Certification Report

BSI-CC-PP-0116-2021

for

PP-Configuration Mobile Device Management – Trusted Server (MDM-TS) complemented with PP-Module Trusted Communication Channel (TCC), Version 1.0

developed by

Federal Office for Information Security

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BSI-CC-PP-0116-2021

Common Criteria Protection Profile

PP-Configuration Mobile Device Management – Trusted Server (MDM-TS) complemented with PP-Module Trusted Communication Channel (TCC)

Version 1.0

developed by Federal Office for Information Security

Assurance Package claimed in the Protection Profile:

Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by ALC FLR.3

3rd October 2031 valid until



SOGIS Recognition Agreement

The Protection Profile identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the Protection Profile and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.



Recognition Arrangement

Bonn, 4 October 2021 For the Federal Office for Information Security

Sandro Amendola Head of Division



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A Certification

1 Preliminary Remarks

Under the Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSIG), the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products as well as for Protection Profiles (PP).

A PP defines an implementation-independent set of IT security requirements for a category of products which are intended to meet common consumer needs for IT security. A PP claimed by a user, consumer or stakeholder for IT gives them the possibility to express their IT security needs without referring to a specific product. Product certifications can be based on Protection Profiles. For products which have been certified based on a Protection Profile an individual certificate will be issued but the results from a PP certification can be re-used for the Security Target evaluation within a product evaluation when conformance to the PP has been claimed.

Certification of the Protection Profile is carried out on the instigation of the BSI or a sponsor. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the Protection Profile according to Common Criteria [1]. The evaluation is usually carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself. The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

2 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSIG)¹
- BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance²
- BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs³
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
- BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-Produkte) [3], including PP Certification
- BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1⁴ [1] also published as ISO/ IEC 15408
- Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
- Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
 - BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-Gesetz) dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365

 Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045

- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
- Internal procedure for the issuance of a PP certificate

3 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same Protection Profile in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on CC - under certain conditions was agreed. Therefore, the results of this evaluation and certification procedure can be re-used by the product certificate issuing scheme in the evaluation of a Security Target within a subsequent product evaluation and certification procedure.

3.1 European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level up to and including Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 4, and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical domains only. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.

Details on recognition, the signatory nations, technical domains and the agreement itself can be found at https://www.sogis.eu.

3.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

The international Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) became effective in September 2014 in its current version. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-products based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.

Details on recognition, the signatory nations and the agreement itself can be found at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.

Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007

4 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The PP-Configuration Mobile Device Management – Trusted Server (MDM-TS) complemented with PP-Module Trusted Communication Channel (TCC), Version 1.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.

The evaluation of the PP-Configuration Mobile Device Management – Trusted Server (MDM-TS) complemented with PP-Module Trusted Communication Channel (TCC), Version 1.0 was conducted by the ITSEF Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH (Bonn). The evaluation was completed on 29 September 2021. The ITSEF Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH (Bonn) is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)⁵ recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Federal Office for Information Security.

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

5 Validity of the certification result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the Protection Profile as indicated.

In case of changes to the certified version of the Protection Profile, the validity can be extended to new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified Protection Profile, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

For the meaning of the CC concepts and terms please refer to CC [1] Part 1 for the concept of PPs, to CC [1] Part 2 for the definition of Security Functional Requirements components (SFR) and to CC [1] Part 3 for the definition of the Security Assurance Components, for the class AVA Vulnerability assessment and for the cross reference of Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) and assurance components.

The validity of this certificate ends as outlined on the certificate. The applicant and the sponsor of this certificate are recommended to review the technical content of the Protection Profile certified according to the evolvement of the technology and of the intended operational environment of the type of product concerned as well as according to the evolvement of the evaluation criteria. Such review should result in an update and a recertification of the Protection Profile accordingly. Typically, technical standards are reviewed on a five years basis.

The limitation of validity of this PP certificate does not necessarily impact the validity period of a product certificate referring to this Protection Profile, but the certification body issuing a product certificate based on this Protection Profile should take it into its consideration on validity.

6 Publication

⁵ Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

The PP-Configuration Mobile Device Management – Trusted Server (MDM-TS) complemented with PP-Module Trusted Communication Channel (TCC), Version 1.0 has been included in the BSI list of the certified Protection Profiles, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

The Certification Report may be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

B Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

- the certified Protection Profile,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

1 Protection Profile Overview

The PP-Configuration Mobile Device Management – Trusted Server (MDM-TS) complemented with PP-Module Trusted Communication Channel (TCC), Version 1.0 [6] is established by the Federal Office for Information Security as a basis for the development of Security Targets in order to perform a certification of an IT-product, the Target of Evaluation (TOE).

