Maintenance Report

Turkish Standards Institution

Common Criteria Protection Profile for Application Firmware of Secure Smartcard Reader for National Electronic Identity Verification System (SSR_PP)
EAL 4+ (ALC_DVS.2)

TSE-CCCS/PP-010-MR-01

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1. Introduction

The Protection Profile identified in this report was assessed according to the Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements, version 2.1, June 2012 and the Impact Analysis Report (IAR). The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report, the Protection Profile and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the Turkish Standards Institution under TSE-CCCS/PP-010.

The certified TOE is:

- “Common Criteria Protection Profile for Application Firmware of Secure Smartcard Reader for National Electronic Identity Verification System”, v2.5

The changed TOE is:

- “Common Criteria Protection Profile for Application Firmware of Secure Smartcard Reader for National Electronic Identity Verification System”, v2.7
2. Description of Changes

The change to the Protection Profile has no effect on assurance. The identification of the maintained Protection Profile is indicated by a new version number compared to the certified one.

The change is not significant from the standpoint of security, however Configuration Management procedures required a change in the version number from Common Criteria Protection Profile for Application Firmware of Secure Smartcard Reader for National Electronic Identity Verification System v2.5 to Common Criteria Protection Profile for Application Firmware of Secure Smartcard Reader for National Electronic Identity Verification System v2.7.

Changes within the Protection Profile are described below:

- Correction on T.EPP_Comm Rationale on Section 4.5 Security Objectives Rationale
- Correction on FPT_IDA.1 definition on Section 5.1.1 FPT_IDA.1 Imported TSF Data Authentication
- Correction on FPT_SSY.1 definition on Section 5.3.1 FPT_SSY State Synchronization
- Correction on FAU_GEN.1 definition on Section 6.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 – Audit Data Generation
- Correction on FIA_AFL.1 definition on Section 6.1.3.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
- Correction on FMT_MTD.1 definition on Section 6.1.5.4 FMT_MTD.1/DTN Management of TSF data – Device Tracking Number
- Correction on FMT_SMF.1 definition on Section 6.1.5.6 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
- Correction on FDP_ETC.2 definition on Section 6.1.7.5 FDP_ETC.2 Export of User Data with Security Attributes
- Correction on OT.IVA_Confidentiality_Authentication rationale on Section 6.4.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale and 6.4.2 Table 17 SFR Rationale Table for TOE on SSR Type 1 without Biometric Sensor and External PIN Pad
- Correction on OT.ID_Verification Policy_Authentication rationale on Section 6.4.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale and 6.4.2 Table 17 SFR Rationale Table for TOE on SSR Type I without Biometric Sensor and External PIN Pad
- Correction on OT.OCSP_Query_Verify rationale on Section 6.4.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale and 6.4.2 Table 17 SFR Rationale Table for TOE on SSR Type I without Biometric Sensor and External PIN Pad
- Correction on OT.TOE_Upgrade rationale on Section 6.4.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale and 6.4.2 Table 17 SFR Rationale Table for TOE on SSR Type I without Biometric Sensor and External PIN Pad
- Correction on OT.Cert_Upgrade rationale on Section 6.4.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale and 6.4.2 Table 17 SFR Rationale Table for TOE on SSR Type I without Biometric Sensor and External PIN Pad

3. Affected Developer Evidence

The Protection Profile Document is affected by the changes described in the previous section. In the following developer documentation of TOE is updated:

- Common Criteria Protection Profile for Application Firmware of Secure Smartcard Reader for National Electronic Identity Verification System v2.7

4. Conclusion

The change to the TOE has no effect on assurance. Consideration of the nature of this/these change/s leads to the conclusion that it is classified as a Minor Change and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

Therefore, the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report 21.0.03/15-002-MR-01 is maintained for this version of the Protection Profile by TSE CCCS.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report 21.0.03/15-002, 03.12.2015.
5. References


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