Testing

#### FPT\_TST.1 TSF Testing

**FPT\_TST.1.1** The TSF shall run a suite of self tests **during power-on start-up**, [selection: periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, at no other condition], at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur] to demonstrate the correct operation of [the TSF].

**FPT\_TST.1.2** The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of [TSF data].

**FPT\_TST.1.3** The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of **the** [TSF].

**Application Note 42.**

*This requirement intends to cover integrity of the TSF functionality (i.e. runtime checks).*

*TSF integrity testing provides the ability to test the TSF's correct operation. These tests are expected to be performed automatically and autonomously at start-up but may also be performed periodically during operation, at the request of the authorized user, or when other conditions are met. It also provides the ability to verify the integrity of TSF data and executable code.*

*All cryptographic functions come with known answer tests (KATs). In addition to verifying the integrity of the firmware executing the TSF, the DSC should also verify the integrity of any data associated with the TSF (such as constants for cryptographic algorithms) as well as performing the KATs.*

**6.8 Resource Utilization**

**6.8.1 FRU\_FLT.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance**

**FRU\_FLT.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance**

**FRU\_FLT.1.1** The TSF shall ensure the operation of [*protection of TSF data*] when the following failures occur: [*fault injection*].

**Application Note 43.**

*TSF data may be protected in response to a fault injection either by providing a method to ensure that the data remains protected or by logically destroying the data or any part of a key change that encrypts it. This behavior may differ based on the type of fault.*

**6.9 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale**

The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE, showing that the SFRs are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives:

Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
O.AUTH_FAILURES	FIA_AFL_EXT.1	This requirement enforces authentication failure handling capabilities to ensure that brute force attacks on the TSF are not possible.
	FIA_SOS.2	This requirement protects against brute force authentication by generating secrets that are statistically impossible to guess.
	FPT_STM.1	This requirement provides reliable system time services that may be used to determine when excessive authentication failure attempts have been made.

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Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
	FIA_AFL_EXT.2 (selection-based)	This requirement defines how access to an SDO is restored if excessive authentication failures trigger a lock on it.
O.AUTHORIZATION	FCS_STG_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that key data is placed into protected storage and cannot be modified by untrusted subjects.
	FDP_ACC.1	This requirement defines an access control policy that governs the authorization required to interact with SDOs.
	FDP_ACF.1	This requirement defines the rules enforced by the access control policy defined in FDP_ACC.1 to control access to SDOs.
	FDP_ETC_EXT.2	This requirement ensures that protected data propagated outside the TOE is not disclosed to any unauthorized subjects.
	FIA_UAU.2	This requirement defines the methods by which users authenticate to the TOE to prove their identity prior to interacting with any protected data.
	FIA_UAU.5	This requirement provides the TSF with the ability to specify the use of multiple authentication mechanisms as a prerequisite to granting access to protected functions or data.
	FIA_UAU.6	This requirement defines when authorization checks are performed for user requests to access SDOs.
	FMT_MOF_EXT.1	This requirement enforces access control on the management functions provided by the TOE.
	FMT_MSA.1	This requirement enforces restrictions on the subjects that can interact with SDOs and their attributes.
FMT_MSA.3	This requirement defines the default access restrictions that are enforced on SDO attributes if not overridden by specific access control policy rules.	

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Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
	FMT_SMF.1	This requirement defines the management functions that are provided by the TOE to authorized subjects.
	FMT_SMR.2	This requirement defines the roles used by the TSF for enforcement of access control to protected functions and data.
	FPT_FLS.1/FI	This requirement ensures that fault injections cannot be used to circumvent access control policy restrictions preventing a user from accessing protected functions or data.
	FPT_MOD_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that there are no accessible debug modes that could be used to circumvent access control policy restrictions preventing a user from accessing protected functions or data.
	FPT_PHP.3	This requirement ensures that some mechanism is in place to thwart unauthorized attempts to access protected functions or data through physical tampering of the TOE.
	FPT_PRO_EXT.1	This requirement defines the RoT for the TOE, which is used to derive all access control functionality.
	FPT_ROT_EXT.2	This requirement enforces the RoT for Storage to enforce access control against SDOs.
	FRU_FLT.1	This requirement ensures that fault injection attempts do not interfere with the enforcement of access control against protected data.
	FIA_AFL_EXT.2 (selection-based)	This requirement defines the access control that is enforced on an SDO if excessive authentication failures block access to it.
O.DATA_PROTECTION	FCS_COP.1/Hash	This requirement provides a cryptographic operation for asserting the integrity of SDOs.
	FCS_COP.1/HMAC	This requirement provides a cryptographic operation for asserting the authenticity of SDOs.

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Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
	FCS_COP.1/SigGen	This requirement provides a cryptographic operation for preserving the authenticity of SDOs.
	FCS_COP.1/SigVer	This requirement provides a cryptographic operation for asserting the authenticity of SDOs.
	FCS_COP.1/SKC	This requirement provides a cryptographic operation for maintaining the confidentiality of SDOs.
	FCS_STG_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that key data is placed into protected storage and cannot be modified by untrusted subjects.
	FCS_STG_EXT.2	This requirement ensures that confidentiality of key storage is maintained using strong cryptography.
	FCS_STG_EXT.3	This requirement ensures that integrity of key storage is maintained using strong cryptography.
	FDP_ETC_EXT.2	This requirement ensures that the confidentiality of protected data propagated outside the TOE is maintained.
	FDP_ITC_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that all SDEs parsed by the TOE have verifiable integrity.
	FDP_ITC_EXT.2	This requirement ensures that all SDOs parsed by the TOE have verifiable integrity.
	FDP_SDC_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that SDEs/SDOs are stored with confidentiality and that all authorization data is protected prior to storage.
	FDP_SDI.2	This requirement ensures that SDEs/SDOs are monitored for integrity violations.
	FPT_ROT_EXT.1	This requirement defines the RoT services that are available for the protection of data.

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Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
	FPT_RPL_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that access control restrictions cannot be bypassed through replay of operations.
	FPT_ITT.1 (optional)	This requirement ensures that confidentiality and integrity is maintained in cases where data is transmitted between physically separate parts of a distributed TOE.
	FPT_PRO_EXT.2 (optional)	This requirement ensures that the TSF can produce attestation of the integrity of its stored data.
	FPT_ROT_EXT.3 (optional)	This requirement allows the TSF to provide a RoT for Reporting that can provide assured information about the stored SDEs.
	FDP_DAU.1/Prove (selection-based)	This requirement defines the Prove service that can be used to invoke the Roots of Trust for Measurement and Reporting and provide affirmation of the validity of stored data.
O.FW_INTEGRITY	FDP_MFW_EXT.1	This requirement specifies whether the TOE's firmware is mutable or immutable, to determine the extent to which this is objective must be satisfied by other SFRs.
	FPT_ROT_EXT.1	This requirement defines the RoT services that are available in the TOE, which can include Roots of Trust for measurement and reporting.
	FPT_TST.1	This requirement defines the mechanisms used to verify and attest to the integrity of the TSF.
	FDP_DAU.1/Prove (selection-based)	This requirement defines the Prove service that can be used to invoke the Roots of Trust for Measurement and Reporting and provide affirmation of the validity of the TSF.
	FDP_MFW_EXT.2 (selection-based)	This requirement ensures that the TSF can generate evidence that its mutable firmware integrity remains intact.
	FDP_MFW_EXT.3 (selection-based)	This requirement ensures that any firmware updates to the TSF are genuine.

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Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
	FPT_FLS.1/FW (selection-based)	This requirement requires the TSF to take action to preserve its secure operation if any violations to its firmware integrity are detected.
O.PARSE_PROTECTION	FDP_ITC_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that all SDEs parsed by the TOE are transmitted over a secure channel.
	FDP_ITC_EXT.2	This requirement ensures that all SDOs parsed by the TOE are transmitted over a secure channel.
	FDP_SDC_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that the confidentiality of authorization data is protected prior to storage.
	FTP_ITC_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This requirement defines a cryptographically protected channel that the TSF can use to securely parse data being imported into it.
	FTP_ITE_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This requirement defines the cryptographic method used to transfer data between the TOE and external entities.
	FTP_ITP_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This requirement defines a physically protected channel that the TSF can use to securely parse data being imported into it.
O.PURGE_PROTECTION	FCS_CKM.4	This requirement ensures that key data is destroyed in a manner that prevents its future recovery.
	FCS_CKM_EXT.4	This requirement ensures that key data is not retained for any longer than necessary for its intended usage.
	FDP_FRS_EXT.1	This requirement defines the condition in which a factory reset will be initiated, which triggers a purge of stored SDEs.
	FDP_RIP.1	This requirement ensures that any purged SDEs/SDOs are erased in residual memory so that their future recovery is prevented.
	FDP_FRS_EXT.2 (selection-based)	This requirement ensures that all user-specific SDOs are purged upon factory reset and may

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Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
		indicate any factory default SDOs that are reset to their initial values.
O.SECURE_UPDATE	FDP_MFW_EXT.1	This requirement specifies whether the TOE's firmware is mutable or immutable.
	FPT_FLS.1/FW (selection-based)	This requirement requires the TSF to take action to preserve its secure operation if a rollback attempt or invalid firmware update is detected.
	FPT_RPL.1/Rollback (selection-based)	This requirement ensures that the TSF will not permit rollback attempts of its firmware.
O.STRONG_BINDING	FDP_ITC_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that all SDEs parsed by the TOE include appropriate binding metadata.
O.STRONG_CRYPTO	FCS_CKM.1	This requirement specifies the supported methods of key generation.
	FCS_CKM.1/KEK	This requirement ensures the generation of strong key encryption keys.
	FCS_CKM.2	This requirement ensures the use of strong key establishment mechanisms.
	FCS_COP.1/Hash	This requirement ensures the use of strong hash mechanisms.
	FCS_COP.1/HMAC	This requirement ensures the use of string HMAC mechanisms.
	FCS_COP.1/KAT	This requirement ensures the use of strong methods to perform key agreement and key transport.
	FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc	This requirement ensures the use of strong methods to perform key encryption.
	FCS_COP.1/SigGen	This requirement ensures the use of strong digital signature services.
FCS_COP.1/SigVer	This requirement ensures the use of strong digital signature services.	

