

Certification Report

BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016

for

**Common Criteria PP Configuration
Machine Readable Electronic Documents -
Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission
Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP]**

developed by

Federal Office for Information Security

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Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik

Deutsches

erteilt vom



IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016

Common Criteria Protection Profile

Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP]

developed by Federal Office for Information Security

Assurance Package claimed in the Protection Profile:

Common Criteria Part 3 conformant

EAL 4 augmented by

ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5

Valid until 06 September 2026



SOGIS Recognition
Agreement



The Protection Profile identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the Protection Profile and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.



Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement

Bonn, 07 September 2016

For the Federal Office for Information Security

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A Certification

1 Preliminary Remarks

Under the Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSIG), the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products as well as for Protection Profiles (PP).

A PP defines an implementation-independent set of IT security requirements for a category of products which are intended to meet common consumer needs for IT security. A PP claimed by a user, consumer or stakeholder for IT gives them the possibility to express their IT security needs without referring to a special product. Product certifications can be based on Protection Profiles. For products which have been certified based on a Protection Profile an individual certificate will be issued but the results from a PP certification can be re-used for the Security Target evaluation within a product evaluation when conformance to the PP has been claimed.

Certification of the Protection Profile is carried out on the instigation of the BSI or a sponsor. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the Protection Profile according to Common Criteria [1]. The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself. The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

2 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSIG)¹
- BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance²
- BSI Schedule of Costs³
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
- BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-Produkte) [3], including PP Certification
- BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14⁴ [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408

¹ Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

² Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231

³ Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

⁴ Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007

- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
- Internal procedure for the issuance of a PP certificate

3 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same Protection Profile in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on CC - under certain conditions was agreed. Therefore, the results of this evaluation and certification procedure can be re-used by the product certificate issuing scheme in the evaluation of a Security Target within a subsequent product evaluation and certification procedure.

3.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level up to and including Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E 3 (basic), and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical domains only. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations involved.

Details on recognition, technical domains and the agreement itself can be found at <http://www.sogisportal.eu>.

3.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

The international Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) became effective in September 2014 in its current version. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-products based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP). In certain cases certificates issued during a transition period until September 2017 are recognised up to EAL 4.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations involved.

Details on recognition and the agreement itself can be found at <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

4 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP] has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.

The evaluation of the Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP] was conducted by the ITSEF T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 23 August 2016. The ITSEF T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)⁵ recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is:

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

5 Validity of the certification result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the Protection Profile as indicated.

In case of changes to the certified version of the Protection Profile, the validity can be extended to new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified Protection Profile, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

The validity of this certificate ends as outlined on the certificate. The applicant and the sponsor of this certificate are recommended to review the technical content of the Protection Profile certified according to the evolvement of the technology and of the intended operational environment of the type of product concerned as well as according to the evolvement of the evaluation criteria. Such review should result in an update and a re-certification of the Protection Profile accordingly. Typically, technical standards are reviewed on a five years basis.

The limitation of validity of this PP certificate does not necessarily impact the validity period of a product certificate referring to this Protection Profile, but the certification body issuing a product certificate based on this Protection Profile should take it into its consideration on validity.

6 Publication

The Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP] has been included in the BSI list of the certified Protection Profiles, which is published regularly (see also Internet: <https://www.bsi.bund.de> and [4]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

The Certification Report may be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

⁵ Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

B Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

- the certified Protection Profile,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

1 Protection Profile Overview

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the

- Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP], identified with BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016, Version 0.9.2, 18.08.2016 [6].

A Protection Profile Configuration is equivalent to a standard Protection Profile.

This PP Configuration is defined in Chapter 8 of [6] and is based on a PP module and one base PP.

The module is

- Common Criteria PP-Module Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates), identified with [MR.ED-ON-PP-Module] and defined in Chapter 2 to 7 of [6].

The base PP is

- Common Criteria Protection Profile, Machine-Readable Electronic Document based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use [MR.ED-PP], BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-2016-MA-01, Version 2.0.3, 18.06.2016 [10].

The concept of PP Configurations, Modules and base PPs is specified in [11].

The Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP] [6] is established by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik as a basis for the development of Security Targets in order to perform a certification of an IT-product, the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The TOE described in the Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP] is a smartcard programmed according to Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03110-1 [8] and TR-03110-2 [9]. The TOE additionally has the ability to update its TOE software during the life-cycle phase “operational use” by an update mechanism. The smartcard contains multiple applications (at least one). The programmed smartcard is called an electronic document as a whole. Here, an application is a collection of data(groups) and their access conditions. The TOE uses the following user data:

- EAC1-protected data, sensitive user data protected by EAC1 (cf. [8]),
- EAC2-protected data, sensitive user data protected by EAC2 (cf. [9]), and
- all other (common) user data, other user data protected by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE, cf. also [9]).