The PP-Configuration Mobile Device Management – Trusted Server (MDM-TS) complemented with PP-Module Trusted Communication Channel (TCC), Version 1.0 describes as TOE type the server part of a mobile device management (MDM) solution in a configuration with additional Trusted Communication Channel (TCC). MDM is the centralized management of mobile devices such as smartphones, tablets, and notebooks within a corporate network. It therefore represents an essential part of Enterprise Mobility Management (EMM) and Unified Endpoint Management (UEM) systems. The purpose of MDM is to ensure the security and functionality of mobile devices in accordance with corporate policies, but also to protect the corporate network from unauthorized access.

The certification covers the PP configuration identified as PP-Configuration Mobile Device Management – Trusted Server (MDM-TS) complemented with PP-Module Trusted Communication Channel (TCC), Version 1.0. The Protection Profile identified as Mobile Device Management Trusted Server (MDM-TS), BSI-CC-PP-0115, Version 1.0 [8] is referenced as a base protection profile in this configuration. The certification of the base protection profile is not in scope of this certification.

Since the PP-Configuration Mobile Device Management – Trusted Server (MDM-TS) complemented with PP-Module Trusted Communication Channel (TCC) refers to the base protection profile, the assets to be protected are defined in the base protection profile [8]. The PP-Module defines one additional threat in respect to the security problem definition, which is outlined in chapter 3.1 of the PP-Module [6]. Also, additional security objectives for the TOE are outlined in chapter 4.1 of the PP-Module [6].

The PP configuration [6] requires a Security Target based on this PP configuration or another PP claiming the PP configuration to fulfil the CC requirements for strict conformance.

2 Security Functional Requirements

Based on the security objectives to be fulfilled by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP configuration the security policy is expressed by the set of security functional requirements (SFR) to be implemented by a TOE. It covers the following policies:

- Security Audit
- Information Flow Control
- User Data Protection
- Identification and Authentication
- Management of Security Attributes

- Trusted Path
- Mobile device management functions

The PP-Module [6] introduces additional major security features of the TOE for establishing and using trusted communication channels which protect user and TSF data in transit between external entities and the TOE.

These TOE security functional requirements are outlined in the PP-Module [6], chapter 6.1, and in the base PP [8], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus, the SFR claim is called:

Common Criteria Part 2 extended

3 Assurance Requirements

The TOE security assurance package claimed in the Protection Profile is based entirely on the assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria. Thus, this assurance package is called:

Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL4 augmented by ALC FLR.3

(for the definition and scope of assurance packages according to CC see [1], part 3 for details).

4 Results of the PP-Evaluation

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the assurance components of the class ACE (Protection profile Configuration evaluation).

ACE INT.1 PP-Module introduction

ACE CCL.1 PP-Module conformance claims

ACE SPD.1 PP-Module security problem definition

ACE OBJ.1 PP-Module security objectives

ACE ECD.1 PP-Module extended components definition

ACE REQ.1 PP-Module security requirements

ACE_MCO.1 PP-Module consistency

ACE CCO.1 PP-Configuration consistency

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Protection Profile as defined in chapter 1.

5 Obligations and notes for the usage

The following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the Protection Profile:

none.

In the Protection Profile Configuration, references are made to a base Protection Profile (see [8]), which is currently under subject to a different certification. The base Protection Profile thus is not in scope of this certification.

6 Protection Profile Document

The PP-Configuration Mobile Device Management – Trusted Server (MDM-TS) complemented with PP-Module Trusted Communication Channel (TCC), Version 1.0 [6] is being provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.

7 Definitions

7.1 Acronyms

AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme

BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for

Information Security, Bonn, Germany

BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security

CCRA Common Criteria Recognition ArrangementCC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation

CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation

EAL Evaluation Assurance Level

EMM Enterprise Mobility Management

ETR Evaluation Technical Report

IT Information Technology

ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

MDM Mobile Device Management

PP Protection Profile

SAR Security Assurance Requirement

SF Security Function

SFP Security Function Policy

SFR Security Functional Requirement

ST Security Target

TOE Target of Evaluation

TSF TOE Security Functionality

UEM Unified Endpoint Management

7.2 Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type.

Protection Profile Configuration - Protection Profile composed of Base Protection Profiles and Protection Profile Module.

Protection Profile Module - Implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base Protection Profiles.

Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance.

TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.

8 Bibliography

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017 Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017 Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017 https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
- [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017 https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
- [3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
- [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE⁶.
- [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also on the BSI Website

AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema

⁶ specially

[6] PP-Configuration Mobile Device Management Trusted Server (MDM-TS) complemented with PP-Module Trusted Communication Channel (TCC), Version 1.0, 2021-09-27, Federal Office for Information Security

- [7] Evaluation Technical Report Summary, Version 1.0, 2021-09-28, Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH (confidential document)
- [8] Protection Profile Mobile Device Management Trusted Server (MDM-TS), Version 1.0, 2021-09-27, Federal Office for Information Security

C Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

Annex A: PP-Configuration Mobile Device Management – Trusted Server (MDM-TS)

complemented with PP-Module Trusted Communication Channel (TCC),

Version 1.0 [6] provided within a separate document.

Note: End of report