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Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
	FCS_COP.1/SKC	This requirement ensures the use of strong methods to encrypt sensitive data.
	FCS_RBG_EXT.1	This requirement ensures the use of strong random bit generation mechanisms.
	FCS_SLT_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that salts and nonces used by the TOE do not negatively impact key strength.
	FCS_STG_EXT.2	This requirement ensures that confidentiality of key storage is maintained using strong cryptography.
	FCS_STG_EXT.3	This requirement ensures that integrity of key storage is maintained using strong cryptography.
	FPT_STM.1	This requirement provides reliable system time services that may be used as inputs to cryptographic functions.
	FCS_ENT_EXT.1 (optional)	This requirement provides an interface to access entropy data so that the TSF can support the use of strong cryptography in its operational environment.
	FCS_RBG_EXT.2 (optional)	This requirement provides an external interface to seed the random bit generator that enforces strong cryptography by requiring a minimum amount of input.
	FCS_CKM.1/AK (selection-based)	This requirement ensures the generation of strong asymmetric keys.
	FCS_CKM.1/SK (selection-based)	This requirement ensures the generation of strong symmetric keys.
	FCS_CKM_EXT.5 (selection-based)	This requirement ensures the use of strong mechanism to perform key derivation.
	FCS_COP.1/PBKDF (selection-based)	This requirement ensures the use of strong methods to derive keys from password data.

Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
	FTP_CCMP_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This requirement defines the implementation of CCMP (IEEE 802.11i) using strong cryptography.
	FTP_GCMP_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This requirement defines the implementation of GCMP (IEEE 802.11ad) using strong cryptography.
	FTP_ITE_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This requirement defines the cryptographic method used to transfer data between the TOE and external entities.

*Table 12: SFR-Objective Rationale*

## 7 Security Assurance Requirements

This cPP identifies the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) to frame the extent to which the evaluator assesses the documentation applicable for the evaluation and performs independent testing.

This section lists the set of SARs from CC part 3 that are required in evaluations against this cPP. Individual Evaluation Activities to be performed are specified in [SD].

The general model for evaluation of TOEs against STs written to conform to this cPP is as follows:

After the ST has been approved for evaluation, the ITSEF will obtain the TOE, supporting environmental IT (if required), and the administrative/user guides for the TOE. The ITSEF is expected to perform actions mandated by the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for the ASE and ALC SARs. The ITSEF also performs the Evaluation Activities contained within the SD, which are intended to be an interpretation of the other CEM assurance requirements as they apply to the specific technology instantiated in the TOE. The Evaluation Activities that are captured in the SD also provide clarification as to what the developer needs to provide to demonstrate the TOE is compliant with the cPP.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Security Target (ASE)	Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL.1)
	Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD.1)
	ST Introduction (ASE_INT.1)
	Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ.2)
	Derived Security Requirements (ASE_REQ.2)
	Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
	TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV)	Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance Documents (AGD)	Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
	Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life cycle Support (ALC)	Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
	TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Tests (ATE)	Independent Testing – Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)	Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)

*Table 13: Security Assurance Requirements*

## 7.1 ASE: Security Target

The ST is evaluated as per ASE activities defined in the CEM. In addition, there may be Evaluation Activities specified within the SD that call for necessary descriptions to be included in the TSS that are specific to the TOE technology type.

In addition to using the ST to demonstrate that ASE\_TSS.1 has been satisfied, this cPP requires the creation of supplemental documentation to justify how the TOE satisfies certain SFRs. This documentation is separated from the ST because the required level of detail may include information that is proprietary to the developer of the TOE. The required supplemental documentation includes entropy documentation and key management documentation. The requirements for the entropy documentation are described in Appendix D of this cPP. The requirements for the key management documentation are described in the SD under the SFRs that require a detailed description of the TSF’s key management.

## 7.2 ADV: Development

The design information about the TOE is contained in the guidance documentation available to the end user as well as the TSS portion of the ST, and any additional information required by this cPP that is not to be made public (e.g., Entropy Essay). The DSC cPP requires only basic functional specification of interfaces presented in the AGD documentation (see 6.2.1) and specification of interfaces that can be invoked by a dependent component in a composed evaluation where the DSC is the base component.

### 7.2.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV\_FSP.1)

The functional specification describes the TOE Security Functions Interfaces (TSFIs). It is not necessary to have a formal or complete specification of these interfaces. For this cPP, the Evaluation Activities for this family focus on understanding the interfaces presented in the TSS in response to the functional requirements and the interfaces presented in the AGD documentation.

The Evaluation Activities in the SD are associated with the applicable SFRs; since these are directly associated with the SFRs, the tracing in element ADV\_FSP.1.2D is implicitly already done and no additional documentation is necessary.

### 7.2.2 Specification of DSC Interface for Use in Composite Evaluations

For the DSC to serve as a base component in a composed evaluation, all DSC interfaces that may be invoked by a dependent component to satisfy dependent component SFRs must be documented.

A DSC that complies with this cPP must make services available to a dependent component through interfaces. The DSC ST author must describe these interfaces in order for a dependent component evaluation to properly map the DSC-provided services to SFRs within the dependent component PP, and to ensure that dependent component implementations properly use the service interfaces.

The Evaluation Activities in the SD require specifying each such interface exported.

### **7.3 AGD: Guidance Documentation**

The guidance documents will be provided with the ST. Guidance must include a description of how the IT personnel verifies that the Operational Environment can fulfill its role for the security functionality. The documentation should be in an informal style and readable by the IT personnel.

Guidance must be provided for every operational environment that the product supports as claimed in the ST. This guidance includes:

- instructions to successfully install the TSF in that environment; and
- instructions to manage the security of the TSF as a product and as a component of the larger operational environment; and
- Instructions to provide a protected administrative capability.

Guidance pertaining to particular security functionality must also be provided; requirements on such guidance are contained in the Evaluation Activities specified in the SD.

#### **7.3.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD\_OPE.1)**

The operational user guidance does not have to be contained in a single document. Guidance to users, administrators and application developers can be spread among documents or web pages.

The developer should review the Evaluation Activities contained in the SD to ascertain the specifics of the guidance that the evaluator will be checking for. This will provide the necessary information for the preparation of acceptable guidance.

#### **7.3.2 Preparative Procedures (AGD\_PRE.1)**

As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the Evaluation Activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures.

### **7.4 Class ALC: Life-cycle Support**

At the assurance level provided for TOEs conformant to this cPP, life-cycle support is limited to end-user-visible aspects of the life cycle, rather than an examination of the TOE vendor's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it is a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation at this assurance level.

#### **7.4.1 Labelling of the TOE (ALC\_CMC.1)**

This component is targeted at identifying the TOE such that it can be distinguished from other products or versions from the same vendor and can be easily specified when being procured by an end user. The evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with ALC\_CMC.1

#### **7.4.2 TOE CM Coverage (ALC\_CMS.1)**

Given the scope of the TOE and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, the evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with ALC\_CMS.1.

### **7.5 Class ATE: Tests**

Testing is specified for functional aspects of the system as well as aspects that take advantage of design or implementation weaknesses. The former is done through the ATE\_IND family, while the latter is through the AVA\_VAN family. For this cPP, testing is based on advertised functionality and interfaces with dependency on the availability of design information. One of the primary outputs of the evaluation process is the test report as specified in the following requirement.

#### **7.5.1 Independent Testing – Conformance (ATE\_IND.1)**

Testing is performed to confirm the functionality described in the TSS as well as the operational guidance (includes “evaluated configuration” instructions). The focus of the testing is to confirm that the requirements specified in Section 5 are being met. The Evaluation Activities in the SD identify the specific testing activities necessary to verify compliance with the SFRs. The evaluator produces a test report documenting the plan for and results of testing, as well as coverage arguments focused on the platform/TOE combinations that are claiming conformance to this cPP.

### **7.6 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment**

For the current generation of this cPP, the iTC is expected to survey open sources to discover what vulnerabilities have been discovered in these types of products and provide that content into the AVA\_VAN discussion. In most cases, these vulnerabilities will require sophistication beyond that of a basic attacker. This information will be used in the development of future Protection Profiles.

#### **7.6.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA\_VAN.1)**

As with ATE\_IND, the evaluator shall generate a report to document their findings with respect to this requirement. This report could physically be part of the overall test report mentioned in ATE\_IND, or a separate document. The evaluator performs a search of public information to determine the vulnerabilities that have been found in network infrastructure platforms and the implemented communication protocols in general, as well as those that pertain to the particular TOE. The evaluator documents the sources consulted and the vulnerabilities found in the report. For each vulnerability found, the evaluator either provides a rationale with respect to its non-applicability, or the evaluator formulates a test (using the guidelines provided in ATE\_IND) to confirm the vulnerability, if suitable. Suitability is determined by assessing the attack vector needed to take advantage of the vulnerability. If exploiting the vulnerability requires expert skills

and an electron microscope, for instance, then a test would not be suitable and an appropriate justification would be formulated.

## Appendix A: Optional Requirements

### A.1 Cryptographic Support

#### A.1.1 FCS\_ENT\_EXT.1 Entropy for External IT Entities

<b>FCS_ENT_EXT.1 Entropy for External IT Entities</b>
-------------------------------------------------------

**FCS\_ENT\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide an interface to make entropy that meets FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 available to external IT entities.

#### A.1.2 FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2 External Seeding for Random Bit Generation

<b>FCS_RBG_EXT.2 External Seeding for Random Bit Generation</b>
-----------------------------------------------------------------

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall provide an interface to allow external seeding of the DRBG with a bit-string of at least the minimum number of bits selected in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2 before the DRBG produces any output.

### A.2 Protection of the TSF

#### A.2.1 FPT\_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection

<b>FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection</b>
--------------------------------------------------------------

**FPT\_ITT.1.1** The TSF shall protect TSF data from [disclosure] and [selection: modification, no other actions] when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.

#### A.2.2 FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2 Data Integrity Measurements

<b>FPT_PRO_EXT.2 Data Integrity Measurements</b>
--------------------------------------------------

**FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall be able to quantify the integrity of the data protected by the TOE by generating integrity measurements and assertions making them available to authorized entities.

#### *Application Note 44.*

*The generation of these integrity measurements and assertions is the creation of OB.Pstate.*

*Data protected by the TOE includes DSC firmware, DSC configuration data, and user data. DSC configuration data may include persistent SDEs or SDOs such as immutable or mutable root keys, authorization values, and authentication tokens (i.e. DSC.ID, OB.P\_SDO, OB.FAACntr, OB.AntiReplay, and OB.Context). User data may include transient SDEs and SDOs as well as authorization values and authentication tokens bound to these SDEs and SDOs (i.e. OB.T\_SDO). Integrity reporting is the process of attesting to integrity measurements (including those recorded in status registers in a DSC).*

**FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2.2** The TSF shall accumulate platform characteristics using a consistent [assignment: description of process for accumulating platform characteristics] process in which verified quantifiable measurements are accumulated to prove the integrity of its SDOs.