Applications considered in [9] are an electronic passport (ePass) application, an electronic identity (eID) application, and a signature (eSign) application. The Protection Profile Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP] [6] however does not make any assumptions on what kind of applications, and how many applications are included.

The TOE comprises at least:

- the circuitry of the chip, including all integrated circuit (IC) dedicated software that is active in the operational phase of the TOE,

- the IC embedded software, i.e. the operating system,
- all access mechanisms, associated protocols and corresponding data,
- one or several applications, and
- the associated guidance documentation.

The following TOE security features are the most significant for its operational use: The TOE ensures that

- only authenticated terminals can get access to the user data stored on the TOE and use security functionality of the electronic document,
- the electronic document holder can control access by consciously presenting his electronic document and/or by entering his secret PIN,
- authenticity and integrity of user data can be verified,
- confidentiality of user data in the communication channel between the TOE and the connected terminal is provided,
- inconspicuous tracing of the electronic document is averted,
- its security functionality and the data stored inside are self-protected, and
- digital signatures can be created, if the TOE contains an eSign application.

The assets to be protected by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP are defined in [6], chapter 4.1.1. Based on these assets the security problem definition is defined in terms of assumptions, threats and organisational security policies. This is outlined in [6], chapter 4.4, 4.2 and 4.3.

These assumptions, threats and organisational security policies are split into security objectives to be fulfilled by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP and security objectives to be fulfilled by the operational environment of a TOE claiming conformance to this PP. These objectives are outlined in [6], chapter 5.

The Protection Profile [6] requires a Security Target based on this PP or another PP claiming this PP to fulfil the CC requirements for strict conformance.

2 Security Functional Requirements

Based on the security objectives to be fulfilled by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP Configuration the security policy is expressed by the set of security functional requirements (SFR) to be implemented by a TOE. It covers the following issues:

- Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
- Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
- Class FDP: User Data Protection
- Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channels
- Class FAU: Security Audit
- Class FMT: Security Management
- Class FPT: Protection of the Security Functions

These TOE security functional requirements are outlined in [6], chapter 7.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the SFR claim is called:

Common Criteria Part 2 extended

3 Assurance Requirements

The TOE security assurance package claimed in the Protection Profile is based entirely on the assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria. Thus, this assurance package is called:

Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5

(for the definition and scope of assurance packages according to CC see part C or [1], part 3 for details).

4 Results of the PP-Evaluation

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the assurance components of the classes APE and ACE.

The following assurance components were used:

APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ACE_MCO.1 PP-module consistency
ACE_CCO.1 PP-configuration consistency

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Protection Profile as defined in chapter 1.

5 Obligations and notes for the usage

The following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the Protection Profile:

-None-

It is recommend to the user to consider the application notes to gain additional information and specific explanations.

6 Protection Profile Document

The Protection Profile Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP][6] is being provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.

7 Definitions

7.1 Acronyms

AIS	Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG	BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAC	Extended Access Control
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PACE	Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SF	Security Function
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality

7.2 Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type.

Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance.

TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.

8 Bibliography

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
<http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>
- [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
<http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>
- [3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), <https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung>
- [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE⁶.
- [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also on the BSI Website[
- [6] Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP], Version 0.9.2, BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016, Federal Office for Information Security, 18.08.2016
- [7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3, 23.08.2016, Evaluation Technical Report BSI-CC-PP-0090-2016, T-Systems GEI GmbH (confidential document)
- [8] BSI: TR-03110-1 - Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents. Part 1 - eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, v2.10, Federal Office for Information Security, 20 March 2012
- [9] BSI: TR-03110-2 - Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents. Part 2 - Extended Access Control Version 2 (EACv2), Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), and Restricted Identification (RI) v2.10, Federal Office for Information Security, 20 March 2012
- [10] Common Criteria Protection Profile, Machine-Readable Electronic Document based on BSI TR-03110 for Official Use [MR.ED-PP], BSI-CC-PP-0087-V2-2016-MA-01, Version 2.0.3, 18.06.2016, BSI
- [11] Common Criteria, CC and CEM addenda, Modular PP, Version 1.1, August 2014, CCDB-2014-03-001

⁶ specially

- AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema

C Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

Annex A: Protection Profile Common Criteria PP Configuration Machine Readable Electronic Documents - Optionales Nachladen (Optional Post-Emission Updates) [MR.ED-ON-PP] [6] provided within a separate document.

Note: End of report