**Application Note 45.**

*Although a platform may enter any state possible—including undesirable or insecure states—it can use platform characteristics, including integrity measurements and assertions, along with logging and reporting to accurately report the state derived from data attributing to those states. In this context, platform characteristics can include, but is not limited to, cryptographic hashes of binary data, security-critical configurations, register values (including status registers) and milestones, such as verification of firmware, or transitioning from a boot phase to an operational phase. A platform characteristic may also represent the state of some entity outside the DSC. A process independent from the DSC or the host containing the DSC may evaluate the platform characteristics and determine an appropriate action.*

**A.2.3 FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3 Root of Trust for Reporting Mechanisms**

<b>FPT_ROT_EXT.3</b>	<b>Root of Trust for Reporting Mechanisms</b>
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**FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3.1** The TSF shall be able to attest to a state as represented by platform characteristics with a Root of Trust for Reporting mechanism that uses for its identity [selection: a cryptographically verifiable identity in FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1, an alias key bound to the cryptographically verifiable identity in FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1] and using a signature algorithm as specified in FCS\_COP.1/SigGen.

**Application Note 46.**

*While it is possible for a group of components to share a single unique group identifier, it is important to ensure that individual components have their own unique identifiers relative to each other.*

*Resident keys or aliases are designed such that they are never visible outside the subset of DSC scope containing the RoT services and are only to be used for encryption. Therefore, possession of such aliases or keys can only be proved indirectly by using it to decrypt a value that has been encrypted with a corresponding public key. In this way, these resident keys or aliases can provide for authentication based on decryption operations instead of producing a digital signature.*

*If non-specialized cryptographic keys used for algorithms in FCS\_COP is selected, it is expected that when used in the context of the RoT for Reporting, these keys are not visible to full DSC scope as described above. While it is possible for a group of components to share a single unique group identifier, it is important to ensure that individual components have their own unique identifiers relative to each other.*

*The DSC will not expose the private portions of resident keys or aliases outside the subset of DSC scope containing the RoT services. Therefore, possession of such aliases or keys can only be proved indirectly by using it to decrypt a value that has been encrypted with a corresponding public key. In this way, these resident keys or aliases can provide for authentication based on decryption operations instead of producing a digital signature.*

*The DSC responds to requests from an external entity to attest to the provenance and integrity of platform characteristics contained within the DSC.*

*Integrity reporting is the process of attesting to platform characteristics (including those recorded in status registers in a DSC). The philosophy behind integrity measurement, logging, and reporting*

*is that a platform may enter any state possible—including undesirable or insecure states—but can still accurately report measurements derived from data attributing to those states. In this context, data can include, but is not limited to, code, security-critical configurations, values of registers, including status registers. An independent process may evaluate the integrity states and determine an appropriate response.*

## Appendix B: Selection-Based Requirements

As indicated in the introduction to this cPP, the baseline requirements (those that must be performed by the TOE or its underlying platform) are contained in the body of this cPP. There are additional requirements based on selections in the body of the cPP: if certain selections are made, then additional requirements below will need to be included.

### B.1 Cryptographic Support

#### B.1.1 FCS\_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Key Generation (Asymmetric Keys)

<b>FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Key Generation (Asymmetric Keys)</b>
--------------------------------------------------------------------

**FCS\_CKM.1.1/AK** The TSF shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys [**selection: identifier from Supported Methods for Asymmetric Key Generation table**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [*key sizes as chosen from Supported Methods for Asymmetric Key Generation table for corresponding key types*] that meet the following: [*standards as chosen from Supported Methods for Asymmetric Key Generation table for corresponding key types*].

Identifier	Key Type	Key Sizes	List of Standards
AK1	RSA	[ <u>selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit</u> ]	FIPS PUB 186-4 (Section B.3)
AK2	ECC-N	[ <u>selection: 256 (P-256), 384 (P-384), 521 (P-521)</u> ]	FIPS PUB 186-4 (Section B.4 & D.1.2)
AK3	ECC-B	[ <u>selection: 256 (brainpoolP256r1), 384 (brainpoolP384r1), 512 (brainpoolP512r1)</u> ]	RFC5639 (Section 3) (Brainpool Curves)
AK4	DSA	Bit lengths of p and q respectively (L, N) [ <u>selection: (1024, 160); (2048, 224); (2048, 256); (3027, 256)</u> ]	FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.1
AK5	Curve25519	256 bits	RFC 7748

Table 14: Supported Methods for Asymmetric Key Generation

#### Application Note 47.

*This requirement is included for the purposes of encryption and decryption operations only. To support ITE protected communications requirement for the transfer of encrypted data, this*

requirement mandates implementation compliance to FIPS 186-4 only. Implementations according to FIPS 186-2 or FIPS 186-3 will not be accepted.

This requirement must be claimed by the TOE if at least one of FCS\_CKM.1 or FCS\_CKM.1/KEK chooses a selection related to generation of asymmetric keys.

**B.1.2 FCS\_CKM.1/SK Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Encryption Key)**

**FCS\_CKM.1/SK Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Encryption Key)**

**FCS\_CKM.1.1/SK** The TSF shall generate **symmetric** cryptographic keys [**selection: identifier from Supported Methods for Symmetric Encryption Key Generation table**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**selection: cryptographic key generation algorithm from Supported Methods for Symmetric Encryption Key Generation table**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**selection: key sizes from Supported Methods for Symmetric Encryption Key Generation table**] that meet the following: [**selection: list of standards from Supported Methods for Symmetric Encryption Key Generation table**].

Identifier	Key Type	Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
RSK	[selection: symmetric key, submask, authorization value]	Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1	[selection: 128, 192, 256, 512] bits	NIST SP 800-133 (Section 7.1) with ISO 18031 as an approved RBG in addition to those in NIST SP 800-133 (Section 5).
DSK [selection: identifier from Table 16: Key Derivation Functions]	[selection: Key Type from Table 16: Key Derivation Functions]	Derived from a Key Derivation Function as specified in FCS_CKM_EXT.5 [selection: Key Derivation Algorithm from Table 16: Key Derivation Functions]	[selection: key sizes from Table 16: Key Derivation Functions]	[selection: List of Standards from Table 16: Key Derivation Functions]
PBK	[selection: submask, authentication token, authorization value]	Derived from a Password Based Key Derivation Function as specified in FCS_COP.1/PBKDF	[selection: key sizes as specified in FCS_COP.1/PBKDF]	[selection: standards as specified in FCS_COP.1/PBKDF]

Table 15: Supported Methods for Symmetric Encryption Key Generation

**Application Note 48.**

*The intent of this requirement is to ensure that attackers cannot recover SKs with less than a full exhaust of the key space. This requirement explains SK generation regardless of how the DSC uses it or when it generates it. The encryption of user data that is not keying material, authentication tokens, or authorization values is outside the scope of this cPP. This cPP assumes that the DSC lacks the required resources to perform bulk encryption/decryption services at a suitable rate for users. The host may use the SK for encrypting user data outside the boundaries of the DSC. On the other hand, the DSC may use the SK on behalf of the user to perform keyed hashes. In this case, all the requirements for generating, controlling access and use, and destroying the key while under the protection of the DSC apply.*

*The selection of key size 512 bits is for the case of XTS-AES using AES-256. In the case of XTS-AES for both AES-128 and AES-256, the developer is expected to ensure that the full key is generated using direct generation from the RBG as in NIST SP 800-133 section.*

*The ST author selects at least one algorithm from the RSK row if the ST supports creating keys directly from the output of the RBG without further conditioning, at least one algorithm from the DSK row should be selected if the ST supports key derivation functions which are usually seeded from RBG and then further conditioned to the appropriate key size, and at least one algorithm from the PBK row should be selected if the ST supports keys derived from passwords.*

*If DSK is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5 must be claimed by the TOE.*

*If PBK is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_COP.1/PBKDF must be claimed by the TOE.*

*This requirement must be claimed by the TOE if at least one of FCS\_CKM.1 or FCS\_CKM.1/KEK chooses a selection related to generation of symmetric keys.*

**B.1.3 FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5 Cryptographic Key Derivation**

<b>FCS_CKM_EXT.5</b>	<b>Cryptographic Key Derivation</b>
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**FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5.1** The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys with [selection: identifier as chosen from Key Derivation Functions table] using [input parameters as chosen from Key Derivation Functions table for corresponding key types], key derivation algorithm [assignment: key derivation algorithms as chosen from Key Derivation Functions table for corresponding key types], and specified cryptographic key sizes [key sizes as chosen from Key Derivation Functions table for corresponding key types] that meet the following: [standards as chosen from Key Derivation Functions table for corresponding key types].

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Identifier	Key Type	Input Parameters	Key Derivation Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
KeyDrv1	[ <u>selection: symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key</u> ]	Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EX T.1	KDF in Counter Mode using [ <u>selection: CMAC-AES-128; CMAC-AES-192; CMAC-AES-256; HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA-256; HMAC-SHA-512</u> ] as the PRF	[ <u>selection: 128, 192, 256</u> ] bits	NIST SP 800-108 (Section 5.1) (KDF in Counter Mode)  [ <u>selection: ISO-CMAC; NIST-CMAC; ISO-CIPH; ISO-HMAC; FIPS-HMAC; ISO-HASH; FIPS-SHA</u> ]
KeyDrv2	[ <u>selection: symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key</u> ]	Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EX T.1	KDF in Feedback Mode using [ <u>selection: CMAC-AES-128; CMAC-AES-192; CMAC-AES-256; HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA-256; HMAC-SHA-512</u> ] as the PRF	[ <u>selection: 128, 192, 256</u> ] bits	NIST SP 800-108 (Section 5.2) (KDF in Feedback Mode)  [ <u>selection: ISO-CMAC; NIST-CMAC; ISO-CIPH; ISO-HMAC; FIPS-HMAC; ISO-HASH; FIPS-SHA</u> ]
KeyDrv3	[ <u>selection: symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key</u> ]	Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EX T.1	KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode using [ <u>selection: CMAC-AES-128; CMAC-AES-192; CMAC-AES-256; HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA-256; HMAC-SHA-512</u> ] as the PRF	[ <u>selection: 128, 192, 256</u> ] bits	NIST SP 800-108 (Section 5.3) (KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode)  [ <u>selection: ISO-CMAC; NIST-CMAC; ISO-CIPH; ISO-HMAC; FIPS-HMAC; ISO-HASH; FIPS-SHA</u> ]
KeyDrv4	[ <u>selection: symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key</u> ]	Intermediary keys	[ <u>selection: exclusive OR (XOR); SHA-256; SHA-512</u> ]	[ <u>selection: 128, 192, 256</u> ] bits	[ <u>selection: ISO-HASH; FIPS-SHA</u> ]

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Identifier	Key Type	Input Parameters	Key Derivation Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
KeyDrv5	[ <u>selection: symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key</u> ]	Concatenated keys	KDF in [ <u>selection: Counter Mode, Feedback Mode, Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode</u> ] using [ <u>selection: CMAC-AES-128; CMAC-AES-192; CMAC-AES-256; HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA-256; HMAC-SHA-512</u> ] as the PRF	[ <u>selection: 128, 192, 256</u> ] bits	NIST SP 800-108 [ <u>selection: (Section 5.1) (KDF in Counter Mode); (Section 5.2) (KDF in Feedback Mode); (Section 5.3) (KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode)</u> ]  [ <u>selection: ISO-CMAC; NIST-CMAC; ISO-CIPH; ISO-HMAC; FIPS-HMAC; ISO-HASH; FIPS-SHA</u> ]
KeyDrv6	[ <u>selection: symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key</u> ]	Two keys	[ <u>selection: AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES-KWP, AES-KW, CAM-CBC, CAM-CCM, CAM-GCM</u> ] from FCS_COP.1/SKC Symmetric Key table	[ <u>selection: 128, 192, 256</u> ] bits	[ <u>selection: see List of Standards in FCS_COP.1/SKC Symmetric Key table</u> ]
KeyDrv7	[ <u>selection: symmetric key, secret IV, seed</u> ]	Shared secret, salt, output length, fixed information	[ <u>selection: hash function from FCS_COP.1/Hash, keyed hash from FCS_COP.1/HMAC</u> ]	[ <u>selection: 128, 192, 256</u> ] bits	(NIST-KDRV) sec 4  [ <u>selection: see List of Standards in FCS_COP.1/Hash and FCS_COP.1/HMAC</u> ]
KeyDrv8	[ <u>selection: symmetric key, secret IV, seed</u> ]	Shared secret, salt, IV, output length, fixed information	[ <u>selection: keyed hash from FCS_COP.1/HMAC</u> ]	[ <u>selection: 128, 192, 256</u> ] bits	(NIST-KDRV) sec 5  [ <u>selection: see List of Standards in FCS_COP.1/HMAC</u> ]

Table 16: Key Derivation Functions

**Application Note 49.**

*Note that Camellia algorithms do not support 192-bit key sizes.*

*The interface referenced in the requirement could take different forms, the most likely of which is an application programming interface to an OS kernel. There may be various levels of abstraction.*

*For Authorization Factor Submasks, the key size to be used in the HMAC falls into a range between L1 and L2 defined in ISO/IEC 10118 for the appropriate hash function (for example for SHA-256  $L1 = 512$ ,  $L2 = 256$ ) where  $L2 \leq k \leq L1$ .*

*General note: in order to use a NIST SP 800-108 conformant method of key derivation, the TOE is permitted to implement this with keys as derived as indicated in Key Derivation Functions table above, and with the algorithms as indicated in the same table.*

*NIST SP 800-131A Rev 1 allows the use of SHA-1 in these use cases.*

*KeyDrv5, KeyDrv6, and the XOR option in KeyDrv4 will create an “inverted key hierarchy” in which the TSF will combine two or more keys to create a third key. These same KDFs may also use a submask key as input, which could be an authorization factor or derived from a PBKDF. In these cases the ST author must explicitly declare this option and should present a reasonable argument that the entropy of the inputs to the KDFs will result in full entropy of the expected output.*

*If keys are combined, the ST author shall describe which method of combination is used in order to justify that the effective entropy of each factor is preserved.*

*The documentation of the product’s encryption key management should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the product’s key management and how it meets the requirements to ensure the keys are adequately protected. This documentation should include an essay and diagrams. This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS; it can be submitted as a separate document and marked as developer proprietary.*

*SP 800-56C specifies a two-step key derivation procedure that employs an extraction-then-expansion technique for deriving keying material from a shared secret generated during a key establishment scheme. The Randomness Extraction step as described in Section 5 of SP 800-56C is followed by Key Expansion using the key derivation functions defined in SP 800-108.*

*This requirement must be claimed by the TOE if at least one of FCS\_CKM.1/KEK, FCS\_CKM.1/SK, or FCS\_COP.1/KeyEnc chooses a selection related to key derivation.*

*If at least one of KeyDrv4, KeyDrv5, or KeyDrv6 is selected AND password-based key derivation is used to create at least one of the inputs, the selection-based SFR FCS\_COP.1/PBKDF must also be claimed.*

**B.1.4 FCS\_COP.1/PBKDF Cryptographic Operation (Password-Based Key Derivation Functions)**

<b>FCS_COP.1/PBKDF</b>	<b>Cryptographic Operation (Password-Based Key Derivation Functions)</b>
------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------

**FCS\_COP.1.1/PBKDF** The TSF shall perform [password-based key derivation functions] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-[selection: SHA-256, SHA-384,

*SHA-512*], with [assignment: integer number greater than or equal to 1000] iterations, and output cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128, 192, 256] bits that meet the following standard: [NIST SP 800-132].

**Application Note 50.**

*The ST must condition a password into a string of bits prior to using it as input to algorithms that form SKs and KEKs. The ST can perform conditioning using one of the identified hash functions or the process described in NIST SP 800-132; the ST author selects the method used. NIST SP 800-132 requires the use of a pseudo-random function (PRF) consisting of HMAC with an approved hash function.*

*Appendix A of NIST SP 800-132 recommends setting the iteration count in order to increase the computation needed to derive a key from a password and, therefore, increase the workload of performing a dictionary attack.*

*The TOE must claim this requirement if it claims FCS\_CKM.1/SK and selects an algorithm in the PBK row or claims FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5 and selects at least one of KeyDrv4, KeyDrv5, or KeyDrv6 AND uses password-based key derivation to create at least one of the inputs.*

## **B.2 User Data Protection**

### **B.2.1 FDP\_DAU.1/Prove Basic Data Authentication (for Use with The Prove Service)**

<b>FDP_DAU.1/Prove Basic Data Authentication (for Use with the Prove Service)</b>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

**FDP\_DAU.1.1/Prove** The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of [selection: [assignment: list of objects or information types] declared valid by the TSF, [assignment: list of objects or information types] declared valid by an authenticated user].

**FDP\_DAU.1.2/Prove** The TSF shall provide [assignment: list of subjects] with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the indicated information.

**Application Note 51.**

*This SFR describes the output of the Prove service provided by the DSC. The evidence of validity or authenticity, or other evidence derived, is expected to be processed by the RoT for Measurement. Additionally, the use of a RoT for Reporting presupposes a logging capability or other means of generating state information that could be conveyed to external entities. Therefore, FDP\_DAU.1.1/Prove must be selected if-and-only-if the RoT for Measurement and the RoT for Reporting are both selected in FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1.1. An ‘authenticated user’ in the sense of the selection in FDP\_DAU.1.1/Prove means a user who has been authenticated by the DSC according to the mechanisms of FIA\_UAU.5.*

*In FDP\_DAU.1.1/Prove, the DSC will issue a validity-stamped or authenticity-stamped piece of data. In this case, validity-stamped means that the form of the issued data enables an external entity to verify that the data has been issued via the DSC’s Prove service. The implementation might be via a DSC cryptographic signature, or a MAC using a symmetric key shared with the*

receiver, for example. Authenticity-stamped means that the receiver of the data can verify that the user providing this data is authentic.

Data that would need to be validity-stamped includes data over which the DSC is the authority, such as the state of its own firmware. Data that would need to be authenticity-stamped includes data about which the DSC knows nothing, but where it will issue the data with a statement that the DSC has authenticated the source of this data.

For data that is validity-stamped, the DSC does nothing but respond to a request to issue the data; thus, authentication of the user issuing the data is not needed and is covered by FDP\_DAU.1/Prove. Otherwise, in the case the DSC has no understanding of this data, a step is needed via FIA\_UAU.5 by which the DSC authenticates the user for this service, and that the DSC or Prove service will therefore vouch for the user, not the validity of the data itself.

## **B.2.2 FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 Factory Reset Behavior**

### **FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 Factory Reset Behavior**

**FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2.1** Upon initiation of a factory reset, the TSF shall destroy [all non-persistent SDOs] and restore the following **pre-installed SDOs** to their factory settings: [assignment: pre-installed SDOs to be restored during a factory reset].

#### **Application Note 52.**

Not all DSCs permit a factory reset of the TOE, or perform a factory reset in response to excessive failed authentication or authorization attempts. Those that do are expected to perform a factory reset in a manner that prevents any inadvertent disclosure of security-relevant data that was present on the DSC prior to the factory reset. For DSCs that permit factory reset functionality (as indicated by selection of factory reset the TOE wiping out all non-persistent SDOs, as described by FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 in FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3, or by no actions or conditions NOT being selected in FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1.1), this SFR must be included in the TOE boundary.

## **B.2.3 FDP\_MFW\_EXT.2 Basic Firmware Integrity**

### **FDP\_MFW\_EXT.2 Basic Firmware Integrity**

**FDP\_MFW\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall have the ability to verify the integrity of the firmware.

**FDP\_MFW\_EXT.2.2** The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence of the integrity of the firmware.

#### **Application Note 53.**

Data and firmware integrity is not a required component of this cPP in all cases because some DSCs will have immutable firmware. This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1.1.

The TOE guarantees the integrity of the firmware by verifying its integrity.

Verifying the integrity of the firmware could be accomplished by guaranteeing the validity of firmware within the TOE prior to execution.

*This requirement covers the case of ensuring the firmware is trustworthy in immutable form or mutable through any firmware updates, since the integrity and authenticity are checked prior to execution.*

*FCS\_COP.1/SigVer applies if the TOE provides the capability to update the TOE firmware and uses digital signatures and MAC verification for update verification. The ST Author should choose the algorithm implemented to perform digital signatures. For the algorithms chosen, the ST author should make the appropriate assignments/selections to specify the parameters that are implemented for that algorithm.*

#### **B.2.4 FDP\_MFW\_EXT.3 Firmware Authentication with Identity of Guarantor**

##### **FDP\_MFW\_EXT.3 Firmware Authentication with Identity of Guarantor**

**FDP\_MFW\_EXT.3.1** The TSF shall have the ability to verify the authenticity of the firmware.

**FDP\_MFW\_EXT.3.2** The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence of the authenticity of the firmware.

#### ***Application Note 54.***

*Firmware authentication is not a required component of this cPP in all cases because some DSCs will have immutable firmware. This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1.1.*

*The TOE guarantees the authenticity of the firmware by verifying its signature.*

*Verifying the authenticity of the firmware could be accomplished by guaranteeing the validity of firmware within the TOE prior to execution.*

*This requirement covers the case of ensuring the firmware is trustworthy in immutable form or mutable through any firmware updates, since the integrity and authenticity are checked prior to execution.*

*FCS\_COP.1/SigVer applies if the TOE provides the capability to update the TOE firmware and uses digital signatures and MAC verification for update verification. The ST Author should choose the algorithm implemented to perform digital signatures. For the algorithms chosen, the ST author should make the appropriate assignments/selections to specify the parameters that are implemented for that algorithm.*

### **B.3 Identification and Authentication**

#### **B.3.1 FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2 Authorization Failure Response**

##### **FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2 Authorization Failure Response**

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2.1** When the TSF locks an **SDO** (i.e. prevents authorization attempts for an **SDO**) due to a user exceeding the allowed threshold for unsuccessful authorization attempts, then only an administrator may unlock access to the **SDO** and reset the corresponding failed authorization attempt counter.

**Application Note 55.**

*This SFR is applicable only when the TSF's response to excessive authorization failures selects prevent all future authorization attempts indefinitely (i.e., lock) as specified by FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3.*

## **B.4 Protection of the TSF**

### **B.4.1 FPT\_FLS.1/FW Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Firmware)**

<b>FPT_FLS.1/FW</b>	<b>Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Firmware)</b>
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**FPT\_FLS.1.1/FW** The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of **firmware** failures occur: [*authenticity violation, integrity violation, rollback violation*].

**Application Note 56.**

*A DSC's ability to handle failures related to authenticity, integrity, and invalid versions of firmware is not applicable in all cases because some DSCs will have immutable firmware. This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1.1.*

*The phrase "secure state" refers to a state in which the TOE has consistent TSF data and a TSF that can correctly enforce the policy. The TOE must ensure that no further processing of TSF or user data takes place while in an insecure state. This state may be the initial "boot" of a clean system, or it might be some check-pointed state. It is expected that in most cases, the TOE will halt and require a reset or re-initialization to return to a known secure state.*

### **B.4.2 FPT\_RPL.1/Rollback Replay Detection (Rollback)**

<b>FPT_RPL.1/Rollback</b>	<b>Replay Detection (Rollback)</b>
---------------------------	------------------------------------

**FPT\_RPL.1.1/Rollback** The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: [*previous firmware builds*].

**FPT\_RPL.1.2/Rollback** The TSF shall **prevent the execution of the loaded firmware and perform [selection, choose one of: [assignment: other actions], no other actions]** when replay is detected.

**Application Note 57.**

*A DSC's ability to detect an attempted rollback (software/firmware downgrade) is not applicable in all cases because some DSCs will have immutable firmware that cannot be modified in any way. This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1.1.*

*The TSF data is used as a guarantee of the ordinal identifier of the firmware instance. When a firmware load is requested, the TSF ensures the authenticated firmware ordinal identifier is greater than or equal to the previously authenticated firmware identifier. For example, this could be accomplished by ensuring the validated instance of the firmware to be loaded is greater than or equal to the instance previously validated and loaded into the TOE. By loading a previous instance of firmware, it potentially opens up the device to known vulnerabilities.*

## B.5 Trusted Path/Channels

### B.5.1 FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1 CCM Protocol

#### FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1 CCM Protocol

**FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement CCMP using [selection: AES, Camellia] in CCM mode and key size [selection: 128-bits, 256-bits] as defined in [selection: IEEE 802.11i, IEEE 802.11ac].

**FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall discard incoming messages if authentication fails.

**FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall discard incoming messages that are malformed or invalid.

*Application Note 58.*

*This SFR must be claimed if CCMP is selected in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.*

*Inclusion of this SFR requires inclusion of AES-CCM or CAM-CCM in FCS\_COP.1/SKC.*

*CCMP is defined in IEEE 802.11i. CCMP-256 is defined in IEEE 802.11ac.*

### B.5.2 FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1 GCM Protocol

#### FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1 GCM Mode Protocol

**FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement GCMP using [selection: AES, Camellia] in GCM mode and key size [selection: 128-bits, 256-bits] as defined in [IEEE 802.11ad].

**FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall discard incoming messages if authentication fails.

**FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall discard incoming messages that are malformed or invalid.

*Application Note 59.*

*This SFR must be claimed if GCMP is selected in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.*

*Inclusion of this SFR requires inclusion of AES-GCM or CAM-GCM in FCS\_COP.1/SKC.*

### B.5.3 FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels

#### FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels

**FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall use [selection: CCMP, GCMP] protocol to provide a communication channel between itself and [assignment: list of entities external to the TOE] that protects channel data from disclosure and ensures the integrity of channel data.

*Application Note 60.*

*This SFR must be claimed if cryptographically protected data channels as specified in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 is selected in either FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 or FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.*

*Entities external to the TOE include applications that communicate with the TOE such as authentication capabilities (e.g. biometrics reader), external storage, and interfaces with an external DSC.*

*If CCMP is selected, the ST author must include FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.*

*If GCMP is selected, the ST author must include FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.*

#### **B.5.4 FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications**

##### **FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications**

**FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall encrypt data for transfer between the TOE and [*assignment: list of entities external to the TOE*] using a cryptographic algorithm and key size as specified in FCS\_COP.1/SKC, and using [*selection:*

- Pre-shared keys;
- Keys established according to FCS\_CKM.2;
- Keys exchanged using a physically protected communication mechanism conformant with FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1

].

#### **Application Note 61.**

*This SFR must be claimed if encrypted data buffers as specified in FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 is selected in either FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 or FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.*

*This requirement applies to encrypted data communications between the TOE and external entities that do not use a physically protected mechanism conforming to FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1, or a cryptographically protected data channel as conforming to FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1. For example, if data is transferred through encrypted buffers (or blobs) then this requirement applies. If data is transferred through a physically protected channel, then FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 applies. This requirement would apply, for example, for communications implemented through a shared data buffer.*

#### **B.5.5 FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel**

##### **FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel**

**FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide a **physically protected** communication channel between itself and [*assignment: list of other IT entities within the same platform*].

#### **Application Note 62.**

*This SFR must be claimed if physically protected channels as specified in FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 is selected in either FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 or FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.*

## Appendix C: Extended Component Definitions

This appendix contains the definitions for the extended requirements that are used in the cPP, including those used in Appendices A and B.

(Note: formatting conventions for selections and assignments in this Appendix are those in [CC2].)

This Appendix provides a definition for all of the extended components introduced in this PP-Module. These components are identified in the following table:

Functional Class	Functional Components
Cryptographic Support (FCS)	FCS_CKM_EXT Cryptographic Key Management
	FCS_ENT_EXT Entropy for External IT Entities
	FCS_RBG_EXT Random Bit Generation
	FCS_SLT_EXT Cryptographic Salt Generation
	FCS_STG_EXT Security Audit Event Storage
User Data Protection (FDP)	FDP_ETC_EXT Export from the TOE
	FDP_FRS_EXT Factory Reset
	FDP_ITC_EXT Import from Outside of the TOE
	FDP_MFW_EXT Firmware
	FDP_SDC_EXT Confidentiality of SDEs
Identification and Authentication (FIA)	FIA_AFL_EXT Authorization Failures
Security Management (FMT)	FMT_MOF_EXT Management of Functions in TSF
Protection of the TSF (FPT)	FPT_MOD_EXT Debug Modes
	FPT_PRO_EXT Root of Trust
	FPT_ROT_EXT Root of Trust Services
	FPT_RPL_EXT Replay Detection
Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)	FTP_CCMP_EXT CCM Protocol
	FTP_GCMP_EXT GCM Protocol
	FTP_ITC_EXT Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
	FTP_ITE_EXT Encrypted Data Communications
	FTP_ITP_EXT Physically Protected Channel

Table 17: Extended Components Definitions


### C.1 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support

#### C.1.1 FCS\_CKM\_EXT Cryptographic Key Management

##### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for key life cycle operations.

## Component Leveling



FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction Timing, requires the TSF to destroy keys when no longer used.

FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5 Cryptographic Key Derivation, requires the TSF to perform key derivation using a defined method.

**Management: FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4, FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4, FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction Timing**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

**FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4.1** The TSF shall destroy all keys and keying material when no longer needed.

### **FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5 Cryptographic Key Derivation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1 Confidentiality of SDEs


**FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5.1** The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys with [*assignment: key types*] using [*assignment: input parameters*], key derivation algorithm [*assignment: key derivation algorithms*], and specified cryptographic key sizes [*assignment: key sizes*] that meet the following: [*assignment: list of standards*].

## **C.1.2 FCS\_ENT\_EXT Entropy for External IT Entities**

### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for allowing the TSF to supply entropy data to external entities.

### Component Leveling



FCS\_ENT\_EXT.1 Entropy for External IT Entities, requires the TSF to have an external interface available for external IT entities to retrieve entropy data from it.

#### Management: FCS\_ENT\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FCS\_ENT\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FCS\_ENT\_EXT.1 Entropy for External IT Entities

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation


**FCS\_ENT\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide an interface to make entropy that meets FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 available to external IT entities.

### C.1.3 FCS\_RBG\_EXT Random Bit Generation

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for secure random bit generation.

### Component Leveling



FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation, requires the TSF to implement a deterministic random bit generator using a specified method and sufficiently strong entropy sources.

FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2 External Seeding for Random Bit Generation, requires the TSF to implement an interface to allow its deterministic random bit generator to be seeded by an external entity.

#### Management: FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1, FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1, FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [selection: Hash\_DRBG (any), HMAC\_DRBG (any), CTR\_DRBG (AES)].

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2** The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source in accordance with NIST SP 800-90B that accumulates entropy from [selection: *assignment: number of software-based sources*] software-based noise source, [*assignment: number of hardware-based sources*] hardware-based noise source] with a minimum of [selection: 128, 192, 256] bits of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011, of the keys and CSPs that it will generate.

### **FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2 External Seeding for Random Bit Generation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation


**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall provide an interface to allow external seeding of the DRBG with a bit-string of at least the minimum number of bits selected in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2 before the DRBG produces any output.

## **C.1.4 FCS\_SLT\_EXT Cryptographic Salt Generation**

### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for salt and nonce usage.

### **Component Leveling**



FCS\_SLT\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Salt Generation, requires the TSF to use salts and nonces that are created by the TOE's deterministic random bit generator.

### **Management: FCS\_SLT\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

### **Audit: FCS\_SLT\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FCS\_SLT\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Salt Generation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation


**FCS\_SLT\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall use salts and nonces generated by an RBG as specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.

### C.1.5 FCS\_STG\_EXT Cryptographic Key Storage

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for ensuring the protection of keys and secrets.

#### Component Leveling



FCS\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Storage, requires the TSF to enforce protected storage for keys and secrets so that they cannot be accessed or destroyed without authorization.

FCS\_STG\_EXT.2 Key Storage Encryption, requires the TSF to ensure the confidentiality of stored data using a specified method.

FCS\_STG\_EXT.3 Key Integrity Protection, requires the TSF to ensure the integrity of stored data using a specified method.

**Management: FCS\_STG\_EXT.1, FCS\_STG\_EXT.2, FCS\_STG\_EXT.3**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FCS\_STG\_EXT.1, FCS\_STG\_EXT.2, FCS\_STG\_EXT.3**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Storage

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide [*assignment: protection method*] protected storage for asymmetric private keys and [selection: symmetric keys, persistent secrets, no other keys].

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall support the capability of [selection: importing keys/secrets into the TOE, causing the TOE to generate keys/secrets] upon request of [*assignment: authorized subject*].

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall be capable of destroying keys/secrets in the protected storage upon request of [*assignment: authorized subject*].

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall have the capability to allow only the user that [selection: imported the key/secret, caused the key/secret to be generated] to use the key/secret. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [*assignment: authorized subject*].

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.5** The TSF shall allow only the user that [selection: imported the key/secret, caused the key/secret to be generated] to request that the key/secret be destroyed. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [*assignment: authorized subject*].

## **FCS\_STG\_EXT.2 Key Storage Encryption**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall encrypt [*assignment: key data*] using one of the following methods: [*assignment: key encryption methods as specified in FCS\_COP.1*].

## **FCS\_STG\_EXT.3 Key Integrity Protection**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

FCS\_STG\_EXT.2 Key Storage Encryption

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.3.1** The TSF shall protect the integrity of any encrypted [*assignment: key data*] by using [*assignment: integrity protection method*].

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.3.2** The TSF shall verify the integrity of the [*assignment: integrity verification attribute associated with or computed from the stored key*] of the stored key prior to use of the key.


## **C.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection**

### **C.2.1 FDP\_ETC\_EXT Export from the TOE**

#### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for export of TSF data outside the TOE boundary that allows for the security of that data to be maintained.

### Component Leveling



FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2 Propagation of SDOs, requires the TSF to transmit data outside of the TOE boundary with protections applied so that they cannot be accessed by unauthorized subjects.

### Management: FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2

No specific management functions are identified.

### Audit: FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2 Propagation of SDOs

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation


**FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall propagate only SDO references, wrapped authorization data, and wrapped SDOs such that only [selection: the TSF, authorized users] can access them.

## C.2.2 FDP\_FRS\_EXT Factory Reset

### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for the conditions that may trigger TOE factory reset and for identifying the data that is destroyed or restored as part of the factory reset operation.

### Component Leveling



FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1 Factory Reset, requires the TSF to allow factory resets under specified conditions.

FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 Factory Reset Behavior, requires the TSF to destroy certain TSF data and restore other TSF data after a factory reset is initiated.

### Management: FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Reset TOE to factory state.

**Management: FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1, FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1 Factory Reset**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 Factory Reset Behavior

**FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall permit a factory reset of the TOE upon: [*assignment: conditions under which a factory reset is authorized*].

**FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 Factory Reset Behavior**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1 Factory Reset


**FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2.1** Upon initiation of a factory reset, the TSF shall destroy [*assignment: TSF data that is destroyed by factory reset*] and restore the following TSF data to their factory settings: [*assignment: TSF data that is restored by factory reset*].

**C.2.3 FDP\_ITC\_EXT Import from Outside of the TOE**

**Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for handling data that is imported from outside the TOE.

**Component Leveling**



FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Parsing of SDEs, requires the TSF to support the import of SDEs from outside the TOE and to verify their integrity when imported.

FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2 Parsing of SDOs, requires the TSF to support the import of SDOs from outside the TOE and to verify their integrity when imported.

**Management: FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1, FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1, FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Parsing of SDEs**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

[FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels,

FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications, or

FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel]

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall support importing SDEs using [*assignment: import method that maintains confidentiality and integrity of imported data*].

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall verify the integrity of the SDE using [*assignment: method of integrity verification*].

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall bind SDEs to security attributes using [*assignment: list of ways the TSF generates security attributes and binds them to the SDEs*].

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2 Parsing of SDOs**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

[FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels,

FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications, or

FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel]

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall support importing SDOs using [*assignment: import method that maintains confidentiality and integrity of imported data*].

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.2** The TSF shall verify the integrity of the SDO using [*assignment: method of integrity verification*].

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.3** The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data.

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.4** The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user data received.

**FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.5** The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.

## C.2.4 FDP\_MFW\_EXT Mutable/Immutable Firmware

### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for specified types of firmware and the management of integrity and authenticity.

### Component Leveling



**FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1** Mutable/Immutable Firmware, requires the TSF to identify whether its firmware resides in mutable or immutable storage.

**FDP\_MFW\_EXT.2** Basic Firmware Integrity, requires the TSF to assert the integrity of the firmware.

**FDP\_MFW\_EXT.3** Firmware Authentication with Identity of Guarantor, requires the TSF to assert the authenticity of the firmware.

### Management: FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Update TOE firmware and pre-installed SDOs.

### Management: FDP\_MFW\_EXT.2, FDP\_MFW\_EXT.3

No specific management functions are identified.

### Audit: FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1, FDP\_MFW\_EXT.2, FDP\_MFW\_EXT.3

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall be maintained as [selection: immutable, mutable] firmware.

### **FDP\_MFW\_EXT.2 Basic Firmware Integrity**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware  
FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

**FDP\_MFW\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall have the ability to verify the integrity of the firmware.

**FDP\_MFW\_EXT.2.2** The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence of the integrity of the firmware.

### **FDP\_MFW\_EXT.3 Firmware Authentication with Identity of Guarantor**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware  
FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

**FDP\_MFW\_EXT.3.1** The TSF shall have the ability to verify the authenticity of the firmware.


**FDP\_MFW\_EXT.3.2** The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence of the authenticity of the firmware.

## **C.2.5 FDP\_SDC\_EXT Confidentiality of SDEs**

### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for maintaining the confidentiality of SDEs.

### **Component Leveling**



**FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1** Confidentiality of SDEs, requires the TSF to specify the method used to ensure the confidentiality of stored SDEs.

### **Management: FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

### **Audit: FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1 Confidentiality of SDEs**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

**FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall use [*assignment: confidentiality protection mechanism*] to protect the confidentiality of authorization data and [*assignment: list of internally and externally stored SDEs identified in the Confidential SDE List attribute of an SDO*].

**FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall use FCS\_CKM.1 to derive or generate the key to encrypt the SDEs.


### C.3 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication

#### C.3.1 FIA\_AFL\_EXT Authorization Failure Handling

##### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for the TOE's behavior when repeated failed attempts to gain authorization to access TSF data occur.

##### Component Leveling



FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1 Authorization Failure Handling, requires the TSF to monitor authorization attempts, including counting and limiting the number of attempts at failed or passed authorizations.

FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2 Authorization Failure Response, requires the TSF to control who is authorized to unlock failed authorization attempts.

##### Management: FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Set authorization failure parameters.

##### Management: FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Unlock access to SDO following excessive failed authorization attempts.

##### Audit: FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1, FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2

There are no auditable events foreseen.

##### FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1 Authorization Failure Handling

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall maintain [selection: a unique counter for [assignment: multiple separate objects each requiring authorization], one global counter covering [assignment: objects requiring authorization]], called the failed authorization attempt counters, that counts of the number of unsuccessful authorization attempts that occur related to authorizing access to these objects.

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall maintain a [selection, choose one of: static, administrator configurable variable] threshold of the minimal acceptable number of unsuccessful authorization attempts that occur related to authorizing access to these objects.

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3** When the failed authorization attempt counters [selection, choose one of: meets, surpasses] the threshold for unsuccessful authorization attempts, the TSF shall [assignment: perform action that temporarily or permanently prevents access to the object] for these objects.

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall increment the failed authorization attempt counter before it verifies the authorization.

## **FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2 Authorization Failure Response**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1 Authorization Failure Handling

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2.1** When the TSF locks an object (i.e. prevents authorization attempts for an object) due to a user exceeding the allowed threshold for unsuccessful authorization attempts, then only an administrator may unlock access to the object and reset the corresponding failed authorization attempt counter.

## **C.4 Class FMT: Security Management**

### **C.4.1 FMT\_MOF\_EXT Management of Functions in TSF**

#### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for who is allowed to perform administrative functions.

#### **Component Leveling**



FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior, requires the TSF to restrict management functionality to authorized administrators.

#### **Management: FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

**FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions in FMT\_SMF.1 to authenticated administrators.


## **C.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF**

### **C.5.1 FPT\_MOD\_EXT Debug Modes**

#### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for debug modes.

#### **Component Leveling**



FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1 Debug Modes, requires the TSF to deny access to debug modes.

#### **Management: FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

#### **Audit: FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### **FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1 Debug Modes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.


**FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide no access to debug modes.

### **C.5.2 FPT\_PRO\_EXT Root of Trust**

#### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for the TOE's implementation of a Root of Trust and its ability to use this to assert the integrity of its stored data.

### Component Leveling



**FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1** Root of Trust, requires the TSF to maintain a Root of Trust and identify how it is stored in memory.

**FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2** Data Integrity Measurements, requires the TSF to generate integrity measurements to assert its own integrity.

### Management: **FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1, FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2**

No specific management functions are identified.

### Audit: **FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1, FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1** Root of Trust

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall contain an SDO that contains the identity of the Root of Trust.

**FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall maintain Root of Trust data as [selection: immutable, mutable if and only if its mutability is controlled by a unique identifiable owner].

### **FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2** Data Integrity Measurements

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall be able to quantify the integrity of the data protected by the TOE by generating integrity measurements and assertions making them available to authorized entities.


**FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2.2** The TSF shall accumulate platform characteristics using a consistent [*assignment: description of process for accumulating platform characteristics*] process in which verified quantifiable measurements are accumulated to prove the integrity of its SDOs.

### C.5.3 FPT\_ROT\_EXT Root of Trust Services

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for individual Root of Trust services that the TSF may implement.

#### Component Leveling



FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1 Root of Trust Services, requires the TSF to identify the specific Roots of Trust it provides.

FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2 Root of Trust for Storage, requires the TSF to prevent unauthorized access to data associated with its Root of Trust for Storage.

FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3 Root of Trust for Reporting Mechanisms, requires the TSF to implement a Root of Trust for Reporting in the specified manner.

#### **Management: FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1, FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2, FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3**

No specific management functions are identified.

#### **Audit: FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1, FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2, FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### **FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1 Root of Trust Services**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1 Root of Trust

**FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide a Root of Trust for Storage, a Root of Trust for Authorization, and [selection: Root of Trust for Measurement, Root of Trust for Reporting, no others].

#### **FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2 Root of Trust for Storage**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1 Root of Trust

**FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall prevent unauthorized access to SDOs associated with the Root of Trust for Storage.

### **FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3 Root of Trust for Reporting Mechanisms**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1 Root of Trust

FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1 Root of Trust Services

**FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3.1** The TSF shall be able to attest to a state as represented by platform characteristics with a Root of Trust for Reporting mechanism that uses for its identity [selection: a cryptographically verifiable identity in FPT PRO EXT.1, an alias key bound to the cryptographically verifiable identity in FPT PRO EXT.1] and using a signature algorithm as specified in FCS\_COP.1.

## **C.5.4 FPT\_RPL\_EXT Replay Detection**

### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for protection of TSF data through detecting and acting upon replay attempts

### **Component Leveling**



FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1 Replay Prevention, requires the TSF to implement a specific method of replay detection and use this to prevent unauthorized operations from being performed on TSF data.

### **Management: FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

### **Audit: FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1 Replay Prevention**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall have a mechanism for preventing replay of user authorization of operations on SDOs using the following methods [selection: monotonic counters, random nonces, [assignment: other methods as specified]].

**FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall detect replay for the following actions: [*authorization of operations on SDOs*].

**FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall deny the requested operation on the SDO when it detects a replay.

## C.6 Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channels

### C.6.1 FTP\_CCMP\_EXT CCM Protocol

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for the implementation of CCMP.

#### Component Leveling



FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1 CCM Protocol, requires the TSF to implement CCMP in the specified manner.

#### Management: FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1 CCM Protocol

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

**FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement CCMP using [*assignment: cryptographic algorithm*] in CCM mode and key size [*assignment: key sizes*] as defined in [*assignment: list of standards*].

**FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall discard incoming messages if authentication fails.

**FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall discard incoming messages that are malformed or invalid.

## C.6.2 FTP\_GCMP\_EXT GCM Protocol

### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for the implementation of GCMP.

### Component Leveling



FTP\_GCMP\_EXT GCM Protocol, requires the TSF to implement GCMP in the specified manner.

### Management: FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

### Audit: FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1 GCM Protocol

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

**FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement GCMP using [*assignment: cryptographic algorithm*] in GCM mode and key size [*assignment: key sizes*] as defined in [*assignment: list of standards*].

**FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall discard incoming messages if authentication fails.

**FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall discard incoming messages that are malformed or invalid.

## C.6.3 FTP\_ITC\_EXT Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for the implementation of trusted communications with entities external to the TOE.

### Component Leveling



FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels, requires the TSF to implement either CCMP or GCMP as a method of communicating securely with external entities.

### Management: FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

**FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall use [*assignment: cryptographic protocol*] protocol to provide a communication channel between itself and [*assignment: list of entities external to the TOE*] that protects channel data from disclosure and ensures the integrity of channel data.

**C.6.4 FTP\_ITE\_EXT Encrypted Data Communications**

**Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for encryption of TSF data that is transmitted to an external entity over an insecure channel.

**Component Leveling**



FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications, requires the TSF to encrypt data in the specified manner using key data that is provided to an external entity in the specified manner.

**Management: FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation


**FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall encrypt data for transfer between the TOE and [*assignment: list of entities external to the TOE*] using a cryptographic algorithm and key size as specified in FCS\_COP.1, and using [*assignment: keys, identified by how they are generated by or imported into the TOE*].

## C.6.5 FTP\_ITP\_EXT Physically Protected Channel

### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for use of physically protected communications mechanisms.

### Component Leveling



FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel, requires the TSF to use a physically protected channel for transmission of data to an external entity.

### Management: FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

### Audit: FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide a physically protected communication channel between itself and [*assignment: list of other IT entities within the same platform*].

## **Appendix D: Entropy Documentation and Assessment**

This appendix describes the required supplementary information for each entropy source used by the TOE.

The documentation of the entropy sources should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the entropy source and why it can be relied upon to provide sufficient entropy. This documentation should include multiple detailed sections: design description, entropy justification, operating conditions, and health testing. This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS in the public facing ST.

### **D.1 Design Description**

Documentation shall include the design of each entropy source as a whole, including the interaction of all entropy source components. Any information that can be shared regarding the design should also be included for any third-party entropy sources that are included in the product.

The documentation will describe the operation of the entropy source to include how entropy is produced, and how unprocessed (raw) data can be obtained from within the entropy source for testing purposes. The documentation should walk through the entropy source design indicating where the entropy comes from, where the entropy output is passed next, any post-processing of the raw outputs (hash, XOR, etc.), if/where it is stored, and finally, how it is output from the entropy source. Any conditions placed on the process (e.g., blocking) should also be described in the entropy source design. Diagrams and examples are encouraged.

This design must also include a description of the content of the security boundary of the entropy source and a description of how the security boundary ensures that an adversary outside the boundary cannot affect the entropy rate.

If implemented, the design description shall include a description of how third-party applications can add entropy to the RBG. A description of any RBG state saving between power-off and power-on shall be included.

### **D.2 Entropy Justification**

There should be a technical argument for where the unpredictability in the source comes from and why there is confidence in the entropy source exhibiting probabilistic behavior (an explanation of the probability distribution and justification for that distribution given the particular source is one way to describe this). This argument will include a description of the expected entropy rate and explain how you ensure that sufficient entropy is going into the TOE randomizer seeding process. This discussion will be part of a justification for why the entropy source can be relied upon to produce bits with entropy.

The entropy justification shall not include any data added from any third-party application or from any state saving between restarts.

### **D.3 Operating Conditions**

Documentation will also include the range of operating conditions under which the entropy source is expected to generate random data. It will clearly describe the measures that have been taken in the system design to ensure the entropy source continues to operate under those conditions. Similarly, documentation shall describe the conditions under which the entropy source is known to malfunction or become inconsistent. Methods used to detect failure or degradation of the source shall be included.

### **D.4 Health Testing**

More specifically, all entropy source health tests and their rationale will be documented. This will include a description of the health tests, the rate and conditions under which each health test is performed (e.g., at startup, continuously, or on-demand), the expected results for each health test, TOE behavior upon entropy source failure, and rationale indicating why each test is believed to be appropriate for detecting one or more failures in the entropy source.

## Appendix E: SFR Dependencies Analysis

The dependencies between SFRs implemented by the TOE are addressed as follows.

SFR	Dependencies	Rationale Statement
FCS_CKM.1	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] FCS_CKM.4	All of FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.4, and FCS_COP.1 are required by the PP.
FCS_CKM.1/KEK	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] FCS_CKM.4	All of FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.4, and FCS_COP.1 are required by the PP.
FCS_CKM.2	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.4 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_CKM.4	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1]	FCS_CKM.1 is required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4	FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.4 is required by the PP.
FCS_COP.1/Hash	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.4 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_COP.1/HMAC	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.4 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_COP.1/KAT	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.4 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.

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SFR	Dependencies	Rationale Statement
FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.4 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.4 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_COP.1/SigVer	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.4 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_COP.1/SKC	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.4 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	FCS_COP.1	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP.
FCS_SLT_EXT.1	FCS_RBG_EXT.1	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 is required by the PP.
FCS_STG_EXT.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FCS_STG_EXT.2	FCS_COP.1	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP.
FCS_STG_EXT.3	FCS_CKM.1 FCS_COP.1 FCS_STG_EXT.2	FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1, and FCS_STG_EXT.2 are all required by the PP.
FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1 is required by the PP.
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.1	FDP_ACC.1 and FMT_MSA.1 are required by the PP.
FDP_ETC_EXT.2	FCS_COP.1	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP.

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SFR	Dependencies	Rationale Statement
FDP_FRS_EXT.1	FDP_FRS_EXT.2	FDP_FRS_EXT.2 is an optional SFR in the PP. It does not need to be required because the PP's definition of FDP_FRS_EXT.1 allows the ST author to specify that no factory reset is possible, in which case the behavior described by FDP_FRS_EXT.2 is not triggered.
FDP_ITC_EXT.1	FCS_COP.1 [FTP_ITC_EXT.1, FTP_ITE_EXT.1, or FTP_ITP_EXT.1]	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP. FTP_ITC_EXT.1, FTP_ITE_EXT.1, and FTP_ITP_EXT.1 are each selection-based SFRs in the PP but the PP's definition of FDP_ITC_EXT.1 requires at least one of them to be selected so the dependency is always addressed.
FDP_ITC_EXT.2	FCS_COP.1 [FTP_ITC_EXT.1, FTP_ITE_EXT.1, or FTP_ITP_EXT.1]	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP. FTP_ITC_EXT.1, FTP_ITE_EXT.1, and FTP_ITP_EXT.1 are each selection-based SFRs in the PP but the PP's definition of FDP_ITC_EXT.1 requires at least one of them to be selected so the dependency is always addressed.
FDP_MFW_EXT.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FDP_RIP.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FDP_SDC_EXT.1	FCS_CKM.1	FCS_CKM.1 is required by this PP.
FDP_SDI.2	No dependencies.	N/A
FIA_AFL_EXT.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FIA_SOS.2	No dependencies.	N/A
FIA_UAU.2	FIA_UID.1	This dependency is not present in the PP because all of the methods used to access the TSF (physically protected channels, encrypted data buffers, or cryptographically protected data channels) all implicitly identify the subject that is attempting to authenticate to the TOE. Therefore, it is not necessary to include a separate SFR that requires subjects to be identified.
FIA_UAU.5	No dependencies.	N/A
FIA_UAU.6	No dependencies.	N/A

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SFR	Dependencies	Rationale Statement
FMT_MOF_EXT.1	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1 is required by this PP.
FMT_MSA.1	[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1	FDP_ACC.1 and FMT_SMF.1 are required by the PP. FMT_SMR.2 is hierarchical to FMT_SMR.1 and is required by the PP.
FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1	FMT_MSA.1 is required by the PP. FMT_SMR.2 is hierarchical to FMT_SMR.1 and is required by the PP.
FMT_SMF.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FMT_SMR.2	FIA_UID.1	This dependency is not present in the PP because all of the methods used to access the TSF (physically protected channels, encrypted data buffers, or cryptographically protected data channels) all implicitly identify the subject that is attempting to authenticate to the TOE. Therefore, it is not necessary to include a separate SFR that requires subjects to be identified.
FPT_FLS.1/FI	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_MOD_EXT.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_PHP.3	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_PRO_EXT.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_ROT_EXT.1	FPT_PRO_EXT.1	FPT_PRO_EXT.1 is required by this PP.
FPT_ROT_EXT.2	FPT_PRO_EXT.1	FPT_PRO_EXT.1 is required by this PP.
FPT_RPL_EXT.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_STM.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_TST.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FRU_FLT.1	FPT_FLS.1	FPT_FLS.1 (as FPT_FLS.1/FI) is required by the PP.

Table 18: SFR Dependencies Rationale for Mandatory SFRs

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SFR	Dependencies	Rationale Statement
FCS_ENT_EXT.1	FCS_RBG_EXT.1	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 is required by this PP.
FCS_RBG_EXT.2	FCS_RBG_EXT.1	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 is required by this PP.
FPT_ITT.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_PRO_EXT.2	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_ROT_EXT.3	FCS_COP.1 FPT_PRO_EXT.1 FPT_ROT_EXT.1	All of FCS_COP.1, FPT_PRO_EXT.1, and FPT_ROT_EXT.1 are required by this PP.

Table 19: SFR Dependencies Rationale for Optional SFRs

SFR	Dependencies	Rationale Statement
FCS_CKM.1/AK	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] FCS_CKM.4	All of FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.4, and FCS_COP.1 are required by the PP.
FCS_CKM.1/SK	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] FCS_CKM.4	All of FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.4, and FCS_COP.1 are required by the PP.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5	FCS_CKM.1 FCS_COP.1 FDP_SDC_EXT.1	All of FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1, and FDP_SDC_EXT.1 are required by the PP.
FCS_COP.1/PBKDF	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.4 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FDP_DAU.1/Prove	No dependencies.	N/A
FDP_FRS_EXT.2	FDP_FRS_EXT.1	FDP_FRS_EXT.1 is required by the PP.
FDP_MFW_EXT.2	FDP_MFW_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1	FDP_MFW_EXT.1 and FCS_COP.1 are required by the PP.
FDP_MFW_EXT.3	FDP_MFW_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1	FDP_MFW_EXT.1 and FCS_COP.1 are required by the PP.
FIA_AFL_EXT.2	FIA_AFL_EXT.1	FIA_AFL_EXT.1 is required by the PP.

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SFR	Dependencies	Rationale Statement
FPT_FLS.1/FW	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_RPL.1/Rollback	No dependencies.	N/A
FTP_CCMP_EXT.1	FCS_COP.1	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP.
FTP_GCMP_EXT.1	FCS_COP.1	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP.
FTP_ITC_EXT.1	FCS_COP.1	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP.
FTP_ITE_EXT.1	FCS_COP.1	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP.
FTP_ITP_EXT.1	No dependencies.	N/A

*Table 20: SFR Dependencies Rationale for Selection-Based SFRs*

## Appendix F: Glossary

Term	Meaning
Access	In the context of SDOs, access to an SDO represents the list of actions permissible with an SDO, including its generation, use, modification, propagation, and destruction.
Administrator	A type of user that has special privileges to manage the TSF.
Attestation	The process of presenting verifiable evidence describing those characteristics that affect integrity. Examples of these characteristics are boot firmware and boot critical data which, combined, describe the way the DSC booted. [SA]
Attributes	Indications of characteristics or properties of the SDEs bound in an SDO.
Authorization Value	Critical data bound to an action by itself or to action on a subject. Such data, when presented to the TOE, authorizes the action by itself or authorizes the action on or with the subject respectively.
Authorization Data	Collective term for authentication tokens and authorization values.
Authentication Token	Critical data bound to a user. Such data, when presented to the TOE and successfully verified by it, authenticates the user. The TOE may use the successful authentication of a user as an authorization to execute an action on its behalf.
Authenticator	A shortened name for Authentication Token.
Boot Critical Data	Critical data that persists across power cycles and determines characteristics of the DSC. Examples of boot critical data can be DSC configuration settings, certificates, and the results of measurements obtained by the RoT for measurement.
Boot Firmware	The first firmware that executes during the boot process.
Chain of Trust	A Chain of Trust is anchored in a RoT and extends a trust boundary by verifying the authenticity and integrity of successive components before passing control to those components. [SA]
Client Application	Entity who relies on the services provided by the platform or DSC.

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Term	Meaning
Data Encryption Key	An encryption key, usually for a symmetric algorithm, that encrypts data that is not keying material.
Integrity	Assurance of trustworthiness and accuracy.
Immutable	Unchangeable.
Key Encryption Key	An encryption key that encrypts other keying material. This is sometimes called a key wrapping key. A KEK can be either symmetric or asymmetric.
Known Answer Tests (KATs)	Test vectors or data generated to determine the correctness of an implementation.
Operator	Human being who has physical possession of the platform on which the DSC is located. [GD]
Owner	Human being who controls/manages the platform on which the DSC is located. May be remote. [GD]
Platform	A platform consists of the hardware and firmware of a computing entity.
Pre-installed SDO	An SDO installed on the DSC by the manufacturer. The SDO consists of an SDE and attributes, which if not explicitly expressed in a data structure, are implicit based on the functions that have exclusive access to the SDE.
Privileged Function	Functions restricted to the role of administrator, which may include, but are not limited to, provisioning keys, provisioning user authorization values, de-provisioning user authorization values, provisioning administrator authorization values, changing authorization values, disabling key escrow, and configuring cryptography.
Protected Data Blob	Data in an encrypted structure that protects its confidentiality or integrity (as required by the context in which it is used).
Protected Storage	Protected Storage usually refers to DSC hardware used to store SDEs or SDOs, and provide integrity protection for all items and confidentiality for those items that require it. Protected Storage may also refer to storage external to the DSC, which is usually encrypted by keys maintained by the DSC's internal protected storage capabilities.
Protections	Mechanisms that ensure components of a DSC (executable firmware code and critical data) remain in a state of integrity and are protected

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Term	Meaning
	from modification outside of authorized, authenticated processes and entities. [NIST-ROTM]
Remote Secure Channel	Logical channel to the DSC from a remote entity, which cryptographically protects the confidentiality and integrity of the channel content.
Root Encryption Key	An encryption key that serves as the anchor of a hierarchy of keys.
Root of Trust (RoT)	A RoT performs one or more security specific functions; establishing the foundation on which all trust in a system is placed. [NIST-ROTM]
RoT for Authorization	(As defined by [GP_ROT]) The RoT for Authorization provides reliable capabilities to assess authorization tokens and determine whether or not they satisfy policies for access control.
RoT for Confidentiality	(As defined by [GP_ROT]) The RoT for Confidentiality maintains shielded locations for the purpose of storing sensitive data, such as secret keys and passwords.
RoT for Integrity	(As defined by [GP_ROT]) The RoT for Integrity maintains shielded locations for the purpose of storing and protecting the integrity of non-secret critical security parameters and platform characteristics. Critical security parameters include, but are not limited to, authorization values, public keys, and public key certificates.
RoT for Measurement	(As defined by [GP_ROT]) The RoT for Measurement provides the ability to reliably create platform characteristics.
RoT for Reporting	(As defined by [GP_ROT]) The RoT for Reporting reliably reports platform characteristics. It provides an interface that limits its services to providing reports on its platform characteristics authenticated by a platform identity.
RoT for Storage	A RoT that acts as the RoT for Confidentiality and the RoT for Integrity.
RoT for Update	A RoT responsible for updating the firmware.
RoT for Verification	A RoT responsible for verifying digital signatures.
Security Data Element (SDE)	A Critical Security Parameter, such as a cryptographic key or authorization token.

Term	Meaning
Security Data Object (SDO)	An SDO may include one or more SDEs. SDOs bind SDEs with a set of attributes.
Symmetric Encryption Key	A value intend to input as a key to a symmetric encryption algorithm, such as AES.
System	A system consists of the platform hardware and firmware in addition to the higher-level software running on top of it (kernel, user-space processes, etc.).
Trusted Local Channel	Physical channel to the DSC within the platform of which the DSC is a part, which is protected by the operational environment to ensure confidentiality and integrity.
User	An administrator or client application.

*Table 21: Glossary*

See [CC1] for other Common Criteria abbreviations and terminology.

## Appendix G: Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CA	Client Application
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CCM	Counter with CBC-Message Authentication Code
CCMP	CCM Protocol
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DAR	Data-At-Rest
DEK	Data Encryption Key
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EEPROM	Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
FQDN	Fully Qualified Domain Name
GCM	Galois Counter Mode
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IP	Internet Protocol

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Acronym	Meaning
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
KEK	Key Encryption Key
KMAC	KECCACK Message Authentication Code
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS	Operating System
PBKDF	Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PP	Protection Profile
RA	Registration Authority
RBG	Random Bit Generator
REK	Root Encryption Key
ROM	Read-only memory
RSA	Rivest Shamir Adleman Algorithm
SDE	Security Data Element
SDO	Security Data Object
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SK	Symmetric Key or Symmetric Encryption Key
SPI	Security Parameter Index
SSH	Secure Shell
ST	Security Target
TLS	Transport Layer Security

Acronym	Meaning
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSS	TOE Summary Specification
USB	Universal Serial Bus

*Table 22: Acronyms*

## Appendix H: References

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